Explaining migrant integration policies: A comparative study across 56 countries

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The correct citation for this article:

Solano, G., & De Coninck, D. (2022). Explaining migrant integration policies: A comparative study across 56 countries. *Migration Studies*. doi:10.1093/migration/mnac032.

Explaining migrant integration policies: A comparative study across 56 countries

Abstract: This article provides novel insights into the main factors associated with integration policies at the national level. Existing literature has analysed specific factors in Western countries, while a comprehensive, theoretically-informed and up-to-date overview is missing, especially regarding non-Western countries. This article fills this gap by combining 2014 and 2019 MIPEX data on integration policies in 56 countries - including non-Western countries - with publicly available international data on migration and asylum trends, economic conditions and public opinion on migration. Building upon existing literature, we introduce three perspectives: evidence-based, institutionalist and partisan perspectives. The evidence-based perspective assumes that policy makers act based on objective factors related to the policy issue (e.g. the number of migrants). The institutionalist perspective points to the relevance of institutional conditions, such as labour markets and welfare institutions. The partisan perspective refers to the role of political ideologies and attitudes in public opinion and in the media. Results suggest that factors related to the institutionalist perspective play the most critical role, alongside factors linked to the partisan perspective. However, the results provide evidence for all three perspectives. Migrant integration policies are associated with several factors: the number of asylum applications and the number of refugees (evidence-based perspective); GDP (per capita) and welfare expenditure (institutionalist perspective); political ideology and public opinion (partisan perspective).

Keywords: international migration; migrant integration policy; MIPEX

1. Introduction

Integration policies influence migrants' ability to remain in their destination country, while also affecting their quality of life and their inclusion in the country (Helbling et al. 2020; Solano and Huddleston 2020). More specifically, inclusive policies have been found to stimulate an overall sense of belonging, trust and well-being among migrants (Solano et al. 2022). This makes it important to investigate these policies, compare them across countries and understand the main factors associated with their inclusiveness - i.e. the extent to which policies are open and inclusive to as wide a range of citizens or individuals as possible (OECD, 2013).

Over the past twenty years, researchers have undertaken systematic comparisons of migration policies by creating quantitative sets of policy indicators/indexes at the national level (Solano and Huddleston 2021). These indicators are designed to analyse the differences and trends in these policies and to be used by the research community to assess policy determinants and effects (Bjerre et al. 2015; Beine et al. 2016; Gest et al. 2014; Goodman 2015; Solano and Huddleston 2021). Some of these studies have focused on explaining integration policies (see for example: Hatton 2004; Howard, 2010; Koopmans and Michalowski 2017; Koopmans et al. 2012; Rayp et al. 2017). They have identified several possible factors associated with migration and integration policies: migration-related factors, contextual-institutional factors and media and political factors.

Despite scholarly interest and the abundance of scattered research findings, we lack a clear theoretical understanding of the main factors associated with migrant integration policies (Schultz, Lutz and Simon 2021). This is also linked to the fact that studies have only focused on one or a limited number of these factors. Systematic and comprehensive analyses of factors have rarely been conducted. Furthermore, in relation to migrant integration policies, some factors have been analysed more frequently (e.g. public opinion) than others. Therefore, the degree to which established theories of migration policy explain the relative inclusiveness of integration polices remains an open question (Schultz et al. 2021).

In this article, we address those research gaps by employing a theoretically-informed and comprehensive approach to the analysis of factors associated with the level of inclusiveness of integration policies. This article simultaneously and comparatively takes into account the main factors that have been analysed by existing literature. We build upon existing theories of migration policies to explain countries' integration policies and we depart from three broad perspectives:

evidence-based, institutionalist and partisan perspectives (Consterdine and Hampshire 2020; Scholten 2020; Schultz, et al. 2021). The evidence-based perspective assumes that policy makers act based on objective factors related to the policy issue (e.g. when it comes to migration policies, the number of migrants). The institutionalist perspective points to the relevance of institutional conditions, such as labour markets and welfare institutions. The partisan perspective expects that policies on migration and migrant integration follow dynamics related to political ideologies as well as attitudes in the public opinion and media.

This article looks at the possible factors associated with integration policies at the national level. In what follows, although we mainly look at the determinants of policy inclusiveness, we refrain from making causal assumptions. Association, which is measured through data obtained from cross-sectional quantitative studies, is not causation (Irizarry, 2022). In most cases, there is no clear indication of whether a factor is a determinant or an outcome of migration policies. We will tackle this issue in both the conceptual section and the methodology.

In this article, we employ new data produced by the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which includes information on integration policies for 56 countries for the period 2014 to 2019 (Solano and Huddleston 2020). While theoretical insights and empirical research on migrant integration policies have been mainly conducted in Western Europe and Anglo-Saxon countries (Solano and Huddleston 2021), MIPEX also analyses integration policies in non-Western countries (China, India, Jordan, South Africa etc.). We link data from MIPEX to publicly available international data on migration and asylum trends, as well as country's economic conditions and public opinion on migration (e.g. from ILO, the World Bank, and UNHCR). These factors were then related to the degree of inclusiveness of integration policies in 2014 and 2019.

2. Explaining integration policies

Migrant integration refers to the process of settlement, interactions with the receiving society and social change due to immigration (Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx 2016; Entzinger 2000). Integration is a two-way process that involves both migrants and the receiving society where migrants live. Integration has many practical and tangible outcomes for migrants. They seek to secure their livelihood in the destination country by finding a job, accessing the health system, registering with the municipality and so on. Integration is, therefore, a multidimensional process that includes a variety of areas: employment, education, health, civil rights, social welfare, family

policies, etc. The interplay between the different areas shapes the integration process of migrants (Garcés Mascareñas and Penninx 2016; Entzinger 2000).

The receiving society creates the conditions that support or hinder migrants and their integration. Integration polies relate to the conditions required to become and to remain part of a specific society and the entitlement rights as well as the support migrants receive (Hammar 1990; Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx 2016; Entzinger 2000). These policies need to pay attention to all integration areas and ensure access to rights, opportunities, and services to tackle the challenges that migrants face when they arrive in the country (Solano and Huddleston 2020). In this way, such policies may enable migrants' untapped potential and allow them to fully contribute to the economy of the country of destination (OECD 2014).

Countries have different policies in place to integrate migrants (Solano and Huddleston 2020; Solano and Ponzo, 2022). Countries adopted these integration policies based on different reasons and in associations to different factors (Consterdine and Hampshire 2020; Scholten 2020; Schultz, Lutz and Simon 2021). We focus on these reasons and factors in the next section.

Several existing studies have analysed the main factors associated with migration and integration policies. We discuss three approaches that build upon existing theories of migration policies (Consterdine and Hampshire 2020; Scholten 2020; Schultz, Lutz and Simon 2021).

2.1 The evidence-based perspective

The evidence-based perspective assumes that policy makers act based on objective factors related to the policy issue (Scholten 2020). It originates from the rationalist tradition which assumes that policy makers act based on existing information and knowledge on the topic. Therefore, according to this perspective, when it comes to migration and migrant integration, policy makers would act based on the existing information and knowledge on migration. The relationship between migration and migrant integration policies, on the one hand, and migration flows and stocks on the other hand has been demonstrated by several studies, including Helbling and colleagues' (2020) study on restricting immigration to foster migrant integration. In his seminal chapter, Scholten (2020) mentions the number of migrants in a country as an example of the type of knowledge that can drive policymaking on migration and migrant integration. This can work in two opposite ways. On the one hand, policy makers might aim to restrict immigration and integration policies, or to

select migrants with greater integration potential (Helbling et al. 2020). On the other hand, to facilitate integration when the number of migrants is high, policy makers might be more likely to implement policies that reduce the integration obstacles that migrants who reside in the country are confronted with (Solano and Huddleston 2020).

Several multi-country studies on the determinants of migration policies corroborated the idea of a backlash of policies linked to immigration. They showed that more restrictive migration policies were associated with a higher number of migrants (Czaika and de Haas 2013; de Haas et al. 2019; Fitzgerald, Leblang and Teets 2014; Hatton 2009; Ortega and Peri 2013; Thielemann 2004). For example, de Haas and Natter (2015) showed that the migration rate was associated with the restrictiveness of migration policy. Similarly, Hatton (2004) looked at asylum policies. His findings suggest that asylum policies in Europe became more restrictive in response to the growing number of asylum seekers during the 1990s.

Literature also points at the fact that these negative associations might be weaker for integration policies. De Haas and Natter (2015) found no significant effect when they looked only at migrant integration policies. Howard (2010) found a non-significant effect of the number and share of migrants on liberalisation of citizenship policies. This might be linked to the fact the causality of the effect can go in the opposite direction. In fact, some studies also indicate that inclusive integration policies are a pull-factor for migrants (Beine et al. 2020; Beverelli 2022; Migali and Natale 2017). For example, looking at the desired movements of potential migrants from over 140 origin countries, Beine and colleagues (2020) find that potential migrants tend to favour countries that have welcoming integration policies. Therefore, migrants would move to countries where integration policies are more inclusive, rather than policies being more or less inclusive as a reaction to the number of migrants.

Nevertheless, by and large, existing literature seems to corroborate the idea that there is a negative association between the inclusiveness of policies and the share/number of migrants and refugees as well as the number of asylum applications:

H1a. The number of migrants is negatively associated with policy inclusiveness.

H1b. The number of refugees is negatively associated with policy inclusiveness.

H1c. The number of asylum seeker applications is negatively associated with policy inclusiveness.

2.2 The institutionalist perspective

A second approach originates from economics and stresses the role of institutional factors - not directly related to migration - in influencing the policymaking process. Scholars point at the fact that policymaking on a certain issue does not take place in a void, but rather it happens in a context characterised by settings that influence the decision making (Bekkers et al. 2017; Schierup et al. 2006). The economic conditions and the structures of labour markets and welfare institutions shape the degree of policy inclusivity (Schultz et al. 2021). The overall idea is that wealthier countries – e.g. in terms of GDP, unemployment rate, inequality – and more generous welfare institutions have more inclusive integration policies. Existing literature hypothesised the above-underlined mechanism, although results are not conclusive. De Haas and Natter (2015) showed that a favourable national economic situation was associated with the adoption of less restrictive migration policy, although this effect was not significant when limiting the analysis to integration policy only. Similarly, Howard (2010), Koopmans and colleagues (2012) and Rayp et al. (2017) found no effect of the economic situation on the change and the level of integration policies. However, by and large, it is possible to expect that countries with a wealthier economy invest more in policies and, therefore, have more inclusive policies towards migrants:

H2. The country's economic situation (GDP) is positively associated with policy inclusiveness and inclusive policy change.

The general level of inequality and the conditions of the labour market may also influence the policymaking process. Not many studies have addressed inequality as a possible factor explaining migration-integration policies. One might expect two opposite mechanisms. On the one hand, the level of inequality and the conditions of the labour market may influence the policy inclusiveness: overall higher levels of inequality and higher unemployment rates may lead policymakers to opt for inclusive policies to mitigate the negative effect of those conditions – for example, to avoid that migrants become a further fiscal burden. On the other hand, the challenges that policy makers face in solving these issues for the entire population may spur anti-migrant policies (Koopmans et al. 2012). The few studies focusing on these two factors do not confirm either the former or the latter. For example, Koopmans and Michalowski (2017) found no effect of inequality on the rights granted to migrants. Howard (2009), who looked at the effect of inequality in the labour market, found no effect of unemployment. Based on this literature, we formulate the following hypotheses:

H3. There is no association between the level of inequality and policy inclusiveness.

H4. There is no association between the labour market conditions and policy inclusiveness, measured by the unemployment rate.

Finally, there is extensive literature on the 'welfare magnet hypothesis', the idea that countries with generous welfare systems attract a higher number of migrants as they expect to be better supported in their integration process (de Jong and de Valk 2020; Giulietti 2014; Kurekova 2013; Razin and Wahba 2015). Indeed, as highlighted by Schultz and colleagues (2021), more generous welfare systems are based on universal solidarity and draw their legitimacy from their inclusiveness and this may translate in more support provided to migrants. However, as noted by some authors, while the concept of the welfare state is indeed linked to a certain degree of national solidarity, non-citizens (migrants) could still be excluded given that the welfare state itself is also a system of stratification (Borevi et al. 2017; Kevins and van Kersbergen 2019; Kymlicka 2015; Ruhs 2017; Van der Waal et al. 2013).

However, although we can expect some differences between migrants and nationals in the support they can access (Gschwind 2021), we could still expect that a more generous welfare is associated with more inclusive integration policies, as showed by Kolbe and Kayran (2019) on EU countries and Romer (2017) on OECD countries. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis:

H5. A more generous welfare is positively associated with policy inclusiveness.

2.3 The partisan perspective

Another theoretical perspective considers that policies follow dynamics related to political ideologies as well as attitudes in the public opinion and media. Particularly in recent years, as global migration numbers have reached unprecedented heights, migrant integration has become a highly politicized issue and polices are therefore determined by partisan preferences: "Migration touches on core questions of societal (re-) distribution of material and symbolic resources and is therefore likely to evoke partisan conflict" (Schultz et al. 2021: 769).

In particular, scholars have pointed to the role of political parties and ideologies (right- vs. left-wing parties), public opinion and mass media in shaping the decision-making process. The overall idea is that more open political ideologies and more favourable public opinion and mass

media attitudes towards migration, migrant integration and diversity are associated with more inclusive integration policies.

Some existing studies have analysed the role of political ideologies and parties. Looking at the differences between right-wing and left-wing parties, there are two possible logics behind these differences. First, left-wing parties have solidarity and equality as core values. In contrast, right-wing parties' values are based on conservatism, nationalism and ethnocentrism and they tend to perceive migrants as a threat (Givens and Luedtke 2005; Thomsen and Rafiqi 2019). Second, left-wing political parties are more likely to see migrants as potential voters (Givens and Luedtke 2005). Both views suggest that right-wing parties are more likely than left-wing parties to stimulate anti-migrant attitudes and are less in favour to expand migrants' rights.

Existing studies analysed the role of political ideologies and parties and have by and large confirmed the above assumptions (Akkerman 2012; Hansen and Clemens 2019; Howard 2010; Givens and Luedtke 2005; Koopmans et al. 2012). For example, the seminal work from Koopmans and colleagues (2012) showed that a high share of right-wing populist parties reduces access to rights for migrants. Similarly, in his analysis of 11 EU countries, Howard (2010) found that citizenship liberalisation was more likely to occur with a left-wing government and that the most important factor that influenced the inclusivity of policies was the strength of far-right parties. Therefore, we can formulate the following hypothesis:

H6. The share of right-wing parties in the country parliament is negatively associated with policy inclusiveness.

In addition, there is substantial literature on the association between integration policies and public opinion towards the migration or migrants, which points at a concordance between integration policies and public opinion. There are two possible reasons. First, integration policies represent society's view on immigration and integration, institutionalised through laws and policies, which in turn influence the perceptions of the population (Schlueter et al. 2013). Members of society internalise these norms through processes of socialisation, which in turn shapes the attitudes or threat perceptions of the majority population towards immigrants (policy feedback, see; Mettler & Soss 2004). Second, policy makers consider public attitudes when designing integration policies in order to reduce the risk of losing votes and to avoid the likelihood of reprisals in the form of protests or public disobedience (policy responsiveness, see: Callens & Meuleman 2017).

Many recent studies that examined the association between migration and integration policy on the one hand and public attitudes on the other found that in countries with migrant-friendly national policies, citizens hold more welcoming public attitudes towards migrants (Callens and Meuleman 2017; De Coninck et al. 2021; Karpiński and Wysieńska-Di Carlo 2018). These studies look at public opinion as driven by integration policies, rather than the other way around. However, in additional analyses, De Coninck and colleagues (2021) estimate the effect of public opinion on integration policies as a robustness check and find that the fit of these models is significantly worse than that of models with public opinion as a dependent variable. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis:

H7. A more welcoming public opinion towards migrants is positively associated with policy inclusiveness.

Furthermore, communication scientists have stressed a third key factor alongside political ideologies media and public opinion, namely news media coverage and journalists' attitudes (De Coninck 2020; Mertens et al. 2019). Their perceptions regarding diversity may affect their reporting on migration. This may also influence the social and political debate on the topic and, in doing so, the political agenda (Walgrave and Van Aelst 2016). Therefore, more open journalistic attitudes towards diversity may be associated with inclusive integration policies.

H8. More positive journalistic attitudes towards diversity are associated with policy inclusiveness.

2.4 Combining the different perspectives

There are of course relevant interactions between the three perspectives, as factors from those three influence each other. The most obvious interactions are between the partisan and evidence-based perspectives and between the evidence-based and institutionalist perspectives.

First, the overall pro- or anti-migrant climate may influence the association between the number of migrants (and refugees and asylum seekers) and the inclusiveness of policies. As illustrated above, as a reaction of a higher number of migrants, policy makers may either restrict immigration and integration policies, to select migrants with greater integration potential, or make their policies more inclusive to support migrants (Helbling et al. 2020). Under a more pro-migrant climate, policy maker may tend to go for the second option, whole they may prefer the first when there is a more anti-migrant climate. The same might happen when the country is in a good

economic situation and/or the unemployment rate and level of inequality are lower (Schultz et al. 2021).

Therefore, it is possible to expect that, under a more favourable climate for migrants and a better economic situation, a higher number of migrants is associated with less restrictive policies:

H9. Under a more favourable climate for migrants, a higher number of migrants is associated with restrictive policies to a smaller extent.

H10. Under a better economic situation, a higher number of migrants is associated with restrictive policies to a smaller extent.

3. Methods

This article is based on research activities and analyses conducted in the framework of the EU-funded Horizon2020 project HumMingBird - Enhanced migration measures from a multidimensional perspective (Grant agreement ID: 870661). The data on integration policies used in this article were collected as part of the 2020 edition of the long-standing Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) (see Solano and Huddleston 2020 and mipex.eu).

3.1 Data collection

In 2019-2020, the research team collected data on national-level policies to integrate migrants in 56 countries for the 2020 edition of the MIPEX (see Figure 1 below and Table A1 in the online appendix for the complete list of countries.[1]

Figure 1. Countries included in MIPEX



In MIPEX, integration is conceived as equal opportunities for all, i.e. the extent to which migrants have equal opportunities compared to nationals (Niessen and Huddleston 2009). Following this approach, MIPEX indicators address the extent to which policies offer migrants access to rights and opportunities (e.g., equal rights to employment). At the same time, MIPEX considers the existence of targeted measures (for example, specific measures to favour migrants' integration in the labour market): when equality is hampered by additional and specific obstacles for migrants compared to the national population, the state can strive to remove obstacles with ad-hoc policies (Niessen and Huddleston 2009).[2]

Although MIPEX analyses the policies as formulated in laws and programmes rather than their implementation or their efficacy, it offers a unique dataset of integration policies in terms of the number and variety of countries and stability of indicators over time (Michalowski and van Oers 2012; JRC 2017).

The most recent MIPEX scores are based on a set of 58 indicators covering eight policy areas for the period 2014-2019. The policy areas of integration covered are the following: labour market mobility; family reunification; education; political participation; permanent residence; access to nationality; anti-discrimination; and health (only for 2014 and 2019). It might be noted that other existing indices have treated family reunification policies in terms of both admission

and integration, as family reunification can be seen as a right of someone already settled or as an immigration channel for the family. Therefore, it concerns both entry/control and integration, depending on the view adopted. In the MIPEX, it is considered to be an integration policy area and this is reflected in the indicators. They refer to both eligibility requirements (of both the sponsor and the family-reunited migrant) and the access to rights and support of family-reunited migrants.

For each indicator, there are a set of options with associated values (from 0 to 100). The maximum of 100 is awarded when policies meet the highest standards for equal treatment, meaning that they offer equal rights and opportunities, alongside some targeted support. Under these circumstances, policies are considered to be the most inclusive. Within the 8 policy areas, the 58 indicator scores are averaged to result in a score for each of the 8 policy areas per country which, then averaged together one more time, resulting in the overall scores for each country. To collect the data, the research team prepared a standardised questionnaire consisting of questions (indicators) on different policy areas (e.g. labour market integration, education, and health). The use of indicators to compare policies is common in cross-country research on policy (Bjerre et al. 2015; Beine et al. 2016; Gest et al. 2014; Goodman 2015; Solano and Huddleston 2021). In each of the countries included, at least one expert completed the questionnaire for his/her country by carrying out desk research and, when necessary, conducting interviews with practitioners. The central research team of MIPEX checked all the scores against reports and other policy analyses, assessing the reliability of the answers and, when necessary, returned to the experts to ask for further information and clarifications. This process allowed us to avoid possible bias concerning the experts' scoring, obtain detailed, consistent, and reliable information as well as comparable data on the considered countries.

3.2 Variables

In the analyses, as dependent variable, we used the overall MIPEX score as a measure of the current migrant integration policies (year of reference: 2019). MIPEX overall score ranges from 0 (critically unfavourable) to 100 (totally favourable). In the creation of the dependent variable, we used the overall MIPEX score, rather than the scores from the sub-areas, as we wanted to catch the overall approach and main factors associated with the overall level of integration policies.

As independent variables, we included the following variables. When yearly data were available, to have a stable and reliable measure, we calculated the median of the values for the period 2014-2018. Given that the DV refers to 2019 and following literature pointing at the fact that effects unfold with delay (Bakker and van Vliet 2022), we introduced a one-year lag between the DV (2019) and the latest year considered for the IVs (2018).

- *Migration-related factors (evidence-based perspective):*
    - Share of migrants. We included the share of migrants out of the total population - source: United Nations. In particular, we included the share of migrants in 2010 (for 2014 cases linked MIPEX 2014 scores) and 2015 (for 2019 cases) as data on other years were not available.
    - Number of asylum applications: We used the number of asylum applications by calculating the sum of asylum applications for the period 2009-2013 (for 2014 cases) and 2014-2018 (for 2019 cases) - source: UNHCR. We inserted the logarithmic version of this indicator in the model because the original variable had a non-normal distribution.
    - Number of refugees: We included the number of number of refugees - source: UNHCR. We chose to include the number of refugees rather than their share of the host population given that their relative presence in most countries was limited. To use a stable and reliable measure, we calculated the median for available years in the period 2009-2013 (for 2014 cases) and 2014-2018 (for 2019 cases).
- *Contextual-institutional factors (institutionalist perspective)*:
    - GDP (per capita); We included data on the GDP per capita as an indicator of a country's economic condition - source: World Bank. To have a stable and reliable measure, we calculated the median of the GDP per capita for all available years in the period 2009-2013 (for 2014 cases) and 2014-2018 (for 2019 cases).
    - Inequality (Gini Index); We employed the Gini coefficient to assess the impact of inequality in a country - source: World Bank. The coefficient ranged from 0 (lowest degree of inequality) to 100 (highest degree of inequality). We calculated the median of available years in the period 2009-2013 (for 2014 cases) and 2014-2018 (for 2019 cases). For New Zealand, we employed the OECD Gini estimate as the World Bank estimate was not available.

- Unemployment rate. We included the unemployment rate for the general population - source: ILO. To have a stable and reliable measure, we calculated the median of the values for all available years in the period 2009-2013 (for 2014 cases) and 2014-2018 (for 2019 cases).
- Welfare expenditure (share of GDP). We assessed the role of welfare expenditure by adding the share of the yearly national GDP that was used for social protection and health - source: ILO. Given that yearly updates were not available for all countries, we used data on the year available for both 2014 and 2019 cases.

- *Media and political factors (partisan perspective)*:
  - Political ideology. To include the role of political ideologies, we looked at the political party's ideology (right-wing vs. left-wing ideology) - source: Manifesto project (see: Burst et al. 2020; Volkens et al. 2021). The Manifesto project dataset provides data for each of the political parties for each of the parliament election in a country, including the share of seats that a party has after the election and the left-right position of the party. We calculate the political ideology score which represents the left-right position of the country in the period 2010-2013 (for 2014 cases) and 2015-2018 (for 2019 cases). We calculated it as follows. Based on the information of the results of the elections, we calculate for each year the left-right score of the country (lower scores are associated with left-wing ideology), which represent the sum of the left-right score for each of the parties in a country weighted according to the share of seats in the parliament of the parties. We then sum the yearly scores. Full data on 10 out of the 56 countries were not available for the covered years. To avoid losing cases, we decided to replace the missing values with the variable's average score.
  - Migrant acceptance (in the public opinion). To address the acceptance of migrants in the public opinion, we used the Gallup's Migrant Acceptance Index – source: Gallup. The higher the score, the more accepting the population was of migrants. As data were available only for 2017, we included the same data for both 2014 and 2019 cases.
  - Journalists' attitudes towards diversity. To include the role of mass media, we looked at journalist attitudes by using the Worlds of Journalism (WJS) study. We

obtained scores regarding the question whether journalists should promote tolerance and cultural diversity, with scores ranging from 0 (journalists should not promote tolerance and diversity at all) to 100 (journalists should heavily promote tolerance and diversity). 18 out of the 56 countries analysed in this article were not included in the WJS or their values were missing. To avoid losing cases, we decided to replace the missing values with the variable's average score. As data were available for one year only, we included the same data for both 2014 and 2019 cases.

See online appendix for a more detailed description of the variables and the descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent and control variables (Table A2).

As a control variable, we included the *continent* in which the country is located. We used Europe as reference category, as it is the continent with most cases.

3.3 Analyses

A standard procedure in many papers that deal with migration policies and migration trends is to employ pooled data (matching annual data on the same countries to have a larger dataset). However, in our case, this was more challenging because some independent variables were not available for each year and many of them were available only for a year (welfare expenditure, migrant acceptance and journalists' attitudes towards diversity – see online appendix). This prevented us from using fixed effects. In addition, a Hausman test (10.96, $p > .14$) confirmed that using random effects was more appropriate than employing fixed effects. The Hausman test tests whether the results (i.e. the estimated coefficients) from a fixed effects and random effects model are significantly different. If the results of the two models are different, that is a reason to prefer the fixed effects model. In our case the difference was not significant.

Furthermore, while MIPEX data on 56 countries covers the years in the period 2014-2019, data on the health policy were available only for 2014 and 2019. Therefore, the MIPEX overall scores including health were available only for those two years. Since we consider health a key part of the overall integration policy framework and given that we had no yearly data for some variables, we decided to run a model with panel data including 2014 and 2019 MIPEX data; the sample consisted of 112 cases (56 countries in both 2014 and 2019). We ran a set of regression

models for panel data with random effects (by using the *xtreg* command in Stata and setting "country" as the entities and "year" as the time variable).

We ran three regression models. Model 1 included migration-related variables (evidence-based perspective), Model 2 covered contextual-institutional variables (institutionalist perspective), Model 3 included variables related to public opinion, political ideologies and mass media (partisan perspective). We decided to run separate models for a number of reasons: 1) to disentangle the contribution of each set of factors linked to the overall perspectives; 2) to avoid multicollinearity, as many variables are moderately or highly correlated (see Table A3 in the online appendix). This was also confirmed by a variance inflation factor (VIF) test on a linear regression model with all the variables included. The test displayed high values for several variables (GDP, Gini and welfare expenditure).

We tested Hypotheses 9 and 10 by running models with interactions between partisan-related factors and evidence-based-related ones as well as between institutional-related and evidence-based-related factors (one separate model for each interaction). These models included the main effects of all perspectives to which the interaction was linked.

As a robustness check, we combined all variables linked to the three perspectives. Since the highest correlation was between GDP and migrant acceptance (r=0.67), we ran two 'combined' models: one without GDP and one without migrant acceptance.

We tested the effect of two other variables by running two additional models, one in which we replaced the share of migrants with the number of migrants and another one with and the share of refugees in the migrant population instead of the number of migrants).

In addition, despite the fact that the Hausman test showed that the preferred model should test random effects, we wanted to account for unobserved country heterogeneity. To deal with that, we ran a Hausman-Taylor model (Green 2008). This type of models employs a 'mixed' structure to include time-invariant variables (as possible in random effect models) and account for unobserved country heterogeneity (as done by fixed effects). It fits a random-effects model for panel data in which some of the covariates are correlated with the unobserved individual-level random effects. A Hausman-Taylor model also provides the possibility of accounting for endogeneity, as it employs the method of instrumental variables (Green 2008). Endogeneity is a problem that might concern several variables, given the potential reciprocal nature of the relationship between integration policies and some of the independent variables. For many factors

included in the analysis, it is possible to hypothesise that there is a circular (or even inverse) causation (see: Solano et al. 2022). In particular, endogeneity appears particularly relevant regarding the degree of acceptance of migrants in the public opinion and the share/number of refugees/migrants (see Section 2 and, among others: Beverelli 2022; De Coninck et al. 2021). As already illustrated in Section 2, migration policies can affect the number of migrants but can also be a reaction to the number of migrants. The same goes for the association between public opinion and migration policies. Does a more welcoming public opinion produce more open and inclusive policies? Or do policies generate a more welcoming public opinion? In addition, there might be a circular relationship between the level of inequality and integration policies. Policies may be a reaction to the level of inequality, but the opposite can also hold true, i.e. the level of inequality is an effect of policy inclusiveness. Therefore, as endogenous variables in the Hausman-Taylor models, we included: Gini-coefficient, share of migrants, number of refugees, number of asylum applications and migrant acceptance.

Finally, given that the values of few variables were just repeated for 2014 and 2019 (as data on only one point in time were available), we ran the same models with 2019 MIPEX scores as dependent variable only and so we did with 2014 MIPEX scores only.

4. Findings

In this section, we first report the descriptive results of our research, focusing on the trends in the countries in the dataset and regional differences. Then we illustrate the findings from main analyses (regression models) as well as conduct a number of robustness checks. Finally, aside from using the aggregated MIPEX policy score, we will also consider the separate integration policy area scores.

4.1 Descriptive analyses

Integration policies in the 56 MIPEX countries were, on average, only moderately favourable (49/100, see Figure 2) in 2019, with country scores ranging from 10 (Saudi Arabia) to 86 (Sweden). This means that, on average, countries' policies were creating as many obstacles as opportunities for migrants to participate and settle in their country of immigration. There were differences based on the policy area considered (see Figure 3). Policies were on average more inclusive when it came

to anti-discrimination, family reunification and permanent residence, while policies were less inclusive in the areas of education and political participation.

Sweden, Finland, Portugal, Canada and New Zealand were countries where migrants enjoyed the most favourable policies. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, India, Indonesia, and the UAE are countries where integration policies were least favourable for migrants (see Table A4 in the online appendix). These results suggest than non-Western countries appeared to develop less migrant-friendly integration policies. There were also significant differences between continents (see Figure 2), as shown by a Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test ($H(4) = 18.251$, $p = .01$).

Figure 2. Integration policy scores in 2014 and 2019



Figure 3. Integration policy scores in 2014 and 2019 – policy areas



On average, integration policy scores increased slightly between 2014 and 2019. The average score increased from 47 to 49 points, but the country-average policy change score between 2014-2019 was +1.4 points (see Figure 2 above and Table A4 in the online appendix). Although small in magnitude, the increase was statistically significant according to a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test (z = -3.786, p < .001).

Nevertheless, the state of policies in 2014 resembled the one in 2019 (see Figure 2). The most and least inclusive areas of policies were the same as in 2019 (most inclusive: anti-discrimination, family reunification and permanent residence; least inclusive: education and political participation - see Figure 3). Both in 2014 and 2019, Sweden, Finland, Portugal, Canada and New Zealand were countries where migrants enjoyed the most inclusive policies. By contrast, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, India, Indonesia, and the UAE were the countries with the least inclusive integration policies for migrants (see Table A4 in the online appendix). Differences between continents still persisted and were significant, as confirmed by a Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test (H(4) = 17.265, p = .02). On average, countries in the Americas and Oceania held the most inclusive policies.

4.2 Main analyses

Table 1 displays the results of the regression models for panel data (random effects) on the policy score. Model 1 covers migration-related variables (share of migrants, number of refugees, number of asylum applications), Model 2 includes contextual-institutional variables (GDP, Gini, Welfare expenditure and Unemployment rate). Variables related to public opinion, political ideologies and mass media are included in Model 3.

If we look at the R^2 of the models, we observe that factors linked to the institutionalist perspective (Model 2), along with the control variables regarding continent, explained 66% of the variance of the policy score. Factors related to the partisan perspective (and the control variables, Model 3) explained 57% of the policy score variance, while migration-related indicators linked to the evidence-based perspective (and controls) (Model 1) explained 40%.[3]

Linked to the evidence-based perspective (Model 1), *Hypothesis 1a* stated that the number of migrants would be negatively associated with policy inclusiveness. The hypothesis is not confirmed as the effect of the share of migrants was not significant. We also expected the same concerning the number of refugees (*Hypothesis 1b*) and the number of asylum seeker applications (*Hypothesis 1c*). Both hypotheses were confuted by the data, as the effect of number of refugees ($\beta = 1.94$; $p < .001$) and asylum applications ($\beta = 2.41$; $p < .001$) were significant and positive.

In relation to the institutionalist perspective (Model 2), *Hypothesis 2* stated that the country's economic situation would be positively associated with policy inclusiveness and inclusive policy change. This is confirmed by the positive effect of GDP ($\beta = 3.68$; $p < .001$, Model 2). Based on previous literature, we hypothesised that there would be no association between the level of inequality and the labour market conditions, on the one hand, and policy inclusiveness, on the other hand. *Hypotheses 3* and *hypothesis 4* are both confirmed, as the effect of Gini and unemployment rate was not significant. *Hypothesis 5* referred to the fact that countries that have more generous welfare systems have more inclusive integration policies, which is confirmed by our results ($\beta = 7.92$; $p < .001$, Model 2).

Finally, we formulated three hypotheses related to the partisan perspective (Model 3). *Hypothesis 6* is supported by our findings, which show that the share of right-wing representatives in the national parliament is negatively associated with policy inclusiveness ($\beta = -1.18$; $p < .001$, Model 3). Our findings on migrant acceptance (or public opinion) ($\beta = 7.48$; $p < .001$, Model 3)

also support *Hypothesis 7*, which stated that a more welcoming public opinion towards migrants was positively associated with policy inclusiveness. Finally, the journalistic attitudes towards diversity are not associated with policy inclusiveness; *Hypothesis 8* is not confirmed.

Table 1. Regression models for panel data on policy score

	DV: Policy score								
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
IVs	β		SE	β		SE	β		SE
Share of migrants	0.80		1.53						
Number of refugees	1.94	***	0.53						
Number of asylum applications	2.41	***	0.67						
GDP				3.68	***	1.47			
Inequality (Gini)				-0.68		1.75			
Welfare expenditure				7.92	***	1.85			
Unemployment rate				-0.33		0.94			
Political ideology							-1.18	***	0.48
Migrant acceptance							7.48	***	1.70
Journalists' attitudes towards diversity							-0.04		1.63
Continent (reference: Europe)									
Asia	-20.26	***	4.57	-4.40		4.53	-18.55	***	4.01
Oceania	21.62	*	9.24	22.78	***	7.40	10.32		8.38
Americas	11.26	*	5.94	17.79	***	5.37	6.12		5.11
Africa	-7.19		12.93	17.07		12.69	-5.94		11.27
Constant	51.46	***	2.11	47.45	***	1.87	52.09	***	1.85
N countries	56			56			56		
N observations	112			112			112		
R2	0.43			0.66			0.57		
SD(u)	12.21			9.64			10.92		
SD(e)	2.4			3.04			2.89		
Rho	0.96			0.91			0.93		
Wald (df)	66.08 (7)	***		99.62 (8)	***		72.44 (7)	****	

Note: p <0 .05; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. All the variables have been standardised.

Hypotheses 9 and 10 state that, under a more favourable climate for migrants and a better economic situation, a higher number of migrants is associated with less restrictive policies. To test this, we ran a set of models with the interactions between partisan-related factors and evidence-based-related ones as well as between institutional-related and evidence-based-related factors (one

separate model for each interaction). Table A5 in the online appendix displays the results of those analyses.

These results provide no evidence for *Hypothesis 9* on the interaction between factors related to the partisan perspective and the evidence-based perspective, as the effect of the interaction variables is not significant. Contrasting pieces of evidence emerge on *Hypothesis 10*. On the one hand, the positive association between migration-related factors (number of refugees) and policy inclusiveness is reinforced when the country has a higher degree of inequality ($\beta = 2.99$; $p < .05$). The same happens regarding the labour market situation (higher unemployment rate) and the number of asylum applications ($\beta = 1.25$; $p < .05$). On the other hand, when the country is in a better economic shape, the (positive) association between number of migrants and policy inclusiveness tends to be positive to a greater extent ($\beta = 2.58$; $p < .01$).

As for the control variable continent, regional differences matter, as they account for 36% of the policy score variance, and the differences emerging from the descriptive analyses were confirmed (although the effect was sometimes not significant depending on the model – see Tables 1 and 2). Countries in America and Oceania were more likely to have more inclusive policies than European countries, while Asian countries were less likely to develop inclusive policies compared to European countries.

4.3 Robustness checks

We ran two additional models, one with the number of migrants (replacing the share of migrants) and the other including the share of refugees in the migrant population (as a replacement of the number of refugees). Both findings from the main analyses were confirmed: the share of refugees was significant and positive ($\beta=2.22$, $p<0.05$) and the number of migrants was not significant ($\beta=-0.68$, $p=0.70$).

Furthermore, we combined the variables from the three models reported as main analyses (Table 1). Since the highest correlation was between GDP and migrant acceptance (0.67), we ran two models: one without GDP and the other one without migrant acceptance (Table 2, Models 4 and 5). The results of the regression models confirmed what emerged from the models displayed in the main analyses, although political ideology became only weakly significant.

We also ran a set of Hausman-Taylor models (Table 2, Models 6 and 7), which employs a 'mixed' structure to include time-invariant variables (as possible in random effect models) and

account for unobserved country heterogeneity (as done by fixed effects). Furthermore, it provides the possibility of accounting for endogeneity. As endogenous variables, we included: Gini-coefficient, share of migrants, number of refugees, number of asylum applications and migrant acceptance. Sargan-Hansen tests showed that the sets of instruments were valid. For the Hausman-Taylor estimator to be consistent, it is necessary to argue that all regressors are uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic errors, and also that a specified subset of the regressors is uncorrelated with the fixed effect term. This is confirmed by non-significant values of the Sargan-Hansen test.

The models displayed some differences compared to the main analyses. First, although still positive, the effect of GDP is not significant anymore. This may be related to a possible correlation of GDP with unobserved country random effects. Second, the effect of migrant acceptance strongly diminishes and is no longer significant. This may point to the endogenous nature of the effect of migrant acceptance (De Coninck et al. 2021; Vrânceanu and Lachat 2021). Third, political ideology was only weakly significant, as it was in the main analysis.

Finally, given that some variables were repeated for 2014 and 2019 (as data on only one point in time were available) we ran all the same models with 2019 MIPEX scores and 2014 MIPEX scores as dependent variable (see online appendix Tables A6 and A7, Models A1-6). The linear regression models confirmed what emerged from the models displayed in the main analyses, for both 2014 and 2019. However, political ideology and number of refugees lost significance but, given that these variables vary between 2014 and 2019, this may have happened due to lower statistical power.

Table 2. Robustness checks

	Model 4			Model 5			Model 6			Model 7		
	DV: policy score full model, panel data regression			DV: policy score full model, panel data regression			DV: policy score full model, Hausman-Taylor regression			DV: policy score full model, Hausman-Taylor regression		
IVs	B		SE	B		SE	B		SE	B		SE
Share of migrants	-0.47		1.35	-0.44		1.28	3.39		2.25	3.41		2.87
Number of refugees	1.95	***	0.53	1.97	***	0.52	2.19	***	0.53	2.20	***	0.54
Number of asylum applications	1.59	**	0.67	1.55	*	0.66	1.64	*	0.69	1.63	*	0.70
GDP	3.48	*	1.53				2.22		1.67			
Inequality (Gini)	-1.46		1.62	-1.18		1.59	-1.22		1.97	-1.16		2.01
Welfare expenditure	6.63	***	1.96	6.29	***	1.88	7.26	***	2.19	6.77	**	2.45
Unemployment rate	-0.50		0.82	-0.94		0.76	-0.78		0.82	-1.09		0.79
Political ideology	-0.75	(*)	0.41	-0.74	(*)	0.41	-0.68	(*)	0.40	-0.68	(*)	0.41
Migrant acceptance				5.23	**	1.68				3.98		3.81
Journalists' attitudes towards diversity	0.82		1.54	1.13		1.49	0.53		1.72	0.94		1.89
Continent (reference: Europe)												
Asia	-8.01		4.75	-10.55	*	4.70	-10.25	*	5.34	-12.22	*	5.73
Oceania	23.66	**	7.71	18.00	*	7.83	20.89	*	8.71	16.30		10.47
Americas	17.61	***	5.39	12.05	*	5.52	15.64	**	6.14	11.64		7.32
Africa	14.30		12.77	9.91		12.58	15.28		14.78	12.38		15.04
Constant	48.14	***	1.92	49.47	***	1.93	48.83	***	2.17	49.82	***	2.41
N countries	56			56			56			56		
N observations	112			112			112			112		
R2	0.64			0.67								
SD(u)	9.74			9.59			10.71			10.08		
SD(e)	2.71			2.35			2.2			2.22		
Rho	0.93			0.94			0.96			0.95		
Wald (df)	125.24(13)	***		135.85(13)	***		116.09(13)	***		117.78(13)	***	

Note: (*) p <0.1; * p <0 .05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. All the variables have been standardised.

4.4 Additional analyses

Given that the MIPEX overall score represents the average of the area scores, which vary considerably, we now repeat the analyses for each of the eight policy areas included in MIPEX. Full results are reported in the online appendix (Tables A8-A15 online appendix).

In general, institutional factors were the ones explaining the highest amount of variance, particularly with regard to political participation and health policies. The factors that have the smallest effects were the migration-related variables, as the R^2 was almost always lower than the ones of the two other perspectives (see online appendix). Concerning the variables related to the partisan perspective, the highest values were displayed regarding political participation. Family reunion, political participation and citizenship were the only areas in which the value of the variance explained by partisan-related factors was higher than the ones for institutional factors. In addition, the importance of the overall regional differences (continent variables) is confirmed, but seems lower than for the overall score model, as the values of the R^2 of the models with only the continent variables (see Table A16 in the online appendix) vary mainly from 0.14-0.21 (labour market, family reunification, education, political participation and health) to 0.30-0.31 (permanent residence and citizenship). An exception is the antidiscrimination score model, for which the R^2 was equal to 0.52.

Going into greater detail in terms of the effect of the different variables, the results for the overall integration policy framework are confirmed when it comes to the migration-related factors. Similar to the result for the overall integration policy framework, the share of migrants has no effect on the policy score besides the case of permanent residence. The share of migrants has a negative effect on the inclusiveness of permanent residence policies (β=-6.80, $p<0.001$). The positive effect of the number of refugees and asylum applications is confirmed by and large, except for few policy areas.

The main results on institutional factors are confirmed, too. In the main analysis, the level of inequality (Gini) and the unemployment rate have no significant effect (except for labour market policies). The positive effect of welfare expenditure is confirmed, except from family reunification and antidiscrimination policies. By contrast, the effect of GDP is more controversial when it comes to the different policy areas, as it is not significant for some policy areas (labour market, citizenship, antidiscrimination) and negative in the case of family reunification policies – in contradiction with the main analysis.

Concerning media and political factors, the positive association of migrant acceptance is confirmed in most of the policy areas (although with the possibility of an endogeneity issue, as illustrated in Section 5.3). The effect of journalists' attitudes towards diversity was not significant in most of the cases, confirming the main analysis. However, the effect of this variable is significant in two policy areas. Whereas political participation policies are less inclusive when journalists tend to promote tolerance and cultural diversity, the opposite holds true for family reunification. In general, the different policy areas display opposite values (some with negative values and others with positive) of the effect of journalists' attitudes. This might suggest that, overall, there is an association, but the direction depends on the policy area. Finally, the role of political ideology is confirmed in just two policy areas (education and health), although the effect is negative in all policy areas.

5. Discussion and Conclusion

Countries have largely different migrant integration policy frameworks in place (Huddleston and Solano 2020). Our study demonstrated that these frameworks can be explained by several factors. In this article, we provided a theoretically-informed and comprehensive analysis of the factors associated with the level of inclusiveness of integration policies. This article simultaneously and comparatively takes into account the main factors identified by existing literature. We build upon existing theories of migration policies to explain countries' integration policies and we use three perspectives: evidence-based, institutionalist and partisan perspectives (Consterdine and Hampshire 2020; Scholten 2020; Schultz et al. 2021). The *evidence-based perspective* assumes that policy makers act based on objective factors related to the policy issue (e.g. when it comes to migration policies, the number of migrants). The *institutionalist perspective* points to the relevance of institutional conditions, such as labour markets and welfare institutions. The *partisan perspective* expects that policies on migration and migrant integration follow dynamics related to political ideologies as well as attitudes in the public opinion and media. The comparison of the R2 values show that factors related to the institutionalist perspective play the most critical role, alongside factors linked to the partisan perspective.

The results provide mixed evidence for all perspectives. Countries seem to differ in their integration policies according to their institutional configurations. Although not significative when fixed effects were introduced, wealthier countries (in terms of GDP) have more inclusive policies.

However, the results of the analyses on the different policy areas reveal that policies are more inclusive in wealthier countries only in some specific policy areas, often when investments are needed (e.g. when programmes and measures need to be in place), as in the case of education and health policies. Furthermore, countries that spend more on welfare for their citizens are more likely to develop inclusive migrant integration policies. Some authors (Kymlicka 2015; Van der Waal et al. 2013) stress that more 'generous' and universal welfare models do not necessarily translate into more open migration and integration policies. This is also confirmed in almost all of the policy areas. Our results partially contradict this by suggesting that, by and large, countries that have more generous welfare models are also more inclusive when it comes to migrants.

Furthermore, the degree of inclusiveness of integration policies are also associated with partisan preferences. Right-wing parties in the national parliament are linked with restrictive changes. This confirms previous findings (Howard 2010; Koopmans et al. 2012) and shows a clear, but unsurprising, ideology-based cleavage in the approach towards integration of migrants. Concerning the degree of acceptance of migrants in a country, our main analysis confirms the association between acceptance of migrants in the public opinion and integration policies – for both the overall policy framework and the different policy areas (Callens and Meuleman 2017; De Coninck et al. 2021; Karpiński and Wysieńska-Di Carlo 2018). Countries in which the public is accepting of migrants have more inclusive integration policies. However, the additional analyses, which took into account endogeneity, suggest that integration policies and policymaking influence public opinion, as recently shown by De Coninck and colleagues (2021) and Vrânceanu and Lachat (2021). Journalists' attitudes towards diversity are not significantly associated with the level of policies. However, the fact that the different policy areas display opposite directions in the effect of journalists' attitudes may suggest that, overall, there is an association with policies, but the direction depends on the policy area.

Regarding the evidence-based perspective, the number of asylum applications and of refugees in a country is significantly associated with the inclusiveness of policies, while the share of migrants is not. By and large, this holds also for the different policy areas. These results contrast some of the existing literature. Previous literature found that the share and number of migrants were related to more restrictive migration policy (de Haas and Natter 2015; Hatton 2004). Findings here indicate that this effect is limited to admission policies as it does not apply to integration policies, which was suggested by de Haas and Natter (2015). Nevertheless, in contrast to our

expectations, the number of asylum applications and of refugees in the countries is positively associated with inclusive policies. This might support the pull factor hypothesis: When deciding where to migrate, asylum seekers and refugees tend to consider the security of their migrant status as well as access to social rights, as revealed by the several that identified a link between inclusive integration policies and migration flows (Beine et al. 2020; Beverelli, 2022; Migali & Natale, 2017). However, the fact that the effect of the number of asylum applications and of refugees in the countries is still significant after applying the Hausman-Taylor estimation might also point to a circular effect, in which policy makers implement more inclusive policies due to the number of refugees and asylum seekers in the country.

The fact that the overall migration dynamics (e.g., change in the share of migrants) have no significant effect may suggest that policy makers act based on a given set of information on the topic (evidence-based perspective), but the choice of these pieces of information seems driven by non-evidence-based factors (media framing of migration, for example). Indeed, the topic of refugee and asylum seekers has been at the centre of the political and public debate in the last five years (Chouliaraki and Zaborowski 2017; De Coninck and Matthijs 2020). This seems to suggest the role of the partisan perspective in defining the way information is used as well as the social construction of policy problems (and solutions) (Bekkers et al. 2017). However, no evidence supporting this emerged from the interaction effects between migration-related factors and the partisan-related variables. The interaction effect seems, by contrast, to reveal a role of institutional characteristics in influencing the association between migration-related variables and policy inclusiveness.

This paper has comparatively analysed the integration policy framework of 56 countries worldwide. It contributes to the field of migrant integration policy by providing new insights on what factors are associated with integration policies. While most studies in this field are limited to only a small number of (Western) countries and consider only one possible set of determinants (Solano and Huddleston 2021), this article expands the scope of analysis by adopting a comprehensive theoretically-informed approach and analysing a unique global dataset on integration policies.

It goes without saying that the associations we found should not be interpreted as causal effects. Beside the case of migrant acceptance, in this article, we refrained from making causal assumptions. For many factors included in the analysis, it is possible to hypothesise that there is a

circular (or even inverse) causation. For example, literature also indicates that inclusive integration policies are a pull-factor for migrants, but, at the same time, policy makers might restrict policies as a reaction to immigration flows (Beine et al. 2020; Beverelli 2022; de Haas and Natter 2015; Migali and Natale 2017). The direction in which these relations operate cannot be assessed with the data because of their cross-sectional character of the analyses.

This paper has also some limitations, which pave the way for further research. First, although the sample included Western and non-Western countries, most of the considered countries were European and/or developed countries. It is possible that the results vary when considering mainly developing countries. Subsequent research should, therefore, explore the determinants of policy and policy change in non-European, developing countries. This would be particularly interesting also to examine the determinants in the so-called Global South (Adamson and Tsourapas 2020). Second, our longitudinal data encompass two years (2014 and 2019), while it would be interesting to analyse a longer period of time when it comes to explaining integration policies (Helbling and Kalkum 2018). This would provide additional insights on long-term policy making.

Finally, the research presented in this article addresses the period 2014-2019 and, therefore, it does not catch the possible effect of the COVID-19 outbreak, which has decreased international migration and put an economic strain on many countries. Future research might study the short- and long-term effect of this crisis, or other crises, on integration policies and their change over time – see, for example, Ponzo (2019) on the 2008 Great Recession. Nevertheless, this article provides novel insights on the factors associated with integration policies. It shows that several factors linked to different theoretical perspectives influence the level of policies.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Marc Helbing for his feedback on the earlier drafts of the paper.

Funding

This research was supported by funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under grant agreement No 870661 (HumMingBird).

Conflict of interest statement. None declared

Endnotes

[1] The full data are available here: https://www.mipex.eu/sites/default/files/downloads/pdf/Policy%20Indicators%20Scores%20(2007-2019)%20%E2%80%93%20core%20set%20of%20indicators.xlsx

[2] See: https://www.mipex.eu/methodology

[3] Literature suggests that researchers should be cautions with interpreting R^2 for this kind of models. Therefore, we ran the same models as linear regressions (*regress* command in Stata) to check for the results concerning the R^2. The following results confirm the previous ones: Model 1. R^2: 0.46, Adj-R^2: 0.42; Model 2. R^2: 0.66, Adj-R^2: 0.64; Model 3. R^2: 0.57, Adj-R^2: 0.54. The full models are not reported.

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APPENDIX

Sample: List of countries

Table A1. List of countries included in the sample.

Albania	Estonia	Korea	Russia
Argentina	Finland	Latvia	Saudi Arabia
Australia	France	Lithuania	Serbia
Austria	Germany	Luxembourg	Slovakia
Belgium	Greece	Malta	Slovenia
Brazil	Hungary	Mexico	South Africa
Bulgaria	Iceland	Moldova	Spain
Canada	India	Netherlands	Sweden
Chile	Indonesia	New Zealand	Switzerland
China	Ireland	North Macedonia	Turkey
Croatia	Israel	Norway	Ukraine
Cyprus	Italy	Poland	United Arab Emirates
Czechia	Japan	Portugal	United Kingdom
Denmark	Jordan	Romania	United States

List of independent variables included in the analysis

- *Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita* - source: World Bank. We included data on the GDP per capita as an indicator of a country's economic condition. The World Bank collect annual country-level data. GDP per capita is defined as the gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars. To have a stable and reliable measure, we calculated the median of the GDP per capita for all available years in the period 2009-2013 (for 2014 cases) and 2014-2018 (for 2019 cases).

- *Inequality (Gini)* - source: World Bank. We employed the Gini coefficient to assess the impact of inequality in a country. Gini coefficient measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. The coefficient ranged from 0 (lowest degree of inequality) to 100 (highest degree of inequality). Data are based on primary household survey data obtained from government statistical agencies and World Bank country departments. We calculated the median of available years in the period 2009-2013 (for 2014 cases) and 2014-2018 (for 2019 cases) (source: World Bank). For New Zealand, we used the OECD Gini estimate as the World Bank estimate was not available.

- *Welfare expenditure* - source: ILO. We assessed the role of welfare expenditure by suing ILO's data on social protection and health. We calculate the welfare expenditure variable by adding the share of the yearly national GDP that was used for social protection and health. Given that yearly updates were not available for all countries, we used data on the year available for both 2014 and 2019 cases.

- *Unemployment rate* - source: ILO. We employed ILO's annual data on the unemployment rate for the general population. To have a stable and reliable measure, we calculated the median of the values for all available years in the period 2009-2013 (for 2014 cases) and 2014-2018 (for 2019 cases) (source: ILO).

- *Share of migrants* - source: United Nations. We included the share of migrants out of the total population. The data were taken from United Nations' figures which are available only for some years (since 2000s: 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, and 2019). Therefore, we included the share of migrants in 2010 (for 2014 cases linked MIPEX 2014 scores) and 2015 (for 2019 cases) as data on other closest years were not available.

- *Number of refugees in a country* - source: UNHCR. We included the number of number of refugees. We chose to include the number of refugees rather than their share of the host population given that their relative presence in most countries was limited. To use a stable and reliable measure, we calculated the median for available years in the period 2009-2013 (for 2014 cases) and 2014-2018 (for 2019 cases).

- *Number of asylum applications* - source: UNHCR. We used the number of asylum applications by calculating the sum of asylum applications for the period 2009-2013 (for 2014 cases) and 2014-2018 (for 2019 cases). We inserted the logarithmic version of this indicator in the model because the original variable had a non-normal distribution.

- *Political ideology***.** To include the role of political ideologies, we looked at the political party's ideology (right-wing vs. left-wing ideology) (Source: Manifesto project – see: https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/). The Manifesto project dataset provides data for each of the political parties for each of the parliament election in a country, including the share of seats that a party has after the election and the left-right position of the party. We calculate the political ideology score which represents the left-right position of the country in the period 2010-2013 (for 2014 cases) and 2015-2018 (for 2019 cases). We calculated it as follows. Based on the information of the results of the elections, we calculate for each year the left-right score of the country (lower scores are associated with left-wing ideology), which represent the sum of the left-right score for each of the parties in a country weighted according to the share of seats in the parliament of the parties. We then sum the yearly scores.

  (Left-right score_party 1*share of seats_party 1 + Left-right score_party 2*share of seats_party 2 + Left-right score_party 3*share of seats_party 3….)_2015 + (Left-right score_party 1*share of seats_party 1 + Left-right score_party 2*share of seats_party 2 + Left-right score_party 3*share of seats_party 3….)_2016 + (Left-right score_party 1*share of seats_party 1 + Left-right score_party 2*share of seats_party 2 + Left-right score_party 3*share of seats_party

3….)_2017 + (Left-right score_party 1*share of seats_party 1 + Left-right score_party 2*share of seats_party 2 + Left-right score_party 3*share of seats_party 3….)_2018

Full data on 10 out of the 56 countries were not available for the covered years. To avoid losing cases, we decided to replace the missing values with the variable's average score.

For additional information on the Manifesto project, see:

- *Migrant acceptance.* To address the acceptance of migrants in the public opinion, we used the Gallup's Migrant Acceptance Index, which is based on three questions that asked respondents in 140 countries about migrants in increasing level of proximity to them. Respondents could indicate whether the increased proximity was a 'good thing' or a 'bad thing'. 'A good thing' response was worth three points, 'it depends' or 'don't know' was worth one point, and 'a bad thing' was worth zero points. The index was a sum of the points across these three questions, with a maximum possible score of 9 (all three were good things) and a minimum possible score of zero (all three were bad things). The higher the score, the more accepting the population was of migrants. As data were available only for 2017, we included the same data for both 2014 and 2019 cases.
- *Journalists' attitudes towards diversity*. To include the role of mass media, we looked at journalist attitudes by using the Worlds of Journalism (WJS) study. It assessed attitudes of 27,500 journalists in 67 countries between 2012 and 2016. We obtained scores regarding the question whether journalists should promote tolerance and cultural diversity, with scores ranging from 0 (journalists should not promote tolerance and diversity at all) to 100 (journalists should heavily promote tolerance and diversity). 18 out of the 56 countries analysed in this article were not included in the WJS or their values were missing. To avoid losing cases, we decided to replace the missing values with the variable's average score. As data were available for one year only, we included the same data for both 2014 and 2019 cases.
- *Continent*. As control variable, we included the continent in which the country is located: Americas; Africa; Asia; Oceania. We used Europe as reference category, as it is the continent with most cases.

Table A2. Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the analysis.

Variable	Obs	Median	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Policy score	112	48.69	49.69	16.07	10.41	87.12
Share of migrants	112	10.95	13.21	14.44	0.10	86.30
Number of refugees	112	6563	126,718	448,690	34	2,900,000
Number of asylum applications	112	18,922	109,169	242,290	147	2,000,000
GDP (per capita)	112	22,513	29,198	23,405	1,444	107,627
Inequality (Gini)	112	33.25	34.40	6.87	24.70	63.40
Welfare expenditure	112	17.65	18.35	7.05	2.40	32.60
Unemployment rate	112	7.20	8.83	5.46	2.21	31.38
Political ideology (left-wing - lower score; right-wing - higher score)	112	-2,169	-2,157	4,106	-13,105	9,681
Migrant acceptance	112	5.6	5.16	2.14	1.47	8.26
Journalists' attitudes	112	3.91	3.92	0.31	2.77	4.56
Continent: Africa	112	0	0.02	0.13	0	1
Continent: Asia	112	0	0.18	0.38	0	1
Continent: Americas	112	0	0.11	0.31	0	1
Continent: Europe	112	1	0.66	0.48	0	1
Continent: Oceania	112	0	0.04	0.19	0	1

Tables A3 a-b. Correlations between variables included in the analysis.

	Policy score	Share of migrants	Number of refugees	Number of asylum applications	GDP	Gini	Welfare	Unempl.
Policy score	1.00							
Share of migrants		1.00						
Number of refugees			1.00					
Number of asylum applications	0.34		0.24	1.00				
GDP	0.54	0.35		0.32	1.00			
Inequality (Gini)					-0.34	1.00		
Welfare expenditure	0.62			0.40	0.49	-0.36	1.00	
Unemployment rate					-0.35	0.33		1.00
Political ideology								
Migrant acceptance	0.58	0.25		0.27	0.67		0.28	-0.31
Journalists' attitudes towards diversity	-0.21			-0.21	-0.46	0.34	-0.24	0.22
Europe		-0.24	-0.23			-0.56	0.55	0.20
Asia	-0.51		0.35		-0.20		-0.55	-0.24
Oceania	0.27							
Americas	0.27					0.47		
Africa				0.20		0.57		0.42

Note. Only significant correlations ($p < .05$) are displayed.

	Political ideology	Migrant accept.	Journalists' attitudes	Europe	Asia	Oceania	Americas	Africa
Policy score								
Share of migrants								
Number of BIPs								
Number of asylum applications								
GDP								
Inequality (Gini)								
Welfare expenditure								
Unemployment rate								
Political ideology	1.00							
Migrant acceptance	-0.21	1.00						
Journalists' attitudes towards diversity		-0.33	1.00					
Europe			-0.19	1.00				
Asia				-0.65	1.00			
Oceania		0.27		-0.27		1.00		
Americas		0.20		-0.48			1.00	
Africa	-0.26			-0.19				1.00

Note. Only significant correlations ($p < .05$) are displayed.

Table A4. MIPEX scores in 2014 and 2019, and the change in policy scores

Country	MIPEX score (2014)	MIPEX score (2019)	Country	MIPEX score (2014)	MIPEX score (2019)
Albania	42	43	Korea	58	56
Argentina	62	58	Latvia	34	37
Australia	69	65	Lithuania	33	37
Austria	46	46	Luxembourg	54	64
Belgium	69	69	Malta	43	48
Brazil	52	64	Mexico	52	51
Bulgaria	37	40	Moldova	39	47
Canada	78	80	Netherlands	57	57
Chile	50	53	New Zealand	77	77
China	27	32	North Macedonia	42	42
Croatia	38	39	Norway	72	69
Cyprus	39	41	Poland	41	40
Czechia	47	50	Portugal	78	81
Denmark	53	49	Romania	49	49
Estonia	45	50	Russia	29	31
Finland	82	85	Saudi Arabia	11	10
France	53	56	Serbia	45	50
Germany	57	58	Slovakia	37	39
Greece	43	46	Slovenia	45	48
Hungary	42	43	Spain	57	60
Iceland	49	56	South Africa	48	48
India	24	24	Sweden	87	86
Indonesia	25	26	Switzerland	50	50
Ireland	59	64	Turkey	26	43
Israel	50	49	Ukraine	46	48
Italy	59	58	United Arab Emirates	21	29
Japan	46	47	United Kingdom	57	56
Jordan	19	21	United States	75	73

Main Analyses: Interaction effects

Table A5. Interaction effects

Interaction variables	β		SE
Share of migrants* Political ideology	1.25		0.81
Share of migrants* Migrant acceptance	-0.75		2.17
Share of migrants* Journalists' attitudes towards diversity	0.13		1.75
Number of refugees* Political ideology	-1.42		0.96
Number of refugees* Migrant acceptance	-1.22		2.56
Number of refugees* Journalists' attitudes towards diversity	4.61		4.13
Number of asylum applications* Political ideology	0.61		0.40
Number of asylum applications* Migrant acceptance	0.45		0.72
Number of asylum applications* Journalists' attitudes towards diversity	0.68		0.71
Share of migrants* GDP	2.58	**	0.95
Share of migrants* Inequality (Gini)	2.65		1.87
Share of migrants* Welfare expenditure	1.80		0.67
Share of migrants* Unemployment rate	-0.80		1.47
Number of refugees* GDP	-0.44		2.84
Number of refugees* Inequality (Gini)	2.99	*	1.30
Number of refugees* Welfare expenditure	0.77		1.85
Number of refugees* Unemployment rate	-0.62		1.05
Number of asylum applications* GDP	-0.62		0.93
Number of asylum applications* Inequality (Gini)	0.65		0.60
Number of asylum applications* Welfare expenditure	-0.17		0.71
Number of asylum applications* Unemployment rate	1.25	*	0.52

Note: The interaction variables have been included in different models (one for each interaction). All the models included the set-related main effects and the control variables. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Robustness checks: Linear regression models

Table A6. Linear regression models on 2019 policy score

	Model A1 DV: 2019 policy score linear regression				Model A2 DV: 2019 policy score linear regression				Model A3 DV: 2019 policy score linear regression			
IVs	B		SE	β	B		SE	β	B		SE	β
Share of migrants	0.02		0.12	0.02								
Number of refugees	0.00		0.00	-0.11								
Number of asylum applications	2.41	**	0.95	0.30								
GDP					0.00	*	0.00	0.28				
Inequality (Gini)					-0.19		0.36	-0.08				
Welfare expenditure					1.02	***	0.28	0.46				
Unemployment rate					0.11		0.35	0.04				
Political ideology									0.00		0.00	-0.09
Migrant acceptance									3.38	***	0.85	0.46
Journalists' attitudes towards diversity									0.65		5.43	0.01
Continent (reference: Europe)												
Asia	-16.94	**	5.11	-0.42	-3.91		4.79	-0.10	-18.12	***	4.03	-0.45
Oceania	19.37	*	9.43	0.23	20.42	*	7.74	0.24	7.73		8.42	0.09
Americas	8.44		5.74	0.17	18.64	**	6.25	0.37	5.91		5.17	0.12
Africa	-9.80		13.11	-0.08	15.62		14.99	0.13	-7.06		11.55	-0.06
Constant	27.41	**	10.11		29.57	*	12.96	.	32.25		22.93	.
N	56				56				56			
R2	0.43				0.65				0.57			
Adj-R2	0.34				0.59				0.5			
F	5.09	***			10.9	***			8.92	***		

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$. B, unstandardized coefficient; SE, unstandardized standard error; β, standardized coefficient.

Table A7. Linear regression models on 2014 policy score

	Model A1 DV: 2014 policy score linear regression				Model A2 DV: 2014 policy score linear regression				Model A3 DV: 2014 policy score linear regression			
IVs	B		SE	β	B		SE	β	B		SE	β
Share of migrants	0.02		0.13	0.01								
Number of refugees	0.00		0.00	-0.12								
Number of asylum applications	2.95	***	0.87	0.37								
GDP					0.00	*	0.00	0.25				
Inequality (Gini)					-0.40		0.36	-0.17				
Welfare expenditure					1.12	***	0.28	0.48				
Unemployment rate					0.20		0.33	0.07				
Political ideology									0.00		0.00	-0.05
Migrant acceptance									3.61	***	0.87	0.47
Journalists' attitudes towards diversity									-0.80		5.77	-0.02
Continent (reference: Europe)												
Asia	-15.97	**	4.82	-0.37	-2.06		5.11	-0.05	-18.92	0.00	4.20	-0.44
Oceania	22.98	*	9.30	0.26	26.75	***	7.82	0.30	12.67		9.11	0.14
Americas	11.48	*	5.57	0.22	22.77	***	6.56	0.43	6.33		5.30	0.12
Africa	-13.89		13.20	-0.11	24.28		14.69	0.20	-4.63		12.34	-0.04
Constant	22.15	*	8.71		31.81	*	12.90	.	35.16		24.41	
N	56				56				56			
R2	0.49				0.68				0.58			
Adj-R2	0.42				0.63				0.52			
F	6.64	***			12.67	***			9.54	***		

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$. B, unstandardized coefficient; SE, unstandardized standard error; β, standardized coefficient.

Additional analyses: Regression models for panel data on policy score for each MIPEX policy area

Summary of the main results for each policy area (see Tables A8-A15 below):

- Labour market integration policies seem to be mainly explained by institutional factors - in particular the level of inequality, welfare expenditure and the unemployment rate –, and those account for the (0.48-0.15=)38% of the variance. In addition, the number of refugees and asylum seekers as well as the degree of migrant acceptance is positively associated with labour market policy inclusiveness.
- Policies on family reunification are associated only with the number of refugees and the journalist attitudes towards diversity. Very interestingly, the number of refugees is negatively associated with the inclusiveness of policies.
- The results on education policies resemble the ones on overall policies, as those policies are associated with the number of refugees and asylum seekers, GDP and welfare expenditure, as well as political ideology and migrant acceptance.
- Policies on political participation are positively associated with the number of asylum seekers and the level of migrant acceptance, while they are negative associated with journalists' attitudes towards diversity. This means that political participation policies are less inclusive when journalists tend to promote tolerance and cultural diversity.
- Permanent residence policies are negatively associated with the share of migrants and positively associated with welfare expenditure.
- Policies on citizenship acquisition are positively associated with the number of asylum applications, welfare expenditure and migrant acceptance.
- Antidiscrimination policies are only (positively) associated with the number of refugees and asylum applications.
- The results on health policies resemble the ones on overall policies, as those policies are associated with the number of refugees and asylum seekers, GDP and welfare expenditure, as well as political ideology and migrant acceptance.

Table A8. Regression models for panel data on policy score - Labour market

	DV: Policy score (Labour Market)								
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
IVs	β		SE	β		SE	β		SE
Share of migrants	-1.91		2.21						
Number of refugees	1.31	*	0.68						
Number of asylum applications	1.75	*	0.86						
GDP				1.44		1.97			
Inequality (Gini)				5.35	**	2.11			
Welfare expenditure				14.97	***	2.93			
Unemployment rate				-2.33	*	1.02			
Political ideology							-0.77		0.54
Migrant acceptance							9.21	***	2.84
Journalists' attitudes towards diversity							3.13		2.73
Continent (control variable)	Yes			Yes			Yes		
Constant	50.88	***	3.02	47.42	***	2.94	52.04	***	3.09
N countries	56			56			56		
N observations	112			112			112		
R2	0.19			0.48			0.31		
SD(u)	18.93			15.95			18.46		
SD(e)	3.08			3.01			3.2		
Rho	0.97			0.97			0.97		
Wald (df)	19.53(7)	**		56.94(8)	***		23.72(7)	**	

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$. β, standardized coefficient; SE, unstandardized standard error.

Table A9. Regression models for panel data on policy score - Family Reunification

	DV: Policy score (Family Reunification)								
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
IVs	β		SE	β		SE	β		SE
Share of migrants	-2.77		1.73						
Number of refugees	-1.48	*	0.77						
Number of asylum applications	0.70		0.94						
GDP				-3.71	0.06	1.96			
Inequality (Gini)				-2.43		2.26			
Welfare expenditure				2.00		2.59			
Unemployment rate				-2.04		1.17			
Political ideology							-0.11		0.62
Migrant acceptance							1.52		1.98
Journalists' attitudes towards diversity							5.62	**	1.90
Continent (control variable)	Yes								
Constant	52.03	***	2.23	51.71	***	2.60	53.65	***	2.15
N countries	56			56			56		
N observations	112			112			112		
R2	0.23			0.2			0.31		
SD(u)	13.19			13.48			12.6		
SD(e)	3.69			3.58			3.75		
Rho	0.93			0.93			0.92		
Wald (df)	19.61(7)	**		18.36(8)	**		22.73(7)	**	

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$. β, standardized coefficient; SE, unstandardized standard error.

Table A10. Regression models for panel data on policy score – Education

	DV: Policy score (Education)								
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
IVs	β		SE	β		SE	β		SE
Share of migrants	3.40		2.68						
Number of refugees	5.40	***	0.96						
Number of asylum applications	2.83	*	1.20						
GDP				8.96	***	2.69			
Inequality (Gini)				-0.37		3.28			
Welfare expenditure				8.69	**	3.32			
Unemployment rate				-0.92		1.82			
Political ideology							-2.01	*	0.96
Migrant acceptance							10.51	***	2.98
Journalists' attitudes towards diversity							-3.26		2.86
Continent (control variable)	Yes								
Constant	42.12	***	3.65	36.12	***	3.35	41.44	***	3.23
N countries	56			56			56		
N observations	112			112			112		
R2	0.24			0.54			0.44		
SD(u)	21.38			16.44			18.99		
SD(e)	4.4			5.85			5.81		
Rho	0.96			0.89			0.91		
Wald (df)	62.80(7)	***		59.27(8)	***		42.90(7)	***	

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$. β, standardized coefficient; SE, unstandardized standard error.

Table A11. Regression models for panel data on policy score - Political Participation

	DV: Policy score (Political Participation)								
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
IVs	β		SE	β		SE	β		SE
Share of migrants	1.71		2.85						
Number of refugees	-0.46		0.88						
Number of asylum applications	3.36	**	1.11						
GDP				10.45	***	2.53			
Inequality (Gini)				-4.40		2.85			
Welfare expenditure				9.03	**	3.43			
Unemployment rate				0.77		1.45			
Political ideology							-0.35		0.70
Migrant acceptance							19.89	***	2.55
Journalists' attitudes towards diversity							-1.16	***	2.46
Continent (control variable)	Yes								
Constant	35.81	***	4.14	28.92	***	3.44	37.54	***	2.78
N countries	56			56			56		
N observations	112			112			112		
R2	0.27			0.63			0.68		
SD(u)	24.71			17.23			16.26		
SD(e)	4.02			4.18			4.18		
Rho	0.97			0.94			0.94		
Wald (df)	24.44(7)	***		75.61(8)	***		107.44(7)	***	

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$. β, standardized coefficient; SE, unstandardized standard error.

Table A12. Regression models for panel data on policy score - Permanent Residence

	DV: Policy score (Permanent Residence)								
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
IVs	β		SE	β		SE	β		SE
Share of migrants	-6.80	***	1.90						
Number of refugees	1.19		1.18						
Number of asylum applications	1.36		1.36						
GDP				-2.01		2.38			
Inequality (Gini)				-5.22	0.08	3.00			
Welfare expenditure				5.98	*	2.85			
Unemployment rate				1.23		1.75			
Political ideology							-1.48		1.00
Migrant acceptance							1.38		2.35
Journalists' attitudes towards diversity							2.65		2.26
Continent (control variable)	Yes								
Constant	61.32	***	2.33	57.90	***	2.89	62.86	***	2.54
N countries	56			56			56		
N observations	112			112			112		
R2	0.43			0.39			0.34		
SD(u)	13.4			14.15			14.59		
SD(e)	6.19			6.13			6.21		
Rho	0.82			0.84			0.85		
Wald (df)	44.32(7)	***		34.20(8)	***		28.94(7)	***	

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$. β, standardized coefficient; SE, unstandardized standard error.

Table A13. Regression models for panel data on policy score – Citizenship

	DV: Policy score (Citizenship)								
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
IVs	β		SE	β		SE	β		SE
Share of migrants	3.13		2.59						
Number of refugees	1.10		1.01						
Number of asylum applications	3.08	**	1.25						
GDP				2.71		2.72			
Inequality (Gini)				-2.03		3.16			
Welfare expenditure				8.54	**	3.54			
Unemployment rate				0.56		1.66			
Political ideology							-0.40		0.85
Migrant acceptance							9.37	***	2.78
Journalists' attitudes towards diversity							-2.46		2.67
Continent (control variable)	Yes								
Constant	45.04	***	3.44	39.73	***	3.56	44.97	***	3.01
N countries	56			56			56		
N observations	112			112			112		
R2	0.32			0.43			0.47		
SD(u)	19.8			18.71			17.73		
SD(e)	4.58			5.23			5.14		
Rho	0.95			0.93			0.92		
Wald (df)	32.92(7)	***		38.55(8)	***		46.19(7)	***	

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$. β, standardized coefficient; SE, unstandardized standard error.

Table A14. Regression models for panel data on policy score - Antidiscrimination

	DV: Policy score (Antidiscrimination)								
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
IVs	β		SE	β		SE	β		SE
Share of migrants	1.77		2.77						
Number of refugees	3.86	**	1.32						
Number of asylum applications	3.14	*	1.60						
GDP				0.35		3.14			
Inequality (Gini)				2.62		3.87			
Welfare expenditure				6.21		3.84			
Unemployment rate				0.18		2.18			
Political ideology							-1.91		1.19
Migrant acceptance							-2.59		3.15
Journalists' attitudes towards diversity							-1.28		3.02
Continent (control variable)	Yes								
Constant	74.38	***	3.50	71.95	***	3.88	73.08	***	3.40
N countries	56			56			56		
N observations	112			112			112		
R2	0.49			0.54			0.52		
SD(u)	19.61			18.85			19.71		
SD(e)	6.08			7.13			7.25		
Rho	0.91			0.88			0.88		
Wald (df)	69.62(7)	***		61.66(8)	***		59.61(7)	***	

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$. β, standardized coefficient; SE, unstandardized standard error.

Table A15. Regression models for panel data on policy score - Health

	DV: Policy score (Health)								
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
IVs	β		SE	β		SE	β		SE
Share of migrants	3.91		2.43						
Number of refugees	3.20	**	1.03						
Number of asylum applications	3.20	**	1.26						
GDP				8.48	***	2.39			
Inequality (Gini)				0.11		2.93			
Welfare expenditure				9.38	***	2.93			
Unemployment rate				-0.23		1.64			
Political ideology							-2.37	**	0.82
Migrant acceptance							10.58	***	2.67
Journalists' attitudes towards diversity							-3.53		2.57
Continent (control variable)	Yes								
Constant	51.16	***	3.15	45.32	***	2.96	50.75	***	2.90
N countries	56			56			56		
N observations	112			112			112		
R2	0.27			0.58			0.44		
SD(u)	17.52			14.42			17.11		
SD(e)	4.58			5.33			4.96		
Rho	0.94			0.88			0.92		
Wald (df)	35.54(7)	***		61.26(8)	***		47.91(7)	***	

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$. β, standardized coefficient; SE, unstandardized standard error.

Table A16. Summary of R2

	Models			
	Continents	Migration-related factors + Continents	Institutional factors + Continents	Media and political factors + Continents
Labour market	0.15	0.19	0.48	0.31
Family reunification	0.19	0.23	0.20	0.31
Education	0.20	0.24	0.54	0.44
Political participation	0.21	0.27	0.63	0.68
Permanent residence	0.31	0.43	0.39	0.34
Citizenship	0.30	0.32	0.43	0.47
Antidiscrimination	0.52	0.49	0.54	0.52
Health	0.14	0.27	0.58	0.44