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Keywords:

Social Sciences, Arts & Humanities, Communication, Linguistics, Language & Linguistics, Philosophy, Pragmatics, Conditionals, Rhetoric, Inferential, Epistemic, Reductio ad Absurdum, 1702 Cognitive Sciences, 2202 History and Philosophy of Specific Fields, 2203 Philosophy, 5003 Philosophy

Abstract:

Inferential or epistemic conditional sentences represent a blueprint of someone's reasoning process from premise to conclusion. Declerck and Reed (2001) make a distinction between a direct and an indirect type. In the latter type the direction of reasoning goes backwards, from the blatant falsehood of the consequent to the falsehood of the antecedent. We first present a modal reinterpretation in terms of Argumentation Schemes of indirect inferential conditionals (IIC's) in Declerck and Reed (2001). We furthermore argue for a distinction between epistemic-modal strong and deontic-modal weak IIC's. In addition, we extend the category of the indirect inferential conditionals in order to include several other deontic-modal subtypes. On the basis of the undesirability of the consequent the hearer in these cases infers that the antecedent is also undesirable. In this way the rhetoric-argumentative strategy of Reductio ad Absurdum is extended from the realm of deductive reasoning to that of practical reasoning. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.