Does Pride in the Nation Foster Participation?

Evaluating the Link between National Identity and Political Engagement across 29 European Societies

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Abstract:
This paper aims to understand the relationship between national pride and mass political participation, a central ingredient of democracy. Although the benefits and drawbacks of national pride for the functioning of democracy have been much debated, so far little empirical research has been conducted in this area. In this paper, we suggest that the effect of patriotism should depend on what *kind* of participation is at issue. National identity implies adherence to prescriptive group norms, which encourage certain types of political participation, most importantly voting, in order to be a 'good' national, but discourage other types perceived as less legitimate. Second, we argue that pride in the national group promotes participation through feelings of solidarity and trust, as well as external political efficacy, which encourage collective behaviour. Third, we explore whether cultural diversity and terrorist attacks trigger the association between national identity and political participation. Using data from the 2008 European Values Study, we find support for the first two hypotheses, though inconsistent evidence for the third.

Keywords: National identity, political participation, social identity theory, multilevel analysis, European Values Study

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1. Introduction

National identity, typically (though not exclusively) viewed through the prism of pride and other measures of attachment to one's nation, is often seen as a prerequisite for a functioning democracy. Without a sense of belonging, an emotional attachment and a certain degree of pride in the country, why would citizens support governmental policies and participate in politics? Although dissenting voices point to the exclusionary danger of hard-edged nationalism, there is a general acknowledgment among policy-makers and social scientists that 'nation-building' – in the sense of crafting a vibrant political community wherein citizens respect each other and institutions of government, and participate actively in democratic politics – is essential for maintaining a healthy democracy. For example, political elites in many European countries, including France and Great Britain, have recently emphasized the need for a common national identity to restore disrupted social ties in contemporary diverse societies. Consequently, many policies are aimed at stimulating national identity: citizenship classes at school, integration programs for immigrants, investment in national sports, and so on.

However, from a more theoretical standpoint it is not necessarily clear why a strong national attachment should encourage democratic participation. The (in)famous paradox of participation suggests that it is not rational for any individual to participate in politics when the costs of doing so outweigh the expected benefits. Clearly, a group defined by its national borders is a very large group and in democracies we can hardly argue coercion or material rewards – prototypically Olsonian solutions to collective action problems (1965: 2) – will explain political participation. That said, authors since Olson have argued that under certain conditions even large groups can overcome collective action problems without material incentive or coercion. One such condition is the strength of the collective identity. Accordingly, studies such as Huddy and Khatib (2007) argue that the strength of individuals' national identity predicts their political engagement. However, these studies have failed to empirically explore mechanisms driving this relationship, thus leaving many questions unanswered. Moreover, given their focus on "legitimate" acts of participation (mainly voting), we have yet to understand the other side of the coin: if national identity encourages sanctioned forms of participation, will it also *discourage* more "untraditional" acts? Finally, they fail to recognize that a national identity is only one among a multitude of identities, and that in order for it to impact on behaviour it needs to be activated. We should therefore not only study exactly how, but also under what conditions national attachment predicts collective action.

In this paper we employ public opinion data from 29 countries included in the 2008 European Values Study in order to provide a better insight into the relationship between the affective component of national identity – national pride – and political participation. First and foremost, we argue that the relationship between pride and participation does indeed depend on the *kind* of

participation at issue: national pride is (in accordance with previous studies) positively associated with 'institutionalised' forms of political activity. Conversely, pride appears *negatively* related to engagement through extra-institutional means (such as protest behaviour). Second, beyond mapping the simple correlation between pride and different facets of political behaviour, we explore a number of different questions about what kinds of predispositions *mediate* the relationship, and under what circumstances it is stronger of weaker. In terms of the former, we argue that national pride should promote participation through feelings of solidarity and trust, which encourage collective behaviour. Third, we further argue that a positive attachment to the nation will more strongly impact on willingness to engage in, or abstain from, certain types of collective behaviour when the cultural integrity or safety of the national group is threatened.

2. Literature Review

2.1. The Paradox of Participation

Public goods – i.e. goods of which "one person's consumption (…) does not reduce the amount available to anyone else" and for which "it is impossible to prevent relevant people from consuming" (Hardin 1982: 17) – produced and maintained through political engagement include election outcomes, legislative decisions (e.g. Leighley 1995; Whiteley and Seyd 1996), and even the stability of democracy itself (Downs 1957). Public goods arise within group contexts whereby the "maximization of short-term self-interest" (Ostrom 1998: 1) implies that the individual costs of contributing towards the production or maintenance of a public good outweigh the shared expected benefits from the good. This results in the "paradox of participation:" rational individuals will not participate in politics (i.e.: vote, protest, join political parties, etc.) because it is unlikely that they will significantly influence the production or maintenance of the public good.

This "paradox of participation" has shown to be a function of group size (for overviews, see: Ostrom 1998; Sally 1995), as the original Olson argument posits that the problem of collective action can only be overcome in small groups or when coercion or (material) selective incentives are applied (1965: 2). On this logic, groups spanning entire nations should not be able to provide public goods in the absence of material selective incentives or coercion. However, results from experimental as well as survey research also show that a strong group identity facilitates public-good provision, even in large groups, and consequently collective identity is seen by some as an alternative to material incentives (e.g. Poletta and Jasper 2001: 284).

A group, of which group identities originate from, can exist simply because it is imagined to exist, as it is nothing more than "a collection of individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same social category" (Tajfel and Turner 1979: 40, quoted in Hogg and Turner 1985: 52). Likewise, the nation – the focus in our paper – is one of the textbook examples of such an "imagined

political community" consisting out of members that "will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (Anderson 1991: 6). Despite modernization's enabling of multiple and overlapping identities,[1] the cardinal role of the nation-state in peoples' political self-definition remains secure even today; it is the source of both intense group loyalty and identity, and it remains the dominant object of democratic political legitimacy (e.g. Brubaker 2004). As Anthony Smith writes: "[national identifications] are vivid, accessible, well established, long popularized, and still widely believed, in broad outline at least" (1992: 62).

A widely-held premise emerging from the "primacy" of national identification is that a strong affective attachment to one's country – through, for example, feelings of national pride and patriotism – can serve as a kind of panacea to many of the ills contemporary democracies face. For one thing, it increases the likelihood that citizens will place trust in both their fellow citizens and the institutions of government (Miller 1995). A sense of collective identity also engenders the prioritization of group welfare over individualism in decision making (Kramer and Brewer 1984). Finally, from the perspective of intergroup relations, the existence of a strong overarching national identity can mitigate competition between societal subgroups (e.g., Gaertner and Dovidio 2000; Transue 2007). For our purposes here, however, the key argument is that those who are strongly attached to their nation will be more likely to conform to its social and political norms (Huddy and Khatib 2007). Because norms in modern democracies generally encourage political participation, national identity should foster collective action and will thereby help to overcome this public-good dilemma.

Yet, at this point several questions remain: (1) if national identity encourages participation in normatively sanctioned and encouraged political activities (e.g. voting), does it also *discourage* participation in less widely-endorsed activities? (2) What specific mechanisms explain *why* national identity should result in more collective action? (3) To what extent is the relationship between pride and participation context-specific?

2.2. Prescribed Norms of Political Participation

In this paper, we define political participation as voluntary activities by ordinary people directed towards influencing, directly or indirectly, political outcomes at various levels of the political system (see, e.g.: Brady 1999: 737; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995: 38-9).[2] Political participation has shown to take many forms, among one of the most persistent distinctions is that between

[1] See, e.g.: Citrin and Sears (2009); Deaux (1996); Dower (2003); Falk (1994); Inglehart (1997); Norris (2000); Roccas and Brewer (2002); Stryker and Statham (1985); Tajfel (1978); Vertovec and Cohen (2002).

[2] Central to this definition is *acting*. Consequently, membership in (political) organizations and any (expressions of) political attitudes or orientations are excluded.

conventional (established, institutional forms of political action) and unconventional (extra-institutional, direct forms of political action) participation (Barnes et al. 1979). The general argument for why we would expect a relationship between national identity and different modes of political participation builds on the notion that, even though a strong group identity will foster collective action and will thereby help to overcome public-good dilemmas, the association depends upon the norms governing conventional and unconventional participation. This distinction matters for us because conventional participation is widely encouraged in democratic societies; as Huddy and Khatib point out, the established political act of voting in particular is seen as an important normative behaviour for a 'good' citizen (2007: 65). On the other hand, unconventional political acts are by nature aimed at challenging the political establishment and, in their most extreme form, the legitimacy of political institutions themselves. Citizens organize and sign petitions, participate in boycotts, block traffic, strike, demonstrate, damage property, paint slogans, and so on at far lower rates than they vote (Teorell, Torcal and Montero 2007), in part because of their ascribed 'illegitimacy' (Barnes et al. 1979) and their conflictual, anti-establishment nature.

Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) (Turner 1985; Turner et al. 1987) predicts that group behaviour is explained by a shift in "self-perception from self-categorization in terms of personal identity to self-categorization in terms of social identity" (Turner 2006). This entails that for individuals for whom group membership is an important contributor to their personal self-identity, the perceived behavioural norms of the group are positively related to their behavioural intentions, and ultimately to their actual behaviour (Terry, Hogg and White 1999). It was on this basis that Huddy and Khatib (2007) hypothesized and discovered that individuals with a strong national identity will be more likely to adhere to the (prescriptive) norm of being a good citizen by participating in conventional acts of participation (in their case political interest and voter turnout). We see little reason to question either their intuition or their empirical findings, and thus our first hypothesis is that national identity has a positive effect on conventional political participation (H1). But by the same token, assuming that "unconventional" acts do not hold the same kind of normative prestige as, say, voting, and may indeed be widely *proscribed* rather than *prescribed* in democratic societies, national identity should have the opposite effect. In this case SCT would lead us to take a step beyond previous work and suggest that national identity has a *negative* effect on unconventional political participation (H2).

2.3. The Mechanism: Explaining the Identity-Participation Link

Beyond making the distinction between conventional and unconventional political participation as we do here, the scholarly literature has made little effort to disentangle the mechanisms that explain how national identity fosters the participation of citizens in political

activities. Most extant work in the area draws heavily (as our discussion above illustrates) upon various social-psychological models of identity in explaining collective action (for an overview, see Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears 2011: 2). However, beyond simply leveraging basic theory to generate expectations regarding the relationship between national identity and participation, no research, as far as we know, has empirically tested the proposed *mechanisms* underlying the relationship. In this section and the one that follows, we closely examine Social Identity Theory (SIT) and its offshoot SCT in order to tease out specific expectations.

In its most basic form, SIT suggests that individuals are motivated to achieve and maintain a positive social identity (Tajfel 1974). This motivation leads individuals to make social comparisons between their in-group and out-groups with the aim of reaching an evaluation of their social group as both positive (e.g. of high status), and distinct (Hogg and Turner 1985: 52; Tajfel 1974; Taylor and Moghaddam 1994). Individuals will attribute more positive personal characteristics to their fellow in-group members than to members of the out-group, and will allocate more resources to them (for an early review, see Brewer 1979). Fellow group members tend to be evaluated more favourably, seen for instance as "friendlier, more trustworthy, and more honest" (Caporael et al. 1989: 693). Individuals are also more loyal to fellow in-group members, and more concerned about their well-being (ibid.; Hunt and Benford 2010: 439). In this sense, solidarity is seen as a natural extension of a collective identity. In sum, the need to achieve and maintain a positive social identity tends to result in positive feelings towards in-group members, among which social trust and feelings of solidarity, which, in turn enable collective action. This line of argument is nicely summed up by Brewer and Kramer (1986: 545):

> "Inclusion within a common social boundary acts to reduce social distance among group members, making it less likely that they will make sharp distinctions between their own and others' welfare. Thus whether individuals respond prosocially to a social dilemma may depend on whether they think of themselves as single and autonomous individuals or whether, in contrast, they regard themselves as sharing membership in and identification with a larger aggregate or social unit. (…) These findings suggest that the potentially deleterious effects on collective outcomes of increasing group size may be overridden when collective identity is high." (1986: 545).

According to SIT then, we can expect that the association between national pride and political participation is mediated by feelings of trust (H3) and solidarity (H4). In practice, this means that we expect that the hypothesized positive association of national identity on conventional participation becomes smaller, while the expected negative association of identity on unconventional participation renders more negative.

Second, in order to partake in collective action in general and political participation in particular, individuals also need to believe that the collective action will be likely to result in the relevant goals being achieved (Klandermans 1984). This belief will depend on their perception of the

responsiveness of the political system: if individuals perceive the democratic system as responsive, they are more likely to perceive conventional political acts as an appropriate means of reaching their goal. However, if individuals are disillusioned with politics, they are likely to opt for more direct or unconventional forms of political action in order to obtain their desired outcome (Pollock 1983). It makes sense to expect that the association between pride in one's national group and political participation is mediated by the perception of a responsive national political system and trustworthy political leaders (H5).

As a final mediating factor we consider political interest, which is regarded as one of the most potent predictors of political participation (e.g. Milbrath 1965; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Following Huddy and Khatib (2007), we expect that those who show pride in their nation also show greater interest in the political institutions and structure of their nation-state. We expect that those who are only marginally interested in politics will focus their efforts not on political participation, but on a different type of collective action. Thus, we expect that the association between national identity and political engagement is mediated by political interest (H6). Once again, this signifies that the expected positive effect of identity on conventional forms of participation is reduced, while the hypothesized negative effect of identity on unconventional participation repertoires turns more negative.

2.4. The Triggers of the Identity-Participation Association

A national identity is only one among a multitude of identities. In order for it to impact on behaviour it needs to be activated. In particular threats are said to raise the salience of in-group/out-group distinctions, sharpening both individuals' preference for in-group conformity and their tendency to negatively stereotype "outsiders".[3] Moreover, ever since Key (1949) there have been arguments put forward that in the presence of a threat, individuals will be more likely to participate in politics. Most prominent evidence has been given by Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior (2004), who argue that a context in which the salience of threats is increased among those already predisposed to distinguish between their national in-group and ethnic out-groups, and precisely act upon this distinction; this makes that patriots are more likely to be engaged in politics. Yet drawing upon the distinction between conventional and unconventional participation and the predescribed norms that support them, two opposing causal mechanisms might be invoked.

On the one hand, an external threat might increase social categorization. Based on SCT, this would mean that in the face of a threat, those who strongly identify with the nation-state will be more likely to act according to the behavioural norms of the nation-state. Assuming that threat


[3] For examples, see: Branscombe 1999; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Huddy et al. 2002; Huddy et al. 2005; Kam and Kinder 2007; Marcus et al. 1995; Reynolds and Turner 2001.

would strengthen social categorization and thus strengthen the association between national pride and political participation, the hypotheses are that the positive effect of pride on conventional participation increases in diverse societies (H7a), while the negative effect of pride on unconventional participation becomes even more negative in the face of a threat (H8a). To be more concrete, while the findings of Sniderman, Hagendoorn & Prior (2004) support this mechanism, we think that especially a threat that sparks a common in-group, like a terrorist attack, is able to resort in this ameliorating effect.

On the other hand, however, recent research has pointed out that not all threat situations might increase categorization. Recent evidence suggests that threats imposed by cultural heterogeneity might restrict social categorization, making that even proud citizens might nevertheless be less likely to take over the predescribed norms of the group, i.e. the nation-state. Empirical evidence suggests that diversity brings out "the turtle in all of us" (Putnam 2007): residents of diverse contexts exhibit lower levels of civic engagement. While evidence across Europe is not consistent in this respect (Hooghe et al. 2009; Gesthuizen et al. 2009), from this research stream we nevertheless derive the hypothesis that a threat context might also erode social categorization, and thus cushions the association between national pride and political participation. This means that we can expect that in a context of threat, there is a weaker positive association between pride in one's nation and conventional participation (H7b) and a weaker negative association between national pride and unconventional engagement (H8b).

To facilitate the comprehensibility of this paper, Figure 1 provides in a conceptual diagram of our research set-up. First of all, we will look at the direct effect of national pride on conventional and unconventional political participation. In a second step, we are interested to see the extent to which these effects can be explained by theoretically relevant mediators. In the third step we research whether a context of threat, and more precisely of ethnocultural diversity and terrorism, are able to moderate the association between national identity and conventional and unconventional participation.

Figure 1. Conceptual Diagram of the Analysis of the Relation between National Identity and Political Participation



3. Data and Methodology

To estimate the effect of national identity on political participation, we analyse the 2008 wave of the European Values Study (EVS). This cross-national survey project has been carried out in more than 40 European countries, comprising the EU member states as well as several post-Soviet societies. The EVS is unique among cross-national surveys in that it contains measures relevant to both national identity and various forms of political participation. In this paper, we restrict ourselves to the 29 countries that are a member of the EU and/or an OECD,[4] as these are the counties usually classified as advanced liberal democracies. The data set is limited to citizens of the respective surveyed countries. After listwise deletion of missing cases, 33,579 respondents, or approximately 1,158 respondents per country have been retained.[5]

3.1. Dependent Variables

Much of our analysis relies on distinguishing 'conventional' from 'unconventional' participation. As an indicator of the former we use the propensity to vote,[6] the most institutionalised

[4] These 29 countries include Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

[5] The original sample comprised 40,671 respondents, which means that 17.4 respondents are left out due to missing information. This mainly has to do with missings on the dependent variables (6.8 for conventional participation and 3.0 percent for unconventional participation) as well as national pride (3.7 percent).

[6] Critical readers might oppose this measurement of the propensity to vote, as it does not measures whether one indeed voted in the last election - i.e. actual behaviour -, but rather departs from the hypothetical situation of an election the

of all conventional acts. Our measure consists of the item "If there was a general election tomorrow, can you tell me if you would vote?" with as offered response categories 'no' (0) and 'yes' (1).[7] Our measure of unconventional participation distinguishes individuals by whether (a) they have done, (b) might do, or (c) would never do at least one of the following: (1) signing a petition, (2) joining in boycotts, and (3) attending lawful demonstrations. For per country descriptive statistics of the dependent variable, we refer to Appendix Table A1.

3.2. Independent Variables

The independent variable of central importance in this paper is the affective dimension of national identity, i.e. national pride. Measures of affective national identity (variously treated as 'pride', patriotism, nationalism, and variants thereof) sit alongside other facets of national identity, including self-categorization and what many refer to as its 'normative boundaries' (e.g. Citrin and Sears 2009; Reeskens and Wright 2011; Theiss-Morse 2009; Wright 2011a, 2011b). The interplay between these different dimensions remains understudied, but we emphasize pride because affect is what has predominantly concerned those interested in participation (e.g. Huddy and Khatib 2007). National pride is measured using the question "How proud are you to be a [country] citizen, offered with a four-category response scale, ranging from 'not at all proud' to 'very proud'.[8]

As we are also interested in exploring the potentially mediating effects of trust and social solidarity on the association between national pride and forms of political participation, we will include first of all a variable measuring social trust in the model, derived from the standard dichotomous item "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?", with the 'can't be too careful' response as reference. Secondly, as a measure for social solidarity with co-nationals, we include responses to the question "To what extent do you feel concerned about the living conditions of your fellow countrymen?" ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). Third, to measure the perceived responsiveness of the political system, we include political trust, namely a means scale of trust in parliament, political parties and trust in government. Fourth, we include political interest, measured using the single item

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following day. Sadly, no other question on voting was asked. Moreover, while this measure is fraught with problems when wanting to measure actual voting behaviour, our argument means that we are more interested in normative behaviour - whether individuals in principle think they should and would vote.

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[8] There is a debate in the literature over how affective national attachments should be measured, with some claiming that "pride" as measured here connotes an ideological bias (e.g. Huddy and Khatib 2007). The EVS limits our ability to address this issue with the care that it deserves; nevertheless, we do control for ideology and other relevant covariates (see below) in order to mitigate against this possibility.

"How interested would you say you are in politics", ranging from 'not at all interested' (1) to 'very interested' (4).

At the national level, first of all, an estimation of the share of foreigners is introduced as a measure for the immigrant diversity of a country. We will use estimated 2008 figures, obtained by a linear interpolation of the 2005 and 2010 shares of foreign-born data statistics of the United Nations Population Division. Other studies have fruitfully employed the U.N. figures we use here (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010; Wright 2011a; 2011b), and they correlate quite closely with estimates from the O.E.C.D. and other international organizations used in other research (e.g. Stolle et al. 2009). As for data on terrorism, we have consulted the Global Terrorism Database of the University of Maryland (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2010) and have recoded whether the countries in our study have been the target of terrorist attacks in the year prior to the date the survey was fielded. For descriptive statistics of the country variables, we refer to Appendix Table A2.

3.3. Control Variables

As we are interested in the unique effects of the proposed independent variables, we also include a range of socioeconomic controls (e.g. Almond and Verba 1963; Barnes et al. 1979; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). First, people with a higher degree are more likely to be politically active than individuals with no or basic education. Educational level is operationalized as no or lower education (the reference category), lower secondary, higher secondary and tertiary education. Next, regarding work status, the expectation is that compared to the employed (the reference category) the unemployed will be less engaged, while students will be more active. Third, people with a higher income are expected to exhibit higher levels of political participation. Income is measured with a harmonised indicator measuring monthly household income.

In addition, we also control for gender, and the (curvilinear) effect of age. Men (our reference category) tend to participate more in most forms of political participation, due to their higher level of resources and political engagement (Lane 1959; Teorell, Sum and Tobiasen 2007; Topf 1995; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Older individuals (but not the very old) are said to participate more in conventional types of participation due to an accumulation of resources, rising pay-offs of participation and an increased integration into the community (Duch 1988; Teorell, Sum and Tobiasen 2007), whereas younger individuals are said to participate more in unconventional types of participation because they have fewer career and family responsibilities, and more time to participate in these more energetic kinds of political activity (Barnes et al. 1979: 101). Moreover, younger generations are said to have become disillusioned with politics, encouraging more unconventional ways to influence politics (Inglehart 1997; Norris 2002). Finally, to help control for

our measure of national identity's (at least potentially) right-wing slant, we include political ideology (questioned with the classical left-right self-placement ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right)) in our models. To cope with considerable non-response on both the income (21.6 percent) and political ideology (20.4 percent), means substitution has been applied,[9] which implies that the ESS average value on respectively the income and the left-right scale is assigned to respondents with an item nonresponse and, in addition, a dummy variable is created that indicates whether the respondent has a missing value for the respective questions. For the descriptive statistics of these variables, we refer to Appendix Tables A3 and A4.

At the country level, we add one relevant control variable for both conventional and unconventional participation, based on previous research outcomes. As for conventional participation, research has shown that voter turnout is higher in countries where voting is compulsory (Blais 2006), which makes it required to add a dummy to the model that indicates in what countries people are obliged to cast their vote ('no compulsory voting' is reference). For unconventional participation, then, models show that non-institutionalised political activities are more common in economically prosperous societies (Inglehart 1997; Norris 2002). Figures for the gdp per capita of 2008 are obtained from the International Monetary Fund.

3.4. Methodology

In order to analyse the association between national identity and political participation, we employ logistic multilevel regression analysis (Hox 2010; Gelman and Hill 2006). This technique accounts for the clustered nature of the EVS data – sampled individuals nested within countries. Since our dependent variables are of the categorical kind, the Glimmix-procedure in SAS is used (Schabenberger 2005). As conventional participation measures voting propensity, we estimate the likelihood of voting compared to the response category 'not likely to vote' (reference). For unconventional participation, we estimate the effect of 'having done,' and 'might do' signed a petition, join in boycotts, and attend lawful demonstrations with 'would not do' (reference). In order to increase the readability of the tables, the T-values of the multinomial models are not printed but can be obtained upon request.

4. Results

4.1. The Impact of National Pride on Participation

In the first stage of the analysis, we look at the relationship between national pride and conventional (i.e. voting) and unconventional participation in a bivariate setting. Model 1a of Table 1

[9] The other alternative of multiple imputation was not considered, as the multilevel models are already quite demanding, and the variables of interest serve merely as control variables in our model.

shows, that for voting, the relationship to national pride is quite strong (b = 0.39, t = 20.07); in other words, individuals who are very proud to be a citizen of their respective country are about three times more likely to say that they would vote in the next elections compared to individuals who are not proud at all.[10] Model 1b, however, shows that for unconventional participation the direction of the effect is the opposite, with a strong negative effect of national pride on indicating to have engaged in an extra-institutional political activity (b = -0.22, t = -10.05), and a weaker negative but still significant effect of identity on the likelihood of expressing a willingness to engaged in one of the three unconventional forms of participation (b = -0.15; t = -6.84). Individuals who are very proud of their country are fifty percent less likely to be involved in unconventional activities compared to non-proud individuals, while they are almost one third less willing to engage in extra-institutionalised modes of participation. These findings provide some initial support for both Hypotheses 1 and 2.

National pride's contrasting relationship with conventional and unconventional participation partly survives the inclusion of controls intended to capture socioeconomic resources in Models 2.[11] For voting, the positive relationship appears largely unaffected (b = 0.38, t = 18.31). The controls do, however, cut the original bivariate parameter between national pride and having participated in unconventional activities of Model 1b almost in half (b = -0.12, t = -4.98), as well as reducing the magnitude of the parameter for the willingness to participate (b = -0.09; t = -3.72). Expressed in odds: those who are very proud are only 70 per cent as likely to have been involved in unconventional activities compared to those who are not -proud (when we hold socioeconomic status constant); while the willingness to engage in these activities has increased to 75 per cent.

In sum, these findings support Hypotheses 1 and 2, which suggested that individuals who are proud of their nation are more likely to participate in conventional forms of political participation (H1), but also *less* likely to participate in unconventional forms of political participation (H2). These findings indirectly support the argument that, depending on the perceived normative nature of the type of political act for being a 'good' citizen, national pride either encourages or discourages certain types of political participation.

[10] To calculate the odds ratios, we imputed the scale range (3) and the regression coefficient (0.38) in the equation P(vote|nonvote) = EXP(range*coefficient). Other odds ratios mentioned in this paper are calculated accordingly.

[11] Most of the control variables are significant and in the expected direction. Age has a curvilinear relation with voting propensity, as well as, unexpectedly, with unconventional participation. This latter finding can be explained by the fact that the questions on unconventional activities asked whether respondents had *ever* participated in such activities. Women are less politically active. Those with a higher diploma, and with a high income are also more likely to indicate that they would go out to vote or to be active in unconventional forms of participation. Compared to the employed, the unemployed are less politically active, while students are more politically involved.

Table 1. The Relation between National Identity and Political Participation

	Conventional Participation				Unconventional Participation			
	Model 1a		Model 2a		Model 1b		Model 2b	
Fixed Effects	**Param**	**T-Val**	**Param**	**T-Val**	**Have done**	**Might do**	**Have done**	**Might do**
Intercept	0.41*	2.48	-1.58***	-7.47	1.64***	1.04***	-0.45	0.84***
National pride	0.39***	20.07	0.38***	18.31	-0.22***	-0.15***	-0.12***	-0.09***
Age			0.05***	9.72			0.07***	0.01**
Age squared			-0.00***	-6.70			-0.00***	-0.00
Gender: Woman (Ref: Man)			-0.02	-0.74			-0.23***	-0.26***
Education								
- Lower secondary			0.04	0.76			0.40***	0.17**
- Higher secondary			0.36***	6.31			0.94***	0.39***
- Tertiary (Ref: Primary)			0.80***	12.19			1.62***	0.60***
Work status								
- Unemployed			-0.33***	-5.29			-0.14	-0.09
- Student			0.43***	5.52			0.59***	0.27**
- Retired			0.15**	2.66			-0.04	-0.04
- Other (Ref: Employed)			0.00	0.01			-0.29***	-0.19***
Income			0.07***	6.67			0.07***	0.03**
Nonresp dummy			-0.12**	-3.02			-0.25***	-0.20***
Left-right scale			0.02*	2.15			-0.06***	0.00
Nonresp dummy			-0.96***	-26.11			-0.94***	-0.53***
Random Effects	**Param**	**T-Val**	**Param**	**T-Val**	**Have done**	**Might do**	**Have done**	**Might do**
Country variance	0.67***	3.64	0.55***	3.61	1.89***	0.52***	1.58***	0.42***

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Note: Entries of the 'conventional participation' models represent the parameters obtained from two multilevel logistic regression models with 'not likely to vote' as reference. Entries of the 'unconventional participation' models represent parameters obtained from two multilevel multinomial regression models with 'would not do' as reference; due to space limitations, t-values of these models are not printed but can be obtained from the authors.

4.2. Exploring Potential Mediator Variables

In Models 3a and 3b of Table 2, social trust is added to assess whether the effect of national pride is mediated by social trust. Looking at the effect of social trust, we can observe that people who indicate that most people can be trusted are indeed more inclined to vote in the next elections also *more* likely to be active in other types of political activity, like signing a petition or joining an unlawful strike. In addition, the mediating effect of national pride by social trust is minimal. Both for voting (Model 3a) and unconventional participation (Model 3b), the magnitude of the effects of national pride remain unchanged after including social trust. A separate multilevel logistic model (available upon request) confirms that this is because national pride is only weakly related to social

trust (b = 0.04; t = 2.36). Thus, we fail to find support for the idea that social trust mediates the relationship between national pride and political participation (H3).

For social solidarity (Models 4a and 4b of Tables 2) there are similar effects with regard to stimulating both conventional and unconventional participation: people who are highly concerned about the living conditions of compatriots are about 1.5 times more likely to engage in conventional, as well as in unconventional political activities, than those respondents who show no concern. Moreover, there is no strong mediating effect of solidarity on the association between national pride and conventional political participation. Thus, we fail to find support for the idea that social solidarity mediates the relationship between national pride and political participation (H4).

For political trust (H5), the story is more nuanced. As we can see in Models 5a and 5b (Table 2), political trust indeed has different effects according to the type of participation. For conventional participation, political trust has a very positive effect (b = 0.59; t = 23.39). Individuals who are very trusting of the political elite are almost six times more likely to vote compared to those who have no trust in parties and government. Political trust has also a considerable mediating effect on the association between national pride and the propensity to vote, as the effect of national pride is cut by one fourth (from b = 0.38 to b = 0.30). This thus implies that proud citizens are more likely to cast their vote because they perceive the political system and their leaders as responsive. In contrast, as political trust plays little role in respondents' participation in unconventional acts (it only shows small positive effects on the likelihood to engage in these activities), it is also not able to mediate the relation between national pride and engaging in unconventional political activities.

Finally, in line with previous research, we confirm that political interest (models 6a and 6b of Table 2) shows very positive effects on political participation, People who are highly interested in politics are almost nine times more likely to cast their vote in the next elections (b = 0.73, t = 36.95) or have done unconventional political activities (b = 0.73, t = 36.36) compared to their fellow citizens who show no interest in politics. Because there is a positive effect of national pride on political interest (b = 0.04; t = 6.37), we can observe that the direct effect of national identity on conventional participation has shrunken slightly (from b = 0.38 to b = 0.37), yet, because this highly positive indirect effect of pride on unconventional participation through interest, the direct path has become more negative (from b = -0.12 to b = -0.16).

Table 2. The Mediating Role of Political and Social Attitudes on the Association between National Identity and Political Participation

Conventional PP	**Model 3a: Social Trust**		**Model 4a: Solidarity**		**Model 5a: Political Trust**		**Model 6a: Pol Interest**		**Model 7a: Integr Model**	
Fixed Effects	**Parameter**	**T-Value**	**Parameter**	**T-Value**	**Parameter**	**T-Value**	**Parameter**	**T-Value**	**Parameter**	**T-Value**
Intercept	-1.66***	-7.89	-1.80***	-8.39	-2.52***	-11.86	-2.54***	-11.43	-3.26***	-14.46
National pride	0.37***	18.09	0.37***	17.74	0.30***	14.32	0.37***	17.08	0.30***	13.96
Social trust	0.37***	9.99							0.25***	6.65
Solidarity			0.10***	6.17					0.02	1.07
Political trust					0.59***	23.39			0.45***	17.19
Political interest							0.73***	36.95	0.67***	33.42
Random Effects	**Param**	**Z**	**Param**	**Z**	**Param**	**Z**	**Param**	**Z**	**Param**	**Z**
Country variance	0.53***	3.61	0.55***	3.61	0.49***	3.60	0.61***	3.62	0.56***	3.61
Unconventional PP	**Model 3b: Social Trust**		**Model 4b: Solidarity**		**Model 5b: Political Trust**		**Model 6b: Pol Interest**		**Model 7b: Integr Model**	
Fixed Effects	**Have done**	**Might do**	**Have done**	**Might do**	**Have done**	**Might do**	**Have done**	**Might do**	**Have done**	**Might do**
Intercept	-0.52	0.82***	-0.76*	0.68**	-0.48	0.69**	-1.32***	0.48*	-1.32***	0.35
National pride	-0.12***	-0.09***	-0.13***	-0.09***	-0.12***	-0.10***	-0.16***	-0.12***	-0.15***	-0.13***
Social trust	0.37***	0.13***							0.31***	0.09*
Solidarity			0.14***	0.08***					0.09***	0.05**
Political trust					0.02	0.10***			-0.17***	0.00
Political interest							0.73***	0.40***	0.74***	0.39***
Random Effects	**Have done**	**Might do**	**Have done**	**Might do**	**Have done**	**Might do**	**Have done**	**Might do**	**Have done**	**Might do**
Country var	1.49***	0.41***	1.59***	0.42***	1.58***	0.41***	1.79***	0.48***	1.77***	0.47***

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. Note: All models are controlled for the respondent covariates of Models 2a and 2b of Table 1. Entries of the 'conventional participation' models represent the parameters obtained from two multilevel logistic regression models with 'not likely to vote' as reference. Entries of the 'unconventional participation' models represent parameters obtained from two multilevel multinomial regression models with 'would not do' as reference; due to space limitations, t-values of these models are not printed but can be obtained from the authors.

In sum, when looking at the integrated Models 7a and 7b of Table 2, we find some (albeit not overwhelming) evidence of the kinds of mediation posited in H3-H6. For conventional participation (Model 7a), the impact of national pride on voting propensity is reduced by almost 25 percent – mainly under influence of the mediating effect of perceptions of the responsiveness of the political system (political trust). Yet, this also means that 75 percent of the effect remains unexplained, and thus could result from either some other unmeasured mediating influence, or the fact that there is something inherent to positive affect toward the nation state that leads directly to participation. Nevertheless, in general, we found that social trust and solidarity are regarded as the key mediators in the relationship between national pride and political participation. The fact that we fail to find any support for their mediating effect, but do find some support for the role of political trust indicates that, rather than group identity, perceptions of the responsive of the national political system and its leaders might be central to explaining why national pride affects political engagement. For unconventional political participation, then, Model 7b shows that the effect becomes more pronounced, mainly due to the influence of political interest, meaning that the original effect of pride on political activities that are of a more normatively ambiguous nature in respect of being a 'good' citizen has been suppressed by related political attitudes. Likewise, the implication of this suppression mediation signifies that affective bonds with the nation oppose those political activities that challenge the political elite in an extra-institutionalised manner, giving additional evidence to hypothesis H2.

4.3. Exploring Cross-Level Interactions

The final test of the empirical exploration of the association between national identity and political participation consists of finding contextual triggers that strengthen or dampen the association. Before evaluating the cross-level interactions between both, we first explore the direct effects between national level variables and political participation. Confirming previous research, we find support for the positive effect of a context of compulsory voting on voting propensity, meaning that individuals in countries where casting a ballot is mandatory are three times more likely to cast their vote compared to citizens of countries where voting is not compulsory. Also, in wealthy societies, people are more likely to engage in unconventional forms of participation – a difference between countries of 10,000 euros in GDP per capita translates in a citizenry that is 3.7 times more likely to engage in unconventional political activities. On the other hand, for our independent variables of interest, namely the share of foreigners and terrorist activities, no direct effects on political participation are found. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that the country context does not moderate the association between national pride and participation.

The answer to whether living in a diverse context strengthens or weakens the link between national pride and political participation is not straightforward: while diversity does not affect the association between national identity and unconventional participation - meaning that proud citizens in countries with a large immigrant population are neither more or less likely to engage in extra-institutionalised forms of political action - we do find that diversity has a negative weak moderating effect on conventional participation. Proud citizens living in diverse societies are slightly less inclined to go to the polling booth than those living in more homogeneous societies. In predicted probabilities, proud citizens living in a country with 15 percent foreign-born residents are 2.2 times more likely to go to the polling booth, while they are 3 times more likely to cast their vote in countries with 5 percent immigrants. This finding gives support for hypothesis 7b, although only for conventional participation, while unconventional participation remains unaffected.

As for the moderating impact of terrorism, we see the opposite pattern. That is, living in a country where at least one terrorist activity occurred in the year before the EVS was fielded does not affect the association between national identity and conventional participation. However, there is a negative cross-level interaction between the event of terrorist activities and the effect of national pride on unconventional participation, providing support for H8a. In other words, especially in societies that have been the target of terrorist activities, proud citizens abstain from extra-institutionalised forms of political participation, lending support for hypothesis 8a. Turned into predicted probabilities, compared to citizens who are not proud, proud citizens in countries affected by terrorist activities are 50 percent less likely to engage in unconventional political activities, while they are one-fourth less likely to do so in countries without terrorist acts.

In other words, while we don't see consistent effects across both modes of political participation, a pattern nevertheless emerges. In line with previous studies, while diversity does not by itself sap the willingness to participate, it moderates the impact of national identity. In the face of increasing heterogeneity, the prediscribed norm of being a 'good' citizen becomes less apparent for conventional participation, making it for proud residents less appealing to cast their votes compared to unproud citizens. On the other hand, shocking events as terrorism seem to strengthen the prediscribed norm attached to unconventional participation, making proud citizens more likely to abstain from unlawful political activities compared to their unproud counterparts. The finding that the national context affects the association between national identity and modes of participation differently strengthens the finding that the distinction between conventional and unconventional participation is meaningful in the study of national identity.

Table 4. Country-Level Moderators of the Association between National Pride and Political Participation

	Conventional Participation Control: Compulsory voting		Unconventional Participation Control: GDP per capita	
Model 8	**Parameter**	**T-Value**	**Have done**	**Might do**
National pride	0.31***	11.15	-0.15***	-0.13***
Country-level control	1.12*	2.27	0.13***	0.06***
Share of foreigners	0.00	0.17	-0.02	-0.02
Terrorism	0.02	0.08	0.29	-0.11
Model 9	**Parameter**	**T-Value**	**Have done**	**Might do**
National pride	0.41***	8.60	-0.10	-0.08
Country-level control	1.11*	2.23	0.13***	0.06***
Share of foreigners	0.03	1.00	-0.01	0.00
Terrorism	-0.01	-0.02	0.28	-0.10
Foreigners*pride	-0.01*	-2.54	-0.01	-0.01
Model 10	**Parameter**	**T-Value**	**Have done**	**Might do**
National pride	0.34***	9.73	-0.09	-0.10**
Country-level control	1.15*	2.33	0.13***	0.06***
Share of foreigners	0.00	0.13	-0.02	-0.02
Terrorism	0.20	0.58	0.64	0.25
Terrorism*pride	-0.08	-1.48	-0.17*	-0.11*

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. Note: Entries are the result of six different regression models, controlling for the respondent covariates of Models 2a and 2b in Table 1, and the mediators of Models 7a and 7b of Table 2. Entries of the 'conventional participation' models represent the parameters obtained from two multilevel logistic regression models with 'not likely to vote' as reference. Entries of the 'unconventional participation' models represent parameters obtained from two multilevel multinomial regression models with 'would not do' as reference; due to space limitations, t-values of these models are not printed but can be obtained from the authors.

5. Conclusion

In this paper we set out to explore the relationship between the affective component of national identity – national pride – and mass forms of political participation, a central ingredient of democracy. Although the merits of national pride in fostering collective political behaviour have been much debated, little empirical research has examined the flipside of the argument (the impact of pride on unconventional participation, the specific causal linkage underpinning the relationship, or the circumstances under which this relationship is stronger or weaker.

Based on two different, but related, theories of group behaviour – Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory – we expected that individuals who express pride in their national group have higher levels of trust in and stronger feelings of solidarity with their fellow nationals and leaders, and are consequently more likely to follow prescriptive group norms encouraging certain types of political participation, most importantly voting, and discouraging others perceived as less legitimate. Our analyses found strong support for diverging effects of national pride, depending on the type of

participation, indirectly lending support to the argument of the importance of the perceived normative nature of the type of political act regarding being a 'good' citizen for choices in collective political behaviour. Thus, the relationship that we expected in Hypotheses 1 and 2 is strong and robust.

Evidence in support of the causal foundation of this relationship is somewhat less convincing. On the one hand, we did find evidence that trust in the political elite is of relatively large importance in explaining the relationship between national pride and the propensity to vote (Hypothesis 5). On the other, we were unable to explain much of the baseline relationship using the mediators here. What is more, in some cases (for the less institutionalized acts), the effects we found are better characterized as suppression rather than mediation. For instance, political interest appeared to play an important role (Hypothesis 6), yet the negative effect of pride only became more pronounced once it was taken into account.

Despite bringing in relevant mediators, a large share of the association between national identity and political participation remains, unexplained, leading to the conclusion that despite relevant mediating mechanisms, a strong affiliation has a unique impact on whether people engage in institutional or abstain from unconventional forms of political participation. This is an interesting finding, as it illustrates the importance of national identity as a distinct predictor of participation. Authors such as Klandermans (2010) have pointed to the importance of group identity in mobilizing individuals into participation. We show that such an identity can be based on nationality, however, a strong attachment to one's national identity leads only to those forms of participation that are generally perceived as legitimate, while it inhibits more unconventional forms of participation.

Beyond measurement, the possibility certainly exists that we have overlooked an alternative mechanism. For example, it is possible that both participatory behaviour, as well as national pride are an outcome of pre-adult socialization processes, and that the relationship between pride and participation simply reflects people who love their country doing what they have been taught to do (or refrain from – as the case may be – doing what they have been taught not to do) as good citizens. As such, the relationship between pride and participation would be spurious, and have little or nothing to do with trust in and/or solidarity with one's fellow nationals or national leaders. Although we have tried to take account of one of the most important factors in individuals' socialization – educational attainment – capturing the full extent of an individual's pre-adult experiences remains difficult.

As for the national context under which the relationship between national pride and political participation is stronger or weaker, we specifically hypothesized about factors that ought to erode or strengthen collective identity, namely ethnocultural diversity and terrorist attacks. While both do not have a direct impact on political participation, we nevertheless discovered that diversity weakens the

association between national identity and the propensity to vote. Alternatively, terrorist attacks make the association between national identity and unconventional participation more negative, making that proud residents of diverse societies are more likely to abstain from extra-institutionalised modes of participation than their unproud co-nationals. While these findings are not consistent across both modes of participation, there is nevertheless a great deal to expect that diversity erodes the collective identity, while terrorism strengthens it.

Keeping the limitation of our study in mind, namely that we have been unable to deploy a full list of mediators, as well as that given the cross-sectional design of the European Values Study we are unable to address reverse causality (that political participation strengthens the collective national identity), we have tried to take several tentative steps towards understanding what it is about national pride that leads to heightened (or suppressed) levels of political participation. The relationships, as we have shown, are complex: they depend on target behaviour, the national context, and the mechanisms driving the relationship are far from straightforward. To the extent that political engagement is a normative good valued by political elites and conducive to a healthy democracy, much terrain remains to be crossed before we can state with authority that promoting national identity is indeed a useful way of generating such a healthy democracy, and in what ways.

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Appendix

Table A1. Per-Country Descriptives of the Individual-Level Variables of Interest

		Conventional political participation		Unconventional political participation			
Country	N	Would not vote	Would vote	Won't do	Might do	Have done	National pride
Austria	1231	14.87	85.13	18.68	29.24	52.07	3.36
Belgium	1389	2.59	97.41	10.37	22.32	67.31	3.15
Bulgaria	1167	30.33	69.67	49.79	36.33	13.88	3.14
Cyprus	1,121	15.61	84.39	40.23	30.42	29.35	3.58
Czech Republic	1,281	32.08	67.92	29.82	34.11	36.07	3.18
Denmark	1,384	2.31	97.69	8.09	17.85	74.06	3.39
Estonia	1,096	25.73	74.27	38.05	34.12	27.83	3.14
Finland	894	9.96	90.04	7.83	33.89	58.28	3.49
France	1,410	10.21	89.79	7.16	19.93	72.91	3.26
Germany	1,579	19.25	80.75	11.72	25.84	62.44	2.91
Greece	1,272	10.38	89.62	37.97	31.53	30.50	3.61
Hungary	1,435	25.85	74.15	50.45	32.82	16.72	3.19
Iceland	707	12.73	87.27	2.69	34.51	62.80	3.54
Ireland	773	8.41	91.59	13.71	29.24	57.05	3.76
Italy	1,185	13.33	86.67	9.79	29.03	61.18	3.32
Latvia	1,049	23.93	76.07	28.31	43.57	28.12	3.08
Lithuania	885	33.11	66.89	30.96	51.07	17.97	2.94
Malta	1,195	8.54	91.46	31.55	28.62	39.83	3.69
Netherlands	1,414	11.03	88.97	15.21	30.76	54.03	3.11
Norway	995	9.85	90.15	3.22	20.00	76.78	3.51
Poland	1,071	33.05	66.95	25.96	48.09	25.96	3.45
Portugal	1,258	26.15	73.85	41.02	32.59	26.39	3.59
Romania	1,084	23.99	76.01	56.46	29.80	13.75	3.27
Slovak Republic	1,008	18.85	81.15	32.24	27.88	39.88	3.36
Slovenia	1,209	25.23	74.77	20.10	42.85	37.06	3.56
Spain	1,169	16.42	83.58	17.96	28.83	53.21	3.49
Sweden	807	3.10	96.90	1.49	12.64	85.87	3.34
Switzerland	913	27.27	72.73	8.65	15.77	75.58	3.30
United Kingdom	1,598	26.10	73.90	14.46	20.09	65.46	3.45
EVS	33,579	18.01	81.99	23.29	29.80	46.90	3.34

Note: Figures represent (1) the per country share of citizens who would vote in the next elections; (2) the per country share of citizens who has been done, might do or would not do unconventional political activities; (3) the mean score on national pride (on a 1-4 scale).

Table A2. Descriptives of the Country-Level Independent Variables

Country	Compulsory	GDP per capita	Diversity	Terrorism
Austria	0	39.889	14.96	1
Belgium	1	36.248	8.86	1
Bulgaria	0	13.192	1.36	0
Cyprus	1	29.024	16.06	1
Czech Republic	0	25.191	4.40	0
Denmark	0	37.376	8.40	0
Estonia	0	20.327	14.16	0
Finland	0	36.205	3.84	1
France	0	34.175	10.66	1
Germany	0	35.666	13.02	1
Greece	1	29.978	9.58	1
Hungary	0	19.413	3.54	0
Iceland	0	40.793	9.82	0
Ireland	0	41.827	17.68	0
Italy	0	30.412	6.52	1
Latvia	0	17.187	15.64	0
Lithuania	0	19.145	4.32	0
Malta	0	24.715	3.44	0
Netherlands	0	41.323	10.54	0
Norway	0	52.870	9.20	0
Poland	0	17.598	2.20	0
Portugal	0	23.094	8.04	0
Romania	0	12.645	0.60	0
Slovak Republic	0	22.002	2.36	0
Slovenia	0	29.679	8.22	0
Spain	0	30.858	12.74	1
Sweden	0	37.800	13.38	0
Switzerland	0	41.405	22.84	1
United Kingdom	0	36.079	10.12	1
EVS	3	30.211	9.19	11

Table A3. Descriptive Statistics of the Categorical Variables

Variable	Category	N	Pct
Conventional participation	Would not go out to vote	6,047	18.01
	Would go out to vote	27,532	81.99
Unconventional participation	Did not participate in at least one activity	7,822	23.29
	Might participate in at least one activity	10,007	29.80
	Did participate in at least one activity	15,750	46.90
Social trust	Cannot be too careful	21,656	64.49
	Can be trusted	11,923	35.51
Gender	Man	15,169	45.17
	Woman	18,410	54.83
Level of education	Primary	4,418	13.16
	Lower secondary	6,544	19.49
	Higher secondary	14,712	43.81
	Tertiary	7,905	23.54
Work status	Employed	18,067	53.80
	Unemployed	1,741	5.18
	Student	1,656	4.93
	Retired	8,649	25.76
	Other status	3,466	10.32
Income nonresponse dummy	Response	27,013	80.45
	Nonresponse	6,566	19.55
Political ideology dummy	Response	27,989	83.35
	Nonresponse	5,590	16.65

Table A4. Descriptive Statistics of the Continuous Variables

Variable	Min	Max	Mean	StdDv
National pride	1	4	3.39	0.73
Social solidarity	1	5	2.96	1.00
Political trust	1	4	2.11	0.69
Political interest	1	4	2.43	0.94
Age	15	108	49.02	17.74
Income	1	12	5.65	2.25
Ideology	1	10	5.38	1.97