

How state influence on project work organization both drives and mitigates gendered precarity in cultural and creative industries

Abstract

This article develops understanding of gendered precarity in project work by considering how transfer of risk from employer to worker is shaped by the contextual pressures of state policy and organization of the industrial field. The focus is the organization of project work as a condition underpinning the shifting of this risk in a mature field of precarious employment, the cultural and creative industries (CCIs). Our empirical exploration in Film/TV in the UK and Germany, and Dance in Sweden and the Netherlands, examines the dynamic interplay between state policy domains (cultural, social and regulatory), industry-level funding bodies or ‘transaction organizers’ and the cultural processes of CCI project networks. We argue that state-led influences both drive and mitigate the transfer of risk in project work as gendered, racialized and classed. Our framework contributes to broadening employment literature on risk and the disadvantaging capacity of networks to hoard opportunities in project-based labour markets.

Key words: comparative case study, cultural and creative industries, gendered precarity, project work, state.

Introduction

Precarious work, that is ‘work that is uncertain, unstable and insecure and in which employees bear the risks of work’ (Kalleberg, 2018, p.3), is both increasing and disproportionately done by women across different sectors (Paraskevopoulou, 2020). This article explores gendered precarity, conceptualized in the literature as the shifting of financial risk from employer to worker resulting in gendered, racialized, and classed precarious outcomes (Fudge & Owens, 2006). The shifting of financial risk is here understood as steps taken by employers to reduce their known costs and maximise their uncertain profits through workers’ increased employment insecurity (Kalleberg, 2009). We consider lesser-researched aspects of gendered precarity through a wider understanding of the organization of project work in a mature field of employment precarization, the cultural and creative industries (CCIs) (Alacovska, 2021; Comunian & England, 2020; McRobbie, 2016). Following Meardi et al. (2016, p.563) in their review of research on the state and work, we note Kalleberg’s (2009, p.11) warning that studies of precarious work have increasingly ‘focused on topics relating to specific work structures

[and] have thus failed to consider the bigger picture of how people come to occupy different kinds of jobs; and economic and status outcomes of work’.

CCIs offer a useful field to consider this bigger picture because of the well-established gendered divisions in employment access (Conor et al., 2015) and the central place of the project form in its work organization (Handy & Rowlands, 2017; Antcliff et al., 2007). While the project form varies in type dependent on context, it is accepted as being often precarious (Rowlands & Handy, 2012; Whitley, 2006). Extant research has noted increasing use of this form of work organization (i.e. ‘projectification’) (Lundin et al., 2015) in both private and public sector organisations (Greer et al., 2019); hence, the utility of considering CCIs, where project-based working is central and many publicly-funded organizations are increasingly marketized, as in ‘the imposition or intensification of price-based competition’ (Greer & Doellgast, 2017, p. 93).

Umney and Symon (2020, p.4), in their analysis of the UK ‘City of Culture’ scheme, draw on Greer et al.’s (2019) argument that relationships between funding sources and those funded are ‘a determining factor on the extent of ‘projectarian’ insecurity in a given case’. They call for research into the effects of policy and funding interventions on the extent of precarity in cultural project work. This article addresses this call, in accounting for project workers’ lived experiences of gendered precarity embedded in industry and national contexts. We aim for ‘refinement and ongoing development’ of the existing employment literature (Locke & Golden-Bibble 1997, p.1057) by making visible key dynamics between state policy domains (cultural, social and regulatory), industry-level bodies shaping transactions between public and private organizations and their hiring networks, leading to employment outcomes which are precarious and disadvantageous at the level of the worker. To do so, we focus on a relatively under-researched dimension of precarity, which is how project work is organized in CCIs (Peticca-Harris et al., 2015). There are many levels involved in such organization; we focus on contextual effects of state-led funding sources and aspects of governmental policy regimes on quality, quantity and accessibility of employment through networks. Centrally, how do state influences on the organization of project work affect gendered precarity in cultural and creative industries?

We consider two CCI sectors where uncertainty and risk are endemic: film and television production (Film/TV), a regular site in the literature on insecure employment; and dance work (Dance) which, despite entrenched precarity, is little-researched in studies of employment. We examine each sector in two pairs of countries: Film/TV in the UK and Germany, and Dance in Sweden and the Netherlands. These sites provide contrasting evidence with regards to national

policy and regulation contexts and the material dimensions of each industry, including market, funding and employment structures. For example, in Germany Film/TV public funding and subsidies are generous and employment conditions for project workers in public broadcasting are regulated through collective bargaining, whereas both are more variable and weaker in the UK. In Sweden, Dance public funding is given directly both to organisations (which can employ permanent, short- and fixed-term workers), and individual grantees. Conversely, in the Netherlands funding is available only for Dance organisations, and these have experienced fierce competition for funding because of austerity policy measures, thereby increasing the prevalence of insecure working. In Dance we focus on ballet and its national funding sources, as it is the major form of employment, although a small minority of our respondents also work in contemporary dance forms.

Key structures in each sector are networks and funding sources, the latter conceptualized in social services by Greer et al. (2019) as ‘transaction organizers’ (TOs), where the state plays a central role, as considered further below. Employment literature on CCI networks, risk and gendered labour markets has largely not engaged with the influence such institutions have at the level of the individual worker. We address this relative gap by constructing a fuller explanatory account of the conditions producing shifting of risk from employer to worker, generating outcomes that are disproportionately disadvantageous. Our framework explains how ‘risk logics’ (Coles & Eikhof 2021), circulating through project-based hiring CCI networks, are facilitated, if not impelled, by the antecedent pressures of industry-based TOs, and shaped through funding and state policy formation and choices. Our framework contributes to broadening extant employment literature on risk and on disadvantaging effect of networks within project-based CCI labour markets, by clarifying how state-led capacity to organize project work both drives and mitigates the transfer of risk in project work as gendered, racialized and classed.

First, we review the literature examining the CCI project work context relating to gendered-based employment, networks and transaction organizers. We introduce our framework for theorising the unique role of the state in the organization of project work, influencing gendered outcomes in CCI labour markets. As we explain, gendered precarity is influenced by the dynamic interplay between the activities of CCI industry-based TOs, shaped at a distance through state policy formation, choices and the cultural processes (i.e., ‘cultures of recommendation’, ‘cultures of invitation’) of their project hiring networks. The research findings are presented, set out by sector in their national contexts, and the implications of our research and analysis discussed.

CCI project work context: the shifting of risk

CCIs encompass industries organising artistically-related work predominantly around the project form. These industries (including the performing arts, film and television production, media work, and design: see Flew & Cunningham, 2010) produce outputs that are uncertain before and during ‘making’ (Rowlands & Handy, 2012) as are outcomes (Menger, 2014) so that high degrees of financial risk are inherent to these industries (Caves, 2000). Our focus is the attempt to manage this risk through CCI labour markets of multiple temporary job holdings (Townley et al. 2009, pp.941-2). As such, CCIs rely on temporary organizations (projects), to combine flexibility with coordination of a complex division of labour. These creative projects commonly shift a significant amount of the risk of commercial uncertainty from employer to worker in relying for delivery on the self-employed or, often more accurately, the dependent self-employed (i.e. workers who ‘contract to supply their own personal services to the employer and who to some degree are economically dependent on the employer's business’ Burchell et al., 1999, p.1).

Risk rests on a complex and unpredictable relationship with the market in CCIs. A core financial risk is whether a specific product generates sufficient revenues, and so the starting point is always consumer demand uncertainty. In Film/TV, an example is whether an audience will pay to see a film (product) and here, (largely independent) creative content producers are the first layer of workers to which key sources of funding such as public or private broadcasters, shift risk (Franklin, 2018). Producers are then pivotal to the networks through which project workers are recruited and selected, on a highly individualized temporary basis. The degree and nature of this endemic risk is also affected by incentives emerging from differing industry- and country-based market governance regimes (Pratt, 2017): while project-based work has long been a core feature of CCIs, it has been increasing as a result of wider retrenchment, downsizing, fragmentation and restructuring that these industries have been undergoing since the 1990s (Baumann, 2002; McElroy & Noonan 2019).

Short-term pressures, combined with oversupplied labour markets, impel and enable reliance on the known and trusted (Antcliff et al., 2007) as a way to reduce anxieties (Handy & Rowlands, 2017) by ‘reproducing the familiar’ (Dean, 2008: 169). Given the characteristics of the traditionally successful, these pressures entrench gender segmentation both in product, and in how and by whom those products are made (Conor et al., 2015). This is because CCI management of risk, and therefore negotiation of trust, take place within dense networks of social relationships (Banks et al., 2000; Coles & MacNeil 2017); Coles & Eikhof (2021) argue

that gendered risk perceptions and practices, in the form of gatekeeper decision-making, are key in accounting for the under-representation of women screen directors.

In CCIs, gender stereotypes and patterns of occupational segmentation remain distinct, e.g., higher-status cinematographers overwhelmingly men, and lower-status makeup artists, women (Creative Diversity Network 2022, p.20; EENCA, 2020); employment patterns signal that risk is not shifted in gender-neutral ways among the dependent self-employed. In the UK, the employment dominance of narrow demographic categories is clear in the 2020 introduction by the BBC of a 20% ‘inclusion rider’, specifying 20% of its on- and off-screen jobs in new productions must be from ‘a Black, Asian, Minority Ethnic (BAME) background, having a lived experience of a disability, or being from a low-income background.’¹ More widely, although newer global media organizations are reporting significantly increased minority representation, persistent disparities remain. At Netflix, although approximately half of leading positions are occupied by women and minority groups, the number of women in technical production roles (our focus in this article) remains at around one-third, and far lower for racialized minorities ².

In UK Film/TV overall, high-status creative production roles are mainly white middle-class and male-dominated (ScreenSkills, 2019; Randle et al., 2015; Milner & Gregory 2022). For example, in 2018 women comprised only 16% of working film writers in the UK, and only 14% of prime-time TV was written by women (Kreager, 2018), while representation from Black and minority ethnic groups is particularly low in senior TV production roles, such as director (9%), writer (9.6%) and producer (10%) (Creative Diversity Network, 2022, p.28). In UK film crews, a high of 34% women has been reached, but this is far short of women’s participation in the wider workforce, and of the 1,729 sizeable films (minimum 50 crew) released between 2000 and 2017, women comprised 50% of the crew on 8 (Nesta, 2017). In German film, women comprise 22% of directors, a figure which may be linked to the central figure of the producer (only 9% of films were produced by a woman); 14% of screenplays were written by women (Loist & Prommer, 2019); and in film crews, women cinematographers and sound specialists comprised 9% and 3%, similar to the proportions in TV (Hochfeld et al., 2017).

In Dance, in both Sweden and the Netherlands, approximately three-quarters are women and a quarter men (Statistiska Centralbyrån, 2021; CBS, 2020). However, the share of self-

¹ See <https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/bbcstudios/2020/bbc-studios-announces-on-off-air-diversity-inclusion-commitment-new-commissions>

² See <https://about.netflix.com/en/news/netflix-inclusion-report-2021>

employment is higher among female dancers, and in Sweden male dancers have higher median incomes: the top income bracket comprises 59% women and 41% men (Konstnärsmnden, 2016). In an echo of the Film/TV producer-gatekeeper position, in the few Dance organizations receiving structural public funding in the Netherlands, there were 43 male and 9 female choreographers in 2017-2020 (Kerchman & Salet, 2019).

It is established that access to CCI employment is gendered, racialized and classed, and a key contribution is made by Friedman et al. (2017), who find class origin significant for UK actors in achieving and maintaining access to opportunities in a project-based labour market (O'Brien et al. 2017; Randle et al. 2015). This includes: through enabling 'culturally legitimate educational pathways [...] which facilitates key early opportunities' (Friedman et al., 2017, p.1006); survival between jobs (the dominant condition in CCI labour markets); and the ability to live in London, epicenter of UK CCI jobs. However, these class dimensions cannot explain all disadvantage in access, and relative salience of worker characteristics is indicated by the fact that the majority of TV is produced in London, where 13% of the population identify as Black and 18% as South and East Asian, but only comprise respectively 3.3% and 2.6% of TV production roles (Creative Diversity Network, 2022, p.23).

These patterns emerge in time-limited projects where individuals are formally paid by organizations as elements in creation of products. As Clegg and Burdon (2021, p.793) describe in relation to television: 'Production becomes a game of Lego, putting pieces of creative infrastructure together'. From a worker's point of view, 'jumping from project to project' (as a respondent described it) involves regular periods of no work, where people often suffer the limits self-employment status poses when accessing the national social security system, as well as the limits of gendered divisions of caring responsibilities. There are different lenses through which to understand unequal access to these Lego jobs, but most accounts emphasize the relevance to access of networks.

CCI project work context: networks and transaction organizers

As Dean (2007, p.260) notes in relation to oversupplied, individualized CCI labour markets: 'Many work opportunities are not advertised and [...] in an industry notable for its permanently high levels of unemployment, the work grapevine is an unstable resource: key for those in work, but silent for the out of work majority.' Networking is considered the way 'to overcome information asymmetries within the project based political economy of creative production' (Lee, 2011, p.550) and recruitment, training and quality control are informally fulfilled by networks consisting primarily of production managers, heads of department, and established

workers (organizational and freelance) trusted as having necessary knowledge (Eikhof & Warhurst, 2013).

Several studies have explained the place of CCI networks' cultural processes in unequal access to employment. For example, Antcliff et al. (2007) emphasize the importance of power relations in their assessment of UK TV networks' practices and choices, as well as for trust and friendship in a fragmented, competitive landscape. They concentrate on the significance of forms of network rather than their gendered effects, which is the focus of Grugulis and Stoyanova's (2012, p.1311) study of UK film and television. This provides valuable insights into the relationship between 'quality' of networks and 'quality' of jobs, in examining racialized, gendered effects resulting from networks' recognition of social capital. Similarly, a recent study of the film festival sector found that gendered network structures explained the scarcer presence of films by women-only core creative teams, resulting in a skewed degree of distribution of films by men-only teams and a more pronounced festival hit dynamic (Ehrich et al., 2022; see also Lutter 2015).

A small number of these studies consider the relevance of national resource contexts within which networks operate in mediating project supply and demand. Examples include Handy and Rowlands' (2017) who note the importance of the 'free market' national regulatory approach to the New Zealand film industry, while studying gendered hiring practices utilized by networks to reduce personal anxieties for team members; Coles and Eikhof's (2021) study on drivers of unequal access for women screen directors in Canada, noted above; and most specifically, Coles and MacNeil (2017, p.227) who conceptualize sectoral 'policy ecologies' in the direct regulation of gender inequalities in film and TV production. Pertinently for our discussion, they argue that the state 'has both the regulatory mandate *and* the financing power to effect change in an industry that is fundamentally anachronistic in its internal dynamics.'

We contend that extending understanding of institutional dynamics underpinning generation and distribution of resources is useful to address Kalleberg's (2009, p.11) warning (above) of a sole 'focus on topics relating to specific work structures'. There are many layers of project organization in CCIs, direct and indirect, and the most visible are the producers we noted above (choreographers in Dance and so on). However, a central focus for our analysis is the less visible antecedent bodies involved and for which we find Greer et al.'s (2019) concept of 'transaction organizers (TOs) useful.

TOs are defined by Greer et al (2019, p.1879) as funding bodies which are 'permanent organizations with stable organizational features which also contain regularly changing projects'. CCI examples in our case countries include the British Film Institute (financially

supported by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport and the National Lottery) and the Swedish Arts Council (part of the Ministry of Culture). TOs as - always potential - funders, stimulate the creation of ‘organizational fields [...] as “quasi-markets”’ (Le Grand, 2003 in Greer et al, 2019, p.1879). This can mean the proliferation of independent TV production companies, as in the UK since the 1980s (Mediatique, 2005). Furthermore, Greer et al. (2019, p.1874) highlight transactions ‘whereby a service provider delivers a service in exchange for money from a public funder’, as key to explaining precarious projectification in European social services, depending on the capacity of the public funder to organize transactions, in the context of the state’s own weaker or stronger regulatory capacity. For example, the role of the state in the organisation of public funding transactions was crucial during and post-pandemic from 2020; however, most countries provided little support to freelance workers in the creative industries (Khlystova et al., 2022). This was highlighted by the atypical example of the Irish government, which introduced a ‘Basic Income for the Arts Pilot Scheme’, increasing 2022 funding to Irish TOs by 74% from 2020, in a strategic bid to sustain these inherently precarious, project-based areas of the economy (Arts and Culture Recovery Taskforce, 2020; Department of Tourism, Culture, Arts, Gaeltacht, Sport and Media, 2022). This example illustrates the importance of extending analysis of the shifting of risk; calling attention to the differences in how this shifting takes place via the activities of TOs shaped through policy formation by the state.

Our framework

Our framework theorises the influence of the state on organization of project work as a key condition shaping gendered precarity in CCIs. To do this, we conceptualize the dynamic interplay between: funding sources and state policy (cultural and employment-related); interventions at macro (national) and meso (industry) levels; the effects they generate for individual project workers through the cultural processes of industry networks. The subsequent precarity is conceptualized at the intersection of class, race/ethnicity and gender. The core insight of (the multiple understandings of) the concept of intersectionality is that social categories operate ‘as reciprocally constructing phenomena that in turn shape complex social inequalities’ (Collins, 2015, p. 2). Here, we use it heuristically, in recognizing interaction of advantage and disadvantage through location in social categories, and also their varying salience. At this micro level we use sociological perspectives to specify the visible dynamics arising from state policy through the cultural processes of industry networks.

We locate networks' cultural processes in Tilly's (1998) theoretical conceptualization of inequality as 'opportunity hoarding'. Tilly is clear that opportunity hoarding is not necessarily an intentional strategy, but can involve exploitation when 'the effort of a favored minority provides a resource-owning elite with the means to extract surplus from an essential but otherwise unavailable larger population' (1998, p. 154). In CCIs, TOs are the resource-owning elite (acting within state policy frameworks) and networks are 'a favoured minority'. Our approach to this model draws on Wright's (1997, p.119) argument that a key research issue in the interaction of class and gender is gender as 'a sorting mechanism into class locations' and notes that 'forms of inequality, domination and discrimination' can have direct effects on access opportunities to different jobs 'by affecting their acquisition of relevant resources' (1997, p.122). Randle et al. (2015) have illustrated how social class position is significant in access to CCI employment by drawing on Bourdieu's work on capital. Here, we use a gendered reading of Bourdieu's (1986: 18) concept of symbolic capital as 'misrecognition of resources', i.e., 'unrecognized as capital and recognized as legitimate competence' in identifying aspects of opportunity hoarding and constraints on access and progression. In our study, examples of symbolic capital include willingness to accept an unpaid job in Film/TV, or possession of a white male body in Dance. Outside the sphere of networks, Wright's 'acquisition of relevant resources' is shaped by the state via regulation of employment and of welfare access.

Here, extraction of surplus occurs within a context where risk is shifted to workers in what Kunst (2015) terms 'projective temporality', marked by fear of insufficient future work and resulting pressure to engage in short-term projects with heterogeneous employers. We need to understand the context within which the influential minority works and it is this line of enquiry into networks, risk, gender and labour markets to which this article contributes.

Our framework contributes to broaden extant employment literature on risk and the gendered effect of hiring networks in CCI labour markets. This is through explaining how state-led influences on the organization of project work both drive and mitigate gendered transfer of risk. This is through highlighting the dynamic interplay between CCI TOs in their national institutional contexts and the cultural processes of CCI project networks discussed below ('culture of recommendation', 'culture of invitation'). In other words, we show how the antecedent pressures of state policy domains and national institutional contexts in the shape of industry-based TOs, are filtered through the cultural processes of industry networks, steering access processes in CCI project employment: i.e. 'how people come to occupy different kinds of jobs' (Kalleberg, 2009, p. 11).

Research Background

We examine two CCI industry cases, studying each across two countries (Film/TV in the UK and Germany, and Dance in Sweden and the Netherlands). We selected the cases in a process of ‘light theorization’ (Kessler & Bach, 2014, p.174) based on our prior knowledge of institutional differences within each industry, subsequently confirmed in interviews with experts i.e., trade unions and professional organization representatives in CCIs at European and national levels. Our criteria for industry and country selection were: (1) prevalence of inherently precarious project work, with Film/TV in the UK and Dance in the Netherlands having experienced a drastic reduction in public funding in comparison to Germany (Film/TV) and Sweden (Dance). Precarious work has increased in these industries, as is happening in other sectors, but here such work is long-established and, usefully for analysis, is expected by workers/potential workers; (2) higher concentration of women in Dance in comparison to Film/TV; and (3) the under-researched status of Dance in comparison to Film/TV.

Data collection

The qualitative sampling strategy was designed to be representative of the phenomena to study rather than of the population (Morse, 2012) and primary data collection included 69 qualitative interviews: 50 narrative with project workers and 19 semi-structured with experts (Table 1 and Table 2).

[TABLE 1 And TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

24 interviews with project workers were conducted in Film/TV in the UK and Germany and 26 were conducted in Dance (principally ballet) in the Netherlands and Sweden. We used narrative interviews (Plummer, 2001), where interviewees (narrators) are asked to tell a story of their work experiences against the backdrop of their life histories, allowing for the reconstruction of narrators’ own perspectives. As McRobbie (2009, p.132) argues, ‘research strategies which foreground life-biography’ are the most effective in capturing the ‘singular [...] nature of careers’ of creative workers. This was followed by a semi-structured section, focusing on work activities (frequency, duration and form of work contracts, relationships with networks). Using theoretical sampling (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), where emerging categories guided the selection of subsequent participants, we interviewed 27 women (11 in Film/TV and 16 in Dance), 22 men (13 in Film/TV and 9 in Dance) and 1 non-binary person (in Dance) (Table 2). With 50 narrative interviews and 27 expert interviews we reached a basic level of

saturation, in that new interviews were raising ‘similar instances over and over again’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p.61). Interviews in Dutch, French and English were collected by the authors fluent in these languages. Interviews in German and Swedish were collected in the original language by research assistants working within the scope of the European project of which this research is part, then translated and transcribed by professionals. Interviewers wrote detailed summaries, including context and personal observations, then shared within the research team. This improved understanding of data, in the native speaker providing contextual knowledge and interpretation.

Interviews were conducted between April 2020 and January 2021 with COVID-19 pandemic restrictions in place; partly face-to-face (with physical distancing) and partly online, via Zoom. Narrative interviews lasted between 90 minutes and 4 hours, with the average lasting 2 hours. Each semi-structured interview lasted between 60 minutes and 2h. Respondents provided information about their demographic profiles, earnings, working hours, household composition and job characteristics; providing useful socio-demographic background information. Given the established salience of class in access to CCI work (see Brook et al., 2018), we asked each participant to self-identify in class terms (Reay, 1998) in types of resources possessed, as in Savage et al. (2005). Resources are economic (income), social (networks) and cultural (educational credentials and competences acquired through the family) and they ‘secure and perpetuate access to economic capital’ (Crompton, 1998, p.149). We were also able to assess class-based resources through narrative analysis, such as family’s financial support in relation to training, unpaid work and unemployment; parents’ occupation and family lifestyle (place of residence, holidays and activities) as well as networks of family and friends. This informed our understanding of the dynamics shaping gendered precarity.

Data analysis

In our use of NVivo 12 we followed Gioia et al. (2012) in coding the data; progressing from first order codes, to second order themes and to concepts essential for our analysis (Pratt, 2008). Analysis of narrative interviews and semi-structured expert interviews differed. The former focused on first-person experiences of work, and difficulties and opportunities encountered. In the expert interviews, their knowledge of each industry informed consideration of how Film/TV and Dance industries have been changing over time and effects of TOs and role of networks in these processes. Analysis moved from first-order concepts and more theoretical second-order themes to analysis across professional categories and institutional contexts within each industry, aiming at second-order ‘aggregate dimensions’ (Gioia et al., 2012, p.20). In line

with the Gioia methodology we systematically compared our inductive observations (concepts, themes, dimensions and their interrelationships) of the interview transcripts with deductive reflection informed by existing theories, to construct empirically-based theorizations. To identify relevant dynamics underpinning social phenomena, we examined changes in industry structures and financial cuts in public support, creating risk at the level of a country's industry, then moved to sorting practices at the level of individuals and project networks. Here, we paid particular attention to networks' management of risk and individual experiences of precarity deriving from risk. The analytical movement between contexts and subjective experiences helped us understand the relations between them and identify generative dynamics of gendered precarity.

In the following sections we consider the detail of the CCI context in relation to the project's empirical data.

The study cases

Film/TV

In Film/TV, structural changes from the late 1980s initiated by state imposition of degrees of marketization, saw transition from vertically integrated production within a few large broadcasters to vertically disintegrated organizational forms (Apitzsch, 2010; Hoyler & Watson, 2019). The arrival of satellite, cable and streaming, together with government-led deregulation³, resulted in the emergence of many independent program makers over the 1990s and 2000s. Germany moved from a public broadcasting monopoly to a combination of powerful public and private broadcasters (RTL, SAT1) which compete for content within a 'dual system' (Windeler & Sydow, 2001). With legally-required quotas and greater competition, public broadcasters (primarily the BBC and ITV in the UK, the ARD and ZDF in Germany) have increasingly outsourced production, circumventing collective agreements and cutting costs (Baumann, 2002; Saundry et al. 2012). Although sectoral ecologies have become increasingly complex in the UK and Germany, broadcasters remain central in organization of transactions as key controllers of financial resources, distribution, and terms and conditions for screen products (Manning & Sydow, 2007). This, however, is in an industrial context of a declining number of viewers per programme, fluctuating advertising revenue, and a push to shareholder-value among private sector providers (McKinlay & Smith, 2009). Specifically, in

³ The 1990 Broadcasting Act in the UK mandated the producers to outsource 25% of programs. The 2004 Broadcasting Act transferred intellectual property rights to independent companies.

the UK, government support for marketization included a significant cut in the government-set BBC licence fee post-2013, leading to further cost-cutting and greater reliance on shifting of risk to a freelance project-based workforce.

The main divergence between UK and Germany is level of public funding. In the UK, this has been limited to the TV licence fee, National Lottery fund distributed by the British Film Institute, and tax relief. Since 1979, policy choices by UK governments have prioritized market factors. These choices have accelerated from 2010, with the consequence of constraining public funding of CCIIs (Alexander, 2018; Newsinger & Presence, 2018; Waterson 2021). Funding pressures from these sources are transmitted to the networks recruiting and selecting workers, in managing financial risk at their level in order to develop, produce, deliver and distribute the project. Producers rely heavily on their own ‘tried and tested’ line producers and heads of departments, who in turn rely on their ‘tried and tested’ workers: uncertainty over commissions translates into financial and employment insecurity, and increasing freelance rather than payroll employment.

In Germany there is generous public funding from regional, federal and European sources (Kurp, 2004; Jansen, 2005), such as the European MEDIA Plus program (Zademach, 2009), and public subsidies in the industry are the second highest in Europe (Bomnüter, 2018). As an expert respondent explained: “it’s possible to apply for multiple funding and some film companies accumulate funding from several regional schemes.” (DEEX1). Almost all TV programs and films in Germany have some sort of public subsidy, which grants power to the funding agencies (Loist & Prommer, 2019), but also cushions some of the pressure exerted on producers and networks. 54% of the workforce in UK in 2019 and nearly 50% in Germany in 2020 are now (self)employed on short-term project work (BFI, 2020; Berauer, 2020). However, in line with lesser reliance on a market model, long-term project workers in German public broadcasting are offered ‘employee-like freelancer’ (*Feste Freie Mitarbeiter*) employment status, regulated by collective bargaining. Accordingly, many project workers enjoy social benefits, and longer-term contracts provide more regular work and remuneration (Herkel, 2019). In addition, women must comprise part of the crew in broadcasting, as a condition for applying for public funding; the joint effect is that the number of women in higher level jobs in German public broadcasting has increased. Between 2018 and 2019 the share of women in film industry ‘creative’ roles was 20%–25% (Loist & Prommer, 2019) and in 2020, women in similar positions (e.g., screenwriters and directors) increased by approximately 25% and 30% respectively in Germany (Simone, 2021).

A culture of recommendations in Film/TV

Uncertainty and variation in funding requires Film/TV to adjust swiftly while limiting costs. This strategy is enabled by the perpetually oversupplied labour market, combined with non-standard employment status and corresponding rights. Doing project work means “to make and to sell to be paid” (DE05_Ben), but “if there’s a way not to pay you, you won’t get paid” (UK13_Niall). While no pay for contracted work is uncommon, low pay and under-payment (for example relative to hours worked) is not. People of working-class background struggle to “make ends meet” (DE02_Dirk), and to access high-quality jobs. This contrasts with (predominantly white) middle- and upper-middle class people entering the industry who often come from “a film family” (DE06_Nico) and therefore have resources and contacts at their disposal (UK10_Chris). Having contacts with the right directors and producers “who run the show” (UK07_Jake) is crucial, since they place people in project departments. Terrie, a working-class woman of mixed African-Caribbean heritage identified the “inner circles” of power in the industry:

It’s like concentric rings, so in the middle you have family members and then it goes out, friends, acquaintances. A lot of people that sort of sit within those circles tend to be private or public school educated, they tend to be male, white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. They tend to be out of a particular type of mould, which is quite identifiable, it’s a type [*laughing*] (UK12_Terrie).

Terrie’s narrative reflects the UK industry structure where, in contrast to state-backed policy aimed at “promoting a more diverse workforce” (Ofcom, 2019), representation of Black, Asian and minority ethnic people in the industry fell from 12% in 2009 to 4.2% in 2018 (Brook et al., 2018). Further, illustrating Wright’s (1997) gender sorting into class locations, the UK film industry is largely: “women in hair, makeup, costume and props, and men in camera, sound and directing” (UK12_Terrie) and similarly in Germany:

In the camera department, there’s one woman to ten men. Maybe even one in twenty. Because you move many kilos a day [...] That’s a woman’s constitution, you have to be on your toes, you have to be fast and for many it is simply too much [...] I have always enjoyed working with female colleagues. Well, not as camerawomen. In other areas such as equipment, props, decoration (DE12_Hanno).

Project workers are recruited by networks, and if the (individualized, unmonitored) assessment is positive, they are recommended for new projects. Interviewees refer to it as “a culture of recommendations” (UK12_Terrie) or “referral marketing” (DE12_Hanno). The gendered dynamic of this is the homophilous nature of networks, which leads to both asymmetry of access to opportunities and information on key factors such as pay: “Men hang out more with men, and women with women. [...] And only men who are my very close friends can say: ‘I’m earning this’. And I’m like ‘What? How are you earning that much money?’, and they are like ‘Oh all the guys are’, What?!” (UK08_Zoe).

This quote clarifies gendered exacerbation of precarity, in capacity to survive financially between projects. Women, working-class, and minority ethnic people often have “a mountain to climb” (UK02_Mike). This is connected to the network itself bearing risk, as it is “primarily responsible for the accomplishment of the project’s goals, in accordance with broadcasting funders’ requests” (UK07_Jake), so seeks to mitigate the risk of “having to do a lot with not much” (UK07_Jake). Network gatekeepers are aware their reputation (symbolic capital) is at stake and that they are expected to help police quality and deadlines. These ongoing risks mean that networks become like “a family and once you are part of the family, you get called [for jobs] because you’re one of them.” (DE09_Frieder).

The privilege of in-groups is maintained over time (opportunities are hoarded) through both active and effective discrimination. The mechanism is networks’ gendered (mis)recognition of capitals and is particularly clear in access to feature films and high-end TV series, where symbolic capital is highest. Several interviewees referred to precarious, often under-paid, positions within the industry as frequently allocated to women in ‘assistant’ positions. In Germany, female interviewees of working-class and lower-middle class backgrounds spoke about being put into the role of “*Mädchen für alles*” (a girl doing everything). In the UK, female interviewees also reported unequal treatment; white, middle-class men have more opportunities to learn, while working-class and minority ethnic women are more likely to be given auxiliary tasks in ‘service’ roles:

“There were two of us but I had done three years of training so I was more experienced [...] and I was tasked with looking after the DOP, the cinematographer. [...] He refused to eat the catering that was provided. So, every day I had to go out and get him his lunch with his driver and sometimes even prepare it for him [...] And there were several other things I had to do, like buying him socks because he forgot to put socks on one day [...] I

basically felt like a waitress [...] And, of course, the other [male] trainee was where I wanted to sit really, right next to the camera” (UK11_Anja).

This and similar practices described by respondents were indirectly supported by the opinions expressed above by DE12_Hanno “I have always enjoyed working with female colleagues. Well, not as camerawomen.”

However, the cultural processes of networks can be mediated at other levels. As noted above, in German public broadcasting project workers can attain an ‘employee-like freelancer’ (*feste Freie Mitarbeiter*) status regulated by collective bargaining, with social benefits such as annual and sick leave, pension schemes (Herkel, 2019) and longer-term contracts providing more regular work. The *feste Freie* status provides a path from standard freelancing, to more protected freelancing, to permanent employment, without over-reliance on homophilous networks. This enables female workers in Germany to reduce their dependence, and thus mitigate gender as a sorting mechanism into class locations. Amina, a working-class woman of Moroccan origin, has worked for several years as *feste Freie* for a public broadcaster in Germany: “Next year I’ll have an open-ended contract. After ten years [of *feste Freie*] you are automatically a permanent employee. [,,] by being a *feste Freie* you have social security and discretion” (DE03_Amina, 30, F, editor).

No UK women interviewees reported any such discretion; there is no comparable employment security for freelancers in the UK, which may contribute to explaining why and how white middle-class men in core positions hoard (effectively) opportunities. A related distinction was captured by UK12_Terrie: “To be honest, it’s difficult to afford having kids, you know, because much more money will be spent on childcare than your actual earnings”. UK08_Zoe talked about working with a woman single parent of two young children: “She was working so many hours because she had to keep working to pay for this childcare... She used to be a production buyer, but now she's working as an art department coordinator, because that role gives her more flexibility of her working hours.”

As childcare responsibilities remain heavily gendered everywhere, whether sole- or two-parent households (and women comprise approximately 88% of single parents: OECD 2014), men’s dominance of core positions in Film/TV is indirectly enabled by the state in childcare provision: the UK has notoriously high professional childcare costs (increasing the amount of risk shifted), as opposed to those in Germany (Neimanns & Bussemeyer, 2021). Further, there are differences in access to state support in the two countries. In the UK, changes in 2013 via ‘Universal Credit’ means that ‘welfare conditionality and benefit sanctions have been

significantly intensified' (Andersen 2020: 432), whereas in Germany (relatively more generous levels of) unemployment benefit 'is based on the principle of security' (Juznik Rotar & Krsnik, 2020, p.283), commonly treated as a way to survive workless periods. DE15_Penny, hair and makeup artist, talked about unemployment benefit as the only way of surviving in the industry:

“It’s very, very difficult. I’ve been doing this for over twenty years now, but actually I’m struggling to survive from year to year... You always have the sword of Damocles above your head. I am personally in the lucky position that I still got unemployment benefit. Without that, I’d have to leave.”

The degree of commodification enabled through CCI TO funding operates within nationally-specific constraints, contingent upon the approach to employment regulation of the country: i.e. broadly neoliberal in the UK and broadly corporatist in Germany. These constraints shape the cascading pressures on CCI project networks (opportunity hoarders) resulting, in Film/TV, in a culture of recommendations.

Dance

Ballet is the principal source of dance employment of our respondents and this art form’s uneasy relationship with the market, in terms of financial support through public or private patronage (Plattner, 1996; Wulff, 2014), is significant in understanding employment outcomes.

In the Netherlands, public funding is not allocated to individual dancers in ballet, but mainly to organizations (at the national, regional and municipal level) and only two leading organizations (i.e. The National Ballet and Scapino Ballet Rotterdam) can apply for long-term public funding from the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (Rijksoverheid, 2020). All other organizations must apply for short-term project funding, and there is a small number of arms-length publicly-funded bodies, such as the Performing Arts Fund, with many private funders such as the *Prins Bernhard Cultuurfonds*. The available resources are more diffused across such TOs and further, the Dutch government emphasizes notions of the ‘cultural entrepreneur’ in awarding public funding (Ministry of Welfare, Public Health and Culture, 1999): cultural organizations have to establish 15% private funding of their total income as a threshold to receive public funding (Pots, 2000).

Such thresholds are absent in Sweden where organizations, such as the Royal Swedish Ballet, are largely state-subsidized. The decisive role of the state to fund projects and organize transactions there comprises both potentially funding Dance organizations and allocating

public grants to individual dancers (SOU, 2009). On acceptance by this type of organization ‘competitive commodification’ (cfr. Laermans, 2015) is ameliorated, as dancers get a public grant providing regular income: “thanks to a state-funded grant I was able to do things by myself without asking anybody” (SE08_Nikola). Nevertheless, the 1990s economic crisis produced austerity measures in Sweden (Myndigheten för Kulturanalys, 2017) and a more mixed model of public-private funding for CCIs was introduced in 2009, similarly emphasising the ‘artist as entrepreneur’ (SOU, 2009, p.16). As a consequence, at national, regional and municipality levels the focus of funding distribution has changed to project-oriented funding, resulting in increasing dominance of short- and fixed-term work and freelancer employment via grants and scholarships. Project work in Sweden increased by 59% between 2010 and 2017, while permanent employment in both contemporary and ballet organizations decreased from 81% to 57% between 1999 and 2018 (Tillväxtverket, 2018). However, private funding in ballet remained rather limited and public funding remains (Flisbäck & Lund, 2015): “the government has been able to structure contracts in the sector by being risk-prepared in case something goes wrong with private funding” (SEEX02).

Therefore, over the past two decades in both Sweden and the Netherlands the state’s role in organizing transactions through public funding bodies has become more significant in effective mediation of dancers’ working lives. However, they started from different places, and the Netherlands state responses to financial crises made the already fierce competition for funding across ballet organizations harsher, as the available budget per funding body decreased. In turn, this has led to an increased proportion of dancers working as freelancers: between 2010 and 2015, project work in dance increased in the Netherlands by 20% and the number in permanent employment decreased by 30% (Lahaut, 2019). Conversely, in Sweden, regular and stable employment retains importance in traditional ballet organizations (Wulff, 2014).

To clarify the dynamics between the structural factors related to the contraction of financial resources, TOs, and gendered precarity outcomes, we now consider the cultural processes associated with their operation.

A culture of invitations in Dance

Dancers commonly construct careers as a patchwork of projects, following their passion for “a beautiful art, which is awfully structured” (NL12_Sara). A key difference with other types of project employment is that Dance as “body work” requires “a long and ongoing investment in physical capital” (NL03_Anis). The connection between capitals was made clear by our respondents, who said that fees and specialist clothing mean that working-class children are

usually unable to enter ballet schools. Then, entry to the core labour market involves participating in numerous workshops, often led by well-known coaches (dominant network gatekeepers) and multiple auditions, with family covering fees and travel costs: “We stayed in London, which was great, but it costs a ton of money” (NL02_Jane). This echoes the work of Friedman et al. (2017) above in relation to another CCI occupation, professional actors. Here, we see national context mediators. To participate in auditions, dancers must register by paying a fee and also need to travel. Mitigation of precarity is available in Sweden where the Public Employment Service (*Arbetsförmed*) offers “reimbursement for travel costs associated to the participation of auditions” (SEEX03). There is no equivalent support from Dutch state authorities, and working-class project workers reported being pushed towards exhausting work patterns, “applying for everything there is” (NL10_Mia) and often unable to afford attendance at auditions. For Dance organizations, networks minimize the risk of not finding reliable and skilled dancers “who are fast to learn and capable of delivering without any disruptions” (NLEX03) and those invited to audition via networks (i.e., are recognized) have higher chances of audition success. SEEX08 describes networks as the “economy of invitation”: as Anis (NL01) put it, “you can always go to auditions, but your chances are very small if you don’t know anybody there” (NL03). From the perspective of Dance organizations, risk has been shifted.

There is fierce competition to enter the “protected Dance shells” (NLEX02) and applicants can easily reach the “thousand for one place only”, (SE12_Astrid). As permanent contract opportunities are scarce, if dancers win a freelance or temporary contract, being “a chosen one” (NL01_Anis) entails working conditions that are far from ideal and inherently gendered: “Three weeks, two weeks here and there, so of course it was out of the question to be a mother and a dancer, just impossible.” (NL09_Alba). Further, in both countries male dancers are “still seen as holy grails” (SE10_Iris), advantage also acknowledged by men respondents:

“If you are a good and a well-resourced male dancer you are definitely luckier than if you are a good female well-resourced dancer, being a man in the dance world is always like you’re more important” (NL07_Alessandro).

Those outside the ‘protected shells’ compete for project work, largely in private organizations. Illustrating opportunity hoarding, dancers continually need to prove themselves to networks as: “even after 20 years, when a new choreographer comes in, I still have to audition.” (NL09_Alba). Economic capital allows capacity to cope with these employment conditions: in

Sweden almost 52% of those entering the industry have parents with high-level education, and family resources can make all the difference to survival and progress (Konstnärsmnden, 2016). It includes both family of origin, “my parents had a lot of money saved for me” (SE09_Hiroko) and partners: “I was lucky I met my husband, financially it was a huge relief” (NL02_Jane). People who cannot rely on such resources must do ‘side’ jobs, hindering vital daily training and restricting self-promotion and networking: “Dance jobs are not good for class travelers” (SEEX01). Our data show that working-class women are those who are primarily unrecognized by networks; partly because women comprise the majority of dancers and partly because they combine irregular dance gigs with demanding low-paid side jobs (in retail, hospitality, care work, cleaning, where women over-represented) and applying for state grants: it is not easy to “piece together budgets” (SE03_Astrid), some recalling projects where they applied for “150 different grants, scholarships and residencies” (SE07_Iris).

These represent attempts to become visible to networks. In the Netherlands white male middle- and upper-class choreographers and directors occupy key positions in networks and several respondents reported that ballet gatekeepers decide on access in accordance with the narrowly defined “ideal of the bodily beauty”, that is “white female and male dancers” (NL09_Alba). Thus, minority ethnic dancers are often excluded because they are not recognized as possessing appropriate symbolic capital. However in Swedish ballet, almost 70 percent of choreographers in key positions in networks are women (Konstnärsmnden, 2016). Further, the number of lower-middle-class dancers and choreographers in Sweden increased from 841 in 2007 to 1032 in 2014 (Flisbäck, 2014; Konstnärsmnden, 2016). This implies broadening of the ‘culture of invitations’ to other social groups: “We have one member whose mother works at the opera, so she helped us sew some costumes [...] my boyfriend is a photographer, so we’ve collected favors here and there.” (SE10_Isabelle). Therefore, there is mitigation of precarity traceable to longer-term effects of the organization of funding transactions in Sweden, which has allowed diminution in the hoarding of opportunities.

Discussion and conclusions

Gendered access to the precarious project work which is core to CCIs is well-established both empirically and theoretically. This article focuses on lesser-researched dimensions of this access, signaled by study data and literature on the relevance to CCI employment of industry policy ecologies and the organization of project work more broadly (Coles & MacNeil, 2017; Umney & Symon, 2020; Greer et al., 2019). The article asked, how do state influences on the

organization of project work affect gendered precarity in cultural and creative industries? We considered a neglected aspect of employment in CCIs; how state-led capacity in the form of industry TOs contributes to maintaining the differentiated employment patterns that networks perpetuate, in the wider context of other state policy domains.

Shifting of risk results from the way in which labour markets adapt to continuing pressures for change within state policy contexts (Crouch, 2011) and the risk and uncertainty endemic in Film/TV in the UK and Germany and Dance in Sweden and the Netherlands are useful sites to consider this adaptation. Marketization underpins project work in industry (meso-level) and country (macro-level) contexts via the state's role in funding projects and organizing transactions, which influence discriminatory dynamics visible through CCIs networks' routinely disadvantaging activities at the micro level. Differing degrees of marketization across state policy domains ultimately result in increased or reduced competitive effects on workers at the end of the economic and political chain. Thus, we assessed CCI network practices within a novel analytical framework which makes visible the opaque dynamics generated by the state across cultural, social and regulatory areas, mediated by industry TOs and their more direct influence on the organization of project work.

We contribute to the understanding of CCI employment in our theorization of the role of the state in both driving and mitigating gendered outcomes for precarious workers in project-based labour markets. How far networks' micro level processes ('cultures of recommendation', 'cultures of invitation') account for enhancing or reducing opportunities (Tilly, 1998) individuals access through 'possession' of resources (i.e., recognition via symbolic capital: Bourdieu, 1986), depends on relationships located in industry and country structures where transactions are organized and more- or less-socially embedded, thereby facilitating gendered sorting into class locations (Wright, 1997).

In this way, we advance a new dimension to understanding of how and why risk is shifted in CCIs, with their observable gendered inequalities. Film/TV recruitment practices in both Germany and the UK follow a 'culture of recommendations' to ensure projects deliver in accordance with the artistic and economic expectations of funding bodies and their recipient project organizers (i.e., project producers/networks). However, in German public broadcasting, employment protection can mitigate the effects of the homophily which frames opportunity hoarding. The stability deriving from the 'employee-like freelancer' (*Feste Freie Mitarbeiter*) contract, together with the public funding requirement that women comprise part of broadcasting crews, potentially reduces dependency on risk-averse networks for job access, resulting in a measure of social embeddedness in project working. Similarly, in the Swedish

Dance sector public grant-providing organizations can dis-embed project work from the market-based relationships of production. In contrast to the Netherlands, this mitigates the ‘culture of invitation’ from project producers/networks operating in uncertain funding contexts. In the Netherlands, dancers without requisite symbolic capital report regular exclusion from invitation to auditions by project networks who do not see them meeting their preferences, the narrowly-defined bodily ideal of white dancers. Centrally, in both Sweden and the Netherlands, is the widely-acknowledged ‘holy grail’ of male dancers. Women must therefore sustain themselves for longer between projects and, as we saw in Film/TV more particularly, gendered pay disparities while in work affects capacity to do so (Figure 1). Thus, while class origin is known to be fundamentally relevant, as our data confirm, (racialized) gender can be more salient at key moments.

[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

This brings us to the second contribution, which is the inclusion of a shifting-risk perspective considering workers’ visibility to networks as usually context-contingent (state activity in organizing the industrial field via TOs; employment legislation and social policy). The distinctive context facilitates or constrains visibility to networks through, for example capacity to be readily available for opportunities to apply for work, and then to take on lower-paid jobs to build reputation. There are additional pressures for dancers, who must possess economic capital to sustain ongoing investment in bodily capital through regular classes. Exploring gendered precarity has illustrated how institutional context underpins the capacity of workers to achieve a relatively privileged position of being *subject* to the shifting of risk. This further enhances understanding of heterogeneity in the differing forms and extent of the shifting of risk from employer to workers. Maintaining presence and attempts at recognition is, we contend, a desired level of shifted risk, framed by the Dutch dancer NL01_Anis, above, as becoming “a chosen one” if given a freelancer contract.

Many creative workers do not become visible to networks; the risk shifted onto them is too great a constraint. We saw this even where precarity is partially mitigated, such as in Germany and Sweden. Meardi et al. (2016, p.564) note that states previously associated with social democratic compromises are going through a substantial process of liberalization, which involves actively fostering marketization (see also Howell 2021). As we saw above, while in Sweden state policy operates to ameliorate the precarity dancers experience unmediated in the Netherlands, in both countries state policy now emphasises these workers as ‘entrepreneurs’.

This ostensibly neutral concept sustains disadvantage in its shifting of risk. It elides what we saw, for example, in variable childcare provision and division of domestic responsibilities, and it contributes to ‘developing an understanding of the state as a site of co-production of class, gender and racialized inequalities’ (Meardi et al., 2016, p.565). Interrogating this co-production further across a range of CCI industries and national settings would extend knowledge about how precarity is shaped by interrelated dynamics, exacerbating the gendered, racialized, and classed character of precarious work.

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Table 1: CCI experts: semi-structured interviews

Film/TV interviews	Number of	Position of interviewees
United Kingdom	3	TUs (UKEX01: UKEX03), Prof. assoc. rep. (UKEX04)
Germany	3	TUs (DEEX03), Prof. assoc. rep. (DEEX05; DEEX06)
Europe	3	TUs (EUEX01; EUEX02), Prof. assoc. rep (EUEX03)
Dance		
Sweden	6	TUs (SEEX05), Prof. assoc. rep. (SEEX06), Funding body rep. (SEEX02; SEEX07), Manager (SEEX04), PES Rep. (SEEX03)
The Netherlands	1	TUs (NLEX02)
Europe	3	TUs (EUEX05; EUEX06), policy maker (EUEX04)

Source: Own elaboration

Table 2: CCI production workers: narrative interviews.

Film/TV			
Code & Name (Age)	Gender	Majority/ Minority Ethnicity(*)	Class
DE01_Agnes (30) DE14_Hannah (40)	F	Maj	Lower middle
UK01_Radek (44); DE02_Dirk (41) DE04_Timo (42) UK06_Mike (60) UK15_Sam (53)	M	Maj	Working
DE03_Amina (30)	F	Min	Lower middle
DE11_Benjamin (50); DE13_Nico (42) DE19_Frieder (37); UK09_Sean (51); UK07_Jake (60) UK13_Niall (36)	M	Maj	Lower middle
DE10_Sandra (46)	F	Maj	Middle
UK16_Jacinta (43) DE22_Brianna (40) UK12_Terrie (40)	F	Min	Working
DE15_Penny (46); UK14_Liz (35) UK08_Zoe (31)	F	Maj	
DE12_Hanno (52); UK04_Peter (71)	M	Maj	Middle
UK11_Anja (29)	F	Maj	Middle
Dance			
NL09_Alba (41)	F	Maj	Working
NL07_Francesco (34)	M		
SE21_Nadja (30)	F	Min	Lower middle
NL01_Anis (30)	M		
SE22_Anna (39)	F	Maj	
SE11_Fabiano (50)	M		
NL12_Jasmin (28) SE12_Hiroko (44)	F	Min	Middle
SE18_Filip (27)	M		
SE06_Arianna (28); SE10_Isabelle (23); NL05_Leen (28); NL02_Jane (38) SE07_Iris (28); SE02_Sandra (32); SE03_Astrid (33); NL10_Dominika (32); NL04_Sara (36)	F	Maj	
NL06_Alessandro; SE28_Jaime (32); SE23_Elias (29); NL11_Bart (40)	M		
NL03_Lisa (32)	F	Maj	Upper middle
NL08_Mia (32)	F	Maj	Lower middle
SE04_Jon (41)	M		Middle
SE08_Nikola (31)	NB		

Source: Own elaboration

Legenda (*): Majority (usually White)/Minority (usually no-White)Ethnicity