BOOK REVIEWS

BERGERMANN, Marc. *Historia Pelagiana. Wahrnehmung und Darstellung des pelagianischen Streites in der protestantischen Kirchenhistoriographie des 18. Jahrhunderts*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2021. Beiträge zur historischen Theologie, 198. XVII-462 p.

This book on eighteenth-century Protestant historiography of the Pelagian controversy investigates historical works by scholars in Germany who had a Lutheran background. The focus, in other words, does not include Protestant historians of the period who belonged to the Church of England or who were Reformed and worked in Switzerland or elsewhere. Even so, this project is important and original, and it clearly fills a lacuna in modern historiography.

After an introductory chapter, the work has four main parts. The first part summarizes the way in which seventeenth-century polemics used the *historia Pelagiana* for its own theological purposes. The second part is devoted to the beginning and early development of eighteenth-century views of Pelagianism. Here attention is given to Gottfried Arnold's revisionist interpretation of Pelagius, laid down in the *Unparteyische Kirchen- und Ketzergeschichte* of 1699-1700. Arnold seems to have been the first to reverse traditional evaluations of Pelagius's relationship to orthodoxy, while still criticizing his view of free will and what Arnold considered Pelagius's underestimation of human corruption (which Arnold criticized despite agreeing with Pelagius's denial of original sin). In his *Institutiones historiae ecclestiasticae antiquae et recentioris* (1755), Johann Lorenz von Mosheim criticized the excessive subtlety of the theological polemics surrounding Pelagius, while distancing himself from Pelagius's theology. Bergermann considers Mosheim's work a "document of transition" (*Dokument des Überganges*; 136). To this category of transition Bergermann likewise reckons Siegmund Jakob Baumgarten (1706-1757), also known as "the father of neology," who still spoke of Pelagius's "errors."

The third part of the book is devoted to Johann Salomo Semler and Christian Wilhelm Walch. Semler (1725-1791), a famous pupil of Baumgarten, vigorously rejected Augustine's theology and had a positive view of Pelagius. During the Pelagian controversy, as reconstructed by Semler, Pelagius defended traditional views whereas Augustine was a great innovator who formulated a novel view of predestination and came to defend an understanding of grace that was

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"truly unchristian" (192) and "about which no human being had heard anything before" (188). Semler furthermore disconnected the Reformation from Augustine by arguing that Augustine's doctrine of justification was closer to the Tridentine view than to Luther's imputed righteousness. Semler wished that more of the learned writings of Julian and Pelagius had been preserved; in contrast, if "two-thirds of Augustine's useless writings" had been lost, it would have been rather helpful (220). A very different atmosphere is found in Christian Wilhelm Walch's *Entwurf einer vollständigen Historie der Ketzereyen*, which included in its fourth volume (1768) an extensive analysis of the Pelagian controversy. Walch wanted to be even-handed and historically accurate. He was very well informed about the historiography of the Pelagian controversy, and he studied the sources in detail. He approached the existing historiography with caution, noting that historical analyses had often been guided by doctrinal motivations. Walch had orthodox Lutheran convictions, and his goal of objectivity did not prevent him from rejecting Pelagian "errors" or describing Pelagianism as "Christian naturalism." He came to Augustine's defence but admitted that the Church Father had made mistakes.

The final part of the book is devoted to what Bergermann calls an ethical coloring (*Ethisierung*, 329) of the Pelagian controversy in the final decades of the eighteenth century, although the author has not convinced me that "ethical" is indeed a significant common denominator of the historical interpretations analyzed in this part. Works by Ludwig Timotheus Spittler, Heinrich Philipp Konrad Henke, and Johann Matthias Schroeckh are analyzed in this part. Spittler sympathized with Neologist theology. In a historical compendium of 1782, he offered no criticism of Pelagius and distanced himself from Augustine. The rationalist theologian Henke authored a survey of church history (1788) in which he similarly criticized Augustine rather than the Pelagians. Schroekh's discussion of the Pelagian controversy in his *Christliche Kirchengeschichte* of 1790 was comparable in scope and scholarly seriousness to Walch's analysis. But Schroekh's was a different theology: he respected Pelagius and was critical of Augustine.

Considering the material that Bergermann presents, it seems fair to conclude that the eighteenth century shows a development (*Entwicklungslinie*, 416) from what was considered a Pelagian "heresy" or set of "errors" to viewing that same material as a respectable "doctrine." However, as Bergermann admits, the development of Pelagius's status was "not rectilinear and free from ramifications"

(416). This is a significant caveat. The author considers Semler a "turning point" (*Wendepunkt*) within this development, but perhaps Semler was in fact the culmination point of a shorter development that only started with Arnold. This is all the more likely because Schroekh's work, the scope of which is comparable to that of Walch, could have been studied in its own right but is discussed instead in a chapter entitled "Conclusions and Afterthoughts," which suggests that Schroekh's work did not constitute a significant further step in the development that Bergermann discerns.

Historia Pelagiana provides abundant material on many different aspects of eighteenth-century investigations into the Pelagian controversy. Notable examples include the search for a "Pelagianism before Pelagius" and the fiction of a sect of "predestinarians," an invention that proved a remarkably persistent element of historical discussions. The presented material suggests that eighteenth-century German historiography, its pursuit of objectivity notwithstanding, was guided by theological convictions, just like the major historical studies of the Pelagian controversy that had been written in the previous century.

Aza Goudriaan

BERTOZZI, Alberto. *Plotinus on Love: An Introduction to His Metaphysics through the Concept of Eros*. Leiden: Brill, 2021. Philosophia antiqua, 155. XV-438 p.

Il sistema di Plotino – se l'espressione è lecita (cf. 1) – è un territorio solcato da molte vie, non tutte egualmente battute. Risalendone una poco frequentata, la recente monografia di Alberto Bertozzi intende offrire una «sistematizzazione interpretativa dell'universo plotinano» avente «l'amore (*love*) come suo concetto guida» (1), nella convinzione che «la nozione di ἔρως» – termine privilegiato nel variegato lessico plotiniano del desiderio e dell'affettività (cf. 3-4, n. 6) – «illustr<i> il carattere sistematico del pensiero di Plotino», operando come «una chiave [cf. 333: «concetto chiave»] che consente al lettore delle *Enneadi* di accedere virtualmente a tutti gli aspetti della […] metafisica» (3) del loro autore.

Lo studio di Bertozzi, in tal senso, ambisce a colmare una lacuna parziale nella letteratura: da un lato, estendendo l'ambito di analisi al di là del solo trattato III.5[50] (Περὶ ἔρωτος), in passato già oggetto di approfonditi studi specifici (non per questo, tuttavia,

trascurato: cf. 141-178); dall'altro, integrando l'orizzonte delle precedenti ricerche sul tema – principalmente centrate sulle molteplici declinazioni dell'ἔρως in relazione alle differenti ipostasi (J. Lacross, *L'amour chez Plotin. Érōs hénologique, érōs noétique, érōs psychique*, Bruxelles, 1994) e sulla sua importanza per la comprensione del processo di derivazione delle realtà a partire dall'Uno (A. Pigler, *Plotin, une métaphysique de l'amour. L'amour comme structure du monde intelligible*, Paris, 2002) – con la sottolineatura della «rilevanza sistematica» della nozione di amore «per il processo di ascesa dell'anima individuale all'Uno» (*ibid.*). Il risultato di tale operazione – a giudizio di chi scrive condotta in modo apprezzabile e convincentemente riuscita – è un'accurata ricostruzione della filosofia di Plotino, restituita come «un tutto organico, con l'amore quale suo tema guida e l'Uno, a un tempo, quale origine e termine di ogni amore» (4).

Il volume consta di due parti principali, dedicate nell'ordine ai processi di *derivazione* di tutte le realtà dall'Uno (capp. 1-2, 9-138) e di *ritorno* dell'anima all'Uno (capp. 3-6, 139-331), entrambi riletti a partire dalla nozione di ἔρως e ridefiniti rispettivamente come "processione *erotica*" e "ascesa *erotica*". Sul piano della *derivazione* (πρόοδος), l'ἔρως opera come «forza regolatrice» (53) della costituzione del reale, di cui assicura l'ordinata attuazione mediante la combinazione di fattori di *discontinuità* e *continuità* (cf. 51, 69, 75, 81-82, 86, 334-335). Per un verso, infatti, l'ἔρως rappresenta la sorgente dell'intera dinamica di processione, nella misura in cui, nella sua assoluta semplicità e unicità, l'Uno si dà come perfetto amore-di-sé (la nozione di *amor sui* offre, sul duplice versante della causalità efficiente e finale, un'adeguata trasposizione in termini erotici alla nozione metafisica di *causa sui*: cf. 21-22). Tale «auto-identità erotica» (28), radice prima dell'infinita potenza generativa henologica (70: «La sovrabbondanza […] è il risultato necessario della perfezione dell'auto-identità erotica dell'Uno»), e tuttavia originaria e indipendente dall'effettiva costituzione delle realtà inferiori, marca nel processo di derivazione un segno di *discontinuità* e *trascendenza*. Per altro verso, in gradi derivati e differenti, l'ἔρως inabita tutte le realtà emanate dall'Uno, conseguentemente pervase da un duplice amore: *di sé*, in quanto esse stesse sono luogo della presenza dell'Uno, e *per l'Uno*, frutto della comunicazione dell'amore-di-sé da parte dell'Uno a ciò che è altro sé (in tal senso, l'Uno ama donando – *in primis* all'Intelletto – ciò di cui esso stesso è privo: cf. 70-72, 195, 334). L'inscrizione di una "traccia" (ἴχνος) dell'amore *dell'*Uno (genitivo soggettivo) nelle realtà derivate sotto forma di desiderio *per* l'Uno (amato *sub ratione Boni*) marca nella dinamica di derivazione un segno di *continuità* e *immanenza*.

Le realtà derivate si strutturano gerarchicamente mediante un processo costitutivo *bifasico* (o, senza variazioni di rilievo, *trifasico*: cf. 79-80, 335) e atemporale, che trova nella dottrina della doppia attività il proprio principio esplicativo (cf. 28-44) e nell'operare di ἔρως la propria forza propulsiva. Se l'identità auto-erotica dell'Uno (l'*ἔρως henologico*) coincide con la sua stessa "attività *dell'*essenza" (ἐνέργεια τῆς οὐσίας), l'"attività *dall'*essenza" (ἐνέργεια ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας) che da esso si dispiega determina in primo luogo l'emanazione di un amore indefinito e indeterminato, variamente denominato "Diade indefinita" (ἀόριστος δυάς), "materia intelligibile" (νοητὴ ὕλη), "intelletto amante" (νοῦς ἐρῶν). Tale amore, che in quanto traccia dell'identità auto-erotica henologica è originariamente e costitutivamente orientato verso l'Uno medesimo (cf. 72, 78, 81-83, 85, 87, 109, 163), si manifesta nella "reversione" (ἐπιστροφή) del generato al generante (cf. l'ampia lista di riferimenti testuali a 82); quest'ultima, a sua volta, culmina nella «reversione della materia intelligibile verso di sé», da cui si originano «la sua stessa autoconoscenza […] e, indirettamente, il tentativo di riprodurre, *come pensiero*, l'unità incondizionata da cui scaturisce» (85; sulla duplice direzionalità del movimento reversivo, cf. 252). La vita dell'Intelletto, così costituita, si struttura come un pensiero auto-trasparente ed eterno (sull'eternità [αἰών] come espressione della φιλία noetica, cf. 90-91), che replica l'unità suprema dell'amore dell'Uno trasponendola nell'uni-molteplicità peculiare di «una sorta di amore interno o di una perfetta armonia delle parti che non sono mai separate» (86, cf. 319). L'armonia così sorta, ciononostante, non coagula interamente né esaurisce autarchicamente il dispiegarsi dell'*ἔρως noetico*, il quale include un riferimento strutturale a un amato (l'Uno) contemplato stabilmente, ma *irriducibilmente altro*; nell'Intelletto, pertanto, la piena soddisfazione della dimensione erotica non richiede la totale cessazione della tensione desiderativa (cf. 300-303, 319-320).

Il processo che presiede alla costituzione dell'Anima ipostatica è il medesimo: l'attività *dall'*essenza dell'Intelletto genera una materialità psichica, protagonista di una reversione erotica al principio generatore, seguita dal tentativo incompiuto di replicarne autoreversivamente l'unità (cf. 98-101). Differente, tuttavia, è il livello ontologico: ciò che nell'Intelletto si presentava come contemplazione noetica eternamente attuale di contenuti noematici immanenti si traduce, nell'Anima, in *pensiero discorsivo*, *atemporalmente sequenziale* (in forma primaria o derivata: cf. 107-108), bisognevole di *attualizzazione* e solo *estrinsecamente* correlato agli intelligibili. Proprio in virtù del carattere estrinseco di tale correlazione, l'*ἔρως psichico*

risulta maggiormente complesso di quello noetico (cf. 163-167). Oltre a riferirsi al proprio oggetto di contemplazione erotica permanente (l'Intelletto) come a qualcosa di altro da sé, infatti, l'Anima coglie l'alterità dei propri contenuti di pensiero, avvertendo in ragione di essa «il desiderio addizionale di produrre l'armonia che vede nell'Intelletto come qualcosa di appartenente a sé» (102).

L'amore psichico, conseguentemente, non può che dispiegarsi *anche* come il desiderio, *addizionale* ma *non accidentale*, di esprimersi esternamente, con cui l'anima – per la precisione «l'anima inferiore in quanto tale, cioè la Natura o l'Anima del mondo», dipendentemente «dalla connessione dell'Anima del mondo alla contemplazione dell'Intelletto da parte dell'Anima-Ipostasi» (103) – esercita la propria attività organizzatrice in rapporto al cosmo sensibile. In quanto consiste nel «dispiega<re>, esprime<re> o temporalizza<re> ciò che nell'Intelletto esisteva *toto simul*» (*ibid*.), tale attività di cura, animazione, illuminazione, sostentamento si pone in un rapporto di continuità con il processo di *comunicazione erotica* scaturito dal Principio, di cui l'Anima cosmica, pertanto, non rappresenta che «l'ultimo garante» (*ibid*.). Se dunque il governo razionale del cosmo equivale alla «temporalizzazione della contemplazione da parte dell'anima superiore del modello noetico eterno», il tempo, analogo dell'eternità noetica e dell'atemporalità psichica, equivale «<al>la forma stessa della vita dell'anima inferiore, o <al>la modalità della sua attività» (105); e così, specularmente alla φιλία intelligibile sul piano noetico e alla contemplazione dianoetica su quello psichico, la συμπάθεια "universale" si instaura quale manifestazione funzionale (cf. 105, 126: «l'amore all'opera») dell'*ἔρως cosmico* (cf. 108, 124-126, 336).

Ultimo residuo di materialità intelligibile, incapace di autocostituirsi ipostaticamente per via reversiva (cf. 109, 164), l'anima inferiore (Anima del mondo o Natura) è pervasa dal desiderio, essenzialmente insoddisfatto e perennemente frustrato, «di riprodurre l'autounificazione che l'anima contempla nelle realtà superiori» (118-119). Coerentemente con il proprio statuto ontologico e con la propria tonalità erotica, dunque, nel tentativo di «replica<re> il gesto originario di sovrabbondanza henologica» essa genera una realtà inferiore: la materia pre-cosmica. Nella misura in cui sorge da una deficienza dell'agente, tuttavia, il prodotto di tale operazione si configura come «l'analogo inverso della materia intellegibile pre-ipostatica che da quel gesto originario era proceduta», null'altro «che un residuo dell'energia primigenia scaturente dall'Uno» (118).

Non stupisce perciò che la materia, soggetto di attributi negativi ed entità dai tratti umbratili e contraddittori, funga da «principio di

entropia» e «termine ultimo […] nel processo di derivazione»: «con essa», infatti, «l'amore originatosi dall'Uno si arresta, incapace *da sé* sia di "revertirsi" sia di produrre qualcosa dopo di sé» (123). L'essere incapace di *reversione erotica* (cf. es. 247) e, conseguentemente, causa dell'arresto del processo henologico di profusione erotica, tuttavia, non le impedisce di disporre di una certa energia desiderativa, che essa rivolge all'essere e alla forma. Eppure, diversamente da quanto accadeva sul piano psichico, tale aspirazione (*Enn*. III.6[26] 7.13: ἔφεσις) sfocia in una partecipazione solo fittizia all'intelligibile, prerogativa di un'ontologia del sensibile dai tratti ineludibilmente pseudo-ilemorfici (cf. 130-131). A partire dalla sua caratterizzazione eminentemente *privativa* e *meontologica*, infine, la materia subisce una "insistente identificazione" con il male (cf. 136), che la costringe talvolta a vestire i panni metafisici di «elemento radicalmente ingannevole e, per così dire, intenzionalmente corruttivo» (137). Ciò che nella prospettiva dell'*emanazione integrale* è paradosso incandescente, tuttavia, pare stemperarsi una volta adagiato sul terreno della *processione erotica* (cf. 137, 336). Se le anime individuali, infatti, non solo promanano dall'Uno ma recano anche in sé, quale frammento dell'ἔρως henologico, un desiderio innato e un "ἔρως connaturale" *per* il Principio, sembra lecito concludere che esse non sono *de iure* condannate a essere contaminate dalla materia (benché *de facto* ciò avvenga "innanzitutto e perlopiù": cf. 137, 157, 171, 174, 231, 254-256); e che, dunque, «alla materia stessa potrebbe essere "consentito" di essere male, […] senza che la necessità metafisica che la caratterizza come il punto d'arresto del processo di derivazione si traduca immediatamente per l'anima nella necessità di essere irrevocabilmente intrappolata in essa» (138).

Contemplando questo snodo della riflessione plotiniana, è possibile apprezzare una saldatura compatta tra *archeo*logia e *teleo*logia (cf. 179), che supporta la convergenza nell'Uno-Bene del duplice primato causale efficiente e finale (la Causa efficiente prima e la Causa finale prima, cioè, risultano *concettualmente distinte*, ma *attualmente identiche*: cf. 180, 337). Che il Principio del tutto sia *ipso facto* Fine universale si impone quale conseguenza lineare della comprensione del processo di derivazione in termini di *comunicazione erotica*; l'Uno, infatti, è *universalmente* amato nella misura in cui «per tutte le realtà derivate essere o esistere significa essere eroticamente dirette verso di esso: noi lo amiamo perché siamo stati fatti per amarlo; o piuttosto […] noi lo amiamo perché siamo stati fatti come amanti di esso» (195).

Di più: in virtù della sua natura di Bene (fondamento della sua desiderabilità: cf. 182-188), l'Uno non può che essere *sommamente* amato (cf. *Enn*. VI.7[38] 32.25; 33.14: ἐρασμιώτατον; VI.8[39] 16.15: ἀγαπητότατον): *estensivamente* (216: «[…] è la causa finale universale, veramente l'amato di *tutti* gli enti, e desiderato nella misura in cui tali enti cesserebbero di esistere se mancassero completamente di questo desiderio») e *intensivamente* (*ibid*.: «[…] solo l'Uno può essere amato con un amore infinito, benché non tutti gli enti sembrino capaci di amarlo in tal modo»). È cruciale, in tal senso, che nelle realtà derivate l'amore *dell'*Uno (genitivo oggettivo) sia, alla radice, amore *dall'*Uno. Se così non fosse, tanto il carattere *non arbitrario* di tale desiderio quanto lo statuto *autenticamente finale* del suo oggetto rimarrebbero ingiustificati, cedendo il passo a «un'interpretazione soggettivistica o relativistica del Bene» (188) e aprendo le porte a una sua identificazione parcellizzante, preludio dello scivolare metonimico del desiderio stesso sul piano inclinato di una "cattiva infinità". La *necessità* fondativa (in senso primariamente esplicativo: cf. 206-207) di tale "circuito erotico", conseguentemente, impone una "radicalizzazione" (cf. 200) della prospettiva aristotelica, che permetta non solo di superare una spiegazione meramente naturalistico-fattuale dell'insorgenza del desiderio per il Principio (ricavabile dal noto "ἔργον-argument" di *Eth*. *Nic*. I.1097b22-1098a20), ma anche di «sottopo<rre> a trasformazione la natura stessa del Principio: non più l'ἐνέργεια noetica del Primo Motore, ma il potere erotico dell'Uno» (199; più in generale, cf. 196-201).

In breve: l'amore costituisce l'*origine*, la *forza trainante* e il *culmine* (cf. 209) anche del movimento di *ascesa*. L'anima partecipa della vita sovrabbondante dell'Uno, comunicata alla totalità delle realtà derivate sotto forma di amore *per* l'Origine, che a sua volta, in quanto *desideratum* universale e ultimo, coincide con il Bene. Ciò equivale a dire che l'anima «desidera τάγαθόν poiché è ἀγαθοειδής; ma è ἀγαθοειδής […] poiché τάγαθόν è il nome dell'ἀρχή di tutto dalla prospettiva del desiderante»; e a concludere, significativamente, che «il desiderio, o l'amore seguito correttamente (ὀρθῶς […]), è il punto preciso in cui la manifestazione dell'identità di Principio e Fine si dà primariamente, il luogo cominciando dal quale l'esplicazione di tale coincidenza diviene possibile» (201).

L'anima individuale, dunque, è essenzialmente (*ergo* necessariamente [cf. 263-264] e irrevocabilmente [cf. 244]) abitata da un desiderio innato, da un ἔρως connaturale che, costituendola come un'«entità fluida» (248), la rende *soggetto potenziale* dell'ascesa verso l'Uno (cf. 137, 171, 179, 209, 232, 241, 244-245, 252, 254, 262-266; sull'attribuzione all'anima individuale, e non all'anima

umana, del ruolo di soggetto dell'ascesa, cf. le condivisibili precisazioni alle 232-249). Ciò significa, da un lato, che tale desiderio è elargito alle anime come un «dono» (cf. 209, 220) di *grazia* (255: «[…] c'è qualcosa in Plotino che può funzionare come un lontano analogo, o un vago sostituto, della nozione di grazia in senso lato»), *universalmente* (cf. 256) infusa più dall'«assistenza implicita» (255) che dall'«intervento diretto» (cf. 328, 339; sul carattere "impersonale" del Principio, cf. 341-345, sulle differenze rispetto alla prospettiva cristiana, cf. 213-214, n. 8; 254) da parte dell'Uno. D'altro canto, esso è requisito indispensabile (in quanto *traccia* dell'affinità con il Fine: sul "principio di affinità", cf. 221-231), e tuttavia non condizione sufficiente dell'elevazione dell'anima: non compie l'ascesa, ma la indica quale un compito (cf. 272, 282); non solleva, ma sollecita l'avvento di una «decisione etica» (241); non produce tensione, ma richiama l'attenzione (cf. 267).

Affinché possa prendere avvio il cammino di ascesa, si è detto, bisogna che il desiderio sia «seguito ordinatamente». In primo luogo, ciò vuol dire che esso necessita di *essere ordinato*: ri-educato (cf. 188, 241, 272, 306), ri-orientato (cf. 232, 241, 244), ri-formato (cf. 232, 245), disposto in un certo modo (cf. 182), purificato (cf. 272). L'anima, dunque, è chiamata a un "lavoro" (cf. 231, 282, 287) di presa di coscienza della propria natura e di disciplina ascetica (cf. 282-283); di purificazione e di risveglio a sé (cf. 288 e, più in generale, 282-292); di pratica della virtù e di auto-trasformazione attiva (cf. 266, 273, 330). Un lavoro che fiorisce nell'attuazione di un radicale mutamento conversivo, che la rende capace di rimodulare le priorità dei propri investimenti affettivi (cf. 273, 286-287, 291, 294) e di superare la condizione di *alienazione erotica* (cf. 291) in cui l'unione con il corpo ordinariamente la invischia. Il riferimento decisivo, ancora, è alla nozione di ἐπιστροφή, intesa però qui nei termini non di una *reversione necessaria*, ma di una *con-versione volontaria*; non si tratta più, cioè, di un processo di *edificazione* ipostatica "automatico", bensì di una operazione di auto-*modificazione* "libera" (vale a dire: consapevole, deliberata, decisa; contingente, non coatta né predeterminata; universalmente attuabile; materia di responsabilità individuale: cf. 253-254, 269, 304; sulla facoltà di auto-determinazione come elemento di somiglianza tra l'anima e l'Uno, cf. 230).

Seguire il desiderio "ordinatamente", in secondo luogo, significa avanzare *progressivamente*, salendo uno dopo l'altro i gradini dell'itinerario ascensivo che, come in un ininterrotto cammino di "semplificazione" (dunque, di abbandono *sottrattivo* del molteplice), si susseguono e co-implicano senza soluzione di continuità (cf. 267-281). L'approdo ultimo è lo stadio unitivo, nel quale, superata la

distanza riflessiva dal Principio che contraddistingue la sfera noetica, «l'anima individuale giunge in contatto diretto con il suo amato, divenendo pienamente assimilata a ciò che in essa è maggiormente simile all'Uno: il centro dell'anima» (340).

Appare coerente, ormai, come il "viaggio" intrapreso dall'anima, con cui essa *per*viene là da dove *pro*viene, non possa concludersi con la sua semplice *reintegrazione noetica* nel dominio intelligibile (cf. 292-307). L'amore, infatti, può vantare una «priorità naturale» (264) sulla conoscenza, di cui è «insieme il fondamento […] e il fine» (215: l'amore innato, a rigore, può forse essere metafisicamente pensato solo come una sorta di *intuizione erotica preriflessiva*, se è vero che [214, corsivo mio] «sarebbe difficile immaginare un amore che non conosce […] *assolutamente nulla* del suo amato»). Inoltre, la più autentica somiglianza con l'Uno, pura identità auto-erotica, si dispiega «non […] nel campo del pensiero, ma in quello dell'amore» (331, cf. 165), ragion per cui l'Intelletto, regno della Forma, non si offrirà mai all'amore come suo ultimo destinatario («[…] l'Intelletto è identico con il regno della Forma, mentre l'amore è essenzialmente e ultimamente diretto verso ciò che è privo di forma. […] Fondamentalmente, in quanto amore di una forma, anche l'amore di ciò che *è* Forma, è già essenzialmente una limitazione dell'amore»). Ascendendo all'Uno, pertanto, l'anima non dovrà attardarsi nella specularità contemplativa dell'*Intelletto pensante*, ma "de-formarsi" accedendo alla condizione dell'*Intelletto amante*, anteriore e superiore in virtù della «sua maggior prossimità all'Uno e <del>l'infinità del suo amore per il Principio, un amore che […] è la traccia stessa dell'amore di sé dell'Uno» (85; cf. 231; 303). Un amore, evidentemente, la cui «bontà peculiare […] risiede non tanto nella possibilità di essere informato, ponendo così termine alla propria indeterminazione, quanto nel fatto stesso di essere completamente catturato nella sua visione, completamente posseduto da ciò che desidera» (166).

Solo svincolandosi dall'"amicizia delle Forme", allora, l'Anima godrà, senza dissolvimento fusionale di *sé* (cf. 308-331), della somma partecipazione alla *quiete dinamica* dell'Uno (cf. 201), che con la sua «pura presenza libererà anche l'amore dal suo aspetto meramente appetitivo e sosterrà la gioia che l'amante avverte (o piuttosto, *è*) nell'essere amorevolmente in sua presenza» (331). Se le cose stanno così, ci si arrischierà volentieri a concludere che «l'ascesa è *primariamente* un affare erotico, un lavoro dell'amore compiuto dall'amore» (245).

Enrico Moro

BRACHTENDORF, Johannes, and Drecoll, Volker, ed. *Augustinus de Genesi ad Litteram: Ein Kooperativer Kommentar*. Boston: Brill, 2021. Augustinus - Werk und Wirkung, 13. VI-402 p.

This recent addition to the *Werk und Wirkung* series on Augustine is, as it claims, the first to deal comprehensively with the single work of *De Genesi ad litteram*, offering a valuable contribution to the body of scholarly commentaries on Augustine's thought and writing and thus communicating the continuing appeal of studying Augustine today.

The volume contains contributions from a 2017 international conference in Tübingen entitled "Augustins *De Genesi ad litteram*" and begins with a comprehensive introduction by Johannes Brachtendorf, who situates *De Genesi ad litteram* within the context of late antique cosmology and philosophy, as well as within Augustine's own *oeuvre*. Brachtendorf details the principals involved in the different hermeneutical approaches to Scripture that Augustine defines in select works, which can variously be reduced to literal-historical or figurative-prophetic interpretation, and then shows how Augustine gave precedence to the literal sense or "*sensus proprius*" by the time he wrote *De Genesi ad litteram.* In the first chapter, Michael Cameron supplements Brachtendorf's introduction and provides a concise overview of Augustine's engagement with Genesis 1-3 in the years leading up to his construction of *De Genesi ad litteram*. In the second chapter, Clemens Weidmann deals with the issue of a standard edition of *De Genesi ad litteram*, concluding that a collation of all manuscripts relevant for the constitution of a text and valid stemma "bleibt…ein dringendes Desiderat" (71).

These prefatory chapters provide an informative backdrop for the subsequent chapters, which systematically address the twelve books of Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram* one by one. These chapters (ch. 3-14) are each written by a different contributor, in either English or German, but the chapters all present an outline of Augustine's arguments in the respective book of *De Genesi ad litteram* (of varying lengths and detail) before highlighting and unravelling the major themes or unique approaches of the book. The contributors' diverse areas of expertise lend breadth of this volume's engagement with *De Genesi ad litteram* and demonstrate the richness of Augustine's work.

A great strength of the volume is the careful cross-referencing between the chapters, likely the result of the volume's origin in an international conference. For example, one notices a respectful nod towards Paul Agaësse and Aimé Solignac's *La Genèse au sens littéral en douze livres (I-VII)* which is referenced in almost every chapter.

Likewise, the questions of how Augustine employs his literal interpretative method and why he gives it precedence over other interpretive approaches are threaded throughout the volume. To offer a few examples, Emmanuel Bermon and Allan Fitzgerald both demonstrate that Augustine's literal reading does not preclude a metaphysical or spiritual interpretation, and both authors point out that Augustine's method always seeks a philosophical understanding of the relationship between God and creation, between eternity and time, in keeping with his other works. Gerald Boersma and Charlotte Köckert present a similar view, arguing that Augustine's literal interpretation of God's creative act as a simultaneous, indivisible operation and his conception of *seminales rationes* are extrapolated in a way that guards against the conclusion that God acts in time. Susanna Elm emphasizes another perspective and notes that, for Augustine, if a literal reading goes against the natural order of things or is not permitted by reason, then a figurative reading is warranted unless the passage refers to miracles or prodigies. Anthony Dupont points out that Augustine's literal interpretation of the creation narrative is intrinsically interwoven with providence and, therefore, a figurative reading. Johanthan Yates and Matthew Drever highlight Augustine's use of Paul's letters as an interpretive lens for Genesis and a way of substantiating Augustine's claim that Genesis ought to be read both *ad litteram* and *in figura*.

In his analysis of *De Genesi ad litteram* 7, Volker Henning Drecoll sums up Augustine's approach well. Drecoll finds the structure of the book to be that of a *quaestio* in which Augustine develops possible alternative interpretations before presenting his own, integrating the problems of the other interpretations with a deft rhetorical hand. By the time he produces his own interpretation, however, it is likewise in the form of a question, signalling that there may be other solutions that he has not come up with (209).[1] In this way the reader travels along with Augustine over the different modes of interpretation, being warned of the traps of a carnal or naive materialist construal of the text, while also being afforded the chance to diverge.

In Chapter 15 Karla Pollman moves away from the close analyses of the twelve books in the previous chapters and sketches a broad overview of the reception of *De Genesi ad litteram*, remarking on early Christian poetry (as well as, interestingly, the German poet Rainer Maria Rilke's *Duino Elegies* [1875-1926]) and the writings of

[1] See also, as Johannes Brachtendorf mentions in chapter 3, Augustine's comment in his *Retractationes* that *De Genesi ad litteram* was more a work of questions than answers (Augustinus, *retr*. 2,24).

intellectuals from the early Middle Ages to the twenty-first century, including Galileo Galilei's (1564-1642) *Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina*. Pollman's chapter illustrates the promising room for further research in this area. Chapter 16 closes the volume by examining Augustine's understanding of Genesis 1 and 2 from an Old Testament perspective and aptly concludes with a section called "Was bedeutet Auslegung *secundum litteram* und *sensus proprius*?" (379-382), bringing the volume full circle.

If one wonders for whom this volume was written, its contributors' areas of expertise as well as its bilingual character might suggest that it was intended for a specialised audience. Its general ease of readability and open-handed approach, however, make clear that it is rather written with students, in the broad sense, in mind. This intention is also evident in that, while certain contributions mention current debates and issues of contention (for example, the dating of *De Genesi ad litteram*), it does not seem to be the volume's intention to challenge current scholarship or bring unorthodox methodologies and sources to the fore. The volume, therefore, serves as an authoritative guide that is especially valuable to newcomers but still allows the reader a free construal of Augustine's work. The volume is not without minor editorial errors (for example, the misprinting in italics of a contributor's own words[2]), but this notwithstanding it offers a clear and compelling commentary that leaves the reader eager to delve deeper.

Christina Emily Turner

CARNES, Natalie. *Motherhood: A Confession*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2020. Encountering traditions. 197 p.

This marvelous book is difficult to categorize. Informed by Carnes' excellent work as a scholar, *Motherhood: A Confession* might be described as a reflective memoir, a personal essay that wrestles with Augustine from her embedded, embodied location as a mother. In so doing, Carnes gives voice to the silent mothers in Augustine's

[2] Cf. 103 in Gerald Boersma's chapter: "An appeal in faith to God's *omnipotentia would not be out of keeping with Augustine's theology. Indeed, for Augustine, the fact that God calls creation into being at all may be considered miraculous. But the genre of a "literal"* exegesis requires an intelligible account of the actual existing order."

Confessions. Carnes traces Augustine's own itinerary in the *Confessions* and considers how his analyses would be deepened, or different, if written by a mother. The book's critical voice is not dismissive; rather, one could say that Carnes' critique of Augustine is an extension of Augustinian sensibilities.

The book can be profitably read by both scholars and non-scholars insofar as, like Augustine's *Confessions*, Carnes' quarry is, ultimately, an exploration of the human condition. However, I think the book would be especially helpful for those who teach Augustine's *Confessions* to undergraduates, offering a fresh angle into Augustine's classic while also articulating questions many of our students likely have. Highly recommended.

James K.A. Smith

CATAPANO, Giovanni, ed. MORO, Enrico, trans. & introd. *Agostino di Ippona, L'anima e la sua origine*. Roma: Città nuova, 2022. Nuovi testi patristici, 2. 316 p.

Il volume, curato da due rinomati specialisti del pensiero agostiniano, è costituito per l'essenziale da una traduzione italiana con testo latino a fronte e brevi note di commento del *De anima et eius origine* di Agostino (43-301), a cui sono da aggiungere una Introduzione (5-27), corredata di una Nota al testo latino (28-30) e di una aggiornata Bibliografia (34-41), un Indice scritturistico (305-306), un Indice dei nomi (307-309) e naturalmente un Indice generale (311-316). La breve ma densa e informata introduzione aiuta a inquadrare la genesi e la natura del testo agostiniano.

Composto dal successivo accorpamento di quattro libri, il *De anima et eius origine* è un'opera di circostanza scritta tra il 419 e il 420 in risposta alle critiche di Vincenzo Vittore, un giovane laico già rogatista recentemente convertito al cattolicesimo. Con grande efficacia dialettica e retorica (notevolissimo lo sviluppo della metafora del naufragio), Agostino vi ribadisce, articolandone le ragioni, i due presupposti della sua "psicologia" cristiana presi di mira dal giovane interlocutore: l'incorporeità dell'anima e l'indecidibilità della sua origine, se cioè l'anima di ciascuno sia creata *ex novo* da Dio (creazionismo) o tratta dall'anima del genitore (traducianesimo, da *tradux*, "tralcio di vite", con riferimento alla pratica agraria della propagginazione, metodo di propagazione / riproduzione della vite ottenuto mediante il ripiegamento e l'interramento di un ramo o propaggine che poi, una volta messe radici proprie, viene reciso dalla pianta madre).

Ora, per Agostino, manifestare incertezza sulla conoscibilità dell'origine dell'anima è una opportuna forma di prudenza, non solo per la mancanza di prove dirimenti a favore dell'una o dell'altra soluzione (le testimonianze scritturistiche addotte da Vittore si rivelano, nella lunga discussione, tutte ambigue e ambivalenti), ma soprattutto per la gravità delle implicazioni teologiche sottese alla questione. In particolare, Agostino insiste sulla difficoltà di conciliare l'ipotesi creazionista con la trasmissione del peccato originale e con la necessità della grazia battesimale, una difficoltà che pone l'incauto Vittore a rischio di pericolose derive pelagiane (svalutando la portata del peccato originale) o origeniste (immaginando l'esistenza di una colpa antecedente, cioè di demeriti prenatali). Il punto infatti è che se Dio crea di volta in volta anime nuove, infondendole nei corpi derivati dai genitori, consegna «alla carne peccatrice delle anime innocenti», e questo pur sapendo che alcune di esse non saranno mai soccorse dalla grazia battesimale (è il grande e tragico tema dei bambini morti prematuramente senza il battesimo). Di qui la trappola in cui per Agostino è caduto avvinto nei suoi stessi «lacci di presunzione» Vittore, ormai incapace di sottrarsi a una alternativa esiziale: o Dio è ingiusto oppure le anime o hanno meritato di essere contagiate o saranno salvate anche senza battesimo. Come ricorda Moro nell'Introduzione, Agostino nelle *Retractationes* non assegna a quest'opera «un esplicito intento antipelagiano». Ciò non toglie che la dannazione dei bimbi non battezzati giochi un ruolo centrale nella teologia della grazia agostiniana e questo restituisce al *De anima et eius origine* una profonda connotazione teologica e pastorale (e del resto implicazioni soteriologiche continueranno a caratterizzare a lungo la questione dell'origine dell'anima, se il garante del creazionismo medievale – ipotesi rivelatasi storicamente vincente – sarà il *De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus*, un testo a lungo considerato agostiniano ma in realtà opera di Gennadio di Marsiglia, autore del V secolo appartenente a quell'ambiente culturale lerinese passato alla storia come "semipelagiano").

Quanto invece all'altro presupposto preso di mira da Vittore, l'incorporeità dell'anima (che Agostino difende, mostrando di nuovo come la tesi opposta di Vittore precipiti in una spirale di contraddizioni, su tutte l'inavvertita assimilazione della natura corporea dell'anima a quella incorporea divina), mi limito qui a sottolineare l'importanza delle pagine conclusive del trattato (IV, xxii-xxiii) per la loro posterità medievale (su cui, in generale, cf. anche Introduzione, 26). Agostino vi ribadisce che nel vocabolario biblico "spirito" significa senz'altro la parte superiore dell'anima, la *mens* (sicché l'uomo è composto di spirito, anima e corpo), ma che ci sono diversi passi scritturistici dove con lo stesso termine si intende anche l'anima nella

sua interezza, per indicarne la natura incorporea (spirituale). Nel commento al salmo 103, 4, *qui facit angelos tuos spiritus*, Agostino distingue tra il nome "angelo", nome dell'azione o funzione (*angelus est nomen officii*), e il nome "spirito", nome della natura o sostanza (ed. Dekkers et Fraipont, 1488). Questo significato di "spirito", spiega altrove Agostino (*Ep*. CXXXVIII, ii, 15), vale nel caso della natura angelica, ma vale anche in quello della natura divina e, in generale, di qualsivoglia creatura razionale, compresa l'anima. Di qui, allora, la conclusione del *De anima et eius origine*: «rimossa ogni ombra di dubbio, comprendiamo che "spirito" è il nome generale dell'anima… L'anima dunque riceve il nome di "spirito" dal fatto che è spirituale (*nomen animae spiritus est ab eo, quod spiritalis est*), riceve il nome di "anima" dal fatto che anima, cioè vivifica il corpo (*animae nomen est ab eo, quod corpus animet, hoc est uiuificet*)» (IV, xxiii, 37). "Anima" e "spirito", in altri termini, stanno tra loro come "angelo" e "spirito", l'uno essendo il nome della funzione (*anima ab animando* ripetono i medievali) e dunque del rapporto causale che lega l'anima al corpo, l'altro il nome della sostanza. Ugo di San Vittore lo espliciterà nel commento al *Cantico di Maria* (Lc 1, 46-47: «magnificat *anima* mea Dominum / et exultavit *spiritus* meus»), affermando che «spiritus *ad substantiam* dicitur, anima *ad vivificationem* …, unus et idem spiritus, *ad seipsum* spiritus … *ad corpus* anima» (PL 177: 418-420). D'altra parte il binomio *anima*/*spiritus* restituisce il titolo di un *best seller* pseudoagostiniano del XII secolo, il *De spiritu et anima* (cf. il cap. 9, che sintetizza quanto appena riportato); ma la sua decisiva importanza è che esso intercetta, attraverso le loro affinità platoniche (porfiriane), un analogo binomio/distinzione presente nel *De anima* di Avicenna e derivato da Giovanni Filopono, dove l'anima è detta *forma* o *entelechia* (*perfectio*) solo in quanto "anima", cioè "in relazione" al corpo che anima, di "per sé" essendo una sostanza intelligibile e separata, chiamata *intelletto* (*spiritus*) anziché *anima*. Ed è questo dispositivo (destinato a riprodursi nella formula scolastica dell'anima *forma et substantia* o *forma et hoc aliquid*) ciò che ha reso possibile nel XIII secolo la costituzione di una psicologia peripatetica latina, permettendo la ricezione dell'attributivismo aristotelico (avicenniano) nel quadro del sostanzialismo (spiritualismo) cristiano (agostiniano).

Il testo latino a fronte della traduzione italiana non presenta varianti significative (tutte comunque segnalate nella Nota al testo latino e in apparato) rispetto all'edizione Urba e Zycha (1913) da cui è tratto e correttamente riportato. Eccellente infine la traduzione, sia nella resa dei concetti e quindi nella funzione interpretativa (basti qui

ricordare la puntuale restituzione della strutturale metafora, ma che in effetti metafora non è, del tralcio e della propagginazione mai ridotta banalmente a derivazione o trasmissione), sia nella ricerca di una certa creatività espressiva capace di restituire anche le assonanze del testo originale (cf. ad es. 135: «… non sia mai che un animo cattolico si beva (*bibat*) una cosa simile. Non è una polla (*fluentum*) della fonte divina, ma una balla (*figmentum*) del cuore umano»). Insomma, pur nella rigorosa aderenza letterale al testo agostiniano, Moro è riuscito a restituire con intelligenza ermeneutica e perizia linguistica una traduzione chiara, elegante e perfettamente leggibile.

Massimiliano Lenzi

CHERRY, Natalya A. *Believing into Christ: Relational Faith and Human Flourishing*. Waco: Baylor University Press, 2021. XI-200 p.

Writers hope that if they can just get the words right then they will be able to change the world. The hoped-for change takes different forms: moving an academic field in a certain direction, advancing a public policy, attracting people to a certain ideology, or helping people see how much depends upon a red wheelbarrow. Writers need this belief if they are to fill the empty page. In a real way, the belief of a writer is a profound confidence in words and in humanity. Such belief is fitting for Christians, who believe in the Word who became human. Surely it moved Augustine to write tirelessly.

Natalya Cherry, a theologian at Brite Divinity School and a minister in the Methodist Church, is a writer who believes in the power of getting words right, in the power of clarifying even our prepositions in order to help revive Christianity today. Her book *Believing into Christ: Relational Faith and Human Flourishing* hinges on understanding the centrality of a preposition—'into'—and how getting a Latin declension right can reconfigure our understanding of creedal Christianity, unite belief and practice, and restore a progressive and loving Christianity in an America dominated by MAGA Christianity. The book has a big argument to make about a small word. What is so admirable is just how much Cherry succeeds, which also makes some of her failures so regrettable.

Cherry's *Believing into Christ* is challenging to review because of the variety of academic modes of writing that she employs. In different chapters, she does different forms of theological reflection.

She opens the book with a chapter called "Faith and Flourishing," which looks at the current theological sense of faith while also defining essential terms such as 'flourishing' and 'deification'. Her next chapter, "The Formula in Augustine," is a scholarly exegesis of Augustine and discourse on the importance of Latin declensions and Augustinian theology. For Augustine scholars, this is the chapter to read. Chapter three, "The Formula after Augustine," is a genealogy of decline, as she traces the disappearance of theological reflection on believing *into* Christ. Her last two chapters—"Restoring the Relational Sense" and "Flourishing Practice"—are really a pastoral philosophy. Unfortunately, these chapters sometimes read too much like opinion pieces.

For scholars, one could easily imagine getting PDFs of specific chapters depending on one's training and interest. But the book merits reading as a whole because Cherry succeeds in writing an integrated text. There is a clear methodological approach: definition of terms, establishment of the right understanding of belief, description of how that belief was lost, description of how to restore it, and argument for why it should be restored. Even if the chapters are quite different, they share the common purpose of restoring an Augustinian account of faith for the contemporary world.

For Cherry, too many Christians have allowed their faith to decline into mere assent to propositions. As she puts it, "There's a difference between a bobbleheaded nod of assent to propositions or tenets *about* God… and clinging in relationship to God through Jesus Christ by the Holy Spirit in a way that transforms every other relationship in care for others" (2). Cherry wants to move her reader towards the latter, but she wants to do so in a way that does not discard assent to propositions about God. Where some are keen to dismiss orthodoxy (right belief) and shift to orthopraxis (right practice), Cherry believes that if we got the orthodoxy part right, we would see that right practice is essential to right belief.

To show this, she turns to Augustine and the importance of prepositions. For Augustine (drawing from Scripture), believing Jesus/God and believing in Jesus/God are not the only aspects of right belief. One can believe Christ (assenting to what he says) and believe in Christ (assent that he is the Son of God), but that is not enough. The center and height of faith is *credere in Christum*, believing *into* Christ. The whole of Cherry's book rests on the 'into.' The success of the book is that she makes this little word uphold a big argument.

Interpreting Augustine, Cherry develops the idea of a *credendo* crescendo. The value of this locution comes from thinking about a

musical crescendo. As the music moves, one feels the urge for the concluding movement. When it is absent or cut off, one feels the insufficiency. *You need to get to the end.* However, this does not mean the beginning is irrelevant. One's musical yearning for the conclusion of the crescendo depends on the building up of tension. Believing God and believing in God are important. There is no room for ditching creeds in the thought of either Augustine or Cherry. But just as you cannot stay in the middle of a crescendo, so too you must move into the fullness of faith. This fullness is believing into Christ.

This is the Augustinian crescendo: "by believing to love, by believing to hold dear, by believing to go into him, and to be incorporated in his members" (31). For Cherry this ascending movement brings us into the heart of faith, in which we develop a relation with God such that our human life enters into the life of God. This deification is communal. To believe into Christ is to be drawn into the Body of Christ. Belief 'into' means being incorporated as a part of the Body. Believing into Christ is about being "so united to Christ that we are glued to him, so our limbs stretch in the direction Christ's always have" (16). This stretching is in the direction of people who are on the margins, especially those marginalized by members of the Church. Mere belief in God or Christ does not entail righteousness. Even the demons believe in Jesus (as Augustine and Cherry both point out). One's faith is only partial (or even demonic) if one's faith is not into Christ. Therefore Cherry holds that we need to get past the contrast between right belief and right practice. Looking to Bede's continuation of Augustine's insight, Cherry argues that "working through love is a defining characteristic of faith" (81). If we believe rightly then we act lovingly (or at least try). True belief entails "cherishing love as the very content of faith" because creedal incorporation into Christ means acting like Christ (86).

The core of her theological argument consists in highlighting and developing Augustine's idea. It is the strongest part of her book. The only real weakness is her dubious argument that Augustine's use of the word member (*membrum*) is meant to startle his listeners with its phallic meaning. While this is a *possible* meaning of the word, it seems unlikely that Augustine was using it that way. Cherry does not offer evidence that he was. More problematically, she describes the usage as possible and then writes about it as though it were certain. She is on much sturdier ground when she argues that Augustine wants his listeners to "consider their hands and feet as intricately bound up with those of Christ, moving in love and reaching out to those Jesus touches: the poor, the sick, and powerless" (35). At the heart of faith

is being a Christlike lover. Lovers love by helping those they love. Believing into Christ means moving with Christ and therefore loving those Christ loves in the way that Christ loves them.

Cherry's book shifts from this core argument into a genealogy of decline, mapping how the *credendo* crescendo continues with thinkers such as the Venerable Bede and Peter Lombard but starts to fade with Thomas Aquinas. Believing-into eventually disappears with the Reformers, especially the Lutheran scholastics. Christianity, in her account, became increasingly propositional, which "results in going through the motions without actually going where Christ goes, following Christ at a distance by observation but not accepting invitation to the life of action that he offers" (124). While Cherry's genealogy is a bit incomplete, she does show how belief-into declines as a center of theological reflection and as definitional to what faith is. At the same time, she tends to strawman supposedly propositional Christianity. Did Christians ever really hold we are supposed to "go through the motions" or offer "bobblehead assent" while following Jesus at a distance? She persuasively argues that Christians have under-articulated believing-into and that this failure undermines our practice of love. As a theologian and writer, I certainly believe that better explication of our belief can help us live out our believing-into. However, I think it would be news to missionaries, soup-kitchen founders, and loving parents that they were just giving bobblehead assent.

In this sense, her genealogy is undermined by her failure to attend to the practice of faith by non-theologians. She oddly attends too much to the propositional side of ecclesial life and not enough on the enacted side of ecclesial life. This division is itself due to the fading away of belief-into such that we think theological discourse has nothing to do with lived Christianity, but her privileging of the former ends up reenacting the binary she wants to overcome. If we consider Thomas Aquinas someone who undermined the articulation of belief-into, we should not forget that, in his life as a friar, he definitely believed-into. Further, Cherry's sometimes unfair characterization of Christians as bobblehead assenters depends on her ignoring forms of Christian commitment she does not particularly like. A man with traditional sexual ethics who practices celibacy prior to his marriage to someone of the opposite sex in order to have children that they then raise in the faith probably thinks that he is believing into Christ. Cherry's progressive Christianity seems like it would consider this as at best following at a distance or at worse enacting the hurtful heteronormative practices she thinks churches need to discard.

This strawmanning undermines her final two chapters, which lay out her vision of a progressive Christianity. Because of this strawmanning, she does not seem to perceive how some Christians believe into a different way of living out Christian practice. She thus does not argue for why her brand of progressive Augustinian Christianity (to which I am deeply sympathetic) is the right form of believing-into. Both these chapters offer rich reflections on restoring belief into Christ through catechesis, sacramental practice, and worship. Drawing on these reflections and her argument from creedal formation around believing-into, Cherry portrays a progressive Christianity distanced from the evangelical forms that seem dominant today. Her critiques of the latter, especially in relation to Donald Trump, are trenchant. But she too often acts like one either believes-into (and ends up progressive) or one merely believes (and ends up a hurtful reactionary).

This approach also means that Cherry's concluding views seem too comfortable with the left. She does not seem to hold any views that would make her awkward in progressive but non-Christian settings. Perhaps she wrote her book for progressive Christians tempted to sluff off creedal claims. This might explain why she does not account for how conservative Christians might think believing into Christ entails commitments different from the ones she holds. Evangelical Christians who commit themselves to pro-life witness think they are believing into Christ and think that LGBTQIA advocacy is a failure to believe-into. In other words, there is a difference of belief (at least regarding certain issues) and so a different sense of what believing-into entails.

This is part of an odd feature of the book: the assumption that belief-into will certainly lead one to progressive Christianity. Cherry just does not make the argument for this, which is especially odd since Augustine would strongly disagree with some of her conclusions. I share Cherry's view that fervent support of Donald Trump indicates a theological problem with many Christians. Her commitment to a more robust sense of orthodoxy modeled on belief-into is well argued, grounded in the Christian tradition, and important for our times. It is just that her conclusions about belief-into are too one-sided.

Despite these criticisms, Cherry has offered us a rich book reflecting on how important the word 'into' is to Augustinian thought and to Christian theology and practice. To see that faith is relational, loving, and deifying is to recover the heart of what it means to "put on Christ" (Romans 13:14). What an overly intellectual Christian scholasticism has separated—faith from love and belief from practice—Cherry seeks to reunite. In so doing, she shows how such believing-

into should revive our commitment to the creeds, to a communal faith, and to the practice of being the loving members of Christ. While her book fails in certain respects and ends up too comfortably in one ideological camp, it is still an important piece of scholarship, of theology, and of advocacy for a progressive Christianity. If writing is meant to change the world, then this book about a preposition that offers an important window into restoring our creedal commitments and, therefore, our creedal practices of love. In this way, the book might help change Christian life and make the world a little better off.

Terence Sweeney

CONYBEARE, Catherine, and GOLDHILL, Simon ed. *Classical philology and theology: entanglement, disavowal, and the godlike scholar*. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020.

This is a rich and diverse collective volume, which captures the reader's interest and has the merit of putting forward a topic that deserves further attention. The overarching topic is formulated most clearly in the beginning of the introductory essay, written by both editors, in a passage that explains how the reader needs to understand both the title and subtitle of the volume (the only element it leaves unexplained is that of the "godlike scholar", which I guess was added to accommodate the final essay, written by Erik Gunderson, who contemplates on models of authorship). The passage deserves to be quoted in full (5-6):

> "This book aims not just to uncover a sample of the extensive imbricated interactions between the two subjects, but also to trace how the development of modern classics as a discipline has found it necessary to disavow its connections to theology, so that the deep connections of philology and theology are regularly misrecognized or denied altogether. Like so many modern disciplines, classics, in the name of objectivity, science and scholarship, has repeatedly defined itself in opposition to faith-based or confessional apology. Yet from the very earliest days, classics has been intimately intertwined with theological argument. Today the theological presence in classics remains largely repressed; but this very repression, we suggest, distorts our approach to the texts and the history of scholarship at the heart of our philological enterprise. Our wager is that to bring the intimacy of classics and theology out of the shadows will reveal a crucial strand not only of the history of the discipline but also of its continuing practices and ideology."

The treatment of this topic has resulted in a volume that is quite diverse: it consists of essays on a wide range of topics. At first sight it might even not be clear what holds the contributions together or what links them to the overarching theme. In the introductory essay, the editors explain the arrangement of the articles (7-11): in four complementary pairs followed by a concluding essay. The editors explain that there is a clear rationale behind that sequence (among the criteria is the alternation of a pair of essays focusing on Hellenism and one on the Latin tradition), but my reading experience made me perceive the book as arranged in another way: a first section of five papers that focus in one way or the other on the discipline and history of classical philology, and a second section of four studies on subjects of antiquity (i.e., themes that are themselves researched in classics).

In the first five contributions the link with the topic of the volume is more obvious than in the second half. There is a risk that the scholarship presented in the final four essays will go unnoticed, since the reader will not look for it, or does not expect to find it, in the volume under discussion: because of the broad scope of the volume and because the titles are somewhat deceptive or enigmatic (the title "Theology's Shadow" does not make one expect Gunderson's piece to end up evaluating the series *Roman Literature and its Contexts*). (The incompleteness of the index of names does not help, and will also affect the readership of the first five papers.)

The diversity of the topics that are treated in the second section is paralleled by a variety in treatment (and style). On the one end one finds matter-of-fact studies of concrete themes: Susanna Elm investigates the emperor Julian's comments on statues of himself, Catherine Conybeare presents the picture of Virgil in the *Saturnalia* of Macrobius. On the other end, one finds reflective pieces on "Boethius in the Genres of the Book: Philology, Theology, Codicology" (by Mark Vessey, who "propose<s> a strategy for revising (our) histories of literature in the light of a certain history of the book", 153) and on "Theology's Shadow" (Gunderson).

Looking at the history of classical philology, the first half of the volume focuses on nineteenth-century Germany and England in particular: Schleiermacher, Karl Lachmann and Zacharias Frankel are central in the essays of respectively Constanze Güthenke, Irene Peirano Garrison, and Theodor Dunkelgrün. Renaud Gagné broadens the scope both in time and space: in his paper on " 'Hellenisation' between Philology and Theology," he turns to Budé, Loisy, Festugière and others, as well as to the Regensburg address of Benedict XVI. Of these five essays that turn to the history of the discipline, that of

Simon Goldhill is most explicitly critical. Not shying away from naming individuals and bringing out the downside of the 'decolonization of the classics' and of present-day institutionalization, Goldhill criticizes the way in which modern academy misunderstands the academic past, notably scholarship in the Victorian era, and that it fails to recognize how philology and theology were two sides of the same coin.

Goldhill's essay illustrates that as a project the volume does not just focus on what classical philology and theology have in common and how they go together, but also on the (institutional) division of both disciplines (cf. also the passage cited above). As a project, the volume proceeds from the contrast between recent and multiform scholarly attention for philology and the lack of recognition, in the development of said interest, of the "interface of theology and philology" (5). This contrast is lucidly presented by the editors in the condensed but rich and learned introductory essay.

There is a substantial level of commitment to this intention of the book. The volume does not settle with the observation that "the misrecognition or disavowal of the theological distorts the self-understanding of classical scholarship" (34, Goldhill). It goes on to articulate that observation as an exhortation: "[o]ne way to reinvigorate classical philology […] is to reopen it to theologies from which it has been unhelpfully sundered" (154, Vessey).

How this exhortation needs to put into practice, is a question that does not receive a straightforward answer. The principle reason is the fact that it is not clear what the editors and authors understand as 'theology', that closest cousin of classics (cf. 7; often it appears to refer to a Christian/Jewish tradition of biblical scholarship). Likewise the reader wonders what the "theological argument" and "theological presence" in the passage quoted above are. Elsewhere in the volume the singular noun from the title has become the plural 'theologies' (cf. the citation above). The absence of much reflection on the boundaries or identity of the discipline in question makes it difficult to translate the exhortative spirit into concrete suggestions (surely we should not all start studying the Septuagint to prove the unfortunate institutional division of classics and theology, cf. 57). It contrasts with the reflection on the discipline and history of classical philology, which one does find throughout the volume, and quite frequently so. This confirms that the sequence of the two disciplines mentioned in the title matches the hierarchy of their treatment: this is a volume edited by, and gathering essays written by, classicists (or historians or philologists) and concerned primarily with (the study of) classical philology and its past and future.

The editors and authors deserve credit for having moved this issue onto the stage and the scholarly agenda. It has led to a volume that challenged my thinking and which informed me. Its richest contribution lies in the collective project as a whole. The book will be most rewarding for the reader who focuses on the first section of five essays and the introductory paper. The message that those contributions put forward deserves to be heard, also by theologians—whose reaction will be a most welcome complement.

Reinhart Ceulemans

COOPER, Kate, and WOOD, Jamie, ed. *Social Control in Late Antiquity: The Violence of Small Worlds*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. XIII-380 p.

This edited volume comprises fifteen chapters by scholars with varied backgrounds in the humanities, including ancient studies, biblical studies, history, theology and religious studies. After an introduction by the editors (1-12), the contributions are grouped into four parts of which each begins with a short introduction. The volume closes with a bibliography (337-342: primary sources; 342-371: secondary literature) and a general index (372-380).

The book focuses on what the editors call "small worlds", that is "the household, the monastery, and the schoolroom", or in other words, the places "in which people lived out their lives" (ix). It thus focuses not on the elites, but on the common people and "the perspective of lived experience" (x), mainly in the fourth to the sixth centuries CE. The volume's aim is to "bring forward the experience of people whose voices have largely been passed over by the historical record" with a special focus on "the disempowered – women, children, and the enslaved" (x). Such a change in perspective, from well-known early Christian authors and their literature to common people, is refreshing and provides important insights into the lives of people in late antiquity. Through this approach and the use of primary sources from everyday life in Roman provinces, mentioned in the introduction (4-6) and throughout the volume, the book presents an important and compelling contribution in the form of a diverse and nuanced study of ancient life from a non-elite perspective.

The four main parts of the book reflect four different small worlds and the experience of violence in them: the late ancient household, with a focus on women; the world of slaves; strategies

used in (male) pedagogy; and the world of female Christians in (male) narratives.

The first part of the volume is entitled "Women and Children First: Autonomy and Social Control in the Late Ancient Household" (13-101) and includes contributions by Julia Hillner, Vasiliki Limberis, Jonathan Tallon, and Kate Cooper. These chapters cover aspects of female crime and confinement, including monastic confinement. A clear gender asymmetry is identified, for example, in the question of who had the authority to physically punish children and slaves. In terms of Christian authors, the positions of Gregory of Nyssa, John Chrysostom, and Augustine of Hippo are discussed, including their views on corporal punishment, domestic relationships, and the role of Christian faith in both.

The second part, "'Slaves, be subject to your masters': Discipline and Moral Autonomy in a Slave Society" (103-170), comprises contributions by Chris L. de Wet, Lillian I. Larsen, and Maria Chiara Giorda. Again, the main focus is on Christian authors and their works and how those authors viewed slavery not only in the wider society but also in monasteries and monastic education. These chapters include discussions of Gregory of Nyssa, John Chrysostom, Theodoret, John of Ephesus and the anonymous Syriac *Book of Steps* (*Liber graduum*), as well as a variety of Egyptian monastic sources.

The third part, "Knowledge, Power, and Symbolic Violence: The Aesthetics of Control in Christian Pedagogy" (171-273), covers education in classrooms and monasteries. It contains contributions by Blake Leyerle, Jamie Wood, Aaron P. Johnson, Blossom Stefaniw, and Melissa Markauskas. They analyse pedagogical and literary techniques and strategies in a variety of Christian authors and works, from the use of fear to physical discipline and violent narratives, including scriptural stories of punishment. Noteworthy is Wood's study of the violent practices used to train elite males; Wood shows that similar strategies were adopted in Christian and non-Christian contexts.

The fourth and final part is entitled "Vulnerability and Power: Christian Heroines and the Small Worlds of Late Antiquity" (275-336). This part, like the first, focuses on women. James Corke-Webster analyses family relationships in the *Acts of Paul and Thecla*, the *Passion of Eugenia*, and the *Life of Macrina* from a female perspective. David Natal examines the literary role of Sotheris and Marcellina, two ascetic female relatives of Ambrose of Milan, whom Ambrose used in his writings to enhance his authority and legitimacy as bishop. Finally, Thomas Dimambro places the Syriac hagiographical

romance *Euphemia and the Goth* in the "wider discourse about identity, violence, and the role of women in the Late Antique eastern Empire" (335).

This edited volume by Kate Cooper and Jamie Wood is rich in content and covers an impressive variety of late antique authors and writings; the volume offers nuanced perspectives on violence and engages the modern sociological concepts of Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault. Fascinating to read are not only the discussions of lesser-known late antique writings but also the alternative perspectives on well-known Christian authors and their texts. With its broad range of topics related to the "violence of small worlds", this book is highly relevant and warmly recommended for anyone interested in historical, sociological, educational, Christian-theological, and literary studies of late antiquity.

Christina M. Kreinecker

DALPRA, Fabio, & JACOBSEN, Anders-Christian, ed. *Explorations in Augustine's anthropology*. Berlin: Peter Lang GmbH, 2021. Early Christianity in the Context of Antiquity, 23. 243 p.

This volume is a collection of eleven essays by Brazilian and European (mostly Danish) scholars, on the very broad subject of "Augustine's anthropology." The contributors worked in two workshops together in 2017 and 2018 before producing this collection. Essays either do a "deep dive" into one Augustinian text (Bilheiro, *Contra Academicos*; Dalpra, *On the Trinity* [bis]; Quaglio, *De Magistro*; Karfikova, *De quantitate animae*; Klöckener, *tractatus in Iohannem*; Moller, *Epistle* 157; Vrangbœk, *City of God*), or an anthropological topic (Jacobsen, freedom/free will; Birkler and Jacobsen, resurrection), or Augustine's influence on a subsequent author (Martins, *The Rule of Benedict*). It concludes with a bibliography and indices.

The essays are all very precise and detailed, and sometimes make useful and interesting distinctions. I found this especially the case in the two essays comparing an Augustinian text to one by Origen (Dalpra, Moller), and in the essay on skepticism (Bilheiro) – perhaps because in these "explorations" specific comparisons could be made to better understand what emerges as the Augustinian alternative. And honestly, I had never before felt skepticism as such a "problem" for Augustine (as I think in *Confessions* it just seems like another step in his development) but its problematic challenge for

Augustine was persuasively argued for here and helped me see beyond the context given in *Confessions*.

The collection epitomizes the strengths and weaknesses of the essay collection genre. On the one hand, gathering individual essays on very specific, narrow topics, allows the kind of detailed examination that makes the contributions valuable to subsequent researchers. On the other hand, the individual essays then remain disconnected, as here. There is no attempt to draw larger conclusions or connections, and build up from the minute analysis to a bigger picture of Augustine's anthropology. That makes the individual essays indispensable for future interpreters, but the overall collection disjointed and frustrating, as there is no full effect. The whole is far less than the parts. But for producing the care of the individual analyses, and making them available to the scholarly world, this collection should be applauded and consulted for many years to come.

Kim Paffenroth

DE WET, Chris, and MAYER, Wendy, ed. *Revisioning John Chrysostom: New Approaches, New Perspectives*. Boston: Brill, 2019. Critical approaches to early Christianity, 1. XXVIII-840 p.

The editors of this massive tome, Wendy Mayer and Chris de Wet, have done a great service in documenting, organizing, and catalyzing a burgeoning diversity of innovative scholarly approaches to the life, work, and significance of the late antique Christian bishop John Chrysostom (357-407 CE). In this volume, they seek to spotlight both established and new scholars whose creative research has not only cleared new ground in Chrysostom studies but also made contributions to the broader study of such interrelated topics as the process of Christianization and identity formation in late antiquity, late ancient social history, and the history of medicine, among others. Mayer and De Wet have marshalled an impressive number of authors: including the introduction, the book contains twenty-two chapters. The introduction is itself very important. In it, Mayer and De Wet helpfully situate the subsequent chapters of the book into several new scholarly trajectories that have emerged in Chrysostom studies since the turn of the millennium, in the process offering readers a useful account of the current state of scholarship in the field and pointing the way toward areas of research that could prove fruitful in the future. In what follows, I do not treat the book's chapters sequentially. Instead,

I organize my account according to the rather serviceable categories Mayer and De Wet use in their introduction, although the exact order of my treatment of chapters departs from theirs.

Several chapters seek to reassess standard accounts of Chrysostom's biography. They remind us just how difficult, if not impossible, it is to uncover the "real" John under the agenda-driven rhetorical depictions of him in the ancient sources. Justin Pigott shows that it was the unique character of Constantinople, rather than, as is often assumed, some aspect of John's personality, that accounts for the failure of his clerical reforms in that city. Jonathan Stanfill seeks to fill in the holes in the manuscript tradition concerning the inclusion of Gothic Christians in Chrysostom's processions. The Goths were a significant non-Greek ethnic group in Constantinople, and the assumption on the part of many Nicene Christians may have been that all Goths were Arian heretics. Stanfill thus argues that the Goths' physical presence in Chrysostom's processions was its own speech act, a way for Goths to affirm bodily their membership in the Nicene church and for Chrysostom to demonstrate the inclusivity of the Nicene Body of Christ.

Other chapters draw upon cognitive science to provide us with a thicker sense of Chrysostom's homilies and their impact than we might otherwise get from the primary sources alone. Against those who seek to mitigate the effect of John's homilies *Adversus Iudaeos* through an appeal to the speeches' particular cultural context, Mayer shows that the invective of those homilies plays upon moral sensibilities that are more universal, thereby helping explain why John's homilies against the Jews have repeatedly resurfaced in the longer history of Christian anti-Judaism. Isabella Sandwell and Jan Stenger likewise draw our attention to the dialogic character of John's preaching. Sandwell argues that, because people use existing knowledge to create new knowledge, the success of John's preaching might often have been in spite of rather than because of his intentions or his conformity to classical rhetorical conventions. Stenger emphasizes the embodied character of cognition. He shows how Chrysostom draws upon his congregants' prior knowledge to generate text worlds, imaginative spaces where they project themselves and simulate experiences of acting, moving, and encountering spiritual entities, thereby gaining new perspectives on reality and prompting behavioral change. In a related way, Geert Roskam wishes to analyze how John engages his audience, but Roskam argues that studies of that dynamic need to focus on the particular context of any given homily rather than simply citing texts from across Chrysostom's corpus. In his chapter, Roskam

thus focuses on one understudied homily, *Peccata fratrum non evulganda*, and he characterizes Chrysostom's rhetoric as emancipatory, insofar as John's persuasive preaching is designed to respect and enable the moral autonomy of his hearers. It is interesting to think about how that claim relates to the conclusions drawn in Sandwell's chapter.

Mayer and De Wet also include several chapters that study Chrysostom and late antique social history. Benjamin Dunning, for instance, probes the reasoning behind John's condemnation of same-sex desire, and, in the process, calls into question Kyle Harper's claim that Chrysostom marks the pivotal moment at which the classical concern with excess and free-male sexual passivity transitions to an understanding of same-sex erotic desire as qualitatively different from heterosexual desire. Dunning shows, however, that the classical understanding of same-sex erotic desire persists in Chrysostom's work. Overall, John appears comfortable deploying contradictory logic in his denunciation of homosexual desire.

Blake Leyerle argues that animal imagery in Chrysostom's homilies functions to mark out spatial distinctions in two ways: mimetically and semiotically. In the former case, animal imagery reflects actual animal life in the wilderness, which in its contrast with human civilization helps John highlight divine providence and the need for humans to govern their emotions. In the latter case, the meaning of Chrysostom's animal imagery emerges only within a broader system of signification. Here animals are likened to humans: for example, monks are like lions, possessing spiritual power and at home in the wilderness, and beggars are like dogs, who, on the margins of the household, are both vulnerable and spiritually powerful.

Leslie Dossey applies recent work in sleep studies to analyze John's discussions of work, time, and sleep. Dossey argues against the historical claim that all preindustrial nights were uniformly marked by the subjective experience of slow-time (open-ended, undirected) and that, only with the advent of the modern city, did they give way to a more socially accelerated (increased activity per unit of measured time) active evening and efficient pattern of uninterrupted sleep. In fact, Dossey's analysis of Chrysostom's homilies suggests that the late antique cities of Antioch and Constantinople were already undergoing the process of social acceleration.

Yannis Papadogiannakis shows how Chrysostom's homilies are an important resource for studying the history of emotions. Papadogiannakis demonstrates how central management of the emotions was to John's preaching and to the process of Christianization. John set

forth emotional narrative scripts and prescribed behavioral regimens that would aid in the individual reordering of emotions and in the strengthening of group bonds and boundaries. In this latter regard, Peter Moore is particularly interested in how John uses rhetoric to elicit common emotions in his church and how John encourages his congregants to feel those emotions toward each other. In a claim that may stand in some tension with other chapters in this volume, Moore argues that the community of mutual feeling that John seeks to build is open and inclusive, rather than closed and defined over against other groups.

John's efforts at individual and communal emotional cultivation and management are part of a broader pastoral program, in which John conceives his role medically. Several chapters accordingly situate Chrysostom into the history of medicine. James Cook notes the similarities and differences between the longer tradition of Greco-Roman medico-philosophical therapy of soul and John's Christian pastoral practice. Following Scripture, John uses the imagery of sickness to refer primarily to one's relationship to God. The goal of his psychic therapy thus differs from that of the Greek philosophers: one's control over the passions was intended to secure happiness in the next life, not this one. Yet other chapters underscore the political dimension of Chrysostom's medically inflected pastoral program. Following Foucault, De Wet argues that Chrysostom used his knowledge of Galenist medicine to gain control over the individual and ecclesial body. De Wet focuses on John's denunciations of gluttony and shows how the bishop's concern with eating connects to issues of gender, as John correlates moderated food consumption to masculinity. Like De Wet, Jessica Wright contends that, for John, medical knowledge was political. According to Wright, John is the first ancient author to draw out the political implications of the brain and nervous system for the traditional use of the body as a metaphor for society. John exploits his medical knowledge of the brain and nerves to establish control over individual bodies and legitimate a centralized, hierarchical structure of authority in the ecclesial body.

Other chapters focus more on John's theology, which is nonetheless strongly related to his psychagogical practice and efforts at Christianization. Several chapters explore the possibility and complexity of tracing philosophical influences on John's thought. Samuel Pomeroy, for example, shows how Chrysostom gains knowledge of some quotations from Plato's *Timaeus* from Eusebius' *Praeparatio evangelica*. Hence, it is not enough to ask how John reads Plato; instead, one must ask how he reads Plato through Eusebius. In this

case, Chrysostom integrates Plato's text into a Christian account of divine goodness and of human origins and destiny. In his chapter, Constantine Bozinis explores Chrysostom's understanding of the natural law. He traces the influence of Platonic and especially Stoic ideas on Chrysostom's thought. Chrysostom identifies the law of nature with the law of God, which is contrasted with positive human laws. Bozinis argues that John's understanding of the natural law enables him to advance rather radical critiques of political and social issues in areas of family law (adultery, divorce), slavery, the possession of wealth, and the practice of usury. Paschalis Gkortsilas explores Chrysostom's ambivalent relationship to Cynic philosophy. John praised the ascetic practices of the Cynics, such as the renunciation of wealth, but criticized what he viewed as their vainglorious motives. This ambivalence characterizes John's appropriation of the Cynic concept of *autarkeia* – living with only what is absolutely necessary and eschewing superfluous luxury. In contrast to the solitary – and in John's view useless and vain – *autarkeia* of the Cynics, John held a communal vision of *autarkeia*, where the voluntary poor do not overlook the needs of the involuntary poor.

Gkortsilas also discusses Chrysostom's use of Cynic philosophers as negative exemplars whom he contrasts with a Christian exemplar such as Paul. Other chapters in this volume take up John's use of biblical exemplars in his preaching. Courtney Wilson VanVeller, for example, seeks to push beyond studies of John's invective against the Jews to explore the more complicated issue of how John reconciles Paul's continued Jewish practice in Acts with his role in John's preaching as the preeminent Christian example. Wilson VanVeller shows that John makes sense of this potential contradiction by framing Paul as an excellent teacher and physician of souls: Paul adopts Jewish practices to become more credible and persuasive in the eyes of the Jews, in the hope of eventually leading them out Judaism into Christianity at the proper time. Demetrios Tonias studies the exemplary function of Abraham in Chrysostom's preaching. While, on the one hand, John interprets Abraham as the ideal Stoic sage, on the other, John fashions Abraham as a distinctively Christian exemplar, one who proves the decisive soteriological and eschatological import of philanthropic care for the poor. John casts Abraham as a model priest, but one according to the Old Testament rather than New Testament priesthood. This attention to Abraham's Jewishness, however, enhances his utility for John's Christian congregants, because Abraham demonstrates the accessibility and task of the lay priesthood, whose salvation is the goal of the Christian Eucharistic priesthood and whose

primary work is the sacrifice of mercy. Pak-Wah Lai considers the soteriological context of John's preaching on biblical exemplars more broadly. Lai argues that John's soteriology is one of divinization, in which Christ remakes fallen human nature and enables it to share in divine life. In John's preaching, then, biblical exemplars demonstrate the possibility and shape of divinized life. For example, according to Lai, John understood Adam and Eve as the first Christian monastics, the original exemplars of embodied angelic life, while Paul illustrated the restored divinized life made possible by Christ.

While Lai explicates John's vision of embodied angelic life, Samantha Miller explores Chrysostom's demonology by means of a comparison with modern deliverance theology. While both John and modern deliverance theologians take the existence of harmful demons for granted, John's theology differs from deliverance theology in its insistence on human choice. According to deliverance theology, Christians seek to be delivered from demons, who cause their suffering. Chrysostom, however, distinguishes between apparent and real harm. The suffering Christians experience in this life offers the occasion for them to resist the temptation of the devil. Submitting to demons is what causes actual harm.

Overall, this volume forms essential reading for those seeking to gain a sense of recent trends and new trajectories in Chrysostom studies and to better appreciate the significance of Chrysostom for the study of early Christianity, late antiquity, and the interdisciplinary humanities more broadly. The book is to be praised especially for its extremely useful introduction and for the myriad ways that the different chapters, each excellent in its own right, connect to each other. One looks forward to the exciting new work in Chrysostom studies which this volume heralds.

Douglas Finn

EDWARDS, Mark J. *Aristotle and Early Christian Thought*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2019. Studies in philosophy and theology in late antiquity. XI-225 p.

This book, published in a series co-directed by the author, seems to be an ample expansion of the author's short chapter ("Aristotle and His School") in M. Edwards (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Early Christian Philosophy* (London and New York: Routledge, 2021, 206-218), and includes material of unequal relevance, originality, and

accuracy. The chapter's paragraph titles were turned, unaltered or adapted, into chapter titles in the book. The author intends to sketch a history of the presence of Aristotle's thought in "Early Christianity" (ix) or the "patristic era" (194) or "Late Antiquity" (viii), construing these terms as referring to the development of Christian thought from the second to the early sixth century. Most of the book's content could be more aptly and less attractively labeled 'The Place of Aristotelian Concepts in the Christian Dogmatics of Antiquity'; indeed, the book focuses more on the Christian utilization of concepts that are Aristotelian in their ultimate provenance and put in service of mainly dogmatic theology than on the Christian reception of, or way of coping with, Aristotelian philosophical doctrines. In this respect, speaking of Christian theologians and theology instead of some "Christian philosopher" (186, 191) and "Christian philosophy" (49, 83) would be more proper.

By and large, the book can be described as a set of annotated collections of some hundreds of passages from approximately sixty writings by approximately twenty Greek or Latin Christian authors, dated to the second through the sixth centuries (196-99). However unattractive that may sound to an easygoing reader, it is in fact the most important merit of the book. Still, even expert readers who would be excited by such a collection are not offered the possibility to actually enjoy this merit, because the Greek or Latin text of these quotations is not provided, so that one must trust the author's translations and the other translations he uses or, sometimes, simply refers to. In certain cases, references are to be sought indirectly, that is, in some study mentioned by the author, and the references to such studies are not always accurate. For instance, Edwards claims that Cyril of Alexandria drew from Aristotle's *Topics* the prescription "that a definition should state 'what the thing which is signified is according to its *ousia*'" (90). How is this statement substantiated? The reader is referred to a study by Ruth M. Siddals, in which references to primary sources are not accompanied by quotations. The reader is also referred to pages 96-97 of Van Loon's monograph on Cyril's Christology, but certain relevant passages are in fact to be found only on pages 77-79. In other cases (e.g., 90), the reader is not referred to the Greek text but to its Latin translation in PG 75: 726A.

Chapter 1 is supposed to offer an account of "The philosophy of Aristotle" and the Aristotelian corpus. This is obviously an impossible project, and the author understandably confines himself to the themes he chooses for discussion in the core of the book. Bits of irrelevant or doubtful information have crept into the chapter. For

instance, the legend that Aristotle tutored Alexander the Great is taken as historical fact.[1] *Categories*, Ch. 1, 1a1-6 is reported as saying that 'man' is univocally predicated of a real man and a statue; in fact, the example Aristotle uses is that of an "animal" and a "picture" of it. This inaccuracy leaves Aristotle's point unaffected. The same cannot be said for *Categories*, Ch. 2, whose distinction between *καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεσθαι* (predicated of a subject) and *ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι* (found in a subject) is repeatedly reported as predication *καθ' ὑποκείμενον*, translated as "according to the subject", which makes no sense, and "predication in the subject", which does not make sense either. Equally problematic is the alleged foundation of that distinction. The author anachronistically construes the *ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι* as equivalent to accidental predication ("an instance of the second would be to say that something is true of X which might cease to be true without destroying his identity"; 3, cf. 117, 120, 123, 127). In fact, this is Porphyry's definition of *συμβεβηκός* ("ὃ γίνεται καὶ ἀπογίνεται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φθορᾶς"). As for Aristotle, *Categories*, Ch. 2 does not say anything about the possible consequences of the removal of this or that *ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ* for its subject; it says that the *ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ* "cannot exist separately from what it is in" (1a24-25; tr. J.L. Ackrill); i.e., from its bearer.

Chapter 2 ("Aristotle in the second century") ends up with a case of (allegedly) reverse "evidence", i.e. "for Alexander's [of Aphrodisias'] knowledge of the Old Testament." A passage from his *Commentary* on *Metaphysics* ("Ἀλλὰ καὶ 'ἀνθρωποειδεῖς' αὐτοὺς ποιήσαντες οὐδὲ τοῦτο μάτην πεποιήκεσαν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς 'τὸ συμφέρον' 'τῶν πολλῶν'· βουλόμενοι γὰρ ἀποτρέψαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπὸ τοῦ τύπτειν ἀλλήλους πεποιήκασι τοὺς 'θεοὺς' 'ἀνθρωποειδεῖς', αἰνιττόμενοι διὰ τούτου ὅτι ὁ τύπτων ἄνθρωπον τὸ θεῖον εἶδος τύπτει καὶ περιυβρίζει"; on XII, 1074b1-7) is paralleled to Gen. 9:6 ("Ὁ ἐκχέων αἷμα ἀνθρώπου ἀντὶ τοῦ αἵματος αὐτοῦ ἐκχυθήσεται, ὅτι ἐν εἰκόνι Θεοῦ ἐποίησα τὸν ἄνθρωπον"; partly based on Gen. 1:26), and this parallel is bitterly deemed "stronger" than the parallels usually "alleged to prove the indebtedness of Christian thought to pagan antecedents" (35). In fact, the above passages have already been judged similar by George van

[1] A.-H. Chroust, "Was Aristotle Actually the Chief Preceptor of Alexander the Great?", in A.-H. Chroust ed., *Aristotle: New Light on his Life and on Some of his Lost Works. Volume 1: Some Novel Interpretations of the Man and his Life*, London – New York, 1973, 125-132.

Kooten,[2] who nevertheless abstained from speaking about dependence and wisely so, because despite appearances (which deceived Van Kooten too) the meaning of the biblical passage[3] is irrelevant to what Alexander says. Based on this alleged dependence, it is further stated that Alexander "had spoken of a divine image in the soul", which, after all, would be quite strange to hold, for someone who argued that "the whole of the soul is mortal" (161).

Chapter 3 ("Aristotle and ante-Nicene Christianity") offers a survey of the references to Aristotle by Tertullian, Hippolytus of Rome, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen, and describes the contexts of these references. In the paragraph on Origen, the author discusses a passage in which the expression *καθ' ὑποκείμενον* occurs, not in any Aristotelian sense but against a Stoic background. The expression does not mean *praedicari de* + abl. but *(esse aliquid) secundum* + acc. The passage from Origen's treatise *De oratione* (which, as is known, is replete with elements of Stoic rather than Aristotelian logic) reads: "Εἰ γὰρ [the Son] ἕτερος, ὡς ἐν ἄλλοις δείκνυται, *κατ'* οὐσίαν καὶ *ὑποκείμενόν* ἐστιν ὁ Υἱὸς τοῦ Πατρός […]".[4] Origen refers to this passage in his *Commentary on John's Gospel*: "…ᾠοντο … παρίστασθαι μὴ διαφέρειν τῷ ἀριθμῷ τὸν 'Υἱὸν' τοῦ 'Πατρός', ἀλλ' 'ἕν' (Joh. 10:30) οὐ μόνον οὐσίᾳ ἀλλὰ καὶ *ὑποκειμένῳ* τυγχάνοντας ἀμφοτέρους, κατά τινας ἐπινοίας διαφόρους, οὐ κατὰ ὑπόστασιν λέγεσθαι 'Πατέρα' καὶ 'Υἱόν'".[5] Here, *οὐσία* means nature or kind of being, *ὑποκείμενον* and *ὑπόστασις* mean the concrete existent being which bears properties, and *ἐπίνοια* means the way in which an *ὑποκείμενον* or *ὑπόστασις* can be considered 'one'. So, to claim that "it is possible that we ought to take *hypokeimenon* in the familiar sense of matter" (52, cf. 116) is not sustainable.[6]

[2] G. van Kooten, "Man as God's Spiritual or Physical Image? Theomorphic Ethics versus Numinous Ethics and Anthropomorphic Aesthetics", in M. Konradt – E. Schläpfer ed., *Early Judaism, Ancient Philosophy, and the New Testament. Internationales Symposium in Verbindung mit dem Projekt Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti (CJHNT) 17.-20. Mai 2012, Heidelberg* (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 322), Tübingen, 2014, 99-138, at 101-105.

[3] See G. von Rad, *Das erste Buch Mose. Genesis. Übersetzt und erklärt. 9., überarbeitete Auflage* (Das Alte Testament Deutsch 2-4), Göttingen, 1972, 37-38 *ad loc*. (Engl. tr. J.H. Marks, *Genesis. A Commentary. Revised Edition*, Philadelphia, 1972, 132-133).

[4] P. Koetschau ed., *Origenes Werke*, vol. 2 (Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller 3), Leipzig, 1899, 334, l. 4-5.

[5] Origen, *Commentarium in Johannis Evangelium* X, 37, 246, l. 41-44 (C. Blanc ed., *Origène. Commentaire sur Saint Jean. Tome II [Livres VI et X]. Texte grec, avant-propos, traduction et notes* [Sources chrétiennes 157], Paris, 1970, 530).

[6] See also M.J. Edwards, *Origen against Plato*, Aldershot, 2002, 67-68, at 72.

Chapter 4, as its title ("The Neoplatonic reaction to Aristotle") indicates, does not discuss any Christian author's treatment of Aristotle; it offers a succinct account of how Plotinus, Porphyry, and Dexippus treated certain logical and ontological Aristotelian concepts (such as 'primary substance' and 'secondary substance') along with the related issue of the compatibility of Aristotle's philosophy to Plato's.

The main figure in chapter 5 ("Aristotle and the Trinity in the fourth century") is Cyril of Alexandria. The statement that he "sometimes echoes Aristotle with an accuracy that suggests first-hand acquaintance" (93) is at odds with the claim that "we might hesitate to credit him [i.e. Cyril] with any first-hand knowledge of Aristotle" (91). Again, Greek terms are sometimes construed in a problematic way. For instance, "προσόντα" (the present tense participle of *πρόσειμι*) from Cyril's *Thesaurus* is translated as "relative" as opposed to "essential" (90), presumably due to misconstruing its first component as *πρὸς* + acc., which mainly denotes direction, relation, and opposition, instead of *πρὸς* + dat., which denotes addition (*τὰ προσόντα* literally means 'the things adjacent to something' and hence 'attributes'). Furthermore, Cyril's anti-heretical methodology is not rendered quite accurately; we are told that "the truth of orthodoxy, according to Cyril, is proved by its adherence to *koinai ennoiai* or common notions (*On the Trinity* 726a)" (90). In fact, the relevant passage is PG 75: 724D-725A, and there Cyril says that "Christians are always fond of truth" and that, although "the vomits" of the heretics are not worthy of refutation, he will nevertheless combat them on the basis of "common notions", so that the illiterate people do not think that "common notions" plead for heresy. The tenor is clearly different. Furthermore, arguing "from common notions" is unfoundedly described as "choosing an Aristotelian point of departure" (90).

In chapter 5, Augustine is discussed as well (83-89). In Augustine's celebrated discussion in *Confessions*, Bk. XI, of the nature of time, Edwards "catches an echo of Aristotle, muted though it is by the stronger echo of Plotinus" (84). The Aristotelian echo, however, sounds absolutely silent, as no reference to any Aristotelian passage, or to any Plotinian or other reception of Aristotle's doctrine of time, is pinpointed. The next topic discussed is Trinitarian theology (85-87). The author criticizes Edward Booth's suggestion that "Augustine's triad originates in a synthesis of Neoplatonic and Aristotelian theories of intellection. In *Metaphysics* Lambda, 'the activity of thinking' is 'set in a cosmos in which everything is moved by desire' for an unmoved mover who is equated with the *noêton* or intelligible". Booth's study is one of the few titles that are referred to (in this case

as "Booth 1975") but are missing from the bibliography. Before rejecting this approach as conjectural (e.g., on the true but irrelevant grounds that Augustine did not know Aristotle's *De anima*), one should take seriously Booth's modest but interesting comparative discussion of Porphyry's *Commentarium in "Parmenidem"*, especially its fragments XIII and XIV,[7] which somehow mingle the Neoplatonic First One with Aristotle's self-thinking God. The third topic discussed is awkwardly labeled "A theory of vision" (87-89). This phrase normally refers to the issue of how the sense of sight functions in relation to its objects, not to the epistemological and linguistic issue of how the visual representation in the mind relates to the thing seen and to the word as signifier. Regardless, even in this realm, nothing truly or specifically Aristotelian is discernible in Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram*, Bk. XII. The author refers to passages from Porphyry's *Commentary on "De interpretatione"*, which Augustine could have hardly accessed, and from Boethius' *Second Commentary on "De interpretatione"*. It seems more probable that Augustine's discussion of things seen, represented in the mind and signified by means of names, goes back to Ps.-Augustine's Stoicizing *Categoriae decem* 1-3, which, it has been argued,[8] provides a probable reading of Augustine.

Lastly, it was probably the author's constant focus on dogmatic issues that resulted in omitting the applicability of Aristotle's *Categories* to the *Deus unus* in Augustine's thought. Even his single reference to Bk. V of the *De Trinitate*, which addresses this issue exclusively, points to *substantia* or *essentia* examined not in relation to the remaining Aristotelian Categories (which is what Augustine does), but to the Porphyrian *praedicabilia*, whose possible value for describing the *Deus trinus* is discussed in Bk. VII.

The theme of chapter 6 ("Gregory of Nyssa and Aristotle") dictates that it should rather be part of chapter 5. Chapter 6 stands apart because it is an unpublished communication presented at a conference on Gregory of Nyssa. Edwards credits Gregory's *Contra Eunomium* with "subsuming and amplifying" Basil's *Adversus Eunomium*, which, in order to "rebut an attack upon the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity which is expressly framed in Aristotelian terms", i.e., Eunomius' *Apology*, had offered an "inchoate revision of Aristotle"

[7] E.G.T. Booth, *St. Augustine's 'Notitia Sui' Related to Aristotle, the Early Neo-Platonists and Hegel* (doctoral thesis), University of Cambridge, 1975, 133-134, 158, n. 123 and 127; 285, n. 82; 229.

[8] L. Minio-Paluello, "The Text of the *Categoriae*: the Latin Tradition", *Classical Quarterly* 39/3, 1945, 63-74, at 65-68.

(97, 98). The least one can say is that presenting Eunomius' anti-Trinitarianism as based on some sort of thorough and staunch Aristotelianism (98, 99) is doubtful. His *Apology* VIII, 7-18, which includes a use of logical-metaphysical notions from Aristotle's *Categories*, seems to be a paraphrase of Alcinoos' *Didaskalikos* X.4, where these notions are shown to be inadequate to express the divine. Eunomius combines this demonstration with Dionysius of Alexandria's non-Aristotelian use of *οὐσία* in his description of God as *οὐσία ἀγέννητος*, which Eunomius adopts.[9] Inadequate information about the literary background for Gregory's knowledge of Aristotle makes doubtful any reconstruction, even regarding the point of this or that passage.

The plausible conclusion (145-146) of chapter 7 ("Aristotle and the Christological controversy"), where Cyril of Alexandria, Theodoret of Cyrus, Severus of Antioch, and Leontius of Byzantium are discussed, is that, in dealing with the nature of the Word Incarnate these authors were not truly interested in what Aristotle's logic and metaphysics actually said, but simply used them as tools *ad libitum* for non-philosophical purposes. *Nil mirum*.

Chapter 8 ("John Philoponus: Theologian and apologist") offers a dense and accurate account of what Philoponus argues for in a number of huge writings about two issues clearly related to Aristotle's doctrine: the (non-)eternity of the world and the nature of the intellect in the human soul. The same holds for the short description of Philoponus' Trinitarian and Christological views.

Chapter 9 ("Boethius and Aristotle") has the same merit, discussing Boethius' Trinitarian theology and Christology as well as his arguments for the compatibility of God's special providence and foreknowledge with chance and free agency. What is flagrantly missing is Boethius' meticulous elaboration, in the *De sancta Trinitate*, of Augustine's doctrine of the applicability of the ten Aristotelian Categories to God.

To conclude, as mentioned above, the book refers once or several times to no more than sixty Christian writings, examined as to their use of Aristotle. This is not a small number for a single author's shoulders; on the other hand, when compared to the thousands of

[9] J.A. Demetracopoulos, "Glossogony or Epistemology? Eunomius of Cyzicus' and Basil of Caesarea's Stoic Concept of *Epinoia* and its Misrepresentation by Gregory of Nyssa", in L. Karfíkova – Th. Bohm – S. Douglas – J. Zachhuber – V.H. Drecoll ed., *Proceedings of the 10th International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa: "Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium II: Philosophy and Theology of Language" (Olomouc, 15-18 September 2004, Center for Patristic, Medieval and Renaissance Texts)*, Leiden, 2006, 387-397, at 389, n. 6.

writings that belong to what the title refers to as 'early Christian thought', it objectively covers a very small amount of it. True, not all of the thousands of the surviving pieces of this literature are relevant to Aristotle; Platonism, Stoicism, and Cynicism were more relevant, and there are a large number of these writings (perhaps the majority) which have nothing to do with philosophy. Still, the major methodological issue is that, quite probably, most instances of Christians engaging with Aristotle are latent and unrelated to Trinitarian theology and Christology, which are the main concerns of the book. I will refer to a single case. Although Gregory of Nyssa's anthropology is flagrantly Platonizing—so much so that it is often at odds with Christian tenets—his account of the gradual development of the human soul's faculties in correspondence with the development of the organs, which belong to the body, is clearly redolent of Aristotelian hylemorphism:

Οἷον δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν *λιθογλύφων* {1} ἔστιν ἰδεῖν. Πρόκειται μὲν γὰρ *τῷ τεχνίτῃ* [2] *ζῴου* [3a] *τινὸς* [3b] *εἶδος* [4] ἐν *λίθῳ* {5} δεῖξαι. Τοῦτο δὲ προθέμενος, πρῶτον μὲν *τὸν λίθον* {5} τῆς συμφυοῦς ὕλης ἀπέρρηξεν, εἶτα περικόψας αὐτοῦ τὰ περιττὰ προήγαγέ πως διὰ τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος τῇ μιμήσει τῇ κατὰ πρόθεσιν… Πάλιν ἐπεργασάμενος προσήγγισε πλέον τῇ ὁμοιότητι τοῦ σπουδαζομένου. Εἶτα, τὸ *τέλειον* [6] καὶ ἀκριβὲς *εἶδος* [4] ἐγχειρουργήσας τῇ ὕλῃ, εἰς πέρας *τὴν τέχνην* [7a] προήγαγε· καὶ ἔστι *λέων ἢ ὅ,τι ἂν τύχῃ* {8} παρὰ τοῦ *τεχνίτου* [2] *γενόμενον*, ὁ πρὸ βραχέος ἄσημος *λίθος* {5}, οὐ *τῆς ὕλης* {5} πρὸς *τὸ εἶδος* [4] ὑπαμειφθείσης, ἀλλὰ *τοῦ εἴδους* [4] *ἐπιτεχνηθέντος* [7b] [7a] *τῇ ὕλῃ* {5}. *Τοιοῦτόν τι* {9a/b} καὶ ἐπὶ *τῆς ψυχῆς* [10] ὁ λογισάμενος τοῦ εἰκότος οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεται. Τὴν γὰρ πάντα *τεχνιτεύουσαν φύσιν* [2] [11], ἐκ τῆς ὁμογενοῦς ὕλης λαβοῦσαν ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μέρος, *δημιουργεῖν ἀνδριάντα* {12a} [13] φαμέν. *Ὥσπερ* {9a/b} δὲ τῇ κατ' ὀλίγον ἐργασίᾳ *τοῦ λίθου* {5} *τὸ εἶδος* [4] ἐπηκολούθησεν, ἀμυδρότερον μὲν παρὰ τὴν πρώτην, τελειότερον δὲ μετὰ τὴν τοῦ ἔργου συμπλήρωσιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ ὀργάνου γλυφῇ *τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς* [9] *εἶδος* [4] κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου προφαίνεται, ἀτελὲς ἐν τῷ ἀτελεῖ, καὶ ἐν τῷ τελείῳ *τέλειον* [6].[10]

How is this to be accounted for? Gregory simply adapts the Aristotelianizing Platonist Porphyry's brief explanation of Aristotle's term *entelechy* and its application to the soul-body relation in the animals:

[10] Gregory of Nyssa, *De opificio hominis* 30 (PG 44, 253C-D).

…Ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, κατανοήσας ὅτι *τινὰ* [3b] *εἴδη* [4], ἃ *ἐπιγίνεται* [7b], ὅταν τὸ οἰκεῖον *'τέλος'* [6] λάβῃ τὸ γινόμενον *ἢ* {9a} ὑπὸ *φύσεως* [11] *ἢ* {9b} ὑπὸ *τέχνης* [7a], ὥσπερ ὅταν ὑπὸ *τῆς φύσεως* [11] τὸ καταβληθὲν σπέρμα *ζῴου* [3a] κινηθὲν καὶ ἀποτελεσθέν, *φέρε ἵππος* {8} ἀποτελεῖται, ὅταν ἔμ*ψυχον* [10] *γένηται* καὶ τὰ ἰδιώματα φέρῃ τοῦ ἐμ*ψύχου* [10], *τὴν ψυχὴν* [10] 'ἐντελέχειαν' προσηγόρευσεν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰς *'τέλος'* [6] τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀφικόμενον τὸ σπέρμα ἔμ*ψυχον* [10] ἀποτελέσαι *ζῷον* [3a], ὑπὸ *δὲ* {9a/b} τοῦ *ἀνδριαντοποιοῦ* {12a} [13] ὅταν *ὁ χαλκὸς* {5} *ἀνδριὰς γένηται* {12a} [13], ἐντελέχειαν εἶναι *τὸ εἶδος* [4] τοῦ *ἀνδριάντος* [13] τὸ *περιτεθὲν* {8} ὑπὸ *τοῦ τεχνίτου* [2] *τῷ χαλκῷ* {5}…[11]

Trying to investigate the invisible part of the iceberg called 'Aristotle' and 'pagan philosophy' will help us better understand how it moved through the still partly unexplored sea of ancient Christian thought.

John A. Demetracopoulos

ELLIOTT, Paul. *Creation and Literary Re-Creation: Ambrose's Use of Philo in the Hexaemeral Letters*. Piscataway: Gorgias Press, LLC, 2019. Gorgias Studies in Early Christianity and Patristics, 72. XIX-226 p.

In writing an exegetical study on creation, which has survived in nine sermons, Ambrose made frequent use of Basil the Great's work *Hexaemeron* and, to a much lesser extent, Philo of Alexandria. In some of his letters and other works, however, Ambrose made frequent use of Philo. Paul M.C. Elliott shows how Ambrose, in his so-called *Hexaemeral Letters*, frequently used and drew directly from Philo's *De opificio mundi*. So it is interesting that for his official sermons Ambrose used a very reliable Christian source, namely, the Greek Church Father Basil, and occasionally Philo, but that on detailed questions, such as why man was created last, Ambrose reverted to an important Jewish source. Incidentally, Philo was not the only Greek source from which Ambrose drew inspiration; he was also interested in Origen, Didymus the Blind, Clement of Alexandria, and Hippolytus of Rome, as well as various pagan Greek sources, including Plato.

[11] Porphyry, *In Aristotelis "Categorias" expositio per interrogationem et responsionem* (A. Busse ed., *Porphyrii Isagoge et In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium* [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV/1], Berlin, 1887, 55, l. 16-24).

At appropriate places, these authors also come into clear focus in Elliot's study. The book, based on Elliot's dissertation (Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion, 2018), focuses on the influence Philo exerted on Ambrose, as seen in his letters to Horontianus and Sabinus.

Elliott illustrates this use of Philo by Ambrose in three clear examples that I propose to discuss in this review. In the first example, from *Letter* 29, Ambrose addresses a question posed by the priest Horontianus: Why did God create man last? Ambrose first replies by observing that since Moses did not comment on this matter, neither should we, because then we would be measuring God. Nevertheless, Ambrose does believe it is possible to address the question, which he does by using Philo's work on the creation of the world (*De opificio mundi* 77-88). Elliott analyzes this usage and notes that Ambrose significantly changes the order of the source and argument. I would venture to say that in this context he changes it completely. Elliott rightly shows that Philo thinks of a macrocosm and a microcosm, even when it comes to man himself. According to Philo, man can be interpreted as a miniature heaven. Philo also connects the perishable and imperishable to man and heaven, respectively. To Philo, this connection makes perfect sense from a philosophical perspective. Elliott carefully and analytically scrutinizes the way in which Ambrose processes this information. Elliott concludes that Ambrose adopts and develops this philosophical model. I would rather think of "corrects" here, since Ambrose fully incorporates his Jewish source into a new framework. There is hardly a takeover here, but rather a thorough renovation and correction of the original. In the process, we see that some attractive stones from the Philonic edifice are joined with quite different New Testament building blocks in the Ambrosian model.

In the analysis of *Letter* 31, which deals with the explanation of the numbers seven and eight, coupled with the day of rest as the seventh day, I found that Elliott was incisive. He notes that Ambrose critically adopts Philo's arithmology. In particular, Ambrose skillfully filters out the Pythagorean element; he openly disqualifies it in his letter. But Ambrose may do this, Elliott shows, because Origen had already distanced himself from Pythagoreanism. With the number eight, Ambrose likewise no longer relies on Philo but goes his own way. Elliott rightly notes that in *De opificio mundi* Philo's goal was to demonstrate a fundamental correspondence between biblical revelation, the best of Greco-Roman philosophy, and the natural order. Ambrose's goal, however, is quite different. He wants to make a theological argument for the superiority of the New Testament over

the Old Testament. These divergent goals are carefully examined and skillfully described by Elliott.

In *Letter* 34, too, Elliott meticulously examines the sources used by Ambrose and explains the differences between what Ambrose puts forward in the letter and what Philo says on the matter. Elliott notes that the Fall of Adam is much more clearly elaborated by Ambrose, showing the difference between the two exegetes, even though Ambrose adopts from Philo information about the serpent in minute detail. However, the loudly expressed idea that Ambrose's view of the Fall was adopted by Augustine and is fundamentally different from Philo's can be nuanced. Indeed, Ambrose does not deny the Fall, but he does not see it as a license for human inability to do good. Augustine, however, emphasizes the seriousness of the Fall much more strongly and places its consequences much more clearly at the center of his theology.

In his conclusions, Elliott describes Ambrose's method of adapting his Jewish source Philo and shows that both authors wanted to use Greco-Roman knowledge in the service of faith in the Bible. Both, Elliott explains, had received an excellent Greco-Roman education, the rewards of which they wanted to use in interpreting the Bible.

Elliott's research shows that Ambrose appreciated Philo's allegorical approach, which corresponds with what Savon and Runia have discovered. In short, Ambrose adapts Philo's anthropological and soteriological view in a way that is consistent with the fourth-century Christian view. There is no Christological approach in Philo, so Ambrose repeatedly adds that approach to the Jewish source.

According to Elliott, Philo's Middle Platonism and Ambrose's Christianized Neoplatonism indeed exhibit differences in approach, yet these systems have few differences when it comes to the underlying thoughts. In my experience, however, this analysis by Elliott is rather optimistic; in Ambrose's exegesis, biblical thinking dominates, and the philosophical component never plays the leading role that it does for Philo. Elliott rightly argues that Ambrose changed more about his source theologically than he did philosophically. But at the same time, the philosophical carpet pad, as it were, has been rendered harmless by the thorough Christianization. An example is Philo's image of man as a sky with starry bodies. Philosophically, this imagery is a fine example of humanity as a microcosm, an idea that is firmly established in other pagan philosophical systems. In Ambrose's exegesis, this image is transformed: the stars for him are the virtues, and the philosophical component is eliminated. Elliott concludes his

study with the valuable observation that Ambrose was a faithful transmitter of the tradition, who, incidentally, put his personal stamp on it as well. In this, I completely agree with Elliott. His study is of great scholarly importance, a real *Fundgrube*. It is very insightful and indispensable to further research on Ambrose.

Marius A. van Willigen

ELM, Susanna, and BLUNDA, Christopher M., ed. *The Late (Wild) Augustine*. Boston: Brill, 2021. Augustinus – Werk und Wirkung, 11. 240 p.

The Late (Wild) Augustine is an edited volume that brings together nine scholars, several of whom are senior researchers in their fields, to analyze the late writings and influence of Augustine. The contributions span multi-disciplinary approaches of historical, literary, philosophical, theological, and philological analysis and offer a textually rich portrayal of the socio-historical, religious, and philosophical dimensions of the late Augustine's thought and times. This portrayal is one of the volume's most important contributions to the field of Augustinian studies, where there remains a dearth of scholarship on the late Augustine, at least in comparison to Augustine's earlier writings. Elm rightly notes this dearth in her introduction, contrasting the long and rich history of scholarly love for the Augustine of *Confessiones* (*conf.*)—from Petrarch, to Husserl, to Gadamer, to Wittgenstein, to Arendt—with the later Augustine of Luther, Calvin, and Jansen less loved and admired by scholars.

The scholarship in the book is reliable and insightful, and most chapters focus on an issue within a single work of Augustine. The chapters delve into the Pelagian controversy—often the scholarly choice of topic when it comes to the late Augustine—as well as into a range of other issues, including: wider ecclesiastical controversies, Augustine's sense of his own legacy, his critical engagement with the wider Roman legal context and historical milieu, and the early reception history of his works. The contributions are a bit uneven in the sense that some are more accessible to a general scholarly audience while others are quite technical. Overall, the volume will probably appeal most to scholars and students working within Augustinian studies.

The volume is limited in part by an issue that commonly plagues edited volumes, namely, the lack of a clear theme borne and

developed throughout the chapters. In the introduction, Elm situates the contributions broadly within the late writings of Augustine from 418 to 430, focusing on five works: *De doctrina Christiana (doc. Chr.)*, *Retractationes (retr.)*, *De haeresibus (haer.)*, *Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum (c. Jul. imp.)*, and *Speculum (spec.)*. This focus is true for about two-thirds of the chapters, with the other third ranging into other writings of Augustine. The volume's title refers to the late and "wild" Augustine, intended to paint a portrait of Augustine as a fearless, formidable, and controversial intellect willing to push ideas to and beyond their limits. A few chapters directly engage with this theme, but most do not explicitly leverage it in their analysis, leaving it to the reader's imagination to discern the connection. Each chapter is a worthy read in itself, but cumulatively the chapters do not press forward an overarching argument beyond alerting the reader to the complexity, intrigue, and range of interests that occupy the late writings of Augustine, itself a noteworthy contribution.

This is not to say that the volume lacks coherence or thematic developments. While it is difficult to discern an overarching set of themes that encompass the volume, one can glean thematic continuities among different subsets of chapters. These continuities appear coincidental rather than intentional, but they trace salient and interesting points in Augustine's late writings. Elm helpfully notes several of these themes in the introductory chapter, of which the most important are the intersection between the text as a material production and the following: the development of Augustine's heresiology; Augustine's sense of his own legacy; Augustine's increased interest in and use of the positive side of human materiality (i.e., the embodiment of the soul) in renegotiating the Platonist and Christian dimensions of his anthropology; and Augustine's employment of the negative side of human materiality (i.e., the connection between original sin and sexuality) in his late anti-Pelagian writings.

Mark Vessey's chapter is positioned after the introduction in part, according to Elm, to draw attention to the importance of the material, or physical, text as an avenue for considering Augustine's thought. Vessey opens with the two pivotal moments of Augustine's conversion and death, arguing that the physical books themselves contribute to each event. The conversion scene in *conf.* 8 centers on Augustine's act of taking and opening a book, while Possidius depicts Augustine's death scene with pages of the Psalms of penance posted on the walls of his room. Both scenes are fabricated for the reader in order to emphasize, through the material effect of the text on Augustine in life and death, the importance of books. Augustine and Possidius

are attempting to create textual communities, a point Vessey illustrates in the main thrust of the chapter that focuses on *spec.*, Augustine's last work, which is a short handbook of collected Scripture focused on God's law. Often taken as a list or mere collection, Vessey argues that *spec.* utilizes an authorial minimalism in which Augustine acts as a human index, bringing together Scripture and community with the goal of facilitating prescribed reading practices in support of a spiritual hermeneutics of self-scrutiny and self-formation. While *spec.* provides the content for the textual community, Vessey argues that *doc. Chr.* provides the community's method. Vessey concludes with a few words on *doc. Chr.* that are less textual analysis and more a textual situating intended to frame *doc. Chr.* as a metatext on hermeneutics—a manual on reading texts and transforming readers. Here Vessey focuses on the final words of *doc. Chr.* in which Augustine is concerned not about the person he was or is, but about what he will become in the hands of future readers. Augustine is identifying with his textual corpus, and *doc. Chr.* becomes the manual whereby Augustine tries to shape his future identity.

Viewed in this way, Vessey's contribution sets up several of the remaining chapters that draw attention to material aspects of Augustine's thought and relate to one of the various Roman and Christian literary, philosophical, and religious communities with which he engages in his writings. The chapters by Conybeare and Flower complement one another in the sense that both offer a literary analysis of the polemical disputes that range across Augustine's engagement with some of these communities. Conybeare focuses on *c. Jul. imp.* and argues that despite formal similarities with ancient controversial dialogues, it does not belong within this genre. Elm points out in the introduction that by the time of *c. Jul. imp.* Augustine has come to eschew such genres so as to avoid the appearance of lying. Augustine makes clear in the prologue that the exchange between him and Julian is not dialogical. Neither is *c. Jul. imp.* a commentary, a possibility that Conybeare rejects because it would privilege the authority of the original text (i.e., Julian's work). She argues that *c. Jul. imp.* is best understood as the invention of a new sub-genre of marginalia in which one responds to the text of another with critical notes in the margins of the original text. Though not directly addressed, it is worth acknowledging that Elm and Conybeare's conclusions provide notes of caution with respect to other recent scholarship, such as O'Donnell and Bonner, who argue that Augustine's work, from *conf.* to his anti-Pelagian writings, is steeped in mendacity that does not faithfully represent either himself or his opponents.

Conybeare delineates Augustine's moral and theological critique of Julian otherwise and, inserting her own provocative twist, argues *c. Jul. imp.* is something like graffiti, an analogy she draws from the literary theory of Jason Scott-Warren. From this analogy she gleans a fourfold insight into the text. First, it presents a textual space in which Julian's work is like the wall and Augustine's comments the graffiti. This imagery makes *c. Jul. imp.* necessarily incomplete because Julian's work can never be fully deconstructed inasmuch as the wall is needed for the graffiti. Second, we glimpse insight into the text's subjective space in the way that, like graffiti, the personalities of the artists are on display in the personal attacks on both sides. Third, we see the temporal space of *c. Jul. imp.* as marking the end of Augustine's life, when he faces his own mortality and death. Conybeare finds a fierceness, fearlessness, and unflinching engagement—perhaps a "wildness", though this is not a term she uses—in how Augustine takes up the question of mortality, sin, death, grace, and redemption, knowing his own death is close. Fourth, the graffiti imagery opens onto a wider philosophical space in which all attempts to resolve the dispute about sin and grace remain incomplete. The materiality of the text, that is, the title and genre—marginalia is literally writing at the edge of the page, at the edge of the debate—supports the wider theological and philosophical point that divine mystery surrounds sin and grace, and that no human words adequately capture it or end the debate.

Flower focuses on *haer.*, a less commonly studied text that scholarship has sometimes cast as a mechanical cataloguing of eighty-eight heresies that repeats prior work in heresiology. Seeking to move beyond this view, Flower focuses on two aspects of the work. First, he examines Augustine's relation with prior Christian heresiology, arguing that Augustine attempts to ground himself within the tradition while simultaneously maintaining that *haer.* is the most comprehensive, authoritative, and reliable manual. Second, and toward this end, Flower notes parallels between Augustine's method and other ancient Roman technical literature, especially the encyclopedia, to gain a wider view of how Augustine is constructing his authority. Here again, we see that the material form of the text—the listing of the heresies as a technical, rhetorical, and scientific strategy—is constitutive of its authority and argument. Flower cautions, however, that despite Augustine's claim to mastery and superiority, *haer.* ends in a pessimistic tone, with Augustine arguing that it is impossible to offer a comprehensive catalogue of all heresies, a qualification that Flower notes is common in encyclopedic literature. One should note the parallel conclusions that come from the literary analysis of Flower

and Conybeare, and how the structural nature of the texts, both of which remain incomplete, drive toward a deeper theological and philosophical conclusion with regard to heresy.

Moving beyond the literary analysis of Conybeare and Flower, the three chapters of Burns, Blunda, and Hermanowicz offer historical and theological analyses of key disputes in which Augustine was engaged and the legacy of these disputes. Burns' chapter focuses on a key theological argument of *c. Jul. imp.*, namely, the status of inherited guilt. He notes that contemporary scholars agree that Augustine changes his position on the condition of humans at birth, but scholars do not always agree about how the shift took place or exactly what the shift entails. Addressing this issue, Burns maintains that the core of Augustine's argument in *c. Jul. imp.* is that inherited guilt is passed through sexual generation and not through any form of imitation. This claim carries in a new direction the volume's metanarrative theme of materiality, namely, the significance of embodiment and its relation to sin. Working out this claim, Burns delineates four phases in Augustine's teaching on inherited guilt. First, Augustine's early view is that the sin of Adam and Eve passes on the punishment of mortality, and mortality in turn weakens the intellect's control over bodily impulses, leading to sin. Second, around 406-407 Augustine shifts positions to argue that Adam and Eve's sin generates not just mortality but also an inherited concupiscence as punishment, though he provides little detail on this sin or how it is transmitted. Third, during the early part of the Pelagian controversy, Augustine begins to argue that all humans share a sin they commit together with Adam that causes both death and concupiscence, and this sin is transmitted through the defective operation of sexual generation. Augustine takes Paul's claim in Rom 7:14-25 regarding the "law of sin in the body" to refer to inherited carnal concupiscence. At this point, Augustine has reversed the earlier dynamic of mortality-sin to a new dynamic of sin-mortality. Fourth, in his controversy with Julian, Augustine draws on his reading of Rom 7:14-25 to focus his earlier claims regarding the centrality of lust and sexual reproduction as the modus through which original sin passes from parents to newborn children.

Blunda's chapter moves beyond *c. Jul. imp.* and looks at the reception history of the late Augustine among fifth-century monastic communities in southern Gaul, sometimes mischaracterized as the semi-Pelagian controversy. Blunda focuses on Gennadius of Marseilles' work *De viris illlustribus*, which provides biographies, including Augustine's, that encompass the past eighty years of Christian history

in the Roman world. Augustine is mentioned in five biographies, and Blunda traces how Gennadius in each portrays Augustine as an ambivalent figure whose theological brilliance is a source of danger and confusion and to whose works no doctrinal deference is owed. Gennadius' biography of Julian of Eclanum is revealing at this point in the way Gennadius endeavors to portray Augustine and Julian on the same authoritative level while casting suspicion on both parties. Gennadius underscores the danger of Augustine in his biographies of Simplicianus and Augustine, where he associates the development of Augustine's later views regarding the gratuity of grace with positions held by Origen, the implication being that Augustine, and later Prosper of Aquitaine, is close to heresy. In this regard, Blunda carries forward the analysis of Conybeare and Burns but also offers an ironic twist to Flower. Flower demonstrates how Augustine works to develop the genre of heresiology within the Latin West, while Blunda shows how later thinkers working within this genre use it to cast suspicion on Augustine's own works.

Hermanowicz' chapter sleuths out the polemical context underlying the ten canons of the council of 427, a conference called by Aurelius, the primate of Africa. The Donatists are not mentioned, and the canons are not theological in nature; they are concerned with clerical property and disputes. Hermanowicz argues, however, that the Donatists are the focus of the canons and that the council is a sign of ongoing problems with the liquidation, hiding, and transference of clerical property as a result of the controversy. Hermanowicz engages in detailed philological and manuscript analysis of the canons in order to establish two broad points: 1) Augustine remains engaged with and concerned about the Donatists into the late 420s, having to deal with them at the administrative level, and 2) Augustine and his African colleagues borrowed writings from the Greek church when drawing up their canons, in order to establish their international credentials and situate the African church within the wider international Christian community. Her chapter and its conclusions serve the important function of demonstrating the lingering legacy and influence of the Donatist controversy, at least at the organizational and ecclesiastical level, within the African church even though Augustine in his writings is largely silent on the issue after the conference of 411, and Possidius maintains that the controversy is ended at this point.

The remaining two chapters of the volume address Augustine's negotiation with his wider Greco-Roman philosophical and literary heritage. Working through *retr.* and Augustine's Platonism, Brachtendorf notes that two central theological concerns are interwoven

throughout the text: the question of grace and the nature of body-soul relationship. Focusing on the less-explored body-soul relationship, Brachtendorf adopts and nuances von Harnack's and Burnaby's claim that Augustine is critiquing his own earlier Platonism and its attendant mind- body dualism in search of a greater harmony and psychosomatic unity between body and soul. Elm helpfully notes here a complementarity between Vessey's focus on Augustine's material hermeneutics, using texts to order the intellectual and spiritual community, and Brachtendorf's focus on Augustine's anthropology and his quest for harmony between body and soul. Brachtendorf argues that in *retr*. we see a search for a greater integration of body and soul spanning Augustine's physiology, epistemology, ethics, and eschatology. For example, in his physiology Brachtendorf notes that Augustine provides only one correction to *c. Jul. imp*. concerning the story of the Ugly King of Cyprus. Though initially puzzling, Augustine follows this story with references to the story about Jacob and the striped lambs, both of which stories have a similar point: physical perception influences *in utero* development. Along epistemic lines, Augustine develops a critique of Platonic anamnesis. While not rejecting reason or its epistemic priority, he argues that the light of eternal reason comes in and through embodiment rather than being abstracted from it. Concerning ethics, Brachtendorf complements Burns' analysis, noting that in *retr*. Augustine documents changes in his views about original sin, criticizing his earlier positions that suggested sexual relations are inherently sinful. Now, he argues that sexual reproduction is part of created human nature and only becomes sinful because of the Fall, nuancing Burns' contention that the dynamic of original sin shifts from mortality-sin to sin-mortality. Regarding eschatology, in *retr*. Augustine argues for the perfection of the entire person, body and soul, and rejects the idea that the mind can be perfected without the body. He also now entertains the idea that we receive the *visio dei* through the body itself, a change Brachtendorf tracks from *De Genesi ad litteram* 12 to *De civitate Dei* 22.

Tuttle works from the perspective of social history and literary analysis, taking up Augustine's engagement with the Roman literary tradition. Tuttle sets up this analysis with an examination of the changing marriage legislation in post-Constantine Rome in order to address the issue of sexual violence in Augustine's discussion of the rape of the Sabine women in *De civitate Dei* 2.17 and 3.13. Tuttle argues that this discussion forms the basis of his broader arguments on legal marriage (*condicio*) and social position (*origo*), and serves as a metaphor for the transmission of original sin. Augustine develops

his position through a critique of Livy's version of the story. In Livy, the story becomes an etiology of marriage and citizenship, while in Augustine the story is one of unjust violence, rape, and enslavement. Tuttle examines contemporary Roman legal concepts of abduction marriage and how Augustine draws on them to reshape Livy's Sabine women into proto-Christian exemplars of appropriate female behavior. According to Augustine, because they refuse to consent out of *pietas* to their family, the women are not legitimately married and their marriage is a captivity. Augustine is arguing for the instability of legal categories in the Roman Empire (e.g., *condicio*, *origo*). He uses this conclusion to undermine the idea of Roman citizenship: the Sabine women were slaves, and as mothers of all Rome, so too are all Romans. Tuttle argues that Augustine also uses the story of the Sabine women to make a second, parallel claim that as the women are enslaved through sin and bequeath this to all future generations, so too are Adam and Eve enslaved through sin and bequeath this slavery to all future generations. Tuttle does not develop this second theological point as convincingly as her social and literary analysis of the rape of the Sabine women. Here the reader would be advised to consult Burns' chapter, which also takes up the question of inherited guilt and sinfulness.

In conclusion, the volume offers a multi-disciplinary approach that weaves a rich tapestry of the social, political, theological, and philosophical thinking of the late Augustine. The volume portrays the late, "wild", Augustine as one who remains engaged in controversies and debates within Christianity and the wider Roman empire, unflinchingly addressing issues of sin, death, and mortality even as his own mortality looms. The volume also shows Augustine's sensitivity to his own legacy and how he would live on in name and text beyond his death, that is, how he would live on in material form past his own material embodiment.

Matthew Drever

GARCIA ALVAREZ, Jaime. *Que veux-tu que je fasse pour toi? L'accompagnement spirituel des malades et des personnes âgées à la lumière de saint Augustin*. Le Coudray-Macouard: Saint Léger Éditions, 2020. 231 p.

The pastoral focus of Augustinians has proved its malleability to the needs of different circumstances and periods. Education, scholarly

work, as well as pastoral care and assistance in parishes and institutes have been major areas of activity and attention for Augustinians in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In light of this focus, Father Jaime Garcia Alvarez, OSA, offers a relevant contribution to pastoral praxis and spiritual care for people who are vulnerable for reasons of age or health. This book presents pastoral reflections on carefully selected fragments of Augustine's texts.

The book's author brings the core of these insights to the reader's attention in an introduction (11) guided by the concepts of *sollicitude* (taking care for) and *accueillir* (to welcome). The author then meditates in thirteen concise chapters on topics such as suffering, desire, trust, and communication. Father Jaime Garcia Alvarez quotes Augustine's text fragments in French translation. He chose them mainly from Augustine's homiletic works but also from commentaries such as *Io. eu. tr.*, *en. Ps.*, *conf.*, and in some cases from works such as *sol.* or *ciu.* In addition to its Augustinian orientation, the book contains traces of phenomenological existential philosophy. The latter influence is a sign of the author's emphasis on respect for alterity in a relationship with a vulnerable person. Yet, Father Alvarez states that the unique quality of an asymmetrical relationship between two people who are living within different atmospheres of life may deepen the perspective of both. However, the author never explains his philosophical stance in detail. He infrequently mentions Max Scheler (48) and evokes the context of phenomenological reflection on suffering in expressions such as 'La douleur existe en moi et pour moi. Il n'y a pas de souffrance en soi, mais des personnes qui souffrent' (49).

After the introduction, Alvarez takes the topic of communication with vulnerable people as a point of departure for his discourse in the first chapter. This topic leads him into a meditation on the mystery of suffering in the second chapter and, in the third chapter, makes him widen his scope in an anthropological direction via a discussion of encounters with elderly people. In this comprehensive perspective, Alvarez turns the spotlight towards Scripture in chapter four: Jesus' encounter with the Samaritan woman (Jh. 4:1-42). Chapter five offers a meditation on *misericordia* based on the parable of the Good Samaritan. Father Alvarez goes in the sixth chapter into the element of respect for ill and aged persons in dialogue with Exodus' narrative on Moses and the burning bush (Ex. 3). He discussed this important topic in the context of hospitality: the encounter between Martha and Mary (Lc. 10:38-42). Grace and love are issues and topics for meditation in the seventh chapter. This meditation finds its scriptural foundation in the parable of the rich

young man (Mt. 19:16-30). These reflections lead the author in chapter eight to the subject of trust in the context of Alzheimer's disease. In chapter nine, by considering the disciples on the road to Emmaus (Lc. 24:13-35), Alvarez examines communication and the decision to initiate relationships with vulnerable people. The book ends with a four-part reflection on the topics of happiness (chapter 10), hope (chapter 11), God's initiative to join human persons in a bond of love (chapter 12), and a final chapter on God's mercy.

In a conclusion, Father Alvarez sums up the steps he discerns in the process of engaging with a vulnerable person, illustrated by Mark's version of Jesus' feeding a multitude with bread and fish (Mc. 6:36-44). The process starts with seeing that it is necessary to catch hold of the gift of life (*prendre la vie*, 222), even in its limitations. A second step is to observe and adapt to the view of Jesus (*regarder*, 222), which finds its consequence in gratitude to the Lord (*rendre grâce*, 222). This insight enables willingness to share (*partager*, 222) and finally, to give (*donner*, 222).

By initiating the reader into Augustine's scriptural spirituality through the richness of biblical texts, Alvarez makes that spirituality accessible to professional pastors and others who seek inspiration in their contact with the ill or the aged. However, there is one caveat. Even though everything stated in this book may stimulate and deepen relationships with the ill and the aged, not much has been said on the topic of devoted caretakers who may feel incapable and unable to meet these ambitious standards for caring for the vulnerable. Since many professional or voluntary pastoral caretakers must face the risk of burning out, it would be interesting to read more of Augustine's voice on the topic of human limitations. Care for the vulnerable occurs today in a society that often fails to create stable communities, which could facilitate that care. The book of Jaime Garcia Alvarez has opened the door to creating them.

Martin Claes

GIANI, Marina. *Il "Liber glossarum" e la tradizione altomedievale di Agostino*. Firenze: SISMEL Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2021. OPA : secoli III-XV, 1. XIII-430 p.

Le *Liber Glossarum*, naguère appelé *Glossarium Ansileubi*, est à la fois une encyclopédie gigantesque et un glossaire, dont le noyau initial est fondé sur les *Étymologies* d'Isidore de Séville, enrichies par

le recours à de multiples œuvres grammaticales, scientifiques et patristiques. Il compte environ 56000 entrées, rangées selon un ordre alphabétique qui prend en compte jusqu'à la quatrième lettre de chaque mot. Jusqu'en 2016, on ne disposait à son sujet que d'éditions très partielles et d'un relevé sommaire de sources. L'édition digitale complète, procurée cette année-là par Anne Grondeux et Franck Cinato (www.liber-glossarum.huma-num.fr), est un travail magistral, qui permet désormais une approche de l'ouvrage vraiment scientifique.

Dans sa première partie (3-162), Marina Giani (M. G.) étudie le *Liber Glossarum* (= *Lg*) dans sa globalité : titre, auteur, structure, sources, tradition manuscrite, méthode de compilation. Le nom au génitif : *Ansileubi*, *cuiusdam Gothorum episcopi,* figurait dans un manuscrit de Moissac, consulté au XVIIe s. et perdu depuis, qui transmettait seulement une forme secondaire de *Lg* ; comme ce nom ne figure dans aucun des 15 manuscrits connus, son autorité semble faible. Date et lieu de composition restent controversés. Naguère encore, on voyait dans *Lg* un monument de la première érudition carolingienne, une thèse adaptée en dernier lieu par Veronika von Büren qui situe la composition durant la seconde moitié du VIIIe s. en Italie septentrionale, dans un milieu riche en bibliothèques et où vivaient des réfugiés visigoths. Les éditeurs de *Lg* ont retenu une autre solution : une composition effectuée au VIIe s. à l'intérieur de la péninsule ibérique, d'abord à Séville à partir de matériaux réunis par Isidore pour la rédaction des *Étymologies*, puis à Saragosse sous les évêques Braulion et Taion, avant le transfert de l'ouvrage par un exilé au-delà des Pyrénées à la suite de la conquête arabe. Après examen détaillé des arguments invoqués de part et d'autre, M. G. montre que les deux théories ont en commun une relation étroite entre la genèse très complexe des *Étymologies* et celle du *Liber Glossarum*. Parmi les sources repérées, la plus récente est l'*Ars* de Julien de Tolède (vers 690), tandis qu'aucun auteur insulaire (qu'il soit irlandais ou anglo-saxon) n'a été exploité. M. G. se prononce en définitive pour une compilation effectuée en Espagne, à partir de livres accessibles dans le monde visigothique, mais sans que la localisation à Saragosse s'impose par rapport à d'autres possibilités comme Tolède, au temps de Julien. Son analyse, bien conduite et solidement documentée, emporte la conviction.

La seconde partie (165-384), qui intéresse plus directement les lecteurs de cette revue, est consacrée aux extraits d'Augustin présents dans le *Liber glossarum*. M. G. commence par établir avec soin, en rectifiant quelques oublis ou erreurs des éditeurs de *Lg*, un corpus de 291 entrées. La plupart portent dans les manuscrits le nom *Augustini*

ou *Agustini*, complété mais rarement par un nom d'ouvrage : *ex libro de ciuitate dei*, *ex libro de genesi ad litteram*, *in decadis*. Certaines cependant sont dépourvues d'étiquettes ou portent d'autres noms (par exemple *Esidori*, *Eutropi*, *Virgili*) par erreur ou en raison de leur caractère composite. Parfois aussi le nom d'Augustin est présent, là où la source véritable est en fait Isidore, citant Augustin, ou encore un ouvrage pseudépigraphe (comme l'*Explanatio de Salomone*, l'*Hypomnesticon contra Pelagianos*, etc.). Parmi les 291 entrées retenues, 148 sont extraites du *De ciuitate Dei*, 66 des *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, 31 du *De Genesi ad litteram*, 15 des *Tractatus in Euangelium Iohannis*, 14 du *De Sermone Domini in monte* ; le reliquat provenant des *Sermones ad populum*, du *De consensu euangelistarum* et du *De Genesi aduersus Manichaeos*. Les compilateurs ont utilisé Augustin comme une mine d'informations sur l'histoire romaine ; la religion, la philosophie et les sciences païennes ; la faune et la flore bibliques ; des définitions lexicales, sans s'intéresser aux aspects exégétiques ou doctrinaux. Un chapitre synthétique, fort intéressant (197-263), commente les interventions éditoriales des compilateurs : adaptations, phrases de transition, simplifications lexicales, coupures, additions, erreurs de compréhension, et insiste sur le rôle du substrat isidorien dans l'organisation des entrées. À la lumière de ces observations, les quatre chapitres suivants visent à évaluer la situation et la valeur textuelles des extraits du *Lg*, en tant que tradition indirecte : pour le *De ciuitate Dei* (265-301), les *Enarrationes in psalmos* (303-336), le *De Genesi ad litteram* (337-364) et l'ensemble des autres œuvres (365-384). Les états de la question sont soignés, la méthode d'analyse impeccable, les résultats un peu décevants. L'intérêt textuel de *Lg*, pour les éditeurs d'Augustin, est réduit, et sans commune mesure avec ce qu'apportent Eugippe, Bède ou Florus. On retiendra cependant les conclusions suivantes, qui intéressent aussi les discussions sur l'origine du *Liber glossarum*. En ce qui concerne *ciu*., le modèle faisait partie d'une branche diffusée dans la péninsule ibérique et en France méridionale. Pour *en. Ps*., les compilateurs disposaient d'une édition répartie en décades et ignorant les erreurs des familles carolingiennes ; en deux passages, *Lg* permet peut-être de combler des lacunes de la tradition directe : « suspenduntur *atque exaltantur* fluctus » (*en. Ps*. XCII, 7, d'après *Lg* SV997 [suspensure]) ; « putas, cum ita loquuntur : *'Putas uidebo hoc', 'putas fiet hoc' uel certe*, 'putas euasi hoc' » (*en. Ps*. CXXIII, 8, d'après *Lg* PV421 [putas]). Dans le cas de *Gen. litt*., la source de *Lg* appartenait aux étages supérieurs du stemma et conservait des leçons authentiques attestées dans très peu de témoins (spécialement Roma, Sess. 13, début VIe s. et Saint-Gall,

Stiftsbibl. 161, IXe s.), mais infime est le nombre de variantes exploitables par le futur éditeur de l'ouvrage. À l'égard des autres traités d'Augustin, les extraits sont en trop petit nombre pour qu'on puisse en tirer vraiment parti. Je voudrais m'attarder seulement sur le cas du *s.* Wilmart 20 ou 101 auct., d'ou sont tirés les extraits EX37 [exaggerat] et SA285 [salutatio] (commentés aux p. 169, 176, 208-209, 373-374). De ce sermon, plutôt rare, j'ai donné une édition critique dans *Sacris Erudiri*, 60, 2021, 7-33, trop tard pour que M. G. puisse l'exploiter, et trop tôt pour que je puisse y faire état de *Lg* en tant que tradition indirecte. Cet exemple est intéressant. À propos de SA285, M. G. a rectifié une erreur des éditeurs de 2016 (qui renvoyaient à *en. Ps.* CI), mais elle les critique à tort au sujet d'EX37 (où ceux-ci ont raison de supposer un emprunt au § 5 du modèle : cf. 169 n. 15). Les compilateurs de *Lg* n'ont retenu du sermon que quelques détails, ce qui illustre bien leur méthode de dépouillement : pour *salutatio*, l'étymologie du mot et le formulaire que les anciens employaient dans leur lettre ; pour *exaggerat*, la définition de l'exagération et deux emplois bibliques de cette figure. EX37 est assez long et fournit diverses variantes, sans valeur pour l'établissement du texte, mais qui reflètent un modèle distinct des neuf manuscrits que j'ai collationnés et dont aucun n'était originaire d'Espagne.

En conclusion et pour résumer mon jugement, je dirais que le livre de M. G. expose et éclaire fort bien les problèmes que pose le *Liber glossarum*, ainsi que les techniques de ses compilateurs. Et sûre est la méthode avec laquelle sont commentés les extraits tirés d'Augustin. Si les résultats obtenus à leur sujet sont restreints, cela tient à la nature de la source, non à un défaut de l'enquête.

François Dolbeau

GLOWASKY, Michael. *Rhetoric and Scripture in Augustine's Homiletic Strategy: Tracing the Narrative of Christian Maturation*. Leiden: Brill, 2021. Supplements to Vigiliae christianae, 166. VIII-195 p.

One of the helpful pieces of advice that M. Lamberigts gave me for studying Augustine was to take into account Augustine's rhetorical education and abilities. In this respect, Augustine research still has much to discover. A valuable contribution to the study of Augustine's rhetoric is the revised edition of Michael Glowasky's dissertation, recently published in the series *Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae*. The author focuses on Augustine's *sermones ad populum*. His central

thesis is that Augustine employs rhetorical tools and, in particular, a distinct homiletical strategy in his sermons; Glowasky's aim is to explore the purpose and the method underlying Augustine's preaching practice. Glowasky clearly demonstrates that Augustine's preaching strategy is designed to guide his audience on their spiritual journey through this transitory world towards eternal life.

Glowasky is aware of the specific problems encountered when examining Augustine's sermons, such as how to organize them, how to select the most relevant ones, and the problems relating to their chronology. The author takes the concrete situation of Augustine's audience as his selection criterion, *in casu* the distinct stages of their spiritual maturation. He mentions arguments for leaving the chronology of the sermons aside. There is much to be said for being cautious about the chronology of sermons as an organising principle, but that chronology can nevertheless be taken into account to a greater extent than Glowasky does. Glowasky's approach leaves the impression that the sermons exhibit no development in terms of subject matter, but this lack of development is not demonstrated.

Concerning Augustine's homiletical strategy, Glowasky argues that the rhetorical tool of *narratio* is essential. After explaining the function of *narratio* in classical rhetorical theory, he deals with Augustine's handbook on preaching: *De doctrina christiana*. He makes it clear that the church father presents Scripture as the given *narratio* of the sermon, but the way Scripture is used as *narratio* depends on the situation of the preacher's audience. In this respect Glowasky differentiates three progressive stages in the Christian maturation process: (1) catechumens during the catechumenate, prior to baptism; (2) neophytes during the short period from baptism to the eight day; and (3) the subsequent phase, when they are received among the faithful.

With regard to the first stage, Glowasky contends that Scripture functions as Augustine's *narratio* in a manner akin to how *narratio* would function in a judicial oration. The preacher seeks to persuade the catechumens to enter the Catholic Church by making the case that it is the only locus of salvation. In classical judicial argument, *narratio* and *confirmatio* belong together. In *De catechizandis rudibus*, Glowasky presents the description of God's salvific work in history as the *narratio* of the church, and the sermons on the Creed and the Lord's Prayer as the corresponding *confirmatio*. This presentation implies that Glowasky relies on Augustine's homiletical works for the *confirmatio* but not the *narratio*. Concerning the *narratio*, Glowasky discerns three episodes which are important for Augustine in making

his case for the church: the creation, the flood, and the exodus, including the subsequent desert journey. The Lenten sermons confirm the preacher's claim and refute competing claims, with the intent that the catechumens make their decision in favour of the church.

When the catechumens are baptized, the second stage begins. The teaching in this second phase concerns the sermons to the neophytes, preached during the Easter octave. According to Glowasky, in these sermons Augustine constructs, rhetorically speaking, a deliberative argument. This deliberative argument instructs neophytes in the Christian way of living according to their new identity. In this respect Glowasky notes a difference between Augustine's sermons and those of other church fathers, such as Ambrose. Augustine is less interested in the mystical significance of the baptismal rite itself. Instead he delivers a strong ethical appeal. It is interesting to consider how Glowasky explains this difference from the perspective of rhetoric: the preacher is no longer constructing a descriptive narrative, as he did for the catechumens, but instead a prescriptive and proscriptive *narratio*, aimed at the exhortation of the neophytes. Once again Augustine relies on the three key biblical episodes (creation, flood, exodus), but now they are the source for his instruction in how the neophytes ought to live, which accords with the deliberative rhetorical style.

The third stage concerns the life of all believers who have previously been catechumens and neophytes. It is therefore understandable that the teaching of this phase includes many more sermons than the teaching of the two previous phases. Glowasky demonstrates awareness of the diversity of the preacher's audience, but he sees the unifying aspect in their transformative journey through earthly life to eternal life. On this spiritual journey, Augustine seeks to guide his congregation through and beyond the *narratio* of Scripture. It is remarkable that Glowasky does not distinguish a specific rhetorical genre in this third phase, except for the informal and dialogical style of the sermons to the faithful. This dialogical approach is referred to as a pedagogical method that is intended to remove intellectual and affective impediments to the soul's progression from the carnal realm to the spiritual realm. Essential to this dialogic approach is a figurative application of Scripture. In this analysis Glowasky again focuses on the *narratio* of the creation (including the Sabbath), the flood (including the ark), and the exodus (including the desert journey). With regard to the third stage, the author clearly indicates that it is a new phase after the first two. Less convincing is his argument that, from a rhetorical perspective, there is a unique strategy that distinguishes the sermons to the

faithful from the sermons preached to the catechumens and neophytes. After all, the dialogical quality of the sermons for the believers can also be found in the sermons relating to the first two stages. In addition to this, it is questionable whether the difference between the third and the earlier stages is really that great with regard to the figurative interpretation of the Scriptures. An example is the allegorical explanation of the desert journey in *sermo* 363: the journey of the Israelites is an image of the spiritual journey of the faithful to the heavenly promised land. Glowasky presents this sermon as representative of the third phase. But this figurative exegesis does not differ substantially from sermons that he classifies as stage two, for example, *sermones* 259 and 260B. These remarks do not alter the fact that Glowasky's study provides very valuable insights into Augustine's homiletic strategy. He makes clear that while Augustine's aim is not merely to create ornate oratorical performances, he nevertheless makes full use of his rhetorical training and skills when initiating his audience into the divine mysteries of Scripture, encouraging his congregation in spiritual progress, and guiding them to the eternal vision of God.

Jan Bernard ten Hove

GOLDHILL, Simon. *The Christian Invention of Time: Temporality and the Literature of Late Antiquity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Greek culture in the roman world. XVI-500 p.

Here we have a grandiose though puzzlingly mistitled book (which should be, and sometimes is, dubbed 'The Invention of Christian Time') on a big subject in a style which blends a baroque luxuriance with (at times) more than a whiff of post-modern-cum-sociological jargon; thus we may be introduced to countless 'figurations', 'strategies', 'normativities' and other abstractions of the immensely erudite professional scholar. Thus (comparatively mildly): 'At the very least any specificity to Jewish history is subsumed as a version of Christian narrative'. Nor is Goldhill averse to citing provocative but implausible generalities of others among the mass of authors seemingly present at his command, thus: 'Ring composition ….embodies the elusive melancholy of recognizing things that can, temporarily, cohere' (218) – which may have been helpful in its original context but hardly fits (for example) the ring-composition of Plato's *Republic*.

Yet getting past this apparently fashionable style, Goldhill has a huge amount to teach us about the Christianization of literary

genres, especially with reference to time in (generally) the fourth and fifth centuries A.D. On the Latin side, his chosen examples are Ambrose, Prudentius, Orosius, Sulpicius Severus (biographer of Martin of Tours), and Augustine, for whose work, especially on time, he evinces a perhaps surprising but gratifying respect; indeed the ghost of Augustine's fascinating meditations on time and the timeless haunt Goldhill's entire project. And among the Greeks, Goldhill introduces us especially to Gregory of Nazianzus (explained with particular insight), Gregory of Nyssa, Basil, Nonnus of Panopolis and many another, all being linked by their (often subconscious) rewriting of the pagan (or Jewish) culture which, before the Council of Nicaea (which for Goldhill is the turning point), held them in thrall.

Goldhill's basic claim is that in late antiquity Christian writers strove to replace with (better: to assimilate into) 'God's time' the pagan and Jewish portraits of the passage of 'human time'. Such portraits described an ongoing series of events (perhaps circular), of daily toil ending in infirmity and death, in which man's only hope of immortality (apart from the physical continuity of the race, tribe or city) lies in the possibility for some of attaining something like the undying fame of Achilles and other paradigms of earthly glory: albeit a glory often provocatively delayed whether by personal choice (as with the pique of Achilles himself) or by the unpredictable interventions of fate or some divine agent.

Against all this the Christians tried to align themselves to God's time, where all is submerged in an eternal present whose character defies analysis in human terms: in a timeless 'now' as puzzling in the theological domain as in the more mundane pagan experience of temporality, whether observed as (say) Horace's '*labuntur anni, Postume, Postume*' or Augustine's metaphysical – and eventually theological – puzzlement about what we think we know about time until we think about it. But Goldhill's book, though replete with comment on philosophical attempts to explain time, from Plato and Aristotle to 'Christian times' (*tempora Christiana*), deals not merely with changing philosophies but with the wider phenomenon of cultural change as ancient time was 'raped' (in Goldhill's language) into the acceptance of new paradigms for the relationship between time and eternity. In short Goldhill is telling the tale of a major culture war of the past, seen through changing accounts (and changing experiences or hoped-for experiences) of time and timelessness.

Goldhill's gaze, though largely on antiquity, has implicit (and sometimes explicit) tendencies to move into the 'now' of our own days. In an endless flow of illuminating comments (and digressions),

from the introduction's epigraph (Marilyn Monroe's 'I've been on calendars but I have never been on time') to the observation that the nineteenth century was the first to describe itself as a century, Goldhill reveals how time has been very differently viewed (and differently measured) in the different ages of man. In particular he argues that in late antiquity, in an attempt to explain the inferiority (and bad metaphysics) of human time unless it is seen as a pointer to God's time, the Christians can be said almost uniformly to have set out on the (sometimes conscious) project of explaining how their own vision of time and timelessness is a fitting framework for their supersession of both Greco-Roman and Jewish culture; and an underlying subtext – reviewers too can do post-modern deconstruction – is that we have now more or less shaken off this fascinating but violence-generating experiment.

It is not easy to understand why Goldhill thinks that a Christian account of time was (and is) any more a gateway to violence than other varieties on the historical table; perhaps, in his view, it is because of the supersessionist mentality of most late antique Christians with reference both to Judaism and to Greco-Roman culture. If so, since most Christians have now abandoned any supersessionist project, and ancient culture is increasingly consigned to oblivion, his verdict might require modification: perhaps at least this lethal aspect of Christianity has been purged. Perhaps, however, Goldhill would not want to admit this; only a few years ago his Cambridge College was home to a project to study the social world of late antiquity in which all qualified were invited to participate – unless they were Christian. There does seem to be a more general anti-Christian subtext to Goldhill's *magnum opus*.

Although this is a book about time, it is not a mere discussion of philosophical theories of time; indeed, as noted, Goldhill has written a study not of philosophical ideas but of cultural change; that is why in the second part of his book he examines literary rather than philosophical texts, though in any cultural change, philosophy (often in its less nuanced varieties) plays a substantial role. Essentially, Goldhill's thesis is that an examination of time affords a good, perhaps the best, way of revealing wholesale cultural change: and the change in late antiquity, perhaps, affords a guide to our more modern variant (still to a degree incomplete): from a post-Christian society to an anti-Christian society which still retains Christian markers of time. Thus Goldhill notes our seven-day week, our Christmases and Easters (though – one might add – perhaps these are merely a ghost of what once were religious festivals, now largely limited to the purchase and

consumption of Christmas puddings and Easter eggs and the admiration of red-nosed reindeer and Easter bunnies).

Goldhill's book is divided into two parts. In the first he examines how time-worn concepts of time and its social implications (such as the longing for 'everlasting' fame) are gradually eroded or reconstructed by that relentless Christianization of the empire which was largely formalized and sealed by Constantine's Council of Nicaea. The second part reveals how Christian literary figures – Gregory of Nazianzus, Orosius and the rest – took advantage of their now overprivileged status to 'finish the job', that is, to promote the new Christian 'ideology' – an anachronistic but favoured word of Goldhill's – as it is well represented in the holy vision of the passage from God's creation to the last things, with inevitable consequences for what happens and what is wanted to happen in the centuries (or however long a time is required) which lie between the former and the latter.

In particular, Goldhill describes what he thinks of the changing '*experiencing* of time': not least of how the timeless 'now' of a number of philosophers, especially Plato, is translated into the more populist mindset of the ordinary Christian who thinks he is poised between old-fashion time with its daily motions and changes and some sort of longed-for state into which he might pass: the timeless and changeless world of 'immortality' – though Goldhill neglects (perhaps wisely) the option of devoting much space to how to fit into the now timeless setting the torments of hell (often much welcomed for others by Christians, not least by Tertullian), these being a worthy but hardly timeless (if eternal) imposition of misery and torture.

The newly expanded but in detail usually diminished Christian time-frame is perhaps particularly illuminated by Goldhill's treatment of the changes in the perspective of historians and hence of historiography from Herodotus' *History* to the *Life of Saint Martin of Tours* or the *Universal History* of Orosius, one of Augustine's most dedicated fans. While a 'second generation' (pardon my loose phrase) of Greek historians such as Polybius (following the groundbreaking but particularistic works of Herodotus and Thucydides) looked to compose a 'universal history' which would deal with differing historical scenarios synchronistically while recognizing that all point to a culmination of the past in the apparently all-engrossing power of Rome – *imperium sine fine dedi*, as Virgil put it – so Christian historians, writing 'ecclesiastical history' from Eusebius on, can envisage their work on an even wider (and therefore often less necessarily detailed) canvass: from the creation of time and the world to the last judgment, when time will cease and the eternal present will be all in all.

In the meantime, the Christian of late antiquity concluded that he must look forward to death not, with the Socrates of Plato's *Apology*, as an opportunity to question the heroes of the past but as an entry into a meta-universe whose nature the Christian can hardly as yet begin to understand. For now, however, he must live differently, and die differently, and reform his 'memories' of his own past and that of his culture. Although he may still quote Virgil's *Sunt lacrimae rerum et mentem mortalia tangent*, he finds that such 'experiences' of the inevitability of death – of our mortal, death-fated life – are now open to wholly different interpretation.

No review of reasonable length can do justice to the richness of Goldhill's project or its importance. For all the sniffy pedantry in my opening comments, I must confess that this book, irritating as it is (to me at least) at times, is a major contribution to the study of those culture wars (in a particular exemplification) which, like it or not, are now liable to engross us for the foreseeable future – or the foreseeable 'now'.

John Rist

GRONEWOLLER, Brian. *Rhetorical Economy in Augustine's Theology*. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. Oxford Studies in Historical Theology. 224 p.

This is a thought-provoking monograph on the use of rhetorical economy in Augustine's writings. The thesis is that Augustine used the concept of rhetorical economy to argue various theological issues throughout his career. The theology of creation, history, and theodicy are analysed as examples. The source material quoted and used to prove the main thesis consists of short excerpts from various works of Augustine written over the course of more than thirty years.

In the introduction Gronewoller positions his own book as a contribution to the scholarship of those who argue that "Augustine also integrated rhetorical theory into his theology" (4) and presents a brief summary of the book. Gronewoller follows in the footsteps of Kathy Eden, who influenced Michael Cameron and other American scholars working on Augustine's rhetoric, in claiming that economy was an important concept for ancient rhetorical theory. Gronewoller is also indebted to Robert Dodaro's studies on the presence of *decorum* in Augustine's writings.

The first part, called "Foundations", includes two chapters. The first one, "Augustine's Use of Rhetorical Economy in His Scriptural Hermeneutic" (11-31), begins with a discussion of rhetorical economy, a concept that is essential to his argument (12-22).

Gronewoller claims that "accommodation lies at the center of the art of rhetoric, and the 'economy' is a subset of accommodation" (12). He reminds us of the Ciceronian claim that the main aim of the orator is to talk in a way that is fitting for persuading the audience (basically a repetition of the Aristotelian concept of rhetoric as the art of persuasion) and claims that "the tool of the art was accommodation" (13). In the remaining sections of chapter 1 (23-31), Gronewoller demonstrates how at an early stage of his career, Augustine reflected on Scripture as a text congruent with rhetorical precepts, and portrayed "the Spirit as a rhetor" (25).

Chapter 2, "Creation, History, and God's Activity as Speech" (32-60), analyses small excerpts from various texts produced by Augustine throughout his career. These excerpts reflect on the themes included in the chapter's title. Gronewoller sets out to observe closely the figurative language of Augustine, specifically metaphors and comparisons used in these contexts, because they include terms and concepts stemming from rhetorical and grammatical handbooks. Gronewoller argues that Augustine's use of figurative language reflects his view that the story of creation and history itself are like the linguistic elements of a discourse. The selection of texts for analysis and the analysis itself is very original and persuasive.

The second part of the book, "Creation, History, and Evil," is divided into three chapters that are linked by Gronewoller's notion of rhetorical economy. Chapter 3, "Augustine's Use of Rhetorical Economy in His Theology of Creation" (63-97), is dedicated to an exploration of Augustine's figurative language as used against Manichaeans in refutation of their argument that the world is not reasonably and beautifully arranged. Augustine built on an old philosophical argument that the beauty of a complex object is more than a beauty of its parts. Gronewoller describes arguments developed by Augustine for the first time in this context (69-70). The main difference between Augustine's language and that of the Stoics lies in Augustine's borrowings from rhetorical theory. Next Gronewoller discusses *s.* 29D, 4-7, preached in defence of God's providence, and proves that the metaphors of speech and body, and the idea of order employed in this sermon, are drawn from the context of rhetorical theory. These similarities, heretofore unnoticed, are a good demonstration of Augustine's use of the language of rhetoric in his theology. In the last

part of the chapter, a similar analysis is applied to *ord.* 1, 7, 18. Gronewoller refutes Anne Isabel Bouton-Touboulic's reading of *ord.* 1, 7, 18. He notices that there are general similarities between Augustine's account and earlier philosophical accounts of the notion of order, such as that of Heraclitus (88-90). He persuasively claims that there is no reference to Heraclitus in other works of Augustine and that the context of rhetoric might better explain Augustine's phrasing of the problem.

Chapter 4, "Augustine's Use of Rhetorical Economy in His Theology of History" 98-134, further explores the thesis proposed in chapter 2. The methods are the same but applied to fragments from *uera rel.* 22, 42-43; *mus.* 6, 11, 29-30; *ep.* 138, 5; and *ciu.* 11, 18. Gronewoller's analysis clearly shows that Augustine's rhetorical training influenced his view of history in many aspects. The similarities between rhetorical arrangement and musical composition, with the order of history enabling him to explain the logic of God's providence and interventions, justify the occurrences of evildoers within history and stimulate reflection on the right and wholesome perception of the logic of history.

Chapter 5, "Augustine's Use of Rhetorical Economy in His Theodicy" (135-153), begins with a passage documenting Augustine's use of rhetorical terms such as *distinctio* and *dispositio* when discussing the creation of the natural order. Gronewoller observes a close parallel between *Gn. adu. Man.* 1, 3, 5 and *Institutio oratoria* 4, 56, 69 that is convincing for this reviewer. In such cases, however, we must take care to avoid the error of equivocation. Augustine used some terms stemming from different semantic fields, and we cannot necessarily conclude that he wanted to make a link between the two fields (e.g. when we say *in vitro* we are not making a reference to the art of stained glass). Next Gronewoller discusses *lib. arb.* 3, 9, 27 in order to tackle the complicated issue of Augustine's theodicy. Here Augustine presents a comparison with a household that is well arranged. All its parts, even slaves cleaning sewer drains, harmonize with the ordered whole. Gronewoller assumes that Augustine is making a reference here to Quintilian's text 7, 10, 16. The assumption is based on the use of two words, *conveniat* and *dispositae*, in the text of Augustine and the words *convenire* and *dispositio* in the text of Quintilian. However, the use of the expression *disposita domus* and the verb *convenire* in the portrayal of a well-arranged household is perfectly understandable without the suggestion that Augustine was using the language of rhetorical economy. For example, in *De architectura*, Vitruvius uses the verb *convenire* and participles

stemming from it about thirty times, and *disponere* and its derivatives about sixty times. More importantly, when Vitruvius defines crucial terms in the first book, he introduces the term 'economy' with many of the words that Quintilian also used:

> *Architectura autem constat ex ordinatione, quae graece τάξις dicitur, et ex dispositione, hanc autem Graeci διάθεσιν vocitant, et eurythmia et symmetria et decore et distributione, quae graece οἰκονομία dicitur. Ordinatio est [modica] membrorum operis [commoditas] separatim universeque proportionis ad symmetriam comparatio.* […] *Dispositio autem est rerum apta conlocatio elegansque compositionibus effectus operis cum qualitate* (Vitruvius, *De architectura* 1, 2, 2).

I do not claim that Augustine knew Vitruvius, but rather that Vitruvius defined the vocabulary that was already in use. Augustine learnt this vocabulary as a native speaker of Latin in an area where people were building houses and churches, and discussing their aesthetic value with words such as *ordinatio*, *distributio*, and *decus*.

Two appendices with tables, four indices, and a bibliography take up the last forty pages of the book.

In considering the merits of the research presented in this volume, it is worth asking two questions: (1) To what extent was 'accommodation' a technical term, and what was its relation to rhetorical economy? (2) To what extent could Augustine have been influenced by Quintilian?

In answer to the first question, three points are in order. First, if *accomodatio* was indeed an important concept, we would expect to find it being used as a technical term in ancient manuals of rhetoric, and we would be able to find its definition there. However, no ancient work on rhetoric defined it. One should note that ancient handbooks used words from natural language in *definiens* to define technical terms in *definiendum* and did not use technical terms to define other technical terms, unless they were defined earlier. When Cicero in *De inventione* 1, 9 defines the term *elocutio* (style), he says: *elocutio est idoneorum verborum et sententiarum ad inventionem accommodatio*. So, style is fitting the right words and sentences to comply with the aim of *inventio*. *Inventio* itself was defined earlier; *accommodatio* was not. That is the only time Cicero uses the word *accomodatio* in his rhetorical works. This definition is repeated almost verbatim in other late antique manuals of rhetoric, such as *Ars rhetorica* by Iulius Victor: *Elocutio est idoneorum verborum ad inventionem accommodatio.*

Second, what was the place of rhetorical economy in the system of rhetoric? Rhetorical manuals from late antiquity say that economy

is a subset of *dispositio*, which is clear from Sulpitius Victor's handbook: 14. *In dispositione haec sunt: ordo cum ea, quae Graece appellatur οἰκονομία, dehinc elocutio, tum pronuntiatio*. So *dispositio* consists of order and economy. Thus economy is just a secondary subcategory of *dispositio*, one of the parts of rhetoric. We should also remember that the verb *accommodare*, as well as adverbs and adjectives stemming from it, are used by rhetoricians in the discussion of *aptum* or *decorum*. Quintilian himself uses *accommodatum* as a synonym for *aptum*. *Aptum* or *decorum* were clearly used as technical terms. Third, in Augustine's work there is no trace of any such term as *accomodatio*.

We might also be sceptical of Quintilian's influence on Augustine. While it is true that there are general similarities between Augustine's phrasing in some fragments and the *Institutio oratoria* of Quintilian, A.C. Diddams and J. Gawley[1] have recently proved that in all the places when one can suspect Quintilian's influence one can also suspect Ciceronian influence. Indeed, Hagendahl identified only three instances of paraphrases from Quintilian in Augustine's immense body of writings. In each case the paraphrases are also similar to fragments from Cicero, and there is no doubt that Augustine knew Cicero's works very well. Augustine taught using *De inventione*, as proved by Augustine's own words in *cura mort.* 11, 13, a fact that is well recognized by scholarship. Augustine paraphrases or quotes Cicero on many occasions. Finally, various studies of John O. Ward have shown that Quintilian was not widely used in Late Antiquity or the early Middle Ages, and Quintilian's thoughts were mostly transmitted via excerpts in *florilegia* or added to the manuscripts containing *De inventione* and, possibly, *Rhet. ad Herr.* When reading this book, it is useful to keep in mind that our evidence suggests that Augustine's rhetorical education was shaped by Cicero and *Rhet. ad Herr.*, where there is no mention of rhetorical economy. So, the question of a possible role of Quintilian is interesting but, ultimately, we lack the evidence to support this claim.

Despite some claims that rest on a problematic understanding of Augustine's knowledge of classical rhetoric, this monograph persuasively and efficiently demonstrates how Augustine's language in his theological writing sometimes closely resembles the language of rhetorical handbooks. More specifically, this monograph shows

[1] A.C. Diddams – J. Gawley, "Measuring the Presence of Roman Rhetoric: An Intertextual Analysis of Augustine's *De Doctrina Christiana IV*", *Mouseion. Journal of the Classical Association of Canada* 14, 2017, 391-408.

that Augustine's discourse on creation, history, and, to lesser extent, theodicy – as far as choice of words and images is concerned – was similar to the discussion of order and arrangement in rhetorical handbooks. Much of this book's analysis is illuminating, its structure is very clear and neat, and the language is elegant and precise without being overly burdened by technical vocabulary.

Rafal Toczko

GROVE, Kevin G. *Augustine on Memory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Oxford Studies in Historical Theology. X-265 p.

Kevin Grove's *Augustine on Memory* offers an important revision of familiar approaches to the study of St. Augustine. First, focusing on the first two decades of the fifth century, he demonstrates that Augustine's theological, anthropological, and personal interests changed fundamentally from his relatively early period when he wrote his ever-fascinating *Confessions*. Second, Grove's thesis is based, not on Augustine's treatises or his numerous doctrinal writings against adversaries, but rather on his sermons on the psalms, his longest work "both in years to complete and in number of words" (4).

Grove regards Augustine's sermons on the psalms as "first order theology," by which he means that in these more-or-less extemporaneous reflections, Augustine "conjures up ideas, develops and refines them, and then revisits them … His most extraordinary discoveries emerge in his sermons and radiate outward" into his treatises (8). In chapter 7, Grove offers a detailed example; he explores connections between Augustine's sermons on the psalms and his later treatise *De Trinitate*.

Grove argues it has too often been assumed that the relatively young Augustine, retracing and examining the situations and events of his youth in order to identify God's inner leading, is the essential Augustine. *Confessions* was an important exercise in that he recognized memory "as a mediator of the self in search of unity and union with God" (3), but had he remained at this stage he would have been "stuck (remansit) in the past" that is, in the self (142-143). Augustine's fifth-century sermons reveal his mature realization that the Christian life "is not consummated by self awareness or mindfulness" (202).

Augustine's sermons on the psalms relocate Christian experience within "the whole Christ," a "communally constituted" identity "beyond self and interiority" (112). The "whole Christ" configures

Christ as head, and Christians as Christ's body: "Head and body together form the *totus Christus*, the whole Christ" (75). Augustine did not "minimize individual experience, but connected it to the whole body" (172); his "own existence becomes small and lacking in importance compared with what is being renewed in him through Christ" (196).

Augustine on Memory is divided into three parts. Part One, "The Beginning of Memory," surveys Augustine's publications between the years of 386-391 CE, showing that "memory language helps the young Augustine to describe mediation *within* the human person." However, the self's *failure* to find "God the Creator's presence to Augustine's mind" (202) becomes the starting point and impetus for the self's healing, in which the self comes to be intelligible as the *shared* identity of "minds in relationship to God" (15). "Christ the true mediator of *Confessions* 10 had not yet been formed fully into the gritty, self-emptying, other-focused, binary breaking reality of the Whole Christ" (225).

Part Two, "The Work of Memory," the book's center, recounts the ongoing communal "work" of Christian life. St. Augustine's description of the exercise of the whole Christ is structured by "remembering together" and "forgetting together." Within these rubrics, the reconciliation of many binaries—such as weakness/strength, restlessness/Sabbath rest, solitude/communion, praising/groaning, hope/reality, and knowledge/wisdom—is included in "the work of [communal] remembering" and the equally requisite "work of [communal] forgetting."

Both remembering and forgetting require discernment. It is not a simple matter of choosing one rather than the other; each binary has a harmful and a helpful pole. There is a dangerous way to remember and a harmful way to forget. Remembering wrongly is "recollecting one's own sins in such a way as to become stuck in them" (143). "What needs to be forgotten includes pits of misery, slimy mud, carnal lusts, empty pleasure, the darkness of iniquity, and the knotty problems of human concern" (148). However, "those in the heavenly city cannot forget their liberation, lest they cease to be grateful to their liberator … Memory remains; shame is forgotten" (150). Rightly exercised, these binaries become "sites of healing" (205) toward memory's goal, "the very image of the triune God renewed in human persons" (208).

At the beginning of a sermon, Augustine often referred to the psalm the congregation had just sung together: "Singing together in Christ [reshapes] the individual's heart" … creating a model of collective action as a form of praise (166-167). Even bodies participate

in this collective action: a congregation that sings together, breathes together. This paradigm informs other communal actions, like eating and drinking; even "sexual pleasure between spouses … can praise God" (167; no citation from Augustine is given for the latter suggestion). In sum, communal identity is continuously constructed in "sharing the richness of Christ with each other" (140) "in lived, embodied, and practiced communal experience" (15).

Memory work "in Christ" is a lifelong "intellectual and affective" (27) exercise that repositions and completes the self in the whole. In short, the work of "remembering together comprises Christian existence for Augustine" (20).

Part Three is called "The End of Memory:" "The work of remembering and forgetting ends in becoming Christ together" (225). Grove reads St. Augustine's deathbed "work" as the joyous completion of his emergence from being "stuck in the self" to being "a self refashioned in Christological communion" (200). "When memory first emerged as an anthropological mediator for the early Augustine, it was limited to the confines of the self. Now, the Christological whole … grounds the movement from hope (spes) to reality (res)" (182). Grove's explication of Augustine's deathbed *transitus* completes the memory work he has traced forward from Augustine's early publications as a priest.

Grove's interpretation challenges Possidius's portrait of the dying Augustine as weeping in (implied) contrition—a description often used as evidence of the old Augustine's "darkened and gloomy outlook on the human condition." Grove persuasively and poignantly argues that "a better description of Augustine's [deathbed] psalm praying is that he was … completing the [lifelong] work of memory [in] … a liminal shift from hope to reality" (225).

Although Grove describes the practices by which communal identity is formed and informed, and acknowledges that "memory is both intellectual and affective" (27), his discussion implies that the core of communal identity is "minds in relation to God" (15). The binaries discussed by Grove do not include what I take to be Augustine's richest binary, namely, fear and love. I suggest that inclusion of the dyad fear/love would render more explicit Augustine's often iterated conviction that feeling is invariably and necessarily a component of thinking. For Augustine, tears always signal moments of strong feeling, whether passionate conversion (*conf.* 8, 11-12), the *pleasure* of confession ("dulce mihi fit … confiteri tibi" *conf.* 9, 4), or the singing of psalms (*conf.* 9, 4, 7). St. Augustine predicted that even dying—that paradigm situation of individual weakness and

solitude—will not be experienced as desolation for the self renewed in the image of God. Preaching on Psalm 70 he said, "Why be afraid that he may desert you, that he may toss you aside when your strength has failed? That is precisely the time when his strength will be in you, when your own is gone."

Like other binaries, the reconciliation of fear and love requires discernment. Augustine identified a necessary and productive "chaste" fear, and a fear that threatens to distract and divert one who "walks along the road" (*conf.* 7, 21). He also said frequently that it matters not only *that* one loves, but *what* one loves (*ench.* 31, 117). If the relationship of fear and love is not prominently featured in Augustine's sermons on the psalms, it is a strong theme in his approximately concurrent sermons on the Gospel of John (*Io. eu. tr.*, c. 407 CE) and on the First Epistle of John (*ep. Io. tr.*, 415 CE).

Finally, Augustine's fear/love binary supports Grove's interpretation of Possidius's account of Augustine's deathbed "penitence." Modern usage of the word focuses primarily, if not exclusively, on recall and repentance of sin; Augustine's deathbed tears were more richly complex. For Augustine, penitence included not only confession of sin but also gratitude and praise for the God he called life, beauty, and love. Augustine's deathbed penitence completed his work of memory, the movement from hope to reality. "When our path is ended, we return to our home" (*en. Ps.* 130, 14; *Io. eu. tr.* 26, 5).

In *Sermon* 348, Augustine used the fear/love binary to describe his expectation of his own death: "Fear should grow less," he said, "the closer we approach to our home country … [and] those who are arriving [will have] none at all" (*s.* 348, 4 [415 CE], PL 39: 1529: "tanto minor sit timor, quanto patria quo tendimus proprior … peruentientium"). He anticipated that dying "in Christ" would be affectively characterized by overwhelming love: "What has put fear out the door … is the love of God, whom you are loving with your whole heart and with your whole soul and with your whole mind" (*s.* 348, 2, PL 39: 1527: "excluserit autem eum caritas dei, quem diligis ex toto corde, et ex toto anima, et ex tota menta tua").

In *Augustine on Memory*, the reader is invited to assume the position of a member of Augustine's congregation as the preacher unfolds his thought—simultaneously brilliant and simple—to his hearers. This fine book's enormously rich offering enables Augustine's reader to more adequately comprehend his journey from being "stuck in the self," to communal identity in the "whole Christ."

Margaret R. Miles

GRUND-WITTENBERG, Alexandra, ed. *Religionspraxis und Individualität: Die Bedeutung von Persönlicher Frömmigkeit und Family Religion für das Personkonzept in der Antike*. Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2021. VI-350 p.

Intention und Konzeption des interdisziplinären Sammelbands werden in dem Beitrag der Herausgeberin über *Transformationen des Personkonzepts und religiöse Praxis in der Antike* erläutert. Während das Personkonzept im Alten Testament lange als Gegenmodell zum modernen Personbegriff konstruiert worden sei, der die Würde der Person unabhängig von deren sozialer Lebenswelt betrachte und der von einem Bewusstsein personaler Einheit, der Wahrnehmung innerer Tiefe und der Autonomie menschlichen Handelns geprägt sei, plädiert der Band im Anschluss an neuere Forschungen sowie an das kognitionswissenschaftliche Embodiment-Konzept für eine differenziertere Perspektive. Anhand literarischer und archäologischer Quellen sollen Merkmale personaler Identität, Individualität und Innerlichkeit nachgezeichnet und als mögliche Symptome von Transformationsprozessen bewertet werden. Den Schwerpunkt bilden dabei die altorientalischen Kulturen.

Jan Assmann befasst sich mit *Religion und Lebensführung im Alten Ägypten* und stellt hier eine tiefgreifende Wende fest. Während die Götter ursprünglich einen Fernhorizont menschlicher Existenz darstellten, der Zugang zur Götterwelt nur durch die Vermittlung des pharaonischen Königtums möglich war und Texte zur Lebensführung zur profanen anstatt zur religiösen Weisheitsliteratur zählten, setzte mit dem Zusammenbruch des Alten Reichs eine deutliche Veränderung in Richtung persönlicher Frömmigkeit ein. Wie Assmann anhand verschiedener Texte des Mittleren Reichs (2000-1750) zeigen kann, finden sich nun Motive des Vorwurfs an Gott, der Verweis auf die menschliche Verantwortlichkeit sowie ein anthropozentrisches Welt- und Gottesbild: Gott kennt jeden Namen und wird als ‚guter Hirte' angerufen. Die Idee des Totengerichts kommt auf, und im Neuen Reich (1550-1100) tritt der Gott aus seinem Tempel, um Prozessionsfeiern zu begleiten.

Unter dem Titel *„Ich habe ihn geschickt, um die Götter seines Vaters zu feiern" (KBo 18.15 8-11)* untersucht Susanne Görke Aspekte persönlicher Frömmigkeit, Familienreligion und Individualität bei den Hethitern. Da die überlieferten Tontafelfragmente nicht aus Privatarchiven stammen, sondern ausschließlich aus Königsarchiven, finden sich Belege für enge Beziehungen zu einer Gottheit nur aus den Kreisen der Herrschenden. Diese müssten jedoch immer auch im

politischen Kontext betrachtet werden. In privaten Zusätzen von Schreibern untereinander, den sogenannten *piggy letters*, sind gleichwohl Wendungen wie „Die Götter sollen dich in Güte beschützen" überliefert. Auch für Vatergottheiten, die dem Schutz der Familienmitglieder dienten, gebe es (eher dürftige) Anzeichen. Wie die Autorin anhand zweier Texte nachweist, zeigt sich Individualität bei den Hethitern allenfalls in Gestalt von Zeugnissen, die ein Interesse an einer differenzierten Selbstbetrachtung haben.

Aspekte der mesopotamischen privaten Frömmigkeit stehen im Fokus des Beitrags von Margaret Jaques, die diese vor allem in den persönlichen Schutzgottheiten sieht. Persönliche Frömmigkeit zeige sich in Personennamen wie „Der Gott ist meine Mutter/mein Bruder", in an die Schutzgottheit gerichteten Gebeten sowie in Beschwörungs- und Traumritualen, die der Kommunikation und der Versöhnung mit dem persönlichen Gott dienten. Im Rahmen einer Analyse der Konzepte Schuld, Scham und Mitleid in Mesopotamien kritisiert Jaques überzeugend den Gedanken einer Entwicklung von Scham- hin zu Schuldkulturen. Eine komplexe Selbstreflexivität und das Bewusstsein menschlicher Autonomie sieht die Autorin u.a. in der Mannigfaltigkeit von Lebensseele, Totenseele, Traumseele und Außenseele sowie in der einschlägigen Terminologie (ni_2(-te): *ramanu* „sich selbst", „eigen").

Jan Dietrich und Hans Jørgen Lundager Jensen untersuchen die Frage nach *Neubabylonischer Frömmigkeit im Alten Testament* anhand der *East India House Inschrift* und der *deuteronomisch-deuteronomistischen Theologie*. Persönliche Frömmigkeit definieren die Autoren als eine habitualisierte religiöse Grundhaltung, die vom Phänomen der Individualität im Sinne eines Willens zur Einzigartigkeit unterschieden werden müsse. In der im Beitragstitel genannten neubabylonischen Königsinschrift finden sich häufige tn- und t-Formen, die grammatikalisch die Dauerhaftigkeit der religiösen Haltung herausstellen. Dieses Interesse an der Persistenz teilen die deuteronomisch-deuteronomistischen Texte, wobei sie persönliche Frömmigkeit traditionsgebunden gestalten und durch Techniken des Hörens, Memorierens und der Disziplinierung als eine gesellschaftlich relevante Haltung gezielt einüben (vgl. Dtn 6,4-9).

Persönliche Frömmigkeit und die Artikulation des „Inneren" im alten Israel ist das Thema des Beitrags von Alexandra Grund-Wittenberg. Die von Bernhard Lang genannten Kriterien persönlicher Frömmigkeit, i.e. der mit einer Sprache der Innerlichkeit verbundene Glaube an einen persönlichen Gott als schützender Begleiter im Verein mit einer emotionalen Bindung an ihn sowie die Fokussierung auf

den Beter und sein persönliches Ergehen, weist die Autorin am Beispiel der Psalmen 27 und 42/3 nach, wobei sie einen engen Zusammenhang zwischen der Innigkeit der Gottesbeziehung und der Entwicklung eines komplexen Selbstverhältnisses sowie des Personkonzepts feststellt.

Rainer Albertz stellt die Frage *Welche Art von Individualität förderte die altisraelitische Familienreligion?* Die im Psalter überlieferten Gebete verstehen sich, so der Autor, nicht als Äußerungen der Individualität, sondern sind literarisch stilisierte Gebetsformulare. Gleichwohl stärkten sie durch die vom Beter aktivierte persönliche Gottesbeziehung dessen Individualität und gewannen ihre Kraft durch das Bewusstsein des Betenden, Geschöpf Gottes zu sein. Letzteres zeige sich auch an der Existenz von Schöpfungsnamen. Die familiäre Einbindung der persönlichen Gottesbeziehung wurde, so Albertz, dadurch erleichtert, dass JHWH schon eine besondere Beziehung zu einer (staatlichen) Großgruppe eingenommen hat und zudem durch eine ausgeprägte Personhaftigkeit charakterisiert ist. Mit Verweis auf die alttestamentlichen Bruderkonflikte nimmt Albertz an, dass die intensive persönliche Gottesbeziehung im alten Israel die Ausbildung starker Individuen förderte.

Im Blickpunkt des Beitrags von Karel van der Toorn stehen *Public Self and Private Self in the World of the Hebrew Bible*. Der Autor sieht eine Unterordnung der individuellen Identität unter die Familienidentität, die von der Kernfamilie bis zum Clan reichte und sich durch gemeinsame Vorfahren und denselben Gott definierte. Außerhalb der Familie gab es keine Ehrung oder Versorgung der Alten und folglich kein glückliches Leben. Wider die gängige Auffassung, das alte Israel sei eine Schuldkultur gewesen, sieht van der Toorn mit der starken sozialen Hierarchisierung, der Pflicht zur Einhaltung von Regeln des gesellschaftlichen Umgangs und dem in den Klagepsalmen erkennbaren Bemühen um einen guten Ruf klassische Elemente einer Schamkultur. Die Hausarchitektur im frühen Israel sah einen Raum für den persönlichen Rückzug und den Schutz vor fremden Blicken vor. Zugleich fasst die Hebräische Bibel die innere Person und deren Gefühle in den Begriff *leb* (Herz).

Bernd Janowski betrachtet den *Psalter und die Entdeckung des „inneren Menschen“*, auf den die im Sinne des Mentalen verstandenen, häufig referenzierten Eingeweide (Herz, Leber, Nieren etc.) verweisen. Hinsichtlich der Entwicklung der Innerlichkeit sieht der Autor drei Phasen. (1) Die ältere Spruchweisheit vermittle den Wert der Aufrichtigkeit in dem Sinne, dass das Herz (*leb*) des Menschen die Innen- und Außenwelt miteinander verbinde. (2) Das *Höre Israel* (Dtn 6,4-9) dokumentiere die mnemotechnisch verankerte Verinner-

lichung der Gottesbeziehung und (3) insbesondere die Individualpsalmen förderten mit ihrem Fokus auf die Ich/Du-Relation die Herausbildung des Ichbewusstseins. Eine besondere Rolle dabei spielten das Bekenntnis der Erschaffung durch Gott sowie das Herz als Ort der Tora.

Der Beitrag von Arbogast Schmitt trägt den Titel *Persönliche Frömmigkeit bei Homer?* Tatsächlich jedoch stehen eher die Fragen nach Phänomenen der Innerlichkeit sowie der Individualität im homerischen Epos im Zentrum seiner Ausführungen. Schmitt beleuchtet kritisch die weit verbreitete Auffassung, Homer habe aufgrund fehlenden Wissens über mentale Prozesse dieselben externalisiert, und zeigt anhand dreier Beispiele (Telemach in Sparta, Athene und Achill in der *Ilias*, Athene und Pandaros) die Autonomie menschlichen Handelns sowie das Bewusstsein zwischen der Trennung des menschlichen Inneren und der Wirkmacht der Götter.

Dorit Engster schreibt *Zur Bedeutung der Mysterienreligionen für die Ausbildung von Individualität im antiken Griechenland*, wobei sie die fundamentale Verbindung der Mysterienkulte, die für die individuelle Erfahrung von Religiosität große Bedeutung hatten, mit der staatlich reglementierten Polisreligion betont und anhand von vier Beispielen (Andania, Mysterien von Eleusis, Theben, Samothrake) überzeugend erläutert. Den Schwerpunkt bildet die Darstellung der Mysterien von Eleusis, wo die Autorin das Moment der Individualität (1) in der Entscheidung zur Teilnahme, (2) im emotional erschöpfenden Nachvollzug des Kultdramas, (3) im erworbenen Wissen über die Kultgegenstände, (4) in der Praxis von Stiftungen und Weihungen sowie (5) in individuellen Erwartungen der Befreiung von Todesfurcht differenziert analysiert.

Wie David Noy zeigen kann, sind die Befunde zu *Personal Piety and Family Religion in Jewish Inscriptions from the Greco-Roman Diaspora* eher gering. Dankinschriften waren keine genuin jüdische Praxis und finden sich eher in Nachahmung heidnischer Gewohnheiten. Die meisten Personennamen, die in den Inschriften auftauchen, unterscheiden sich kaum von denen nichtjüdischer Provenienz, und auch Epitaphen sind in der Regel eher biographischer als religiöser Natur. Epitaphen in den jüdischen Katakomben Roms (3./4. Jh. n. Chr.), die auch Verweise auf die Frömmigkeit des Verstorbenen enthalten, sowie an weiteren Orten, sind bisweilen mit jüdischen Symbolen (Menora, Palmzweig, Toraschrein etc.) versehen. Auch die Beisetzung von Diaspora-Juden in Eretz Israel bezeugt persönliche und familiäre Frömmigkeit. Inschriften zur Freilassung von Sklaven, zur Widmung sowie zum Erhalt oder zur Renovierung

von Synagogen sowie die Herausstellung individueller Spender werden gleichfalls vom Autor besprochen.

Religiöse Individualität und Familienidentität im frühen Christentum betrachtet Markus Öhler. In 1 Kor 7,12-17 diskutiert Paulus die exogame Ehe. Da ein Herrenwort (Mt 5,32) die Ehescheidung unter Gläubigen verbietet, müsse im Falle einer Scheidung der nichtgläubige Partner verantwortlich gemacht werden. Sofern allerdings die religiöse Praxis des glaubenden Partners (oder Partnerin) gesichert sei, stehe einer Aufrechterhaltung der Ehe nichts im Wege. Wie die Kinder, so sei auch der Partner des (oder der) Glaubenden heilig, und zwar unabhängig von dessen praktizierter Frömmigkeit. Während Paulus religiöse Individualität respektiere, habe in der Apostelgeschichte die kollektive Religiosität und die einheitliche Kultpraxis im Haushalt den Vorrang. Am Beispiel der individuellen Kultpraxis des Lykomedes in Ephesos zeigt der Autor die Spannung zwischen Individualität und religiöser Gemeinschaft in den Johannesakten (2. Jh.).

Annette Weissenrieder analysiert *The Inner Being as a Place of Individual Relationship with God in 2 Cor 4:16 and Rom 7:22*. Ihren Ausführungen zur paulinischen Formulierung *ho esô anthrôpos* stellt sie eine kurze Analyse der Adverbien *esô* (im medizinischen Gebrauch), *endon* (bei den griechischen Theologen und Plotin) und *entos* (bei Platon) voran, wobei sie die Bedeutung der in den medizinischen Texten gebrauchten Terminologie herausstellt: Wie die Medizin der Antike der Auffassung gewesen ist, dass der äußere Körper Auskunft geben kann über die innere Physiologie, so verstehe Paulus in 1 Kor 4,16 den äußeren bzw. inneren Menschen nicht als Leib bzw. Seele, sondern im Sinne von Sterben und Leben, Vergehen und Erneuerung in Christo. Dagegen gebrauche er in Röm 7,22 eher philosophisch konnotierte Begriffe, die die Beziehung zu Gott ins Innere des Menschen verlegen. Dieses Innere sei aber weder Seele noch Vernunft.

Abschließend befasst sich Pablo Irizar mit *Augustine on the Metamorphosis of Interiority*. Ausgangspunkt ist die in den *Confessiones* thematisierte fragmentierte Innerlichkeit und der Versuch, diese im Zuge der Selbsterkenntnis und des Bewusstseins eines Verwiesenseins auf Gott zu heilen. Durch die Ausforschung der Erinnerung in Buch X soll Gott im menschlichen Inneren gefunden und seine absolute Einheit (Gott als *idipsum*) in der Überwindung der Zeitlichkeit nachgeahmt werden. Diese Gottsuche im Inneren werde in *De trinitate* durch das Auffinden von Spuren der göttlichen Trinität in der menschlichen Seele vertieft und verwandelt. Erfüllung finde die Gottsuche und die Sehnsucht nach innerer und äußerer Einheit in den

Enarrationes in psalmos, wo die Kirche als Leib Christi mit einheitlicher Stimme spreche.

Der Sammelband hält, was die Herausgeberin im Einleitungskapitel verspricht: Mit „Schwerpunkt auf dem alten Israel" (2) werden die Phänomene Individualität, personale Identität, persönliche Frömmigkeit und Familienreligion in den alten Kulturen mit Blick auf ihre Relevanz für Transformationen im Personkonzept beleuchtet. Die Befunde bestätigen den Trend der neueren Forschung, der Momente von Individualität insbesondere im Bereich der persönlichen Frömmigkeit schon in den altorientalischen Kulturen feststellt. Argumentativ und methodisch sind die Beiträge nahezu durchgehend auf hohem Niveau. Die einschlägige Terminologie (Individualität, Familienreligion, Innerlichkeit, persönliche Frömmigkeit, Personalität etc.) wird nicht nur im Einleitungskapitel definiert; vielmehr erläutern die meisten Autoren ihr je eigenes Verständnis der Konzepte, problematisieren dieses im Rahmen ihrer spezifischen Fragestellung und verweisen damit auf die Komplexität und Mannigfaltigkeit der Thematik. Nützlich für einen schnellen Einblick in die Beiträge ist das englischsprachige Abstract, das jedem Kapitel vorangestellt ist.

Interessant ist der Sammelband vor allem für die Altorientalistik, die Bibelwissenschaft und weitere theologische, aber auch anthropologische Disziplinen sowie für die Debatte zum Personkonzept. Der Erkenntnisgewinn für die Augustinus-Forschung erscheint auf den ersten Blick eher gering. Es fehlen eigene Beiträge zu Platon, zum Neuplatonismus sowie zur stoischen Tradition, die für das augustinische Denken auch in dieser Frage prägend gewesen sind. Bei genauerem Hinsehen ergibt sich jedoch ein anderes Bild. Der innovative Beitrag von Pablo Irizar verbindet die augustinische Elaboration der Innerlichkeit mit dem kirchlichen Außen und vervollständigt damit die auf das Individuum bezogene Selbsterforschung in den *conf*. um ihren, wie er zeigen kann, fundamental gemeinschaftlichen Aspekt: Ein Heilwerden der fragmentierten Innerlichkeit kann nur im Kontext der kirchlichen Gemeinschaft geschehen. Dies korrigiert im Einklang mit anderen jüngeren Studien die lange Zeit vorherrschende Position, wonach Innerlichkeit und Kirche bei Augustinus zwei getrennte Erfahrungshorizonte darstellen. Darüber hinaus können die Beiträge des Bandes zeigen, dass die (religiös konnotierte) selbstreflexive Innerlichkeit eine Tradition hat, die weit vor Platon, Seneca und Augustinus liegt. Die gängige, auch in der Augustinus-Forschung weithin kolportierte Auffassung, wonach letztere als Entdecker der Innerlichkeit gelten, erfährt somit eine differenzierende und sachgerechte Modifikation. Gewinnbringend ist auch die Erkenntnis, dass

die augustinische Betonung des göttlichen Wirkens im menschlichen Herzen (vgl. *conf*. 9,2,3) in der Religionsgeschichte markante Vorläufer hat. Jan Assmann stellt für die persönliche Frömmigkeit im ägyptischen Neuen Reich den Gedanken fest, „dass in dem gefestigten Herzen Gott selbst den Lotsen spielt" (39), und Margaret Jaques verweist auf eine „typisch mesopotamische Variante der Metapher des Schöpfergottes als Töpfer" (68), die auch für die Gnaden- und Erbsündenlehre des Kirchenvaters mit Verweis auf Röm 9,19-21 konstitutiv ist. Jan Dietrich und Hans Jørgen Lundager Jensen urteilen schon in Bezug auf das Deuteronomium „Die Quelle der Inspiration liegt außen" (86) und sehen für die nachexilischen Zeiten des alten Israel die Hoffnung, „dass Gott selbst seine Gottesfurcht in ihr Herz gibt (Jer 32, 30) und seine Tora in ihr Inneres legt" (98). Auch die Überlegung von Rainer Albertz, wonach mit Blick auf die alttestamentlichen Bruderkonflikte den Autoren daran gelegen sei, „JHWHs Handeln gerade in den zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen aufzuspüren, und sie beobachteten es vor allem dort, wo die normale menschliche Ordnung durchbrochen […] wurde" (149), erinnert an die augustinische Lehre von Gnade und Erbsünde (vgl. *Simpl*. 1,2,3 mit Bezug auf Röm 9,10). Bernd Janowski stellt die Einzigartigkeit von Jer 31,31-34 heraus, „denn der Einzige, der handelt, ist JHWH, während Israel ohne Initiative ist." (187)

So bleibt festzuhalten: Originelle und innovative Inspirationen zur Augustinus-Forschung können sich gerade dort ergeben, wo sie außerhalb der üblichen Forschungswege liegen. Der vorliegende Band ist in dieser Hinsicht beispielhaft.

Dagmar Kiesel

HADAS, Daniel, ed. *Augustin d'Hippone, Commencement de Commentaire sur l'épître aux Romains*. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2019. Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum, Extra seriem. VIII-407 p.

Augustine's response to Simplicianus on questions arising from Paul's letter to the Romans, especially Romans 9, has been described by Robert Markus as "a landslide in Augustine's thought." Thereafter, Augustine became the biblical exegete and combat theologian we know as "Augustine": *Confessiones*, *Contra Faustum*, *De Genesi ad litteram*—all begin the flow of and toward his mature masterworks. Before this turning point circa 396, such soaring productivity would

have been hard to predict. Augustine's introduction (in translation) to Plotinus and Porphyry, back in Milan, had resulted in four mannered philosophical essays from Cassiciacum. His return to Africa saw him beginning to undertake biblical exegesis, in fits and starts (on Genesis, Paul's letters, and Psalms); to swat at the Manichees both in writing and in public debate; to address directly questions about the will's freedom and the usefulness of belief; and to confront his older contemporary, the internationally renowned commentator-qua-theological-diva, Jerome, on the issue of deception. In the early to mid 390s, Augustine, in brief, was still finding his feet—or, perhaps better, his voice.

Augustine's *Inchoata expositio* on Romans dates to the period just preceding the *Ad Simplicianum*. Shorter attempts at particular verses—*Notes on Romans* (*Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistula ad Romanos*) and *qu*. 66-68 of his collection of scriptural Q and A—had warmed him up for this effort. The commentary itself was conceived on a huge scale—so huge that it collapsed under its own weight. As he later wrote in his *Retractationes*, he grew "discouraged by the magnitude and the labor of this task." Indeed, in the twenty-odd print pages of Latin reproduced in the present volume, Augustine managed to cover only Paul's opening greeting, Rom 1:1-7. Had Augustine continued to scale, the commentary might have totaled a mammoth sixty books. (See Hadas' calculation, Introduction, 8.)

Daniel Hadas has now given scholars a thorough and beautifully produced scientific edition of this work, with Introduction (1-29); a detailed discussion of the MSS tradition (30-84) and of prior editions (84-110); an analysis of Augustine's style (110-148); and a clear translation with facing Latin (for the most part, that of the CSEL 84: 148-149). Hadas concludes with his own commentary on Augustine's commentary (196-389). A bibliography and two indices, one of scriptural references and one of other ancient authors, completes the whole (391-407). Hadas' work highlights the *Inchoata expositio* as an important point in Augustine's development as a biblical exegete and as a theologian.

As Hadas observes, the figure and model of Origen loomed large over all fourth-century commentators, with (in the Latin West) only Ambrose and Jerome even attempting to touch the high bar set by that towering figure. For all his interest in Origen, already evident in this period, Origen's work remained inaccessible to Augustine, whose Greek was hardly up to the task; and Rufinus' abridged translation of Origen's Romans commentary would not appear for almost

another decade. Was Augustine motivated no less by an immediate concern to attack Manichees and/or Donatists? Hadas thinks not (9-11). The project of biblical exegesis itself, he insists, drove Augustine's effort.

Why were so many commentaries on Paul produced between Nicea and Chalcedon? No obvious answer presents itself, though Hadas hazards four observations: (1) the period was beset by Christological controversies, a topic evident in all these works; (2) a generalized "thirst for salvation" cannot be usefully invoked in explanation; (3) a sense of competition with the Greek East fueled Latin production—though the West, with its six Pauline commentaries, really could not match the East in this regard, which had forty; (4) the period was marked by an effulgence of commentaries in general. Seen in this light, the question is not, "Why do we suddenly have six Latin commentaries on Paul?" but "Why do we have so few?" (12-13).

How does the *InchExp* fit within the immediate context of Augustine's own life and work in the 390s? Hadas notes Augustine's prior Manichaean acquaintance with the apostle, as well as his being drawn to Paul thereafter (on the evidence of *conf.* 8, 27). The quarrel with Jerome beginning in 394/95 certainly focused his attention (15. Curiously, Augustine's public debate with Fortunatus in 392, most of which turned on verses from Paul, is invisible in Hadas' reconstruction.) Beginning a commentary on Romans in the face of the toxic Jerome's pique required a certain *chutzpah*: Augustine worked without access both to the Greek exegetical tradition (especially as represented by Origen) and without a Greek text of Paul's letters. Thus, urges Hadas, far from suffering from a sort of writer's block (*contra* O'Donnell), Augustine was fully confident in his own "génie" (17) when he embarked on his huge undertaking.

On the evidence, however, this confidence was misplaced: Augustine abandoned both this commentary and his first attempt at a literal interpretation of Genesis. Thus, "even in his own judgment, Augustine was not yet prepared to become a second Jerome, much less a second Origen" (17). And thereafter, once bishop, Augustine's attention lay elsewhere—enmeshed in the thick politics of the North African church—and he never resumed this commentary. Nonetheless, his earlier emphasis on Paul's concern in Romans with grace versus works would later serve him well, especially, post-*ad Simpl.*, when he faced off with Pelagius and Julian.

Much more could be said about Hadas' careful reading and full-hearted appreciation of Augustine's effort at unpacking Romans. (Pages 21-23 offer a particularly thoughtful essay on the unforgivable

sin against the Holy Spirit, a topic that dominates the *InchExp*, prompting Hadas to characterize it—rightly, in my view—as a work shaped as much by pastoral concerns as by exegetical ones.) Chrysostom, Origen, and other luminaries are usefully deployed in Hadas' own commentary. The *InchExp* may not figure among Augustine's many theological masterpieces, but thanks to Hadas' careful scholarship, we can better appreciate its role as a stepping-stone to Augustine's "novel and terrible ideas on grace" (and, I note, on predestination) first presented in the *ad Simpl.* and fully realized in the Pelagian controversy (19). Augustine's earlier emphasis on the divine amplitude of saving grace so emphasized in *InchExp* thus represents, by contrast—alas—the road not taken by later Latin theology.

Paula Fredriksen

HANNAN, Sean. *On Time, Change, History and Conversion*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020. Reading Augustine. VIII-166 p.

Two basic insights recur in the author's reading of Augustine on time. First, time is an objective, Aristotelian continuum (συνέχεια): a timeline where the present is a point so tiny that it fails to be a part of time. Second, time is finite: all things fade away because that's their creational *modus* (their way of being, their limit, and their measure). The author sticks to those ideas tightly in surveying how Augustine's philosophy on time, conditions his theology on change, history, and conversion. This approach results in a brilliant summary, a kind of *Time with Augustine in a Nutshell*, inviting all scholars to enrich their vision of Augustine's theology with his narrative on time.

Within a short span of pages, the author reveals how Augustine deals with the reality of time (9-16). Past and future both refer to what *is not*, rather than to what *is*. The present is even more problematic because it lacks duration: it is the spaceless Aristotelian point, a limit between past and future. *Attentio*, as an affective state of mind, reconstructs the stretch of time by colliding the spaceless present with the near past images which reside in the soul's memory (*memoria*), and the near future images which reside in the soul's expectation (*expectatio*).

This all comes at a cost as we find our souls shattered over time. This shattering makes time a *distentio animi*. The author repeatedly argues that the case of the noun *animi* is an objective – rather than a subjective – genitive. A subjective genitive would imply that

time is shaped by the soul. The opposite is true: time is the actor tearing the soul apart as an object. This *distentio animi* provides the ultimate proof of time's existence: "Augustine's account reveals that he attributes objective reality to the force of time. His central discovery is that time is a distensive force which stretches many things, including the human soul" (6).

Eternity – far from being the everlasting stretch of time – is equal to timelessness. God is the all-transcending harmony, beyond (the pains of) time. For our part, we are always running late (*tardus*) in our perceptive awareness and our understanding of our life and history. Temporal experience is at the root of an existential discomfort, which the author coins *belatedness*: "Belatedness, then, names the difference between our perspective and God's. We are out of step not only with the present instant of time, but also with the present age of history" (69).

The intentional time in our soul is not different from the created time in our universe: "*Distentio* is the objective force of cosmic time stretching the soul apart" (45). The author refers to *De Genesi ad Litteram* [5.5.12] to illustrate what the creation of time looked like: "It is time that begins from the creation, rather than the creation from time" (*potius ergo tempus a creatura quam creatura coepit a tempore*). Since creation emerged from the *Principium*, the eternal or atemporal Word, there must have been a "day without yesterday" (33) similar to Lemaitre's primeval atom, which is the first point of infinite density at the origin of the universe (42). This atom, the author says, is Lemaitre's *Principium*.

In my opinion, Lemaitre's cosmic atom should be linked to Augustine's *exordium* (origin) rather than to his *Principium*. *Exordium* is the first stage of creation: it gives an outline of how the created universe originally looked as heaven and earth. *Principium* is the divine first cause of creation; it is God's Word and Wisdom. Unlike the cosmic atom, and unlike heaven and earth, the *Principium* has never been created because it is a constituent of God. Time eventually took its beginning (*initium*) out of the *exordium*, the original heaven and earth (see *conf.* 12, 20, CCL 27: 226, 47-52). From our perspective, the cosmic atom as the *exordium* neither proves nor disproves God as the *Principium* of creation. Taking into account the *exordium* as a step in between could have directed the author to other conclusions.

In his treatise on mindfulness and his exploration of Augustine's conversion, the author does a deep dive into what he brands as the "anti-presentism" of Augustine (25). The great gulf between Augustine

and mindfulness, as a spin-off of Stoicism, lies in the appreciation of the present. Augustine tells us not to live in the moment but to place our hope in the absolute future of the eschaton (80). For him, there is no real present in which to live: conversion is only a *punctum temporis* (101). Hence, as a point, conversion can hardly be of any importance: "Taking the span of a human life into account, the turning-point of conversion is far from the determining factor. At most it is a retroactively positive point, itself a response to the prior spontaneity, conditioning our experience" (110).

Of course, the author is right when he claims that Augustine advocates considering every moment of our belated lives from a full lifetime perspective: only eternity will tell. Still, in my opinion, this does not make Augustine an "anti-presentist" because that same *praesens* is for Augustine the only way of being: God is the *totum praesens* and the *omne praesens*. With Augustine, the past and the future do not exist but as a *praesens* in *memoria* and *expectatio*. Last but not least, six times in the conversion account we find the word *attentio* or something to that effect: because of that *attentio perdurat*, the conversion point expands to an intense period of God's presence.

For Augustine, as we read in the book, hoping that our earthly vicissitudes – like an intimate friendship – would last for eternity is a sin. This determination also applies to our ideas about Augustine on time: it is a never-ending story. The author's contribution to that everlasting discussion can hardly be overestimated.

Peter Demasure

HEINE, Ronald E., TORJESEN, Karen Jo, ed. *The Oxford Handbook of Origen*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. XXXVIII-596 p.

Appreciation for the legacy of Origen's theology, exegesis, and spirituality continues to abound in the wake of twentieth-century interpreters such as Jean Daniélou, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Henri de Lubac, and Henri Crouzel who featured Origen in their *ressourcement* efforts. This installation of the *Oxford Handbook* is just one witness to the ongoing resurgence of interest generated by these and other scholars. In *The Oxford Handbook of Origen*, Ronald Heine and Karen Torjesen have assembled a balanced cast of contributors, including junior and senior scholars writing from around the world and specializing in subjects that span the wide spectrum of research questions related to Origen. The handbook contains six parts:

(1) Origen in his Contexts, (2) Origen and Hermeneutics, (3) Origen and the Bible, (4) Origen's Theology, (5) Receptions of Origen, and (6) Modern Contributions to the Study of Origen.

The first part takes a broad view of Origen's "contexts," attending to his social, philosophical, religious, and literary horizons. In the first contribution, Jakab offers a clear overview of the social and political history of the Church in Alexandria, its establishment, development, and membership. This initial chapter is followed by five essays designed to examine and to assess the sources of Origen's thought. Berchman draws upon the resources of modern literary theory, especially that of deconstructionism, to describe the nature and scope of Origen's reception of Greek philosophy. Dunderberg parses certain complexities in Origen's reception of Heracleon and the school of Valentinus, putting forward areas of similarity and difference while also celebrating Origen's charitable representation of Heracleon. Likewise, Van den Hoek investigates Origen's relationship to Clement by analyzing their shared participation in an Alexandrian tradition reified in common literary genres and shared subjects of interest. Rogers similarly probes the manner and degree of Philo's influence upon Origen, identifying both exegetical practices and certain doctrines such as the pre-existence of souls as areas in which Origen exhibits Philonic influence even while maintaining his own intellectual creativity. Boyarin analyzes the similar hermeneutics at work in the spiritual reading practices of Origen and the Rabbis he likely encountered during his time in Caesarea, arguing that what sets Origen's interpretation apart is his belief that the divine Word secures the spiritual meaning of the whole of Scripture in relation to its parts. In the final, somewhat unexpected, essay of this section, Urbano canvasses the ways Origen has been remembered and adverts the limitations biographers face due to limited sources and data.

Three essays make up the second part on Origen's hermeneutics. Dunn provides a circumspect account of Origen's use of classical rhetoric—"a tradition for the construction, arrangement, and delivery of arguments" (145)—in biblical interpretation on display in his late *Commentary on Romans* (ca. 246). Dunn concludes that this commentary exhibits the presence of not only textual exposition but also rhetorical persuasion. In summarizing the impact of Bernhard Neuschäfer's *Origenes als Philologe* (1987) on the study of Origen's biblical interpretation, Rodríguez-Galarza also frames it as an invitation for present-day scholars to give further consideration to the sources, assumptions, and basic commitments of Origen's hermeneutical perspective. Young, for her part, offers a reassessment of the standard

scholarly trope that there was a "hermeneutical antithesis" in the biblical interpretation of Alexandrian and Antiochene Christians. She clarifies the nature of *historia*; differentiates "ikonic" and "symbolic" exegesis in Antiochene and Alexandrian authors (184), respectively; and suggests the significance of differing Christological sensibilities for the divergent hermeneutical strategies at play in Alexandria and Antioch when it comes to discerning deeper meanings in the words, arguments, and stories of Scripture.

Part three contains four essays on Origen and the Bible. Niehoff explores the impact of Origen's move from Alexandria to Caesarea upon his approach to commenting upon the Old Testament, noting in particular the import of his more direct encounter with rabbis in the latter setting over against his longstanding familiarity with Philo and the allegorical tradition. Heine introduces readers to Origen's commentaries on the Gospels, capturing the significance of his Pauline lens and theological instincts when it comes to reading the Gospels as portrayals of the Word made flesh. In examining Origen's commentaries on Pauline epistles, Cocchini outlines the importance of Rufinus and Jerome for recovering much of Origen's Pauline commentary and explores the common ground he finds with Paul's addresses to the churches of his time. In providing a concise overview of the extant homilies Origen preached in Caesarea, Pieri explains the difficulties of discerning their chronology, summarizes their transmission, and differentiates them from his biblical commentaries on the basis of his mixed and scholarly audiences, respectively.

Eight essays on Origen's theology constitute the fourth part. In the first, Lyman provides a well-balanced overview of Origen's theological perspective in its historical context and with keen awareness of the broader spectrum of interpretations advocated by modern scholars. Edwards analyzes the philosophical polemic of Origen's *Contra Celsum*, outlining what Origen attests about the ancient philosophical schools in this polemic and challenging the all-too-easy criticism the work commonly faces. Niculescu argues that Origen's theology is liturgically encoded insofar as it is better received as exegetical and performative rather than merely doctrinal, meant to draw together communities consisting not only of the spiritually mature but also those still in need of milk. For Hengstermann, Origen's theology exhibits a definitive pattern of tri-hypostatic divine activity wherein the three divine hypostases—Father, Son, and Spirit—are unified in their free and common activity for the sake of human salvation. After problematizing the application of the modern term "Christology" to Origen's understanding of Christ's person and

works, Martens offers an inductive study to chart the names Origen applies to Christ with an eye to the horizon of the narrative of salvation from protology to eschatology. Alviar proposes that Origen's conception of the self-defining creaturely choice between moral good and evil is grounded in his notion of the *imago Dei* consisting principally in human freedom and creativity. Scott develops Origen's free-will theodicy, a major area of contention among readers of Origen ancient and modern, into a rationale for the incorporation of matter into the fabric of God's plan of salvation, the means by which God's providential *therapeia* heals the sinful wills of rational creatures. McGuckin explains the meaning of Origen's systematic account of "eschatology," a synthesis Origen constructed while relying upon the rule of faith and his own creative intellect as a scholar keen to pose open-ended answers to difficult questions.

The fifth part of the handbook considers five inflections of Origen's reception. Since the response to Origen among Greek Christians was especially fraught, Louth pursues the development of theological traditions indebted to Origen by examining the doctrinal views of fourth century theologians (Athanasius and the Cappadocians in particular) for the extent of their coherence with Origen. Layton traces fourth-century theologians who responded favorably to Origen's writings (e.g., Methodius, Didymus, Rufinus, and Evagrius) and those who exhibit a clear aversion (e.g., Eustathius, Epiphanius, and Jerome), concluding that Origen provoked the minds of all who came into contact with his writings. Cameron maps out the similar experiences Origen and Augustine underwent in their confrontations with Gnosticism and Manichaeism, respectively; outlines the importance of Christ to both authors' scriptural reasoning; and elucidates Augustine's departure from Origen in his formulation of a doctrine of "radical grace" (473-478). In condensing his earlier work on Erasmus's reception of Origen, Scheck describes Erasmus's qualified advocacy of Origen's exegesis for the sake of the Church in his day, his production of a critical edition of Origen's works as a leading patristics scholar, and his anticipation of twentieth-century theologians' recovery of Origen's legacy. Villani argues that whereas Luther's sensibilities concerning Scripture's plain sense and justification by faith alone led the Reformers to reject Origen's theology and exegesis, Renaissance humanists embraced Origen's theology as a part of a larger synthesis.

In the sixth and final part, three essays introduce readers to major modern contributions to Origen scholarship. Rapetti reports on the accomplishment and significance of Pierre-Daniel Huet's *Origenis sacras Scripturas Commentaria* in the seventeenth century, the first

published edition of Origen's writings in Greek. In describing major figures in the twentieth-century rehabilitation of Origen, Daly submits that Walter Völker's *Vollkommenheitsideal* (1930) initiated the turn towards the reintegration of the true or whole Origen, a holistic vision of Origen's spirituality that integrates his long-divided legacies as theologian, philosopher, and man of the church. Finally, Perrone introduces readers to the Psalm homilies of Codex Monacensis Graecus 314 discovered in April of 2012 in the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek in Munich, explaining the internal and external evidence supporting its attribution to Origen and outlining continuities and discontinuities discernible in its literary, historical, and doctrinal features.

Among the most interesting aspects of this new addition to the *Oxford Handbook* series is its dual emphasis on tracking select subjects of consideration and the history of scholarship. The editors gathered a strong and diverse group of contributors who have offered mostly balanced contributions. Several writers effectively managed to give an up-to-date overview of their subject that also either advances the state of the question or provokes questions for future consideration. Among the most noteworthy highlights in the volume are contributions by Young, Niehoff, Scott, Layton, and Perrone, for they perform the duty of surveying their topics well while also injecting a creative energy to push them forward. Reliable introductory essays can also be found in Dunderberg, Heine, and Cameron. As this reviewer has argued elsewhere, there are salutary avenues open to study in following an approach similar to that of Louth's contribution: tracking the development of theological traditions rather than trying to pin down explicit exposure to, or usage of, earlier sources.

This new addition to the shelves of Origen scholars and university libraries does raise a few questions along the way. For instance, might it have been helpful for the editors to give a stronger rationale for the divisions of its contents, the selection of subjects, and the often-shifting emphasis among contributors on primary and secondary literature. Likewise, perhaps some contributors could have avoided taking on more ambitious or integrative approaches that enjoy less success in volumes such as this. For example, Berchman's chapter seems to have left even the editors unsure where to place it as they locate it in the first part on contexts and yet discuss it elsewhere in the introduction to the volume. Secondly, might there be a subconsciously anti-Protestant edge to this volume? The approaches of Scheck and Villani together suggest an inability for the Reformers to appreciate anything in Origen's theology or exegesis, a one-sided

report to be sure. Moreover, Daly describes his own reluctance regarding the "Catholic Scholars" angle of the title under which he was asked to contribute. Lastly, it is also fair to say that typographical infelicities were more noticeable than one would expect from an Oxford University Press volume. Avoiding certain inconsistencies in style could have prevented unnecessary distractions to the reader. Despite these questions, the extensive erudition and the breadth of subjects covered in this altogether successful volume commend it to all those with serious interests in Origen and his legacy.

Alexander H. Pierce

HELLEBRAND, Johannes. *Retractationes: Augustinus' Selbstrevision seiner gesamten Werke*. Würzburg: Echter, 2021. 120 p.

Aus zwei Gründen ist es nicht leicht, diesem Werk gerecht zu werden. Zum einen existiert neben der hier zu besprechenden Druckfassung eine auf ein Jahr früher (2020) datierte und durch das „Zentrum für Augustinus-Forschung" in Würzburg ins Internet gestellte Online-Version mit unterschiedlichem Titel „Die Retractationes des Augustinus. Inhalt, Struktur und Intention".[1] In der Zwischenzeit ist der Autor verstorben, der weder Philologe noch Theologe, Philosoph oder Historiker, sondern Jurist, nämlich emeritierter Staatsanwalt und Honorarprofessor an der Universität Bochum war und der im Jahre 2019 eine Monographie über „Augustinus als Richter" vorgelegt hat.

Nach einem kurzen Vorwort sammelt Kapitel I als eine „erste Informationsplattform" (11) bzw. „Basiswissen (81) Abschnitte aus acht Augustin-Biographien über die *Retractationes*. Das umfangreiche Kapitel II gibt ein „Bild von der vollen Bandbreite der Retractationes". Kapitel III widmet sich speziellen Fragen, besonders zur Intention des Werkes. Der Autor wendet sich gegen den Standpunkt von H. Müller, daß die Auswahl der Kritikpunkte von dem in derselben Zeit geführten Kampf gegen den Pelagianismus bestimmt sei und referiert V.H. Drecolls Aufsatz über Augustins „Selbststilisierung (2001). Ein kurzer Anhang I bietet die wichtigsten biographischen Daten, Anhang II eine tabellarische Übersicht über die 94 Werke mit ihren 232 Büchern, Anhang III Literaturangaben.

[1] www.augustinus.de/retracatationes.

Inhaltlich finden sich kaum neue Erkenntnisse. Geradezu obstinat betont der Autor immer wieder Augustins positive Entwicklung im Denken und Schreiben,[2] jedoch ohne an die προκοπή der Stoiker zu erinnern,[3] und sieht keinen Gegensatz zwischen *reprehendere* und *defendere*. Indem er für die eigene Person und die Sache, das Christentum, wirbt, geht er über die im Prolog formulierten Intentionen hinaus. Der Schwerpunkt der Notate liegt bei den Schriften vor der Bischofsweihe (so schon K. Pollmann: 98 Anm. 116). Über weite Strecken hin bietet der Autor schlichte Aufzählungen von Exzerpten oder Nacherzählungen von Passagen Augustins oder der Sekundärliteratur. Der Versuch, gegen Augustins chronologische Reihenfolge eine Systematik zu erstellen, überzeugt nicht und führt bei den extrem heterogenen Notaten zugegebenermaßen (43, 60) zu Überschneidungen und Wiederholungen. Damit unterscheidet er sich von den „Ordnungsfanatiker" (47, 84) Augustin, der hierin übrigens seinem Vorbild Varro folgt.[4]

Die im zentralen zweiten Kapitel auf den Seiten 23-80 entfaltete „volle Bandbreite" zeigt, daß die Beobachtung G. Mischs über Augustins „Scheitern an der Form der Breite" auch für den Autor zutrifft.[5] Augustin hat die Gefahr selbst gesehen, wenn er im Prolog von den dem Text der *Proverbia* ausgeht (Prov. 10,19 zitiert in *retr*. pr. 2): *ex multiloquio non effugies peccatum*. Das daraus entwickelte Wortspiel: *incidunt ex multiloquio etiam in falsiloquium* paßt über dieses Buch hinaus auf den heutigen Literaturbetrieb, wo bereits vor der digitalen Wende „kaum etwas die Chance hatte, ungedruckt zu bleiben" (E. Vogt), was sich im Zeitalter des Internets weiter potenziert.[6]

[2] Kernstelle ist 89-95 nach Aug. *retr*. pr. 3 *in melius proficientem*, vgl. 18 nach K. Rosen, ferner 44; 47; 55; 59, 79; 76; 97 (dort zitiert: *ad melius*) u.ö.

[3] Vgl. auch den AL-Artikel, s.v. *Emendatio, editio*.

[4] Vgl. hierzu den demnächst erscheinenden AL-Artikel s.v. *Varro*, dessen Spuren im zweiten Buch von Augustins Dialog *De ordine* zu fassen sind. Die besonders gegen Ende hin ungeschickte Rubrizierung fährt ab 95 nach Abschnitt *e)* mit Unterabschnitt *aa)* fort, usw.

[5] G. Misch, *Geschichte der Autobiographie* 1, 2, Frankfurt, 1949[3], 696. Eine Berücksichtigung dieses Standardwerkes hätte das Buch bereichern können.

[6] Die gequälte methodische Apologetik eines „normalen" Augustinus-Interessenten mit wissenschaftlichen „Background" (10) will erreichen, daß H. Müllers AL-Artikel „nicht das Schicksal vieler neuerer Beiträge zu Augustinus teilt", d.h. unbeachtet bleibt. Die Flut an Augustinusliteratur ist zwar schlicht unübersehbar, weil Augustin als schöpferischer Autor immer wieder zu eigenen kreativen Beiträgen anregt, doch sind gerade die knapp und höchst informativ zusammenfassenden Überblicksartikel des AL – auch dank ihrer digitalen Verfügbarkeit – mit Sicherheit nicht dem Vergessen anheimgegeben.

Rein wissenschaftlich und handwerklich gibt es etliches zu bemängeln. Stil und Gliederung fallen zum Ende hin sichtlich ab. Da der Autor „deskriptiv“ und „rein narrativ“ (11) vorgeht, bleibt er vor sachlichen Fehlern oder Ungenauigkeiten weitgehend gefeit. Abgesehen von reinen Flüchtigkeiten[7] seien dennoch einige genannt: Von den acht in Kapitel I in Auszügen ausgewählten „deutschsprachigen“ Augustin-Biographien (21) wurden nur zwei ursprünglich auf Deutsch verfaßt (Geerlings und Rosen), eine ist aus dem Holländischen (van der Meer), zwei sind aus dem Italienischen (Trapé, Paronotto) und drei aus dem Englischen übersetzt (Knowles-Penkett, Wills, Brown).[8] Der Titel des *Indiculus* erscheint nur einmal (19) in einem wörtlichen Zitat von K. Rosen in der nach aller Wahrscheinlichkeit richtigen maskulinen Form, sonst in dem leider verbreiteten Neutrum.[9] Als Datum für die Taufe wird (27 und 115) der 24. April 387 angegeben, während sonst der 25. April genannt wird (das war damals der spätestmögliche Termin). Genauer gesagt, fand das Sakrament jedoch in der Osternacht vom 24. Auf den 25, April statt.[10] Die Tagesgrenze wurde in der Antike und gerade auch zur Zeit Augustins eifrig diskutiert.[11] Für Völker, die mit dem Mondkalender rechneten, ‚stirbt‘ der Gesamttag (νυχθήμερον) mit Sonnenuntergang, er beginnt also mit der Nacht, wovon sowohl bei Juden als auch bei Christen noch heute Spuren vorhanden sind.[12] Diese Ungenauigkeit ist beileibe keine

[7] Stets korrigiert: 10 Mutzenbecher (hier auch online falsch, sonst aber richtig), 14 Pachomios (richtig 120, aber an falscher Stelle), 47 Scriptorium (sonst richtig), 52 Bethlehem (richtig 32), 58 Academicos (richtig 116); 103 Hildegund Müller (online korrigiert); 2001 als Jahreszahl des Aufsatzes von V.H. Drecoll (auch 120 und online utrobique falsch), 107 (Drecoll-Zitat) deshalb.

[8] So beklagt der Autor (81), daß viele der im AL-Artikel genannten Arbeiten nicht in deutscher Sprache geschrieben sind. Diese Erfahrung macht ein Student in der Regel im ersten Semester.

[9] 20 und passim, besonders 83f. Vgl. hierzu W. Hübner, “*Indiculum* oder *Indiculus?*”, in G. Förster – A.E.J. Grote – Ch. Müller ed., *Spiritus et Littera. Beiträge zur Augustinus-Forschung. Festschrift zum 80. Geburtstag von Cornelius Petrus Mayer OSA*, Würzburg, 2010 (= Cassiciacum 39.6 = Res et Signa 6), 597-614 besonders 606.

[10] O. Perler – J.-L. Perler, *Les voyages de saint Augustin*, Paris, 1969, 142f. und Tabelle 432. AL I 533 s.v. *Augustinus (vita)* mit Verweis auf *conf*. 9,14 *renasci in te*.

[11] Varro bei *Gell*. 3,2; Plin. *nat*. 2,188. Zur Zeit Agustins gehen die *Saturnalia* des Macrobius eben von dieser Frage aus: Macrob. *Sat*. 1,2,19-1,3. Die Bewegung von der Nacht zum Tag spielt bei Augustin in dem Dialog *De ordine* eine zentrale Rolle.

[12] Entsprechend beginnt der neue Monat mit dem ersten Sichtbarwerden der schmalen Mondsichel am Abend, vgl. O. Neugebauer, *A History of Ancient Mathematical Astronomy*, Berlin – Heidelberg – New York, 1975, 1067: „If however, a

Nebensache, denn sie bekommt ihre tiefe Bedeutung, wenn man, wie bei Ambrosius und Augustin geschehen, die Taufe zu der Auferstehung Christi in Beziehung setzt. Insgesamt wird also derjenige, der sich für die *Retractationes* interessiert, mit mehr Gewinn den reichhaltigen AL-Artikel von H. Müller konsultieren.

Die lateinischen Texte werden fast immer richtig zitiert. Abgesehen von einigen Flüchtigkeiten[13] hängt das Zitat (29 Anm. 49 mit dem typischen Dativ am Briefanfang) *iussioni tuae, sancte frater Aureli* in der Luft, denn das Verbum *obtemperare* fehlt, daher übersetzt Perl etwas ungenau: „gemäß deinem Befehl …". Quelle ist Augustin (*retr*. 2,21,2): Was dort als Angabe des Incipits seine volle Berechtigung hat, sollte im Lesetext zu einer syntaktischen Einheit ergänzt werden. Ähnlich hängt der Genetiv (35) *Probationum et testimoniorum contra Donatistas* ohne Bezugswort in der Luft. Der Titel der geplanten Schrift über die sieben freien Künste hätte sicher nicht *De libris disciplinarum* gelautet (49 und 116), bei Augustin heißt es nur (*retr*. 1,6): *diciplinarum libros conatus sum scribere*.[14] – Die aus einem Brief von 412 an Marcellinus ohne genaue Stellenangabe zitierte Formel (85 Anm. 93) *scribendo proficere, proficiendo scribere*, lautet wörtlich (*ep*. 143,2): *fateor me ex eorum numero esse conari, qui proficiendo scribunt et scribendo proficiunt*.[15] Einen echten Schnitzer leistet sich der Autor bei der Bildung des Plurals zu *caput* (24).[16]

Grundlage ist die zweisprachige Ausgabe von C.J. Perl (1976), der auch die Übersetzungen entstammen. Diese ist allerdings im Jahre 2021 nicht „mehr als 50 Jahre" (110), sondern gerade einmal 45 Jahre alt. Ihr entnahm er auch den Titel „Revision" (s.u.). Der Leser hätte gern auch etwas über die unterschiedliche Kapitelzählung erfahren, denn die nicht erwähnte und lange maßgebliche CSEL-Ausgabe von P. Knöll (1902) weicht ab. Vom Brief 224 gibt es offenbar noch keine deutsche Übersetzung, in seiner (vermutlich eigenen) Übertragung gibt er die Zahl *ducentos triginta duo* mit 92 wieder (93).

calendar becames strictly lunar, the reckoning of the months from the first visibility of the moon seems most natural."

[13] 73 (*retr*. 2,5,2) *artari*, 76 (*retr*. 2,4) *origine*. Falsche Stellenangabe 53: *retr*. 1,1. 93 *Iuliani*; ibid.: noch; 107: *ecclesiasticas*. 110 fehlende Versteiltung im Zitat von Hor. *carm*. 3,30,1-6.

[14] Vgl. AL II (1996-2002), 485-487 s.v. *Disciplinarum libri*. Zahl und Reihenfolge der Bücher spielen dort in der Nachfolge Varros eine große Rolle.

[15] Erst 90 richtig zitiert, wörtlich auch bei H. Müller, AL IV 1193, Anm 77.

[16] Bei der Sonderbedeutung „Kapitel" nennt der *Thesaurus linguae Latinae* II c. 416,18-28 nur eine einzige Stelle für den Plural *capita*: Isid. *orig*. 1,3,6.

Hinzu kommen einige formale Unebenheiten wie der inkonsequente Gebrauch der Kursive (besonders bei dem zentralen Wort *Retractationes*), bei Klammern (auch online fehlerhaft)[17]. Das Werk wurde also nur unzulänglich lektoriert – ein allgemeines Phänomen. Bedenkt man, daß in der Anfangszeit des Thesaurus linguae Latinae noch der Setzer in Leipzig lateinische Fehler korrigiert haben soll, so wie wird heute aus wirtschaftlichen Gründen sämtliche Kontrollarbeit von den Verlagen dem Autor, Herausgeber oder sonstigen wissenschaftlichen Gutachtern oder Mitarbeitern im akademischen Bereich angelastet.

Das Literaturverzeichnis auf der letzten Seite ist eine Katastrophe. Es lohnt sich nicht, die Mängel einzeln aufzuzählen. Sie wurden in der Online-Version denn auch stillschweigend korrigiert.[18] So ergibt sich das Paradox daß die früher datierte digitale Fassung verläßlicher ist als die gedruckte mit späteren Datuur.

Auf der anderen Seite gibt es am Anfang der Druckausgabe zwei Zusätze zu dem Online Text: Zum einen erklärt eine Widmung (3) „meinen drei Enkeln …“ das Werk zu einer Art Vermächtnis an die Jugend. Hinzu kommt eine offenbar aus dem Familienkreis stammende und auf den Juli 2021 datierte Bemerkung: „In Erinnerung an den Autor, einen großartigen Ehemann, Vater und Großvater, der Augustinus nicht nur erforscht und studiert, sondern auch gelebt hat.“ Diese beiden Aktualisierungen führen ebenso ins Private wie ins Existenzelle. Die Beschäftigung des emeritierten Juristen mit dem emeritierten Augustin[19] zeigt das innige Verhältnis zwischen dem Autor und seinem Gegenstand. So führt schon der Begriff „Revision“ [20] im veränderten Titel der Druckversion zu dem eigentlichen Fachgebiet des Autors (26f.). Er stammt allerdings schon von C.J. Perl.[21] Aus dem Prolog der *Retractationes* zitiert dieser dort (*retr*. pr. 1): *cum … me ad Christianae vitae otium contulissem*. Entsprechend bietet Augustin (59) „nach Rückzug aus dem öffentlichen

[17] Gehäuft e.g. auf den Seiten 72-75. 88 auch „Retraktationen“, 97 = 111 „Retraktation“, 99 „Retractationen“. Fehlende schließende » 60 Anm. 72,8.

[18] Eine kardinale Einzelheit sei dennoch hervorgehoben: Der AL-Artikel *Retractationes* von H. Müller lautet präzise online: „Bd. 4 (2012-2018) 1186-1199“.

[19] Vgl. 115 über Augustins „Emeritierung“ und im Klappentext „emeritierter Staatsanwalt“.

[20] Der im neuen Titel gewählte Begriff wird etwa 59 und 64 wiederholt und ist schon in der Online-Version vorhanden (dort 44 und 49), vgl. 9 in der Possidius-Übersetzung. Andere Übersetzungsversuche hat der Autor 81f. gesammelt.

[21] Aug. *retr*. 1,18 *in hoc libro* wird dort mit „In diesem Revisionsbericht“ übersetzt, zitiert auf 95, vgl. kurz vorher „revidierte“ für *retractarem*.

Leben", „ein quicklebendiges Produkt eines greisen alten Mannes",[22] wobei selbst der Gedanke des Selbstgerichts im Prolog zu den *Retractationes* bereits vorgeprägt war (Aug. *retr*. pr. 2 nach I Cor. 11,31*: ut me ipse iudicem*.[23] Den selbstbewußten und krönenden Anschluß bringt das – von Augustinus selbst nirgends verwendete – Zitat Hor. *carm*. 3,30,1-6 … *non omnis moriar*.

Man wird heutzutage unter den „Augustinus-Begeisterte(n)" (82) nur selten einen Juristen finden, da unsere europäische Rechtskultur von der Aufklärung und vom ursprünglich kirchenfeindlichen ‚säkularen'[24] Liberalismus geprägt ist. Die ernsthafte Beschäftigung des gealterten Mann mit der Selbstjustiz des großen Augustinus samt dem Ringen um Glauben, Verantwortlichkeit und Gnade ist ein lebendiges Zeugnis eines ‚gelebten Augustinismus', vor dessen Leistung man sich respektvoll verneigt.

Wolfgang Hübner

HESEKAMP, Ingrid. *Das Bild von ‚Africa' in der augusteischen Dichtung. Poetische Konstruktionen eines geographischen Raumes (Vergil, ‚Aeneis' – Horaz - Properz)*, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2021. Göttinger Forum für Altertumswissenschaft, Beihefte, Neue Folge 11. X-263 p.

Die Autorin versucht in ihrer Studie einen narratologischen Ansatz mit einer historischen Interpretation zu verbinden. Dabei ist für die Leser nicht unbedingt einsichtig, in welchem Verhältnis die narratologische Analyse zu der Analyse des historischen Kontextes der besprochenen Werke steht. Die Autorin spricht somit zwei Leserkreise an, einen narratologisch interessierten und einen historisch interessierten. Allerdings dürfte die Schnittmenge zwischen diesen beiden nicht sehr groß sein: historisch interessierte Leser werden nicht unbedingt bereit sein, das notwendige Interesse für die narratologischen Ausführungen aufzubringen, und umgekehrt mag ein Interesse an Handlungsgeschichte nicht unbedingt einhergehen mit einem Interesse an historisch-politischen Zusammenhängen.

[22] Vgl. 60 „der greise, gereifte Augustinus".
[23] Vgl. vorher Aug. *retr*. pr. 1: *cum quadam iuduciaria severitate*, zitiert 89.
[24] Augustin bezeichnet seine überwundene heidnische Phase mit den Worten (*retr*. 1,1,1): *in cupiditatibus huius mundi*, vom Autor auf 26 und 89 zitiert.

Die Aussage der Studie läßt sich folgendermaßen zusammenfassen: das Bild ‚Africas' in der augusteischen Dichtung ist das einer in jeder Hinsicht gefährlichen Region, sowohl was das Klima, wie die Tierwelt wie die dort lebenden Menschen angeht, eine Region, die nur dank des zivilisatorischen Einflusses der römischen Herrschaft aus einem barbarischen und primitiven Zustand in einen kultivierteren herausgeführt werden konnte. Der Anteil der narratologischen Analyse an dieser Aussage ist dabei nicht unbedingt nachzuvollziehen.

Der Text enthält zahlreiche Wiederholungen, auch in Form von Zusammenfassungen, die nicht immer weiterführend zu sein scheinen. Ein Manko ist vor allem auch die fehlende Übersetzung der lateinischen Zitate.

Gertrud Mager

HORNUNG, Christian. *Monachus et sacerdos: asketische Konzeptualisierungen des Klerus im antiken Christentum*. Leiden: Brill, 2020. Supplements to Vigiliae christianae, 157. VI-271 p.

Hornung's third monograph deals with the implementation of ascetic ideals in the clergy. While it takes into account eastern and western sources from the second to the seventh centuries, it primarily focuses on the Latin tradition of the fourth and fifth centuries. Apparently, the choice of this topic was a well-reasoned decision, based on an observation Hornung made in his doctoral thesis of 2010:[1] "Der Klerikalisierung auf der einen Seite entspricht die Monastisierung des Klerus auf der anderen. Das asketische Leitideal der Spätantike zwingt förmlich den Klerus, […] sich durch eine dem Mönchtum vergleichbare Lebensweise auszuzeichnen."[2]

Horung's current publication aims to qualify and substantiate this hypothesis. Hornung approaches the problem in three main steps: after a short introduction on the evolution of the theory of asceticism (10-12), he deals (in chapter 1) with conceptions of clerical asceticism (*Konzepte klerikaler Askese*), such as those found in the writings of Gregory of Nazianzus (38-46), John Chrysostom (46-57), Ambrose (58-64), Augustine (64-85), Caesarius of Arles (85-96) and Gregory

[1] C. Hornung, *Directa ad decessorem: Ein kirchenhistorisch-hiloloigscher Kommentar zur ersten Dekretale des Siricius von Rom*. Münster: Aschenforff, 2011. (Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum: Kleine Reihe 8).

[2] Hornung, *Siricius*, 2011, 225.

the Great (96-108). In a second step (chapter 2), he reconstructs the genesis of the canonical tradition (*Disziplin klerikaler Askese*) found in conciliar decisions, synodal rulings, and papal decrees. His approach to the sources in this chapter is less chronologically stringent than thematically motivated. So, while grouping his sources he covers certain aspects of ascetic life, such as sexual ethics (118-135), public life (135-149), and the relation between clerics and monks (149-156). The chapter concludes with remarks on regulations made in ecclesiastical law, as well as in public law in as far as it is concerned with clerical asceticism (164-171). After constructing a general background of theological theory and juridical discipline, Hornung offers a summary (chapter 3) that describes the practice of ascetic life, its pastoral opportunities, and everyday challenges (*Praxis klerikaler Askese*). Here he focuses on concrete examples of clerical convents such as those found in Rhinocorura, Vercelli, Hippo Regius, and Ruspe. Each location thus corresponds to the works of a specific author: the situation at Rhinocorura is described by focusing on Sozomen (176-178); Vercelli is accessed primarily through the account of Ambrose (178-182); Hippo Regius through the eyes of Augustine (182-189); and Ruspe by focusing on the works of Fulgentius and his biographer Ferrandus (189-193). Hornung concludes this account by hinting at the possible existence of other convents of clerics in bishoprics such as Caesarea, Aquileia, and Spain in general (193-197). Apart from his general conclusions (226-233), the final chapter points to theological concerns and reservations about the implementation of ascetic discipline in the life of secular clergy (208-225). He thereby completes the general picture by giving room to some critical voices.

In his Habilitationsschrift *Apostasie im antiken Christentum*,[3] Hornung developed a similarly structured three-step approach. This structure allows him to draw a wide picture, taking into account a multiplicity of sources and combining theory, history, and practice. At the same time, however, the scope of the study can become too wide; therefore strict limitation is essential. In his present book, Hornung reacts to this necessity by giving special attention to the highly influential pastoral writings (*Pastoralschriften*) of John Chrysostom (*De sacerdotio*), Ambrose (*De officiis*), and Gregory the Great (*Regula pastoralis*).

[3] C. Hornung, *Apostasie im antiken Christentum: Studien zum Glaubensabfall in altkirchlicher Theologie, Disziplin und Pastoral (4.-7. Jahrhundert n.Chr.)* (Supplements to Vigiliae Christiane 138), Leiden: Brill, 2016.

In his first main section, which deals with the theory of asceticism, Hornung uses these writings as a backdrop to track the characteristics of clerical asceticism. If other authors and their works are mentioned, it is only to create a broader context and lay down a general basis for his third main section, which addresses specific situations at specific places at specific times.

In all these cases, Hornung's assumptions are to the point. With regard to John Chrysostom, for example, Hornung assumes that *De sacerdotio* was written around 393, to justify Chrysostom's attempt to flee his parish and escape ordination as a bishop. In so doing, Chrysostom was adopting a literary *topos* used since Gregory of Nazianzus's *Oratio 2*, in which Gregory tried to justify his actions in a similar situation. To add further weight to this line of thought, Hornung points out, even the arguments used by Chrysostom to justify his deeds somehow correspond to those of Gregory. In both cases, Gregory of Nazianzus and John Chrysostom not only put forward a high ideal, they also felt that this ideal is met by very few clerics of their time. In consequence, they tried to flee their flock in order to prevent themselves from succumbing, like so many others, to despair and failure.

Hornung contrasts this account with the completely different situation of Ambrose, as described in *De officiis*. In that work, considerable respect for the life of the clerics is expressed, but at the same time the main focus is not on idealization and justification, but on reformation and identity formation. Therefore, Ambrose does not refer to Gregory of Nazianzus or the works of other Christian predecessors but instead to Cicero and his highly influential *De officiis* (58). While Cicero tried to provide young rhetoricians with orientation, Ambrose aims to give guidance to young clerics of his diocese (59-60). To that end he gives no general code of practice to implement in daily life but instead describes fundamental attitudes to be followed, forming a catalogue of virtues consisting of *verecundia*, *castitas* und *pudicitia* – general norms, one might say, to guide and structure the daily life of the clerics (60-61). As such, the line of argument used by Ambrose could not be more different than that of Chrysostom. While the latter argues from a transcendent orientation, Ambrose's arguments are universally human and therefore potentially acceptable not only in a Christian setting, but in society as a whole – be it Christian, Roman, or even Gothic (64).

While John Chrysostom and Ambrose might be easily distinguished in terms of language, motivation, and the audiences they addressed, they still remain contemporaries with certain shared features, including a general interest in questions of identity formation.

Gregory the Great and his *Regula pastoralis*, however, date some 200 years later, and therefore his approach to the topic ought to be differentiated from these earlier church fathers. Hornung, however, simply states that Gregory the Great's approach is highly dependent on the works of his already esteemed predecessors. With Chrysostom – Hornung states – Gregory shares the literary *topos* of justifying his attempt to flee ordination (97). And in his attempt to deduce ethical, fundamental attitudes by differentiating heavenly and worldly affairs, and giving preference to those of the heavenly sphere, Gregory resembles Ambrose.

In the words of Gregory the Great, a distinction is to be made between *spiritualia* and *carnalia*. It is in the field of *passionis carnalia* that the cleric must achieve merit and therefore must overcome worldly affairs. Unlike Ambrose, who intended to explain the Christian way of life in terms of general human attitudes, Gregory aims to stress a two-tier ethical model in which the cleric, generally speaking, ought to live a more rigorous life than the non-ordained layperson (99-100). In the course of his considerations, Gregory the Great adopts a catalogue of virtues comprising *castitas*, *abstinentia*, *doctrina*, *patientia*, *auctoritas*, *pietas*, and *iustitia* (100). The origin of this list in Gregory's work remains obscure. Hornung states: "Im Hintergrund der Liste können klassische Tugendkataloge stehen, die auch Gregor rezipiert, oder biblische Vorstellungen, etwa die sieben Gaben des Heiligen Geistes nach Jes. 11,2; gleichwohl scheint die hier genannte Liste der Tugenden von ihnen allenfalls inspiriert, nicht im engeren Sinne entlehnt" (101). This last remark in particular is absolutely correct. In part it is so, however, because Hornung is discussing three different text corpora – answering for three completely different situations with regard to time, space, and audience – and it does not seem possible to draw reliable conclusions without a deeper understanding of the actual context to which the texts are responding.

It is at precisely this point that I, the reviewer, started to experience a certain unease with regard to the methodological approach developed by Hornung. And this unease became further entrenched over the course of the work and especially in the next main section, which deals with questions of ecclesial discipline and how ascetic ideals were reflected in magisterial doctrine.

In this part of his monograph, Hornung no longer adopts a chronological approach but instead opts for a thematic one. He thus appeals to decrees and canons of councils and synods, dealing with questions of ascetic discipline at different places and times. Or to put it differently, Hornung once again compares texts written for

situations that are very different in terms of time and space, and again the concrete background of each text is not taken into account to any great degree.

For the practice of celibacy, for example, the so-called Council of Elvira (ca. 300) is considered to be of major importance. Can. 33 of that council stresses the obligation of clerics to refrain from having children. At the same time, however, the right to have a spouse is explicitly confirmed. In consequence, the limitations the cleric faced, as Hornung states, concern only the right to consummate marriage (118-119). In 319, however, the Council of Neoceasarea comes to more far-reaching conclusions when it introduces a general prohibition on marriage for clerics (119). The extent to which these regulations were implemented remains an open question. It is striking, however, to see that the Quinisext Council has to stress the obligation of celibacy for the clergy again in 691/692 (119). Hornung's account could be continued, which he does by discussing additional material, but by this point the problem is apparent and can be summarized in the question: What do we mean by celibacy of the clergy? Does it refer to general sexual abstinence or does it allow a cleric to wed? If the latter, is an act of remarriage possible or not? And above all, how was observance of the norms to be guaranteed?

As mentioned, it remains unclear how all these decrees were implemented in daily life at all. If we consider, however, that one and the same issue had to be addressed by different synods and councils at different times, again and again, it seems justifiable to conclude that such rules had rather limited impact in daily life.

According to Hornung, however, it is not only the impact that cannot be genuinely assessed; more importantly, the line of argument proposed by the church fathers to have an impact on the discussion remains obscure. Regarding synodal decrees and conciliar canons, we have nothing other than the text pertaining to the decision itself, since the debate about the ideas on which the text was founded is generally lost.

It is at this point that Hornung stresses the importance of the Roman bishops' circular letters, for it is in their writings that the decrees of the councils are justified and situated in terms of doctrine (123). When Hornung takes into account the letters of Siricius, Innocent, and Zosimus of Rome, he is once again able to build on his doctoral thesis, which is devoted to Siricius and was published in 2011.

According to Hornung, the concern of Siricius, and his main argument for clerical celibacy, was the perception of cultic purity, as expressed in Siricius' *Ep*. 1. There Jesus Christ is portrayed as the

Church's founding father, and the Church is said to be the spouse of Christ. A cleric, therefore, is not allowed to consummate marriage, because he is already married to Christ. If he were to take a worldly spouse, he would commit adultery and lose his cultic purity (125). Siricius thereby calls for general abstinence among the clergy, including a prohibition on not only the right to consummate a marriage, but the right to wed at all. Thus Siricius appears to be in line with the decrees of the Council of Neocaesarea. Innocent of Rome, on the other hand, adopts a position that is more in line with the decrees of the Council of Elvira. In his *Ep*. 2,9,12 he refers to clerics being married but practicing sexual abstinence (125), and in *Ep*. 6,1,2 he threatens clerics who are not willing or able to succeed in this challenge with the punishment of laicization (125-126).

Through these teachings, Innocent of Rome participated in the process of identity formation and in formulating a clerical professional ethic that would distinguish clerics from the common layperson. Or, in the words of Hornung: "Die Enthaltsamkeitsverpflichtung des höheren Klerus wird damit (abseits der kultischen Argumentationslinie) zu einem Differnzierungsmerkmal zwischen klerikaler und laikaler Lebensform. Innozenz intendiert eine wahrnehmbare Abgrenzung" (127). This conclusion is only true, in as far as a distinction between clerics and laypeople indeed can be made. If clerics are allowed to wed, but are merely restricted in terms of consummating their marriage, things remain slightly obscure however. For in daily life an obvious differentiation between clerics and laypersons can not be made. If this is the case – and the opinion of Innocent seems to point in this direction – the conclusion of Hornung appears rather trenchant.

A similar problem occurs when comparing clerics and monks. According to Hornung such a differentiation is rather difficult, since from an outside perspective it might be hard to determine whether a monk is also a cleric. Clarification comes once again from Innocent of Rome, who aims to gain an "intentionale Differenzierung" (149) and to establish an interpretative framework on the basis of which clerics and monks can be identified. Innocent stresses the importance of remaining true to whatever way of life has been chosen. A monk who wants to become a cleric is advised not to marry. A cleric, on the other hand, who feels the need to become a monk is not allowed to get divorced but must take care of his wife. The monastic practice of this clerical monk-to-be must accommodate his marital status (151). At this point clerical practice appears to be more challenging for the individual than monastic practice. For while the cleric has to deal with

worldly affairs – since he is allowed to wed while being obliged not to consumate marriage –, the monk appears to be protected from them by the obligation of celibacy – understood as the prohibition to wed and to have sexual relations. This conclusion might be true, but it remains unclear, since from an outside perspective the life of a married priest could be perceived to be less ascetic than the life of a simple, celibate monk.

Once again it could be helpful to contextualize the Roman approach to asceticism by considering the actual situation in Rome at this time. A possible starting point could be episcopal succession and the question of monks' eligibility to become bishops. It is striking to see that both Siricius and Zosimus are hesitant to allow monks to become bishops. They argue that monks, like laypeople, do not have the necessary theological education to become bishops (155-156). This limitation, however, is due neither to ascetic ideals, nor to the necessity of discriminating between clerics and laypeople, but to the establishment of a functional elite and their retention of power.

And here too, it would be helpful to contextualize the accounts of Innocent and Siricius by analyzing the specific situation in Rome, namely, the situation during the period of Pelagius.

Apparently, Innocent and Siricius aim not only to implement ascetic ideals in the clergy but also to validate and strengthen their position against Pelagius and his successful preaching ministry. This is the context in which the bishops of Rome propagate a reform of the clergy and implement ascetic practices as a form of priestly *habitus*. They thereby generate a distinctive priestly lifestyle in an attempt to redefine the (self-)perception of the Christian clergy. From this perspective, the significance of the Roman circular letters lies not so much in the implementation of ascetic ideals among the Christian clergy as in their being another example of controversial literature directed against Pelagius and his succesful preaching.

Unfortunately, Hornung neglects to discuss the case of Pelagianism, since the scope of his study excludes all heterodox positions – such as Montanism, Donatism, or the already mentioned Pelagianism – thus propagating a stricter canon of values than was capable of winning a majority within mainline Christianity.

Hornung's reluctance to deal with movements perceived to be heterodox might be in part due to the fact that he is discussing the case of asceticism in a framework of legal texts. At the same time, however, it would be precisely in this canonical context that a discussion of heterodox positions – the very theological reference point for the disciplinary issues raised – would generate deeper insights.

This desirability applies to the case of Siricius of Rome and his controversies with Pelagius.

The lack of context might be unfortunate in the case of Roman Pelagianism, treated in Hornung's third main section, which deals with issues of daily life in clerical asceticism (*Praxis klerikaler Askese*). It develops a woeful dynamic, however, when the major research results are given in the form of negative findings. With regard to Sozomen, Hornung writes, "Struktur und Organisation der klerikalen Gemeinschaft bleiben im Dunkel" (177). With regard to Ambrose, "Ambrosius scheint anzudeuten, dass die Verbindung zwischen monastisch-asketischer und klerikaler Lebensform im Osten bereits länger bekannt und älter ist; weiter Zeugnisse hierfür fehlen" (179 n. 26). With regard to Augustine (182-189) and his monastic experiments, it is not clear that these qualify as examples of clerical asceticism. At least the monasteries at Cassiacum, Thagaste, and the first monastery at Hippo Regius seem to represent first and foremost examples of groups in which clerics as well as laypeople, males as well as females, lived side by side, seeking to form a Christian community. The same is true for Fulgentius of Ruspe (189-193), whose monastic experiments are very diverse. The same is also true with regard to the additional data (*weitere Nachrichten*) to which Hornung refers. Here he takes a plurality of diverse realities, situations, and contexts into account, but the only unifying factor is the scarcity of the surviving data. This situation is hardly suitable when analyzing and interpreting different datasets.

So what to make of Hornung's book in general terms? Without a doubt, the proposed research question is of great importance. That is especially true in times like these, when the concept of clerical and priestly existence is questioned by the world and society in general as well as by members of the priesthood. At the same time, it is quite clear that this monograph is only a first step and a first contribution in a process of (self-)assurance. Hornung does provide a wide and general view of the potential sources to be taken into account when dealing with questions of asceticism on the one hand and the perception of the priestly ministry on the other. How these concepts fit together and form a unity, however, is a different question, one that needs further investigation. Hornung provides a very strong impetus in formulating a research desideratum, and it is greatly to be hoped that he will provide additional research in the years to come.

Fabian Sieber

KELLY, Gavin, and WAARDEN, Joop van, ed. *The Edinburgh Companion to Sidonius Apollinaris*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020. XVIII-838 p.

Le livre dont j'ai à rendre compte, un monument d'abord par son épaisseur comme par son format (in-quarto), est dans la ligne, par l'ampleur de ses objectifs et ses ambitions, de la série des *Edinburgh Companions to…* Il est le fruit du concours de dix-huit chercheurs internationaux (augmentés de trois collaborateurs), qui s'en sont réparti les vingt-quatre chapitres. Sa langue est l'anglais.

Cette « somme » vient sept ans après un premier recueil également dirigé par les deux « curateurs » du présent volume, Gavin Kelly, d'Édimbourg, et Joop van Waarden, de Nimègue (*New Approaches to Sidonius Apollinaris*, Leuven, 2013, 397 pages). Et l'on n'oubliera pas un troisième ouvrage collectif : Rémy Poignault et Annick Stoehr-Monjou (dir.), *Présence de Sidoine Apollinaire*, Clermont-Ferrand, coll. « Caesarodunum » 44-45 bis, 2014, 629 pages. C'est dire que les études sur Sidoine disposent aujourd'hui d'outils remarquables : peu d'écrivains latins de l'Antiquité la plus tardive sont aussi bien lotis.

Voici la table des matières, aménagée légèrement (auteurs et titres, traduits ; un mot sur le contenu et le titre original quand ma traduction n'est pas assez explicite) :

Ière partie. La vie de Sidoine

(1) Joop van Waarden, « La biographie de Sidoine 'en négatif' » (j'expliquerai cette expression *infra*), (p.) 13-28

(2) Ralph W. Mathisen (Urbana-Champaign, Illinois), « Le monde de Sidoine (*Sidonius' People*). Prosopographie de Sidoine. Lieux sidoniens : appendice géographique », 29-165

(3) Gavin Kelly, « Dater les œuvres de Sidoine », 166-194

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(Gavin Kelly et Joop van Waarden, « Épilogue : Approches à venir de Sidoine », 730-736)

À quoi s'ajoutent une Bibliographie de 60 pages et cinq Indices (*Locorum*, i.e. des références anciennes et médiévales ; Géographique ; des noms de personnes [Antiquité] ; des noms de personnes [après l'Antiquité] ; des sujets [*Topics*]).

Ce livre, qui se veut, et se trouve être, informatif et problématique poursuit trois desseins : **(1)** Procurer un instrument, un manuel qui fasse le point sur nos connaissances et fournisse tout l'appareil nécessaire, avec toutes précisions idoines. D'où, en introduction, un bref panorama, et surtout, on vient de l'indiquer, à la fin du volume un vaste répertoire bibliographique, à exploiter en s'aidant du chapitre 18 qui commente titre par titre, selon un ordre à la fois logique et chronologique, la production contemporaine (S. Condorelli *et al*., « Sidonius Scholarship : Twentieth to Twenty-First Centuries »). D'où aussi d'apparents doublons qui sont en fait autant de raffinements dans l'enquête : ainsi la distinction qui est opérée entre la *recherche savante* sur Sidoine de la Renaissance à nos jours et la *réception* de Sidoine pendant la même période. **(2)** Faire avancer la recherche en proposant des synthèses critiques qui renouvellent les méthodes d'approche. **(3)** Établir un bilan-programme : ce qui est fait ; ce qui se fait ; ce qui reste à faire. C'est l'objet propre de l'« Épilogue ».

Il n'est pas *ad rem* de s'attarder à chacun des chapitres. J'attirerai cependant l'attention, en premier lieu, sur quelques domaines, qui, plus que d'autres à mon avis, soulèvent des questions, de méthode ou de fond :

– Biographie de l'écrivain. Sa reconstitution s'avère grevée d'une difficulté bien mise en relief par J. van Waarden (chapitre 1) : nous n'atteignons Sidoine, pour l'essentiel, qu'au travers de ce qu'il veut bien laisser transparaître de lui. « En négatif » (*in Photo negative*), selon le sous-titre du chapitre.
– Prosopographie des personnages que Sidoine a côtoyés et qui sont nommés dans ses poèmes et sa correspondance, ou qui y sont laissés anonymes. Ce second parti technique surprend : la *Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire*, par exemple, au contraire, ne recense que les personnages nommés (cf. H.-I. Marrou, « Préface » au vol. I, *Afrique*, 1982, 8 : « Nous avons écarté les personnages dont nous n'avons pu percer l'anonymat ») ; mais de fait, dans les divers milieux qu'évoque l'œuvre, les anonymes jouent un rôle, qu'il n'est pas inutile pour l'historien de connaître. Dans le même ordre d'idées, l'incorporation de noms de « Pères », latins ou grecs, antérieurs (Ambroise, Augustin, Lactance, Prudence, Basile de Césarée, Jean Chrysostome) ou d'empereurs (Constantin, Théodose)

déconcerte, et ne se justifie que comme un coup de sonde annexe sur l'information de Sidoine en l'occurrence.
– Rapport de Sidoine à la culture. Le chapitre « Creating Culture and Presenting the Self in Sidonius », à l'intitulé de prime face énigmatique, offre une réflexion pénétrante. La culture était un moyen, dans une sorte de « guerre » (*culture war*, 244), pour se construire une identité par la communion avec un glorieux passé et l'interprétation du présent à sa lumière, pour conserver un rang et établir une connivence avec un cercle, plus ou moins large, de pairs qui partageaient le même *éthos* intellectuel et mental. Il faudrait seulement s'interroger plus au long que ne fait l'A., p. 256, sur le sens que revêt l'intégration de la Bible et des lettres chrétiennes à la culture classique.
– Intertextualité. C'est-à-dire les problèmes relatifs à l'évaluation de la culture, classique en l'espèce surtout, de Sidoine et à l'analyse des mécanismes du remploi chez lui. Pour ce qui dans cette optique concerne la Bible et les lettres chrétiennes, j'y reviendrai.
– Les clausules chez Sidoine. Leur nature (quantitative, accentuelle, ou mixte), à replacer dans l'évolution de la prose métrique tardive et protomédiévale.

En second lieu, parce que le patrologue que je suis, quelque peu profane *in campo Sidoniano*, trouve à cela un intérêt spécial, j'insisterai sur le traitement réservé aux aspects spécifiquement religieux, voire, si le mot n'est pas trop gros, théologiques, de Sidoine.

J'entends bien que l'œuvre de celui-ci, poèmes et lettres, n'en fait pas un « écrivain ecclésiastique ». Cependant, minorer pareils aspects serait passer à côté de la signification non seulement historique mais même, et surtout, pour répéter le mot, *théologique* du parcours que vécut le personnage – théologique en ceci qu'il révèle ce que j'appellerai un nouvel « être au monde » de l'Église, assumé consciemment. Sidoine, haut fonctionnaire devenu sur le tard évêque et mort en odeur de sainteté (sa *memoria* est encore inscrite, le 21 août, au propre de sa ville épiscopale), fut le témoin et l'un des acteurs, en un âge de bouleversements, dans la Gaule des derniers jours de l'Empire d'Occident, du passage que réalisèrent les élites du service de l'état à celui de l'Église, seule institution désormais en mesure, à leurs yeux, de sauver ce qui pouvait l'être de l'ordre ancien : aristocrate raffiné s'astreignant, sincèrement, à une exigeante vertu (et peut-être, ajouterais-je volontiers, comme les sénateurs romains « philopélagiens », peu auparavant, sublimant ainsi son désir d'excellence) et transposant dans les liens, épistolaires ou directs, avec d'autres membres de l'épiscopat, ou d'autres clercs, le type de relations mondaines que sa classe lui avait

appris à cultiver, lettré qui, si une fois entré dans le clergé il affirme renoncer à la mythologie, ne sépare pas, face aux Barbares « ariens », résistance dans la foi et sauvegarde de l'héritage classique, administrateur zélé de sa communauté et défenseur, malheureux au demeurant, de sa cité. Ces préliminaires posés, jugeons sur pièces.

Le chapitre dû à I. Gualandri, par ailleurs très fouillé, est évasif dans le dénombrement des réminiscences scripturaires et « patristiques ». À trois reprises il mentionne ce type de réminiscence :

– 286. Nomenclature des auteurs chrétiens repérables, sans références, mais avec renvoi éventuel à la bibliographie moderne afférente.
– 305. Sur deux citations de l'évangile de Luc (5, 8.12 ; 11, 5) respectivement en *Ep*. 6, 1, 2 et 4, 2, 4 : citations insérées comme telles mais sans notation de leur source.
– 313. Autres souvenirs bibliques, non littéraux (entre autres, en *Ep*. 1, 7, 3, souvenir probable du récit du passage de la Mer Rouge en Ex 14, 15-30, *via* la traduction établie par Rufin d'Origène, *Hom. in Exod.* 5, 5).

Toutes choses suggestives mais parcellaires. On aurait aimé en savoir plus : un exposé *ex professo*, circonstancié et systématique, sur la science scripturaire et patristique de Sidoine n'aurait pas déparé.

Le chapitre dû à L. K. Bailey (« Sidonius and Religion ») m'a laissé, je l'avoue, lui aussi sur ma faim. Son programme était facile à tracer, et ses parties successives le déclinent ainsi : (1) « Sidonius as a Bishop » ; (2) « Sidonius' Knowledge and Use of Scripture » ; (3) « Religious Heroism » ; (4) « Language of Sin ». Les aspects ainsi étudiés de la figure épiscopale de Sidoine se ramènent à trois :

– L'évêque patron de sa cité, évergète, père des pauvres, pris dans un jeu complexe de relations sociales ;
– L'évêque dans sa piété personnelle et son effort de sanctification, marqué par l'incessante confession de ses péchés ;
– L'évêque et sa culture chrétienne.

Ce schéma plus ou moins recoupe les traits que j'ai résumés *supra*. Sur le dernier aspect la contribution de L.K. Bailey complète un tant soit peu, mais pas totalement, les esquisses d'I. Gualandri. À rebours, plusieurs éléments qui sont dans R. W. Mathisen (« Sidonius' People. A Prosopography of Sidonius ») et dans S. Mratschek (« Sidonius' Social World ») semblent à même de la compléter touchant les relations sociales de l'évêque. En revanche cette contribution n'est, je crois, d'aucun secours pour mieux comprendre comment la culture chrétienne de Sidoine s'intègre à sa culture classique : chose que pour ma part j'ai tenté d'éclaircir, très cursivement, plus haut. (On mesure

là, soit dit en passant, l'intérêt qu'il y a à pratiquer des lectures croisées, d'un chapitre à l'autre : par les navettes à quoi elles invitent, elles permettent détection d'échos, rééquilibrages et prolongements.)

De toute façon, en règle générale, un supplément d'investigation s'imposait. Sur plusieurs autres plans aussi :

– Sidoine liturgiste. L. K. Bailey par deux fois (262, 264) rapporte un témoignage de Grégoire de Tours sur la confection de messes par Sidoine, qui aurait eu pour cette activité de grandes aptitudes (*Hist. Franc.* 2, 22). Ladite activité, qui ne nous est plus accessible en sa teneur, doit se resituer dans le contexte gaulois du temps, qui vit se développer l'inventivité liturgique. Comparer le cas du prêtre Musée de Marseille, que nous connaissons par le seul Gennade, *Vir. Ill.* 80 (sur Musée et son œuvre euchologique, voir P. Mattei, « *Massilia christiana*. Lettrés, théologiens et spirituels dans le Marseille des Ve-VIe siècles », dans Clément Chillet, Cyril Courrier et Laure Passet éd., *Arcana Imperii. Mélanges d'histoire économique, sociale et politique, offerts au Professeur Yves Roman*, Vol. 1, ÉFRome 2015, 471-504, spéc. 487-491). Sidoine lui-même signale l'initiative prise par l'évêque de Vienne Mamert d'introduire la fête des Rogations (*Ep.* 5, 14, 2-3 ; 7, 1, 2) et le travail du frère de Mamert, Claudien, qui était versé dans le chant sacré et qui composa un lectionnaire (*Ep.* 4, 11, 6, v. 13-17).
– Sidoine lecteur des écrits doctrinaux de son époque. Voir *Ep.* 5, 2, 1, à Nymphidius, sur le *De statu animae* de Claudien Mamert ; surtout 9, 9, 10s., à Fauste de Riez : allusion, imprécise, à un traité de celui-ci, qui est peut-être le *De Spiritu sancto* (opinion de Mathisen, 95) mais que Mario Neri identifierait plutôt comme le *De ratione fidei* : cf. « Sidonio Apollinare (epist. 9, 9, 10) e la possibile attribuzione del *De ratione fidei* a Fausto de Riez », *Bollettino di Studi Latini* 41, 2011, 531-542 [cité 610.778])
– Deux détails qu'apparemment aucun des auteurs du *Companion* n'a aperçus (je ne sais si d'autres l'ont fait) :
(1) En *Ep.* 5, 3, 3 la formule *ante compulsus docere quam discere* (Bailey, 272) répète un mot célèbre de S. Ambroise, *Off.* 1, 1, 4 (… *factum est ut prius docere inciperem quam discere*).
(2) En *Ep.* 9, 9, 12, afin de célébrer le savoir séculier de Fauste, qui a su récupérer les *artes* des Gentils et les plier au service de la vraie foi, il est fait recours à l'allégorisation de dispositions du *Deutéronome* (21, 10-14) sur la captive païenne que l'Hébreu peut prendre pour concubine, mais après l'avoir purifiée ; or cette exégèse est traditionnelle (cf. e.g. Jérôme, *Ep.* 21, 13) ; et de cette tradition Sidoine dépend, manifestement, vu le tour de sa phrase.

– Contre-chant : un dernier détail qui, à l'inverse des précédents, ne rassure pas sur la compétence de l'évêque. Dans le *Carmen* 16 (*Eucharisticon*, c'est-à-dire « Remerciement ») adressé à Fauste, Sidoine déclare vouloir invoquer non plus les déités de la Fable inspiratrices des poètes, mais le *Spiritus* (v. 5) dont on découvre, en particulier aux v. 35 et suiv., qu'il est le Christ : « binitarisme » (?) curieux, en plein Ve s. De cette curiosité le *Companion* ne dit rien. On en lit davantage aux p. 25-26 du commentaire que Stefania Santelia a consacré au *Carmen* 16 (Bari 2012 ; signalé dans la Bibliog., 786, mais non pas au chap. 18, 597 ; sur le poème 16, voir d'autres titres récents (2000-2017), chap. 18, *l. laud.*).

Il y aurait donc eu à creuser plus avant pour présenter d'une manière plus balancée Sidoine *auteur* chrétien. Il n'écrivit pas de théologie ; mais il fut plus averti, à l'occasion, qu'on ne l'estimerait ; s'il n'a pas participé, ouvertement, aux débats en cours, c'est peut-être qu'il se sentait mal armé, peut-être aussi parce que son amour de l'amitié lui interdisait de polémiquer (L.K. Bailey, 266, fait de cet amour le mobile central, sinon unique). Sans doute cependant s'en est-il mêlé, à sa mode : la même L.K. Bailey, 270, suppose, à bon droit, que l'accent qu'il met sur le péché et la miséricorde constitue possiblement une réaction pratique aux controverses sur la faute et la grâce, qu'au moins sa proximité avec Fauste ne pouvait lui laisser ignorer. Et s'il s'est refusé à rédiger des traités, il n'a pas pour autant déserté les lettres proprement ecclésiastiques, sur un terrain où son aisance stylistique lui conférait, loin des querelles, quelque avantage : la liturgie…

Le gros livre dirigé par Gavin Kelly et Joop van Werden, loin de stériliser la recherche future, est au contraire de nature à la stimuler. Le constater est le plus juste hommage qu'on puisse rendre au labeur de ceux qui y ont pris part.

Paul Mattei

LEE, Chungman. *Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine of Hippo, and the Filioque*. Leiden: Brill, 2021. Supplements to Vigiliae christianae, 169. XII-366 p.

A major source of division between the Western tradition and the Orthodox tradition is the issue of the *filioque*. Thanks to this book, the topic has now been clearly explained and discussed in all its complexity. The author begins with an introduction to the issue,

observing that the conflict between East and West has not been solved yet but also that scholars representing each tradition now better understand the opposing view. This observation characterizes the whole book. On the one hand, the author tries meticulously to explain the differences between the two traditions; on the other hand, he tries to overcome the rift caused by these two versions of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed. The latter aim is mentioned because this rift still exists and because it still plays a considerable role in ecumenical contacts and discussions between East and West. The author therefore begins with a comparison of the main documents that the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) have published on this issue.

In 1981, the WCC published a document called the *Klingenthal Memorandum*, edited by its Faith and Order Commission. In 1995, the RCC published a document called the *Clarification*, which also analyzed the *filioque*. Although the main divergence exists between the Orthodox churches and the churches of the West, the author shows in his analysis of the *Memorandum* and the *Clarification* that Protestant and Catholic approaches to this issue also differ. Beginning with the *Memorandum*, the author observes that its starting point was the full acceptance of the original form of the *Sym. Nic.*, in which the *filioque* does not figure; the *Memorandum* therefore recommended this form as the normative one. At the same time, the *Memorandum* asserted that this normative formula was not clear about the relationship between the Son and the Spirit and therefore needed to find a balance between monopatrism and the *filioque* tradition. The *Memorandum* did so mainly by stating that the Father, from whom the Spirit proceeds, is the Father of the Son. Hence, the Spirit is also given by the Son, because the Father is always the Father of the Son, and the Spirit then also proceeds through the Son. By stating things in this way, the *Memorandum* tried to avoid a double cause for the Spirit's origin. In general, the *Memorandum* tried to respect the *taxis* (order) of the hypostases: Father, Son, and Spirit. It suggested that the *filioque* had its origin in the void that was left by the traditional formula regarding the relationship between the Son and the Spirit. Leaving aside the *filioque* might potentially also lead to undermining the unity of the Trinity. Therefore, the main arguments of the *Memorandum* are based on the relationships between the three persons, and it insists that the Bible only speaks of the three persons by showing them as reciprocally linked one to another.

Next, Chungman Lee examines the *Clarification*. Compared to the *Memorandum*, the *Clarification* is even clearer in its insistence on the procession of the Spirit 'from the Father alone'. Furthermore, it

explains that the *filioque* was added to counter the threat of Arianism. Moreover, the *filioque* is not to be understood as an essentialistic approach but as a personalistic one. In other words, the *Clarification* insists that the *filioque* was added only to preserve the unity of the three persons and did not intend to introduce subordination between these three persons. This summary leads to the conclusion that the *Clarification* very much agrees with the formula of the *Memorandum*: the Spirit proceeds from the Father of the Son. The *Clarification* makes clear, however, that there is a vital distinction between the divine economy and the divine theology (economy and immanence). The *Clarification* insists on the close relationship between economy and theology, but the *Memorandum* was already less clear about this relationship, and the Eastern tradition obviously distinguishes between these two aspects of the Trinity. Also, the *Clarification*'s arguments are biblically documented to a lesser extent than is the case with the *Memorandum*. These chapters are constantly summarized by Lee, and the main questions resurface under the heading of 'What is at stake'?

Of course, all this is an expression of the interpretation of the Trinity itself and the different ways in which the Western and Eastern traditions view the Trinity. The author, therefore, continues his work with an analysis of the works of Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine. Regarding Gregory, the author starts by explaining that Gregory uses a purely Platonic scheme of a two-sided reality in which one can distinguish a material, divided aspect and an immaterial, undivided one. Next, this scheme is applied to the biblical distinction between creator and creatures. God the Father is the immaterial reality that created the visible and material reality. How does that relate to the Son and the Spirit? In particular, the begetting of the Son is a complicated matter since the Son has a twofold nature, human and divine. In his argumentation, Gregory mainly turns against Eunomius, rejecting his subordinationism. In Gregory's view, it belongs to the essence of the Father to beget, and it is therefore impossible to argue that the Son has a different *ousia* than the Father. Gregory's is a subtle argument with different concepts in which *ousia* and *energeia* play a major role, allowing him to distinguish between the divine economy and its *ousia* without separating the two. This model is of course a merely Neoplatonic one in which the second hypostasis cannot be separated from the first. Gregory uses the analogy of a first, unbegotten sun, from which a second one is shining out 'as if begotten simultaneously with the very thought of the first' (132). Then there is a third light 'sundered by no interval of time from the begotten light, but shining through him' (132), meaning that the Son is the mediator

of the Spirit, yet not in a passive but in an active way. Moreover, the Spirit is, in Gregory's view, as divine as the Father and the Son. Yet the *taxis* (order) of Father, Son, and Spirit remains unchanged, which for Gregory also implies that the Son has no causal relationship with the Spirit; it is only the Father who is the cause of the Spirit. The Spirit is indeed an independent hypostasis but proceeds only from the Father. The role then of the Spirit is to encourage human beings to see God through the Son and to teach them that they are adopted children of God the Father. This characterization therefore includes a kind of deification that can be interpreted as participation in the hypostases of the Son and the Spirit. In short, Gregory values the role of the Spirit but is in no way willing to conceive of the Spirit's procession in terms of a *filioque*.

Lee then moves to Augustine, basing his analysis mainly on Augustine's *De Trinitate*. To begin with, he introduces Augustinian anthropology, which is based on the notion of *imago*. This image is the model according to which humans have been created, and Augustine wavers between characterizing humans as created according to the image of God and created as the image of God. In the latter case, this image can suffer from deformation due to sin. People can convert themselves, however, and then become more godlike. One might call this a process of participation, since conversion implies becoming more and more the image of God that one once was. Yet the notion of participation remains highly disputed. The concept of image is thus clearly related to the famous Augustinian *cogito*: the mind knows itself because it knows it is thinking, and hence it cannot doubt its own existence. But then again, knowledge has many forms, and there is a difference between *scientia* and *sapientia*. No form of knowledge should be neglected – they should be taken together (which in fact only happens in Christ) – but even then, the danger remains that knowledge can be mistaken and has to be corrected. For that reason, one might also argue that there is a kind of apophatic theology present in Augustine. Yet the corrupted mind must be purified by the divine economy, and there we encounter the difficulty of some of the Augustinian parameters. On the one hand, a divide must remain between the creator and the creatures, which is paralleled by the distinction between spiritual and physical; on the other hand, there is the notion of participation. Lee explains in detail the difficulties Augustine had in using the traditional terms for the unity of God (which Augustine often calls the *idipsum*). Augustine had, of course, inherited the terms *substantia* and *persona*, though he wasn't really satisfied with them. Nevertheless, there is a way out of this

equivocality: namely, by understanding the different hypostases as relations between each other. The terms 'Father' and 'Son' do refer one to another, and it is not an ontological divide that makes the difference. But what then about the Spirit? Augustine defines the Father as the *principium* but not in a temporal way. He is Father, not born from a father. But the notion of *principium* is also a notion that can be applied, at least, to the Son. This application is possible because Augustine, with his insistence on intra-Trinitarian relations, can define the Spirit as *communis* in the sense of *donum*. The Spirit is a gift given by the giver but no less received by the giver. This explanation is based on a strict distinction between the divine economy and immanence, but it makes clear why Augustine can consider the Spirit to be a gift from the Son as well as from the Father. Such a view is already articulated in *De Trinitate* I,7: *Spiritusque Sanctus nec Pater sit nec Filius, sed tantum Patris et Filii Spiritus*. Hence, the monarchy of the Father is completely respected but not in an ordinary, causal way: first this and afterward that. When it comes, then, to the hypostatic qualities of the Spirit, they must be defined as *communis*, *donum*, and *caritas*. Having described these qualities, Lee inserts an excursus on the views of Cipriani, Ayres, and Coffey. In all three cases, Lee admits their enormous contribution to the interpretation of Augustinian Trinitarian theology, but he remains critical. He then moves on to the role of Christ, now that there is room (and not only room but also necessity) for a *filioque*. He defines the role of Christ as *exemplum* and *sacramentum*. Regarding the term *exemplum*, there is an interesting discussion of the Pelagian point of view. The author explains that there might be a common understanding of this notion between Augustine and his adversaries but that the latter took Christ as an example of something humans could follow and adopt, thereby reducing the two natures of Christ to one human nature.

Finally, the author compares Augustine and Gregory and draws a conclusion from this comparison. Lee takes four issues as the basis for comparison: monopatrism, the role of the Son, the relation between economy and immanence, and the hypostatic properties of the Spirit. He concludes that there are significant differences between Augustine and Gregory on these four points. Gregory, for example, makes a clearer distinction between the economy and the immanence than Augustine, who is more explicit in his Christological approach. There are also many similarities, however, between the two church fathers, and the author concludes that they agree on the hypostatic identity of the Spirit as well as on the idea of *deus de deo*. Unfortunately, despite

these similarities, the author is not optimistic about solving disagreements regarding the *filioque*. It will probably only be at a future time when we can contemplate the Trinity itself.

Though the conclusion, from an ecclesiastical and ecumenical perspective, may be disappointing, the book is thoroughly written. It compares Augustine and Gregory in a fair way, and it is based on a solid study of the sources. Moreover, it has a very clear structure and one can only admire the work that is behind this thesis. Yet I do have some doubts about the structure. The author starts with the modern reception of the *filioque* and the ecumenical reports that have been written on this topic. He thoroughly analyses the *Memorandum* as well as the *Clarification*, but this approach implies that the whole issue is still framed today as one of the cleavages between East and West. We are close to the paradigm of De Regnon, who was falsely accused of creating a scheme grounded in the differences between East and West. Once we are trapped in this scheme of cleavage, we will never be able to resolve it, whatever the similarities between East and West. The author has a great chapter titled 'What is still at stake?', which is subdivided into three sections that are all likewise subtitled 'What is still at stake?', but he does not show where we might see the actual relevance of this theme. It looks a bit like one of those ecumenical debates that reveal how ecumenism has lost its relevance during recent decades. Ecumenism in the traditional sense represents the dynamic of the last decades of the twentieth century, a dynamic that unfortunately has entirely lost its relevance and meaning. So why focus on the ecumenical aspect of the *filioque*? Moreover, this study is curiously structured. The dispute only became urgent in the ninth century. A historian might expect in this case that the ninth-century historical context would be highlighted. Why was the *filioque* so suitable for political debate and battle? That has very little to do with the theology of Augustine and Gregory. These church fathers are used as combatants in a battle they could not have foreseen. Why then go back to authors who did not know they would play these role centuries later? Today, either the historian gives us an explanation of why the *filioque* played this role in the ninth century, or the systematic theologian explains the relevance of the formula for modern times. If the latter is the case, why not refer to the wider debate on the Trinity and include important scholars such as Sarah Coakley (*God, Sexuality, and the Self*)? The present study – and I do appreciate this work very much – suffers from a methodological error. It suggests that history can solve a systematic problem or that systematic theology can solve a historical and political problem. Neither

assumption is sound, and I regret the choice to frame this study as an ecumenical issue.

Secondly, there is a problem with the level of language regarding being and thinking. The author repeatedly speaks about apophatic theology, making clear that it was a method used by both Augustine and Gregory. Augustine insists that God is incomprehensible, but he does not suggest that there is no predicate applicable to God; if he had, he would have struggled with the choice between *essentia* and *substantia*. Apophatic theology is the idea that predicates cannot be applied to God, which is something different from arguing that God is incomprehensible. The incomprehensibility of God has to do with the insufficiency of our language about being. *De Trinitate* V,1,1 clearly exhibits the Platonic order of being, thinking, and speaking. Our thoughts cannot grasp being, and language cannot render our thoughts. That conundrum raises the question of the *filioque* as seen from a philosophical point of view. When the notion of hypostasis becomes as important as it has become in the *filioque*, why is the matter of predication not addressed? The whole Trinitarian theology is based on Neoplatonic structures, and in Neoplatonism the issue of predicating is extremely important. Why then has the author not delved into the question of predicating the Spirit, not only by referring to the Father but also to the Son? What does this new element say about the possibilities of language?

Finally, the definition of Christ as *exemplum* is something that indeed matches the Pelagian point of view. It does not seem fair to me, however, to argue that the Pelagians reduced Christ to his human nature. They wanted to take the incarnation seriously. They could, perhaps with even more insistence, claim that the *filioque* was an impetus for humans to act according to the example of the Son. Didn't he send his Spirit? How then can we fail?

But these critical remarks only show the pleasure I had in reading this book.

Matthias Smalbrugge

MARLOW, Hilary, POLLMANN, Karla, and VAN NOORDEN, Helen, ed. *Eschatology in Antiquity: Forms and Functions*. New York: Routledge, 2021. XXIV-629 p.

This very comprehensive volume, containing forty-two essays by some of the world's leading scholars, examines eschatological beliefs

spanning from ancient Mesopotamia around 1200 BCE to Jewish apocalyptic texts of the 9th century CE. Broader in scope than handbooks and encyclopedias limited to Judeo-Christian apocalyptic literature, it presents the ideas of ancient Babylonians, Zoroastrians, Egyptians, Greeks, Etrucans, Romans, and Muslims, as well as Jews and Christians, on both individual eschatology (beliefs about life after death) and universal eschatology (thoughts regarding the end of the world). The book is divided into six sections, each comprised of between five to eleven chapters. Each chapter concludes with a comprehensive bibliography. The major sections are:

Section I: Ancient Near East and Hebrew Bible
Section II: Greek World
Section III: Jewish Texts of the Hellenistic and Roman Periods
Section IV: Etruscan and Roman Worlds
Section V: New Testament Texts
Section VI: Late Antique and Byzantine Worlds.

Section I discusses eschatology in ancient Mesopotamian texts, Zoroastrianism, Egyptian oracles, the biblical books of Isaiah, Ezekiel, and Daniel, and apocryphal Daniel literature. In this section I found very interesting the Zoroastrian belief that after a final battle in which the Evil Spirit would be removed from creation, the earth would "ascend to the level of the stars" (43). The chapter on the Book of Daniel was informative in its explanations of the influence of that text on the writers of the New Testament and on patristic and Byzantine literature.

Section II includes studies on Hades in the Homeric epics, Orphic views of the afterlife, and the eschatology of Pindar, Empedocles, and Plato including their ideas about reincarnation. The views of several of these authors are responsibly presented as concepts which developed throughout their writing careers rather than as static belief systems. The discussion of the *Odyssey*'s portrayal of the location of Hades across the Ocean (109) reminded me of medieval voyage texts which describe monks finding the earthly Paradise, an intermediate dwelling place of the righteous, while traversing the Ocean.

Jewish ideas of the end times in Enoch literature, the Dead Sea Scrolls, Philo of Alexandria, *4 Ezra*, and various pseudepigrapha are presented in Section III. The authors of several of these chapters, and elsewhere in the book, discussed a corollary of certain eschatologies, namely, the relationship between human freedom and "pre-ordained fixed times" (224).

The eschatological ideas of the Etruscans, Cicero, Lucretius, Virgil, Ovid, Seneca, and Lucan are unfolded in Section IV. Especially interesting to me was the Etruscan belief of souls being carried

into the afterlife by winged horses (257-58), the Etruscan division of history into ten ages (261-63), the future collapse and destruction of the world in a single day in Lucretius (283), the cycle of a thousand years in Book 6 of Virgil's *Aeneid* (297), Seneca's portrayal of an end-time conflagration and "stars colliding with stars" (327), and his admonition to live every day as if it were our last. In Chapter 25 Jerry Toner elucidated popular eschatological visions of Roman people, including their belief that some of the spirits of the dead were wandering ghosts which interact with the world of the living (349), the sight of giants on Mount Vesuvius prior to its eruption (351), and an oracle which saw the destruction wrought by Vesuvius as divine vengeance on the Romans for the killing of Jews and destroying their temple.

Section V organizes and presents the eschatological concepts contained in the Gospels of Matthew and Mark, in Luke-Acts, the Gospel of John and the Johannine Epistles, the Pauline and Catholic Epistles, and the Book of Revelation. These concepts include the Second Coming of Christ, the general resurrection, Antichrist, the Last Judgment, the last days, and eternal life. Chapter 29 by Jörg Frey is a very well-written portrayal of eschatology in Johannine literature.

Universal salvation and the restoration of all things (*apokatastasis*) in Origen and Gregory of Nyssa, Basil of Caesarea's rejection of *apokatastasis* and assertion of eternal punishment of the wicked, the eschatology of some early Christian poets, Augustine's views on last things, eschatology in hagiography, Syriac, Armenian, and late-antique Egyptian eschatology, Muslim apocalypses, and eschatological motifs in early Christian art are featured in the final section of the book. Highlights include the discussion of Augustine's views of cultural progress and decline (480), the belief of many early Christians that after death the souls of martyrs go "at once" to paradise (489-91), the function which miracles played at the burial places of saints (496), Aphrahat's articulation of a doctrine of "soul sleep" (501-502), Ephrem's belief that Paradise was on top of a mountain (502), the unique eschatological views of Stephen BarSudaili and his critics (503-505), an end-time discovery of the Ark of the Covenant and the burning up of the Antichrist by fire coming out of the Ark as portrayed in an Armenian text (520-521), and a Jewish belief that the resurrection of the dead will take place on the Mount of Olives (521). This section made me want to re-read the *Syriac Apocalypse of Daniel* and the Arabic *Life of Shenoute*; and I discovered two texts of which I was unaware and want to read: *On the End of the World* by Agat'angel (517, 524, 526) and an Egyptian "Apocalyptic Gospel" (542-542). When reading the latter text, I want to determine whether

or not its descent of Christ and resurrection of virgins, placed in the narrative before an eschatological battle between Antichrist and Enoch, is simply a narrative sequence or suggestive of its end-time chronology.

My critiques of the book are few. I disagree with the opinion in Chapter 27 that Mark's version of the Olivet Discourse is strictly about the destruction of Jerusalem and not at all referring to the Second Coming and general resurrection (374-375). It seems to me that to interpret Mark 13:26-27—"Then they will see the Son of Man coming in the clouds with great power and glory. And then he will send his angels, and gather his elect from the four winds"—as events associated with the Roman-Judaean war requires immense spiritualizing of the text. I also differ with Chapter 30's categorization of certain New Testament epistles as pseudo-Pauline (416) and its dating of some of the Catholic epistles in the second century (418-19). Finally, I would like to have read more about the eschatology of Commodian in Chapter 33, for example, his belief in a double Antichrist and an end-time discovery of the lost tribes of Israel, and in Chapter 35 more about Augustine's views, for example, the return of Enoch and Elijah and mass conversion of ethnic Jews. However, I realize that the contents of the respective essays were subject to word limits.

I envision *Eschatology in Antiquity* as a textbook for graduate courses on eschatology and a reference work for academic libraries. For, its intersection of many disciplines will make it a valuable resource not only for students of theology, religious studies, church history, and apocalypticism, but also for those studying ancient history, literature, and culture.

Francis X. Gumerlock

MAXWELL, Jaclyn L. *Simplicity and Humility in Late Antique Christian Thought: Elites and the Challenges of Apostolic Life*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. XI-193 p.

Jaclyn Maxwell, außerordentliche Professorin für Geschichte und Klassische Philologie/Religionswissenschaften an der Ohio University, untersucht in ihrem Buch „Simplicity and Humility in Late Antique Christian Thought. Elites and the Challenges of Apostolic Life" sozioökonomische Auswirkungen des aufstrebenden Christentums im Römischen Reich. Dazu analysiert sie die Auslegung christlicher, radikal-sozialer Lehren durch Bischöfe und Theologen aus der

Oberschicht zur Zeit der Spätantike (in der zweiten Hälfte des vierten und den ersten Jahrzehnten des fünften Jahrhunderts). Neben der Förderung des Almosenwesens und der *Caritas* gab es unter christlichen Eliten auch Stolz und Herablassung gegenüber sozial Schwächeren. Die Haltung kirchlicher Autoritäten angesichts ungebildeter oder weniger angesehener Mitglieder der Gemeinden setzte weder die konventionelle soziale Ordnung fort, noch ergab sie sich gänzlich aus christlichen Werten.

In der Einleitung (1-11) bietet Maxwell einen *Status quaestionis*. Sie gruppiert ihr Vorhaben neben neueren Studien zu spätantik-christlichen Haltungen bezüglich Sexualität, Reichtum und Armut sowie Sklaverei, welche sich mit der Frage einer Anpassung von Weltanschauungen zu einer Zeit beschäftigen, in der die traditionelle römische Kultur christliche Werte übernahm und umgekehrt. Als das Christentum dominierende Religion wurde, waren christliche Überzeugungen und Tugenden noch kein Allgemeingut. Gleichzeitig begannen gebildete Männer, den Episkopat zu dominieren; Askese und Almosengeben spielten eine zunehmend größere Rolle. Biblische Lehren stellten gewisse Aspekte einer elitären Weltsicht jedoch in Frage. Für ihre Untersuchung zieht Maxwell griechische Theologen (Basilius von Caesarea, Gregor von Nyssa, Gregor von Nazianz, Johannes Chrysostomus) und Kirchenhistoriker (Rufinus, Sokrates, Sozomenus, Theodoret) heran. Dass Bischöfe elitäre Werte artikulieren, die im Widerspruch zu biblischen Lehren zu stehen scheinen, lässt sich laut Maxwell besser mit einseitiger Argumentation und kohärenter Dissonanz begründen als mit Heuchelei oder einem bewussten Versuch einer Aristokratisierung ihrer Religion (vgl. 9).

Das erste Kapitel („Roman and Early Christian Attitudes toward Social and Economic Divisions", 12-33) gibt einen Aufriss über römische und frühchristliche Einstellungen zu sozialer und wirtschaftlicher Ungleichheit, zu körperlicher Arbeit und elitären Statusmerkmalen wie Bildung. Biblisch-soziale Lehren fügten dem Selbst- und Weltverständnis römischer Christen neue Dimensionen hinzu (vgl. 33). Dabei können Personen durchaus widersprüchliche Vorstellungen und mehrere Identitäten gleichzeitig vertreten.

Kapitel 2 („Christian Attitudes toward Social and Economic Divisions in Late Antiquity", 34-55) bietet in Fortsetzung des vorangehenden Kapitels einen Überblick über die spätantik-christliche Haltung zu sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Unterschieden. Dabei kann Maxwell auf neueren Studien aufbauen (34). Die Einführung christlicher Werte und Vorbilder wandelte zwar soziale Erwartungen, etwa

durch die Betonung des Almosengebens; überkommene Einstellungen bezüglich der sozialen Hierarchie wurden allerdings nicht vollständig geändert.

Kapitel 3 („Tentmakers and Fishermen: The Apostles' Social Status in Late Antiquity", 56-84) zeigt auf, wie die mit den Aposteln verbundenen Tugenden in eine Vielzahl von Kontexten neue soziale Werte einführten. Teilweise brachten Kirchenführer, von den Aposteln inspiriert, ihre Bewunderung für einen einfachen, ungebildeten Glauben und für Tugenden von Handarbeitern zum Ausdruck. In anderen Fällen bekannten sie sich zu traditionellen Werten und zogen gebildete, gut vernetzte Männer in kirchlichen Führungspositionen vor. Auch wenn die Apostel in mancher Hinsicht Vorbilder blieben, wurde ihr sozialer, wirtschaftlicher und bildungsmäßiger Status nicht oft nachgeahmt oder propagiert.

Angesichts zeitgenössischer theologischer Kontroversen befasst sich Kapitel 4 („Apostolic Simplicity and Elite Education in Late Antique Theological Controversies", 85-118) mit der Tugend der Einfachheit. Bischöfe und Theologen mussten sich inmitten theologischer Auseinandersetzungen, mitunter komplexer Art, verteidigen. Sie griffen manche Feinde auch wegen deren mangelnder sozialer und kultureller Kompetenz an. In vielen Fällen konnten die „ungebildeten und einfachen" (Apg 4,13) Apostel nicht als Beispiel dienen.

Das 5. Kapitel („The Virtue of Humility in Late Antiquity", 119-157) wendet sich der Tugend der Demut zu, ein für Christen der Oberschicht wohl schwer anzueignender Begriff. Manchmal wurden Bibelstellen und die soziale Stellung neutestamentlicher Persönlichkeiten als Leitfaden für einen neuen Stil sozialer Beziehungen unter geistlich Gleichgestellten präsentiert. In anderen Fällen wurde die Demut zu einer exklusiv elitären Tugend. Die kappadokischen Väter dachten darüber nach, wie ein hoher gesellschaftlicher Status mit einer christusähnlichen oder apostolischen Demut koexistieren kann.

Auf sechs Seiten fasst Maxwell ihre Studie zusammen („Conclusions", 158-163). Häufig haben in der Spätantike kirchliche, der Oberschicht entstammende Autoritäten nicht nur neue soziale Ideen entwickelt, sondern sozialkritische biblische Forderungen so umgewandelt, dass sie für die bestehenden sozialen, wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Hierarchien an Bedrohlichkeit verloren. Asketische Gemeinschaften boten einen Rahmen, der biblische Ideale, wie ein einfaches Leben und eine demütige Haltung, verwirklichen und unter der Aufsicht kirchlicher Autoritäten ordnen half. Der neue Adel

beruhte auf spezifisch christlichen Tugenden, die über alte Vorstellungen von elitärer Identität und traditionellen sozialen Beziehungen gelegt wurden. Gegenüber den kappadokischen Vätern und den Kirchenhistorikern sticht Johannes Chrysostomus dadurch hervor, dass er biblische Lehren mit der Notwendigkeit eines Wandels in gesellschaftlichen Überzeugungen oder gar Strukturen verbindet. Christliche Führungspersönlichkeiten ehrten zwar Einfachheit und Bescheidenheit der Apostel, legten aber umgekehrt gleichzeitig typisch elitäre Haltungen an den Tag. Sie zeigten zum einen Bewunderung für die Apostel und weigerten sich zum anderen doch, Analphabeten und ungebildete Männer als gleichrangig zu akzeptieren. In der Spätantike entwickelten einige Kirchenführer auch eine neue Wertschätzung für die unprätentiöse Lebensweise der unteren Schichten. Die klassische Mentalität wandelte sich: Einfachheit und Bescheidenheit wurden zu Eigenschaften, nach denen auch Christen der Oberschicht streben sollten. Je nach Kontext konnten sowohl der einfache Glaube als auch der gebildete Diskurs angemessen sein.

Abschließend bietet Maxwell eine reichhaltige Bibliographie (164-189), außerdem ein hilfreiches Register (190-193).

Jaclyn Maxwell trägt in schön gegliederter und gut aufbereiteter Weise neuere Ergebnisse zusammen und führt sie gemäß ihrer Fragestellung weiter. Dafür zieht sie überzeugend ausgewählte östliche Theologen und Kirchenhistoriker heran. Bei sich an diese Studie anschließenden weiterführenden Untersuchungen wäre es wünschenswert, noch andere östliche und lateinische spätantike Schriftsteller hinzuzunehmen, mit deren Hilfe sich die christliche Haltung zu sozialen, wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Hierarchien vor dem Hintergrund apostolischer Einfachheit und Demut detaillierter verdeutlichen ließe. Auch in Schriften der besprochenen Autoren finden sich weitere gute Hinweise (zur Demutsthematik etwa in Gregor von Nyssas Schriften *De perfectione*, *De uirginate*, *De beatitudinibus*).

Der von Maxwell untersuchte Einfluss christlicher Werte auf die sozialen Einstellungen der Elite (und umgekehrt) ist Teil eines größeren Wandels sozialer und kultureller Weltanschauungen. Das Christentum führt zu Veränderungen klassischer Mentalität, aber zu keinem revolutionären Wandel in der Praxis. Denn weiterhin fühlen sich Gebildete im Vergleich zu Ungebildeten überlegen. In geistlicher Hinsicht wurde die Vorstellung der Gleichheit aller Christen aufrechterhalten, und so bleibt Gelegenheit zur Kritik an vorherrschenden Hierarchien – bis heute: Die Bibel bietet Werte, die zu jeder Zeit herausfordern. Jedes Mal, wenn ein Ideal an die Welt und

ihre Logik „angepasst“ wird, sind allerdings auch Kompromisse notwendig.

Jaclyn Maxwell hat bezüglich der Bedeutung der biblischen Tugenden der Einfachheit und Demut für spätantik-christliche Führungspersönlichkeiten eine Studie vorgelegt, die kompakt, prägnant und lesenswert ist.

Notker Baumann

MECONI, David V., and STUMP, Eleonore, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine's City of God*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. The Cambridge companions to philosophy. XXIV-379 p.

It would be interesting to know why, in the late 2010s, Cambridge University Press commissioned or was offered a *Companion* to Augustine's *City of God*. Publishers like *Companions* and *Handbooks*, presumably because they sell, mainly to university libraries. The target audience consists of advanced undergraduate or graduate students, who will probably look up a particular topic; possibly an academic colleague who works in a different field; and the elusive 'general reader' who is more likely to use the whole volume. *City of God* is a book that some people feel they ought to read (when they have a month or two to spare, as a colleague remarked). Parts of it, usually extracts as in *florilegia*, may feature in university courses on a range of subjects: theology and early Christian studies, late antiquity and classical reception, medieval and early modern history, philosophy and political theory. As many commentators have pointed out, Augustine did not write a work of political theory. His reflections on power and peace, just rule and just society, receive proper attention in this *Companion*, but the *Cambridge Companion to Augustine's City of God* is rightly placed in the series Cambridge Companions to Religion, as is the *Cambridge Companion to Augustine's Confessions* (2020) ed. Tarmo Toom. In contrast, *Augustine's City of God*: *a Critical Guide* (2012) ed. James Wetzel is in a Cambridge series for 'some of the most important works of philosophy'; and Fr David Meconi, S.J., editor of the *Companion* under review, co-edited with Eleonore Stump the second edition (2014) of the *Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, which is in the series Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. (He dedicates the current volume to Dr Stump as *concivis in civitate Dei:* with all possible respect to both, would Augustine

claim to be confident about this? Fr Meconi himself on p. 6, and Andrew Hofer on p. 230-231, raise the question of the city of God and the earthly city, which are mixed until the final judgement; for James Wetzel, 148, this uncertainty 'speaks to the alluring possibility of political humility'.)

The publication of two recent *Companions* suggests that Augustine sells, and that is good to hear. Tarmo Toom, in his Introduction, answers the question 'why now?', considers who is likely to read the *Companion* or the *Confessions*, and relates the *Companion* to other kinds of commentary. Fr Meconi points instead to the undoubted excellence of his contributors, and spends part of his Introduction summarising their contributions. Most, like him, work in the USA: (in alphabetical order) John Cavadini, Dean Hammer, Andrew Hofer, David Hunter, Mary M. Keys, Isabel Moreira, Michael Sweeney, James Wetzel, Jonathan Yates. From Europe are Mark Edwards (Oxford), Mathijs Lamberigts (KU Leuven), Oliver O'Donovan (Edinburgh), and Christian Tornau (Würzburg), who add some diversity in academic and confessional location to the general diversity of style and approach. *City of God* is notoriously long and wide-ranging; Robert Markus, who is deservedly praised by several contributors, once translated Augustine's description *magnum opus et arduum* as 'this great and exhausting work'. How best to approach it? The immediate Anglophone competitors to this *Companion* are Gerard O'Daly, *Augustine's City of God*: *a Reader's Guide* (Oxford University Press, 1999; the second edition, 2020, was presumably not available to Fr Meconi and his team) and *Augustine's City of God: a critical guide* (ed. Wetzel 2012, see above). O'Daly's excellent guide begins with context: the historical setting, what Augustine means by 'cities', the making of the book, the tradition of apologetic ('defending the city of God', as Augustine put it). He then works through the argument of *City of God* in accordance with Augustine's own divisions (Books 1-5, 6-10, 11-14, 15-18, 19-22) and adds a survey of Influences and Sources. Wetzel's Introduction offers illuminating comment on the twelve lively essays in his volume; he does not suggest that he steered the choices of his distinguished contributors.

So it would be good to hear more about the design of the *Cambridge Companion to the City of God*, about the guidance offered to contributors, and in particular about the envisaged audience and its needs. The *Companion* assumes that all its readers are familiar with biblical abbreviations, and allows some untranslated Latin phrases. Unfortunately, the copy-editing has not been sufficient. Probably this is a consequence of the pandemic, when CUP was not

the only publisher to struggle with staff shortages, outsourcing, and miscommunication about who should do what. In some chapters (notably 7 and 9), there are unusually many typos. More importantly, readers who are not familiar with Augustine and his sources will have trouble with references. The list of abbreviations of Augustine's works (xvii-xix) gives the full Latin title with its English translation. (*b.Faust*., probably a computer-generated error, is correctly expanded to *contra Faustum Manicheum*.) The list of references (321-322) begins with a full reference to the translation by William Babcock in the series *The Works of Saint Augustine*: *A Translation for the 21st Century* (New City Press), which is used by several contributors. Thereafter the list offers only abbreviations for Latin titles of Augustine's works. It does not give full titles or list editions and translations except for a few unexplained mentions of CCSL, CSEL, PL, and translations (e.g. Hill I/2) in the same series as Babcock. The Secondary Bibliography does not distinguish editions from secondary studies. It includes, as Dombart and Kalb 1954, the standard edition of *civ*. (referred to on p. 17); it also includes Proclus 1904; but, in general, silence prevails on ancient sources. Readers could at least have been pointed to fuller information at www.augustinus.de, or in *Augustine Through the Ages: an Encyclopedia* ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald OSA (Eerdmans 1999), or in *A Companion to Augustine* ed. Mark Vessey (Wiley-Blackwell 2012), or in the *Augustinus Lexikon*, or in O'Daly, or in CUP's own *Augustine's City of God*: *a Critical Guide*, xiv-xviii. It is to be hoped that these defects can be corrected in the e-book.

Fr Meconi explains (7) that each chapter in his volume is meant to serve as a commentary on the given book or books and to provide a guide to Augustine's 'theological macrostructure' and to the themes of his pastoral concerns. Again, it would be interesting to hear more about how the books were allocated, some singly, some in groups of two and in one case three; and it would be helpful to explain that 'books' are Augustine's divisions, whereas 'chapters' within them were introduced by medieval editors who wanted to make it easier to follow the argument. Fr Meconi's Introduction briefly sets the historical context, suggesting that the baptism of Theodosius I, in 380, is a better starting-point than the entry of Alaric the Goth into Rome in 410. Historians (like this reviewer) will remark that they have for some years questioned whether the edict *Cunctos Populos*, issued at Constantinople in AD 380, made 'Catholic Christianity the official religion of the Roman Empire'; whether 'Alaric's infamous Sack of Rome' in 410 was as dramatic as Jerome (but not Augustine) alleged; whether 'in AD 391 the ancient rites would be banned' overstates the

effect of the laws excerpted in the *Codex Theodosianus*; whether the temporary removal of the Altar of Victory from the Senate, in 357, was of lasting significance. (See Dean Hammer's nuanced discussion of 'what was left of paganism', 82, by the time Augustine embarked on *civ*.) Fr Meconi then turns, with necessary brevity, to the contrast of the city of God with the earthly city; to Augustine's exposition of the Christian narrative of creation and redemption; and to the meaning of citizenship. It seems unfair that the volume editor has especially suffered from (intrusive or absent?) copy-editing, which presumably led not only to typos but to some surprising errors on p. 5-6. The first half of *civ*., i.e. Books 1-10, does not 'read as an encyclopedic "who's who" in Roman history': in Books 1-5 Augustine exploits a few well-known names and episodes (see Christian Tornau in Ch. 4), but in Books 6-10 he engages with a small number of philosophers, and he does not say in *Retractationes* that 'Books 6-10 are dedicated to showing how pagans remaining in the empire are fooling themselves thinking that there have not been massive tragedies and losses of all sorts before 410'. *Estote divites de Deo* (*sermo* 62.12) means 'be rich from God', not 'be God's riches': Augustine continues 'you will not make him rich, but you will be rich from him'.

Fr Meconi next undertakes the challenging task of summarising the contributions. This often seems to be expected of editors, who alone have an overview of the whole. The contributors to this *Companion* do not refer to other chapters, but are careful to show how their assigned books of *civ*. relate to other parts of Augustine's argument. Rather than attempting to revisit Fr Meconi's work or to engage in detailed debate, which (as Augustine would say) would be another matter requiring long discussion, I resort to brief indications with occasional comments. In Ch. 2, Fr Meconi traces the various themes of Book 1 and links them to Augustine's overall purpose. (On p. 22, compare p. 47: Augustine avoids saying that the Goths in Alaric's army were Christian, let alone that they were Arian.) In Ch. 3, Oliver O'Donovan's lucid exposition of Book 2 prompts reflection on present-day categories of religion and morality in relation to Augustine's attack on demon-inspired religious culture, and on his concern for morality in the public realm throughout Rome's history. Readers who have some Latin will benefit from the footnotes on important questions of translation. Christian Tornau, on Book 3, shows how Augustine deliberately uses his rhetorical expertise in following familiar themes of Christian apologetic: not as a historian (another kind of rhetoric), but as an advocate who uses well-known sources so as to base an emotive case on Rome's history of civil war and on the demonic

exploitation, even of Numa's peace. (A reference, perhaps to Book 18, has dropped out in n. 23.) Dean Hammer offers a closely integrated discussion of Books 4 and 5, beginning with a thoughtful survey of constraints on pagan practice in the fourth and early fifth centuries. (No evidence is cited for the surprising statement, p. 85, that in 391 Theodosius 1 ordered the eternal flame of Vesta to be extinguished; thanks to Dr Mattias Gassman for confirming that no evidence survives.) Hammer traces the logic of Augustine's argument and of his attack on Varro in Book 4; he shows why at the start of Book 5 Augustine tackles fate, causality, foreknowledge, and free will; and he concludes with the collective Roman desire for freedom and *imperium*, praise and glory, and its consequences for just rule and for imperial authority.

Books 1-5, as Augustine said, argue against those who think that many gods should be worshipped for the sake of blessings in this life. In Books 6-10, he expected to encounter a greater challenge when answering those who think that many gods should be worshipped for the sake of life after death, because they include outstanding philosophers who agree with Christians on important questions. But in Books 6-7, his target is Varro, and though Augustine insists (as he did in Book 4) that none of the many gods discussed by Varro can offer eternal life, he has little to say about Varro's metaphysics and much about the absurdity and cruelty of Roman civic cult. Mary Keys, in a clear and charitable account, takes as her cue Augustine's remark (Book 7.23) that he wants to engage with Varro as a political thinker constrained by Roman tradition; her focus is the question of nature and convention in civic life and institutions. In Books 8-10, Augustine does engage with 'outstanding philosophers', namely Platonists, who (according to his very selective treatment of Platonist thought) held that many gods could mediate between human beings and the supreme God, and could help us to purify our souls. Book 10, as John Cavadini points out in his Epilogue (see below), is different in kind from Books 8-9, but Mark Edwards provides a concise and impressively learned account of all three books. It moves swiftly, and it would be challenging for a reader who is not yet familiar with late Platonism in Christian and non-Christian texts. (On p. 140, Edwards calls Porphyry 'the persecutor': that is not how Augustine presents him.)

So ends the first part of *City of God*, and Augustine moves to 'our' beliefs and to the origins, course, and due ends of the two cities. He continues to offer refutation where it seems appropriate (*retr.* 2.69), but he cannot spend so much time in rhetorical demolition of opponents. In the first group of four books he confronts difficult questions

about creation and fall. James Wetzel, on Books 11 and 12, begins with Augustine's reliance on the authority of Scripture and with the inventiveness of his interpretations as he seeks for angels in the creation narrative of Genesis. Wetzel's own interpretation offers a vivid and detailed imagining of fallen and unfallen angels in relation to time; of blessedness and the inexplicable losing of blessedness; and of God's eternal creation, 'the coming to be of good things out of goodness itself' (165). Mathijs Lamberigts, on Books 13-14, engages with the creation and fall of the first humans. (There seems to be a missing 'not' at the end of the first paragraph: n. 3 makes the point that Augustine wrote against Pelagians in other works from this period, but not explicitly in *civ*.) Lamberigts lucidly explores Augustine's sequence of argument on physical and spiritual death and on soul and body in paradise and in resurrection; on life according to the flesh and according to the spirit; on will, emotions, and on the consequences of the fall; and on the final, much quoted, definition (Book 14.28) of the two cities made by two loves.

The next four books, on the course of the two cities, are often neglected. Augustine follows the course of the city of God in Scripture, saying very little (as he acknowledges in Book 18.1) about the earthly city. Genealogies, the history of Israel, and prophecies of Christ in words and events mattered greatly to him, the more so because difficulties in the text could be used to question the authority of the Old Testament. Chapters 10 and 11 of the *Companion* make a strong attempt to demonstrate that there is material here which is still important. Jonathan Yates, on Books 15 and 16, offers an attentive but not uncritical account of Augustine's exegetical principles, and shows how his uneven treatment of Israel's early history results from a Pauline perspective on God's guidance of his people. Michael Sweeney, on Books 17 and 18, takes prophecy and kingship, both political and spiritual, as his guiding theme. His treatment of the immense Book 18 is so efficient that he has space for an unexpected comparison with the ninth-century Islamic Platonist Al-Farabi on the relation of reality and image, philosophy, and political life.

Now to the last four books. Book 19, acknowledged as the most widely read, evidently deserves a chapter to itself. Andrew Hofer provides a clear and exceptionally well documented exposition of Augustine's appeal for lasting peace, and of its reliance on reason to persuade one audience and on Scripture to convince another. He helpfully traces connections with other books of *civ*., and offers an analysis of the movement of thought in Book 19. Book 20, on the Last Judgement, also has its own chapter, so that Isabel Moreira has space to explore, in awareness of medieval reception, Augustine's exegesis

of Revelation and other Scripture texts about the Last Day, God's justice, purification by fire, resurrection, and the communion of saints. Book 21 is often grouped with 20, but here David Hunter brings it together with Book 22 for a discussion of eternal death and eternal life. His focus is on the body and on Augustine's notable change of mind between the early writings which expect a spiritual resurrection and the later writings which affirm the human being as body and soul in this life and the life to come.

Finally, John Cavadini provides an Epilogue: an impressive, even moving, overview of the 'architectonic plan'. He comments especially on the inclusion of constructive theology in the first part and of refutation in the second, as Augustine said in *Retractationes*. Thus there is only a brief mention of the Incarnation in the historical narrative of Book 18, because so much more has been done in Book 10 once Book 9 has challenged Platonist accounts of mediation. It would be possible to query this 'heavy constructive lifting on the Incarnation' (299) in that Augustine strongly affirms the incarnation of Christ as the true and only mediator between humans and God but does not discuss what it means to 'put on' or to 'take up' flesh and how the divine and human mind of Christ work together. But there are always more questions to ask about *City of God*: perhaps that is the reason for a new *Companion*.

Gillian Clark

MÖLLENBECK, Thomas. *Gerechtfertigt durch Erfahrung? John Henry Newmans* conversion narratives *und die Rolle von Luther und Augustinus in seiner Rechtfertigungslehre*. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöning, 2018. 598 p.

Thomas Möllenbeck's voluminous *Gerechtfertigt durch Erfahrung* offers a wide-ranging and ambitious interpretation of John Henry Newman's theology of justification, as expressed primarily in his 1838 *Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification*. Because of its critical appraisal of Martin Luther's approach to justification, Newman's *Lectures* were neither translated in German nor properly received and digested there. Möllenbeck's monograph is an admirable attempt to turn the tide and stress the *Lectures*' ecumenical value for today. The originality of Möllenbeck's work lies in his interpretation of Newman's theory of justification in light of the various conversion narratives Newman constructed throughout his life and the experiences of conversion they reflect.

After a substantial introduction that situates Newman's *Lectures* as an ecumenical endeavour, then discusses their reception, and finally explores the study of conversion narratives, the work falls into two parts. In the first part, Möllenbeck discusses the various fictional and autobiographical conversion narratives Newman constructed as a Catholic, to wit, his novels *Callista* and *Loss and Gain*, and what is often deemed his spiritual autobiography, the *Apologia pro vita sua*. In the second part, Möllenbeck turns to Newman's actual theory of justification in the *Lectures*, which he treats in two large movements. In a first movement, he situates Newman's theory as a *via media* between those of Luther and Augustine, who function as the poles for a heuristic antagonism between justification by faith alone and justification through obedience. In a second movement, Möllenbeck offers a theological interpretation of Newman's theory of justification, focusing on the indwelling of the Holy Spirit as the core of Newman's *via media*.

Throughout his monograph, Möllenbeck displays erudition and thorough knowledge both of Newman's works and of the secondary literature, which he navigates with nuance and precision. From a historian's point of view, more could have been done with the specifics of Newman's own development (especially prior to the Tractarian Movement) as well as the various religious and cultural contexts in which Newman wrote. As a piece of interpretative theology, however, Möllenbeck's work can hold its own as an important contribution to the field.

Geertjan Zuijdwegt

MUELLER, Robert. *Hereafter Knowing in Sonnets and Their Similars*, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2022. 252 p.

This dense and frequently mystifying volume by Robert Mueller concerns the philosophical and theological dimensions of poetry, in particular honing in on – but by no means limiting itself to – the (post-)Petrarchan sonnet. It is a book whose central conceit is hard to outline, and Mueller himself meaningfully makes no attempt to do so (even the cover blurb only provides an overview of various relevant topics). Its arrangement is associative, flowing from this to that subject and covering authors as vastly different as Aristotle and Dan Machlin, with little in the way of set-up, conclusions, or simple signposts (only the introduction and chapter 2 sporadically include cryptic

subheadings) to add some much-needed structure to the collection of otherwise valuable insights. Central themes throughout the four chapters are the nature of (divine) "knowing" and the act of addressing through poetry, flagged by the chapter titles.

Significant for our purposes is Mueller's exploration of the writings of Augustine and most notably of the "shared experience" constituted by the *Confessions*. While the Church Father appears throughout, it is the second chapter – titled "Address to Deus Meus. Desire to Praise on the Verge of Knowing and Time" – that extensively deals with his act of confession and the ways in which it involves "knowledge". Different *aporiae* occasion, both for Augustine and for Mueller, the discussion of such concepts as bodies, place, time, creation, and the First Cause that originated them. Though the confessor may never come to fully know the latter, it is precisely in surrendering to this perspective that the value of his attempts lies.

For the reader who is willing to engage with its opaque nature, *Hereafter Knowing in Sonnets and Their Similars* provides some genuinely insightful readings of a range of canonical poets. Its commitment to uncovering the weighty philosophical concepts that motivate Augustine's *Confessions*, as well as its attention to the actual Latin text in doing so, is similarly appreciated. One only wishes the book's presentation reflected the acuity of these findings.

Sam Urlings

MÜLKE, Markus, ed. *Chrésima: Exemplarische Studien zur frühchristlichen Chrêsis*. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2019. Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte, 138. VII-367 p.

The starting point of this book is the category of *chrêsis* (χρῆσις), which has been extensively explored by Christian Gnilka, currently Emeritus Professor in Classical Philology at the Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, in his well-known study: *Chrêsis. Die Methode der Kirchenväter im Umgang mit der antiken Kultur. I: Der Begriff des "rechten Gebrauchs"* (Schwabe, Basel-Stuttgart 1984, 2012^2). This category stands for the "use" of Greco-Roman culture by the early Christians in the course of the imperial period: on the one side, the early Christians employ the literary, scientific, and philosophical material of the pagan background; on the other side, this employment is not neutral, which means that they reformulate and

imbue with new meaning the methods, terminology, and doctrines of the ancient world in light of the Judeo-Christian revelation. This volume, edited by Markus Mülke, who authors the preface as well (1-6), collects fourteen papers which were dedicated to Gnilka himself on the occasion of his 80th birthday, on December 20th, 2016, and which are about specific cases of the aforesaid use of Greco-Roman thought by early Christian theology.

This collection opens with the research of Holger Gzella (7-19) who demonstrates that the category of *chrêsis* applies not only to the relation between the Greco-Roman world and early Christianity, but also to the interplay of the Jews with Ancient Near Eastern culture; for instance, the juridical lexicon of the Babylonians is found in the book of Daniel. The paper of Heinz-Günther Nesselrath (21-43) focuses on Tatian's *Discourse to the Greeks* and particularly on the thesis that, since Moses is earlier than the Greeks, Greek philosophy derives from Moses' wisdom: the author sheds light on the strategy and the sources used by Tatian in order to corroborate this thesis. Manabu Akíyama (45-55) studies how, in the thought of Clement of Alexandria, the true Gnostic makes use of earthly things, with particular attention to Clement's interpretation of Easter in relation to both the Jewish Passover and the sacrifice of Christ. The research of Leonardo Lugaresi (57-72) is devoted to Tertullian's approach to Roman culture, which proves to be twofold: on the one hand, Tertullian criticizes and refutes Roman ideology; on the other hand, several aspects of the Roman world are employed by Tertullian in his apology for Christianity. Raban von Haehling (73-94) explores the understanding of the figure of Atilius Regulus both in Greco-Roman historiography and in Christian literature, for example, in Tertullian, Minucius Felix, and Augustine. The paper of Giulio Maspero (95-113) is about the use of "phantasy" (φαντασία) and its cognates in the vocabulary of the Cappadocian Fathers. The following research of Markus Mülke (115-146) deals with *epistle* 54 of Jerome, to Paulinus, in which Jerome encourages his addressee to study the Bible and patristic tradition. At this stage of the volume, there is a section of four papers which are completely devoted to the writings and thought of Augustine: Maria Becker (147-164) analyses how Augustine, through a hermeneutical approach which goes back to the Neoplatonists, faces the ambiguity of the literal interpretation of Holy Scripture; Maria Vittoria Cerutti (165-194) studies how, according to Augustine, some traces of Christian monotheism are found in pagan theology, on the basis of a famous passage from his *On Christian Doctrine* (II,40,60); Giuseppe Fidelibus (195-227) investigates how the philosophical *uti/frui* distinction, which originates with Cicero, is used by Augustine in

his writings, from *On Christian Doctrine* to *The City of God*. Fidelibus argues that there are two phases of Augustine's use of this distinction: a first phase, in which Augustine gives the distinction an anthropological and cosmological meaning; and a second phase, in which Augustine understands the distinction from an epistemological perspective. The last paper of this section is by Christian Tornau (229-248), who offers an account of the debate between Augustine and Longinianus about the techniques of philosophical dialogue. The last three papers further contribute to understanding the use of Greco-Roman culture in early Christianity: Wilhelm Blümer (249-288) concentrates on the figure of Camilla in Virgil's *Aeneid* and her impact on the *Psychomachia* of the Christian poet Prudentius, in which *Fides*, a personification of the Christian faith, is inspired by Camilla herself; the research of Paolo Liverani (289-317) focuses on the portraits of bishops in late antiquity and demonstrates the debt of this iconography to Roman images, with particular attention to iconographic portrayals of the Roman emperor; the volume concludes with the paper of Nikolaus Staubach (319-348), which is about the practice and the symbolic meaning of eating in the Greco-Roman world and the continuity and discontinuity between the conception of the pagans and Christian views of the Eucharist.

The book is provided with five indices (349-367): an index of the biblical quotations; an index of the quotations from early Christian writings; an index of the Greek words quoted in the book; an index of the Latin words quoted in the book; and an index of names and subjects.

In sum, this book offers a rich and well-documented overview of the interaction between Greco-Roman culture and early Christian writings in the imperial era, contributing both to our understanding of the circulation and reception of the pagan world in Christian thought and to our knowledge of the formulation and development of early Christian theology and literature.

Vito Limone

MÜLLER, Christof, and FÖRSTER, Guntram, ed. *Augustinus als Pädagoge und als Sprachtheoretiker*, Würzburg: Augustinus bei echter, 2020. Cassiciacum, 39/16. Res et signa, 16. 284 p.

This volume brings together the contributions presented at two study days in Würzburg in 2018 and 2019. The first of these colloquia, under the motto 'Learning, Teaching, Leading', was devoted to the

question of Augustine's pedagogy and the general theory of education in Christian late antiquity. The second colloquium dealt with the topic of Augustine's philosophy of language. The editors succeeded in attracting very distinguished colleagues to both topics. The volume thus contains essays written in German that cover a broad range of competencies, including ancient history, classical philology, history of philosophy, and patristic theology.

The first contribution comes from the pen of Peter Gemeinhardt, who is concerned with the question of whether early Christianity can be described as an 'educational religion' (*Bildungsreligion*) despite its anti-intellectual tendencies. Gemeinhardt gives a positive answer to this question: first, Christian educational institutions emerged early on, even if they had to struggle with the problem of how to deal with pagan educational content – especially the motifs of Graeco-Roman mythology – in the teaching program. In addition, the author points to the view held by the early church that, as a Christian, one should be a lifelong learner. In this context, Christ, the *Logos*, is understood as the actual 'inner teacher' (*magister interior*) and the church as a 'school' (*schola*). Gemeinhardt rightly distinguishes the conception of education in late antiquity from that of education in modern times: the former was not primarily intended to make people autonomous in questions of personal belief, but first and foremost to make them open and receptive to religion.

Gemeinhardt's contribution is thematically and directly followed by the essay of Konrad Vössing. The author's aim is to provide a comprehensive overview of the role Augustine played as a rhetor and teacher in the educational system of his time, beginning with his own schooling. Vössing relies especially on the information that Augustine himself supplies in the *Confessions*. Augustine's criticisms of contemporary school teaching as well as the content of rhetoric form an important point of the study. The mechanisms for achieving social privilege through education are also discussed. We find in Augustine, as Vössing nicely shows, a critique of the competition and struggle for prestige that existed in the educational system of his time.

Therese Fuhrer elaborates on an interesting point. Starting from the question of what role music plays in Augustine's educational curriculum for an ascent to the vision of the divine, the author takes a closer look at the meaning of the formula *a corporeis ad incorporea* (*mus*. 6.2). She asserts that Augustine is concerned, in this passage from *De musica*, with the perception of music expressed in bodily movements. Fuhrer's thesis is that Augustine acquired his theory of the world as organized according to numbers by observing

musically moving bodies. The pedagogical intention connected with this theory is that the teacher should lead his students to the highest knowledge through a theoretical examination of musical movement. *De musica* is not confined to acoustic aesthetics. Bodily movements are treated by Augustine, for the first time, as part of an 'aesthetics of movement'.

The following paper, by Elisabeth Reil, deals with the small treatise *De catechizandis rudibus*. She highlights how this particularly charming treatise can be read as having cross-temporal significance and how relevant it is for contemporary educators. For example, an important subject of Augustine's reflections is the relationship between self-motivation and external motivation. In this way, he goes decisively beyond an emphasis on the teacher's competence and addresses the fundamental question of the teacher's self-understanding and personality. Frustration and loss of motivation in the teacher are broken down according to their various possible causes. Six remedies are then presented and discussed, showing how deeply Augustine thought about the practice of proper education.

The last essay on the subject of pedagogy is contributed by Winfried Böhm. He examines the impact of various Augustinian motifs on modern pedagogy. A first point of reference is Rousseau: Böhm identifies the *duae civitates* doctrine as well as the theory of original sin as the most important points of contrast between Augustine and Rousseau. In these two respects, modern educators who refer to Rousseau diverge most clearly from those who are inspired by Augustine, such as Comenius. There seems to be a contrast between Rousseauist and Augustinian conceptions of education. Böhm, however, finds the reference of twentieth-century personalist philosophies to Augustine much less controversial. Finally, Böhm's account of the young Hannah Arendt's reception of Augustine is most positive: in Arendt's doctoral dissertation, we find many basic motifs of her later political thought, including the roots of the concept of 'natality' in an Augustinian quotation, namely, *initium ut esset, creatus est homo* (*civ.* 12.21).

The second part of the anthology deals with the philosophy of language under the motto 'Word – Truth – Lie'. Here Lenka Karfikova first examines the topic of language in *De quantitate animae*. In this dialogue, Augustine moves from the problems of psychology (How can a centipede continue to move after being divided, given the unity of its soul and body?) to basic questions of the philosophy of language: Is it possible to split the unity of phoneme (*sonus*) and meaning (*significatio*), which constitutes a noun (*nomen*),

into parts? According to the Neoplatonic view, which Augustine follows, the soul, although itself undivided, can split itself into parts of the body, as it were. Combining Stoic and Neoplatonic elements, Augustine develops, as Karfikova shows, a theory of recollection (*anamnêsis*) that Augustine eventually had to correct in his *Retractationes*. Karfikova thus locates *De quantitate animae* in the formation of Augustine's philosophy of language, starting from *De dialectica* and leading to *De magistro* and *De Trinitate*. One might have wished for much more detailed observations on this development.

The essay by Tobias Uhle is about the limits of language in Augustine's negative theology. In fact, as Uhle convincingly argues, Augustine not only advocates for a theory of intellectual knowledge of God, but also for the thesis that God is "better known through non-knowledge" (*De ordine* II.44). In inner contemplation, rational dualism is transcended in a vision of God. Accordingly, in *sermo* 52.16, we read that whatever can be grasped of God's nature in such a way that it can be expressed is not really God. According to Augustine's *lingua mentis* conception, words cannot convey knowledge; language possesses only the function of reminding and of expressing something known within. Uhle concludes that Augustine can be called a mystic in that he defines the knowledge of God as an experience that transcends language.

In his contribution, Alfons Fürst examines the problem of the lie in Augustine. Augustine was the first ancient philosopher from whom we have complete writings about lying; in fact there are two: the early treatise *De mendacio* and the late treatise *Contra mendacium*. Especially Augustine's definition of lying has had a lasting effect on further discussion. The Church Father understands lying as a combination of four elements: (a) deviation from objective facts, (b) untruthfulness by the speaker, (c) the intention to deceive (*voluntas fallendi*), and (d) intended (negative) consequences. Fürst nicely describes how Augustine's discussion of individual cases – including those in which the Bible appears to legitimize lying – shows him to be a rigorist who rejects any sort of lying. All eight cases of lying distinguished by Augustine are considered impermissible, even the white lie. It is particularly important for the reception history of Augustine's ideas that he viewed lying primarily as, to use terminology drawn from speech-act theory, a performative misuse of language.

In the volume's last contribution, Johannes Brachtendorf discusses the Augustinian theory of linguistic meaning and its reception by Wittgenstein. As is well known, Wittgenstein criticized the Augustinian theory of language (or what he thought it was) in the

first thirty-two paragraphs of his second major work, the *Philosophical Investigations*. According to Wittgenstein, Augustine commits the mistake of interpreting the acquisition of language by children as if it were a matter of sticking a linguistic label on every object. In so doing, Augustine erroneously orients himself to nouns for concrete objects, while ignoring abstract expressions, such as number words. This criticism is certainly unjustified, as Brachtendorf rightly points out with reference to *De magistro*, where Augustine discusses the example of the meaning of conjunctions and other syncategorematic expressions. Brachtendorf also points out Wittgenstein's background convictions: the theory of language acquisition as some sort of 'training' (*Abrichtung*) and the rejection of the notion of an 'inner world'. Wittgenstein's presuppositions, however, are hardly shared in the present. It seems too implausible to reduce the first-person point of view to the third-person point of view. Moreover, the opinion that one can naturalize intentionality as a feature of mental acts is widely considered to have been overcome in contemporary philosophy. Thus, in a certain sense, Wittgenstein's behaviorist position is more alien to us than Augustine's perspective, which assumes the existence of an independent inner world.

This volume contains a number of highly valuable studies on the topics of Augustine's pedagogy and philosophy of language. The essays deserve attention and should definitely be taken into consideration by the international community of Augustine scholars.

Christoph Horn

ORTLUND, Gavin. *Retrieving Augustine's Doctrine of Creation: Ancient Wisdom for Current Controversy*. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2020. XII-248 p.

This book is written from a perspective not all will share. That perspective has been shaped by debates within the (largely American) evangelical tradition. Ortlund's book is a manual for educated pastors wanting to bridge the gap between the history of Christian doctrine and contemporary debates about evolution. He sees Augustine not only as a textual authority or a historical figure worthy of further examination, but also as a model for young Christians wrestling with the thorny question of how to square the creation story in Genesis with the latest scientific theories. Just as Augustine wondered whether the Manichaeans were right to pillory certain aspects of the Genesis

account, so do modern believers worry about the compatibility of Scripture with evolution.

The parallel suggested here is fair enough, though it may prove an odd lens through which to try to make sense of what Augustine was up to in the late fourth and early fifth centuries. As Ortlund (2) frames the problem: "our threat today comes from naturalism, while Augustine's came from Manichaeism." From a historian's point of view, the choice of the term "threat" is unsettling. Yet Ortlund's goal is presumably not to please historians of late antiquity, but rather to mobilize historical study for the sake of clarifying what Augustine can (and cannot) offer to contemporary debates over evolution. A work like this is certainly preferable to a pastoral manual that eschews historical precision entirely.

Still, it remains the kind of book that has footnotes and a couple of indices, but not a general bibliography. Ortlund, for his own part, is admirably forthright about the scope and limits of his own project. "It is not a work of historical theology proper," he admits (7), "it is a work of *theological retrieval*, which concerns bringing historical theology into the realm of contemporary constructive theology" (his italics). And it is precisely the "alien feel" of an ancient text like Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram* that can serve as a "stimulus" for Christian thinkers in the twenty-first century (6).

Yet we should not let the "alien feel" of late antiquity blind us to the light that recent scholars of Augustine and Manichaeism (for example) have shed upon that era. In a footnote, Ortlund (2) describes Manichaeism as a "dualistic religion that combined Gnostic and pagan ideas with Christian ones." At the risk of being charged with pedantry, we could pull on a number of loose threads in this framing of Mani's followers. What kind of *gnosis*, for instance, is being invoked here? Valentinian, Sethian, Basilidean, or some other kind? Is this a modern diagnosis of 'gnosticism' or is it meant to map onto ancient taxonomies? Even the term 'pagan' fails to convey the subtleties of Mani's adaptation of late-Parthian and Sassanid-era Zoroastrianism to suit the framework of his Christ-centered dualism. This book is not, of course, the place for a deep dive into the intricacies of Manichaean cosmology. Nevertheless, more sustained engagement with scholars of Augustine and Manichaeism such as Jason BeDuhn, Nicholas Baker-Brian, and Thomas Clemmons would have allowed Ortlund to ground his claims in a stronger foundation by demonstrating a firmer grasp of what Augustine was reacting against.

Ortlund (59) outlines his own claims in further detail when he states that reading Augustine on creation can "*refocus* us on the

central issues, *remind* us of neglected topics, and *redirect* us toward unconsidered possibilities" (his italics). More specifically, re-engaging with an Augustinian interpretation of Genesis can do the following: refocus us on the core elements of the theology of creation (e.g., *creatio ex nihilo*) shared by rival positions in today's debates (60); remind us of the "doxological and practical uses of creation" (61), which sidestep philosophical subtleties in order to simply "revel" in the glory of the created world (63); and redirect our attention to the connection between Genesis and the gospel by highlighting how both make God "the infinite reference point for all other reality" (66). By marshalling these forces of refocusing, reminding, and redirecting, Ortlund aims to defuse tensions between the three main camps in evangelical evolutionary debates today: the young-earth creationists, the old-earth creationists, and the theistic evolutionists (7). He pictures representatives of these camps sitting around a conference table to hash out their differences, but now with Augustine as their salutary guide.

The 'young-earth versus old-earth' distinction might imply that the question of the age of the universe will prove central to Ortlund's book. But that is not quite true. While he does dedicate his third chapter (110-150) to the problem, it later becomes clear that he finds the true heart of the Augustinian doctrine of creation elsewhere. For Ortlund, thinking about creation in an Augustinian way means caring less about the age of the universe than about creation as a source of divine causality, which must be met, in turn, by a human sense of dependence and humility. Such calls to humility can doubtless be found in Augustine, though they could probably be found in numerous other Christian sources from across a range of periods. Ortlund inches a bit closer to Augustine's more idiosyncratic contributions to doctrinal developments concerning creation when he touches on how Augustine draws from ancient philosophy's dichotomy of instant and sequence to clarify the distinction between instantaneous and sequential creation (147-148).

The strongest and most distinctive chapter in the book is Chapter 4, which deals with the suffering and mortality of animals. Augustine's treatment of this topic and its relation to creation-evolution debates are less well covered than some of the other issues rehearsed here. Building on the work of Ronald Osborn, Ortlund argues that animal suffering poses problems both for traditional theodicy and for Christian theories of evolution. For instance, if a Christian thinker were to chronologically expand the notion of creation to make room for millions of years of evolutionary adaptations, this would also increase the total amount of animal suffering from Genesis 1:24-25

until today. Processes of mutation and adaptation and selection do, after all, tend to play out by way of innumerable violent scenarios. Some modern interlocutors, says Ortlund, have claimed that all premodern doctrinal authorities attributed animal suffering to humankind's postlapsarian state. *Sed contra*, counters Ortlund, Augustine "did not attribute such phenomena to the human fall but vigorously defended the current state of the animal kingdom as a reflection of the goodness and wisdom of God" (153).

Drawing on texts such as *De Genesi ad litteram* 11.32.42, Ortlund lays out Augustine's argument that animal death preceded the Fall, rather than being caused by it (154). The Manichaeans, according to Augustine, had rushed too quickly to superficially associate 'what appears bad to us' with 'what is actually evil.' That is how they missed the (albeit oft-hidden) providential fittingness and utility of all beings, even within those scenarios which strike us as evil on the surface, such as animal suffering. Leaping around between *De ciuitate Dei* (11.22 and 12.4) and *De Genesi ad litteram* 1.8.14 and *De Genesi ad litteram liber unus imperfectus* 15.50, Ortlund shows us that Augustine saw animal mortality as part of the temporal tapestry of arising and passing-away that characterizes the universe as a whole (155-156). The strife and decay engendered through various evolutionary processes would thus still count as part of the "temporal beauty" which could only be seen in full if we were able to adopt a perspective encompassing the totality of nature in its diachronicity. Even the most disgusting of insects, concedes Augustine in *De vera religione* 41.77, ought rightly to be viewed as "breakable beauties" (158). Ortlund extends that insight to encompass the entirety of evolutionary history.

In his conclusion, Ortlund returns to the image of contemporary evangelicals gathered around a table to talk creation and evolution. "If Augustine were at the table," he muses (240), "how might the conversation about creation move differently?" Summing up the progression of his own argument, Ortlund leaves us with a list of five characteristically Augustinian contributions: (1) "wonder at sheer createdness," which is surely not exclusive to Augustine; (2) "irenicism" or a rosier outlook on relations between theology and the natural sciences; (3) a sense of "complexity" concerning the many possible exegeses of Gen. 1; (4) acceptance of the suffering of animals within providential and evolutionary frameworks; and (5) moderation when faced with the question of the degree to which Christians need to rely upon (or abolish) the notion of a 'historical' Adam (240-245).

These are modest proposals and well worth considering. At its best, Ortlund's approach fits in snugly alongside the research of other

scholars operating at the intersection of historically informed theology and evolutionary theory, such as Daniel Houck (whom Ortlund mentions in his acknowledgments) on Thomas Aquinas, original sin, and evolution. Having said that, it is also worth considering how best to position this approach relative to Augustine studies as a subfield. Taken as a whole, the book reads rather like a roadmap—but a roadmap to where? It may not lead many scholars of Augustine into any deeper understanding of Augustine's relation to the Manichaeans or how his exegesis of Genesis changed over the decades, seeing as Ortlund leaves us with more of a synchronic snapshot of various Augustinian views. The book could, however, still serve as a rough-and-ready roadmap for theologically inclined pastors eager to include premodern voices in their 'conference table conversations' with other Christians about evolution. And one could always do worse than adding Augustine's voice to the conversation.

Sean Hannan

PAFFENROTH, Kim. *On King Lear, The Confessions and Human Experience and Nature*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2021. Reading Augustine. VIII-183 p.

Early on in his engaging monograph for the *Reading Augustine* series, Kim Paffenroth tells us that "all but the most lost and debased" humans among us "are finally and completely creatures that examine and draw connections among the things to which we devote our attention" (2). In Paffenroth's case, the connections are to be drawn between Augustine's *Confessions* and Shakespeare's *King Lear*.

Indeed, "examining and drawing connections" is precisely the hermeneutic mode that Augustine refined in his *Confessions*: a loaves-and-fishes discursive strategy that collects the bits of a human life into a singular feast, "gathering myself from the dispersion in which I was torn to pieces, wherein turning away from the One that is You I disappeared into the many" (*Confessions* 2.1). A fragmented history is unified into a telos-driven narrative. The same hermeneutics underlies Augustine's theory of signs, no less than his conception of key doctrinal matters such as the Triune God or the nature of sin. At stake for Augustine throughout his work is an imperative to re-member the parts of a shattered Creation. It is to Kim Paffenroth's great credit that Augustine's imperative seems as timely now – in our doomscrolling, media-saturated, MAGA-afflicted, post?-pandemic world – as it did in late antiquity.

A religious studies professor and director of the Honors Program at a Catholic university (Iona), Paffenroth's career testifies to the enduring legacy of ideas, themes, and tropes that one may broadly call "religious," but his deeper allegiance is to a mid-century, distinctly American vision of liberal education as bulwark against a dehumanized and debased political culture. To read closely, broadly and freely – "liberally" in a sense that seems hopelessly outdated in 2022 – is to exert a civilizing, expansive force on the human mind.

As he explains in his introduction, Paffenroth's textual commitment was shaped by his father's talismanic attachment to a *New Yorker* article on the Great Books curriculum at St. John's. My own educational talisman was a later *New York Times* feature on the poststructuralist "Yale School." And indeed, my generation of literary scholars came of age at a time when "French theory" was spelling the death of Great Books curricula throughout the academy. But for all that, a certain soteriology of reading underlay the Derridean commitment to *le texte*. My poststructuralist training was perhaps more recondite but equally committed to the premise that *close reading will set you free*.

At the heart of Paffenroth's thin volume, then, is less an argument for the connections between *Confessions* and *King Lear*, than an argument for the soul-saving, heart-expanding act of reading itself. This is an argument he enacts rather than expounds.

Each of Paffenroth's chapters unwind versions of the book's core paradox: "the paradox of a contingent, mortal being, being brought into contact with and knowledge of the eternal and ultimate, precisely through and because of all of its contingent, temporal experiences" (9). In the book's introduction, we get the fullest exploration of that paradox as "The Problem of Time." As Paffenroth notes: it is only contingency, the brute and time-bound unfolding of a human life, that yields our contact with eternal and timeless truths. In "The Problem of Love", the tension between contingent and eternal gets played out as the conflict between human fidelity and allegiance to truth. Resolution comes in the compassion of a Monica, a Kent, a Cordelia: the lesson they provide is that the only way to hold fast to truth is to never forsake the beloved in the name *of* truth.

In the next chapter, "The Problem of Language," at issue is once again the question of truth, as it runs aground on the contingent and merely conventional. As Paffenroth demonstrates, in both *Confessions* and *Lear*, language is critiqued as a mere mask that conceals a dishonest heart. It is in this chapter that Paffenroth is most visibly hindered by his resistance to secondary scholarship. He entirely misses a broad swath of criticism regarding performativity,

theatricality, and vow in *Lear,* and in so doing fails to see the central Wittgensteinian truth of the play: there is no private language. (I'm telescoping here Stanley Cavell's long-celebrated work on these topics.) Words don't fail because they are masks. Instead, words deliver meaning precisely because they are circumscribed by function, context, contingency, network. Truth is conveyed precisely *because* words are masks.

In "The Problem of Nature," Paffenroth's central paradox takes the form of that great oxymoron: *human nature* itself. Given the enormity, indifference, and implacability of the natural world – where does human affect and meaning-making find its home? This answer is found in necessity: "In a universe so enormous and so unconcerned with our safety or enjoyment, loving and caring for others is reaffirmed, as the only way we could survive or thrive, individually or as a group" (133). In "The Problem of Reason" Paffenroth argues somewhat analogously that the role of reason in both texts is, paradoxically, to discover reason's insufficiency.

Toward the book's end, Paffenroth notes that all of his readings keep "revolving back to love" (161). It's here that the central flaw in Paffenroth's project becomes clear. Lear lives in a thoroughly pagan world; it is that same pagan world that the Augustine of *Confessions* rejects via his conversion. Yet Paffenroth pays almost no attention to that central and critical difference between the two texts. For Augustine, love ultimately revolves him toward God: "his heart can only find its true love in God" (161). What Paffenroth misses is the profoundly teleological nature of Augustine's text and thought. God is not just the ultimate and only true Beloved; He is the ultimate and only true Meaning. He is quite literally the Be All and End All for Augustine. He is the one true Signified to which all signifiers point…. The one true End toward which all means lead…. The one true Satisfaction toward which all uses tend. And as the one true One, God also serves as the guarantor of all that we benighted humans call contingency.

In contrast, the world of Lear is the world of no assurances. It is the world of the single most perfectly trochaic line of blank verse: *Never, never, never, never, never* – a line Lear utters over the lifeless corpse of his daughter.

> Why should a dog, a horse, a rat, have life,
> and thou no breath at all? Thou'lt come no more,
> never, never, never, never, never! (5.3.303-5)

Lear inhabits a world with no guarantees, no Guarantor.

I like Lear's world better than Augustine's, to be honest. We are living through an era of QAnon reveries, widespread paranoia, and red-pill hermeneutics; I prefer my signifiers to be waiting for Godot. I have spent the last five years working as a hospital chaplain. I left academia just in time for a global pandemic. Nearly every day I confront the wonder of human meaning-making in the face of a world of no assurances. Paffenroth's volume has been good company for me in this context. He tells me something I already knew, but it was something I needed to remember about good literature and the balm to be found there. As Paffenroth reminds us: both Augustine and Shakespeare are broad, unrelenting, and fundamentally compassionate observers of human experience… and both authors show us that human nature itself is broad, unrelenting, and fundamentally compassionate.

Esther Lisa Freinkel Tishman

PIERETTI, Antonio, PAGLIACCI, Donatella, and TARCHI, Elisabetta. *La donna nel pensiero di Agostino*. Firenze: Libreria Editrice Fiorentina, 2020. Testi cristiani. 159 p.

This volume, dedicated to the memory of Remo Piccolomini, brings together three essays focusing on the relationship between Augustine and women and observed from three different philosophical perspectives. The first, by Antonio Pieretti, examines Augustine's themes in relation to marriage; the second, by Donatella Pagliacci, explores the relational dimension with different women that was entertained by Augustine during his life and in his works; the third, by Elisabetta Tarchi, focuses on Augustine's epistolary and analyses as central themes the changes in roles and responsibilities of two emerging groups in the fourth century, namely widows and virgins.

The aim of the three authors is avowedly to emphasise 'the profound sensitivity and great respect with which (Augustine) treats the question' of the relationship with women, 'showing openings of absolute novelty'.

The three essays possess some common characteristics. First, they rarely make use of quotations from the original text. Second, oriented as they are to emphasising the innovative aspects of a new consideration 'of woman', they appear poorly contextualised and limit themselves to lengthy paraphrases of Augustine's passages, mostly

disregarding a precise analysis of the textual contexts in which these passages are inserted and clarifying the phases of Augustine's life in which his texts took shape.

Moreover, starting from the title, it is not made sufficiently clear that Augustine's connections were established with different women; consequently the book's focus on 'woman' as an abstract concept does not take into account the specific relationships, even asymmetrical ones, that he established throughout his life.

Cristina La Rocca

PIGNOT, Matthieu, ed. *Latin Anonymous Sermons From Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (ad 300-800). Classification, Transmission, Dating*. Turnhout: Brepols, 2021. Instrumenta patristica et mediaevalia, 86. Ministerium sermonis, 4. 288 p.

Wenn ein Forschungsgebiet neue Anstöße erhält, intensivieren und vervielfachen sich nicht nur die Bemühungen darum, es erschließen sich auch neue Fragehorizonte. Dieses Phänomen trifft in diesem Fall auf das Studium der spätantiken und frühmittelalterlichen lateinischen Predigt zu. Den Anstoß gab François Dolbeaus Entdeckung von 26 neuen Augustinuspredigten in Hs I 9 der Wissenschaftlichen Stadtbibliothek in Mainz. Dieser sensationelle Fund generierte neue Aufmerksamkeit bei der Katalogisierung und dem Studium von Handschriften. Diese ließ im Jahr 2007 Isabella Schiller, Dorothea Weber und Clemens Weidmann von der Kirchenväterkommission der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien im Erfurter Codex Dep. Erf. CA 12^0 weitere sechs neue Augustinuspredigten identifizieren. Weitere Einzelfunde verschiedener Gelehrter traten hinzu.

Zugleich erfuhr die seit 1961 ins Stocken geratene kritische Edition der Predigten Augustins eine so erfolgreiche Wiederbelebung, daß inzwischen vier weitere Bände erschienen sind: *Sermones* 51-94 (Matthäusevangelium) und 151-183 (Briefe) = CCL 41 Aa-b, Ba-b (2008-2019). Hinzu kamen in den Jahren 1991-2021 über siebzig Einzeleditionen, die in die Gesamtedition werden einfügt werden, sowie zahlreiche Übersetzungen in moderne Sprachen.

Die Zahl und Weite der Studien lassen sich den Online-Bibliographien entnehmen: Zentrum für Augustinusforschung (ZAF), Würzburg: Literatur-Portal (www.augustinus.de); Katholieke Universiteit Leuven / Villanova University, Philadelphia/NJ: Finding Augustine

(www.findingaugustine.org) sowie den beiden gedruckten Bänden von Hubertus R. Drobner, *Augustinus von Hippo, Sermones ad populum. Überlieferung und Bestand – Bibliographie – Indices*, 2 Bde., Leiden 2000, Frankfurt/M. 2010. In besonders konzentrierter Form spiegeln die Kongreßbände „Ministerium Sermonis", zu denen auch das anzuzeigende Buch gehört, Forschungsstand und -themen wider: IPM 53 (2009), 65 (2012), 75 (2017), 86 (2021). Einen umfassenden Zugang zur lateinisch-patristischen Homiletik eröffnet des weiteren der Band: *Preaching in the Patristic Era. Sermons, Preachers, and Audiences in the Latin West*, ed. Anthony Dupont, Shari Boodts, Gert Partoens, Johan Leemans (= A New History of the Sermons 6), Leiden-Boston 2018.

Die Erweiterung des Fragehorizontes betraf hauptsächlich die Überlieferungsgeschichte der Predigten Augustins, deren Einschätzung sich entscheidend auf die Ermittlung ihrer historischen Zusammenhänge und Chronologie auswirkte. Denn es stellte sich die Grundfrage, warum die Mainzer und weitere neuentdeckte Predigten sich nur so spärlich und nur in einem bestimmten Überlieferungszusammenhang erhalten hatten. Die Diskussion dieser Themen wird in unterschiedlichen Formen geführt: in den Einleitungen der Editionen und Übersetzungen, in Kongreßvorträgen, Zeitschriften- und Lexikonartikeln. Von der großen Zahl der Beiträge darf auf drei Publikationen verwiesen werden, die einen Blick auf das gesamte Gebiet erschließen: Pierre-Marie Hombert, *Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustiniennes*, Paris 2000; François Dolbeau, *Sermones (ad populum)*: Augustinus-Lexikon 5/1-4 (2019-2021) 244-399; Hubertus R. Drobner, *Die Chronologie der Predigten Augustins. Eine neue Methodologie*, 2 Bde., Leiden-Paderborn 2023.

Die Etablierung der Authentizität der neu aufgefundenen Augustinuspredigten im Kontext von den Umständen und Bedingungen ihrer Textüberlieferung führte zwangsläufig zu der noch umfassenderen Erweiterung des Forschungshorizontes, nämlich der Frage, nach welchen Kriterien die Echtheit einer Predigt festgestellt werden kann. Diese Echtheitsprüfung muß sowohl für namentlich als auch für anonym, pseudonym oder pseudepigraphisch überlieferte Stücke gestellt werden. Ein wichtiges Ergebnis dieser Forschungsrichtung besteht dabei in der Wiederzuweisung von unaugustinisch bewerteten Predigten an Augustinus als ihren Autor (vgl. z. B. Augustinus, *Sermones selecti*. Ediert von Clemens Weidmann = CSEL 101 [2015]); ein anderes in der Neuzuordnung von Predigten zum Corpus der *Sermones ad populum* Augustins, die sich in den *Enarrationes in Psalmos* und in den *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* erhalten haben

(*sermo* 166A = *en Ps* 25,2; *sermones* 126A-C = *Io eu tr* 20-22; vgl. Clemens Weidmann, Vier unerkannte Predigten des Augustinus: REAug 56 [2010] 173-196).

In diesen Kontext fügt sich der vorliegende vierte Band „Ministerium Sermonis" ein. Er vereint neun Beiträge einer internationalen Konferenz an der Universität von Namur am 16. Mai 2019, deren Ziel darin bestand, „Wissenschaftler zusammenzuführen, die über spätantike und frühmittelalterliche Predigten arbeiten, um erstmals anonyme Predigten als eigenständiges Forschungsgebiet zu betrachten" (Einleitung, 9). Dieses Ziel ist offensichtlich erfolgreich erreicht worden. Denn bei den Autoren handelt es sich durchgehend um hervorragend ausgewiesene und international wohlbekannte Philologen und Editoren. Die behandelten Predigten gewähren Einblicke in eine Periode von fünf Jahrhunderten. Diese können natürlich im einzelnen nur punktuell geschehen, gewähren aber insgesamt doch einen ersten Gesamteindruck, den künftige Studien sicher erweitern und vertiefen werden.

Die Beiträge behandeln:

(1) Matthieu Pignot (Durham): Ausführlicher Überblick über Themen, Methoden und Perspektiven der Erforschung anonym überlieferter lateinischer Predigten (9-41).

(2) Shari Boodts (Nijmegen): Der pseudo-augustinische *Sermo* 382 als Beispiel der digitalen Aufarbeitung und Vernetzung in der neu entstehenden PASSIM-Database, die „flexiblen Zugang zu anonymen und fälschlich zugewiesenen Predigten bieten soll, ihren verschiedenen Versionen, ihren Quellen und Nachkommen sowie ihrer handschriftlichen Überlieferung (vgl. auch S. Boodts, Navigating the Vast Tradition of St. Augustine's Sermons: Old Instruments and New Approaches: Aug(L) 69 [2019] 83-115, bes. 110-114) (43-64).

(3) Raúl Villegas Marin (Barcelona): Das Predigtcorpus des Pseudo-Eusebius Gallicanus (65-82).

(4) Clemens Weidmann (Salzburg): Patchwork Sermons (Centones) (83-109).

(5) François Dolbeau (Antony): Die Quellen einer pseudo-augustinischen Osterpredigt in der Französischen Nationalbibliothek in Paris (BnF latin 3783) (111-123).

(6) Marie Pauliat (Lyon): Sermo Mai 53. Edition, Authentizität und ausführliche Inhaltsanalyse (125-164).

(7) Gert Partoens und András Handl (Leuven): Sermo Mai 8 und eine unedierte Predigt aus Moissac (Paris, BnF latin 2077)

über die Frau, die beim Ehebruch ertappt wurde (Joh 8,3-11). Kritische Edition der letzteren Predigt im Kontext von Überlieferung und Inhalt von Sermo Mai 8, mit einleitender Studie zur Rezeptionsgeschichte der biblischen Perikope in der Alten Kirche, insbesondere ihrer Interpretation seitens Augustin (165-192).

(8) Pierre-Maurice Bogaert (Maredsous) und Matthieu Pignot (Durham): Die Überlieferung des pseudo-augustinischen Sermo 123 *De laudibus Mariae* in den Drucken des Corpus des Fulgentius (193-206).

(9) Jérémie Delmulle (Paris): Kritische Edition des *Tractatus „De Salomone"* (CPPM I 5027) mit ausführlicher Einleitung und unter besonderer Erörterung seiner Zuweisung an Gregor von Elvira, mit dem Ergebnis: „Die Überlieferung … lädt dazu ein, … der Zuweisung an Gregor von Elvira Vorrang einzuräumen" (247) (207-264).

Der Sammelband präsentiert also neue Editionen, kritische Evaluationen von Zuweisungen und Authentizität, grundlegende Einblicke in die Überlieferungsgeschichte der Predigten, Quellenkunde und Inhaltsanalysen.

Aus dieser reichen Fülle darf ich folgende Ergebnisse hervorheben:

(1) Clemens Weidmanns Beitrag zu den Centones, die besonders vom fünften bis zum achten Jahrhundert blühten, bestätigt erneut eine Erkenntnis, die in ihrer Gewichtigkeit erst im Gefolge der Entdeckung der Mainzer Predigten immer stärker ins Bewußtsein rückte, daß nämlich der Einfluß der bewußten, von Eigeninteressen geleiteten Eingriffe gebildeter Redaktoren in die Texte für Form und Umfang ihrer Überlieferung viel höher einzuschätzen ist als oft in Rechnung gestellt wurde: „Predigten wie diese sind mehr als eine mechanische Zusammenstellung verschiedener Texte durch Kopie und Zusammenkleistern (copy and paste). Die Prediger zeigen eine verständige Wahl ihrer Quellen …". Gleichzeitig „bewahren [Centones] viele Schätze, die noch immer darauf warten, gehoben zu werden" (109). Diese Aufgabe gleicht angesichts der überreichen Fülle der überlieferten Texte einer Sisyphusarbeit, führt aber dennoch, wie Weidmanns Arbeiten zeigen, zu beachtlichen Ergebnissen, die unsere Kenntnis der Überlieferungsgeschichte sowie der authentischen Texte bereichern. François Dolbeaus Artikel trägt ein Beispiel einer präzisen Quellenanalyse eines solchen Cento bei.

(2) Ein solches und andere Mammutprojekte können nur mit Hilfe elektronischer Datenbanken und Instrumente bewältigt werden. Shari Boodts weist auch in diesem Band dazu neue Wege. Man darf allerdings nicht vergessen, daß auch in diesem Falle der Computer selbst und alle Programme lediglich mechanische Arbeiten verrichten, die immer der gelehrten und erfahrenen Anwendung und Auswertung der Daten durch geeignete Fragestellungen bedürfen, wie sie Shari Boodts mit ihrer Liste von Fragen an PASSIM exemplifiziert (63).

Der vorliegende thematisch und methodisch reiche und ergebnisreiche Kongreßband spiegelt die aktuellen bahnbrechenden Entwicklungen in der Erforschung der antiken Predigtgeschichte wider, weist in vieler Hinsicht neue Wege und betritt selbst unerforschtes Neuland, was ihn zu einem lesenswerten und zu weiterer Forschung inspirierenden Werk macht.

Hubertus R. Drobner

POMEROY, Samuel. *Chrysostom as Exegete: Scholarly Traditions and Rhetorical Aims in the Homilies on Genesis*. Leiden: Brill, 2022. Supplements to Vigiliae christianae, 171. XX-379 p.

"Per questo spieghiamo le Scritture, non perché soltanto comprendiate le Scritture, ma perché riformiate anche i costumi. Se ciò non avviene, invano leggiamo, invano interpretiamo". Queste parole, tratte dal *De prophetiarum obscuritate* 2, 7, esprimono efficacemente la finalità etica presente nell'attività esegetica di Giovanni Crisostomo, realizzatasi essenzialmente in forma di omelie che, come è noto, si articolano in una prima parte, in cui viene spiegato il testo biblico versetto per versetto, e in una seconda parte, dedicata allo sviluppo parenetico e pastorale dell'argomentazione scritturistica. Da tutto questo si evince che l'impegno esegetico di Crisostomo non era di carattere intellettuale ed ermeneutico fine a sé stesso, ma era volto a scuotere la coscienza del suo pubblico, di ascoltatori o di lettori, perché si mettesse in pratica, nella vita concreta, la parola di Dio; di qui l'insistenza sull'utilità della Scrittura. Nel suo pregevole lavoro, che indaga specificamente le omelie crisostomiane sulla *Genesi*, libro biblico così importante da vari punti di vista, antropologico, cosmologico, teologico, Pomeroy, pur senza menzionare espressamente il passo suddetto, mostra certamente di tenere ben presente l'impostazione etica dell'esegesi dell'Antiocheno, anche all'interno delle conclusioni, dove mette in evidenza gli elementi parenetici, documentati

nelle omelie sulla *Genesi*, finalizzati alla comprensione dell'identità cristiana.

Ad ogni modo, per comprendere meglio l'approccio di Crisostomo alla Bibbia, è di grande importanza il prologo alle sue omelie sul vangelo di Matteo (*In Mt. hom.* 1, 1), in cui egli, da un punto di vista di carattere programmatico, osserva preliminarmente che sarebbe stato necessario non aver bisogno dell'aiuto derivante dalle Scritture, ma si sarebbe dovuto mostrare una vita così pura (ritorna ancora la dimensione etica) in modo che la grazia dello Spirito avesse occupato il posto dei libri. Questa è la prima via, contrassegnata dalla grazia divina, da cui però gli uomini si sono allontanati, trovandosi quindi nella necessità di percorrere la seconda via, costituita dai testi biblici. Che la prima via fosse migliore è dimostrato, per Crisostomo, dalla familiarità con cui Dio parlava con personaggi quali Noè, Abramo, Giobbe, Mosè, non mediante testi scritti, ma direttamente, in quanto trovava puro il loro animo. Quando però si arrivò a toccare il fondo della malvagità, allora subentrarono gli scritti, le tavole della legge e i loro ammonimenti. Tale situazione si verificò non solo nell'antica alleanza, ma anche nella nuova, perché Dio non dette nulla di scritto agli apostoli, ma anzi Cristo promise di dare, invece di testi scritti, la grazia dello Spirito santo che avrebbe ricordato tutto ciò che il Salvatore aveva detto. Quindi in virtù della potenza dello Spirito gli apostoli cominciarono a diffondere il messaggio di Cristo diventando quasi libri viventi. Poiché comunque ci fu bisogno dell'ammonimento di testi scritti a causa della malvagità in cui l'uomo cadde sempre di più, Crisostomo invita a trarre vantaggio dalle Scritture che rappresentano un mezzo assai efficace perché si possa recuperare la grazia divina. Nelle Scritture si manifesta la condiscendenza di Dio (su cui giustamente si sofferma Pomeroy nel suo lavoro), che tiene conto della debolezza, a causa del peccato, dei destinatari della sua parola e indirizza loro il messaggio di salvezza. D'altra parte proprio nelle omelie sulla Genesi (*In Gen. hom.* 2, 2) Crisostomo affronta ulteriormente il tema dell'origine delle Scritture, mettendo in rilievo che all'inizio il Creatore parlava agli uomini direttamente, conversava con essi in modo conforme alla loro natura, ma quando nel corso dei secoli tutto il genere umano precipitò nell'abisso del male, Dio non volle allontanarsi da esso e rinnovò la sua amicizia con l'uomo, nonostante il peccato, inviando, tramite Mosè, degli scritti e attirando tutti a sé.

Sempre nell'ambito del discorso sull'origine delle Scritture, Crisostomo, in un altro passo (*Ad pop. Antioch. hom.* 9, 2), rifacendosi alla tecnica delle *Quaestiones et responsiones*, su cui dovremo

tornare in seguito, si chiede perché le Scritture non furono date all'inizio, ma all'epoca di Mosè, e spiega che Dio voleva istruire gli uomini non mediante gli scritti, ma per mezzo della creazione. Richiamandosi alla testimonianza di Paolo in *Rom.* 1, 19-20, Crisostomo rileva che Dio, quando ancora non c'erano le Scritture, ha posto la creazione davanti agli occhi degli uomini, perché dalle opere potessero risalire all'esistenza del Creatore. Tutto questo naturalmente non diminuisce l'utilità e la necessità delle Scritture, a partire dalla Genesi, alla cui esegesi Crisostomo dedica un numero rilevante di omelie, dimostrando di inserirsi in una tradizione precedente e di dare al tempo stesso un suo particolare contributo.

L'analisi puntuale e dettagliata delle tematiche affrontate da Crisostomo nelle omelie sulla Genesi è svolta con acribia da Pomeroy che, oltre ad avere ampia conoscenza della bibliografia al riguardo, mostra di tenere ben presente il retroterra culturale del mondo classico e giudaico che tanto ha influito, in misura maggiore o minore, sugli autori cristiani; in questo contesto viene dato grande spazio agli aspetti della tecnica retorica, di cui fa largo uso Crisostomo che in questo modo rendeva ancora più efficace il suo discorso, rivolto a un pubblico eterogeneo che indubbiamente era attratto dalla sua potenza oratoria. Nella prima parte del suo studio Pomeroy prende in considerazione le omelie sulla Genesi dal punto di vista da un lato degli elementi retorici e linguistici, dall'altro della tradizione che vi è sottesa. Basti pensare, come si è già accennato, al genere letterario delle *Quaestiones et responsiones*, ben attestato in autori profani e giudaici e ripreso nell'omiletica cristiana greca a partire da Origene. Pomeroy, riguardo alla terminologia di tale genere letterario, mette in evidenza come, nelle omelie sulla Genesi, venga usato il t. zētēma più frequentemente di aporia, come si deduce dall'Appendice 1, posta al termine del volume. Vengono segnalate inoltre varie formule per indicare il genere delle *Quaestiones*, il che mette in rilievo la flessibilità terminologica con cui Crisostomo introduce i punti problematici, oggetto di indagine, e le relative soluzioni. Ma, come Pomeroy giustamente sottolinea, Crisostomo ritiene che si debba porre un limite nel sollevare questioni, quando cioè si tratta di indagare con eccessiva e inopportuna curiosità quanto va al di là delle possibilità della natura umana. Per esprimere questo atteggiamento, che non sa contenersi nei giusti confini, Crisostomo usa i verbi periergazesthai e polypragmoneîn che appaiono anche in altri contesti polemici, ad es. quando attacca il razionalismo teologico degli anomei che vogliono indagare eccessivamente, con vana curiosità, e scrutare inopportunamente il mistero di Dio. Riguardo al

genere delle *Quaestiones*, per rendere più concreta la sua argomentazione, Pomeroy, come altrove, prende in esame una singola omelia crisostomiana sulla *Genesi*, in questo caso la 29, per mettere in luce la connessione, in Crisostomo, tra la *Quaestio* e l'applicazione morale da lui proposta; da notare che tale omelia è strutturata in domande e risposte. Anche qui è annessa una tabella molto dettagliata al riguardo.

Una specifica omelia sulla *Genesi*, la 37, è analizzata da Pomeroy anche nell'ambito del tema della retorica dell'oscurità che Crisostomo sviluppa in modo particolare con riferimento all'oscurità dell'AT e segnatamente delle profezie concernenti Cristo e la futura economia di salvezza. Come si accennava più sopra, Crisostomo affronta questa tematica in modo dettagliato nelle omelie *De prophetiarum obscuritate*, in cui intravede l'oscurità o comunque una maggior difficoltà dell'AT rispetto al NT anche nel fatto che il primo è stato tradotto dall'ebraico in greco, con tutti i problemi che derivano dal passaggio da un sistema linguistico a un altro. Questa retorica dell'oscurità è poi approfondita da Pomeroy nelle omelie sulla *Genesi*; l'esame dell'omelia 37 gli è utile per illustrare la connessione tra l'insegnamento esegetico di Crisostomo e il suo scopo teso al progresso morale del suo uditorio.

Pomeroy affronta poi alcuni aspetti linguistici in contesto retorico e innanzitutto presenta una selezione di glosse, brevi commenti mediante sinonimi o espressioni parafrastiche, quali risultano nelle omelie sulla *Genesi*; da notare la formula antì toû che introduce la glossa. Un esempio interessante di questo modo di glossare si trova a proposito della beatitudine riportata in *Mt*. 5,6, dove si proclamano beati quelli che hanno fame e sete della giustizia, perché saranno saziati (cf. *In Gen. hom.* 24, 1): qui Crisostomo spiega la locuzione chortasthēsontai ("saranno saziati") nel senso di emplēsthēsontai, volendo mettere in rilievo una condizione psicologica che implica un desiderio spirituale. Comunque occorre osservare che nel commento specifico alla suddetta beatitudine (*In Mt. hom.* 15, 4), Crisostomo riporta il t. chortasthēsontai senza indicare un'altra locuzione che ne spieghi il senso, forse perché qui egli, con una forte sottolineatura di carattere sociale, ha cura di contrapporre la giustizia all'avarizia e puntualizza che chi pratica la giustizia non deve aver paura della povertà, in quanto è la giustizia ad arricchire veramente e non l'avarizia.

Pomeroy si sofferma poi su alcuni aspetti linguistici e lessicali, quali il t. ethos in riferimento all'uso, alla consuetudine delle Scritture di designare, ad es., l'essere umano con il t. anima o con il t. corpo. Questa consuetudine delle Scritture si riscontra anche nell'uso della particella temporale heōs (finché), che non si riferisce a un tempo determinato, come nel caso di *Mt.* 1, 25, dove si dice che Giuseppe

non conobbe Maria finché non ebbe dato alla luce Gesù. Analogamente è consuetudine delle Scritture di ricapitolare: esempio tipico è costituito da *Gen*. 2 che ricapitola il racconto di *Gen*. 1, di cui è una sorta di sommario.

Dal punto di vista linguistico assai rilevante è il caso dell'interpretazione dei nomi, presente nelle omelie sulla Genesi, come mostra ancora una volta una specifica tabella. Per Crisostomo, sottolinea Pomeroy, l'interpretazione dei nomi è importante per cogliere il significato dell'intero passo biblico; a volte i nomi sono prefigurazioni di realtà future, spesso in senso cristologico o ecclesiale. Per illustrare meglio questo metodo di interpretare i nomi, Pomeroy prende in esame un'omelia particolare, la 20, e mette in evidenza che in tale tipo di interpretazione Crisostomo è più vicino, in vari punti, a Filone, Origene, Eusebio di Cesarea, Didimo piuttosto che ad autori di ambito antiocheno quali Eusebio di Emesa o Diodoro, e spesso fornisce interpretazioni non letterali del testo biblico.

Questo discorso sul tipo di interpretazione del testo biblico da parte di Crisostomo prepara la seconda parte dello studio di Pomeroy, in cui esamina le possibili fonti esegetiche dell'Antiocheno, di cui rileva, a mio parere giustamente, il carattere eclettico, in quanto Crisostomo mostra di assumere dalla tradizione esegetica quello che è utile e funzionale ai suoi scopi. Pomeroy parte da alcune varianti di *Gen*. rispetto al testo dei LXX, riportate da Crisostomo e da Eusebio di Emesa e da Diodoro. Riguardo alle fonti di queste varianti, a volte Crisostomo è più generico, a differenza degli altri due, limitandosi in qualche caso a parlare di un altro traduttore non meglio specificato. In Eusebio di Emesa e in Crisostomo vengono affrontati problemi di coerenza narrativa di *Gen*. anche in relazione a possibili contraddizioni nei confronti di altri testi biblici. Talvolta, differenziandosi da Eusebio, Crisostomo può aver combinato altre fonti insieme a quelle di Eusebio, e questa considerazione spinge Pomeroy a valutare i casi in cui Crisostomo segue altri procedimenti rispetto a Eusebio e Diodoro o non concorda con essi. Un caso interessante di disaccordo con loro è rappresentato dalla spiegazione in Crisostomo di *Gen*. 9, 4, relativo alla proibizione di mangiare la carne con il sangue, nel senso di animale soffocato, il che non si trova in Eusebio e Diodoro, ma si rifà a un'altra tradizione esegetica.

Da rilevare anche alcune tradizioni esegetiche in comune tra Crisostomo e Efrem Siro, quali delle metafore musicali applicate all'anima e al corpo nel contesto della creazione dell'uomo. Inoltre mentre si ritrova in Efrem l'immagine della veste di gloria, di cui era rivestito Adamo prima del peccato, Crisostomo fa riferimento alla veste fulgida e splendente, da cui erano avvolti all'inizio Adamo ed Eva. A questo

proposito si può ricordare quanto osserva Ireneo (*Adv. haer.* 3, 23, 5) sulla veste di santità, ricevuta dallo Spirito e persa da Adamo.

Pomeroy stabilisce poi un confronto fra Basilio di Cesarea e Crisostomo innanzitutto menzionando l'*ep.* 260 del Cappadoce su *Gen.* 4, 15 e la questione dei sette peccati di Caino: qui Basilio appare la fonte di Crisostomo, che si ispira a lui molto da vicino. Interessante è inoltre il parallelo tra l'omelia 1 sul digiuno di Basilio e l'omelia 1 crisostomiana su *Gen.*, nonché l'esame di alcuni aspetti dell'*Esamerone* basiliano: tra il Cappadoce e Crisostomo si può riscontrare una terminologia condivisa riguardo alla creazione a opera di Dio e alla negazione che essa sia un processo spontaneo e che le cose si siano prodotte da sé.

Molto rilevante è il rapporto fra Crisostomo e Eusebio di Cesarea, analizzato nella sua polivalente opera di carattere storico, teologico, apologetico, esegetico e nella sua collocazione tra Antiochia e Alessandria. L'influsso di Eusebio su Crisostomo concerne specificamente l'interpretazione tipologica e la spiegazione delle teofanie. Per il primo punto si nota in particolare una convergenza terminologica relativamente ai gemelli di Tamar, Fares e Zara (*Gen.* 38), e alla benedizione di Giacobbe (*Gen.* 49), la cui pericope nel complesso è intesa in senso cristologico, il che differenzia Crisostomo da Eusebio di Emesa e Diodoro. Per quanto riguarda il secondo punto, Eusebio e Crisostomo offrono un'intelaiatura simile di riferimenti biblici applicati alle teofanie; condividono inoltre una terminologia simile per designare la natura divina quale si è manifestata nelle teofanie compatibilmente con le possibilità umane.

Ampio spazio è dedicato alla tradizione alessandrina per individuare punti condivisi con essa da parte di Crisostomo, e a tal fine Pomeroy presenta una tabella che segnala convergenze tra l'Antiocheno e l'ambiente alessandrino nell'illustrazione di vari passi di *Gen.*, ad es. nell'uso di formule applicate a testi biblici specifici. Sia Origene sia Crisostomo mettono in relazione *Gen.* 28, 20 con *Mt.* 6, 11; inoltre Crisostomo e Didimo sono i soli che riportano la variante di *Giobbe* 3, 23 (LXX) per spiegare il nome di Noè. A proposito dell'episodio della torre di Babele, viene messa in luce la dialettica concordia-divisione nel confronto tra Origene e Crisostomo, che rileva quanto grande male sia la divisione e quanto grande bene sia la concordia, mentre d'altro canto Origene sottolinea che dove ci sono divisione e disaccordo, ci sono segni di malvagità, e dove invece sono presenti unità e concordia, ci sono segni di virtù. Vengono esaminati passi che ponevano problemi dal punto di vista morale; è questo il caso dell'ubriachezza di Noè, la cui spiegazione nel senso

che essa fu causata dall'ignoranza degli effetti del vino, può derivare a Crisostomo, come ad altri autori, da Origene. Ci sono poi passi che sembrano in contraddizione con altri, ad es. *Gen.* 2, 3 sul riposo di Dio dopo la creazione, rispetto a *Gv.* 5, 17: "Il Padre mio opera sempre". Come Origene, Crisostomo osserva che Dio opera costantemente con la sua provvidenza. A volte la reazione di Crisostomo nei confronti dell'allegorizzazione di passi quali *Gen.* 2, 8, relativamente alla collocazione non in terra, ma in cielo del giardino in Eden, pare derivare da una comune tradizione polemica contro tale allegorizzazione e non da un testo specifico di ambito alessandrino.

Dal punto di vista antropologico, Pomeroy, richiamandosi a *Lev.* 17, 11, fa riferimento all'om. 27, 5 su *Gen.*, dove Crisostomo nega l'identità fra sangue e anima, il che lo pone in contrasto con una tradizione filoniana (cf. *Quaest. in Gen.* 2, 59, dove comunque l'Alessandrino, nel presentare la tesi che la sostanza dello spirito o anima è il sangue, distingue, citando *Gen.* 9, 4, tra lo spirito sensibile e vitale, la cui sostanza è il sangue, e lo spirito razionale e intellettuale). C'è comunque da osservare che nel suddetto passo crisostomiano il testo di riferimento non è *Lev.* 17, 11, ma *Gen.* 9, 4-6. D'altra parte nell'om. 13, 3. pure presente nel lavoro di Pomeroy, Crisostomo, a proposito di *Gen.* 2, 7, rileva che nel corpo formato dalla terra fu infusa la forza vitale che costituisce la sostanza dell'anima, e cita *Deut.* 12, 23 e non *Lev.* 17, 11 come indicato nell'edizione PG 53: 107 (su tutta la questione si veda il mio studio *Sangue e anima nell'interpretazione crisostomiana di Gen. 9, 4-6; Dt. 12,23*, in Atti della seconda Settimana di studio "Sangue e Antropologia biblica nella Patristica", Roma, 23-28 novembre 1981, vol. I, 1982, 17-20).

Un punto in cui Crisostomo è accostato a Origene riguarda la polemica contro la concezione antropomorfica di Dio, e a tale proposito Crisostomo mette in relazione *1 Cor.* 11, 7 e *Gen.* 3, 16 sulla creazione dell'uomo a immagine di Dio nel senso del dominio. Qui Pomeroy cita Harrison che sostiene che per Crisostomo la donna non sarebbe stata creata a immagine di Dio, un po' alla maniera di Diodoro, ma mi permetto di rinviare alle mie argomentazioni in replica alla posizione di Harrison (cf. il mio contributo *La creazione dell'uomo (maschio e femmina) a immagine di Dio nell'esegesi antiochena di Gen. 1, 26-27 e 1 Cor. 11, 7*, in *Paradigmi del maschile e femminile nel cristianesimo antico*. XLVII Incontro di studiosi dell'antichità cristiana (Roma, 9-11 maggio 2019), Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum 157, Roma 2020, 302-309). Infatti mentre per Diodoro la donna fin dall'inizio è esclusa dal concetto di creazione a immagine di Dio, molto articolato è l'atteggiamento di

Crisostomo che sottolinea con forza l'originaria parità di onore fra uomo e donna, la piena partecipazione della donna al dominio sulle cose visibili, in cui, secondo lui, consiste la creazione dell'essere umano a immagine di Dio. Questo era il progetto originario divino. Quando fa riferimento alla subordinazione della donna all'uomo, Crisostomo mostra di tener presente la condizione post-lapsaria, non appunto il disegno originario divino, e a tale proposito è significativo che metta in parallelo con *1 Cor.* 11, 7 (l'uomo è immagine e gloria di Dio, la donna è gloria dell'uomo) non *Gen.* 1, 26-27, ma *Gen.* 3, 16 che delinea i rapporti fra uomo e donna dopo il peccato. Quindi anche su tale complessa questione si può riscontrare l'autonomia di Crisostomo nei confronti di Diodoro e l'originalità del suo pensiero e della sua esegesi.

L'ispirazione a tradizioni alessandrine si può intravedere nel collegamento, da parte di Crisostomo, di *Gen.* 2, 7 con *Sal.* 119 (118), 73 riguardo alle mani di Dio che creano l'uomo, e nella confutazione della concezione dell'eternità della materia, cui Crisostomo contrappone la teoria della creazione *ex nihilo*.

Significative sono poi alcune tipologie che possono stabilire un rapporto fra Crisostomo e Origene, come nel caso del sacrificio di Isacco (*Gen.* 22), considerato typos del sacrificio di Cristo sulla croce; diversi sono i punti di contatto fra i due autori anche di carattere terminologico. Un altro esempio in cui in Origene si può intravedere una fonte di ispirazione per Crisostomo è rappresentato dalla tipologia di Sem e Iafet, con riferimento rispettivamente ai giudei e alla chiamata delle genti.

Un altro punto di contatto tra Crisostomo e gli Alessandrini viene individuato da Pomeroy nelle raccolte di *Testimonia*, passi biblici dell'AT e del NT utilizzati a sostegno delle proprie argomentazioni. Interessante è il caso dell'interpretazione di *Gen.* 1, 3-5, in connessione con *Gv.* 1, 9 e *Rom.* 13, 13; Crisostomo e Didimo concordano nel distinguere tra la luce sensibile, nel senso dell'errore, e la luce intellegibile, nel senso della verità dell'insegnamento di Cristo.

In ultima analisi, come si era già visto in precedenza, Pomeroy ribadisce il carattere eclettico dell'esegesi di Crisostomo che, pur essendo radicato certamente nell'ambiente antiocheno, si rifà a tradizioni provenienti dall'ambito alessandrino nonché siro, e offre numerosi spunti parenetici, tipici delle sue omelie esegetiche, finalizzati alla comprensione dell'identità cristiana. Lo studio di Pomeroy, ben articolato nelle sue due parti, di cui la seconda, relativa alle possibili fonti, appare strutturata in modo particolarmente organico, costituisce un importante contributo all'approfondimento non solo delle omelie su *Gen.*, analizzate accuratamente con un'esposizione efficace che

tiene desta l'attenzione del lettore, ma anche, più in generale, della *ratio* esegetica di Crisostomo, in cui si compenetrano felicemente tradizione e innovazione.

Sergio Zincone

HERMANIN DE REICHENFELD, Giovanni. *The Spirit, the World and the Trinity – Origen's and Augustine's Understanding of the Gospel of John*. Turnhout: Brepols, 2021. Studia traditionis theologiae, 40. 276 p.

Origen as well as Augustine considered the Gospel of John to be the most important book in Scripture. Both authors wrote a commentary on this Gospel, in which pneumatology rules. The Spirit is the key to the Trinitarian and dualistic problems raised by this Gospel, a historically dualistic text. The way Origen and Augustine deal with the two main Johannine themes, the relation between the hypostases and the dualism between God and the world, results in two paradigms, which are not equivalent to the traditional paradigms of Greek and Latin Christianity. The dualistic structure of John's Gospel makes this text a pivotal one for the study of Origen's thought and Augustine's.

Giovanni Hermanin de Reichenfeld (GHR) makes an intriguing and fruitful heuristic comparison of the status and the role of the Holy Spirit in these two commentaries on the Gospel of John. Origen and Augustine fought against two different cosmic dualisms. Origen's fight against Valentinian Gnosticism smoothes the Gospel's dualism between the Spirit and the world; Augustine's fight against Manichaeism shapes a radical opposition between the Spirit and the world. GHR presents a contextual reading of their Trinitarian theology.

GHR deals with three research questions: the Trinitarian role of the Spirit in the authors' Trinitarian constructions; their interpretation of the Johannine concept of the 'world'; the peculiar relationship between the Spirit and the world. Part A of this study investigates the role of the Spirit as an ontological hypostasis. Part B examines Origen's and Augustine's interpretation of the Johannine concept of the world and of the role that the Holy Spirit plays in the relationship between God and the world. Part C, comparing the outcome of these analyses, unfolds two different paradigms of pneumatology and the strong connection between Trinitarian theology and soteriology. The ontological role that the Spirit plays in the Trinity determines the Spirit's soteriological role in dealing with the world.

In the *prolegomena*, GHR indicates the sources of his analysis: Origen's *Commentary on John* as a scholastic work, written for students already familiar with Scripture and offering several possible interpretations; and Augustine's *Tractates on John*, almost equivalent to homilies. In his heuristic comparison, GHR does not problematize the consequences of the two different literary genres of commentary and tractate for the theological comparison of the two pneumatologies. Only on page 218 does he recognize the differences in literary genre at all.

In Part A, GHR deals with God's Spirit in Origen and Augustine. Origen is the first theologian with a specific pneumatology. Convincingly, GHR challenges the idea that Origen's soteriology does not need a pneumatology. In Origen's soteriology, the Spirit's peculiar essence and subordination to the Son allow the Spirit to perform a mediating role between God and creation. GHR makes the important and clarifying distinction between priority and superiority. The relationship between the Father and the Son is an ontological subordination of priority, not of superiority. Between the Father and the Spirit, who is a fundamental part of the divine Trinity and an immanent hypostasis within it, there is an ontological subordination of double priority. GHR shows that Origen's affirmation of a strong ontological subordination does not diminish the Spirit's important soteriological role.

GHR wants to detect a Trinitarian pneumatology in Augustine's ontological reinterpretation of John's Gospel. The Gospel helps Augustine to grasp the nature of the immanent Trinity. Augustine presents the very essence of the Trinity as an eternal process of generation and procession. Using John 1:1; 5:26; 8:25; and 16:13, Augustine avoids any interpretation of subordination. The Holy Spirit is the ontological gift of God's grace, being a communion of love, and the Spirit works for the salvation of humankind. GHR tries to show the Spirit as the most crucial character in Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity. In opposition to Arianism, Augustine uses the text of John as the authoritative basis to describe God as Being itself and to speak of God in a metaphysical manner. The Son and the Spirit are Being, just as the Father is Being. The only distinction between them is their ontological relation of origin. With love as the very essence of the Spirit's being, the Spirit is the ontological bond of love between Father and Son. Convincingly, GHR shows the true relational essence of the Trinity, which Augustine reveals in his account of the Spirit's procession. In his *Tractates on John*, Augustine presents the idea that the Trinity exists as one process of eternal generation and procession.

The Holy Spirit is the most perfect expression of this communion. The Son, the life in himself (John 5:26), has the generative nature of the Father, who granted that the Spirit might proceed from the Son as well. GHR considers *Tractates* 99, 8-9 as the formulation of Augustine's mature Trinitarian theology.

In Part B, GHR deals with the Spirit and the world in Origen and Augustine. GHR proves that Origen envisions a specific soteriological role for the Spirit, distinct from that of the Son. The Spirit provides the ontological substratum for the salvation of rational creatures, who achieve a pure noetic understanding of the Son and grasp a glimpse of the noetic world. GHR shows that Augustine's soteriology is driven by John's Gospel much more than scholarship has recognised. In creation, human beings are given existence; in salvation, human beings are given God. Salvation, a work of re-creation, a special grace granted to the elect, is the act of pulling human beings out of the world, an operation by Christ and the Spirit. In a clarifying section, GHR distinguishes the *proprium* of Christ and the *proprium* of the Spirit in their work of salvation. Human salvation is a rebirth, a second birth in Christ, who is the first of the predestined. By the work of the Spirit, human beings, chosen by God out of the world, can enter the Trinitarian communion, instantiated in the Spirit, who is the source of love. In relation to the elect, the Spirit is also the hypostatised agent of communion inside the Trinity: the *proprium* of the Spirit. Augustine does not create distance between the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity. The double procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son is the sign of the Spirit's ontological and soteriological *proprium*. GHR identifies the Johannine contribution to the theology of Augustine in the formulation of a radical dualism between the Spirit and the world, understood in the sense of the *massa damnata*.

In Part C, GHR makes a comparative analysis of the interpretation of John given by Origen on the one hand and Augustine on the other; the result is an evaluation of their pneumatologies and a new assessment of the Johannine derivation of their Trinitarian theologies. GHR considers the main innovation of his research to be the identification of two paradigms: participation/transformation for Origen, identity/separation for Augustine, and the way in which Origen and Augustine derive these paradigms from John.

GHR identifies the difference between the Son's participation in the Father and his identity with the Father as the main difference between the Trinitarian theologies of Origen and Augustine, who emphasise different passages of John. The difference between Origen

and Augustine is even more visible in their pneumatologies, especially in their understanding of the Spirit's procession. In Origen's doctrine of the Trinity, the Spirit, having an οὐσία that differs from that of the Son, is merely a soteriological agent of the Son for the sanctification of creatures. For Augustine, in the peculiar phrasing of GHR, the Spirit is the 'privileged' hypostasis of God, for only in the Spirit is the perfect communion of the Trinity instantiated. These two paradigms of the intra-Trinitarian relationships have important consequences for the soteriologies of Origen and Augustine, which interpret evil differently. Origen considers the salvation of the world as a whole, a process of transformation from the perceptible world to the noetic world; in this process the Son and the Spirit work, each according to his own nature and distinct soteriological role. In the thought of Augustine, who always depicts the original creation of God as good, one is separated from the fallen world and becomes a sharer in the Holy Spirit by grace, thanks to the Trinity, which exists in reality as a unity and works as a unity. Salvation is intended as separation, salvation out of the world. The Spirit as love, both in the immanent and economic Trinity, instantiates the unification of God and the elect.

In an innovative way, GHR shows convincingly the necessity – in the interpretation of Origen's and Augustine's soteriologies – of taking full account of their pneumatologies, which are based on the Johannine logic. These two theological trajectories cannot be taken as representatives of the Eastern and Western paradigms of Christianity.

In *Modern Theology* 38:2 (2022), 282-304, GHR elaborates his thoughtful new Johannine and methodological framework for understanding Origen's pneumatology, which cannot be intended in an anti-Nicene, proto-Arian fashion.

Piet Hein Hupsch

SCHECK, Thomas P., ed. *Pelagius, Commentaries on the Thirteen Epistles of Paul with the Libellus fidei*. New York-Mahwah: The Newman Press, 2021. Ancient Christian Writers: the Works of the Fathers in Translation, 76. 464 p.

Thomas Scheck ha recentemente tradotto i commenti di Pelagio alle tredici lettere di San Paolo, insieme al *Libellus fidei*, una professione di fede. Si tratta della prima traduzione integrale in una lingua

moderna di queste opere. Il contributo di Scheck, infatti, mette a disposizione per la prima volta al lettore moderno tutti i commenti alle lettere di Paolo, che in precedenza erano solo stati tradotti parzialmente (la lettera ai Romani da Theodore de Bruyn, *Pelagius's Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans*, Oxford, 1993, e la stessa lettera insieme alle due lettere ai Corinzi da Sara Matteoli, *Pelagio, Commento all'epistola ai Romani, commento alle epistole ai Corinzi*, Roma, 2012), mentre non mi risultano traduzioni moderne del *Libellus fidei*. La traduzione è preceduta da un'interessante introduzione che, oltre a presentare brevemente la controversia pelagiana, affronta il complesso problema della trasmissione testuale dei commenti alle epistole paoline e i principali contenuti teologici espressi da Pelagio in ogni commento. Di notevole interesse, anche per i suoi possibili futuri sviluppi, è l'ultimo paragrafo dell'introduzione (30-35), in cui Scheck tratteggia la ricezione dei commenti di Pelagio nel periodo della Riforma e della Controriforma. La traduzione è, inoltre, riccamente annotata (359-415), con numerosi riferimenti alle esegesi di autori antichi, quali, per esempio, Origene e Girolamo. Ampia è, infine, la bibliografia (417-427).

Scheck offre sostanzialmente una traduzione dell'edizione critica di Souter (*Pelagius's Expositions of Thirteen Epistles of St. Paul II: Text and apparatus criticus*, Cambridge, 1926). Per esempio, il testo riportato tra parentesi quadre riproduce quanto nell'edizione di Souter è parimenti riportato tra parentesi quadre, in quanto presente solo in parte della tradizione manoscritta, anche se ascrivibile, forse, a una successiva revisione di Pelagio stesso. La scelta di Scheck è sicuramente condivisibile, in quanto segnala facilmente al lettore i passi su cui è utile e necessario consultare l'edizione critica per verificarne la presenza, qualitativa e quantitativa, nella tradizione manoscritta.

Sulla stessa linea si pone la scelta di tradurre i lemmi delle lettere di Paolo così come sono presenti nell'edizione di Souter. Il testo delle lettere di Paolo a disposizione di Pelagio è un tema molto complesso e dibattuto dalla critica moderna, impossibile da riassumere in questo contesto. In breve, mentre Souter riteneva che Pelagio leggesse un testo vicino alla *Vetus Latina*, l'antica traduzione latina della Bibbia, la critica moderna, a partire da Frede (*Pelagius, der irische Paulustext, Sedulius Scottus*, Freiburg, 1961), sembra propendere per ritenere che il testo biblico di Pelagio fosse più prossimo alla *Vulgata*, la nuova versione latina della Bibbia prodotta a partire dalla fine del IV secolo. Scheck, ritenendo che il compito di ricostruire il testo biblico di Pelagio fosse oltre le sue competenze, ha deciso di

tradurre il testo presente nell'edizione di Souter (20-21). La scelta del traduttore è comprensibile e condivisible, considerata la complessità della materia, la quale, più che aver raggiunto un risultato definitivo, sembra ancora un "work in progress", come dimostra anche una recente pubblicazione sull'argomento (W. Stelzer, *A New Reconstruction of the Text of 2 Corinthians in Pelagius's Commentary on the Pauline Epistles*, Piscataway, NJ, 2018).

Infine, l'ultima nota riguarda la scelta di Scheck di tradurre l'introduzione a tutti i commenti delle lettere paoline (*Argumentum omnium epistularum*, 3-5 nell'edizione di Souter, 41-43 nella traduzione di Scheck). Questa introduzione è presente nell'edizione di Souter, che la considerava dello stesso autore dei commenti, ovvero Pelagio. Altri studiosi moderni hanno invece ritenuto che questa introduzione generale sia opera di un autore successivo che la ha aggiunta ai commenti di Pelagio. Anche in questo caso ritengo che la traduzione di Scheck sia comunque preziosa e che l'indicazione in nota (n. 1, 372-373) del dibattito sulla paternità di questo scritto sia più che sufficiente per indirizzare il lettore.

La scelta di Scheck di tradurre nel medesimo volume i commenti alle epistole paoline e il *Libellus fidei* è molto interessante. Si tratta, infatti, di opere composte in due periodi completamente diversi. I commentari esegetici sono stati redatti prima dello scoppio della controversia pelagiana, indicativamente tra il 406 e il 409, mentre Pelagio si trovava a Roma. Il *Libellus fidei* è, invece, l'ultima opera nota di Pelagio, scritta mentre si trovava in Palestina e in risposta alla condanna sancita nel 416 dai sinodi africani di Cartagine e Milevi e ratificata da Innocenzo I. Pur essendo separate da pochi anni, le due opere rappresentano due momenti estremi della vita di Pelagio, da ammirato asceta e interprete delle Scritture a eretico condannato. L'aver accostato questi due testi, suppur così diversi come genere letterario, faciliterà senza dubbio il compito del lettore e dello studioso nel riconoscere le linee di continuità nel pensiero teologico di Pelagio. A titolo esemplificativo, si pensi all'insistenza anti-ereticale (tra cui, in particolare, la lotta al manicheismo e all'arianesimo) e al ruolo della grazia divina, presente in entrambe le opere, benché non in termini "agostiniani".

In conclusione, ritengo che Scheck abbia offerto un contributo di notevole valore e un servizio molto importante a quanti si dedicano allo studio della controversia pelagiana. La traduzione dei commenti di Pelagio, infatti, permetterà di meglio comprendere il suo pensiero teologico e la sua tecnica esegetica, oltre che di rivalutarne l'importanza. La traduzione di Scheck si pone in continuità con una generale

rivalutazione della figura di Pelagio, seppur contraddistinta da accenti diversi da studioso a studioso. La peculiarità di Scheck, a mio parere, è quella di aver riportato l'attenzione della critica moderna sui commenti paolini di Pelagio, offrendo, al contempo, la possibilità a un pubblico più ampio di conoscere e leggere questa opera.

Giulio Malavasi

SIEBEN, Hermann-Josef introd., trans. and ed. *Contra Adversarium Legis Et Prophetarum. Wider einem Gegner des Gesetzes und der Propheten. Zweisprachige Ausgabe. Augustinus.* Opera – Werke 49. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2021.

Als im Jahre 420 in einem Buchladen an der Hafenpromenade von Karthago vor einer großen Menschenmenge aus einem Buch eines unbekannten Verfassers vorgelesen wurde, das radikal mit dem Alten Testament brach und das Gesetz und die Propheten entschieden ablehnte, sandten Christen, die darauf aufmerksam wurden, eine Abschrift an Augustinus mit der Bitte um Widerlegung. Dieser kam dem Wunsch umgehend nach und verfasste die zwei Bücher *Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum*. Hermann-Josef Sieben SJ übernahm für die Reihe „Augustinus – Opera / Werke" (nach De baptismo AOW 28, Contra Cresconium AOW 30 und den antiarianischen Schriften AOW 48) die Bearbeitung dieses Werks und legt neben dem Text, der aus der Edition von Klaus-D. Daur (CCL 49) übernommenen ist, erstmals eine deutsche Übersetzung dieses weniger bekannten Augustinuswerks vor.

Auf 47 Seiten Einleitung führt der Herausgeber in die Problematik dieses Texts ein. Hier diskutiert er (1) die Stellung des Werks im Schaffen Augustins; mit der Datierung auf 420 folgt er der Communis Opinio. (2) Danach referiert er die Versuche, die Identität des anonymen Adversarius zu bestimmen. Augustinus selbst berichtet, dass ihm trotz aller Bemühungen eine Bestimmung des Adversarius nicht gelungen ist (1,1). Hier ist vor allem die These von Theodor Zahn interessant, der im Namen seines Lehrers Fabricius (2,3,29 und 2,41,1) einen Schreibfehler vermutet, hinter dem der auch bei Augustinus, De haeresibus 61 genannte Patricius stecke. Wenn auch mit Ausnahme der italienischen Übersetzerin Maria Pia Ciccarese die meisten Forscher (Adolf von Harnack, Thomas Raveaux) dieser These zustimmen, muss doch mit aller Entschiedenheit gesagt werden, dass Augustinus selbst diese Identifikation unbekannt war. Denn er nennt

ihn zweimal unter dem Namen Fabricius (im textkritischen Apparat zu beiden Stellen sollte nicht von Harnack, sondern Zahn als Urheber dieser These genannt werden). (3) Im dritten Kapitel stellt Sieben die theologischen Positionen des Adversarius zusammen. Da diese teils manichäisch, teils marcionitisch, teils singulär sind, ist eine klare Einordnung unmöglich. Schon Augustinus selbst war sich bewusst, dass der anonyme Gegner wegen der Ablehnung eines guten Schöpfergottes kein Manichäer sein kann (1,1). (4) Nach der Erörterung der Frage, wie Augustinus seinen Gegner charakterisiert und gegen ihn polemisiert, folgt (5) eine Aufbauanalyse des Werks und des widerlegten Pamphlets, das nur durch Augustins Zitate und seine teilweise verzerrte Darstellung greifbar ist. Da Augustinus erklärt, nicht der Struktur dieser Schrift zu folgen, unternimmt Sieben anhand der besprochenen Bibelstellen den Versuch, die Aufbauprinzipien Augustins (Abfolge nach biblischen Büchern, thematische Anordnung, u.a.) zu erschließen. Das erste Buch verteidigt das Alte Testament gegen die Vorwürfe des Häretikers, das zweite das Neue Testament, insbesondere wird die Behauptung widerlegt, die Apostel hätten ihrerseits das Gesetz und die Propheten verworfen. (6) Im umfangreichsten sechsten Kapitel sammelt der Verfasser auf 13 Seiten Testimonien zur Wirkungsgeschichte des Werks. Die zahlreiche Namen umfassende Darstellung (Cassiodor, Beda, Florus, Sedulius Scottus, Johannes Scottus Eriugena, Reimbald von Lüttich, Rupert von Deutz, Johannes von Salisbury, Petrus Lombardus, Robert Grosseteste, Thomas von Aquin, Bonaventura, …) könnte leicht verlängert werden (wenngleich Vollständigkeit nicht angestrebt wurde); eine flüchtige Recherche in der Library of Latin Texts nach Zitaten des Titels ergibt z.B. mehrere Treffer bei Alexander von Hales oder Cornelius Jansen. (7) Abschließend werden die wichtigsten Informationen zur Überlieferung in aller Kürze ohne Präsentation von Bindefehlern zusammengestellt. Die benutzte Edition basiert auf acht Handschriften, die im Zeitraum zwischen dem 9. und 12. Jh. entstanden. Das Stemma spaltet sich in zwei Zweige, α aus dem deutschsprachigen, β aus dem französischen Raum, von denen letzterer einen besseren Text überliefert. Eine Sonderstellung mit singulär richtigen Lesarten nimmt laut Daur die β-Handschrift *R* (London, BL Royal 5 A XIII) ein. An der Methodik der von Daur vorgenommenen Variantenwahl hatte schon J.-P. Bouhot in seiner Rezension zur Edition im CCL Kritik geübt (REAug 32, 1986, 287f.).

Den Hauptteil des Buches bildet der Text, dem auf der rechten Seite eine deutsche Übersetzung gegenübergestellt ist. Es begleiten ihn am unteren Rand vier Apparate: Eine Leiste der verfügbaren

Textzeugen, ein Apparat der Quellen, v.a. der zitierten Bibelstellen, ein textkritischer Apparat und ein Fußnotenapparat mit kommentierenden Bemerkungen. In diesem wird nicht nur auf einschlägige Literatur (Ciccarese, Raveaux), sondern vor allem auf Artikel im Augustinus-Lexikon und in Fitzgeralds Augustin through the ages hingewiesen, darüber hinaus werden zahlreiche Parallelstellen zitiert, v.a. aus De civitate dei, Confessiones, De trinitate.

Der Text entspricht in seinem Wortlaut weitgehend dem der Edition von Daur. Dennoch sei es hier gestattet, vier Vorschläge zur Verbesserung des Texts vorzubringen. Erstens 1,19,1: Hier entscheidet sich Daur subjektiv für die singuläre, aber wohl als lectio facilior zu erklärende Lesart *respondemus* (*R*) gegenüber dem ihm unverständlichen (CCL 49, 20) Konjunktiv *responderim* („ich möchte antworten"), obwohl diese Form mehr als 30mal im Oeuvre Augustins bezeugt ist und wohl den korrekten Text darstellt. Zweitens 1,35,15f.: *propter non exhibitam humanitatem tantam reprehendere severitatem* („wegen einer nicht erwiesenen Menschenfreundlichkeit an einer so gewaltigen Strenge festzuhalten"). Hier bietet sich an, anstelle des kaum verständlichen *reprehendere* die nicht im Apparat dokumentierte Lesart des Codex *P* (Paris, BNF lat. 12207, f. 119r, l. 6) *rependere* zu bevorzugen, die sich auch bei den Maurinern findet; das Verb wird bei Augustinus häufig im Kontext von Vergeltung verwendet. Drittens 1,49,23: *arborem bonam fructus bonos, malam malos … facere*. Hier verlangt die bessere Überlieferung in β eine rhetorisch anspruchsvollere Umstellung: *arborem fructus, bonam bonos, malam malos … facere*. Viertens 2,21,11f.: Aus Gründen des Parallelismus ist in *invisibiliter … visibilibus* das zweite Glied wohl in *visibiliter* zu ändern. Leider sind in den Text einige neue Druckfehler geraten (1,4,4: es] ex; 1,10,26: imcomparabiliter] incomparabiliter; 1,37,51: nostrorum] nostrum; 1,42,6: nec] ne; 2,4,27: circumcisionem] circumcisionis; 2,20,10: illa] illic; 2,24,16: adivit] adiuvit; 2,27,4: intellegens] non intellegens; 2,38,2: furioris] furoris); in 1,20,1-3 ist der lateinische Text durch Zeilenvertauschung entstellt (die Übersetzung gibt aber den korrekten Textfluss der älteren Editionen wieder). Auch für *conditio* wäre die Schreibung *condicio* zu bevorzugen (1,8,12; 1,30,8; 2,37,30).

Der größte Unterschied zum Text von Daur besteht darin, dass (S. 46) „die Interpunktion an einigen Stellen behutsam geändert" wurde. Dabei wurden längere Perioden zu kürzeren Sätzen umgestaltet, was mitunter Nebensätze zu selbständigen Sätzen umformt (1,13,4; 1,38,12.14; 1,48,41; 2,11,8), von Daur ererbt sind die unpassenden Interpunktionen in 1,6,9; 1,11,19; 1,17,15; 1,38,34.37; 2,11,2; 2,18,9;

2,20,12; 2,25,10; 2,38,3. Ebenso auf Daur gehen zurück die unglücklichen Interpunktionen in 1,15,1f., wo *eidem* als Apodosis an *de tenebris* anschließt (der dazwischen stehende Satz wäre als Parenthese zu kennzeichnen) und 2,42,25, wo mit *nescio quibus enim* ein neuer Satz beginnt, sowie die störenden Kommata in 2,22,5 (*nuncupavit … carnem et sanguinem, homines*) und 2,22,20 (*sed haec repetitio, sententiae superioris expositio est*); neu in den Text geraten sind hingegen die absurden Interpunktionen in 1,11,16 (*de qua faceret, mundum*); 2,24,13 (*mundi huius, iste opinatur auctorem*); 2,38,6 (*quod vero alium dicit: Esse*). Analog zur Modikfikation der Interpunktion wurde eine neue Absatzgliederung eingeführt. Auch hierbei wurden mitunter syntaktisch oder inhaltlich eng zusammengehörende Abschnitte voneinander getrennt, z.B.: 1,7; 1,9 (das Verb zu 1,9,7 *quia et ipsos* folgt erst im nächsten Absatz: 1,9,15: *vidit*); 1,27,10 (die drei 1,27,2 angekündigten Punkte werden in 1,27,4.11.12 behandelt; der Absatz sprengt also den ersten behandelten Punkt; dass Augustinus in 1,27,12 *illum tertium* als Neutrum verwendet ist schwer zu glauben; ich würde daher *illud tertium* konjizieren); 1,38,26 (der *quia*-Satz korreliert mit 1,38,25 *ideo* und darf daher nicht von ihm getrennt werden; vgl. 1,38,39f.); 1,48,22 (durch den Absatz wird die Korrelation 1,48,18.22: *aut … aut* zerstört); 2,13,16 (es ist nicht sinnvoll, die Aufzählung von fünf prophetischen Testimonien durch einen Absatz zwischen dem 2. und 3. Glied zu unterbrechen); 2,25,7 (die beiden mit *sub illa … sub ista* beginnenden Sätze sollten nicht voneinander getrennt werden); 2,33,8 (auch hier wird bei der Aufzählung der fünf Rollen die Paulus bei der Verkündigung des Evangeliums übernahm, der erste Block von den folgenden vier getrennt); 2,37 (in der kontrastierenden Auflistung von Aussagen über den Gott des Alten und des Neuen Testaments erhält jedes Glied einen eigenen Absatz; daher sollte auch in 2,37,62 und 89 ein Absatz gesetzt werden, während in 2,37,76.103.109 die Absätze zu beseitigen wären, weil sie Zusammengehöriges trennen).

Die deutsche Übersetzung ist gut lesbar. Sie bemüht sich um kürzere syntaktische Einheiten und vermag dem nicht lateinkundigen Leser einen guten Einblick in den nicht immer einfachen Gedankengang des Werks zu verschaffen. Wo Augustinus von seinem Gegner nur in der dritten Person spricht, fügt der Übersetzer im Interesse der Klarheit „unser Häretiker“ hinzu, einmal wohl zu Unrecht, weil der Apostel Paulus gemeint ist (2,27,14: *quam dicit* + Zitat von 2 Cor. 3,6: „von dem er doch sagt“). In 2,34,36-38 (*convincitur enim regula falsa, sed sua, nec sapientis ac docti, sed stulti, sicut ipse est, atque ineruditi manu, suo tamen gladio iugulatur*) missversteht der Übersetzer den Ablativ *regula* als Subjekt des ersten Satzes und lässt den zweiten Satz erst mit *atque* und nicht mit *nec* beginnen. Ich würde

den Satz in folgender Weise übersetzen: „er wird nach einer falschen, wohl aber nach seiner Grundregel widerlegt, und nicht von der Hand eines Weisen und Gelehrten, sondern eines Dummkopfs und Ungelehrten, wie er eben selber einer ist, wohl aber mit seinem eigenen Schwert erdolcht". Alle weiteren Bemerkungen zur Übersetzung sind nur Kleinigkeiten: in 1,18,24 wird nicht die Textfassung, sondern die Variante der älteren Editionen übersetzt. An folgenden Stellen würde ich eine etwas andere Übersetzung vorgschlagen: 1,1,13: quoquo modo] auf jeden Fall (*statt* irgendwie); 1,4,4: olim] einst (alles); 1,9,17: ubi sint ordinandi] wo sie angeordnet werden sollten (wodurch die Ordnung wieder hergestellt werden sollte); 1,11,22: ista] diese (jene); 1,16,17f. nobis … notissimam … nobis notissimum] die uns allbekannte … den uns allbekannten (Wortstellung wie in 1,16,12); 1,18,11: dolores] Leiden (Tod); 1,18,14: per ipsum] „durch sie" ist vor „durch Erfahrung" zu stellen; 1,18,25: er kannte (erkannte); 1,23,15: cum causa sit peior] denn seine Sache ist schlechter (denn sein Fall ist tiefer); 1,27,21: cur audet] warum wagt er (warum wagt); 1,36,11: quam gravius] um wieviel (dass gewissermaßen); 1,41,7f.: quasi … tamquam] als ob er (dass er); 1,41,25: extinguitur … inextinguibilis] gelöscht wird … unauslöschlich (in Vergessenheit gebracht … unvergesslich; Anspielung auf l. 8: *spiritum nolite extinguere*); 1,42,11: velut misericordiam] gewissermaßen Barmherzigkeit; 1,43,23: numquid] wird er denn (wenn er); 1,44,5f. nisi insipientibus … dementibus] wenn nicht die Toren und solche, die … immer mehr den Verstand verlieren; 1,47,6 vel] das heißt (beziehungsweise); 1,49,28: cum] wenn (weil); 2,5,9: pacem] Frieden (Evangelium); 2,16,25: vobis] euch (ihnen); 2,24,10: interpretatione] Übersetzung (Auslegung); 2,37,135: quorum] deren (dessen; das Relativpronomen bezieht sich auf *pomorum* „Frucht"). Einige Textteile sind in der Übersetzung übergangen (1,18,19: *cum laude*; 1,31,7: *qui … concilio*; 1,42,2: *ubi dictum est*; 1,45,6: *post diluvium genus*; 2,6,29-31: *quamvis … valerent*; 2,12,29: *quae non paris*; 2,13,29: *illarum scripturarum*), ebenso einzelne kleinere Wörter wie *alius* (1,52,22); *autem* (2,39,11); *deus* (1,15,12; 1,39,21); *enim* (2,40,5); *ergo* (2,4,50); *etiam* (1,36,2); *fortasse* (2,41,10); *hic* (2,8,10); *iam* (1,40,15); *inquit* (1,38,41); *ipse* (2,3,14); *is* (1,34,29); *iste* (1,16,25); *quidam* (1,16,13.24); *quidem* (2,9,10); *quippe* (2,16,3); *sed* (2,9,3.13; 2,10,1); *similiter* (1,34,18; cf. 1,34,39); *suus* (2,9,14); *tamen* (1,41,16); *tamquam* (1,18,4; 1,49,29); *tunc* (1,3,9; 1,10,32); *tuus* (2,12,10); *utique* (1,23,12.18); *velut* (2,20,3); *vero* (1,41,8).

Im Apparat der verfügbaren Textzeugen befremdet die Präsentation der älteren Editionen: *edd.maur* = (*am fr lov*) ist durch Umstellung der bei Daur so angeordneten Siglen entstanden: *am fr lov* = *edd.*

maur. Textzeugen der indirekten Überlieferung sind in diesem Apparat nicht lückenlos angeführt, die Texte Bedas (Genesis- und Lukaskommentar, Collectanea) ohne detailliertere Angabe unter der Sammelsigle *Beda*.

Die Bibelstellen sind zweifach angegeben, zum einen im Bibelapparat unterhalb des lateinischen Texts, zum anderen (und hier mit anderen Abkürzungen) im Lauftext der Übersetzung (einige Konfer-Zitate sind nur in der Übersetzung nachgewiesen). Neu gegenüber Daur ist die Angabe von Zitaten des Adversarius in diesem Apparat. Ob es sich aber in 1,18,2: *quare sic me finxisti?* wirklich um ein wörtliches Zitat des Adversarius handelt, ist fraglich; denn es ist ein (nicht nachgewiesenes) Zitat von Rom. 9,20. Ebenso nicht aufgeschlüsselt sind folgende Bibelstellen: 1,30,3-4: 2 Reg. 24; 1,30,4-5: 1 Reg. 2-4; 1,48,32: Gen. 1,26; 2,5,30: cf. Rom. 11,25. In 2,29,17: *unde dicit apostolus Petrus*: *Eripiet vos de praesenti saeculo maligno* liegt ein bisher nicht zufriedenstellend geklärtes Zitat vor. Daur und Sieben athetieren den Namen Petrus, weil es sich um ein Zitat des Paulus (Gal. 1,4) handle. Es liegt hier aber weder ein Schreibfehler noch ein Irrtum Augustins vor, sondern ein nicht erkanntes Zitat von Act. 2,40, wo eben diese Aussage dem Petrus im Anschluss an seine Pfingstpredigt zugeschrieben wird (Vulg.: *salvamini a generatione ista prava*; vgl. Aug. fid. op. 13 und 37: *eripite vos a saeculo hoc pravo* / *ab hoc saeculo pravo*, ebenfalls mit ausdrücklicher Zuschreibung an Petrus). Auch bei Binnenverweisen wäre eine exakte Angabe der referenzierten Stellen zu begrüßen: 1,39,10: *quae iam supra commemoravi*; 2,9,6: *quod et supra commemoravi*; vor allem in der Rekapitulation (2,35) würde man gerne Verweise auf die Stellen des Werks sehen, an denen die Themen behandelt wurden.

Der textkritische Apparat wurde aus der Edition von Daur ohne größere Änderung übernommen. Alle Lemmata sind in der vorliegenden Fassung ausgeschrieben, auch auf die Abkürzung der Lesarten wurde verzichtet. Kleinere orthographische Varianten werden nicht berücksichtigt; dass diese ursprünglich vorhanden waren, zeigt sich daran, dass sich vor allem bei Eigennamen (Abraham, Ariani, …) leere Lemmata finden, bei denen zwar die Lesarten, nicht aber die Lemmata eliminiert wurden (1,46,1; 1,49,1.22; 2,2,3.13; 2,6,10; 2,7,4; 2,12,17.19; 2,13,26; 2,18,7; 2,31,14.17.20). Die bei Daur vorhandenen unklaren Apparatangaben wurden soweit wie möglich anhand der im Internet verfügbaren Handschriftenreproduktionen überprüft, verbleibende Dubia sind auf S. 47 aufgelistet und an der betreffenden Stelle im Apparat mit einer Crux versehen; es sind jedoch noch einige unklare Apparateinträge vorhanden, z.B. 1,11,8: accedente] accedente

F; 1,34,4: appellatas R] appellatos α (T^1) – welchen Text die anderen Hss., bieten ist unklar. Neue Ungenauigkeiten sind hinzugekommen, z.B. 1,4,13: die Maurinervariante *factum est ab eo* wäre zum Lemma *ab eo factum est* (und nicht bloß *factum est*) zu stellen; ähnlich wäre in 1,38,30 als Lemma für die Umstellung *iam debeant* anzusetzen; 2,5,19: die Variante der Hss. lautet *alios*, nicht *ilios*.

In allen Teilen des Buches finden sich zahlreiche Ungenauigkeiten, die leicht zu beheben gewesen wären: Die Benutzerfreundlichkeit und Auffindbarkeit der Stellen wäre deutlich erhöht, wenn die in der Einleitung gebotenen Zitate nicht nur auf Buch und Kapitel, sondern auch auf die exakte Zeile verwiesen. Einzelne Bibelzitate im Text sind (wie bei Daur) nicht durch Kursivierung hervorgehoben (1,34,11f.; 2,11,6f.), dafür an manchen Stellen der verbindende Text (z.B.: 1,48,32: *et*). Im Quellenapparat und im textkritischen Apparat werden nach den Lemmata teils eckige Klammern gesetzt, teils fehlen sie (v.a. nach Indexzahlen). Das dürfte genauso an (einer Fehlbedienung) der Editionssoftware liegen, wie das Phänomen, dass das letzte Wort eines Kapitels in den Apparaten der Zeile 0 (!) oder Zeile 1 des folgenden Kapitels zugerechnet wird (z.B. Bibelapparat zu 1,15,14; 1,28,24; 1,32,22; 1,38,51; 1,39,37; kritischer Apparat zu 1,21,16; 1,29,20; 1,31,18). In den Fußnoten finden sich mehrere Druckfehler (z.B. Anm. 178: es handelt sich hier um cons. ev. 1,2, nicht 2,6), ebenso in den Abkürzungsverzeichnissen; hier vermisse ich eine Erklärung der Abkürzung CSEL (gleichsam als Kompensation werden Editionen des CCL dem CSEL zugeschlagen: S. 75 Anm. 86 CSEL 27 statt CCL 27, S. 135 Anm. 191 CSEL 50 statt CCL 50). Auch die Bibliographie weist viele Druckfehler auf: Richtig wäre z.B. S. 263 Cassiciacum (statt Cassiacium); S. 265: CCL (CLL); S. 267: BT (BSGRT); pericula (periculo). Es finden sich fehlerhafte Datierungen von Literatur (S. 45: Amerbach 1505-1571, Lovanienses 1676; S. 276: Schirner 1915) und viele formale Unstimmigkeiten (Kursivierung, Zeichensetzung, Orthographie, …): Nachnamen sind falsch geschrieben (statt Rübke wäre korrekt Rüpke), Vornamen sind teils ausgeschrieben, teils gekürzt, es fehlen Seitenangaben und vieles mehr. Das Buch hätte mit Sicherheit von einem gründlichen Lektorat profitiert.

Trotz dieser Mängel ist das Buch sehr verdienstvoll und sein Verfasser zu beglückwünschen, weil er ein weniger bekanntes Augustinuswerk einem breiteren Publikum in einer guten Übersetzung zugänglich macht und die damit verbundenen Forschungsfragen anschaulich präsentiert.

Clemens Weidmann

SMITH, James K. A. *On the Road with Saint Augustine: A Real-World Spirituality for Restless Hearts*. Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2019. XIV-240 p.

This was a strange book to read during a pandemic. The main title of James K.A. Smith's recent offering, *On the Road with Saint Augustine*, may not prove to be quite as stirring to a quarantined readership, especially if taken in between bouts of binge-watching old TV shows and wearing days-old sweatpants. Which I suppose is another way of asking: is Augustine's journey metaphor always attractive, and *must* it be? One wonders what other metaphors might have risen to the surface – in Augustine, even – had Smith written this book during the Covid-19 nightmare.

This is not to say that nightmare removed our interest in self-discovery; far from it. And besides, Augustine is always stressing the point (which he gets from Plotinus) that it is a journey of desire and not of geographical location. But what *kind* of journey, and do we really want to go on it? Desire, sure. But repentance, conversion, the transformation and elevation of desire? We may question how open the modern reader is to those things.

To its credit, Smith's book is remarkably fearless in tackling the well-worn clichés of our therapeutic culture (e.g., "how to find yourself," 20). Exposing them to the hard-earned wisdom of Augustinian interiority, it never slides into a tone of condescension and dismissiveness, but seems genuinely to believe that where we find ourselves today is still a place where St. Augustine may be able to meet us, intrigue us, even challenge and incite us. Another great feat of this conversational book: it shows us where Augustine might want us to end up. It's not *all* about the journey, the climb, the process. A journey without an endpoint is a pointless affair; and possibly it betrays a measure of self-indulgence on our part. It is something we *say* without thinking about it; and much of Smith's book is trying to help us think about "it" – that is, things we say or believe unthinkingly today.

So, a chapter on freedom takes on our desire for freedom and shows us just how thin our conception has become. Freedom understood as liberation, a freedom *from* something, has its place in the history of freedom and the discourse about it. But left at that, freedom *from* something leads us to the desert, where now the void must be filled with our own concocted choices. But is that really freedom, or just another kind of lostness, even "enslavement" (63)? Anyone who has read Smith's other learned books knows how capably he integrates the work of philosophers in his writing. Something else to

appreciate in this popular offering is his facility with cultural and literary productions. In the span of a few pages on the topic of freedom, we hear of Heidegger and Sartre, but also of Corvettes and Mustangs. Former Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy makes an appearance; then it's back and forth with Augustine as we encounter memoir (Jamison's *The Recovering*), film (Gerwig's *Lady Bird*), philosophy again (Marcel's *Homo Viator*), and then Jesus, who appropriately gets the last word. It's all very impressive if at times overwhelming. It shows the manifold ways Augustine's "voice" can still be heard; and the advantage of ranging so widely and randomly is that the culturally ignorant are bound to recognize something, and maybe even glean a recommendation or two.

Perhaps the book's subtitle gives us a clue as to the method: "A Real-World Spirituality for Restless Hearts." As an author, Smith is eager to introduce us to Augustine, but not in so direct a manner as a biography or a commentary. Other voices are invited to speak, some critical of Augustine, and some knowing nothing about him yet still partaking in the Augustinian charism. Interspersed among them is a portion of Smith's travelogue – he's clearly well-traveled – that widens the scope of where Augustine shows up today. It all suggests that wherever we may find ourselves today, and especially if we haven't found ourselves quite yet – "restless hearts" – there is something in our story that Augustine would have the time for, and plenty he would want us to hear in response. "The alienation is real," writes Smith. "The sense of frustration, futility, of never arriving, never feeling settled with ourselves…" (40). And yet, if this is us, it can be the beginning of something. Restless for a reason; not aimless but longing, even in confined quarters in the midst of a pandemic. The gift of Smith's book is that it gives us an Augustine whose journey kept on going, even after he found his way: but found his way he did.

Ian Clausen

SNYDER, H. Gregory, ed. *Christian Teachers in Second-Century Rome: Schools and Students in the Ancient City*. Leiden: Brill, 2020. Supplements to Vigiliae christianae, 159. VIII-219 p.

What is the significance of quasi-independent "small study circles" for understanding the teaching activities of the likes of Marcion, Valentinus and Justin Martyr in Rome during the second century? In this volume, M. Gregory Snyder's excellent team of scholars works

out several implications of Brown's classic insight that "Small study circles were the powerhouses of the Christian culture of the second and third century" (Brown, *The Body and Society*, 1982, 104). Though the editor acknowledges that the volume breaks fresh ground that requires further work, it is an excellent resource that both opens up new vistas on Christian activity in second-century Rome, as well as provides direction for further study regarding the significance of rival teaching "schools" in Rome for the development of Christian culture and lived religion.

The nine chapters in the volume are preceded by Snyder's incisive introduction to the research question, and to how each essay contributes to the critical edge of such research. The first essay, Judith Lieu's "Jewish Teachers in Rome?" suggests that Jewish teaching activity – aside from synagogues – in second-century Rome may have followed the teacher-led patterns of debate and dialogue that plausibly took place in Ephesus, as per Justin's *Dialogue with Trypho*. Admittedly a speculative essay in so far as Jewish teaching circles is concerned, its significance for second-century Christian groups is that Ephesian teacher-led small-group practices appear to be mirrored in Rome, as suggested by most of the essays that follow and the fact that Justin Martyr himself was in Rome for a time. Next, the essays of Einar Thomassen and Christoph Markschies offer diverging views on the best concepts and terminology for describing Valentinian and Gnostic teaching groups. Alleged differing goals and emphases between these groups raise the issue of what terminology and frameworks are best for describing them: are they "philosophical schools," "religious groups," "churches" or something else entirely? A key divide in the debate between these two scholars (and others) is how one conceives of the ways that knowledge and teaching function in the lived religion of these groups: to what degree does the extant evidence point to teaching circles revolving around esoteric experiences as much as formal philosophical teaching? Further research is required to answer this question; these two essays alone demonstrate the significance of this volume for stimulating further work into second-century Christianity in Rome.

The fourth essay is Robin Jensen's, which focuses on second- to fourth-century visual representations of Jesus, Paul, and others in Rome, across various media. The evolution of these portrayals and the values they communicate about the art's subjects (especially Christ the Teacher), as well as the art's patrons, are significant for how teaching and wisdom may have been progressively understood in small Christian schools or study groups. The strength of this essay lies

in Jensen's ability to make coherent connections between second- to fourth-century Christian cultures and their Roman surroundings, without asking too much of the evidence at hand.

Heidi Wendt's essay, "Christians as and among Writer-Intellectuals in Second-Century Rome," is another highlight of the volume. Wendt enlarges the social matrix within which Christian intellectuals operated. Hence Wendt is able to suggest that there was a significant overlap and intellectual exchange (which may be direct or mediated by others) between the composers of canonical or non-canonical Gospels in addition to "religious experts" such as Justin, Marcion and Valentinus. This fascinating essay is followed by an equally intriguing and productive work on Marcion by Winrich Löhr, "Problems of Profiling Marcion." Next is Fernando Rivas Rebaque's "Justin Martyr as an Organic Christian Intellectual in Rome." Gramsci's distinction between an organic and a traditional theologian is deployed in order to explain a number of features in Justin's life, including his travels and relationships with the various communities in which he was welcomed. The eighth essay is "Tatian *Theodidaktos* on Mimetic Knowledge" by Miguel Herrero de Jáuregui. In the wake of Tatian's recent rehabilitation as an apologist for Christianity, Herrero de Jáuregui points out Tatian's unique arguments against modes of knowledge that competed for attention in Rome at the time he was there. The essay proceeds from the well-substantiated view that Tatian's *Oratio ad Graecos* was likely written in Rome. Ultimately, the author concludes: "In opposition … to Heraclitus' self-teaching or to those who have received mimetic knowledge from others, Tatian's true teaching comes directly from God via the Scripture. This primacy of the text over the teacher, to use Gregory Snyder's terms, is a clear feature of his thought" (175). The author argues that one of the implications of this conclusion for the study of second-century teaching in Rome is that, according to Tatian himself and his teaching circles, "teachers had a minor role to play, except for ordering the minds of their audience by giving them adequate access to the divine text" (175). This essay ends with two appendices that unpack Herrero de Jáuregui's interpretation of Tatian's approach to knowledge and teaching, and the significance of that interpretation for understanding Irenaeus' *Adv. Haer.* 3.23.1-8 (about Tatian himself) and Eusebius' *Hist. eccl.* 5.13.7 (about Rodon, Tatian's disciple). The final essay, by H. Gregory Snyder, is titled "Shoemakers and Syllogisms: Theodotus 'the Cobbler' and His School". This essay expands our demographic understanding of the schools of learning that may have been operative in second-century Rome. Snyder argues that Theodotus the Cobbler, who was active in

Rome in the late second century, was not exceptional as a worker-intellectual who had a teaching role in a moderately learned community that resembled a "school". This essay includes maps of Rome, which are used in combination with other ancient sources, such as Galen, in order to point out that in Roman commercial districts, artisans such as cobblers would have been physically proximate to sources of knowledge such as books and other modes of teaching, including public debates.

In sum, this volume is an excellent resource for specialists and undergraduate students of second-century Christianity alike.

Scott Harrower

STENGER, Jan R. *Education in Late Antiquity: Challenges, Dynamism, and Reinterpretation, 300-550 CE*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2022. IX-336 p.

Stenger fokussiert die Frage, welche Schlussfolgerungen sich bzgl. des Verhältnisses von Bildung und Gesellschaft in der Spätantike ziehen lassen, wenn nicht länger auf konkrete Praktiken, sondern auf die diese begründenden bzw. rechtfertigenden Theoriebildungen geblickt wird. Hierbei ist er sich der „polyphony of the discourse" (9) bewusst und gliedert seine Untersuchung entlang fünf thematischer Aspekte („1. Educational Communities"; „2. The Emergence of Religious Education"; „3. What Men Could Learn from Women"; „4. The Life of Paideia", „5. Moulding the Self and the World"; „6. The Making of the Late Antique Mind"). Jeder dieser Abschnitte beginnt mit einer aufschlussreichen theoretisch-methodischen Zuspitzung der Fragestellung, bevor je drei bis fünf quellenbasierte Skizzen folgen, die je einen Autor bzw. eine Protagonistin in den Blick nehmen. Hierbei stehen Texte aus verschiedenen Zeiten, verschiedenen Regionen und sogar verschiedenen Religionskulturen direkt vergleichbar nebeneinander, wobei christliche und pagane Quellen nahezu gleichgewichtet werden, jüdische Quellen werden kurz gestreift (2.2). Im Blick auf christliche Autoren zeigt Stenger eine Vorliebe für die Kappadokier, Johannes Chrysostomus und besonders Augustin (1.2, 2.5, 4.4, 6.4), wohingegen seine Überlegungen zu monastischer Bildung aus theologischer Perspektive wenig überzeugen (2.4, 7.). Stenger schlussfolgert (7.), dass der „education discourse" (290) gebildeter Eliten nur wenig mit der konkret stattfindenden „pedagogy" (ebd.), zu tun habe, sondern dass er vielmehr

als Vehikel diene, um Fragen der Weltanschauung pointiert zu diskutieren und ein weitreichendes „explanatory system“ (292) der Welt und des Selbst zu bieten.

Dorothee Schenk

STUCCO, Guido, ed. *Arnobius Iunior, Praedestinatus*. Turnhout: Brepols, 2022. Brepols Library of Christian Sources, 6. 255 p.

This book contains the critical edition by Franco Gori (CCSL 25) of Arnobius the Younger's *Praedestinatus* with a facing English translation by Guido Stucco. Arnobius the Younger, not to be confused with Arnobius of Sicca, was originally from North Africa, but served as an abbot of a monastery in or near Rome in the 420s through the 440s. Sometime during the pontificate of Sixtus II (432-440), he wrote this anti-predestinarian work in three books (10). The tone of the discourse in the books suggests that it was penned during the most heated years of the controversy over Augustine's theology of grace, that is, 432-434. The title of this anonymous work, *Praedestinatus* (*Predestined*), was given to it by Jacques Sirmond (d. 1651). Sirmond most likely took the name from Book 3.15, where Arnobius calls the predestinarian tract in Book 2 the *liber Praedestinatus*.

Book One is a heresiology listing ninety heresies from the first through the early fifth century with short descriptions of the beliefs of each. Several references in Book One reveal detailed knowledge of places and persons in both Africa and Rome, and confirm that the author was indeed an African who relocated to Rome (8, 89) and not Julian of Eclanum. Arnobius lists predestinarians as the ninetieth heresy.

Concerning the occasion for the text, I have shown in my article "Arnobius the Younger against the 'Predestined One'" that Arnobius and his monks most likely had a personal encounter in Rome with Prosper of Aquitaine. In their discussion, Arnobius disagreed with Prosper's teaching on predestination; and Prosper, as was his custom, accused Arnobius of supporting the heresy of Pelagius (137). This troubled Arnobius, who wrote: "So, why do you misinterpret our argument and accuse us of following Pelagius' belief?" (225). Arnobius expressed his purpose for writing *Praedestinatus* as his fear of being labeled a heretic (127). He continued: "It is because of them [predestinarians] that we have recalled all heresies from the time of Simon Magus until now, so that we may establish that we are in full

agreement only with the Catholic faith" (127, see also 143). And again he wrote that all the heresies which he condemns have been gathered into one book "so that the Predestinarians may know that we do not agree with any heretic" (145).

Scholars who criticize Prosper for saying that opponents of Augustine's theology of grace were supporters of the Pelagian heresy because they regarded faith and the beginning of a good will as meritorious, should take note that the Gauls and Arnobius were equally, if not more, vicious in their attacks against predestinarians. The Gallic author of the *Vincentian Articles* wrote that predestinarians believe that when consecrated virgins are seduced, and when mothers sexually abuse their sons, these events happen because God predestined them (ACW 32:170-171). The *Gallic Chronicle of 452* (Ch. 24) spoke of "the heresy of the predestinarians." Faustus of Riez threatened to excommunicate the priest Lucidus for predestinarian beliefs (CSEL 21: 161-165); and Gennadius of Marseilles assailed predestinarians as heretics (PL 81: 644). Here Arnobius likens predestinarians to Manichaeans (165) and calls them "followers of the Antichrist" (127). In fact he slanders them as the *worst* of all heretics, writing: "I have included eighty-nine heresies in the first book; I noticed that none of them has condoned human crimes as much as this last one, nor have I found another one that heaps up so many blasphemies on God." (165).

Was there really a sect of predestinarians in the early fifth century? In the Introduction, Stucco, without personally taking a stand on the question, makes a unique contribution to scholarship by tracing how this question was answered from the early Middle Ages through the seventeenth-century Jansenist controversy. I tend to believe that a sect of *praedestinati* was fabricated by Arnobius to deflect the accusation of heresy off of himself and onto Prosper and his associates; for at one point, Arnobius admits that only "two or three fools, having a blind heart" hold the views he is condemning (159).

Arnobius claimed that the predestinarians "produced spurious books and various letters, which they falsely attribute" to the famous bishop of Hippo, Augustine (143). Book Two purports to be a transcription of a predestinarian tract which Arnobius calls *liber Praedestinatus* (186). Some passages of the tract contain views consistent with the views of Prosper and Augustine, such as grace preceding human choice, that only those whom God wants to be saved will be saved, and that "all" in certain biblical passages refers to only a part (133, 137). But the tract also describes ideas inconsistent with the writings of Augustine and Prosper, including, for example, the view that if people are predestined by God to life, even if they refuse to

come, they are "led to eternal life against their wishes" (137). I wonder if Arnobius was admitting to exaggerating the views of the predestinarians he knew when he wrote: "Even though these statements are revealed to the readers to have gone way beyond their own perversity, we have acted in such a way that truth may be distinguished from falsehood not only by means of rational discourse, but also of scornful remarks" (63-65).

Earlier scholars have shown convincingly that the little tract came not from Augustine or his supporters, but from the pen of Arnobius himself, who was setting up a straw man, which he would systematically knock down in Book Three. Some of their arguments for Arnobian authorship of the tract include an incorrect Scriptural citation that appears in Book Two and in Book Three, and a similarity between something written in Book 2.4 and a comment of Arnobius on Ps 26 in his *Commentary on the Psalms.*

Book Three reiterates sections of the tract in Book Two; Arnobius shows how each point deviates from true faith or correct interpretation of the Scriptures. My question is this: If Arnobius was so concerned that the tract was falsely attributed to the "orthodox teacher" (63) Augustine, why doesn't Book Three simply use Augustine's genuine writings and teaching on predestination to oppose the tract which was falsely attributed to "such an orthodox man" (145)? Instead, Book Three contains views on predestination dissimilar and even contrary to Augustine's. It seems that Arnobius was not as concerned with clearing Augustine's name as he was with placing teaching on divine predestination held by Augustine's supporters in a most horrible light. For Arnobius, predestination is simply God's plan to patiently await the repentance of those who incline themselves to evil, and to reward the faith of those who come to him with forgiveness and adoption (145). The Creator did not predestine anything else except that people should live according to God's will (151). People are either saved or deceived through their own consent (177).

One of Arnobius's main objections to predestination was pastoral. In his mind the predestinarian view of his opponents ruled out the possibility of conversion, that people can change their ways (147). People make themselves into either vessels of honor or vessels prepared for destruction, he taught (155). Arnobius is also horrified by an idea which he attributes to his opponents, namely, that sin is committed by the order of a predestining God rather than by sinners themselves. If God's predestination is responsible for people's sins, then his judgment of those deeds, which he foreordained to take place, is unfair (151, 165).

According to Arnobius, God wants all humans to be saved (159-163). "He calls everybody and invites everybody…Whoever will not be saved must attribute it to their own negligent, spiteful and indifferent self" (215). Judas fell away because of his own negligence, not due to divine predestination (169-171). The apostle Paul was not drawn to God against his will, and those who say that he was, rob Paul of the reward for his faith (171-177). God is the perfect physician, who heals for free "but requires the patient's obedience" (177). The grace of God precedes the human will in that God sent his Son to save sinners and open wide the gates of his grace. Arnobius rejects the view of his opponents, which says that grace as an interior power given to only the elect must precede for a person to begin to choose what is good (181). Against this, "we argue…that the human will precedes the grace of God" because the Lord did not say, "You will receive first, so go ahead and ask," but *Ask and you shall receive* (181). God does not give his grace to those who do not ask for it (219).

The passage about God loving Jacob and hating Esau does not support individual election and reprobation, but is merely a prophecy that the greater people of the Jews would serve the lesser people of the Gentiles (157). Book Three also contains Arnobius's non-predestinarian interpretations of biblical passages often cited by predestinarians, such as the following: *Unless the Lord builds the house, they labor in vain who build* (Ps 127:1); *No one can come to Me except the Father draw him* (John 6:44); *Those whom he predestined, he also called* (Rom 8:30); *It is not of the one who wills or runs, but of God who has mercy* (Rom 9:16). Book Three also contains interpretations of passages frequently cited by opponents of predestination, such as these: *Come unto Me all* (Matt 11:28); *He was handed over for us all* (Rom 8:32); *Who wants all to be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth* (1 Tim 2:4); and *The grace of God has appeared to all* (Tit 2:6).

Stucco's translation is lucid, clear, and flows nicely, sometimes including colloquial expressions, e.g. "martyr wannabes" (105). The few critiques I have are minor. Page 65, line 19 may be better rendered as "described in many thousands of lines the beginning, struggle, and outcome of each heresy." Page 127 *pax hominibus bonae uoluntatis* might better translated as "peace to people of good will" rather than "peace to those on whom his favor rests" because Arnobius was citing the passage to show, against the predestinarians, that humans can have a good will. In several instances Scripture passages are expanded in the English version, such as when the phrase

who sent me is added to John 6:44, though it is not in Arnobius's Latin quotation of the passage (125-127, 135, 185). Also, the Latin quote of Jeremiah 10:23 by Arnobius simply says: *non est in homine uia eius* (130-131), but it is translated as *No one chooses their way, nor determines their course nor directs their own step*.

A few typographical and grammatical errors were also missed in the editing process: "nor" and "non" for "not" (59, 65); "the" for "they" (95); "us Catholic" for "us Catholics" (119); "those who are have sexual relations" (79); "They also say that that this Christ" (95); "They are used to kill themselves" (109); and "They are used to say" (125). And to the bibliography can be added David Lambert's 2009 article "Augustine and the *Praedestinatus*" and Raul Marin's 2019 article "The Best Defense is a Good Offence: Arnobius the Younger's *Praedestinatus* and the Debates on Predestination in Mid-Fifth Century Rome."

Stucco's work advances scholarship in three areas, the first of which is patristic heresiology. Four important works from the late fourth and early fifth century listing heresies are those of Epiphanius, Philastrius, Augustine, and Arnobius. While the works of Epiphanius and Augustine were translated into English in the twentieth century, the work of Arnobius has not been rendered into English translation until this book; and the book of Philastrius still needs to be translated. For further research, a parallel version of all four of these heresiologies would be very helpful. Another research topic would be an investigation into whether Arnobius tailored his description of any of the other eighty-nine heresies to correspond with the alleged beliefs of his predestinarian heretics.

The next contribution concerns how people in Christian history have understood divine predestination. Stucco has been translating primary texts on predestination for several decades. Some recent works include *The Doctrine of Predestination in Catholic Scholasticism* (2017) and Cornelius Jansen's *The Predestination of Humans and Angels* (2022). His translation of Arnobius's *Praedestinatus* is important in the history of the theology of grace because it was the first written response against Augustinian predestination. "Until now," Arnobius wrote, "no one was willing to confront [the predestinarians] in writing" (143). I look forward to Stucco's forthcoming translation in the Brepols Library of Christian Sources of Faustus of Riez's *On Grace*, another major work of the fifth century that was directed against Augustine's teaching on predestination.

Stucco's work also contributes to the on-going effort of scholars over the last several decades to bring the major works of the Pelagian

and so-called Semi-Pelagian controversies into English. The last few decades have seen first English translations of Pelagius's *Commentary on the Pauline Epistles*, the Pelagian *On the Hardening of Pharaoh's Heart*, Augustine's *Unfinished Work against Julian*, and Fulgentius of Ruspe's *On the Truth of Predestination and Grace*. Arnobius's *Praedestinatus*, another major text from these controversies, is now available to English-speaking readers.

Arnobius Iunior, Praedestinatus will be a valuable read for those interested in heresiology, predestination and the theology of grace, patristic biblical interpretation, and texts from the fifth-century controversy over Augustine's views.

Francis X. Gumerlock

SYTSMA, Lee. *Universal Salvation and Freedom of Choice According to Origen of Alexandria*. Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2020. Gorgias Studies in Early Christianity and Patristics, 74. 226 p.

In this published version of his Marquette doctoral thesis (2018), Lee Sytsma tackles the apparent tension in Origen's thought between, on the one hand, his affirmation of universal salvation and, on the other, his insistence on human free will and moral autonomy, arguing that Origen was indeed able to hold both together by modifying the Stoic model of impressions and assent and by developing a 'middle way' account of God's foreknowledge that anticipates Molinism. The book opens with an Introduction providing a limited review of contemporary scholarship on these questions, before turning in Chapter One to the various forms of 'predestination' facing Origen: the alternatives of asserting that people are of different natures or that their fate resides in the inscrutable will of God alone, leading in both cases to a fatalism. The second chapter places Origen's understanding of moral autonomy in the context of the Greek philosophical tradition, especially the positions of Epictetus and Alexander of Aphrodias; Sytsma argues that while Origen adopted the Stoic model of impression and assent, he modified it by superimposing upon it a tripartite anthropology of spirit, soul, and body, so that the soul, in the middle, receives competing rational impressions, leading it to either virtue or vice, and ensuring that, no matter how depraved the moral character might become, the person will never be deprived of at least some degree of positive rational motivation originating from the spiritual aspect. The third and fourth chapters sketch out Origen's understanding of cosmic

history in six acts, from the creation of the intelligent minds that had been eternally foreseen, to the apokatastasis.

The most important and constructive part of the work is Chapter Five, where Sytsma explores the various nuances regarding the words 'necessity' and 'certainty' in Origen's writings, and the three different types of divine foreknowledge that Origen considers: the first, a simple foreknowledge of what a person will freely chose in the future, not implying any providential planning; second, the foreknowledge of the range of possibilities that each person could have chosen in the future, foreknowing the person's capabilities or possibilities, for which it is important to differentiate 'necessity' from 'certainty' (God's foreknowledge of a person's character leaves open a range of possible actions, though these are also foreknown, as is that which would ultimately be chosen). And finally, the third type is what Sytsma calls 'God's foreknowledge of hypothetical voluntary possibilities', that is, the foreknowledge of what each person would have chosen had they ended up in a set of circumstances that never in fact became actual. It is by running through all of these possibilities, that God can settle upon the particular configuration that inevitably leads to a universal salvation while not yet undermining the moral autonomy of each: 'since God would never violate moral autonomy, God's unspeakable wisdom had to concoct a complex plan for a future timeline which would certainly result in the foreordained apocatastasis' (173). The conclusion to the volume reiterates the argument of the book and points to six implications that might be drawn, the final one of which is that Origen anticipated the idea of the 'middle knowledge' ascribed to God by Luis de Molina, that is, the idea that God has a particular form of knowledge regarding the counterfactuals of human freedom, which has again come to the forefront with figures such as Alvin Plantinga.

On Sytsma's presentation, God computed incredibly complex calculations before creation: 'The amount of complexity involved in the arrangement to save just a single soul is staggering. And this is exponentially so when one considers that God will only actuate a future timeline which will save every rational soul' (176–7). Intriguingly, on this presentation, Sytsma ends up endorsing the paraphrases of Origen's teaching made by his detractors: that 'God decided to only create the amount of creatures which could be sufficiently governed by his providence' (176). That Origen taught this is indicated, for Sytsma, by a passage given by Justinian (Koetschau Fragment 24, at *Princ*. 2.9.1), which, Sytsma asserts, has been 'toned down' by Rufinus. Whether it has been 'toned down' by Rufinus, or whether

it has been caricatured by Origen's opponents deserves, however, further reflection. In Rufinus' translation, Origen does indeed make the following assertion: 'in that *archē* it must be supposed that God created so great a number of rational or intellectual creatures … as he saw would be sufficient' (*Princ.* 2.9.1). In this reading, the issue is not so much God's power or ability, but rather one of 'sufficiency', that is, for the end towards which creation is oriented. Put more emphatically, given that Origen asserts (and says he has repeatedly asserted) that it is by looking to the end that we understand the beginning (*Princ.* 1.6.1-2; 3.5.4), if there is an end—the apokatastasis, when God is 'all in all'—there must ultimately be a fixed number of rational beings, not due to God's inability to manage more or make more complex calculations, but simply because the end is a given of the apostolic preaching. There has been an increasing emphasis in recent Origenian scholarship that one must begin at the end rather than the beginning, with eschatology rather than protology (cf. Alexander Pierce, 'Apokatastasis, Genesis 1:26-27, and the Theology of History in Origen's *De Principiis*', *JECS* 29.2 [2021], 169-91), leading to a number of scholars abandoning the idea that Origen taught an initial creation of rational beings that subsequently fell away from their unity in God (cf. Ronald Heine, *Origen: An Introduction to His Life and Thought* [Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2019], 94-5). Along similar lines, Panayotis Tzamalikos' numerous studies of Origen's understanding of time, history, and eschatology, could fruitfully have been brought further into play, regarding what he describes as the 'reverse' causality in the intersection between divine eternity and human temporality (e.g. *Origen: Philosophy of History and Eschatology* [Leiden: Brill, 2007], 120-1). Nevertheless, this is a welcome addition to our deepening understanding of Origen's teaching regarding the apokatastasis in which God becomes 'all in all'.

John Behr

Toczko, Rafał. *Crimen Obicere: Forensic Rhetoric and Augustine's anti-Donatist Correspondence*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2020. Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, 120. 232 p.

In the decade following the publication of Brent Shaw's *Sacred Violence: African Christians and Sectarian Hatred in the Age of Augustine*, a magisterial study of the Donatist-Caecilianist (or

Catholic) schism, we have witnessed a proliferation of important scholarship on the Donatists. Rafal Toczko's learned study of Augustine's anti-Donatist letters should be added to the list of must-read books for any scholar with interests in epistolography, Augustine, or the development of Late Roman Christianity. Toczko takes a sub-collection of Augustine's letters—his correspondence with or related to his Donatist contemporaries (including two texts that are generally considered *libri*)—as his object of study. He then demonstrates the significant value of studying this correspondence through the lens of forensic rhetoric. In doing so, he elucidates elements of this epistolary sub-collection that are essential to our understanding of Augustine's anti-Donatist tactics. This study offers the first book-length study of these letters and approaches them with a novel and productive interpretive framework.

Beyond its contributions to our understanding of Augustine's efforts to quash the Donatists and unify the North African Christian Church, this book reminds us of something essential: Augustine was, first and foremost, a rhetorician. He was classically educated. He taught rhetoric at Carthage and Rome, and he eventually made his way to the Imperial Court in Milan as a rhetorician. It is tempting to read the narrative of his retirement from his post in Milan (*Confessions* 9) as a rejection of rhetoric itself. As Toczko convincingly demonstrates, however, we cannot understand Augustine and his fellow North African elite without taking account of their training in classical rhetoric. Their training was not in theology but in rhetoric and the law, and this training is what shaped their understanding of Augustine's writings. Furthermore, this study provides a salutary reminder that we use letters as historical source texts at our own risk.

Early in the book (22-23), Toczko provides two schematic charts: the first organizes the letters examined in the study by addressee; the second provides an organization by letter function. It is here that we learn the book will include *Contra litteras Petiliani* and *Epistula ad Catholicos de secta Donatistorum*. The inclusion of these two texts, which are not typically included in collections of Augustine's letters, is a sensible decision for the purposes of this study. The remainder of the book is divided into three parts: Augustine's Anti-Donatist letters in context; Accusation; and Defense. The first section contextualizes the letters within the ancient epistolary tradition and then turns to a fairly dense discussion of forensic rhetorical theory as it will be used throughout the book. The second section takes on the accusations of schism and rebaptism that Augus-

tine levies against the Donatists, including a thorough discussion of the rhetorical elements that Augustine employs to support his accusations. The third section addresses the Donatist accusations of persecution and betrayal (*traditio*), with an extended breakdown of precisely how Augustine employs elements of forensic rhetoric to refute these accusations. Each of these three main sections is divided into several discrete chapters that are further subdivided.

The table of contents will prove helpful to a reader who wishes to find a discussion of one specific element of Augustine's use of forensic rhetoric, or who wishes to re-visit Toczko's introductory comments to various rhetorical elements that appear throughout the book (e.g. *status qualitatis*; *status definitionis*). Taken as a whole, this highly structured organization assists the reader in following the sometimes very technical analyses of Augustine's use of the elements of forensic rhetoric in these letters. Such an organizational scheme also means that it can feel a bit disorienting to try to follow the analysis of a particular letter or two throughout the book. Helpfully, Toczko has provided *an index locorum* in the appendices (along with a list and short description of each of the anti-Donatist letters, as well as indices of ancient/medieval writers and of modern scholars). These indices will be very useful to scholars who wish to collect Toczko's observations on some subset of the anti-Donatist letters (or find where their work is cited!).

Early in the book, Toczko clearly differentiates his own study from Jennifer Ebbeler's chapter on the Donatist letters in *Disciplining Christians: Correction and Community in Augustine's Letters*. As he rightly notes, Ebbeler's study falls within the *genus deliberativum* while his book applies the principles of the *genus iudicale* to elucidate Augustine's rhetorical tactics in the anti-Donatist letters. While Toczko does not directly correct any of Ebbeler's claims, his study clearly demonstrates that, even if he was attempting a kind of "friendly correction" before turning to secular law, Augustine was always framing his engagements with various Donatists in judicial terms. The presence of secular (and scriptural) law is far more extensive than previously understood or acknowledged.

Toczko demonstrates an admirable mastery of a wide range of relevant primary texts, including the works of rhetorical theorists such as Cicero and Quintilian. He is able to cite key passages from Christian Scripture to bolster his general claim that Augustine was not merely hoping that Roman secular authorities would resolve the North African schism. Augustine makes clear that, while he might cite a Cyprian in support of his arguments, the most important

authority of all is the Christian God, whose law is found in Christian Scripture. Toczko also displays an enviable mastery of the secondary literature, including scholarship in Polish, English, French, German, and Italian (not something one can take for granted these days).

The important insights of the book are too numerous to enumerate in a short review. Suffice it to say, this book will be an essential tool for any future work on the anti-Donatist letters in particular and, more generally, on Augustine's engagement with the Donatists. Toczko puts forward a thoroughly convincing case for taking seriously Augustine's rhetorical education and its ongoing influence on his writing (and speaking) throughout his life. We must nuance our understanding of Augustine's views of law (and coercion) in his treatment of the Donatists. These letters are not stand-alone forensic speeches, as Toczko makes clear. Still, Donatist readers and listeners who had likewise received a classical education would have understood exactly what Augustine was doing. It would have been impossible to miss the implicit threat: if the Donatists persisted in disunity, they would find themselves in a court, before secular authorities, attempting to find ways to poke holes in Augustine's arguments. In this way, the anti-Donatist letters might be understood as preparation for the Council of Carthage in 411. The Council did not mark a radical divergence from Augustine's earlier strategies but rather, a logical conclusion.

One of the enduring challenges of studying Augustine's writings, especially his invectives, is the extent to which we have only his voice. Toczko's magnificent analysis shows us the master rhetorician at work. It is tempting to imagine his Donatist adversaries left speechless and inept at handling Augustine's masterful courtroom rhetoric. In truth, though, we do not really know the full extent of how the Donatists responded to Augustine. We can conclude from Augustine's side of the exchanges that, often, they refused to engage in public debates. But did they write back? Were their responses as polished as Augustine's attacks? Certainly, Augustine leaves us with the impression that his opponents largely refused to engage with him. This choice, if it was their choice, appears even more devastating in the context of Toczko's book.

This book is and will continue to be very important for scholars in history, classics, and religious studies. It is well-written, clearly organized, free of obvious typographical errors, and provides very useful appendices. It should be read in full, but will also prove useful to scholars who want to consult it for details about individual letters.

Toczko makes a meaningful contribution to our understanding of Augustine's battle with the Donatists in the late fourth and early fifth centuries. Finally, he reminds us that Augustine was never afraid to innovate, in this case by incorporating features often found in invective into his anti-Donatist letters.

Jennifer Ebbeler

VALLBRACHT, Sophia. *Die normative Kraft des Decorum: Angemessenheit bei Cicero, Ambrosius und Augustinus*. Tübingen: Narr Francke Attempto, 2019. 287 p.

This rich, suggestive study highlights a neglected ancient rhetorical theme, *decorum*, and argues cogently for its ongoing relevance. It effectively clarifies the word's ancient meanings alongside a host of correlative rhetorical concepts; it convincingly reveals how Cicero tied the concept's stylistic dimension to a moral-social foundation; it broadly suggests *decorum*'s generative reception among thinkers through the ages, at least until rhetoric's modern desuetude; and it ambitiously suggests possibilities for reviving *decorum* and rhetoric in our own fractious time. Studying *decorum*'s antecedents from the Greek literary and philosophical past, the book reveals *decorum* as the organizing center of Cicero's *De officiis* and more generally of his campaign to re-envision Roman culture. The book decisively influenced Cicero's Christian admirer, Ambrose of Milan, who wrote a similarly titled work that transposed its premises into a Christian key and transfigured its meaning for aspiring clerics. Augustine extended Ambrose's transformation of Cicero into an ethics of love. This work handsomely repays close reading.

Chapter 1 states central issues and overviews the work. *Decorum* is conceptually elusive; despite its central position as a rhetorical concept, precise definition is wanting in ancient literature and must be deduced from context (10). The chapter surveys the concept's function in various language groups and works throughout the centuries, looking for leads in the history of philosophy, which includes a substantial section on Christian Thomasius (d. 1728).

Chapter 2 pursues a fine-grained study of the Greek and Latin etymological background of appropriateness (τὸ πρέπον, *decorum*) with its interrelated concepts. The chapter uncovers roots in Greek literature from Homer through Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle. That leads to the study of Cicero, who used the term *decorum* to translate the Greek outlook.

Chapter 3 in my judgment is the finest chapter in the volume. Its star, and the star of the whole book, is Cicero, who brought *decorum* to full bloom from its Greek roots. The first part of the chapter surveys prominent modern scholarly studies. The most important is the 1934 Leipzig dissertation of Lotte Labowsky, "Die Ethik des Panaitios. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Decorum bei Cicero und Horaz" (still the "Standardwerk" for studying Cicero's *decorum* [65]). That work studied the influence of the Stoic philosopher Panaitios, who infused an ethical component into Cicero's sense of *decorum* in *De officiis*. While Stephen McKenna's 2006 English language study of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* by Adam Smith (d. 1790) is featured, one misses engagement with the important 1987 Oxford dissertation of Helen DeWitt, "*Quo Virtus?* The Concept of Propriety in Ancient Literary Criticism."

The book shows how Cicero related *decorum* to both speech (*decorum orationis*) and life (*decorum vitae*) (133). It argues that *decorum* intrinsically conjoins stylistics and morality as a verbal marker of broader Roman social attitudes. This union marks a development from Cicero's Greek inheritance; with Plato and Aristotle, Greeks located ethics in the aesthetics of beauty, but for the Romans ethics also concerned *societas* (60-61). Cicero's expansion of *decorum* to embrace both stylistics and ethics helped to bridge the schism between philosophy and rhetoric opened by Socrates (58).

While Cicero's *De oratore* highlighted *decorum*'s place in speech, his *De officiis* raised the concept to a principle of life. As such *decorum* wielded normative power for the way it regulates expectations not only of the speech but also of the speaker. Cicero's newly coined term *humanitas* labeled his expansive vision of a just and humane society; it came to concrete expression in acts, words, and attitudes via the obligations of public duty, *officium*. This mix included morality: *honestum*, conceived as that attitude that gave rise to honorable acts, was *decorum*'s moral prerequisite. Thus, *decorum* verbally expresses the fittingness of humanly comprehensible truth and achievable morality, and names the norm for lived, actionable rhetoric. For Cicero, the persuasive power of speech emerged from the harmony of a speaker's words with subject, situation, and audience *and also* with the speaker's character. *Decorum* therefore is "the socio-ethical aspect of eloquence" (71) and the linguistic instrument and standard of *humanitas*, which becomes threatened when *decorum* is not observed verbally (87). Grounded in common social attitudes, *decorum* is an "archimedische Punkt" (a favorite image, used throughout the book) that brings together an aesthetic aspect through *ornatus*, a social aspect through *humanitas* and *officium*, and an ethical aspect through

honestum (183); under the umbrella of *decorum*, these create an indissoluble and balanced construct of human "Handlungsmöglichkeiten" (184).

The study helpfully highlights linguistic nuances. Although modern views often reduce *decorum* to mere verbal beauty, Cicero teases out a more precise meaning by using two related terms: *aptum* addresses the coherence of literary content (inner *aptum*) and empathetic harmony with audiences and their situations (outer *aptum*) (71), while *ornatus* names the stylistic beauty that reaches toward the sublime. But *aptum* is subordinate to the broader idea of *decorum*; and even if *ornatus* seems to be in symbiosis with *decorum* (74), they must be sharply distinguished (252).

Chapter 4 studies Cicero's admiring Christian imitator, Ambrose, who adopted and reconfigured the master's insights for Christianity. Ambrose drew deeply on Cicero's work, as suggested by his mimetic title, *De officiis* ("*ministrorum*" was added later to distinguish them), even while transforming Ciceronian *decorum* by the Christian logic of redemption. An example is Ambrose's adaptation of Cicero's idea of *verecundia*, defined as modesty, or restraint, grounded in the fear of shame. Cicero sees *verecundia* as a quality of *decorum* in the sense of tactful behavior and an appropriately reserved style, especially at the beginning of a speech (137). Using biblical examples, Ambrose makes *verecundia* speak to the Christian virtues of chastity and modesty and serve as a touchstone for a cleric's moral character (138), even while it remained a rhetorical *modus loquendi*.

Ambrose like Cicero defined *decorum* as a standard of speech and life. But while Cicero's *decorum* served the realization of society-wide *humanitas*, Ambrose's *decorum* served the Christian community in view of its *telos*, eternal life (170). Through the "ecclesiological expansion" of Ciceronian *decorum*, Ambrose fixed *decorum* as *the* Christian norm of divine provenance (143). Ambrose thus oversaw "die erste Umfunktionalisierung" of Ciceronian *decorum* (136) in light of the divine revelation that focuses not only on society but on eternity; this shift brought Christian *decorum* to birth. Cicero's rhetorical-ethical *decorum* became Christian *decorum* through Ambrose's theological ethics of duty (20).

The first half of chapter 5 summarizes the preceding chapters as a sort of second introduction. It sets context for the last half of the chapter focusing on Augustine (see below).

Chapter 6 examines the contemporary situation of rhetoric, the insufficiency of traditional views, and the phenomenon of norm-breaking communication in modern art, politics, and business, i.e., showing

how breaking *decorum* is not a bug but a feature of many contemporary forms of communication. Today meaning commonly derives from the act of transgressing norms. The book notes the modern focus on feelings and intuition as organs of judgment, leading to the need for a "new" *decorum* that is "erfühlt," i.e., that derives from a self-commitment to the norm of speech and action that feeds on the human desire to belong and to avoid shamed exclusion (230-31). Modern attempts at communication must take into account a culturally endemic individualism and "Ich-zentrierung" (254). Hence the chapter asks about the possibility of a fresh understanding of *decorum* as a functional principle for understanding communication "als einem reziproken prozesshaften Geschehen" (246). This understanding requires shifting *decorum* from a primarily ethical-aesthetic value to a situational principle of coherence achieved through "Transsubjectivität" (247). Drawing on Kenneth Burke's *The Rhetoric of Motives*, the book relates *decorum* to a persuasion process of "identification" that seeks to create new social bonds that overcome biological and social separation through a process of rhetorical conjoining that uses words to create "eine wesensgleiche Einheit" with someone other than oneself (248-49).

Chapter 7 harvests the study's results in hope of transforming rhetoric's entrenched reputation as merely the art of manipulation. *Decorum* might be seen as "eine mächtige Waffe" (255) in the arsenal of a new, rehabilitated view of rhetoric. The book's provocative claim is that *decorum* gains normative power from recognizing how effective rhetoric entails a smooth and mutual coding and decoding of speech. This new approach to *decorum* might make explicit the tacit covenant between the speaker who encodes and the hearers who decode a message in the interest of charging each side with responsibility for effective communication that foreswears ideology and deception and agrees upon clear "Geltungsframes" (252-53). This positive and hopeful process recognizes that morally-imbued rhetorical appropriateness "als archimedische Punkt unverzichtbar ist," both from a rhetorical production perspective and from a pragmatic recipient perspective (259).

The book's synchronic-conceptual approach ranges freely and somewhat haphazardly across centuries and disciplines, with tour stops at philosophy, sociology, psychology, pop culture, modern politics, and even contemporary tabloids. It considers, sometimes at length, contributors to *decorum*'s long reception history, including Diogenes Laertius, Pico de Mirandola, Christian Thomasius, Adam Smith, Kant, Schiller, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sartre, and others. However, the many digressions are sometimes kaleidoscopic, and can

lead to a feeling of impressionistic scattershot. Moreover, in seeking to set comprehensive context, the book at times adopts a generalizing, encyclopedic approach that adds little except a sense of rushed shallowness (e.g., the three-paragraph tour of Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed views of grace; 173-174).

Finally, regarding Augustine, the book presents several suggestive overview sentences, e.g., describing Augustine as performing "eine zweite Umfunktionalisierung" of Ciceronian *decorum* after Ambrose (20); Augustine synthesizes Ciceronian and Ambrosian *decorum* in the Christian sphere (ibid.), which lands his position somewhere between Cicero and Ambrose (218). But in the end the book's real interest in Cicero and Ambrose assigns to Augustine a minor role. Aside from scattered passing references, analysis of Augustine amounts to only about twenty pages, not enough space for more than an anodyne survey of *De doctrina christiana* book 4, and sketching how he extends or differs from Ambrose. These pages might have served better as a subsection or excursus in the chapter on Ambrose, and the book's title not untruthfully could have omitted Augustine's name altogether.

But the book implicitly prompts ideas for studying *decorum* in Augustine. For instance, one might pursue the implications of young Augustine's first book, already lost in his lifetime, *On the Beautiful and Fitting* (*conf.* 4, 14, 23) (which the book mentions but does not explore; 215-216). Might one probe *decorum* in Augustine's early post-conversion works where it re-emerges in a different guise, i.e., a Ciceronian sense of a divine "order," where everything, even evil, has a place in the Creator's great "song of the universe" (*carmen universitatis*; *mus.* 6, 11, 29)? Study might explore early works such as *ord.*, *mor.*, and *vera rel.*, which expand upon the idea's cosmological, epistemological, hermeneutical, and ethical implications.

Further, might Cicero's full-orbed *decorum* have been a factor in young Augustine's famous rejection of the Bible on Ciceronian grounds? After being enflamed for wisdom by the *Hortensius* (*conf.* 3, 4, 9), he grew disenchanted with the Bible because, he wrote, it did not match Cicero's *dignitas* (3, 5, 9). On the heels of that disillusionment, Augustine joined the Manicheans (3, 6, 10). The narrative causally ties these three moments together by the word *itaque*. Most analysts presume that his judgment on the Bible was occasioned by disgust with its crude style. But if Cicero's *decorum* united rhetorical style with moral grandeur, as this book strenuously argues, might not Augustine's repulsion have had more to do with moral objections than aesthetic ones? Such an understanding might make better sense of

his immediate attraction to the Manicheans, among whose chief complaints against Catholics was their acceptance of the Old Testament despite the perceived immorality of Israel's patriarchs, kings, and prophets (*c. Faust.* 22).

Lastly, the converted Augustine's new sense of the coherence of the Old and New Testaments, which reflected the unity of God and was revealed gradually in stages from old to new, from flesh to spirit, from law to grace, and from fear to love, became a major argument against the Manichean fragmentation of the Bible. Augustine says that Ambrose's figurative readings untied many knotty problems in his reading the Old Testament (*conf.* 5, 14, 24). Ambrose enabled Augustine to envision the Bible as a rhetorical unity wherein divine literary *decorum* plays a central role, as suggested by Robert Dodaro's fine study *Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine* (which does not appear in the book under review).

These issues aside, *Die normative Kraft des Decorum* offers a wide-ranging and often surprising deep dive into *decorum*'s roots, history, and future, and delivers sharp and fruitful conceptual clarity. The book will advance discussions of this elusive, neglected theme among scholars working in classics, early Christian studies, and the history of rhetoric.

Michael Cameron

VÁZQUEZ, Daniel, and Ross, Alberto, ed. *Time and Cosmology in Plato and the Platonic Tradition*. Leiden: Brill, 2022. Brill's Plato studies series, 9. X-230 p.

In the famous fresco *Scuola di Atene*, Plato is portrayed as the central figure in a group of ancient philosophers; he is holding the *Timaeus* in his left hand and pointing with his right hand to the heavens. This image is a perfect metaphor for the content of the book and its influence. In the words of Timaeus, Plato vividly described a cosmological view that became widespread in the ancient world. Among the many subjects treated in the dialogue, time is an important but overlooked theme. It may be the first significant theory of time in the history of philosophy, but it is often overshadowed by subsequent thinkers who disagreed with Plato, such as Aristotle and Augustine. This book, edited by Daniel Vázquez and Alberto Ross, attempts to bring the reader's attention back to Plato's theory of time and its interpretations in the Platonic tradition.

In the beginning, Daniel Vázquez gives the reader a brief introduction to the issue. He first introduces the relevant content of the *Timaeus*, and then discusses other works, including the *Republic*, the *Laws*, the *Statesman*, and *Parmenides*. Through historical retrospectives, Vázquez demonstrates the reception and understanding of Plato from Speusippus to Neoplatonism, including Aristotle's critical interpretation. At the end of the general introduction, Vázquez describes the structure of the present volume and summarises the content of each chapter. He groups the chapters under two themes, namely, different aspects of time and God's relation to the cosmos. Readers can see at a glance which components of these themes the articles take up, as well as the lack of a coherent and clear structure for the collection as a whole.

These thematic studies begin abruptly with a discussion of the *Statesman*. In the first chapter, Jenny Bryan focuses on the myth of different ages in the *Statesman*. This arrangement may be particularly confusing for readers who are not familiar with the concept of time in the *Statesman*. Bryan examines two notions in the text: "us" and "now". Rendering these two terms with relatively general and ambiguous meanings, Bryan discovers continuity and community in the myth. Such an interpretation is contrary to our intuitive reading experience, because in the text the stranger compares the ages of Kronos and Zeus. Bryan justifies her view by introducing the perspective of God's divine design, according to which even the absence of God is part of the overall design. One argument in favour of this interpretation is the collective mythic memory, in other words, that we and our ancestors both have the memory of the previous age. This phenomenon implies the presence of divine care in our time, thereby reducing the opposition between features of the two ages. In the conclusion, Bryan establishes a similar continuity between the true statesman and "the directing god of the myth". This effort is certainly interesting, but I have some doubts about its basis. Given that the crucial terms "us" and "now" are both frequently used in daily language, can Bryan prove the necessity to comprehend them in such a way?

Chapters 2 and 3 present two completely opposing views of the role and nature of the Demiurge. Following a chronological order, Viktor Ilievski presents the reception by ancient scholars and the discussion by modern scholars. The comprehensive literature review is quite friendly to non-experts, allowing readers to examine the author's proposal for themselves. Ilievski first conducts a semantic analysis of *dēmiourgos* as found in various dialogues. The preliminary conclusion is that this concept needs to be taken seriously and not as an allegory.

With textual analysis, Ilievski suggests that "the Demiurge is a *nous* of some kind". Distinguished from the Forms and the World Soul, the Demiurge is a new entity, with cognition and self-consciousness. Luca Pitteloud, by contrast, regards the Demiurge discourse in the *Timaeus* as a thought experiment. In fact, Pitteloud takes the discourse of Timaeus as a thought experiment. We learn from the text that Pitteloud is fully aware of the main challenges to this thesis. The concept of thought experiments was completely foreign to Plato. In response to this challenge, the author defines 'thought experiment' as a more precise version of the mental model account. Specifically in the *Timaeus*, the perspective of the Demiurge is understood as the only way to observe the universe from the outside, since this exploration goes beyond direct human experience. With the same strict standard, Pitteloud excludes the part about the young gods, arguing that the account is rooted in empirical knowledge. Despite being consistent within its own framework, this reading imposes a rather implausible division of the narrative. Whatever standard the researcher sets, it should first and foremost respect the coherence of the text itself. Textual support for this reading is quite weak. Ilievski's work further shakes the foundations of Pilleloud's essay in chapter 3. The Demiurge cannot be interpreted in isolation, since it appears frequently in other works.

Although the next chapter has a title in the style of Augustine ("Before the Creation of Time in Plato's *Timaeus*"), the author, Vázquez, immediately corrects potential misapprehension: Plato's universe was not created *ex nihilo* (out of nothing) by the God of the Christians. Whether Plato's account is consistent before and after the creation of time has become an unsolved mystery and caused controversies among scholars. Vázquez firmly defends the consistency of the account. Meanwhile, he insists on a literal and factual interpretation. It is interesting that Vázquez refers to the ideas defended in chapter 3 but disagrees with them. After setting out the positions and views of other interpreters, Vázquez discusses the pre-cosmic state in the light of the text. He limits 'time' in the *Timaeus* to cosmic time and offers a discontinuous understanding of time in order to escape from the Newtonian view of absolute time that readers often misapply to ancient texts. Moreover, by properly specifying God's activities, the goodness of God is protected. Vivid and humorous examples are used to illustrate this point. But the most valuable part of this contribution is its methodology, which allows the reader to understand the author's principles and considerations.

Chapter 5 by Carolina Araújo has a novel theme: light. Araújo acutely captures the connection between light, fire, and vision in the

Timaeus. I remain cautious about the status that the author accords to vision. There may also be some contradiction between this proposal and the theory of elements. This potential contradiction, however, does not affect the chapter's investigations into calendar and light. The only problem is that the primacy of visibility is seen as a prerequisite for the interpretation of time. One might wonder what happens if the fire in the deductive system is replaced by the earth (which Araújo clearly claims to leave aside). Another possible challenge is that these descriptions of fire have different contexts. While Timaeus talks about fire and earth (31b), he follows up with an introduction to the perfect life without eyes (33c). I believe these questions need clarification.

Silvia De Bianchi works on three aspects related to time: eternity, instantaneity, and temporality. Special attention is paid to the concept of atemporality. Like Araújo, De Bianchi takes the calendar of Plato's time into account. Ancient astronomical instruments are also judiciously mentioned in the discussion in order to assist in understanding time in Plato's mind. The descriptions in the *Statesman* are used for comparison. Noting the complex relationship between instant, present, and time, De Bianchi uses *Parmenides* as a point of reference. De Bianchi believes that the generation of time can be better explained by the concept of atemporality, especially instantaneity. The reader may notice that this chapter touches on all the subjects previously discussed: the *Statesman*, the Demiurge, the creation of time and visibility.

The last two chapters turn to the Platonic tradition. Alberto Ross reconstructs Aristotle's doctrine and hypothetical enemy in *Physics* VIII. The conclusion is that Aristotle's view of the Prime Mover is a critique of Plato. By rejecting the Platonic cosmic soul, Aristotle emphasized the immobility of the Prime mover. Ricardo Salles extensively examines Stoic texts, summarizing the evidence and arguments in support of an intelligent universe. On this basis, Salles tries to find the corresponding antecedents in Platonic texts. He is particularly concerned with the method of proof and finds a family of hitherto undiscovered proofs in Plato.

For those interested in Plato's cosmology and theory of time, this book is of considerable value. Nevertheless, I sincerely hope that readers will approach it with patience and sufficient background knowledge. Such an approach will enable outstanding minds to better dialogue with the authors and gain inspiration from their methods. One regret is that the book is not long enough, resulting in many issues being bypassed and skipped. Nevertheless we should be grateful to the authors for the work they have done.

Zinan Zhang

VEILLARD, Christelle, RENAUT, Olivier, et EL MURR, Dimitri, ed. *Les philosophes face au vice, de Socrate à Augustin*. Leiden: Brill, 2020. Philosophia antiqua, 154. VI-314 p.

Depuis une vingtaine d'années et l'article très remarqué de T. Irwin « Vice and Reason » (2001), les études dans le domaine de la philosophie antique témoignent d'une volonté croissante d'analyser la pratique philosophique non plus à travers le prisme de la vertu, mais celui du mal, des passions et du vice. Le présent volume en est la manifestation la plus récente. Celui-ci rassemble quinze communications présentées et discutées lors de deux journées d'études organisées les 4 et 5 décembre 2015, et les 9 et 10 décembre 2016, par C. Veillard et O. Renaut (Université Paris Nanterre) et par D. El Murr et P.-M. Morel (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne).

Les philosophes de l'Antiquité utilisent des mots que nous traduisons par « vice » (*kakia*, *vitium*) pour nommer le contraire de la vertu. Ils ont dressé des listes de vertus et de vices opposés, et ont mis en garde leur auditoire contre des modes de vie insensés en l'exhortant à pratiquer la philosophie. Pourtant, nous trouvons rarement dans la philosophie antique des développements autonomes consacrés au vice en soi. Le vice y est souvent conçu de manière implicite par opposition à la vertu correspondante, ignorance quand la vertu est connaissance, erreur quand elle est vérité, désordre quand elle est harmonie. S'il est plus aisé d'organiser son discours autour de la vertu que du vice, c'est parce que la vertu est unifiée et finie, alors que les vices présentent des formes illimitées, et donc paradoxalement aucune forme précise. Toutefois, comme Platon l'a démontré dans la *République* (445c6), le vice doit être examiné comme un objet spécifique qu'il convient de connaître pour pouvoir le combattre.

L'intérêt principal du présent volume est de tenter de surmonter cette difficulté en traçant une cartographie de cet envers de la vertu qu'est le vice, à travers l'étude d'un vaste corpus au sein de la philosophie, incluant des articles non seulement sur Platon et Aristote, mais aussi sur les premiers socratiques, le corpus hippocratique, les épicuriens, les stoïciens, les platoniciens impériaux et Augustin. À la suite d'une introduction (1-13) résumant les différentes parties de l'ouvrage, quinze chapitres présentent chacun un article de manière chronologique, de Socrate à Augustin. Il s'agit de contributions originales en anglais, français et italien, écrites par des spécialistes de l'histoire de la philosophie antique et des études classiques. Le volume se termine par trois index des auteurs anciens, des auteurs modernes et des notions.

Les trois premières études du volume concernent les fondements, principalement socratiques, de la pensée occidentale sur le

vice. Dans la première étude (15-34), Aldo Brancacci établit une opposition sur le plan politique entre vertus royales et vices tyranniques chez les Socratiques. Alors que le tyran (*tyrannos*), chez Antisthène et Platon, est caractérisé par la mollesse et la luxure, le roi (*basileus*) incarne la rigueur et l'austérité qu'il possède en commun avec le philosophe. Platon définit plus particulièrement le tyran comme celui qui ne tient pas ses promesses, qui est réfractaire à tout discours de vérité, ce qui lui ôte toute légitimité pour gouverner et fait de lui l'incarnation de la *philargyria*, la soumission complète aux choses dont il jouit. Dans le chapitre suivant (35-55), Pierre Pontier étudie la notion de « mollesse » (*malakia*) chez Platon et Xénophon, et se demande si celle-ci peut être qualifiée de vice. En effet, le terme est ambigu dans la mesure où il semble parfois désigner une qualité, celle de la douceur, alors que d'autres emplois le placent clairement du côté de deux vices : la lâcheté et l'intempérance. Sur le plan politique, la mollesse s'oppose à l'endurance (*karteria*), vertu majeure d'une âme forte, disposée à défendre les valeurs du bien et de la justice. La mollesse constitue en ce sens le vice par excellence, une absence totale de maîtrise de soi, aux antipodes du modèle du bon citoyen. Il convient ainsi de l'éradiquer, soit par la promotion de l'effort, le *ponos*, soit par une réforme complète de l'éducation au sein de la cité. Quant à Paul Demont et Robert Alessi (56-71), ils abordent la question du vice dans le cadre d'un passage du traité hippocratique des *Humeurs* (V, 488, 15-490, 8 Littré) où le manque de maîtrise de soi (*akrasia*) est présentée à travers les manifestations corporelles qu'elle produit. Après avoir établi et traduit ce passage en regard de sa version arabe dans les lemmes de Galien, les deux auteurs analysent la thérapeutique proposée pour une telle affection. Les recommandations diététiques (diètes, exercices) témoignent d'une conception imbriquant psychologique et somatique, tout à fait comparable à ce que l'on trouve dans la philosophie socratique.

Les trois études suivantes abordent plus spécifiquement le traitement du vice chez Platon. Olivier Renaut (72-94) se propose d'étudier la théorie des vices dans la *République*. Pour Platon, le vice est privation de la vertu, mais aussi absence de perfection qui empêche l'être d'exercer convenablement sa fonction. Analogue à une maladie physique, le vice désorganise la structure de l'individu dans la mesure où la partie désirante de l'âme prend une place plus importante qu'elle devrait. Lorsque ce déséquilibre s'est durablement installé, le vice rompt l'équilibre fonctionnel de l'individu ou de la collectivité à laquelle il appartient. Ainsi, on passe du modèle du vice-ignorance à celui du vice-maladie, dans le cadre d'une anthropologie politique où

le vice devient un problème central quant au bon fonctionnement de la société. Dans le chapitre 5 (95-113), Christopher Rowe remet en question une théorie communément admise à propos de Platon, selon laquelle ce dernier serait passé de l'idée naïve selon laquelle le vice est ignorance (comme dans le *Protagoras*) à la psychologie plus sophistiquée de la *République* et du *Phèdre*, où le vice est compris en termes de conflit entre les parties psychiques. Rowe souligne que cette évolution ne tient pas compte des développements dans les dialogues ultérieurs, comme le *Sophiste* ou le *Timée*, dans lesquels Platon réaffirme l'identification du vice à l'ignorance et abandonne le modèle du conflit intrapsychique. Enfin, Jérôme Laurent (114-126) s'intéresse aux limites de la condamnation du mensonge par Platon. Il se donne pour but de dépasser l'opposition dans laquelle on enferme souvent le philosophe, entre la condamnation du mensonge au nom de l'amour du vrai que représente la philosophie, et la justification d'un Noble mensonge qui assurerait le bien en politique. En réalité, le mensonge doit s'entendre dans les dialogues de manière polyphonique. Un certain usage du mensonge, autorisé par la rationalité législative à des fins éducatives, permet d'éradiquer le vice. Ainsi ce dernier n'est pas nécessairement une forme d'ignorance.

Les trois articles suivants s'intéressent au vice en général, et à deux vices en particulier, chez Aristote. Laetitia Monteils-Laeng (127-146) étudie les éléments définitoires du vice qu'Aristote s'attache à différencier des errances transitoires : le vice est la disposition qui conduit en toute circonstance à faire le mal et à produire des représentations erronées. Il est ainsi l'état du passionné qui s'est enlisé dans un comportement erroné jusqu'au point de ne plus jamais pouvoir adopter un comportement bon. Au contraire de Platon, le vice n'est pas pour Aristote le résultat d'un conflit intérieur qui fait éprouver la honte de ne pouvoir contrôler ses désirs, mais bien le choix délibéré d'un renversement des valeurs entre le bien et le mal. L'homme en proie au vice n'est donc pas la victime de mouvements violents qui le contraignent, mais un homme constant dans ses choix, dont la faculté rationnelle est intacte. Son erreur réside dans le fait qu'il vit selon une règle fautive, celle de la satisfaction constante d'appétits changeants et instables. Douglas Cairns (147-174), lui, se concentre plus particulièrement sur l'*hybris* comme forme majeure de vice chez Aristote. L'*hybris*, telle qu'elle est définie dans la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote, implique un défaut de caractère, celui de posséder une conception de soi démesurée, ce qui est une forme de « l'injustice particulière » dont il est question dans le livre V de l'*Éthique à Nicomaque*. Cette variété spécifique d'injustice se caractérise par une

fausse représentation de l'honneur comme forme de cupidité ou d'avidité. Cette conception reflète la vision aristotélicienne de l'honneur comme bien non matériel qui peut être poursuivi de manière juste ou injuste. Par conséquent, l'*hybris* est une catégorie de l'injustice, une variété de *pleonexia*, qu'il faut considérer à la lumière des développements éthiques et politiques d'Aristote au sujet de la justice et de l'égalité. Enfin, David Konstan (175-188) étudie le cas intéressant des vices qui ne sont pas le contraire des vertus correspondantes. Ainsi, alors que l'ingratitude est l'incapacité à éprouver une émotion adéquate à la situation, la gratitude, elle, est le sentiment naturel éprouvé à l'égard d'un bienfaiteur. L'ingratitude peut donc être comprise comme une absence de honte qui s'oppose à la vertu de retenue (*aidos*), et non comme le contraire de l'émotion de la honte (*aischynè*). En réalité, la retenue n'est pas une vertu à part entière, car le véritable motif de l'action doit être le bien. En revanche, l'ingratitude et l'absence de honte sont bien des vices dans la mesure où ils conduisent les hommes à faire fi de la sociabilité en suivant leurs propres désirs sans aucune considération des autres.

Les chapitres 10 et 11 traitent des philosophies stoïcienne et épicurienne qui, dans la lignée de l'intellectualisme socratique, présentent une approche purement cognitive du vice. Teun Tieleman (189-204) envisage les vices stoïciens en tentant de répondre à deux questions : comment expliquer l'existence du vice dans le monde providentiel des stoïciens ? et comment le vice peut-il exister dans l'âme si celle-ci peut contrôler ses représentations de manière rationnelle ? Le vice existe en vertu de la logique des contraires, et est ainsi nécessaire du fait même de l'existence de la vertu. Pour ce qui est de son existence dans l'âme, Tieleman avance deux réponses. D'abord, le vice est la conséquence des erreurs de l'âme, influencée par l'apparence même des choses ou les opinions fausses transmises dès le plus jeune âge. En outre, l'âme est en proie à l'erreur en raison du lien qui l'unit à un corps matériel. Dans la lignée du *Timée* de Platon, les stoïciens considèrent que ce statut matériel fausse dès le départ la capacité rationnelle de l'âme. De ce fait, il faut renforcer la partie rationnelle de l'individu afin qu'elle domine les autres parties. Ainsi, le faux est chassé de l'âme, et avec lui les passions qui conduisent au vice. Francesco Verde (205-228) se concentre sur le sage épicurien et le contrôle des passions. Pour des auteurs comme Philodème de Gadara, Carneiscos et Philostrate, le plaisir ne s'atteint que par un « raisonnement sobre », et non par la multiplication des désirs et des plaisirs. Comme pour les platoniciens, le vice est pour les épicuriens un désordre causé par l'ignorance des choses qui les laisse nous atteindre alors qu'elles n'ont rien de terrible. La tranquillité de l'âme

(*ataraxia*) et l'absence de douleur (*aponia*) qu'ils recherchent ne peut s'obtenir que par la classification correcte des désirs. En effet, c'est en ne poursuivant que des désirs naturels et nécessaires qu'il est possible de réduire l'instabilité passionnelle du corps et de l'âme. Le vice repose donc sur une erreur de jugement qui ajoute une opinion fausse à la donnée brute de la réalité.

Les deux études suivantes portent sur les médio-platoniciens et Plotin qui procèdent à un changement de perspective déjà amorcé chez Platon et les stoïciens, en faisant du vice un problème non seulement éthique, mais surtout ontologique et cosmologique. Mauro Bonazzi (229-241) explique que la classification des vices chez les médio-platoniciens naît de la combinaison de la psychologie tripartite platonicienne et de la théorie aristotélicienne du vice comme excès ou défaut. Le vice est le résultat involontaire d'une ignorance et de l'incapacité de la partie rationnelle à gouverner les deux autres. Le *Traité* 19 de Plotin déplace le problème du vice sur le terrain de la métaphysique : le véritable moi résidant dans la partie de l'âme non descendue dans le corps, il suffit de réduire l'existence à la contemplation de notre nature divine. Le vice est ainsi supprimé par l'effort accompli pour échapper à la matière du corps. Laurent Lavaud (242-262) poursuit cette réflexion dans le cadre du *Traité* 51 de Plotin.

Pour lui, le vice dans l'âme est la manifestation secondaire du « mal en soi » (*autokakon*), le principe du mal. L'âme individuelle n'est ni le principe ni la source du vice, mais ne fait qu'y participer dans la mesure où elle est contaminée par la matière. Plotin fait ainsi des vices et des vertus des événements secondaires qui ne concernent l'âme qu'en tant qu'elle est en contact avec la matière. Le vice n'est donc pas un accident qui se produit lorsqu'une âme raisonne de manière erronée, mais la privation absolue du bien qui est la caractéristique de toute âme descendue. De ce fait, ce n'est pas l'âme, mais la matière, qui est la source et le principe du vice.

Enfin, les deux dernières études portent sur Augustin, qui vient parachever cette inflexion métaphysique du vice comme conséquence nécessaire de la nature descendue de l'âme, autrement dit de l'incarnation. Isabelle Koch (263-286) s'intéresse à la conception du vice chez Augustin comme *imitatio perversa*. Le péché y est présenté comme une mauvaise orientation de la volonté qui se détourne de Dieu. À la différence de la descente plotinienne de l'âme, cette mauvaise orientation renvoie à une imitation perverse de Dieu qui aboutit au vice, au péché. La vertu n'est plus qu'un idéal inaccessible, une perfection irrémédiablement perdue, à laquelle les forces de l'âme incarnée ne peuvent plus accéder ici-bas. De même, Dominique Demange (287-304) explique que seule l'aide de Dieu par l'octroi de

la Grâce peut permettre de retrouver la vertu. L'homme n'a pas la capacité d'identifier lui-même la vertu, sous peine de tomber dans le vice de l'orgueil. Quels que soient les efforts accomplis, nous ne sommes responsables ni de nos vices ni de nos vertus, dans la mesure où les premiers sont la conséquence de la Chute, les secondes de l'octroi éventuel de la Grâce de Dieu. Il s'agit là, selon Demange, de l'acte de décès de la morale antique, puisque le vice n'est plus une disposition que l'homme peut combattre par son éducation et sa raison, mais le fait de ne pas vivre dans la vérité du Christ.

Cet ouvrage présente la grande qualité de traiter d'une question difficile de manière abordable. Les contributions, bien qu'érudites, s'attachent toujours à rester claires et compréhensibles, et la démonstration générale de l'ouvrage reste à la portée des étudiants de philosophie. Il faut néanmoins noter que bon nombre d'idées développées dans l'ouvrage nous ont semblé particulièrement stimulantes et novatrices. Tout d'abord, les articles situés à la suite dans le volume dialoguent souvent entre eux et permettent de nuancer une vision trop rigide du vice au sein d'un même courant philosophique. Nous en trouvons un bon exemple dans les contributions d'Aldo Brancacci (« Vertus royales et vices tyranniques chez les Socratiques ») et de Pierre Pontier (« Remarques sur la mollesse (*malakia*) chez Platon et Xénophon »). Les deux chapitres permettent de mettre en lumière le débat au ve siècle avant notre ère sur la valeur de la *tryphè*. Alors que certains penseurs socratiques, notamment Antisthène et Xénophon, placent le rejet de la *tryphè* au centre de leur conception de la pratique philosophique, d'autres penseurs, notamment le socratique hétérodoxe Aristippe, l'évaluent de manière positive. En outre, certaines contributions offrent de nouvelles perspectives sur des auteurs pourtant déjà très étudiés. Ainsi, Douglas Cairns (« Aristotle on *Hybris* and Injustice ») et David Konstan (« When Vice Is Not the Opposite of Virtue: Aristotle on Ingratitude and Shamelessness ») insistent sur l'importance d'enrichir notre lecture d'Aristote en allant au-delà de ses traités d'éthique et en tenant compte de la manière dont ses autres écrits, en particulier la *Rhétorique* et la *Politique*, entretiennent souvent une relation complexe avec son enseignement proprement éthique. De même, l'article de Francesco Verde (« Il saggio epicureo e il controllo dei passioni ») se donne pour but de mettre à mal une représentation stéréotypée des mouvements de la philosophie hellénistique. Selon une conception traditionnelle, le débat central de la psychologie morale après Platon oppose les stoïciens, qui adoptent une conception moniste de l'âme et soutiennent que toutes les représentations sont des jugements corrects ou incorrects, et les péripatéticiens, qui optent pour une psychologie multipartite selon laquelle les représentations non

rationnelles ont une place naturelle, même dans une âme vertueuse. Selon Verde, cette distinction ne tient pas compte des épicuriens, qui n'adoptent ni l'une ni l'autre de ces positions. Ceux-ci formulent un troisième point de vue selon lequel les passions telles que la colère sont inévitables. Elles ne doivent pas, comme dans la vision stoïcienne, être totalement extirpées, mais elles ne doivent pas non plus, comme dans la vision péripatéticienne, être traitées comme une source légitime de motivation. Elles appartiennent à l'humanité du sage, tout en ne contribuant en rien à son bonheur ou à son malheur. Enfin, certaines théories avancées nous semblent tout à fait stimulantes. C'est le cas de l'article de Laurent Lavaud qui soutient dans son chapitre (« Mal en soi et vice total dans le *Traité* 51 de Plotin ») que Plotin a théorisé le vice en posant la matière comme un principe causal à part entière, ce qui va à l'encontre d'une frontière conceptuelle profonde de la pensée antique.

Il faut également noter que l'étude du vice dans la pensée antique était jusqu'à présent un phénomène largement anglophone. Ce volume, en mettant les travaux anglophones en conversation avec les travaux contemporains en français et en italien, vient indéniablement combler un manque dans la bibliographie universitaire.

Concernant le choix du corpus, nous pouvons apprécier la présence d'études portant sur des auteurs choisis en dehors des courants intellectuels dominants représentés par Platon, Aristote et leurs successeurs. Nous pouvons toutefois regretter que la philosophie romaine n'ait pas davantage sa place dans le volume, et qu'un auteur comme Sénèque, qui a consacré une bonne partie de son œuvre éthique au combat contre le vice, ne soit pas vraiment représenté. Sans doute cela tient-il au fait que les éditeurs du présent volume sont tous hellénistes. Quoi qu'il en soit, cette absence n'est pas nécessairement un défaut, dans la mesure où la matière traitée est suffisamment riche et abondante pour faire naître des vocations du côté des philosophes latinistes qui pourront se fonder sur le présent volume pour la rédaction de son pendant romain.

Jean-Christophe Courtil

VERHEYDEN, Joseph, and NICKLAS, Tobias, ed. *Early Christian Commentators of the New Testament: Essays on Their Aims, Methods and Strategies*. Leuven: Peeters, 2021. Biblical tools and studies, 42. XIII-305 p.

The interpretation of the New Testament by early Christian commentators is the focus of this volume, which contains a selection of ten

papers presented at the Ninth International Colloquium of the *Novum Testamentum Patristicum* research project, held at KU Leuven in 2018. The book examines the exegetical methods, traditions, goals and content of New Testament commentaries and outlines the development of this literary genre between the second and the eighth centuries. The contributions, by C. J. Berglund, L. Perrone, C. Hoogerwerf, K. Huber, L.J. Dorfbauer, J. Lössl, S. Cooper, A. Fürst, V. Marchetto, and S. Foot, deal with a variety of Christian authors whose Greek and Latin commentaries evince several interpretative approaches and techniques of textual analysis (such as intertextuality, *syncrisis*, and recapitulation). Studies on Latin commentaries prevail over those on the Greek ones, as the editors acknowledge in the introduction (x), which offers a concise yet thorough overview of the book's contents. Recurrent themes can be identified, and they make the volume interesting to read as a whole. At the same time, the chapters, each of which focuses on a different commentator, can be read separately. A common thread, which is examined from multiple perspectives, is the relationship between Christians and non-Christians. Cooper argues that Ambrosiaster warned Christians against having an interest in pagan disciplines, including philology, which had provoked the introduction of textual variants into the Latin Bible. However, Roman education is shown to have influenced the works of Marius Victorinus and Augustine, who in their commentaries made use of the techniques learned during their rhetorical training. According to Lössl, the forensic technique, consisting of analysing and discussing documents, is a strategy that Marius Victorinus employed when he quoted the Bible to reinforce his stances. Marchetto argues that the exegetical techniques used by Augustine to interpret John 17:21 betray the influence of the *ars grammatica*: by interpreting each word of the verse, Augustine demonstrated the consubstantiality of God and Christ and refuted Arianism. The question of what role and function the Old Testament has in relation to the New Testament emerges in several contributions. Perrone shows that Origen used the Old Testament as a key to interpret the New Testament and vice versa, while Foot demonstrates that, several centuries later, Bede regarded the New Testament as the fulfillment of the Old Testament and commented on and drew examples from both in his treatises.

The volume is generally clear, accurate and consistent, and the presence of isolated typos (for instance, 'attenuato' for 'attenuto' at p. 165, 'Trinita' instead of 'Trinità' at p. 232 and 'lam' instead of 'I am' at p. 233) does not compromise its high quality. The English translations of Greek and Latin sources, which are provided in all the

chapters except Lössl's, make the book accessible to a wide audience. In the contribution of C. Hoogerwerf, the texts are not quoted in the original languages: it would be interesting to know whether this choice is due to the multilingual tradition of Theodore of Mopsuestia's commentaries or to other reasons.

This volume is highly recommended to biblical and patristic scholars as well as to classicists who have an interest in early Christian commentators. Non-experts might especially benefit from the introductory sections of each chapter as well as the rich and up-to-date bibliographical references. The study of commentaries discovered recently, such as Origen's *Homilies on the Psalms* and Fortunatianus of Aquileia's *Commentary on the Gospels*, makes the book fresh and appealing. All the contributions undoubtedly broaden our knowledge of New Testament commentaries and stimulate further research in this field.

Anna Persig

TAVOLARO, Gianpiero, ed. *Giacomo da Viterbo, Sermones: i cinque sermoni su San Luigi Re, "quasi ymago Dei in terris."* Firenze: Edizioni del Galluzzo per la Fondazione Ezio Franceschini, 2021. Per verba, 36. XCII-104 p.

James of Viterbo (Viterbo c. 1255 – Naples 1308) entered the Augustinian priory of Viterbo in 1272 and studied theology under Henry of Ghent in Paris from 1278 to 1283. He then taught for two years at his Order's house of studies in Viterbo. James's name appears in the chapter reports of the Roman Province of May 1283, when he was elected definitor. He returned to Paris in 1285 together with Giles of Rome – who had that year become the first Augustinian to receive the title of Master of Theology – to attend Giles's lectures. The two men knew each other from the time they were both definitors of the Roman Province, and Giles held James in great esteem.

In Paris, James was attached to the Order's house of studies. In 1288, he obtained the degree of *baccalaureus formatus*, which permitted him to take an active part in academic disputations and to lead debates. Like Giles, he now also began to lecture himself. He was granted the degree of Master of Theology around Easter 1293. The Roman Province afforded him an additional stipend from 1288 onwards: a sum of eight gold florins, to purchase books (manuscripts) and have texts copied. It was a stipend he continued to receive during

his years as a lecturer. He left Paris – for good – in 1300, to attend the general chapter on behalf of his province. The chapter placed him at the head of the *studium generale* of the Order in Naples, where he lectured for two years. In 1302 he was appointed bishop of Beneventum, and in December of the same year he was promoted to archbishop of Naples at the request of King Charles II. He died in Naples in 1308.

James's influence on the theology of his time is evident from the many manuscripts of his works that have been preserved, but even more so from the frequency with which other authors quote him. He himself was methodical and meticulous when quoting others. Eelcko Ypma, OSA, published a text-critical edition of James's four *Quodlibeta* (Würzburg, 1968-75). In addition to this great work, Ypma also published his *Quaestiones in divinis praedicamentis*: qq. I-X (Roma, 1983), qq. XI-XVII (Roma, 1986) and subsequently, in *Augustiniana*, qq. XVIII-XXVI (1988-99).

Debate arose at the University of Paris in the last quarter of the thirteenth century as to which human faculty was most important: the will or the intellect. Problems raised during the *disputationes de quolibet* attracted large audiences due to their topical nature. The quodlibetical literature reflected the topicality of these issues very clearly; James himself became quite famous even during his lifetime on account of his *Quodlibeta*. The veneration for his mentors which he never failed to exude and his serene manner in debate earned him the moniker of *doctor gratiosus*.

Many references to Aristotle in his work demonstrate James's customary affinity with the Greek philosopher. Quotations of the works of Augustine are much less numerous, but if the authority afforded to quotations is taken into account, Augustine often plays a decisive role. James gives the impression that he read Aristotle mainly through the lens of the great Church Father. Nevertheless, he lacked the thorough familiarity with the works of Augustine that his fourteenth-century confreres Gregory of Rimini, Hugolinus of Orvieto and Alphonsus Vargas displayed.

James's most famous work was *De regimine christiano*, published in 1302. It was an important contribution to the development of late medieval philosophy, theology and political theory. He wrote it to support Pope Boniface VIII in his conflict with King Philip IV of France. Together with Giles of Rome (*De ecclesiastica potestate*), James laid the foundations for a monarchical interpretation of the papacy, specifically in the context of defending the position and unity of the entire Church vis-à-vis the claims that secular rulers pretended to extend to it. *De regimine christiano* contains relatively many refer-

ences to Augustine, including many quotations from Augustine's *De civitate Dei*. His main idea, the Church as a kingdom, was also supported with quotations from Bernard, Chrysostom and Pope Innocent III.

Tavolaro, a specialist in the philosophy and theology of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, is working on a publication of James's *Lectura in primum sententiarum* and his *Sermones*, and has now, in *I cinque sermoni su san Luigi re*, published a text-critical edition of five sermons. The sermons in question are *sermones* 1-5, contained in MS Arch. Cap. S. Pietro D.213, in the Vatican Library. As archbishop of Naples, James preached a lengthy sermon each year between 1303 and 1307 on the liturgical feast of Saint Louis (+1297). Tavolaro's edition is preceded by an erudite introduction which places the sermons in their historical, philosophical and political context, and he gives a reasoned division of each text which greatly helps to clarify the sermons.

James's portrait of King Louis is that of an ideal prince. He calls Louis's Capetian dynasty a *beata stirps*, but rarely goes into detail about the royal person as such. The preacher's objective was not to promote the king's saintliness, but to incorporate his deeds into James's own concept of the relationship between Church and State, between the spiritual and the secular power. These two powers, James argues, are distinct, but not entirely separate. He had previously addressed this issue in *Quodlibet* IV, q. 30, where he contended that the Church as a spiritual kingdom was founded on the best principle and ordered optimally. *Quodlibet* I, q. 17 was his first attempt to articulate the distinction between the spiritual and temporal power.

James's core idea in these published sermons corresponds with the thought of his confrere Giles of Rome. As prior general of the Augustinian Order, Giles was eager to secure a prestigious place in the Church for his young religious order. The Order had to compete with existing institutes such as the Friars Minor and the Friars Preachers. Giles focused therefore primarily on the position of the Church itself, and then assigned a place to the Augustinian Order within this position of the Church as he defined it. He based his endeavour on the scriptural passage *Spiritualis autem iudicat omnia et ipse a nemine iudicatur* (1 Cor 2,15). A spiritual person judges all things, but is not judged by anyone. Giles's view was adopted by Pope Boniface VIII in his conflict with King Philip IV. In his bull *Unam Sanctam*, issued on 18 November 1302, the pope spoke of two swords or powers, the spiritual and the temporal. The temporal power is judged by the spiritual, but the spiritual power is not judged by the temporal.

Basing his argument upon the classical division of communities, James mentions three basic forms of communal life: the family, the city and the kingdom. Augustine is his source, but the reference could just as easily have been to Aristotle. In terms of this threefold division, the Church as an extended community can be regarded as a kingdom, but one destined for eternal salvation. The city of God is related to this kingdom of the Church. By using the term *kingdom*, James wishes to foreground the *unity* of the ecclesial community; a unity that is expressed in the monarchical authority of the king. James calls the Church a kingdom, specifically the kingdom of Christ and his heavenly Father.

This kingdom exists on two levels, that of heaven and that of the earth. Heaven is inhabited by two kinds of creatures: the angels and the saints. On earth, however, the kingdom of the Church, despite its close relationship to the kingdom of God, is a mixed community, many of whose members belong to the kingdom of God, but others belong to the kingdom of the devil. On earth, these two kingdoms are intertwined. And yet the Church as a whole is identified with the kingdom of God, even though some of its members must be regarded as belonging to the kingdom of the devil.

With respect to papal power, James refutes the objection that the pope's authority is derived from a secular potentate, the emperor. The argument was that the pope's power had been bestowed upon him by the Emperor Constantine, and that he could not therefore exercise legitimate jurisdiction over temporal rulers. James raises the objection that there is true justice only where Christ is the legislator (Augustine). Earthly realms do not exist by chance, nor by fate, nor by the will of some idol; they are established by the providence of the one, true God: in his hands lie all power, all laws and all kingdoms.

Martijn Schrama

VALLAT, Daniel, ed. Vergilius orator. *Lire et commenter les discours de l'Énéide dans l'Antiquité tardive*. Turnhout: Brepols, 2022. Studi e testi tardoantichi. 388 p.

Comme le rappelle à juste titre Daniel Vallat en introduction de cet ouvrage collectif, Virgile avait la réputation d'être un mauvais orateur dans l'Antiquité. Ainsi, selon une anecdote transmise par Aelius Donat dans sa biographie du poète, mais qui remonte au *De poetis* aujourd'hui perdu de Suétone, Virgile perdit le seul procès où il plaida

en raison de son manque d'habileté rhétorique. Cette image d'orateur raté se lit également chez Sénèque le Père (*Controuersiae* 3, *Pr*. 8) et, de manière plus implicite, chez Quintilien ou chez Tacite. Pourtant, sans doute à partir du IIe s. apr. J.-C., et de manière systématique à partir du IVe apr. J.-C., les *grammatici* en vinrent à réévaluer les qualités rhétoriques mises en œuvre par Virgile dans ses différents poèmes, et tout particulièrement dans l'*Énéide*. Là résident l'intérêt et l'apport de cet ouvrage collectif : mettre en lumière cette évolution que connaît la réception de Virgile durant l'Antiquité tardive.

L'ouvrage s'organise en quatre parties. La première partie (« Aux confins de l'exégèse : les discours virgiliens entre *imitatio* et *praelectio* ») se propose d'étudier la présence des discours virgiliens dans différents genres littéraires pratiqués durant l'Antiquité tardive. Martin Bažil (« *Proba oratrix*. Éléments virgiliens dans les discours directs du *Centon* de Proba », 21-44) montre ainsi, à travers l'étude du genre hybride du centon virgilien, comment Proba dans son centon de tonalité chrétienne témoigne d'une connaissance assez précise de Virgile pour non seulement citer certains de ses vers, mais également pour reprendre et exploiter les techniques et les styles caractéristiques des discours virgiliens. Pour sa part, Bruno Bureau (« Virgile chez Aelius Donat et le discours théâtral », 45-69) étudie comment Donat, dans son commentaire des pièces de Térence, recourt aux discours virgiliens pour illustrer les discours des personnages térentiens et met en valeur, par la même occasion, un *Vergilius dramaticus* dont les discours se caractérisent par leur nature profondément théâtrale.

La deuxième partie (« Virgile et les techniques rhétoriques ») se consacre, quant à elle, aux commentaires des *grammatici* tardo-antiques relatifs aux techniques rhétoriques utilisées par Virgile dans ses discours. Maria Luisa Delvigo (« *Oratorie dicta* nel commento di Servi e Servio Danielino all'*Eneide* », 73-105) propose une étude du terme *oratorie* dans les commentaires de Servius et du *Seruius Danielis*. Elle souligne ainsi combien ce terme est lié au concept de *calliditas*, de ruse, dans l'esprit des commentateurs. Daniel Vallat (« Commencer le discours : *beniuolentia*, *attentio* et *docilitas* dans l'exégèse virgilienne », 107-137) montre comment les commentateurs tardo-antiques de Virgile reprennent à leur compte les concepts rhétoriques de *beniuolentia*, d'*attentio* et de *docilitas* au point de faire des *proemia* des discours virgiliens des modèles du genre. Enfin, Ute Tischer (« Indirekte Kommunikation. Antike Kommentare über nicht-offene Rede in Vergils *Aeneis* », 139-170) s'intéresse à la manière dont les commentateurs tardo-antiques, en l'occurrence Servius, Tiberius Donat et les scholies du *Seruius auctus*, analysent

le discours implicite chez Virgile. Elle montre ainsi que les commentateurs témoignent d'une connaissance précise des débats rhétoriques les plus récents sur le sujet, mais qu'ils préfèrent recourir à une terminologie propre à l'art des *grammatici* et qu'ils s'intéressent essentiellement aux effets de réception des discours plutôt qu'aux techniques propres du discours implicite.

La troisième partie de l'ouvrage (« Thématiques rhétoriques dans l'*Énéide* ») se compose pour sa part de trois contributions qui étudient différentes thématiques rhétoriques traitées dans les commentaires tardo-antiques des œuvres de Virgile. L'article de Marisa Squillante (« *Vergilius orator an poeta ?* (Ti. Donat., *Interp. Verg., Aen.* 1-2) », 173-196), partant de la question posée par Tiberius Claudius Donat dans ses *Interpretationes Vergilianae*, montre comment l'étude des discours des livres I et de II de l'*Énéide* permet à ce même Tiberius Claudius Donat de présenter l'essentiel des techniques rhétoriques du discours. Pour sa part, Muriel Lafond (« Amour et persuasion dans l'*Énéide* à travers le regard de Servius », 197-222), à travers une étude des commentaires des discours virgiliens sur l'amour, conçu dans ses différentes formes, dans l'*Énéide*, en vient à souligner la différence d'approche entre le *Seruius Danielis* et Servius. Le premier, en effet, insiste dans ses commentaires sur l'étude de la technique rhétorique et sur une approche moralisatrice, tandis que le second s'intéresse surtout aux procédés propres au pathétique et à l'importance des liens affectifs et se refuse à toute condamnation morale du personnage de Didon. Enfin, Fabio Stok (« *Obscura quidem, sed uera*. Profezie e divinazioni nella prospettiva serviana », 223-250) propose une étude détaillée de l'interprétation que Servius et le *Seruius Danielis* font des prophéties d'Anchise aux livres II et III de l'*Énéide* de Virgile. Il met notamment à jour une différence de traitement entre les deux commentateurs, puisque le commentaire du *Seruius Danielis* tend à souligner davantage le rôle d'Anchise en tant que prophète et reflète ainsi une tradition prévirgilienne du récit où Anchise revêtait un rôle plus central dans la geste d'Énée.

Enfin, la dernière partie (« Le décryptage de l'éloquence virgilienne ») se compose de quatre contributions qui s'attachent à l'étude des commentaires faits par les *grammatici* tardo-antiques de discours virgiliens précis. Séverine Clément-Tarantino (« *Ut solet, Venus uincit* : le dialogue entre Vénus et Junon au chant 4 de l'*Énéide* lu par les commentateurs antiques de Virgile », 253-270) montre ainsi que, tant dans le commentaire de Servius que dans les *Interpretationes Vergilianae* de Tiberius Claudius Donat, la joute verbale entre Junon et Vénus est étudiée de manière précise afin d'en mettre à jour les

enjeux implicites et de comprendre les ressorts de la victoire finale de Vénus. L'article collectif, « Les remarques de Servius à propos des discours féminins du chant 7 de l'*Énéide* », 271-290, de Mathilde Simon, de Sylvia Estienne et de Judith Rohman, dont la thèse sur Virgile, *Le Héros et la déesse. Personnages, stratégies narratives et effets de lecture dans l'*Énéide, vient de paraître aux Belles-Lettres, s'intéresse au traitement des trois discours féminins au livre VII de l'*Énéide*, à savoir ceux de Junon, d'Amata et d'Allecto, chez les commentateurs tardo-antiques. Les autrices soulignent ainsi le traitement particulier que font les commentateurs de ceux-ci : Servius s'intéresse davantage à la précision du lexique employé par Virgile plus qu'à la technique rhétorique mise en jeu dans ces discours, tandis que Macrobe, tout en faisant du monologue de Junon un modèle du discours pathétique, n'en propose aucune étude précise. Luigi Pirovano (« *Deliberat Diomedes, an Latinis auxilium petentibus ferat* : Diomede e l'ambasceria dei Latini tra esegesi, retorica e prassi scolastiche », 291-313) souligne combien les commentaires des interprètes tardo-antiques de l'ambassade de Venulus à Diomède aux livres VIII et XI de l'*Énéide*, qu'il s'agisse de ceux de Servius, du *Seruius auctus* ou de Tiberius Claudius Donat, témoignent d'une connaissance très précise des interprétations qu'en donnent au même moment les rhéteurs tardifs, qu'il s'agisse de Sulpicius Victor, qui interprète le discours de Diomède comme une *suasoria* fondée sur le problème de la *qualitas negotialis legalius*, ou d'Emporius, qui y recourt pour illustrer un type particulier d'éthopée nommée *pragmatica*. Ce faisant, Luigi Pirovano met en évidence l'importance de l'œuvre de Virgile dans les pratiques scolaires tardo-antiques, aussi bien dans l'apprentissage de la théorie rhétorique que dans sa mise en pratique à travers des exercices rhétoriques traditionnels (*progymnasta*, *suasoriae*, *controuersiae*). Enfin, Ilaria Torzi (« Le parole di Drance al vaglio dei commentatori tardoantichi », 315-371) propose une étude dense et complète des interprétations que Servius, le *Seruius Danielis* et Tiberius Claudius Donat donnent des discours de Drancès au livre XI de l'*Énéide*. Celles-ci mettent toutes en relief l'adéquation entre les techniques rhétoriques utilisées et le l'*inuidia* qu'incarne le personnage virgilien. Les annexes se composent d'un seul *index auctorum* ; en outre, bien qu'une bibliographie spécifique soit donnée à la fin de chaque contribution, une bibliographie générale eût été ici fort appréciable.

Cet ouvrage collectif s'inscrit dans un ensemble de travaux menés notamment en France et en Italie depuis quelques années qui tendent à reconsidérer pleinement l'importance des écrits des *grammatici*

tardo-antiques. De fait, la variété de ces travaux, qu'il s'agisse de travaux d'éditions et de traductions ou de lectures à nouveaux frais des écrivains classiques, ont le mérite de mettre en valeur le rôle stratégique que cette tradition grammaticale a pu avoir tant sur l'interprétation que les écrivains tardo-antiques, aussi bien chrétiens que païens, ont pu faire des écrivains classiques que sur la constitution et la transmission d'un corpus d'écrivains classiques à la période médiévale. En nous permettant de mieux comprendre l'évolution de la réception de cette tradition classique, ces travaux restituent un chaînon essentiel du savoir qui nous permet, en retour, de mieux comprendre les écrivains tardo-antiques dans leur contexte culturel propre. Cet ouvrage sur *Vergilius orator* recèle de fait un intérêt évident pour tous les spécialistes de la littérature tardo-antique en nous permettant de mieux comprendre la réception de Virgile et son évolution du IVe au VIe s. apr. J.-C.

Jérôme Lagouanère

VOS, Nienke, and GELJON, Albert C., ed. *Rituals in Early Christianity: New Perspectives on Tradition and Transformation*. Leiden: Brill, 2021. Supplements to Vigiliae christianae, 164. XII-363 p.

This volume contains thirteen contributions of high quality about a broad range of topics. The reader can learn a great deal about meal practices in ancient Christianity, about Church fathers including Cyril of Alexandria and Augustine of Hippo, about the earliest development of paraments, about the architecture of the Hagia Sophia, about ritual gestures such as the holy kiss and the washing of hands, among many other things. Clearly, the volume's unity is not to be sought in a thematic focus. Rather, as vaguely suggested by the book's subtitle, it is "new perspectives" or, as is claimed in both the introduction and the first chapter, a "paradigm shift" in the study of early Christianity that is supposed to yield the volume a form of consistency and cohesion.

I am not sure that the editors (and authors) have succeeded in achieving this goal. If a multiplicity of approaches and a variety of topics are the only or the most distinct characteristics of the new paradigm, then all there is in the end is just the production of heterogeneous multi-authored books and the juxtaposition of unrelated and even incomparable research results. That is somewhat paradoxical, since the promoters of the "new paradigm" are eager to talk about interdisciplinarity, but one wonders what that actually means without

profound interdisciplinary conversation. If interdisciplinarity only requires that individual scholars make use of different approaches (together), especially approaches that were not previously employed or were regarded as insufficiently relevant, then interdisciplinarity risks becoming an empty box. True interdisciplinarity implies thorough debate as well as the avoidance of relativism. True interdisciplinarity is anything but an excuse for indifferentism.

Fortunately, the present volume all in all avoids this pitfall. Nienke Vos, one of the editors, does a great job inasmuch as she has written not only a noteworthy introduction (and one of the thirteen articles), but also a series of reflections to conclude the book. In both the introductory and concluding texts, she emphasizes that there are significant connections between the themes and approaches of the contributing authors, and she is definitely right about that. Yet it would have made the volume even stronger if Vos had ventured some more daring conclusions about the importance of modifying our views of ancient Christianity by the sheer growth of knowledge about it. For this whole question is not only about an increasing complexity in academia or the humanities, but also about the multi-layered difficulties of connecting to a distant past, about remembering and commemorating it, and thus about positioning ourselves today. It is not unlikely, however, that the warning against the debate being dominated by theological readings of history that privilege continuity has outweighed the urge to reconnect the study of ancient Christianity to contemporary thinking. This work of reconnection is definitely a pressing challenge for the near future, both for scholars of (Christian) antiquity and for theologians, so that current interdisciplinary conversations between them do not get lost in the grand chain of history. Besides these considerations, it is rather strange that the co-editor of the book happens to have co-authored neither the introduction nor the concluding reflections. Neither is he mentioned in the "notes on contributors". What is the meaning of his appearing only on the cover?

The added value of the book basically consists in the quality of (most of) the individual contributions. Even if not all of them present original material or are not as innovative as they self-consciously claim to be, they offer a nice synthesis of discussions or at least a convincing state of the art. Gerard Rouwhorst's overview of the origins of the liturgical year is a good illustration of this generalisation, as is Karel Innemée's discussion of the earliest known development of ecclesial dress, with its roots in the clothes worn by different classes of people in the Roman Empire. Examples of articles for which one can talk of a real innovation are Jutta Dresken-Weiland's

text about grave inscriptions and what they reveal about funeral culture in ancient Christianity, and Jan Bremmer's presentation of the theme of the Eucharist in a selection of apocryphal acts, since looking at these sources is certainly a welcome addition to what is already known on the basis of so-called canonical sources only.

Another asset of the volume is the strict format which the individual contributions adopt and the general indices at the end. Every contribution is well-written, cleverly structured, and understandable for a non-specialist audience, provided of course that they have an academic background. Moreover, every contribution ends with a well-balanced bibliography, which contains both primary and secondary sources. This is a great help to connect the different topics discussed in the book with other relevant literature. For this and for the other reasons mentioned, the present volume offers a nice impetus for future research.

Finally, a word of appreciation is definitely due for what ultimately does unite the authors of the book, even if they employ different approaches, are interested in very heterogeneous things, and have or do not have something to do with theology, etc. They are members of a performant network, standing in a notable tradition of scholarship in the Netherlands. All of them have close ties to the Society for Early Christian Studies and, as such, are inheritors of what Christine Mohrmann, still a crucial reference in the field, accomplished. Some of the history of this society is sketched in Vos' introduction to the volume. It is to be hoped that many more books of equally high quality will follow from the many collaborations within and networking around this society.

Joris Geldhof

WIEBE, Gregory D., *Fallen Angels in the Theology of St. Augustine*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Oxford Early Christian Studies. 288 p.

G.D. Wiebe's study of Augustine's demonology is a revised version of a 2015 dissertation from McMaster University in Canada. The main work employed here is Augustine's *City of God* (*De civitate Dei* = *ciu.*). The book of *ciu.* which seems to be the departure point for this study is the tenth, which contains an extensive refutation of Porphyry, the Neoplatonist. Augustine discusses this philosopher's works on ancient religions and theurgy. The latter term refers to

practices in which demons are called upon to aid the seeker in obtaining an experience of the divine. Porphyry and his demonology receives Wiebe's full attention in chapter six, although prior to this chapter, many diverse aspects of *ciu.* are drawn into this discussion. Although other works of Augustine's are consulted, this study gives an excellent, highly detailed rendition of major undercurrents in Augustine's *magnum opus*.

The introduction gives a brief but fascinating overview of the treatment of demons in the Old and New Testaments, as well as non-Christian ancient literature. Wiebe also indicates in the introduction some of the problems involved in this research topic. The following are three examples: (i) when Augustine discusses the demonology of Porphyry or Apuleius, it is sometimes difficult to discern which are his own ideas and which are those of Porphyry, Apuleius or other ancient authors; (ii) regarding Porphyry, there is the problem of large lacunae in his oeuvre, which is only available to us today in fragments; and (iii) there is uncertainty as to whether the keywords that Augustine mentions in his succinct summaries of the subject matter are actually titles of particular works by Porphyry. Wiebe admits that resolving many of these problems falls outside of the scope of his investigation, as they require specialized speculation.

A most appropriate preamble to Augustine's demonology is his angelology, which is the subject of Chapter 1 ("Angels of God", 16-52). Wiebe's exposition of this topic is of a length that I have never before encountered. It begins with Augustine's interpretation of Genesis and the primeval angelic nature in *ciu.* XI, which the author supplements with passages from *De Genesi ad litteram* (*Gen. litt.*) (e.g., I-III, XII), *Confessiones* (*conf.*) and *De Trinitate* (*Trin.*).

Their creation from immaterial light, Wiebe explains, clarifies the angels' affinity with God and the godly realm. Angels are "created wisdom", enlightened through their love of God and unceasing contemplation of the Father. Thus they were perfected at their inception. As intellectual spirits they possess a more thorough knowledge of creation and of God than humans do. The task of the angels is to help humans solve a number of existential problems, for example, how humans are to know and love God given the remoteness of God's eternity. For this reason, angels fulfill an administrative role in carrying out God's external, volitional mode of providence. They testify to the Incarnation of the Son of God, not only by bringing about miracles, but, most notably, by their transmission of the Holy Scriptures. In this chapter, Wiebe expands on the communicative role of the angels in Augustine's thought.

Augustine's angelology in *ciu.* is embedded first and foremost in the context of his theology of the two cities. Throughout books XI-XXII, Augustine interjects the subject of angels, mentioning their abode in the heavenly city, which is the destination of humans. They play an instrumental role throughout the history of the earthly city as intermediaries between God and humans. Augustine's definition of the role of angels makes up one of the key counterarguments in book X against the invocation or veneration of demons as divine mediators, practiced by certain Platonist philosophers who had been influenced by Porphyry.

A section in this chapter of Wiebe's book is devoted to angelic contemplation and knowledge, which necessitates a treatment of Augustine's conception of *rationes*, invisible "form principles" which had been infused into all creatures by God at creation and which are perceptible to angels. The Greek philosophical sources for the *rationes* are amply discussed here. The rational principles inherent in creation are the ingredients for the angels' effectuation of wondrous events, which are manifestations of God's providence. Wiebe commendably mentions the remarkable theological and scriptural cohesiveness of Augustine's understanding of angels, although Augustine's dependence on Scripture sometimes caused him to doubt his own philosophical interpretation.

Chapter 2 ("The Fall of the Angels", 53-93), which is the longest chapter in this book, focuses on highly complex questions, such as the origin of evil, the fall of certain angels, as well as that of Adam and Eve and how these topics are intricately related in Augustine's thought. The chapter starts with the bishop of Hippo's search in *conf.* III-VII for the cause and definition of evil, an important issue in his intellectual development prior to conversion. Here Augustine expressed doubts about his own conception of God (among other things: the materiality of the divine; and good and evil as separate divinities), which he had assimilated from his nine-year membership in the Manichaean church. These uncertainties were exacerbated when Augustine read certain Platonist books. The remainder of this chapter sheds light on Augustine's interpretation of the biblical adage that pride is the origin of all evil (*ciu.* XI). Pride occurred first in the angelic realm and involved the will and its two-tiered orientation: either to God or to oneself. Now Wiebe turns to the central theme: the church father's conception of the Devil and demons. Wiebe's overview of these relevant aspects from *conf.* and *ciu.* is well documented and carefully explicated.

Augustine's ideas on the Devil and demons are examined meticulously, then subjected to critical analysis, and juxtaposed with

other aspects of Augustine's teachings, such as predestination, grace, and God's foreknowledge. One of the main threads here is Augustine's contention that the Devil will never be redeemed. On p. 65, Wiebe declares the lack of resolution and utter logical inconsistency in Augustine's approach to demonology (which is in direct opposition to his evaluation of Augustine's angelology).

In the next thirty pages, Wiebe delves deeper into these topics, in particular into Augustine's view of the human will. Comparing Augustine's depiction of the human will to his portrayal of the wills of both good and bad angels, Wiebe concludes that the latter two are paradigmatic for Augustine's view of the human mind. This is pithy subject matter which reads more like a philosophical treatise. A certain deconstruction of Augustine's thought takes place here. There is also a great deal of activity in the footnotes, which become increasingly filled with thought-provoking related topics and debated issues, some of which, in my opinion, would have been suitable for integration into the main text (70-72). Wiebe engages here with, among others, J. Rist, one of the leading researchers on Augustine's doctrine of the will, as well as E. Te Selle, W. Babcock, I. McFarland, and J. Wetzel (n. 97-101).

The author then confronts issues arising from Augustine's doctrine of evil in *ciu* XI: how could Satan, who had possessed the same perfected divine knowledge as the good angels, have fallen? The crux of the matter here is Augustine's placement of Satan's fall "at the beginning" of creation which Augustine indicates is also "the beginning of time" (which coincided with the perfection of angelic knowledge). This rich and profound exposition is followed by another hefty question: within the perspective of the angels being created as perfected beings in a pure intellectual realm, how is it possible that the fallen angel, Satan, a spirit without a body, became so influential in the earthly paradise as well as in human history? How is it possible that this angel with perfected knowledge then communicated his pride and love of self to the primal humans (through the vehicle of a serpent) and persuaded them to do something they knew perfectly well was contrary to God's instructions?

The decisive consideration in these issues, Wiebe indicates, is Satan's lack of a physical body. Augustine posits here, as he does elsewhere in *ciu*. (XXI-XXII), that the possession of a human body is a necessary condition for redemption. The human body is also the vehicle for sin, through which the will, in its two-tiered orientation to God or to oneself, ultimately discloses inner or hidden desires. Wiebe brings Augustine's anthropology to the fore in regard to both the

human embodied state and the soul, each of which has affinities with the characteristics of good and bad angels. Of interest here is Wiebe's clear synthesis and well-argued conclusion (90-93) which engages Augustinian expert J. Wetzel (2012), who has published extensively on the problems of Augustine's notion of evil and his demonology.

This topic continues into Chapter 3 ("Demonic Bodies", 94-119). Augustine believes that demons have aerial bodies (*ciu.* VIII, 22). In *De divinatione daemonum*, he contrasts demonic bodies with the human spirit. Thus, the question at hand is this: given this belief that demons, as spiritual beings, do possess some kind of body, how are they able, according to Augustine, to affect the human spirit (106-112)?

Wiebe's treatment proceeds with Augustine's conception of spiritual vision (*Gen. litt.* XII) and what this vision signifies for his demonology in *ciu.* IX-X. Spiritual vision consists of images from the human experiential world that are produced in the imagination or memory. Demons or angels communicate this imagery to human minds by means of "joining or mixing" with the human spirit. In this way, Augustine conjectures, angels and demons are allowed access to the interior of humans. Wiebe concedes to M. Miles in describing as a "phenomenological method" Augustine's approach to the question of how demons with their aerial bodies are able to manipulate corporeal elements. Demons' desire for physical embodiment is the driving motivation behind their manipulation of human souls.

This discussion flows over into Chapter 4, entitled "Demonic Phenomena" (120-146), in which the theme of demonic deception takes precedence. Wiebe highlights Augustine's view of the three main desires of demons, as expounded in *De vera religione* 38.71, which motivate their temptation of humans. Augustine asserts that allurement to vice and *curiositas* (pursuing matters which are ultimately useless) can be resisted by overcoming one's desires. Temptation can also be induced through magical arts and divination. A leitmotif frequently employed in Augustine's demonology is the image of Satan disguised as a being of light (*ciu.* X.10; 2 Cor. 11:14). This apparition can cause miraculous supernatural phenomena, which are, however, merely illusory. Wiebe underscores another prevalent theme in Augustine's demonology: "those who fall prey to the devil, deserve to be deceived" (130-131). In other words, the victim's consent is necessary before the seduction can be successful. Therefore, Wiebe concludes, Augustine stipulates the limitations of demonic influence. Demons can ensnare, yet they cannot control behavior. Temptation involves consent to a lesser form of love, an object of desire which is presented to the human by a demon. Temptation can also involve a

mysterious union between the spirit of the tormentor and that of the tormented victim. In the worst case, it can result in demonic possession, which has damaging consequences.

Augustine insists that Christians rely on the grace of God to subdue vicious desires and to withhold consent, in order to emerge victorious. The next two sections focus on Augustine's testimony to Christ's instrumental role of subduing diabolic influence, as well as Augustine's famous declaration of *massa damnata*, God's final judgement, resulting from the Devil's contrivances. The following is an example of Wiebe's illuminating closing synthesis: "The closure of the self to God is thus not just the organizing logic of demonic phenomena, but the foundational desire that binds a substantial portion – perhaps the greater majority – of rational creatures throughout all of history into a single communion, which Augustine comes to call the *terrena civitas*, the earthly city" (145).

In chapter 5 ("The Devil and His Body", 147-177), Wiebe applies the rich material from the first chapters in his book specifically to the topic of the ensuing tension between Christians and pagans. Here he shows how Augustine's critique of ancient Roman cult in *De vera religione* can be seen as the forerunner to *ciu*. Wiebe assumes that it is Porphyry who is being referred to as "the Platonist" in *De vera religione*. Porphyry is not mentioned explicitly in this work, although he can be plausibly inferred.[1] Wiebe's subsequent in-depth exposition of Porphyry and of Augustine's critique of demonology in *ciu*. X is thorough and insightful. The following section, "Sacramental Body of the Devil", gives an outstanding rendition of Augustine's conception of sacraments and signs, the latter of which are interwoven into the discourse on demonology in *ciu*. X.

Augustine viewed theurgy as the sacrament of the Devil and demons. The spirits involved in these Platonist rituals presented themselves as agents of an anagogic meditation. The practices which Augustine regarded as demonic sacraments, which are listed and summarized on pages 165-166, include divination, all forms of magic, and temple rituals, such as initiation mysteries. Wiebe closes this section with an insightful synthesis: for Augustine, theurgy and pagan sacrifices are sacraments of disordered desire imposed by conventions in the earthly city. Through these rites, one automatically enters into a community with demons. An interesting extension of this subject is found in the section "Making Gods", which depicts

[1] See G. Catapano, *"Nobilissimus philosophus paganorum/falsus philosophus*: Porphyry in Augustine's Metaphilosophy", *Studia graeco-arabica* 8, 2018, 49-66.

Augustine's view of how the sacramental systems of pagan religions brought forth the art of making statues or images for the expressed intention of inviting gods (spirits) to inhabit them. Wiebes' summary (173) illustrates Augustine's view that humans provide embodiment for demons, not just by making statues which demons can ensoul, but through the lives people live and the stories they tell. Demons, "lacking their own embodiment in the flesh, are dependent upon humans to establish the cult by which they are worshipped as they desire, a desire which Augustine repeatedly seeks to expose." Augustine recognized demons' skill in luring humans to various kinds of addictions and afflictions (173).

I am further impressed by Wiebes' explanatory summary (177) as to why demons occupy so much space in *ciu*. "Humans and demons are mutually operative in the same complex social networks of moral influence on the basis of sacramental agreements they share, this is how demons come to be embedded within *The City of God*, a work which is widely understood to be political or social." Quoting R. Dodaro, Wiebe underlines that in Augustine's thought "Satan provides not only the 'archetypal seduction'" but also "the prototype for all secular discourse which is constituted in deceptive rhetoric that disrupts the political community in its search for beatitude and happiness."

This train of thought continues in the final, variegated chapter 6 ("Pagan Demonolatry", 178-221). This chapter commences with Augustine's opinion about the collapse of moral standards in the Roman Empire, which resulted in a steady accumulation of the fear of death, love of glory, and desire to dominate. Augustine asserts in *ciu*. that the Roman gods did not seek to combat immorality. On the contrary, they encouraged misdeeds, which were best exemplified by the behavior of the gods as portrayed at the theater. The plays served as a source of information about the gods, since Roman traditional cult had no statements of belief or sacred texts. Crimes occurring in the tales of the poets complemented the corruption of the priests who had founded the rites to the gods. For Augustine, the diversity and vast number of divinities in the Roman pantheon represented the boundless human pursuit of the fulfillment of desire. He points out how most of the gods were competitive and warlike; accordingly, Roman traditional cult was a "self-centered" religion. Multiple divinities of this kind essentially produced a fractured state of the divine leading to disordered desires on the part of the worshippers.

The section on demon worship by intellectuals (194-198) raises a poignant question: could pagan readers identify with Augustine's critique of their religion in books I-VI of *ciu*.? Augustine was aware

that his opponents could reproach him for taking their gods too literally. In the Platonist tradition, they were symbols of the eternal and likewise attested to monotheistic worship. Wiebe then plumbs the depths of the conceptions of gods and demons held by Plato, Apuleius, and Porphyry (*ciu.* VIII-X), ultimately comparing Porphyry's teachings and writings on demonology with those of Apuleius and Iamblichus. Then the author approaches the matter from another perspective: the philosophical rejection of Christianity, or of the elements in this relatively new religion which the philosophers found reprehensible.

In the final chapter ("Conclusion", 222-232), the reader must not expect a resumé or synthesis. Instead, Wiebe adds a new dimension to his study by considering whether Augustine's demonology is relevant to today's society or contemporary politics. Wiebe's discussion aligns itself with another, which is currently taking place in scholarship. In this context, he adds some helpful notes regarding Augustine's understanding of the Devil's "rights over humanity", an idea which is seen as offensive to many modern-day Christians, who regard "the Devil" as a metaphor for the negative bonds and fetters that characterize our lives. Augustine would, in turn, view those bonds and fetters as a consequence of humanity's pervasive sinfulness. Wiebe then scrutinizes the debate regarding the adaptation of Augustine's demonology to modern politics through the perspectives of C. Mathewes, H. Arendt, and M. Hanby.

Aside from minor typographical oversights and a few problematic statements (which I will discuss below), this study is extremely well written, clear, admirably in-depth, and stimulating. Readers of Wiebe's study will acquire a more profound understanding of Augustine and this complex subject matter. This reviewer particularly valued the sections that focus on the complex book X of *ciu.*, among them: the "Sacramental Body of the Devil", the exposition of Augustine's conception of sacraments and signs, and Augustine's refutation of Porphyry, which go far beyond other published syntheses. All in all, a very pleasurable read. In addition, there is a lengthy bibliography, consisting of primary and secondary sources, an index of references, and a subject index.

The study also has a few minor weak points; these, however, do not detract from the book's overall high quality. The following two points are the most striking. The first is the lack of clarity as to which English translations of the Latin or Greek sources were used. The second has to do with errors that occur in the introduction on 12-13. In referring to Porphyry, Wiebe writes: "A number of his

works written in Greek, were translated by Marius Victorinus into Latin, which is how Augustine would have had access to them." Here a footnote with a reference to the provenance of this statement should have been provided (= *conf.* VII, 9, 13; 20, 26). The main problem with this passage, however, is that Augustine does not refer to Porphyry or to any specific Platonist in *conf.*, but solely to "*libri platonicorum*" – unspecified books of Platonist philosophy – which he claimed to have read before his conversion. Wiebe presents Porphyry as the only Platonist with whom Augustine had engaged during this period, but such a view is not a confirmed fact. The identity of the authors of these Platonist books has been a subject of debate since the early twentieth century. There are many more possibilities than Porphyry alone, including Plotinus. The cause of this error, as I see it, is the restricted selection of secondary literature consulted on this issue (12-13), namely, E. Te Selle, F. van Fleteren, and G. Clark, who focus on Augustine's dependence on Porphyry. Yet there is a mass of literature on Augustine's reading of Plotinus, which has apparently gone unnoticed by Wiebe. (See i.a., J. Rist, who argues that the *libri platonicorum* were likely, for the most part, books of Plotinus.) R. Rombs provides a full *status quaestionis* on the issues revolving around the *libri platonicorum* in *conf.*, as well as the *Quellenforschung* from the previous century.[2] This issue, insufficiently studied by Wiebe, reappears several times in incorrect statements on pages 55 and 152.

My final remark is a suggestion for a possible new edition. An expansion of the Table of Contents with the headings of sections and subsections would be helpful. The chapter titles and the cover text do not do justice to the richness of this book's content.

Laela Zwollo

WISNIEWSKI, Robert. *Christian Divination in Late Antiquity*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2020. Social Worlds of Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, 6. 287 p.

Robert Wiśniewski, professor of ancient history in the Department of Ancient History at the University of Warsaw, specializes in late antiquity, hagiography, the cult of saints, divination, Roman Gaul, and

[2] *Saint Augustine and the Fall of the Soul*, Washington, 2006, 26-32. See also L. Zwollo, *St. Augustine and Plotinus: The Human Mind As Image of the Divine* (Vigiliae Christianae Supplements 151), Leiden, 2018, i.e., 18-20.

Christian clergy. He is also the author of numerous publications, among them, *The Beginnings of the Cult of Relics*, OUP: Oxford 2019. The particular study under review was originally published in Polish in 2013 and was translated into flawless English by Damian Jasiński.

What can be said about Christian divination in late antiquity? Late antique sources usually mention divination only in passing and in a disparaging tone. Divination is also often grouped with other dubious practices, such as magic, astrology, oracular readings, etc. The fact that divination merited ancient writers' attention in the first place implies that these activities could have been widespread. Due to the scarcity of explicative material, however, it is difficult to pronounce clear-cut statements on Christian divination in late antiquity.

Yet Wiśniewski's study attempts to do so. It tackles a broad array of exceedingly diverse sources in an effort to fill in some of the many lacunae in our knowledge of divinatory practices among Christians. Some of the ancient authors employed in this study are well known, such as church fathers and fourth- and fifth-century historians. Yet many other major sources are obscure; to give an example: *Sortes Astrampsychi*. Wiśniewski's strategy is to analyze the content, character, and context of these passages. The primary questions about late antique divination among Christians are the following: What did late antique Christians do when they wanted to gain hidden knowledge, such as knowledge about the past (for example: Who stole my things?), the present, or the future (for example: What should I do? Should I study medicine?)? Did Christians make use of the same divinatory practices as their non-Christian contemporaries who borrowed traditional Greek, Egyptian, or Celtic techniques?

Other fundamental questions pursued here are: When and how did Christian divination emerge? What were the techniques involved? Who used them and under what circumstances? Who offered expertise to perform such consultations? What were the attitudes of bishops, intellectuals, and ordinary Christians towards divination? Greek, Roman, and Jewish sources are also examined, as they are especially informative about the extent to which Christian divination – which can be spoken of for the first time around the 350s – is indebted to pre-Christian or pagan practices (249-250).

The introductory chapter describes the current state of research and how scholarly approaches to ancient divination evolved during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the heyday of academic classical studies, divination was apparently a topic of loathing, rather than one which sparked genuine interest. Classicists found it

embarrassing to engage with such a topic, Wiśniewski indicates, because these activities were in direct contradiction to prevailing early modern attitudes, namely, that classical civilization was "radiantly illuminated by the triumph of reason." Some considered divination an alien factor that "sullied the allegedly impeccable rationality of the Greek and Roman worlds" (12). Nevertheless, this period brought forth several cases of excellent scholarship on the subject (such as the work of Auguste Bouché Leclerq, 1879-1882) that are still useful to researchers today.

In the foregoing decades, there has been a surge of new interest, especially in the field of anthropology, which has identified and examined the practice of divination as a widespread cultural and social phenomenon. More recently the focus has been directed towards specific aspects (for example, prophesy) or a particular geographical area or historical period. As a result, the understanding of ancient divinatory techniques has evolved substantially. In addition, new sources have been discovered. Wiśniewski's book, in the author's own words, represents a further step towards fulfilling the goal of providing a much-needed comprehensive picture of divination in the late antique Christian setting (15). The author's fascinating overview of the nature of the sources, their number and diversity, convincingly demonstrates why the inquiries raised by this investigation are so numerous and challenging.

The author's strategy entails arranging a multitude of sources into six general categories, which at the same time serve as chapter headings. Each chapter begins with a quotation of one of the sources, which is intended to launch the discussion. The passages are then explained and subjected to multifarious inquiries.

The content of the majority of the passages is usually vague with respect to Christian divination. Divination is rarely the main topic of the ancient authors' discourses. As a result, their remarks demand much labor on the part of the researcher whose aim is to contextualize them and extract substantial generalizations. Ancient authors seldom offer an explication of the specific practices to which they are referring; nor do they see it as necessary to convey precisely what these practices entailed or who utilized them.

The validity and credibility of the content is therefore a recurrent problem, which justifies the author's intensive probing from every possible angle. In the course of this study, it becomes increasingly apparent that each excerpt has its own convoluted background and history, which must be taken into serious consideration before obtaining answers to the main research inquiries.

The first chapter, aptly entitled "Attitudes to Divination", deals primarily with ancient Christian authors who targeted pagan and non-pagan divination. The attitudes highlighted here are then analyzed in light of fourth- and fifth-century edicts. Christian prophecy, the main subject of the second chapter ("Prophets"), begins with a chronological overview. The phenomenon of prophesy culminated in Montanism in the second century CE and thereafter waned, yet saw a resurgence in the fourth century, as attested in *The Lives of the Saints*. The title of chapter 3, "Take and Read", echoes Augustine's conversion scene in *Confessions*. Upon hearing a child singing *tolle*, *lege*, Augustine spontaneously opened a codex of Paul's letters and found the words which resolved his personal difficulties. Researchers of Augustine will be interested in Wiśniewski's analysis of these passages, which casts light on the divinatory practice involved. This chapter also explores many other sources and forms of bibliomancy.

The remaining chapters proceed in the same spirit: scrutinizing ancient material, the terminology and contexts, passage by passage. Chapter 4, "Books and Bones", aims to illuminate divinatory books, chapter 5, divinatory lots. Chapter 6, "Interrogating Demoniacs", deals with attempts to obtain obscure or future information from persons possessed by demons. Chapter 7 addresses another divinatory technique, namely, that of incubation, a term which generally refers to sleeping in sacred places with the hope of receiving a dream as an answer to a particular problem. The conclusions from the preceding chapters of this monumental project are compiled and analyzed in chapter 8. These conclusions deal with the following: questions of chronology; the indebtedness of Christian divination to pagan practices; and Christian attitudes towards divination in general. Certain passages permit a clear-cut identification of the inquirers, including their social standing and whether they were male or female. As to be expected, many of the conclusions are uncertain, as well as contingent, due to the lacunae in the source material. Here the author emphasizes that the extant literary sources do not and cannot tell us everything; our present knowledge is still incomplete.

This book is clearly written, and the analysis of the material is thorough. However, this degree of thoroughness can also be tedious. The literary structure of numerous consecutive samples subjected to a lengthy, rigid examination tends to come across as a series of unconnected narratives. This is not a book to read from cover to cover. However, the questioning process in itself is highly stimulating, profound, and thought-provoking. I recommend Wiśniewski's book as a reference work or lexicon for the sources it covers. It will be

especially valuable for researchers who are working on the same references to divination or on related topics. Wiśniewski's descriptions and analyses also offer a solid introduction to these sources. On account of its critical approach to ancient literary material, this book will be highly instructive for history students. It demonstrates how to derive as much concrete information as possible from an ancient author's vague commentary or even from *ex silentio* considerations.

This compilation is the fruit of a time-consuming, labor-intensive investigation of difficult and complex material. In my estimation, Wiśniewski's study makes a significant contribution, not only to the scholarship on ancient Christian divination, but also to the broader field of ancient Christianity. This book will be a helpful resource for patristic scholars, as many passages in question are from the works of Augustine or his fellow theologians.

I have only three points of minor critique, the first of which has to do with the Table of Contents. This single page consists merely of short chapter headings. The titles do not always adequately reflect the content. For instance, the title of chapter 3, "Take and Read", invokes Augustine's conversion scene in *Confessions*, yet the main focus of this chapter is the phenomenon of bibliomancy. Another example is the title of chapter 4, "Books and Bones". From such a heading, it is not immediately evident that the general subject is divinatory books.

Although there is an index at the end of the work, this study will prove to be somewhat intractable for a researcher or a student of ancient history who simply wants to know which sources are important for a certain sub-topic of divination. Wiśniewski's valuable research would be more easily accessible if a table of the sources mentioned in it were included at the beginning of each chapter. An alternative means of facilitating access would have been to provide a short abstract at the beginning of each chapter, informing the reader of which sources and general inquiries will be pursued.

The four-page index is too meager. For example, there is no entry for "Septuagint", even though it is referred to repeatedly on pages 32-33. (Likewise for "laws" or "legislation", which are treated on pages 41-44.) An index of Scripture would also have been helpful. Personally, I was astonished to learn from Wiśniewski's investigation how extensive the biblical references to divination are, especially those depicting a divinatory practice in a positive light.

Laela Zwollo

WILCOXEN, Matthew A. *Divine Humility – God's Morally Perfect Being*. Waco: Baylor University Press, 2019. X-227 p.

In the development of systematic theology and philosophy of religion, there are numerous attempts to determine the nature of God *in se*. The question of what constitutes the being of God, how it is to be characterized in and for himself, has been dealt with repeatedly. Lists of divine attributes have been developed, summing up the essentials of God's being and justifying them argumentatively. Such lists are exemplified by Thomas Aquinas in the first part of the *Summa Theologica* (S.th. I-I, q.3-11). There, God's being is characterized by a number of essential attributes: absolute simplicity, goodness, infinity, omnipresence, immutability, eternity, and unity. Together, these attributes belong to God as Supreme Being; they constitute God's perfection. In this way, God is determined *in se*, in his immanent reality.

If God is characterized in himself, then nothing has yet been said about the relation of God to the other: to the world, to humanity, to history. The relation between God and the non-divine, the created, is thus not yet determined: God *ad extra*. A theological bridge is missing between God's being-*in-se* and the historical experience that people have with God, expressed, for example, in the Holy Scriptures. But how exactly is this relationship to be conceived? Does God's relation to the non-divine come only secondarily to the being of God in himself, or is the relation to the other essential for God, always already there? Is this external relationship an essential characterization that should be attributed to God? And if so, which language and concepts could describe the connection between God *ad intra* and God *ad extra*?

It is this foundational problem of the theological and philosophical doctrine of God that Matthew A. Wilcoxen addresses in his book. As a starting point, Wilcoxen notes a void, an ambiguity in the theoretical edifice of the doctrine of God. The question of the relationship between God's being-*in-se* and God's relationship to the other on the level of the divine attributes has yet to receive sufficient clarification. A conceptual discrepancy exists "between who God is in himself and who he is for us" (2), and as a result, thinking about God in terms of his being-in-itself and in terms of his being-in-relation falls apart.

Wilcoxen's book considers this vacancy and aims to develop a more precise conceptualization of the relationship between God *in se* and God *pro nobis*. Facing the cleavage, the book asks: What conceptual possibilities are there for thinking about both dimensions of

God's being as belonging together? And what conceptual treasures does the Christian tradition provide for this task (2)?

Wilcoxen answers this question with an innovative proposal: He suggests implementing the concept of "humility" as a new divine attribute (cf. 2-4) and developing the doctrine of God towards a theology of divine humility. "Humility…suffices as a theological answer to the conceptual problem of the relation between the immanent and economic realities of the triune God" (7). Wilcoxen sees God as a being profoundly humble in his inner being. And as this humble being, he is at the same time related to everything non-divine. "Humility" characterizes God's self-being on the one hand, and at the same time names God's relationship to the world. The term "humility" functions as a hinge, as a cardinal concept that mediates God's eternal life *ad intra* with his being *ad extra*. It conceptually sums up "the interrelation between the attributes of God's intrinsic being and his actions ad extra" (3-4), and expresses "the fact that God's perfect being is always already oriented towards his creature" (3).

Wilcoxen unfolds this argument in five steps. Adopting a fundamental theological perspective, Chapter 1 deals with the question of whether and how statements about the being of God are possible at all. The author rejects Martin Heidegger's critique of onto-theology, according to which no meaningful statements about God's being are possible. Following the theologian Kevin Hector, Wilcoxen argues for the possibility and necessity of a "morally perfect being theology" (35-43). On the basis of interpersonal experiences of goodness, God can be recognized and spoken of as a "morally perfect being" (cf. subtitle).

Chapter 2 represents the conceptual core of the book. Here, the guiding, basic understanding of "humility" is developed, and the author shows how the concept mediates between God's being *in se* and God's being *pro nobis*.

Wilcoxen first notes that "humility" in common usage is an open-ended, "polythetic" (77) term. To survey the complex field, he introduces a central distinction between two understandings of humility. In a first conceptualization (shared by such thinkers as Hume, Nietzsche, and Goldstein), "humility" refers to a relationship between agents that is characterized by subordination and subservience. One agent is in a position of strength and power; other agents are assigned to the one agent and submit to the situation, possibly also enduring suffering. The result is a zero-sum game of forces: one wins, and the others lose. As the strength of one comes at the expense of the others, a humble practice in this sense is morally culpable.

In contrast, on the basis of Athanasius, Basil the Great, Augustine, and Benedict of Nursia, the text elaborates a different understanding of humility, which is not characterized by such a destructive dynamic. Following these authors, a truly humble relationship takes shape in a way that does not lead to a destructive subjugation of one side by the other, but to a process of mutual growth. The acting person in the position of strength shapes the relationship in such a way that other persons also increase in strength. There is no zero-sum game of forces, but a process of growth in which strength is shared and multiplied. The agent in the position of strength is humble in the sense that he does not exercise strength destructively, but in a mode of growth that benefits others. The term "humility", then, does not describe an attitude of submission on the part of the subordinate agent, but names a constructive, creative quality on the part of the strong partner that marks the relationship itself. Such a humble relation to the other is morally good because of the creative dynamic it generates and the strength and growth it enables.

This second notion of humility operates between two poles. On the one hand, it names an essential aspect of the agent who is in the position of strength, *ad intra*. The respective agent is morally good. On the other hand, this understanding of humility simultaneously names an aspect within the relation to the other, *ad extra*. Humility in this sense builds a bridge between an agent's being-in-se and the agent's being-in-relation.

Wilcoxen sees, in this second understanding of humility, an adequate characterization of God, an adequate attribute of God (80). God's sovereign omnipotence, his self-being in himself, is essentially characterized by a humility toward the other, i.e., by a mode of relationship that does not amount to a zero-sum game of forces, but to growth and elevation. Wilcoxen develops this aspect significantly from Augustine's *De civitate Dei*. "Humility is true greatness, inasmuch as it is the use of one's strength for the sake of the true polis. It is a greatness that cannot be defined in zero-sum terms over against the greatness of others; it is a greatness that increases as it is lifts others up [*sic*]." The "essence of humility" (4) is to strengthen others, to elevate them, and make them great. In this way, humility mediates as a bridging concept between God's being *in se* and his being *ad extra*, *pro nobis*. An agent of this kind is morally good through and through. God becomes conceivable in his divine humility as a "morally perfect being".

In the following chapters of the book, this concept of "humility" is brought into discussion with three authors and further differentiated.

Chapter 3 deals with Augustine, "the theologian of humility par excellence" (105), especially with his interpretations of such biblical passages as Ex 3:14-15, John 5:19-30, and Phil 2:6-7. It becomes clear that Augustine repeatedly addresses humility as a characterization, an attribute of God, and in so doing latently touches on the question of how the concept mediates between God's immanent reality and God's economic reality. However, Augustine's thinking here tends to remain intuitive; there is no precise definition of the term "humility" and no systematic mediation between God's *ad intra* and *ad extra* (5; 106-107).

Chapter 4 discusses aspects of Karl Barth's *Church Dogmatics*, vol. 4. This chapter shows that Barth does use the concept of "divine humility" to characterize the relationship between God's being *in se* and his relationship to history. On the other hand, Barth adheres to an understanding of humility that requires subordination and obedience. Thus, Barth's approach to humility cannot adequately represent the goodness of God in relation to the world or the Trinitarian relations between Father and Son (143-144).

Finally, chapter 5 reconstructs central elements of Kathrin Sonderegger's theology of creation: God's eternal self-existence is deeply interwoven with creation. God makes the world possible, puts it into existence, and sets it free. It is precisely this generosity that marks God's greatness in himself, *ad intra*, and simultaneously connects God intrinsically and essentially with the other, *ad extra*. "Humility" is the term in Sonderegger's language that names this "dwelling-with of God to his creation" (183).

In this five-step approach, Wilcoxen's text determines the concept of humility in a very clear, differentiated way and plausibly shows how it can be made fruitful for the doctrine of God, namely, as a hinge between God's being in himself and God's being for us. In this respect, the work provides a conceptual toolkit for naming the connection between God's immanent reality and his economic realities in salvation history. The spiritual depth of the text sensitizes readers to the mystery of God as a humble life power, and such a view of God's "morally perfect being" can inspire people to act in a humble, life-enhancing way.

Nevertheless, Wilcoxen's text also raises questions and provokes critical remarks. The first question concerns his conception of humility itself. Wilcoxen's thinking starts on the side of God and sees humility as a relationship from God to humanity, to the world, to creation. Humility consists in God's communication of strength for the growth of the others, the non-divine. In this communicative act, God

as active agent turns to the other. Formally speaking, it is a one-way movement from God toward the non-divine. However, shouldn't we also think the other way around? Are people within such a humble relation only recipients of a divine gift, i.e. passive recipients (77), or are they not also actively, co-creatively involved in the shaping of the relationship? Wouldn't a humble God accept, enable, and foster exactly such interaction? In other words, to what extent is the humble relation of God *pro nobis* reciprocal?

In my view, the term "humility" acquires its full meaning only when this reciprocity is taken into account. Then God is thought of not only as a static giver of all good, but as someone who is available for disposition in the gift (of) himself. God himself is changed in the encounter with the other, and only this changeability realizes his essential humility, for it allows the other to unfold a transformative strength of its own. Divine humility implies that God in his essence is at the disposal of the other and thus is changed.

Taking this aspect of reciprocity and change into account, as an implication of a strong understanding of God's humility, has consequences for the conceptualization of the classical attributes of God, especially in regard to his immutability. We would then have to think of God not as a sovereign, static, all-powerful being, but as a being-in-process whose essence is not static, but fluent. The humility of God is only radically conceived when we move from a stable to a processual concept of God. Wilcoxen's text, however, does not exploit this critical potential of divine humility but instead remains wedded to a static concept of God that locates God in a secretly sovereign position toward the other, from which he mediates himself unilaterally.

The critical potential of humility also has a practical, socio-critical dimension. At the end of his text, in a brief concluding section, Wilcoxen turns to the question of how divine humility relates to human humility. In what ways can divine humility affect human behavior and change it for the better? The author mentions the "active, subversive nature of humility" (187). The text seems to favor a model of ethical virtue in this regard. The divine virtue of humility inspires people to be humble themselves in a comparable way. God's virtue of humility can have an effect on inner attitudes of human beings and be concretized in their ethical disposition. Divine humility is coupled with human humility through the concept of virtue; humility is thereby spiritualized and moralized: "[P]erhaps a thoroughgoing doctrine of divine humility might help to rehabilitate a more empowering and transformative version of the human virtue that goes by nature" (8). However, what Wilcoxen does not address in this context

is the question of the effects of divine humility on external political, social and economic conditions in the real world. What would it look like for divine humility to be concretely implemented and embodied in human living conditions? Where and how could divine humility actually realize its subversive potential? In my view, it is not enough to speak only about "tough-minded and tender-hearted" characters (186), that is, about inner, virtuous attitudes. Wilcoxen's ethical approach would have to be combined with a clearer practical-theological perspective. The central question in this regard would be how "divine humility" relates to the experiences of "human humiliation", i.e., to concrete conditions and events in today's world where people experience humiliation and struggle for the recognition of their dignity. How does God, as a profoundly humble being, relate to the sovereign power that humans exercise over other lives?

The connection between humility and social, political power is a subject that biblical texts repeatedly address, exemplarily in the *Magnificat* (Lc 1:46-55). God's humility, mirrored in Mary's hymn of praise, not only becomes visible as a process of the exaltation of a subaltern human being, but is also accompanied by a critical change in power relations: the humble God overthrows the powerful. This power-critical aspect of the biblical heritage as it relates to God's humility seems to be outside Wilcoxen's focus.

The enriching, significant contribution of Matthew A. Wilcoxen's work is to clarify the concept of humility and make it fruitful for the doctrine of God. The author is able to grasp more clearly the relationship between God's being *in se* and his being *pro nobis* and to name an ethical mode of relationship between God and the world, which is able to sensitize people to their own potential for humble relationships. In this sense, the book offers a precise systematic-theological orientation to the humble nature of God. The book prepares the ground for further thinking in practical-theological terms and with critical sensitivity to concrete power relations and the socio-political challenges of our times.

Christian Kern

ZACHHUBER, Johannes. *Time and Soul*. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2022. Chronoi, 6. 100 p.

In the field of time studies, Aristotle and Augustine are the two peaks of the ancient world, as their theories constantly influence subsequent

scholars. If anyone wants a bird's-eye view of the landscape between the two, *Time and Soul* by Johannes Zachhuber would make an excellent guide. The four-chapter book starts with a brief account of Aristotle's theory of time in the *Physics*, followed by the philosopher's *aporia*: can time exist without soul? This *aporia* demonstrates the tension between subjective temporal experience and the universal dimension of time. After summarising the views of modern researchers, Zachhuber turns to the understandings and responses of ancient readers. Chapter 2 introduces the interpretations of the Peripatetic school. Boethus of Sidon argued that time can exist without the soul, while Alexander of Aphrodisias disagreed with him. Influenced by Plato, Alexander established a relationship between time and the cosmic soul. The next chapter focuses on Neoplatonists. In addition to Plotinus, the commentary by Simplicius of Cilicia is highlighted. Zachhuber's narrative concludes with the Church Fathers. St. Augustine's famous discussion of time in book XI of the *Confessions* is the main object of analysis in the final chapter, but through the work of John Callaghan, Zachhuber also presents the thoughts of Gregory of Nyssa. The book strikes a perfect balance between individual philosophical views and their intellectual contexts, thus portraying the continuity between different theories as well as their originality. If the specific concerns of Augustine could be taken into account, it would be the icing on the cake.

Zinan Zhang