Author:

Keywords:

Maatschappelijk onbehagen, Etnopopulisme, Ressentiment, Etnocentrisme, Politiek cynisme, Extreemrechts stemgedrag

Abstract:

This study is dedicated to two main topics. First, we develop a theory of the relationship between late modernity, resentment, ethno-populism and democracy. The goal is a general diagnosis of contemporary society that explores the implications of the crisis of organized modernity: where social resentment is coming from; how populists are able to respond to this resentment; and how populism is related to liberal democracy. Second, we investigate how social resentment can be conceptualized and which mediating role it plays in the explanation of the relationship between structural positions on the one hand and cultural and political attitudes as well as extreme right-wing voting on the other hand. This investigation consists of a conceptual and empirical component. The conceptual part defines the concept of social resentment and its measurable aspects as well as the composing attitudes of the ethno-populist complex. The empirical part follows a step by step quantitative approach investigating empirically the relationship between structural positions, feelings of resentment, cultural attitudes, political discontent and extreme right-wing voting. Part I describes the transition from organized modernity to liquid modernity. Globalization and individualization are seen as the centrifugal processes that undermine the traditional cultural classifications, the social contract and the political identities of the post-war society. Particularly, we examine the effects of the crisis of organized modernity on the economical and political systems and on the everyday life. The proposition is that contemporary society is characterized by a de-closure of the social contract, the cultural compromise and the political cleavages of organized modernity. We argue that the processes of globalization and individualization are undermining the established principles of integration and demarcation linked to the bounded structuring inherent to the national and pillarized class society. This results in resentment and new cultural and socio-economic conflicts of integration versus demarcation that could be mobilized by political challengers. In part II we argue that populism is structurally embedded in the crisis of organized modernity and formulate the hypothesis that populist parties mobilize the social resentment of the losers of modernization. In this study we address the question of the genesis of social resentment and its relationship to populist attitudes and voting behaviour. The proposition is that social change will lead more likely to feelings of disintegration, relative deprivation and social injustice, which combined with powerlessness are the belt drive of resentment. In empirical terms, we operationalize four latent constructs: ontological insecurity, economic insecurity, discrimination and powerlessness. The second proposition is that resentment go together with adjusted schemes of perceptions, appreciation and action, and is resulting more likely – partly driven by cultural and political mobilization – in an ethno-populist habitus masterfully expressed in the slogan of ‘our own people first’ as a combination of nativism, authoritarianism, populism and welfare particularism. The crux of ethno-populism is that its discourse of ‘our own people first’ is responsive to the feelings of disintegration, relative deprivation and powerlessness of the discontented natives, while the populist revanchism as a form of dualistic discursive closure succeed to scapegoat the ‘cultural Other’ and the political establishment as the origin of all problems and as the enemies of the people as a substantial community (ethnos) and as the absolute sovereign body (demos). In part III, proposed theories are empirically tested by examining to what extent and how structural positions and feelings of resentment have an effect on the anti-immigrant and authoritarian attitudes, on political discontent and on extreme right-wing voting in an urban context. The empirical analysis is based on quantitative and qualitative data gathered in Antwerp: (a) data of a face-to-face survey of 938 Antwerp citizens in 1999; (b) a qualitative study of 76 in-depth interviews conducted in 2004 in Antwerp, Schoten and Brasschaat. In both studies, the respondents were interviewed about their neighbourhood, their everyday life, their attitudes towards immigrants, social order and politics as well as their voting behaviour and motives. The main results are as follows. First, the feelings of resentment are a consequence of a growing dissociation of collective interests, identity and power since the feelings of disintegration, relative deprivation and powerlessness are the most meaningful experiences of the losers of modernization. Second, the study emphasizes both the close relationship between resentment and ethno-populism, as well as the social stratification of the feelings of resentment and the cultural and political attitudes. In fact, contemporary resentment is structurally embedded in the fragile position of the unskilled subjects in the meritocratic society, while resentment goes difficult together with cultural tolerance and political trust. Particularly, relative deprivation, powerlessness and pessimism have an effect on the constituent attitudes of the ethno-populist complex. These results indicate that the ethno-populist worldview of the unskilled positions and their preference for demarcation is strongly associated with conflicts over collective interests, identity and power as a consequence of the changing group positions and power balances in liquid modernity. Third, the electoral space in Antwerp is divided by educational level and structured by new cultural and political conflicts along the integration versus demarcation nexus. Although the new political identities are strongly rooted in the structural conflict of educational level, it does not mean that Vlaams Belang could be described as a party of only losers characterized by resentment since the party attracts also highly-skilled subjects embedded in a culture of contentment. Nevertheless, a common characteristic is the moderate to radical position in terms of attitudes and/or ideology at the (new) demarcation versus integration conflicts. A lot of Vlaams Belang voters tend more or less towards authoritarian nativism, antagonistic cynicism and particularistic solidarity, but at the same time, the recruiting base of successful radical right parties goes beyond the radical positions since the party allows to attract also more moderate voters who are not cynical, but in the first place sceptical about the current cultural and political order. Our argument is that the electoral success of radical right parties depends on the degree that they can forge an electoral coalition of both radical rebels as well as moderate innovators. The so-called rebels are convinced voters whose worldview is closely connected to the ethno-populist ideology: they advocate a populist realism and they agree with the program, the party leadership and populist style of Vlaams Belang. The so-called moderate innovators or signal voters are sceptical about the de-structuring and de-bounding of organized modernity: they put the ‘Other’ not as a radical enemy apart, but they want first and foremost political change, while also being sceptical to the party programme, the party leadership and the populist style of the radical right party. In case of the Vlaams Belang in Antwerp (1999), the electoral coalition consisted of a ratio of 40% radical rebels and 60% moderate innovators. Our conclusion is that the vote to Vlaams Belang is attitudinally related and/or ideologically embedded, but it does not mean that the whole electorate has to be homogenized to the radical part or the mean party voter. It appears that successful radical right achieve an electoral coalition of committed voters and signal voters as reflected in our study. Part IV considers populism as a type of political mobilization, style and ideology. First, we propose to define populism as a thin-centred ideology which advocates the sovereign rule of the people as a homogeneous body. Next, we argue that the populist interpretation of political representation could be described as a triangle where the people and the leader are the horizontal axis, each in an antagonistic relationship to the establishment. Since the people-as-one is the central reference, the interpretations of ‘the people’ makes it possible to distinguish different types of populism, like ethno-populism, civic populism and economic populism. In our study we focus on the variant of ethno-populism that locates the popular will in an ethnic substance. Then, the relationship between populism and democracy is disentangled. Our proposition is that the fixation of populism on a substantial and homogeneous body of the people is in conflict with the democratic logic which argues that the locus of power can no longer be embodied by anyone, but has to remain an empty place. Finally, we develop a concentric containment model for dealing with political extremism based on the twofold requirement of tracking and filtering. We argue thatthe containment policy, which listens to extremist voters and simultaneously puts unremitting civilising pressure on extremist parties, is not only desirable from a normative point of view; as shown by the empirical findings concerning the successes and failures of actual containment strategies, but the twofold concentric approach, including, if necessary, a cordon sanitaire around the extremist party, might also turn out to be the most effective one. In the last chapter, we try to determine how Flemish citizens think about the cordon sanitaire using the results of in-depth interviews. The results show that public opinion is based on pragmatism, strategy and principles. The pragmatic vision depends on citizen’s definition of the party and citizen’s assessment of the risks associated with the participation to government, while principled arguments are dependent of the fundamental meaning of democracy.