Author:

Keywords:

Social Sciences, Industrial Relations & Labor, Business & Economics, FACTORIAL SURVEYS, VOLUNTEER WORK, PAY, EDUCATION, SEARCH, UNEMPLOYMENT, EMPLOYERS, DURATION, VIGNETTE, WOMEN, 1402 Applied Economics, 1503 Business and Management, 1801 Law, Industrial Relations, 3505 Human resources and industrial relations, 3801 Applied economics

Abstract:

© 2019 The Regents of the University of California We investigate the signalling effect related to participation in active labor-market programs. To this end, we conduct an experiment in which human resources professionals make hiring decisions concerning fictitious job candidates who apply either under a job-vacancy referral system or directly. We provide first causal evidence for a substantial adverse effect of referral on the probability of being hired. In addition, we find that employers perceive referred candidates as being less motivated than other candidates.