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Abstract:

Recurring solutions to software engineering problems are often captured in patterns, which describe, in a generic but reusable manner, a specific problem and a corresponding solution. This thesis develops a deeper understanding about how pattern catalogs can help a software architect to reconcile the software's requirements and the architecture in the context of security. To achieve this goal, we follow an empirical approach.Two aspects of development are taken into account, namely (1) the construction of the software, and (2) its evolution over time. An analysis of the security patterns landscape shows that sufficient security patterns exist for the construction of secure software, but organization is needed to make them more usable. With a controlled empirical experiment, we investigate the effect of such organization from the viewpoint of the software architect.Regarding patterns for secure co-evolution, we observe that no patterns have been defined. Therefore, we propose a framework for precisely describing such patterns (called change patterns), together with a process for applying them. We illustrate the concepts with patterns for handling evolving trust requirements and access control. The approach is validated by means of two empirical studies, and implemented in a proof of concept tool.