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European Security and Defense Policy: From Taboo to a Spearhead of EU Foreign Policy

Quite surprisingly, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has emerged in the past decade as one of the spearheads of the EU's foreign policy and a main asset in the EU's foreign policy toolbox. Even more, the ESDP has become one of the rare recent success stories of European integration. This came at a time when the integration process seemed to be in disarray, with growing divergences between the twenty-seven member states, a weakened institutional framework and European leadership, and serious hurdles to getting the 2007 Lisbon Treaty ratified. In the space of merely a few years, the EU managed to translate the first ideas on the ESDP into concrete operational capabilities, leading to the first ESDP operation in early 2003 and more than twenty operations on most continents by 2009. The emergence of the ESDP as a light in the darkness is quite remarkable, particularly as the military and security dimension has been one of the major taboos in the European integration process for several decades. This fundamental change was made possible because for the first time in some fifty years of European integration the member states managed to sufficiently overcome two major areas of tension that had paralyzed EU foreign policy: the cleavages between European integration and Atlantic solidarity and between civilian power and military power.

This chapter discusses the historical background, explaining the long-standing taboo on military and security issues; analyzes the establishment of the ESDP and of the EU's military and civilian crisis management instruments and operations; and concludes with some general assessment and warnings, particularly on the danger of an increasingly active ESDP, without the ESDP being sufficiently matched by and embedded within a clear European foreign policy.[1]

Historical Background

After World War II, the resulting Western European military weakness, American military superiority, and the perceived Soviet threat meant that for most

Western European states the Atlantic alliance and the American guarantee were the essential prerequisites for security.[2] In April 1949, the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty sealed America's commitment to providing a security guarantee for its Western European allies. However, it was not clear at that time what kind of military structures would be established to organize Western Europe's collective defense and what the position of West Germany would be. Whereas the Europeans pushed for greater American leadership and the continued presence of American soldiers, the United States initially expected Western European countries themselves to assume more responsibility for guaranteeing Europe's defense.

The escalation of the East-West conflict and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 transformed this context, and half a year later the North Atlantic Treaty was upgraded, becoming the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). An integrated military alliance, including a heavy commitment of American troops with an American supreme allied commander, directed the territorial defense of Western Europe and reflected U.S. leadership as well as America's direct role in managing European affairs.[3] This dependency on the United States also largely defined and restricted the parameters of member states' national foreign and security policies and attempts to initiate European cooperation and integration in the field of security and defense. Practically every proposal was, and still is, reviewed by a major part of the member states against what has been labeled the "what do the Americans think?" test.[4] The appropriateness and feasibility of an EU security and defense policy initiative came to be measured not solely in terms of its importance for European security or European integration, but also or often even in the first place for its impact on transatlantic relations and acceptability in Washington.

The logic of the Atlantic choice was confirmed in the early 1950s and 1960s by the failure of French attempts to bring defense within the scope of European integration: first through the Pleven Plan and the failed European Defense Community, next through the rejected Fouchet plans. In October 1950, the French launched the Pleven Plan, under which military units from the member states would be integrated to create a European army, which would operate under the direction of a council of member states' ministers. Following the example of the European Coal and Steal Community (ECSC), the creation of a supranational European Defense Community (EDC) meant that German soldiers could operate within a European army without having to create a new German army. This was unacceptable to most European states, which barely five years earlier had been the victims of German aggression. Negotiations over the Pleven Plan finally resulted in the EDC Treaty, which was signed in May 1952 by the six member states of the ECSC (France, West Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, and

Luxembourg). However, the treaty was less "common" and "European" than its title suggested. The French had been forced to accept that the project would be more intergovernmental and more linked to NATO than foreseen. By mid-1954, improvements in the East–West relationship had lessened the urgency to create a European army and, amid growing concerns about the loss of national sovereignty in security and defense, the French Assembly refused to ratify the EDC Treaty.[5]

Following the failure to establish the EDC, an alternative method was needed to address the question of German rearmament. The solution was the creation of the Western European Union (WEU) through the signing of the Modified Brussels Treaty of October 1954. This treaty allowed West Germany and Italy to enter a six-year-old military assistance pact among France, Great Britain, and the Benelux countries. Interestingly, the treaty's article IV foreshadowed the arguments and concerns that forty-five years later would also be at the heart of the debate on ESDP: "Recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council [of the WEU] and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters."[6] In practice, responsibility for military affairs was de facto passed to NATO. When the WEU was stripped of its potential as a site for independent European defense cooperation, the Europeans also lost the opportunity to use their own military capabilities in pursuit of their own foreign policy choices.

The second French attempt to get the Six to act as one in foreign policy and defense also failed. With the Fouchet plans of 1960 and 1962, Paris proposed creating a "European Union" with a common foreign and defense policy on the basis of purely intergovernmental cooperation outside the framework of the existing ECSC and European Economic Community (EEC). The subsequent negotiations broke down because the other EEC partners feared that the French plans were aimed at undermining both the Atlantic Alliance and the EEC and its supranational method of integration. In 1965, President de Gaulle withdrew France from the military structures of NATO after America and Britain rejected its request to be on an equal footing with the UK in NATO's military command structure. The French withdrawal and decision to follow its own military and nuclear doctrine led to a fundamental breach between France and the other EEC countries, making European cooperation or integration in the field of security and defense virtually impossible. This would only be reversed through the Franco-British Saint-Malo Declaration of December 1998, which launched the ESDP process, and through the gradual rapprochement between France and NATO, leading to the decision of French president Nicolas Sarkozy to reintegrate France into the military organization of NATO in 2009.

The fundamental choice between organizing security and defense policy within the Atlantic framework or within a purely national setting (for France) turned military security into a taboo in European integration and set the parameters for attempts in the following decades to pursue cooperation and integration in the field of foreign policy. When the EC member states in the early 1970s initiated the first informal cooperation in the field of foreign policy within the framework of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), it was clear that the EC/EPC would manifest itself exclusively as a "civilian power."[7] The EPC lacked both military and civilian crisis managements instruments, which made it impossible for the European countries to give substance to its declarations and initiatives. The constraints of being "a civilian power in an uncivil world" became painfully obvious during the several military conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s.[8] European military impotence during the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s would be the painful consequence of the choices made in the early 1950s. This was particularly painful as neither NATO nor Washington was willing to be involved in the conflict in the initial stage of the Yugoslavia conflict, during the Bosnia war, or in the subsequent Kosovo war. They intervened only later, when tens of thousands of people had already been killed or injured.

These various crises made it impossible for member states to continue to ignore the military dimension of security when negotiating the new Treaty of Maastricht and the new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was to replace the EPC. However, whereas France, Germany, and some other countries were pleading for a "common defense," the Atlantic-oriented and neutral countries opted for minimal changes. Several ambiguous formulas allowed them to overcome this paralysis and to sign the new treaty text in 1992. First, they agreed that "the common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense," as stated in article J.4(1) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). According to article J.4(2) of the same treaty, the Council of Ministers could ask the WEU "to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications." In article J.4(4), the text also incorporated safeguards for neutral and NATO-oriented states, indicating that the new arrangements "shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain member states and shall respect the obligations of certain member states under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defense policy established within that framework."

A closer look at the treaty made it clear that the UK and other member states had conceded much on words and symbols, but nothing on substance

and practice. The TEU included the term "defense" and referred to "all areas of foreign and security policy," but the member states had not provided the EU with its own instruments and institutions to allow it to become active in the field of crisis management or conflict prevention. Also, the intended more intensive cooperation with the WEU proved illusory. This reflected the fundamental rejection by the UK (and also the United States) of any involvement by the EU or the WEU in military security matters. Not surprisingly, also after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty the EU demonstrated impotence in the Balkans, which further discredited the CFSP.[9]

The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 strengthened the relationship between the EU and the WEU. The EU gained access to the WEU's operational capability for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (the "Petersberg tasks"). The EU was also to "foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the EU." However, the new provisions on EU-WEU relations were quickly overtaken by a new dynamic, leading to the European Security and Defense Policy.

The Establishment and Development of the ESDP

In the space of a few years, the military dimension, which had for decades been taboo in the process of European integration, became one of the spearheads of EU foreign policy. This was made possible because the member states managed to sufficiently overcome two areas of tension that had paralyzed EU foreign policy: European integration versus Atlantic solidarity and civilian power versus military power.[10] The first area of tension was tackled through intensive high-level negotiations among Paris, London, Berlin, and Washington, while the second was overcome by carefully balancing the NATO states and the EU's neutral states and by complementing new *military* crisis management tools with *civilian* crisis management tools.

This new-found flexibility in the mindset of member states was mainly triggered by the Kosovo crisis, which increased frustration in the capitals of the three largest EU member states and in Washington over Europe's military impotence and dependence on the United States. Most European countries, particularly the UK and France, recognized that Europe had to take more responsibility for security in Europe and that the EU had to become more than merely a civilian power. The British government, under Prime Minister Tony Blair, adopted a more pro-European attitude than the previous British government. It recognized that strengthening Europe's military capacities was essential to rebalance

transatlantic relations and thus to safeguard the future of NATO. In Paris, after the debacle in Kosovo, political leaders assumed a more pro-Atlantic attitude and demonstrated a greater willingness to cooperate with NATO.

These moves were sealed in several agreements between the main capitals and within the context of the EU with all partners. The Saint-Malo Declaration of December 1998, signed by President Jacques Chirac of France and Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom, provided the political basis for the establishment of ESDP. This Franco-British declaration was less a meeting of vision than a compromise between two opposing views on European security. Nevertheless, getting Britain and France to move toward common ground was the fundamental prerequisite for the start-up of the ESDP. In their "Joint Declaration on European Defense" adopted in Saint-Malo, Blair and Chirac agreed that "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises." It was emphasized that Europe would be "contributing to the vitality of a modernized Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defense of its members."[11] These two sentences in the Saint-Malo Declaration perfectly reflected the traditional priorities of Paris and London, thereby bringing them together in one text and paving the way for further progress within the EU context.

Only half a year after the Franco-British declaration, the EU member states at the Cologne European Council of June 1999 adopted the goal to establish a European Security and Defense Policy in the EU.[12] In their conclusions, the EU member states repeated practically verbatim the two sentences cited above, as well as other crucial parts of the Saint-Malo Declaration. This set a pattern that would be followed in other important ESDP steps, with London and Paris (as well as Berlin and, from behind the scenes, also Washington) effectively pre-cooking decisions that were subsequently also accepted by the other member states.

The quick succession of new steps in the following years demonstrated that the EU member states took the new ESDP objective quite seriously and were willing to move beyond the declaratory level. Half a year after the Cologne summit, the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999 made the commitment to develop the capacity to deploy military forces (known as the "Helsinki Headline Goal"; see below), as well as decisions on the institutional setup of the ESDP. Within the framework of the Council, a standing Political and Security Committee (composed of national representatives at the ambassadorial level), an EU Military Committee (composed of the member states' chiefs of defense), and an EU Military Staff (which provides the requisite military expertise) were to be created.[13]

On the initiative of Sweden and Finland, the EU member states also agreed to develop civilian crisis management capabilities. After the experience in Bosnia, the situation in Kosovo had again strengthened their arguments that civilian crisis management was an essential complement to military crisis management in order to achieve stability over the longer term.[14] The European Council of June 2000 in Feira defined four priority areas for the EU to develop civilian capabilities: police, rule of law, civil administration, and civil protection, with security sector reform and monitoring missions being added to the priorities in a later stage. Reflecting the fact that the member states were serious in establishing the ESDP, the member states started a series of capability commitment conferences in order to evaluate the available military and civilian capabilities immediately after the Helsinki and Feira meetings. They were meant to assess shortfalls and to set out concrete targets and pledges regarding military and civilian personnel and crisis management instruments.[15]

The ESDP, NATO, and the United States

One of the most difficult aspects of establishing the ESDP was clarifying the relationship with NATO and the United States (as well as with Turkey). The administration of U.S. president Bill Clinton had called for increased European military efforts and in principle had a positive attitude toward the development of the ESDP. It thereby reversed the historic U.S. opposition to the Europeans developing autonomous military capabilities. However, this was on condition that the EU avoided the "three Ds", as formulated by the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright: no decoupling (of ESDP from NATO); no duplication (of capabilities); and no discrimination (against non-EU NATO members).[16] The thorny issue of EU access to NATO military assets and command structures was resolved by the December 2002 Berlin Plus Arrangements, which would govern relations between the EU and NATO in crisis management. Under these arrangements, the EU can either conduct an operation autonomously by making use of the operational headquarters of one of the member states or use NATO assets and capabilities. If it opts for the second alternative, the EU can ask for access to NATO's planning facilities, can request that NATO make available a NATO European command option for an EU-led military operation, and can request the use of NATO capabilities. The Berlin Plus arrangements were both pragmatic and symbolic: pragmatic because the Europeans lacked the core equipment and logistics necessary to conduct major military operations within the ESDP framework, symbolic because it also institutionalized for many member states the essential interlinking of the EU with NATO.

The December 2002 agreement on the Berlin Plus arrangements came just in time for the EU to take over the NATO operation Allied Harmony in the former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in January 2003 (through the EU's first-ever military operation, Operation Concordia), followed in 2004 by the takeover of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina (through the then 7,000-strong EU Force Althea [EUFOR Althea] mission of the EU). In 2003, the EU's first military operation under the Berlin Plus arrangement was followed quickly by the first military operation conducted through the "Europeanized" national operational headquarters of a member state, which was also the first operation outside the European continent (Operation Artemis, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with France providing the operational headquarters) and the first civilian crisis management operation (the EU Police Missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). In short, less than three years after the decision of the European Council in Cologne to establish an ESDP and to break the forty-five-year-old taboo on defense, the EU had not only created the necessary institutional and instrumental apparatus, but had also moved to operational action.

These first operations were followed in fairly rapid succession by other military and civilian operations in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia (see table 3-1). By May 2009, the EU had conducted (or was still conducting) twenty-three ESDP operations, including six military crisis management operations and seventeen civilian crisis management operations, nine operations in Europe (mainly the Balkans), nine in Africa, and five in the Middle East and Asia.[17] These ranged from rather small operations such as the EU border assistance mission in the Palestinian Territories (with a staff of only twenty) to very extensive missions, such as EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina (which still has 2,200 soldiers) and the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo (with 1,700 international staff and 800 local staff).

Remarkably, the establishment of the ESDP and its subsequent development were possible despite the open conflict between the EU member states (and between some EU member states and the United States) during the Iraq crisis and the invasion in Iraq in 2002–03. Progress in the field of security and defense might have been expected to be impossible in view of the painful disagreement between those member states that actively participated in the American-led military invasion of Iraq (led by the UK and including most central and eastern European countries) and the countries that actively opposed the war, which they considered both illegitimate and detrimental to global and Western security (led by France and Germany).[18] Instead, the dramatic events provided new impetus to the ESDP.

First, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq painfully demonstrated the limitations of European military capabilities, leading to new commitments within the ESDP to tackle some of these shortfalls through new Headline Goal (including

Table 3-1. *Overview of ESDP Operations, 2003–09*

Operation	Type of Mission	Scope
BALKANS		
Operation Concordia (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM, 2003)	Military (Berlin Plus)	400 forces
EUPM (Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2003–09)	Police	166 international police officers, 35 international civilian staff, and 220 Bosnia-Herzegovina staff
Operation Proxima (FYROM, 2003–05)	Police	200 police experts
EUFOR Althea (Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2004–)	Military (Berlin Plus)	2,200 forces
EUPAT (FYROM 2005–06)	Police	30 police advisers
EULEX KOSOVO (Kosovo, 2008–10, open to extension)	Police/Rule of law	1,710 international and 825 local police officials, judges, prosecutors
CAUCASUS		
EUJUST Themis (Georgia, 2004–05)	Rule of law	10 international civilian experts
Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (2005–07)	Border assistance mission	69 experts and 50 local support staff
EUMM Georgia (Georgia, 2008–09, open to extension)	Monitoring mission	340 staff (personnel in headquarters and field offices, monitors)
AFRICA		
Operation Artemis (DR Congo, 2003)	Military autonomous (EU Operational HQ in France)	1,700 forces
EUPOL Kinshasa (DR Congo, 2005–07)	Police	Approx 30 staff
EUFOR RD Congo (DR Congo, 2006)	Military autonomous (EU Operational HQ in Germany)	Over 1,000 forces; a rapid force available
EUSEC RD Congo (DR Congo, 2005–09)	Security sector reform	60 staff
DARFUR EU support to Amis II (Sudan, 2005–06)	Civilian-military	31 police officers, 17 military experts and 10 military observers

(table continues)

Table 3-1. *Overview of ESDP Operations, 2003–09*

Operation	Type of Mission	Scope
EUPOL RD Congo (DR Congo, 2007–10)	Police	53 international and 9 local staff
EUFOR TCHAD/RCA (Chad, 2008–09)	Military autonomous (EU Operational HQ in France)	3,700 troops
EU SSR Guinea-Bissau (Guinea-Bissau, 2008–09)	Security sector reform	19 international and 13 local staff
EU NAVFOR Somalia (operation Atalanta) (Somalia, 2008–)	Military autonomous maritime operation (EU Operational HQ in UK)	1,500 forces
MIDDLE EAST		
EUJUST LEX (Iraq, 2005–09)	Rule of law	800 judges and police officers
EUBAM Rafah (Palestinian Territories, 2005–09)	Border assistance mission	20 EU staff and 7 local staff
EUPOL COPPS (Palestinian Territories, 2005–10)	Police	41 EU staff and 16 local staff
ASIA		
Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) (Aceh, 2005–06)	Monitoring mission	Approx. 80 unarmed personnel
EUPOL Afghanistan (Afghanistan, 2007–10)	Police	225 international and 123 local staff

Source: Council of the European Union, *European Security and Defence Policy: Operations, 2009* (www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=en).

Note: Situation as of May 2009. For a more comprehensive and continuously updated version of this table, see the Online Resource Guide "Exploring EU Foreign Policy" (http://soc.kuleuven.be/iieb/eufp/content/cfspesdp).

the decision to develop the EU Battlegroup Concept). Second, and more important, with its new military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan and its new "war on terror," it became clear that the United States would be unable and unwilling to maintain its extensive military presence in the Balkans, implying that the Europeans should prepare to assume these responsibilities. Washington also wanted NATO and its NATO partners to gradually shift attention to the new security challenges that it considered more important than the situation in the Balkans. In this sense, it was not by chance that the Berlin Plus Agreements were adopted and that the EU for the first time took over a NATO operation in the months preceding the invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

As a sign of the member states' willingness to proceed with the ESDP, progress was not hampered by the French and Dutch rejection of the 2004 European Constitution or the Irish rejection of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty. Despite the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, new ESDP operations were launched and the European Defense Agency was established. Nor did the difficulty getting the Lisbon Treaty of December 2007 ratified stop the EU from launching its largest civilian crisis management operation (EULEX Kosovo) and its first military autonomous maritime operation, EU Naval Force (NAVFOR) Somalia in 2008. The new Lisbon Treaty, if entered into force after a positive Irish referendum, will in the first place institutionalize the existing setup of ESDP.[19] It will thus not fundamentally alter the basic rules of the game of the ESDP.[20]

Military Crisis Management Instruments and Operations

This section and the next look in more detail at the military and civilian crisis management instruments available to the EU and the nature of ESDP operations.

The 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal is at the basis of the EU's military capabilities. The Helsinki European Council decided that, in "cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, member states must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 50,000–60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks."[21] These tasks include humanitarian and rescue activities, peacekeeping, and the tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (with joint disarmament operations and support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform added to this list in 2004). This formulation of the Helsinki Headline Goal implicitly points to two fundamental principles of ESDP, which together underline the parameters and also limitations of ESDP. The first principle is related to the objectives of ESDP: in contrast to what its title might indicate, the ESDP is not at all involved in the territorial defense of the EU member states. On the contrary, it focuses on various dimensions of crisis management. And it is also clear that the ESPD is not conceived for large-scale military operations (such as those in Iraq or Afghanistan). The second principle is related to methodology: European military capabilities are not achieved by creating permanent European forces, and even less by establishing a permanent European army, but are based on the voluntary and temporary contribution of member states to operations conducted in the framework of the ESDP.

Whereas the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal was largely inspired by the context of the Balkan wars, the New Headline Goal 2010 (HG2010), adopted by the European Council in June 2004, reflected the new security context after 2001 and the experience with the rapid reaction force used in Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).[22] With HG2010, the member states

endorsed a list of high-profile initiatives aimed at reducing the remaining short-falls in military capability, including the establishment of a European Defense Agency and the goal to increase capacity in strategic lift. In terms of soldiers, attention shifted from the capacity to deploy 50,000–60,000 troops (the Helsinki Headline Goal) to the Battlegroup Concept. The Battlegroup implied a more limited number of troops but was meant to increase the capacity for rapid reaction.[23] For the EU, a battlegroup consists of 1,500–2,000 troops with appropriate support at a high state of readiness (deployable within fifteen days) and capable of high-intensity operations. On paper, the EU should be able to concurrently deploy two battlegroups for a period of between thirty and 120 days. They can be formed by one nation or a group of nations, with two battlegroups being on standby for a six-month period. For instance, in the first half of 2010 a Polish-led battlegroup (with troops from Poland, Germany, Lithuania, Latvia, and Slovakia) and a British-Dutch battlegroup are on standby, with two other battlegroups taking over in the second half of the year.

From the start, doubts have been raised about the effectiveness of the Battlegroup Concept, in view of the operational challenges of the half-yearly rotation system, the different capabilities of the various battlegroups, problems of financing, and dependence on the agreement of the countries that take part in the multilateral battlegroups that are on standby. The latter proved to be a major stumbling block, as countries on several occasions were unwilling to use their battlegroup for an envisioned operation or could not reach a consensus about the modalities. This was the case with Germany with regard to military mission in the DRC in 2006, with the Nordic battlegroup in the discussion of a mission in Chad in 2007, and with the British and the Spanish-Italian battlegroups in 2008–09 in the discussion about sending troops to the DRC. By the spring of 2009, the battlegroup had not yet been used in any ESDP military operation.[24]

The result is that several ESDP operations could not be launched because the member states were not willing to battle in risky contexts (such as the DRC in 2008), preferred other multilateral frameworks for crisis management operations (such as the UN for the intervention following the Israel-Lebanon crisis in 2006), or continued to be established on an ad hoc basis, depending on a "coalition of the willing and able" to contribute troops and to use one of the multilateralized operational headquarters (see below).[25] This "ad hocism" also explains why the EU was often not able to provide a "rapid response." For example, half a year or more was needed to deploy the operation for the DRC election in 2006 and in Chad in 2008. On the other hand, the deployment of EU NAVFOR Somalia indicates that the EU in some circumstances is able to react rather swiftly and that flexible ad hoc solutions, with contributions from countries

that can make a real difference in a specific context, can be more appropriate than predetermined battlegroups.

The limited "European" and "integrated" nature of military crisis management also becomes clear from the three options available for the military headquarters ESDP operations. The first option, under the Berlin Plus arrangements, is to make use of NATO's operational headquarters located at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) in Belgium, with NATO's Deputy SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) being the operation commander. This option was used for only two operations in the Balkans: Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (with 400 forces) and Operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina (initially 7,000 forces, reduced to 2,500 in 2007). As indicated before, the EU in both cases took over responsibility from NATO, which meant in practice that the majority of the soldiers replaced their NATO badges with EU badges, and that the Deputy SACEUR, not the SACEUR, was the operation commander.

The second option, for "autonomous" ESDP operations, is to use facilities provided by one of the operational headquarters made available by five EU member states (France, the UK, Germany, Italy, and Greece). These are then "multinationalized" for the EU operation. In this case, the operational commander is also provided by the member state providing the headquarters. This option was chosen for Operation Artemis in the DRC and EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic (both using the French headquarters), for Operation EUFOR DRC (using the German headquarters), and most recently for EU NAVFOR Somalia (using the British headquarters). Operation Artemis in 2003, with some 1,700 forces involved, was aimed at the stabilization of security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunya in the northeastern part of the DRC, awaiting UN troop reinforcements (from MONUC, the French acronym for UN Mission DR Congo). Operation EUFOR DR Congo in 2006, with 1,000 forces and an additional rapid reaction force in reserve, helped to secure the region during the elections in Congo (again in support of MONUC). EUFOR Chad/RCA in 2008–09, including 3,700 troops, was a bridging operation for the UN mission in the Central African Republic and Chad. It protected civilians in danger and the UN staff, and facilitated humanitarian aid. EU NAVFOR Somalia or Operation Atalanta, with 1,500 forces, started in late 2008, with the objective of protecting vessels off the Somali coast against acts of piracy.

The third option is to command operations of up to 2,000 troops and civilian experts from Brussels through an integrated Civil-Military Operations Center (OpsCen) within the EU Military Staff (EUMS) under the command of a designated operation commander. This EU 0perations Center is not a standing headquarters, but can be activated through the small joint Civilian-Military Cell

(Civ-Mil Cell) that has been established within the EU Military Staff.[26] An EU operations center would consist mainly of "double-hatted" personnel from the EUMS and from member states, implying that virtually no extra personnel were provided to the EU. As such, in its final form, the civilian-military cell was far from the autonomous military headquarters originally proposed by France and Germany, but went beyond London's original position. By mid-2009, this third option had not yet been used, reflecting the continuing reluctance of member states to allow the EU to have its own operational headquarters.

Civilian Crisis Management Instruments and Operations

As noted earlier, the June 2000 European Council in Feira defined four priority areas in which the EU should develop civilian capabilities (police, strengthening the rule of law, civil administration, and civil protection), with two additional priority areas defined later (monitoring missions and generic support capabilities). The Civilian Headline Goal 2008, which was adopted in 2004, included clear objectives for these six agreed priority areas.[27] The EU aimed to be capable of carrying out any police operation, from strengthening missions (advisory, assistance, and training tasks) to substitution missions (where the international force acts as a substitute for local police forces). From a pool of more than 5,000 police officers, 1,400 are to be deployable in less than thirty days. Rule-of-law missions, similar to police missions, were to be capable of both strengthening and temporarily substituting for the local judiciary or legal system. The member states committed 200 judges and prosecutors, some portion of whom were to be deployable within thirty days. Under the civilian administration rubric, a pool of more than 500 experts had to be created, capable of carrying out civilian administration missions to provide basic services that the national or local administration is unable to offer (covering fields such as elections and taxation). In civil protection, the objective was to develop assessment and/or coordination teams of ten experts that could be dispatched within seven hours, as well as intervention teams of up to 2,000 people and additional specialized services. More than 500 experts have been committed to establish a monitoring capability, with possible missions including border monitoring, human rights monitoring, and observing the general political situation. Finally, the generic support capabilities to support the work of EU special representatives or form part of multifaceted ESDP missions are to consist of a pool of 400 personnel, including experts in fields such as human rights, political affairs, mediation, media affairs, security sector reform (SSR), and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR).

In quantitative terms, member states managed to substantially exceed their targets, at least on paper. However, shortfalls were identified in mission and planning support capability, financing, the ability to deploy on short notice,

common training and exercises, institutional memory, partnerships with other international and local actors, procurement, and capability requirements (particularly judges and staff with financial expertise). The EU's civilian capacity was less integrated than expected and the capacity goals for 2008 in fact quickly seemed to be unattainable, with progress afterwards also very limited.[28] In November 2008, the EU member states agreed to develop new strategies for civilian crisis management and also adopted a declaration of strengthening capabilities.[29] In this declaration they indicated that the EU should be able to conduct "two major stabilization and reconstruction operations, with a suitable civilian component," as well as "around a dozen ESDP civilian missions" of varying formats, "together with a major mission (possibly up to 3,000 experts) which could last several years." However, these goals reflected more the existing situation than they did a clear strategy for the future.

Institutionally, on the political level the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) was established to give advice to the Political and Security Committee and Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and to ensure follow-up on civilian crisis management capabilities and operations. On the operational level, the joint Civilian-Military Cell served as the locus for the civilian crisis management operations. The EU's capacity to conduct civilian operations and to integrate capabilities can be expected to further improve as a result of the establishment within the Council's General Secretariat of the new Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), which since late 2008 is responsible for planning, deployment, conduct, and review of civilian crisis management.

However, on the institutional and administrative level the civilian component of the ESDP remains hindered by several specific problems. First, in quantitative terms, the number of people working for the civilian side of the ESDP is markedly smaller than its military counterpart, which is paradoxical since there are many more civilian operations than military operations and because the number of civilian ESDP operations is growing. Furthermore, while the military has the possibility of recourse to NATO or national headquarters for planning and operational control, the EU staff working on civilian operations cannot rely on backup from external planning entities.

Second, problems of consistency and coordination follow from the relationship between the ESDP's civilian capabilities and the civilian crisis management instruments of the EU's first pillar, which are largely managed by the European Commission. These partially complementary, partially overlapping competencies of the EC and the ESDP can be positive when the various initiatives indeed complement and strengthen each other, but can also undermine the consistency and effectiveness of the EU's crisis management policy if they give rise to turf

battles between ESDP actors and the European Commission and to an ineffi-
cient use of resources. Third, civilian crisis management implies that a wider set
of national actors are becoming involved in the ESDP. This makes the prepara-
tion and management of civilian operations much more complicated and leads
to major challenges for consistency and coordination among actors. In addition
to foreign and defense ministers, ministries of interior affairs, justice, finance,
and others are also involved, each with its own bureaucracy, procedure, and cul-
ture. Moreover, most of these actors had no or only limited traditional experi-
ence in extracting judges, police, and civilian experts from their domestic duties
to undertake foreign missions.

The two main areas of EU civilian crisis management are the Balkans and
the DRC, which complement the military-civilian crisis management opera-
tions of the EU in these two areas. The most important, comprehensive, and vis-
ible civilian operation is EULEX Kosovo, with 1,800 European police officials,
judges, prosecutors, and other specialists involved since 2008 in assisting and
supporting the Kosovo authorities in three major areas of the rule of law: police,
the judiciary, and customs.

Since 2003, the EU has also conducted the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, with around 500 police officers and other staff supporting the
local police, to develop independence and accountability, to create capacity
and institutions and, increasingly important, to fight organized crime. By mid-
2009, the only other mission on the European continent was the EU Monitoring
Mission in Georgia, with a staff of 340 personnel who monitor the stabiliza-
tion process and the compliance of the parties to the six-point agreement of
August 2008.[30] Following two more modest civilian operations in that country,
the main civilian crisis management operation in DRC is EUPOL RD Congo,
which since 2007 has assisted the Congolese authorities in its security sector
reform with around fifty international staff.[31] Other active ESDP missions out-
side the European continent in the spring of 2009 were: the rule of law mission
EUJUST LEX, which since 2005 has provided training for judges, magistrates,
and senior police (mainly outside Iraq); the police mission EUPOL Afghanistan,
which since 2007 has mentored, advised, and trained a sustainable and effective
civilian police force under Afghan ownership; and the rather modest mission in
Guinea-Bissau, which since 2008 has provided advice and assistance on security
sector reform in Guinea-Bissau.[32]

Assessment

How can we evaluate these various crisis management operations and the ESDP
in general?[33] Looking first at the operations, it is clear that the assessment will be

different depending on the criteria used and the perspectives adopted. From a historical perspective, some clear trends can be detected, which together testify to the growth of the ESDP. Nicoletta Pirozzi and Sammi Sandawi see the following operational trends: globalization of the operational area (from an initial focus on the Balkans to the eastern part of the European continent, the Middle East, Africa, and even Asia); the expansion of the operational spectrum and objectives (from military crisis management to a widening spectrum of civilian crisis management); an increasing interaction between civilian and military operations and blurring of this divide; a growing intertwining of the first and second EU pillars; and an evolving capability development process.[34]

However, growth in the range of ESDP operations is paralleled by a series of shortcomings and related challenges. Beside those already mentioned, there is a need to pay more attention to quality, since in the past the main concern was often quantitative, centered on finding enough soldiers and civilians for the missions; the need to envisage the possibility of more risky operations; the need to increase the efficiency of interaction with other (local and international) actors involved in a conflict; and the need to tackle the increasingly complex interventions that cover the entire crisis management cycle, including issues such as institution building and security sector reform.[35] The latter also points to one of the innovative developments in the civilian crisis management operations of the ESDP and of the EU at large: the increasing focus on structural crisis management as part of a broader structural foreign and security policy, a policy that seeks to influence or shape sustainable political, legal, socioeconomic, security, and mental structures on various levels.[36]

When assessing ESDP operations from the perspective of the effectiveness, efficiency, and added value provided by these missions, the story becomes even more complicated. For instance, a large military operation such as that in Bosnia-Herzegovina can seem to be effective, but this may be mainly the result of the close link to NATO and the remaining security guarantee of the United States. Missions such as Operation Artemis in the DRC and the mission in Aceh might have been rather limited in time and terms of mandate, but can nevertheless have been important and valuable.

With the exception of the missions in the Balkans, it is clear that the scope of most ESDP operations was or is too limited to make a real difference. And in some of the main conflict areas in the world like the Middle East, Darfur, and Afghanistan, the contribution of the ESDP is at best symbolic, although it is fair to say that the sometimes more robust interventions of other international actors were not more successful in these areas. In this context, it is also important to take into account that, for many member states, the purpose of launching ESDP operations is not primarily about having an impact on a crisis, but also about

proving that European integration is progressing (despite all the problems in the EU) and about managing and balancing the different interests among member states (or between the European Union and the United States).[37]

Looking at the ESDP at large, a historical perspective also leads to different conclusions based on criteria such as relevance, legitimacy, visibility, and coherence. Considering that the military dimension was a taboo in the preceding decades, that ESDP operations only started in 2003, and that civilian crisis management is a fairly new domain of conflict management, it is fair to say that the speed of change in the ESDP has been rather impressive. The ESDP has been able to move forward while being increasingly perceived by the member states as a positive-sum game in which the added value of military and civilian ESDP missions, in addition to acting unilaterally and/or interventions through NATO or the UN, is recognized in a growing number of situations. The time lag between the rhetoric and the reality of civilian and military operations has indeed been relatively small. Moreover, from this perspective, it is also inevitable that such a process is accompanied by the problems, ambiguities, and shortcomings that have been discussed.

However, there is also a paradox in this evolution, which is mainly related to the relationship between the ESDP and the CFSP. One the one hand, the ESDP qualitatively changed the nature of CFSP and resulted in an "upgrade" of the EU's foreign policy. It allowed the CFSP to move from a declaratory foreign policy focused on diplomacy to a more action-oriented foreign policy focused on proactive crisis management. For the first time, the member states succeeded in developing a framework to effectively pool national resources within the CFSP. And although still limited in scope, the EU finally had boots on the ground. This strengthened both the credibility of the High Representative and other EU negotiators when dealing with third parties or mediating conflicts. It also increased the EU's potential effectiveness in its foreign policy on specific issues, as it now has a bigger toolbox.

On the other hand, there is real risk inherent in an enhanced ESDP without a sufficiently developed European foreign policy. The development of the ESDP and military and civilian crisis management operations has not been matched by parallel efforts on a common foreign policy. The ESDP operations can indeed be misleading, giving the impression that the EU has an agreed, clear, coherent, and comprehensive policy toward the issues at stake and in foreign policy in general. Agreement on ESDP operations is sometimes a surrogate for a coherent common foreign policy on specific issues. Even Kosovo and Central Africa are examples of areas where the EU member states were able to agree to ESDP operations, but where they nevertheless have major political disagreements on the fundamentals of these crises.[38] Moreover, with the exception of the

operations in the Balkans, no other ESDP operation really answers the urgent strategic needs of the European Union.

The European security strategy adopted in 2003 and slightly adapted by late 2008 does not provide clear clues about when, where, and under what conditions the EU should initiate ESDP operations.[39] This political and strategic ambiguity can also be considered the Achilles' heel of the ESDP. It might become particularly apparent when an ESDP operation runs into real trouble, for example as a result of an escalation of violence and geographic spread of a conflict, including a high number of casualties. Within this context, even though the ESDP has emerged as one of the spearheads of EU foreign policy, it may prove to have been mainly a symbolic spearhead, which does not pass the test when confronted with "real" violent crises.

Notes

1. This chapter draws to a major extent on the analysis in S. Keukeleire and J. Mac-Naughtan, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), as well as on a series of interviews with diplomats and civil servants of the EU and EU member states conducted in April 2009. For recent comprehensive studies of ESDP, see J. Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); M. Merlingen and R. Ostrauskaite, eds., *The European Security and Defence Policy: Operationalisation, Impact and Context* (London: Routledge, 2007); M. Merlingen and R. Ostrauskaite, eds., *European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation Perspective* (London: Routledge, 2007); F. Mérand, *European Defence Policy: Beyond the Nation State* (Oxford University Press, 2008). For other sources, see http://www.exploring-europe.eu/foreignpolicy.

2. For a comprehensive analysis of the evolution from the European Defense Community (EDC) to the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), see S. Duke, *The Elusive Quest for European Security: from EDC to CFSP* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999).

3. See D. P. Calleo, "Early American Views of NATO: Then and Now," in *The Troubled Alliance: Atlantic Relations in the 1980s*, edited by L. Freedman (London: Heinemann, 1983), pp. 7–27; D. Cook, *Forging the Alliance: NATO, 1945–1950* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1989).

4. Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, *Foreign Policy,* p. 10.

5. For a comprehensive analysis of the EDC, see E. Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History* (London: Macmillan, 1980). For the basic documents, see C. Hill and K. E. Smith, *European Foreign Policy: Key Documents* (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 16–32.

6. Hill and Smith, *European Foreign Policy*, pp. 40–41.

7. F. Duchêne, "Europe's Role in World Peace," in *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans look Ahead*, edited by R. Mayne (London: Collins, 1972), pp. 32–47.

8. A. Pijpers, "The Twelve Out-of-Area: A Civilian Power in an Uncivil World?" in *European Political Cooperation in the 1980's*, edited by A. Pijpers, E. Regelsberger, and W. Wessels (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), p. 143. For a detailed analysis of the EPC, see Pijpers, Regelsberger, and Wessels, *European Political Cooperation in the 1980's*, and S. Nuttall, *European Political Co-operation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).

9. For an analysis of the genesis and first years of the CFSP, see S. Nuttall, *European Foreign Policy* (Oxford University Press, 2000); M. Holland, ed., *Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Record and Reforms* (London: Pinter, 1997); E. Regelsberger, P. de Schoutheete de Tervarent, and W. Wessels, eds., *Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1997).

10. For an analysis of these and other cleavages and areas of tension in determining EU foreign policy, see Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, *Foreign Policy,* pp. 8–19.

11. See the full text of the Saint-Malo Declaration in M. Rutten, "From St-Malo to Nice: European Defence: Core Documents," Chaillot Paper 47 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2001), pp. 8–9.

12. European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, Cologne: June 1999.

13. For an analysis of the institutional framework, see J. Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 61–91. On the role of the PSC in the ESDP, see S. Duke, "The Linchpin COPS: Assessing the Workings and Institutional Relations of the Political and Security Committee," European Institute for Public Administration Working Papers 5, no. 35 (Archive of European Integration, 2005); A. E. Juncos and C. Reynolds, "The Political and Security Committee: Governing in the Shadow," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 12, no. 2 (2007): 127–47.

14. On the role of Sweden and Finland, see H. Ojanen, "Participation and Influence: Finland, Sweden and the Post-Amsterdam Development of the CFSP," Occasional Paper 11 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2000), pp. 1–26.

15. B. Schmitt, "European Capabilities: How Many Divisions?" in *EU Security and Defense Policy: The First Five Years (1999–2004)*, edited by N. Gnesotto (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2004), pp. 89–110; E. J. Stewart, "Capabilities and Coherence? The Evolution of European Union Conflict Prevention," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 13, no 2 (2008): 229–53.

16. M. Rutten, "From St.-Malo to Nice," pp. 10–12.

17. For more detailed information and formal documents on all ESDP operations, see the website of the Council of the European Union (European Security and Defense Policy: Operations): www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=en. For regular updates and analysis of ESDP operations, see the bimonthly "European Security Review" of ISIS Europe (www.isis-europe.org).

18. P. Van Ham, "The EU's War over Iraq: The Last Wake-Up Call," in *European Foreign Policy: From Rhetoric to Reality?* edited by D. Mahncke, A. Ambos, and C. Reynolds (Oxford: Peter Lang Verlag, 2004), pp. 209–26.

19. A second referendum is planned in Ireland in the second half of 2009.

20. The implications of the Lisbon Treaty are discussed in this book in the chapter by Nicola Verola. See also the comprehensive analysis in B. Angelet and I. Vrailas, "European Defence in the Wake of the Lisbon Treaty," Egmont Paper 21 (Ghent: Royal Institute for

International Relations, 2008), pp. 1–62; S. Biscop and F. Algieri, "The Lisbon Treaty and ESDP: Transformation and Integration," Egmont Paper 24 (Ghent: Royal Institute for International Relations, 2008), pp. 1–53; R. Whitman and A. Juncos, "The Lisbon Treaty and the Foreign, Security and Defence Policy: Reforms, Implementation and the Consequences of (Non-)ratification," *European Affairs Review* 14, no 1 (2009): 25.

21. European Council, *Presidency Conclusions—Helsinki Headline Goal* (Helsinki, December 2009), pp. 10–11. These tasks were labeled the "Petersberg tasks" because they were initially defined by in a WEU meeting in 1992 in Petersberg, Germany.

22. See European Council, *Presidency Conclusions—Headline Goal 2010* (Brussels, June 17–18, 2004).

23. G. Lindstrom, "Enter the EU Battlegroups," Chaillot Paper 97 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2007), p. 97.

24. C. Mölling, "EU Battlegroups 2007: Where Next?" *European Security Review* 31 (December 2006): 7–10.; Lindstrom, "Enter the EU Battlegroups," pp. 57–61; Jean-Yves Haine, "Battle Groups: Out of Necessity, Still a Virtue?," *European Security Review* 39 (2008), pp. 1–5.

25. M. Dembinski, "Europe and the UNIFIL II Mission: Stumbling into the Conflict Zone of the Middle East," *CFSP Forum* 5, no. 1 (2007): 1–4.

26. European Council, *European Defense: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations. Annex to the Presidency Conclusions* (Brussels, December 12–13, 2003).

27. European Council, *Presidency Conclusions—Civilian Headline Goal 2008* (Brussels, December 17, 2004).

28. P. Viggo Jakobsen, "The ESDP and Civilian Rapid Reaction: Adding Value Is Harder Than Expected," *European Security* 15, no. 3 (2006): 299–322; Giji Gya, "Tapping the Human Dimension: Civilian Capabilities in ESDP," *European Security Review* 43 (2009): 2–4.

29. *Council Declaration of 8 December 2008 on the Enhancement of the Capabilities of the European Security and Defense Policy* (16840/08).

30. Completed missions in Europe include: the police missions Operation Proxima and EUPAT in Macedonia (with 200 and thirty advisers respectively); the rule of law mission EUJUST Themis in Georgia to support the reform of the criminal justice system (with around ten experts); and the Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine to help prevent smuggling, trafficking, and customs fraud by providing advice and training (with seventy experts).

31. These are: EUPOL KINSHASA to monitor, mentor, and advise the integrated police units (with thirty staff) and EUSEC RD Congo, which was an advisory and assistance mission for security reform (with eight experts).

32. Completed missions outside Europe were located in Indonesia and the Palestinian Territories. In 2005–06, after the tsunami, the Aceh Monitoring Mission monitored the implementation of the peace agreement. The police mission EUPOL COPPS provided support to the Palestinian Authority in establishing effective policing arrangements, while the border assistance mission EUBAM RAFAH monitored the operations at the border crossing at Rafah in Gaza. In 2005–06, the EU also conducted a mixed civilian-military operation in Sudan: Darfur EU support to Amis II, with sixty police

officers and military experts supporting the African Union in its efforts to address the crisis in Darfur.

33. For recent evaluations of the ESDP, see also A. Menon, "Empowering Paradise? The ESDP at Ten," *International Affairs* 85, no. 2 (2009): 227–46; A. J. K. Bailes, "The EU and a 'Better World': What Role for the European Security and Defense Policy?" *International Affairs* 84, no. 1 (2008): 115–30.

34. Nicoletta Pirozzi and Sammi Sandawi, "Five years of ESDP in Action: Operations, Trends, Shortfalls," *European Security Review* 39 (2008): 14–17.

35. Ibid. On SSR, see D. Spence and P. Fluri, eds., *The European Union and Security Sector Reform* (London: John Harper, 2008).

36. Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, *Foreign Policy*, pp. 25–28; Stephan Keukeleire, Robin Thiers, and Arnout Justaert, "Reappraising Diplomacy: Structural Diplomacy and the Case of the European Union," in "Special Issue: The European Union and Diplomacy," edited by Brian Hocking and Jozef Batora, *Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 4, no. 2 (2009): 143–65.

37. Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, *Foreign Policy*, pp. 189–91. On the difference between "external" objectives and "internal" (integration, identity, and interrelational) objectives, see pp. 12–14.

38. EULEX Kosovo is the largest civilian crisis management mission of the EU, but the member states did not manage to agree on the fundamental issue of the formal recognition of an independent Kosovo. And the DRC is, after the Balkans, the location of most ESDP missions, but the member states still fundamentally disagree on issues related to the Great Lakes Region at large and the relationship between and with Rwanda and the DRC in particular.

39. European Council, *European Security Strategy—A Secure Europe in a Better World* (Brussels, December 12, 2003); Council of the European Union, *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy—Providing Security in a Changing World* (17104/08) (Brussels, December 10, 2008); see also S. Biscop, *The European Security Strategy: A Global Agenda for Positive Power* (Hants, UK: Ashgate, 2005); S. Biscop, ed., "Special Issue—The European Security Strategy 2003–2008: Review and Implementation," *Studia Diplomatica* LXI, no. 3 (2008).