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LANGUAGE LOSS AND INJUSTICE

A STRUCTURAL INJUSTICE APPROACH TO LANGUAGE LOSS

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Introduction

Let us begin with a hypothetical world, which will introduce this dissertation's principal subject matter: language loss. Imagine that there are three mountains A, B, and C. A distinct group of people live on each mountain; group A on mountain A, group B on mountain B, and group C on mountain C. Each group speak unique language; language A is spoken by people in group A, language B is spoken by people in group B, and language C is spoken by people in group C. In this hypothetical world, the quality of life differs among the three groups. Group C is the largest and the wealthiest, followed by group B, and then group A. Furthermore, as a result of the imbalance among the three groups, people often move to the larger groups, in search of a better life. Let us call this world *The World of Three Mountains.*



Now, imagine that the phenomenon of language loss occurs in this world. That is, a speaker of a language undergoes the process of assimilation to another language. As a result, the speaker loses the context or the ability to use the language they used to speak (Huss, 2017, p. 100). Imagine that language loss occurs in two different ways in this world:

(1) People who move to the neighboring mountain undergo language loss. When members of group A migrate to, say, mountain B, they undergo assimilation to group B and adopt language B.

(2) Members of group A face language extinction. Due to constant migration the number of speakers of language A steadily decreases, soon facing the prospect of extinction.

This hypothetical world is not dissimilar to our actual world. It is also argued that language loss occurs in our actual world at two levels: either at family- or societal-levels (Haynes, 2010). On the one hand, loss of language may occur at a family-level, where individuals undergo language loss. For example, we observe that out of 7,151 known languages in the world that are spoken today, only 23 languages account for more than half of the world's population (Ethnologue, n.d.). These dominant languages have spread, and continues to spread, due to the assimilation of non-native speakers to dominant languages. As a primary example, we may look at migrants who undergo assimilation to said dominant languages.

On the other hand, loss of language may occur at a societal level due to extinction of a language. We observe that out of 7,151 languages, 3,045 languages, approximately 40% of the total, are endangered (Ethnologue, n.d.). These facts suggests that a significant portion of our world may be experiencing language loss due to language extinction. For example, many indigenous languages are going extinct, such as Nuchatlaht, the language of the Nuchatlaht First Nation in Canada.

Do such phenomena of language loss deserve normative scrutiny? If yes, why? This dissertation's aim is to come up with answers to these questions. By way of providing a normative analysis of the phenomena of language loss, I argue that certain types of language loss constitute a type of injustice for which a remedy is required. To this end, I will employ two debates that were mostly kept separate in political philosophy: linguistic justice and the structural injustice approach. The debate on linguistic justice will illustrate the normative significance of language and what kinds of concerns regarding justice arise due to conflicts surrounding language. I will do so by applying an interest-based approach to theories of linguistic justice, with the aim of identifying and promoting the fundamental interests of individuals in language. I will then introduce the structural injustice approach, which will

conceptualize language loss as a type of injustice by identifying objectionable or unjust social structures that enable serious harms at a collective level.

Now I will illustrate the focus of my analysis. First, there is significant literature dedicated to the topic of linguistic justice, thus my engagement with this topic will be limited to a specific scope. Linguistic justice initially started as an application of theories of justice to language, constituting a part of the debates regarding multiculturalism and cultural recognition (Kymlicka, 2003; Taylor, 1995). Language was employed in order to indicate the cultural difference between majority and minority groups. However, thanks to political philosophers who addressed the issue of language head-on, the debate soon developed into a full-fledged field (Kymlicka & Patten, 2003). The field has become huge and a discussion of normative challenges related to language is being conducted through use of a plethora of theoretical frameworks and approaches.

The debate regarding linguistic justice is divided into two distinct subfields. The first subfield is that of *inter*-linguistic justice, where the debate is guided by the question of "how states should govern diverse linguistic groups" (Patten, 2014; Van Parijs, 2011). It addresses the condition of linguistic diversity observed within specific territories, focusing on issues that arise as a result of many linguistic groups living side by side. The second subfield is *intra*-linguistic justice, which pertains to the fact that linguistic diversity also exists within a linguistic community. In this subfield there is a focus on the fact that standardized versions, which provide a hegemonic representation of a linguistic group, may cause injustice to those who speak dialects that stem from regional, class-based, or ethnic-based differences (De Schutter, 2020).

Because the principal subject matter of this dissertation is language loss, the contribution lies in the field of inter-linguistic justice. For the purpose of this dissertation, I define language as a marker of differences among groups, both as a unique tool of

communication and as a source of identity. This means that speakers of the same language constitute a distinct group, referred to as a linguistic group. In other words, language will be conceptualized as a distinct, unique grounds for membership, which is informed by history, customs, beliefs, ways of living, and culture.

This is not to claim that the framework I have developed cannot be applied to intralinguistic justice. There may be losses of stylistic differences found within a linguistic group, e.g., class- or ethnic-based differences in speech, or differences among varieties, may be lost, for one reason or another. However, linguistic traits that may signal significant differences within a linguistic group, which may attest to distinct social identity traits of individuals, will not be included in my analysis. This is to dedicate my focus on language loss that occurs across groups. This also means that the type of "language" that may be shared within specific social or political groups, e.g., choice of vocabularies, terms, or discursive patterns that distinguish different ideological camps, which may signal a person's ideological, economic, or social background, will also not be a part of my normative analysis.

These cases were excluded from my analysis due to the clear existence of a shared membership among members of the same linguistic groups. Despite differences in accent, vocabulary, or speech patterns, a sense of membership is shared among people who speak the same language. This is not the focus of my dissertation, as my principal subject matter is language loss, which occurs as a result of the process of assimilation where groups shared no sense of membership beforehand.

Secondly, I explain how I will engage with the existing literature on the structural injustice approach. The structural injustice approach offers a novel framework that addresses the temporal orientation of justice, which has been an important point of dispute in the literature on intergenerational justice and reparative justice. These debates are often divided between backward- and forward-looking approaches. On the one hand, backward-looking approaches

assume that an injustice, once committed, should be rectified. Likewise, the present generation has obligations to rectify historical injustices today. On the other hand, forward-looking approaches take historical injustices to be relevant as long as they help improve the present relations or lessen present inequalities. Between the diverging camps of backward- and forward-looking approaches, structural injustice approaches offer an original take on the temporal orientations of justice.

This dissertation will focus on a separate aspect. The structural injustice approach will be addressed with the focus on three core concepts that constitute its basis: (1) social structures, (2) injustice and (3) remedy. Rather than to compare the structural injustice approach to other frameworks, this dissertation aims to establish the structural injustice approach as a framework that will be used to expose language loss as a particular kind of injustice, i.e., structural linguistic injustice. The structural injustice approach will illustrate that our innocent actions, which we habitually carry out on a daily basis, produce and reproduce objectionable or unjust social structures that enable serious harms at a collective level. In particular, I will argue that attitudes toward language, which refer to certain predispositions, evaluative judgments, values, or beliefs towards certain languages, enable hierarchal relations among linguistic groups. These hierarchal relations will conspire to the occurrence of abrupt language loss, which is a particular type of language loss where individuals are not able to enjoy fundamental interests in language, thereby experiencing harms.

Because of my dedication to the issue of language loss, the condition of linguistic diversity is the principal context of investigation in this dissertation; hence, my kickoff using the World of Three Mountains. The benefits of focusing on the context of linguistic diversity is two-fold. The first benefit is that the analysis addresses the context that is closer to our actual world. Our actual world is linguistically immensely diverse. Unfortunately, more often than not, this condition of linguistic diversity consists of hierarchal relations among linguistic

groups. To wit, when there is coexistence of many languages, use of certain languages becomes more dominant over use of other languages. Individuals may choose to rely on specific language in specific contexts (e.g. switching to English as lingua franca in multilingual contexts). In addition, linguistic minorities in non-international monolingual settings may choose to adopt the dominant language within their contexts. In particular such choices may be made when multilingualism does not appear to have much value. These language-related choices made by individuals often surmount to social practices that result in formation of a hierarchy among linguistic groups. In my opinion, such a context may present potential moral concerns, which may require evaluation. In short, the context of linguistic diversity appears to present us with thorny moral and political problems.

Secondly, by addressing the context of linguistic diversity, we are addressing the main context in which language loss occurs. As described with my hypothetical world, the aim of this dissertation is to examine why language loss, at both levels, may constitute serious injustices. The leading intuition is that language is presented as a carrier of a unique set of fundamental interests. If the condition of linguistic diversity is fraught with the threat of language loss, which may pose threats to a person's enjoyment of a set of fundamental interests related to language, I find that there is a serious moral issue.

In a nutshell, the aim of this dissertation is to determine how a particular type of language loss, which will be revealed later as abrupt language loss, is harmful. Furthermore, I will illustrate that this harmful type of language loss is enabled by our own daily actions, which appear to be innocent and banal.

The contribution of this dissertation is two-fold. First, I introduce the structural injustice approach, which is a new contribution to the debate on linguistic justice. As this dissertation will illustrate, the structural injustice approach captures an important aspect that should be included in the normative analysis in order to fully understand language loss as a harmful

phenomenon: the normative significance of the actions of individuals that enable serious harms at a collective level. This focus offers an enriching analysis of language loss, which had not yet been reported in the existing literature on linguistic justice.

Second, the dissertation contributes to the literature on the structural injustice approach. I broaden the scope of analysis of the structural injustice approach in two ways. First, I will develop a novel concept of structural linguistic injustice, a type of structural injustice that as not yet been discussed in the existing literature. Second, while developing the notion of structural linguistic injustice, I will also offer a novel concept of structural remedies that accounts for a hitherto underdeveloped dimension, i.e., epistemic dimension. I will argue that most debates on the structural injustice approach focused on identifying social structures that result in injustices. In order to identify which social structures are constructive, i.e., resist and counterbalance structural injustices, I will develop the epistemic dimensions of structural remedies.

This dissertation is comprised of five chapters. Chapter 1 will introduce the debate on linguistic justice. In the first half of the chapter, I will introduce why language is normatively significant by endorsing an interest theory of linguistic justice. This theory assumes that individuals may hold fundamental interests in relation to the languages they speak, which should be fairly distributed based on certain principles of justice for a society to be just. The current state of the art identifies five fundamental interests that individuals have in language: (1) democracy, (2) unity, (3) opportunity, (4) life-world and (5) dignity interest. In addition to these five interests, I argue that we must pay attention to the security interest, where people hold interest in continuing to speak one's language. I develop a theory to defend the security interest further, i.e., a theory of relational linguistic continuity. In the latter half of the chapter, I map out two existing approaches that attempt to identify normative issues that arise due to language loss: autonomy- and dignity-based approaches. I point out that both approaches are

not satisfactory as they do not fully illustrate the harms caused by language loss. I will point out three different types of circumstances that may be harmful: linguistic isolation, linguistic alienation and language extinction.

Chapter 2 introduces the state of the art on the structural injustice approach. The structural injustice approach will be introduced, with the focus on three core concepts that constitute its basis: (1) social structures, (2) injustice and (3) remedy. After having introduced the state of the art, I argue that most debates on the structural injustice approach focused on identifying social structures that result in injustices. I argue that we should broaden the scope of analysis by attempting to identify which social structures resist and counterbalance said structural injustices. Then, I apply the structural injustice approach to hitherto neglected issue within the field: language loss. I suggest that the debate on linguistic injustice will benefit from the structural injustice approach. Namely, the scope of normative analysis of language loss is broadened by looking at individuals' daily and banal actions that appear harmless, yet, could potentially result in serious harms at a collective level.

Chapter 3 infuses the two debates introduced in previous chapters and develop a notion of structural linguistic injustice. Moreover, I will discuss two types of structural remedies for structural linguistic injustice. I first stipulate a working definition of structural linguistic injustice, which I will illustrate thereafter based on the concrete example of language attitudes. Language attitudes constitute a part of objectionable or unjust social structures that enable hierarchal relations among linguistic groups. As a result, certain linguistic groups that are structurally disadvantaged may face the threat of abrupt language loss, where individuals adopt (a) new language(s) and abandon their heritage language(s) or language(s) of origin within a short period of time (e.g., within one generation, language shift is completed). I will illustrate that those who face abrupt language loss do not get to enjoy the fundamental interests in language. After illustrating my notion of structural linguistic injustice, I will discuss potential

structural remedies for structural linguistic injustice. This dissertation will put forward three types of remedies in total. However, in chapter 3, I will only discuss the first two types of structural remedies: family-level remedies and state-level remedies. The third type of structural remedies, which I will develop in chapter 4, will focus on epistemic dimensions of structural remedies.

Chapter 4 articulates the epistemic dimensions of structural remedies. I will illustrate that even when political responsibility is successfully assigned to responsible moral actors, responsible moral actors may fail to achieve genuine structural remedies due to epistemic barriers. That is, responsible moral actors may not know which social processes are objectionable or unjust, how they should remedy them, and who should remedy them. Therefore, achieving genuine structural remedies may remain difficult. I will identify two reasons for epistemic barriers: (1) difficulties of establishing causal connections between the innocent actions of individuals and structural injustice and (2) epistemic injustices that accompany structural injustice. Then, I will demonstrate how epistemic barriers might be overcome. A theory of structural-epistemic responsibility will be developed, which pursues epistemic dimensions of political responsibility for structural remedies. That is, politically responsible moral actors have yet another important responsibility, what I call the structural-epistemic responsibility, which is a duty to satisfy the epistemic condition in order to bring about genuine structural changes.

As the final chapter, Chapter 5 will conclude by highlighting the limits of structural remedies. I discuss supersession of the need for language revitalization as a remedy for language endangerment. Supersession occurs if it is no longer justified to correct past injustices in the present due to changed circumstances. I will map out the possibility of supersession of structural remedies for structural linguistic injustice. Especially, I will focus on language

revitalization as a type of structural remedies and discuss whether the need for revitalization may be superseded.[1]

[1] Chapters of this dissertation are drawn from my published articles or an article under review. These articles are "Relational linguistic security," which is under review in *Nations and Nationalism*, "Superseding Colonial Linguistic Injustice?: Language revitalization and historically-sensitive dignity-based claims," published in *Critical Review in International Social and Political Philosophy* (Forthcoming), "Structural injustice and the significance of the past," published in *European Journal of Political Theory* (2021), and "Denial of Japan's Military Sexual Slavery and Responsibility for Epistemic Amends," published in *Social Epistemology* (2021).

Chapter 1: Linguistic justice

1.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the debate on linguistic justice is introduced. The interest theory of linguistic justice, one among many theories of linguistic justice, is introduced in the first half of the chapter as this theory is critical to understanding the moral stakes in language loss. In the current state of the interest theory of linguistic justice, five different fundamental interests in language: (1) democracy, (2) unity, (3) opportunity, (4) life-world and (5) dignity interest. Regarding the first three interests it is assumed that language is an efficacious tool of communication, which provides instrumental value. Our interests in languages we speak is based on the fact that we need them in order to realize other goals. The other two imply that language has an inherent value, due to its influence on a person's identity as well as a point of world view.

After presenting five interests in language, I argue that a distinct interest known as the security interest deserves greater attention. The security interest, introduced by Denise Reaume and Leslie Green, refers to a person's interest in continuing to speak the language of origin or socialization. While there is much to appreciate in the concept of security interest presented by Reaume and Green, I argue that additional theory is required for this concept, which has not yet been reported in the literature. I aim to fill this gap with development of a theory of relational linguistic continuity, which provides a theoretical framework of security interest.

Then, normative issues that arise from language loss are addressed. Two existing arguments found in the literature are introduced, autonomy-based and dignity-based arguments, which conceptualize language loss as a morally problematic phenomenon. I will argue that both arguments are unsatisfactory in the effort to fully illustrate the harm caused by language loss. This chapter concludes by suggesting that there are other types of harms that may arise

due to language loss. I map out three circumstances that may arise due to language loss: linguistic isolation, linguistic alienation, and language extinction. I argue that these circumstances are harmful.

1.2. Six interests in language

To wit, the normative significance of language refers back to the fact that individuals, as well as state, are necessarily situated within certain linguistic contexts. People are dependent on specific languages for making friends, finding partners, earning money, and voting. States rely on shared languages to provide public service, social welfare and legal enforcement and the manner in which these facts shape our interests in language. In these contexts, it appears that language has significance. Among many theories of linguistic justice, the interest theory of linguistic justice attempts to identify the interests held by individuals in language. Five interests in language stipulated by the interest theory of linguistic justice are briefly introduced in this section: (1) democracy, (2) unity, (3) opportunity, (4) life-world and (5) dignity interest.

There are two reasons for introducing the interest theory of linguistic justice. First, the interest theory of linguistic justice is introduced with the aim of demonstrating that if members of certain linguistic groups fail to enjoy a fundamental interest in language, while other linguistic groups do, this may become one of many aspects that constitute an injustice (as I will demonstrate, later, a structural linguistic injustice).

Second, the aim is to extend this framework to actively include the security interest, which refers to a person's interest in continuing to speak his or her language. The literature mainly discusses the abovementioned five interests; the security interest is not mentioned. I suggest that the security interest should be included. In addition, I argue that the defense for the security interest, as introduced by Reaume and Green, is insufficient. I will develop a theory of relational linguistic continuity in order to provide the basis for security interest.

1.2.1. Democracy interest

The democracy interest is the first interest individuals hold in language. As a tool of communication, language is considered necessary for promotion and realization of democratic politics. This argument illustrates that individuals' interest in language may be based on the function of language as an efficacious tool of communication. In particular, it is a critical tool of communication for use by individuals or states in attainment of certain goals. Consequently, democracy interest is often referred to as instrumental interest. Rather than languages having value for their own sake, they have value because they are helpful in realizing other values that constitute the precondition of individuals' realization of their ideal versions of life.

The democracy interest may be presented in two ways. First, citizens should have a shared language among themselves in order to be able to participate in the ideal version of deliberative democracy. Second, language should be shared by a state and its citizenry in order to successfully uphold democratic politics.

According to the first argument, the ideal version of democracy relies on a shared language. As stated by Barry, citizens cannot negotiate with language barriers, as without shared languages they "cannot deliberate together about the way in which [their] common life is to be conducted" (Barry, 2002, p. 227). In other words, a shared language among citizens is required for the success of democratic participations and deliberative processes. Only with shared languages can citizens partake in discussions, evaluations and decision-making processes regarding which interests and concerns should be met at the level of society, or so it is argued.

The second argument states that a state and its citizenry also rely on a tool of communication. In order to realize democracy, a state must be able to provide open, transparent communication to its citizenry. For successful organization of public discourse, political

debates and elections, citizens must have a certain level of linguistic proficiency in the same language.

As mentioned above, democracy interest assumes that language matters for individuals because of its role in achievement of other goals (Robichaud & De Schutter, 2012, p. 125). The same sort of assumption is observed in arguments that identify individuals' unity interest and opportunity interest in language. In short, language is considered to play an important – often, necessary – role as an instrument of communication for the three interests: democracy, unity, and opportunity.

1.2.2. Unity interest

Similar to democracy interest, the unity interest is based on the role of language as a shared tool of communication. In particular, it is argued that a shared language provides the basic grounds for political unity or social cohesion. For example, Barry argues that "for democratic politics to work, the citizens must be able to communicate with one another, and *must have access to the same forums of political debate*." (Barry, 1991, p. 178, my emphasis). The content of political debates, discourses and forums may be controlled in a society with linguistic homogeneity, allowing consumption of consistent information throughout the society.

One may argue that the need for linguistic homogeneity may indeed provide political unity, but this does not mean that there should be *one* shared language among citizenry. Consider multilingual parliaments, which may nonetheless achieve communication among citizens based on translation, subtitles or simultaneous interpretation. As long as there are a number of linguistic mediators, political unity may be fostered in states with multiple shared languages, where citizens do not share one lingua franca (Réaume, 2015).

To this rejoinder, the following response would be made. There is still the value of one shared language, above sharing multiple languages. A shared language facilitates the value of

effectiveness. David Weinstock determines that the unity interest may allow effective communication at the level of society:

> effective communication between the state and its citizens implies certain conditions being fulfilled by both communicating parties. The state must ensure that it communicates in a manner which makes plain to the average citizens what the rights and obligations created by the state's legislative action are, and that it explains how these obligations are to be fulfilled and these rights upheld. It must communicate in a manner that makes possible meaningful citizen participation in public debates about the legislative agenda. And it must develop means of responding to citizen input. (D. M. Weinstock, 2003, p. 265).

Furthermore, the effectiveness is often required by the state in order to function properly. This ideal of efficiency indicates the need for successful communication, which is necessary for democracy, which is aided most successfully by having one shared language. Just like the democracy interest, unity interest stresses the value of language as a tool of communication at the level of society.

1.2.3. Opportunity interest

The third interest concerns socio-economic opportunities. Individuals hold interest in specific languages because proficiency in those languages may have a direct, or indirect, impact on our access to opportunities.

Opportunity interest illustrates the value of language based on its influence on socio-economic opportunities. Consider how the information on the welfare state is disseminated and made accessible in particular languages. Not only that, the assistance of bureaucrats who work

at city halls, governmental office services, etc. are also available in particular languages. This means that an individual's enjoyment of welfare may partly depend on language, as the lack of linguistic proficiency may result in limited opportunities in having access to, say, the welfare state. The individual may have an interest in learning the language where information regarding social opportunities is disseminated.

The same goes for work opportunities. Opportunities in the job market are significantly affected by an individual's linguistic proficiency. For example, consider an Inuit residing in Canada, who is a monolingual Inuktitut. If they move out of Canadian cities where Inuktitut is not spoken, they face truncated opportunities in the Canadian job market, which mainly require proficiency in English or French. As stated by Barry, "whatever clothes you wear and whatever language you speak at home, if you want a job on Wall Street you will need to speak English and wear a suit." (2001, p. 91).

Barry, who addresses the issue of linguistic barriers in the job market based on the framework of egalitarian liberalism, argues that individuals are interested in obtaining linguistic proficiency in the dominant language so that their access to opportunities is not truncated:

> When we say, then, that equality of opportunity is a criterion on which an egalitarian liberal society can properly be judged, this must be taken to mean that everybody should have an opportunity to acquire the country's language, to achieve educational success in that language, and to gain employment on the basis of those qualifications without suffering discrimination. … in contrast, the provision of genuine equality of opportunity without linguistic assimilation by immigrants would be, if not absolutely impossible, almost unimaginable burdensome (2001, p. 107)

Thomas Pogge presents a similar argument (2003). Although his focus is on second generation immigrant children with Hispanic parents in the US, Pogge describes a similar observation that with a lack of English proficiency, many opportunities conducive for social advancement may not be available to immigrants. Pogge then considers two viable options for children with Hispanic heritage, to receive (1) English only education, or (2) Spanish only education, and argues that the best option would be the first one (Pogge, 2003, p. 120). Only by achievement of English proficiency could individuals enjoy equal access to opportunity. In conclusion, Pogge is in agreement with Barry that a state would have a fundamental duty to provide equal treatment to members of any linguistic group. However, this duty requires ensuring that individuals with a minority linguistic background have access to the dominant language, so that their former linguistic background, which may have become a source of social sanction, is overridden by their new proficiency in the dominant language.

1.2.4. Life-world interest

The fourth interest, the life-world interest, focuses on the fact that language provides its speakers with unique conceptual frameworks, idioms, metaphors, and symbolic systems, which assist the speakers in understanding the world in unique ways. As explained by Helder De Schutter:

> Language knowledge functions like a key to a room: one needs to speak the language in order to access what is discussed in the room. But once inside the room that the key gives access to, one is surrounded by arguments and styles of discussing that are not readily available to people who don't speak the language. Languages thus function as sluices of information: one only has access to the information if one speaks the language in which it is available. As a result, growing up in a language community means that one has been

> surrounded by particular sets of options and information. Each language thus discloses and structures its speakers' "life-world". (De Schutter, n.d., no assigned page number).

Recall the hypothetical World of Three Mountains introduced at the beginning of this dissertation. The World consisted of three distinct mountains and groups residing within each mountain. We can fill in more details by imagining that mountain A is snowy, mountain B has many rainforests, and mountain C is made out of sand. Now, let us imagine that these environmental factors will determine the way in which members of each group understand the world. For example, members of group A would cherish, value, protect, or exploit the snowy habitat in unique ways. Their cultural activities might include engagement with snow, their identity may be construed out of their relationship with the snowy habitat, their novels may have references to their snowy mountains. In other words, their environment constitutes their life-world.

Analogously, the language of group A may present members of the group with unique life-worlds, as did their environment. Their words, metaphors, and idioms may be particularly suitable in comprehending and appreciating the advantages and disadvantages of, say, nature, which influences the life-world for members of group A. This is because the manner in which we express ourselves is dependent on spoken language, which shapes our perspectives towards the world. This fosters a certain interest in language. We want to enjoy the unique life-worlds provided by particular languages. The life-world argument, then, explains how each language constitutes a way of understanding the world, which is shared by others who speak the same language.

The life-world interest illustrates the potential inherent value of languages. This inherent value comes from the role of language in constituting a person's identity. As a speaker

of particular languages, which provides particular life-worlds, there is a profound sense of one's identity. The value of language goes beyond its worth as a tool of communication.

1.2.5. Dignity Interest

The last interest in language is known as dignity interest. This argument concerns the ways in which language may become a source of social sanction and why we take such sanctions so seriously. This is because our dignity may depend on the status of our linguistic backgrounds. The dignity argument addresses the relation between self-respect and dignity and language. In order to have a full life we must have self-respect and we should be able to enjoy a sense of self-respect when it comes to our linguistic background. When a person's linguistic background becomes the source of humiliating, denigrating or offensive treatment from others, our enjoyment of self-respect and dignity is disallowed.

Philippe Van Parijs famously argued that parity of esteem should be one of three principles of linguistic justice (2011, Chapter 4). Van Parijs argues that under the condition of linguistic diversity, people cannot but choose a language in order to interact with one another. Under such circumstances, one specific language becomes prioritized as a medium of communication over another, resulting in asymmetrical linguistic practices (Van Parijs, 2011, p. 118). Often enough, such practices follow the pattern established by the history of injustice. Even if these practices continue well after the history of injustice, they are often interpreted as a sign of enduring hierarchy, where the linguistic community whose language is preferred enjoys unjust linguistic privilege. Consider the example presented by Van Parijs of a Flemish barman residing in a Dutch territory in Belgium, who encounters disrespect during interaction with a French journalist in French:

> One afternoon in August 2008, Stéphane Bern, a journalist for France's national television channel, enters a bar in the Flemish (and hence officially Dutch-speaking) city of Bruges and orders a drink in French. The waiter refuses to serve him unless he repeats the order in Dutch. When Bern points out that he is a Frenchman and not a francophone Belgian, the waiter retorts: "You all say that." (Van Parijs, 2011, p.118)

The fact that Dutch speakers had a history of linguistic domination in Belgium greatly influences the barman's interpretation of Bern's linguistic practice. In other words, the context of historical linguistic injustice in Belgium, where French was imposed as the only official language of Belgium and no public service, signage or higher education were provided in Dutch, provides context for the barman's experience of disrespect. Based on this example, Van Parijs argues that such experience of disrespect indicates our identity interest in language.

Continuing Van Parijs' concern for dignity, many authors in the linguistic justice debate also addressed the close relation between language and esteem. For example, power hierarchy has been addressed as a factor closely linked to esteem, qualified in various ways. One of these is the number of speakers (Laponce, 2012; Weinstock, 2014). The imbalance of material and immaterial resources is another. For example, Weinstock argues that unjust background conditions that push assimilation by linguistic minority groups to the dominant linguistic group could give rise to reasonable dignity-based concerns (Weinstock, 2015, pp. 204–206). Anna Stilz argues that if non-dominant groups feel as if they are "bowing down" to the dominance of English when they speak English, this is a reasonable dignity-based complaint, but only with the background of military, economic, and political hegemony of Anglophone countries (Stilz, 2015, p. 183). All of these authors indicate a specific interest we may have in language, which is related to dignity.

Again, the dignity argument assumes that language has an inherent value, as a crucial source of our identities. As we are born into a certain language, we form attachments to our language as something that is irreducible to a tool. Arguments that claim that individuals have an identity interest in language assume a fuller concept of language, where language is considered to provide us with a sense of belonging, unique conceptual frameworks, references, beliefs and knowledge. It shapes us, more than a tool does to which we rely on.

1.2.6. Security interest and a theory of relational linguistic continuity

Despite the richness of the interest theory of linguistic justice, I identify a need to expand it by actively including one more interest. Individuals are interested in continuing to speak their language, which is referred to as the security interest. Unlike other interests, which were assumed to be classified as either identity or instrumental interest, the security interest relies on both assumptions that (1) language is valuable due to its role as a tool of communication and (2) language is valuable because it constitutes an important part of a person's identity. Therefore, security interest may be perceived as both instrumental and identity interest.

The first idea of security interest was developed by Denise Réaume and Leslie Green. The two authors have defended linguistic security on several occasions, offering various definitions. For example, they argue that to "have linguistic security in the fullest sense is to have the opportunity, without serious impediments, *to live a full life in a community of people who share one's language*" (Réaume & Green, 1989, p. 782, my emphasis). This indicates that it is important for an individual to have access to his language throughout his lifetime. Elsewhere, Réaume further unravels linguistic security in terms of continuous robust access to a person's language. She states that with linguistic security a person can *use* her language continuously over time (Réaume, 1994, p. 128). In other words, an individual can participate in the "socialization of children into the language" cross-generationally and, second, be able to

use his language in a range of contexts that "must be sufficiently rich to sustain the complexity that contributes to the language's future development" (Réaume, 1994, p. 128). At least for Reaume, linguistic security indicates the ability of an individual to use and have access to their language in both private and public spheres.

Green adds two more aspects to the concept of linguistic security. First, Green defines linguistic security as an interest in knowing "that one's language group may flourish and that one may use the language *with dignity"* (Green, 1987, p. 658, my emphasis). Second, Green argues that linguistic security is a present-oriented interest: individuals should enjoy the prosperity of their languages of origin or socialization *only* in the present. People only want their languages to flourish to the extent that they can communicate, form human relations, and have social interactions with their descendants in their languages. In other words, individuals would want to see the survival of their languages of origin or socialization until approximately four generations (e.g. until one's great-grandchildren) (Green, 1987, p. 658).Despite the wide range of values used in articulating linguistic security, both Réaume and Green focus on one relevant factor: preservation of a language. In a nutshell, linguistic security stresses the importance of continuous use of one's language.

While Réaume's and Green's conceptualization of linguistic security offers much to admire, i.e., that we have an interest in sharing our languages of origin or socialization with at least some others and in continuing to share our languages up to a certain moment in time, neither author explains why we want to enjoy linguistic security. In fact, more argument is needed in order to explain the importance of linguistic security. I develop here a theory of relational linguistic continuity in order to sufficiently illustrate the normative significance of linguistic security. Relational linguistic continuity refers to a condition wherein individuals may continuously form human relations and social interactions with others in their languages of socialization or origin, which should last indefinitely across generations, as it constitutes the

meaningfulness of individuals' linguistic activities. I argue that individuals can enjoy their security interest only if the relational linguistic continuity is satisfied

I identify four issues in the concept of linguistic security, as introduced by Green and Réaume, which arise due to the fact that there is no fundamental framework that defends linguistic security:

I. It is unclear why individuals' interest in linguistic security should fall back on dignity.
II. While it is claimed that individuals are interested in linguistic security, further development of an argument that explains why linguistic security is an interest is needed.
III. It is unclear why the interest in linguistic security should only be a present-oriented concept.
IV. Finally, it is unclear whether linguistic security is a subjective or objective concept.

These weaknesses are explained in greater detail below. As an attempt to defend the idea of linguistic security, which avoids these four weaknesses, I will develop a theory of relational linguistic continuity. This theory will explain why security interest is important. (I will focus on the idea of linguistic security presented by Green. I address Green, as he provides a more complete definition of linguistic security that encompasses that of Réaume.)

The first aspect that is underdeveloped involves Green's definition of linguistic security. Green's argument on linguistic security rests in part on the importance of dignity, which he discusses briefly in connection with the experience of linguistically insecure immigrants. He argues that immigrants suffer from linguistic insecurity by undergoing a

"surrender to a dominant culture combined with knowledge that one's language lacks status and that it is subject to heavy assimilative pressures which are likely to overtake one's children or grandchildren" (Green, 1987, p. 658). Green focuses on the sense of "surrender" often experienced by immigrants; as a result, their linguistic background becomes a source of both social liability and loss, due to assimilation of children and grandchildren into the majority language. Consequently, it appears that Green's positive concept of linguistic security constitutes a condition of dignity, i.e., security should be satisfied in order for individuals to enjoy dignity.

Even if we were to accept that linguistic security constitutes a condition for realizing other interests such as dignity, the question of how linguistic security would successfully support individuals' satisfaction of dignity remains unclear. Contrary to the argument presented by Green, I believe that security interest should not hinge on dignity, or vice versa. In fact, I think that the security interest should rely on another factor that is normatively significant, i.e., continuity.

To understand the normative significance of continuity, consider the hypothetical scenario of a couple. The premise is that they both want to be together for a long time. Assume that they are happy with each other because they do many things together (talk about politics, watch TV, make jokes, etc.), they are able to be autonomous in their life-choices (no control issues), and they have respect for one another (no esteem-related issues). This couple enjoys a life of complete autonomy and dignity.

Now, imagine that one of the two people suddenly develops commitment issues, which causes the other to feel constantly under threat of a break-up, as he is unsure whether the relationship will last. In this scenario, I suggest that the couple is not as happy together as they were previously. The reason for this downgrade does not hinge on autonomy or dignity. Rather,

the problem arises due to a person's commitment issues, which causes insecurity, making him doubt the continuity of the relationship.

The purpose of this example is to illustrate that continuity is an important value, along with autonomy and dignity. However, one might remain unconvinced with regard to the importance of continuity, compared to other values. Continuity may only become valuable when the thing that is being continued is worthwhile. More often than not, we think partners should be free to separate, especially if the relationship is not worth continuing, for example. Nobody should be trapped in a relationship simply for the sake of continuing it. Based on this intuition, one might argue that continuity is a value that is dependent on other values, which ensures robust enjoyment of other values.

I am critical of this assessment because it appears that continuity is not altogether dependent on other values. In fact, at times, continuity triumphs over other values. Imagine that a student is offered two jobs after completing her PhD degree. One of the jobs is a one-year post-doc position at a prestigious university, where she will have the opportunity to enjoy many types of values, but only for one year. The other job is a position at a small university that does not provide the same values, however it is a life-long position. Because of the value provided in life by continuity, there is a reason to choose the latter option, instead of the former one. It may provide the student with more stability in life. In itself, continuity may be regarded as important.

I think the doubt regarding the worth of continuity may be further lessened if it can be applied to our actual subject matter, i.e., continuing to speak one's language of origin or socialization. Consider the following actual example of Alban Michael, the last surviving speaker of Nuchatlaht, the language of the Nuchatlaht First Nation in Canada:

> Back in 2005, when Alban Michael was in hospital with pneumonia, his parents came to him in a dream. They spoke Nuchatlaht, just like when he was a boy on Nootka Island. Alban's dreams were, in fact, the only place such a conversation could take place. Of the seven billion people on Earth, the Vancouver Island man was the very last one fluent in his mother tongue. *It made him sad. "I'm the only one now," he said, slowly*. (Knox, 2016, my emphasis).

Michael passed in 2016 and Nuchatlaht is now extinct. I wish to focus on the sorrow experienced by Michael as the last surviving speaker of a dead language (if there is only one surviving speaker of a language, that language is classified as dead). To answer the question of what caused Michael's sorrow, we might explain how his five fundamental interests in language were diminished due to the fact that he is the last surviving speaker his language. However, this may not provide a complete picture of what is at stake. Michael's sorrow may partly stem from the fact that Michael cannot have human network in Nuchatlaht.

This sorrow is frequently observed in many other endangered communities. For example, some members of the Sámi people, who are an Indigenous people living in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia, are reported to "feel sorrow and guilt for being unable to transfer their native language to their children," especially parents with small children (Aikio-Puoskari, 2018, p. 356). The same goes for Tai Ahom, one of the oldest Tai languages spoken in Northeast India. According to a linguist who interviewed elderly speakers of Tai Ahom, a language spoken in the village of Pawaimukh, "the old men lamented the fact that their language was being lost." (Morey, 2018, p. 438). And so on.

I argue that these experiences of sorrow are the result of *relational linguistic discontinuity*. When individuals are not able to speak their languages of origin or socialization in a way the speakers of vibrant and prosperous languages do, they lose out on an important

value, i.e., being able to transmit their own languages and to continue speaking their languages. There is an inherent value in being able to achieve continuous formation of human relations and social interactions in their languages of socialization or origin with others. I will unpack this claim further as I proceed with my argument.

It is important to note that even though I have described the importance of relational linguistic continuity based on examples of endangered languages, it is not my intention to argue that only the speakers of endangered or dead languages may lose out on relational linguistic continuity. Speakers of prosperous languages may also experience relational linguistic discontinuity. Allow me to illustrate what this discontinuity would look like at a family-level. Consider the actual experience of a Canadian woman, whose mother has an immigrant background. In this actual example, we observe relational linguistic discontinuity:

> [M]y mom and I literally don't speak the same language. I speak English; she speaks Chinese. In our linguistic Venn diagram, there's a small, Chinglish overlap where we cobble together our relationship. … As an adult, it's jarring to overhear my mom tell a story and understand only 40 percent of the words coming out of her mouth. And the Chinese that comes out of my own is so juvenile, my family mockingly calls me jook sing — a Cantonese label describing an overseas-born Chinese person with westernized values who can't speak the ancestral tongue. I realize, in these moments, that my mom and I don't have an easy parent-child relationship, and I often worry our language barrier might prevent us from ever truly understanding each other. … *My broken Chinese is the only key I have* to a huge part of my identity — and *to my mom*. (Lum, 2017, my emphasis).

Lum's story captures the difficulty elderly family members might experience when attempting to adopt new languages after immigration, which may mean that, despite their earnest efforts to integrate, they may end up obtaining limited proficiency of the dominant language of the host country. Lum's mother is one example. In contrast, these struggles may not be encountered by younger family members, who often adopt the dominant language so fast that they undergo assimilation to the dominant language of the host country and lose their heritage language. In short, the family is often split into two language groups. Instead of achieving the bilingual ideal, linguistic discontinuity may occur in inter-familial settings due to the absence of a common language. As a result, children often grow to cease communication with their parents, especially as topics and contexts of conversations become more mature and complex.

Lum's circumstance appears to be problematic due to the relational linguistic discontinuity that strikes both Lum and her mother simultaneously. As Lum describes, this discontinuity causes her to feel like she has lost the "key" to connecting with her mother. I argue that this "key" refers to the enjoyment of relational linguistic continuity, where a person feels connected to the other person who appreciates, loves, and cares for her, in part, due to the shared language between them. The cause of this linguistic discontinuity, again, is the failure of intergenerational transmission of language. As a result, the discontinuity may cause disruption of a person's most intimate human relations and social interactions. In other words, as a result of the lack of a shared language, an individual is not able to have human relations and social interactions with central figures in their lives.

Based on these two examples, I formulate a working definition of relational linguistic continuity without reference to dignity but to human relations and interactions:

> Relational linguistic continuity refers to a condition wherein individuals may continuously form human relations and social interactions in their languages of socialization or origin with central figures in their lives.

My definition establishes two things. First, it aims to establish the inherent value of continuing to maintain human relations in particular languages. Second, my definition of relational linguistic continuity is distinguished from the concept of linguistic security developed by Green. I shed the reference to dignity as my aim is to demonstrate that the ability to build human relations, not to establish a condition wherein individuals may enjoy dignity, is what is important about continuing to speak one's language.

The second aspect I want to criticize with regard to Green's idea of linguistic security is this: why should linguistic security be regarded as an interest? The analysis presented by Green does not explain why. Rather, it simply claims that it is the case. This gap arises due to the lack of a theoretical foundation for linguistic security. By way of explaining why individuals may hold security interest in language, I develop a theory of relational linguistic continuity as I aim to argue that the condition of relational linguistic continuity should be fulfilled in order for individuals to robustly enjoy their security interest in language.

The reason why individuals want to enjoy relational linguistic continuity is two-folds: (1) because being in a circumstance where the condition of relational linguistic continuity is not satisfied is harmful, and (2) because relational linguistic continuity provides individuals with a sense of meaningfulness of their linguistic activities.

The first reason is explained in part above, based on the examples presented by Michael and Lum. As argued by James Nickel (1994), individuals who fail to participate in intergenerational transmission of their languages experience harm. In agreement with the statement by Nickel, I have explained above why failure of intergenerational transmission of

language causes harm. The reason is that intrinsically valuable human relations that individuals may have formed across generations cease to be available to them.

By identifying harm as being related to discontinued human relations and socialization, my aim is to illustrate that relational linguistic discontinuity should not be mistakenly understood as harmful in purely instrumental sense. Of course, a language barrier may be formed when there is a lack of language transmission, disallowing individuals from understanding each other. This was expressed by Lum, by not being able to understand her mother fully. However, this lack of a tool of communication constitutes only a part of the concern posed by relational linguistic discontinuity. In fact, even if Lum were to have a complete understanding of Chinese, and her mother English, they would still experience a feeling of linguistic discontinuity, as it is most likely that Lum will not transmit Chinese to her children. In short, there is a loss of connectedness resulting from the failure of intergenerational language transmission. A relational connection is lost.

Now, further imagine that such a harm is unfairly concentrated in specific groups of people, such as minority language speakers (e.g. migrants or national minority groups). In the latter part of my dissertation, I will argue that if certain linguistic groups are less likely to be able to transmit their languages across generations, thereby less likely to experience relational linguistic continuity, while other linguistic groups are not, then this may constitute an injustice. In particular, if this imbalance is the result of social structures produced by thousands of individuals, this may constitute a type of structural injustice. (See chapter 3.)

Now, the second criticism of Green's concept of security interest was the following: While it is claimed that individuals are interested in linguistic security, further development of an argument that explains why linguistic security is an interest is needed. Again, I argue that my theory of relational linguistic continuity will explain why. Namely, continuity provides us with meaningfulness for our linguistic activities.

Consider Chaim Gans, who argues that when we participate in an activity that we consider meaningful we require that this meaningfulness would be shared with others. Individuals want their endeavors to have significance beyond their own persons because people "desire that their actions have significance in the world outside them" so that "the world in question must be a world whose existence is independent of their own existence." (Gans, 2003, p. 53). This means that when we pursue a project, believing that it is meaningful, we are dependent on a belief that this project will be appreciated by others as well.

Likewise, our wish to share languages with others has normative significance. We want our languages to provide a source of connection with individuals who may exist with us, come before us, or come after us. Language is similar to a communal project, which courses through us and our job is to utilize it and enrich it as it passes through our hands. In this joint project, our participation in human relations and interactions provides inherent value.

Based on this idea, I update my definition so that relational linguistic security does not only concern individuals who form human relations and social interactions with central figures in their lives, but with many others such as friends, colleagues, fellow group members or co-citizens:

> Relational linguistic security refers to a condition whereby individuals may continuously form human relations and social interactions with others in their languages of socialization or origin.

When I say "others," I refer not only to intimate figures in our lives, such as family members, friends, or colleagues, but also include anonymous other people who constitute the broader network of a linguistic community. This enlarges the scope of relational linguistic security from mother-daughter scenarios to other human relations that may include fellow members of linguistic communities.

The third issue I want to critically appraise in regards to Green's concept of security interest is the temporal orientation. He argues that individuals would like to see survival of their languages of origin or socialization until about four generations (e.g. until one's great-grandchildren) (Green, 1987, p. 658). This means that individuals would want to enjoy linguistic security now, however they are not concerned with regard to whether their enjoyment of linguistic security should go beyond the immediate present.

Again, if we regard my theory of relational linguistic continuity as the foundation of the security interest, we find that the inherent value of forming continuous human relations and interactions should not be limited to four generations. If relational linguistic continuity constitutes a condition where a person's linguistic activities become meaningful, thanks to continuous human relations and interactions, I believe that this condition is best conceptualized in indefinite terms.

To illustrate my point, imagine a writer who is striving to produce a good piece of work, and who hopes that her pursuit will be recognized as meaningful. She writes in an effort to leave a mark on the world – to show that she was here – so that her work becomes a reflection of what has been written in the past, resonates in the present, and is remembered in the future. This wish to "leave a mark on the world" may be considered in terms of generations, where the writer would hope that her book would provide entertainment for her children and grandchildren. However, it could also be considered in terms of indefinite influence beyond a person's intimate circle of intergenerational human networks. Neither one appears to exhaust the scope of the writer's wish. In fact, both seem important in order to fulfill the writer's wish. As stated by Gans, individuals want the world as they know it to survive their mortality, because

> Any uncertainty as to whether that world will exist when they themselves no longer do can undermine their belief in their ability to undertake meaningful projects during their own lifetime. *They naturally wish that the endurance of this world should somehow be secured*. (Gans, 2003, p. 53, my emphasis).

Because we want to know with certainty that our endeavors are actually meaningful, we have an interest in the continued existence of the world, as we know it, beyond our mortality. This requires a certain level of prosperity and longevity in the world as we know it, even when we are gone. We would want the world as we know it to survive us, so that our deaths will not indicate its end (see Scheffler, 2014).

Gans' argument, although developed in a different context, may be applied to the issue of language. What would be required, then, for us to be able to find meaning in our linguistic activities, so that we may be able to leave a mark on the world as linguistic beings? I argue that the world as we know it, where our languages flourish, should survive our deaths. This indicates that the future generations will inherit our languages as something meaningful. Consequently, the future generation may be placed under a certain obligation to continue to hold that our languages are worthy of protection and find the meaningfulness of the past generations' linguistic activities.

Satisfying these conditions does not mean that the world should be preserved as is. Rather, the sense of meaningfulness should be shared intergenerationally, so that a person's belief in the meaningfulness extends beyond his or her lifetime. To understand the normative weight of this wish, consider the following hypothetical example. Imagine a society where the past generation has gone to war with neighboring countries, where hundreds of thousands have died, in order to protect a piece of land that is considered sacrosanct. Imagine that just 80 years after the war, the new generation declares that they want to sell the land for profit. Imagine now that the old war veterans come forward, imploring them to reconsider, based on the

thousands of others who gave their lives to protect that land. Intuitively, there is significance to their request. Other interests may surely outweigh the importance of their request. However, this does not mean that their wish is not significant.

Be that as it may, it could be argued that conferring duties based on such a wish is too burdensome. Why should a person's wish that the world as we know it would survive our death carry normative weight, so much so that it justifies conferring duties to others? After all, we possess many desires and wishes; surely not all of them should be considered normatively significant, especially when placing others under duties. Instead, it could be argued that curbing the person's wish is more realistic. For instance, referring to the example of the writer, rather than placing others under duties to appreciate her work, the writer may simply rest at peace with the idea that she may or may not have an audience who could appreciate her work. (This potential for appreciation does not translate into any duties.)

I have two rejoinders to this objection. First, these duties may not be so burdensome as they appear to be, moreover, we may already be bearing those burdens already. We live in a world where personal wishes of deceased people sometimes translate into important duties. Consider a person's will to not donate her bodily organs. The will of a dead person places other practitioners under a solemn duty to not remove her organs. This illustrates that the interests of deceased individuals may survive their deaths, placing others under duties.

This idea of surviving duties may be defended in different ways. On the one hand, individuals' interest may survive their deaths, for example, because even when human persons perish, the promises or relationships that they might have shared may survive their deaths. For example, even if my mother passes, my relationship with her will survive. On the other hand, Lukas Meyer argues that the same reasons that place people under duties survive even when they perish. If I had promised her something, that promise between she and I will continue to shape and define my responsibilities as I live on. In other words, even if the deads are gone,

living individuals may be held under duties towards the dead due to the promises they had made in the past, so that the living must work to meet the interests of the dead persons (Meyer, 2006, p. 414).

Furthermore, I want to stress that the wish to see a language survive a person's death seems to be reasonable enough to confer a duty to preserve the language for future generations. There is an inherent value at stake, i.e., the inherent value of continuing human relations and interactions in their languages of origin or socialization. Not only that, the survival of a distinct language may offer other inherent values, such as unique knowledge, cultural references, history, and so on that are channeled by a distinct language. These seem important enough to bind individuals under certain duties. By imagining that a part of our linguistic activities may survive our existence, for example, we may hope that a fragment of our work will enhance those values, constituting a part of numerous others' work to preserve those values.

On this basis, I have updated my working definition:

> Relational linguistic continuity refers to a condition whereby individuals may continuously form human relations and social interactions with others in their languages of socialization or origin. Relational linguistic continuity ideally should last indefinitely across generations, as it constitutes the condition of possibility wherein individuals may enjoy meaningfulness of their linguistic activities.

Using this conceptualization of relational linguistic continuity, I wish to illustrate the difference between my theory of relational linguistic continuity and the linguistic security described by Green. My theory argues that for individuals to enjoy a sense of relational linguistic continuity, survival of a language should be anticipated in indefinite terms. In contrast, Green believes that individuals may enjoy linguistic security insofar as the language survives within a family, for

a maximum of four generations, so that a great-grandfather may speak to his great-grandchild. However, because of my attention on the meaningfulness, I do not think that individuals may fully enjoy linguistic security without the certainty of relational linguistic continuity.

For our linguistic existence to be meaningful, a surviving language that reaches beyond one or two generations is needed. We want a language that is endowed with history, and imbued with the heritage of the past and with the ambition of the future generations to continue that heritage. In addition, this language should foster human relations, where individuals may draw a sense of meaning from the linguistic activities of their ancestors, as do the English with their Shakespeare. A linguistic community should continue to flourish and this demand for continuity reaches beyond the immediate present. In other words, relational linguistic continuity must be satisfied in order for individuals to achieve robust enjoyment of linguistic security.

I would like to critically reflect on the last aspect: the way in which Green's linguistic security could be measured. It is unclear whether Green's idea of linguistic security – or linguistic insecurity for that matter – is based on subjective experience, or whether it relies on objective factors. I will address this concern by developing my concept of relational linguistic security as having both subjective and objective dimensions.

My theory of relational linguistic continuity may offer an idea on how the threshold can be measured. Personal experiences of relational linguistic continuity or discontinuity may differ from one person to another, indicating a subjective dimension. However, judgment of the reasonability of individuals' experiences of relational linguistic continuity may be based on objective standards. To understand my point, imagine two persons, A and B, who are situated in distinct circumstances. Person A speaks German. Person B speaks the Māori language, one of the most well-known endangered languages (King, 2018). Now assume that both people claim to suffer from a sense of relational linguistic discontinuity because there are few people

with whom they could form human relations and social interactions in those languages:

> **A** claims to suffer from relational linguistic discontinuity because many people who speak different languages have moved into his region, disallowing him from speaking German in his region.
>
> **B** claims to suffer from relational linguistic discontinuity because not many people speak the Māori language due to language endangerment.

I want to add that all other things are assumed to be equal. Neither person faces the threat of persecution, poverty, or any dire indignities. In this case, I think that only the claim made by person B is reasonable, whereas the claim made by person A is not. Here, I stress the importance of judging whether the experience of relational linguistic in/security is reasonable based on plausible standards (cf. Martin, 2020, who provides an analysis of an example of ironic religion in order to argue that a religion should pass a "sincerity" test in order to warrant exemptions from laws or rules). Defining plausible standards of reasonability fall outside of the scope of this paper, as my aim is to provide a critical revision of the idea of linguistic security. However, I still point out two normatively relevant circumstances that may be used in qualifying plausible standards of reasonability.

The first circumstance is the one observed above, i.e., Lum's story. Lum described the circumstance of an abrupt language shift between two generations. When individuals fail to build and sustain relations with each other due to an abrupt language shift, despite the central role they play in each other's lives, then I argue that the experience of linguistic discontinuity is reasonable.

The second circumstance that may be normatively relevant in the effort to determine whether the claims of relational linguistic discontinuity are reasonable is the vitality of language, something that can be measured. For example, UNESCO suggests nine factors for

measuring the vitality of language: intergenerational language transmission (ILT), the attitude of community members towards their own languages, shifts in domains of language use, governmental and institutional language attitudes and policies, type and quality of documentation, response to new domains and media, availability of materials for language education and literacy, as well as the proportion of speakers within the total population and absolute number of speakers (UNESCO, 2011, p. 5). Based on how well languages fare with regard to these nine factors, languages may be regarded as prosperous or endangered. Language vitality may range from safe, vulnerable, definitely endangered, severely endangered, critically endangered, and extinct (Krauss, 2007, p. 1). If an individual who claims to suffer from linguistic discontinuity is a speaker of a language that has robust vitality, I argue that his claim should be considered unreasonable. In contrast, if the individual claims that he suffers from linguistic insecurity as a speaker of a vulnerable or endangered language, then I argue that his claim should be regarded as *pro tanto* reasonable.

In conclusion, I update my working definition for the last time:

> Relational linguistic continuity refers to a condition whereby individuals may continuously form human relations and social interactions with others in their languages of socialization or origin. Ideally relational linguistic continuity should last indefinitely across generations, as it constitutes the condition of possibility wherein individuals may enjoy the meaningfulness of their linguistic activities. Relational linguistic continuity has both subjective and objective dimensions. While individuals may experience relational linguistic continuity based on subjective standards, judgment regarding the reasonability of their claims may be based on objective standards. These objective standards may be informed by normatively relevant circumstances, such as the occurrence of an abrupt language shift or vitality of the language.

I believe that my theory of relational linguistic continuity provides a foundation for security interest, which is substantially stronger than the arguments provided by Green, as it avoids the four weaknesses presented above.[2]

Before I move on to the next analysis, I want to stress that my theory of relational linguistic continuity supports the normative significance of security interest in language. This theory, in other words, explains why the security interest is a fundamental interest. It is because of the inherent value of continuing human relations and interactions in languages of origin or socialization. This means that continuing human relations and interaction in one's language is one of the factors constituting the social, political, economic, and psychological preconditions

[2] Until now, I have used specific scenarios in my effort to develop my theory of relational linguistic continuity, where a person has a claim regarding relational linguistic continuity based on one specific language. As a rejoinder, one may ask "what if a person has four grandparents who all speak distinct languages? Can she reasonably claim that all four languages should satisfy relational linguistic continuity?" I do accept that, hypothetically, a person may experience the threat of relational linguistic discontinuity to all four languages. However, as I have argued in my definition, the normative significance of these languages should be based on the fact that the person grew up or was socialized in particular languages. If all four languages have been a significant part of the person's life, it is surely possible that she would hold an interest in seeing the survival of these languages. This means that polyglots might experience less difficulty enjoying the security interest, as their human relations and interactions will span from four different languages. Moreover, this could mean that the claim made by monolinguals for relational linguistic discontinuity may be regarded as more urgent than the claim made by the polyglots.

under which individuals may enjoy their particular version of the good life. In addition, it is one of the inherent values that we are interested in for enjoyment of the values that enrich our quality of life.

Now, as the final analysis of this section, I would like to go a step further and suggest that the security interest, supported by the theory of relational linguistic continuity, may become a ground for language rights. In particular it gives rise to the *right to linguistic survival*. This is in contrast to Green and Réaume, who argue that the interest in linguistic security gives rise to the right to linguistic security, not survival; they argue that the two rights give rise to different kinds of duties (1989, p. 780-1). One must enjoy relational linguistic continuity in order to truly actualize linguistic security, especially as I described above.

I extend the interest-based theory of rights presented by Joseph Raz in an effort to defend the right to linguistic survival (for an alternative theory of rights, see Hart, 1982). According to this theory, a person has a right if her interest is significant enough to justify holding another person under duties (for a more detailed account, see further Raz, 1986, p. 166). If individuals share an interest in X, this gives rise to the duty of government to secure that interest (Raz, 1986, p. 202). I agree with Réaume and Green that due to the innate characteristic of a language framing language rights in terms of individual rights may result in a conceptual issue. The right to linguistic survival, which safeguards the fundamental interest of individuals in relational linguistic security, could only be framed as a group right.

I assume here that language is a shared or a participatory good. Language is a shared good because it is a non-rival good, since "its enjoyment by some does not leave any less for others," and it is a social good because "one cannot enjoy it as an individual, but only in common with at least some others" (Green, 1987, p. 660). This means that language only functions as a good insofar as individuals can share it with at least some others in the present. If not, individuals cannot enjoy language as a tool of communication, a source of identity, or a

marker of membership in a community with a distinctive cultural heritage. In addition, language functions as "the bearer of conceptual frameworks and metaphors for conducting one's life" and "the means of expressing a community's distinctive concept of beauty and truth" (Réaume, 1994, p. 127). However, in order for language to serve as frameworks and metaphors, there should be a collective pursuit of "the process of creating and recreating language rather than any end product that might be said to be useful to individuals as individuals" (Réaume, 1994, p. 127). Therefore, language is a participatory good, so that its value as a good is dependent on the active participation of its speakers in its making and remaking.

Based on the inherent characteristics of language as a shared and participatory good, I frame the right to linguistic survival as a group right. This right is defined as follows:

> Group X (that speaks Xish), whose members reside in group Y's territory (group Y speaks Yish), has a right to see the survival of Xish in group Y's territory if and only if group X has a fundamental interest in seeing the survival of Xish that is significant enough to justify holding group Y under duties.

This means that the members of any linguistic community have language rights as long as their interests in languages are significant enough to grant them language rights and place others under duties. The significance is granted as long as there is a fundamental interest. As I have argued above, the interest in relational linguistic security is fundamental.

What kind of duties follow from the right to linguistic survival? The health and the longevity of Xish should be maintained in order to satisfy the right of group X to linguistic survival. Consequently, the right of Group X to linguistic security would preclude societal arrangements that place Xish under the threat of endangerment and death. For one, any use of

state power (such as the legal system, governmental structures, educational system, etc.) for either blatantly or insidiously prohibiting the use of Xish is precluded. In addition, the right of group X to survival precludes imposition of pressure to abandon the use of Xish in private spheres. For example, pressure to abandon the transmission of Xish to their future generations should not be placed on group X. Or, Xish should be adopted by private businesses operating in the territory where group X resides when conducting their private businesses.

So far, I have established the concept of relational linguistic continuity in order to advance the right to linguistic survival as a group right. A few points must be presented before concluding this section. My argument thus far was a pro-tanto one. Regarding my argument on relational linguistic security and the right to linguistic survival, one may object to this right by stating that this results in burdensome duties. However, whether the duties are too burdensome depends on an all-things-considered evaluation. During an all-things-considered evaluation, the aforementioned autonomy argument, the dignity argument, and the argument on relational linguistic continuity (and perhaps many others) are weighed in order to determine what overrides what. Furthermore, other interests are evaluated in addition to the security interest. Determining the respective weights of rights and duties is surely a crucial aspect of normative thinking. However, since my aim here has been to illustrate that relational linguistic continuity may serve as a justificatory basis for linguistic survival, an extensive discussion of this task will not be included in this paper.

Now that I have introduced six fundamental interests in language, the next section will address the principal subject matter, i.e., language loss. I aim to illustrate why language loss is a morally problematic phenomenon.

1.3. Articulating the problem of language loss

In this section, I will claim that language loss may be a harmful phenomenon because individuals who undergo language loss are able to enjoy fundamental interests in language. This analysis will illustrate that language loss is a morally problematic phenomenon. (Later, I will demonstrate that language loss becomes a concern of justice due to the fact that individuals face the threat of language loss unequally.)

To this end, I will first introduce two predominant arguments that discuss language loss in the existing literature.

(1) Autonomy-based approach: Assuming that people have an instrumental interest in language, the autonomy argument argues that language loss is problematic because it threatens one's enjoyment of equality of autonomy.

(2) Dignity-based approach: Assuming that people hold identity interest in language, the dignity argument it conceptualizes language loss as a threat to individuals' equal self-esteem and dignity.

These approaches address the topic of language loss and shows why language loss is normatively significant. They focus on whether language loss threatens the values of autonomy and dignity and address whether linguistic survival, which is a conceptual foil of language loss, could be defended. I will point out that while the two approaches illustrate why language loss is harmful, their scope of analysis is not exhaustive for two reasons.

First, autonomy and dignity are not the only values that are threatened due to language loss. When individuals undergo language loss, their other values, such as their enjoyment of fundamental interests in language, may also be threatened. Not being able to enjoy fundamental interests in language may cause harms that go beyond the violation of individuals' autonomy and dignity.

Second, in theorizing how language loss could be combated, autonomy and dignity approaches focus on the role of public spheres (public institutions, legal systems or educational systems) in maintaining a language. However, these arguments leave out insidious social practices that may result in language loss, such as everyday practices that may not directly alienate, ridicule, or denigrate targeted languages, yet, culminate into serious harms at a collective level.

I will first introduce the two approaches. Then, in order to fill in the gaps that are not covered by autonomy- and dignity-based approaches, I will show how language loss may hinder individuals' enjoyment of fundamental interests in language. I identify three novel circumstances, which arises due to language loss. I will argue that individuals who are placed in those circumstances may be harmed.

1.3.1. Autonomy-based approach

T*he autonomy-based approach* explores the link between an individual's autonomy and language loss. To begin with, I introduce Will Kymlicka in order to set up the autonomy-based approach to language loss, who argues that the health of an individual's culture and language is closely related to her exercise of personal autonomy (1995, Chapter 5; in particular, see pages 79-80).

Kymlicka argues that loss of one's culture, which may be caused by the endangerment of one's culture, may significantly limit one's exercise of autonomy because one's cultural background shapes the "context of choice" from which one draws a "secure sense of identity and belonging" so that she can "call upon confronting questions about personal values and projects" (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 105). When a culture is in decline, it fails to offer a rich "understanding [of its] language and history" (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 83). Without this understanding, we lack the cultural narrative based on tradition, conventions, and history that

informs us of the cultural, social and ethical significance of our actions. This leads to an impoverishment in our contexts of choice, based on which we get to critically reflect and choose our actions, experiences and life choices that we pursue as autonomous beings.

Kymlicka does not engage with language loss. However, I find it plausible that an argument similar to that of Kymlicka could be formulated that shows how language loss may play a crucial role in inhibiting an individual's exercise of her linguistic autonomy. Imagine that an individual's linguistic community is facing endangerment. Her linguistic community's network, through which her language is transmitted, documented, and used as the medium of instruction, is weakened. This may result in the individuals' loss of her language, where she undergoes assimilation to another linguistic group. The loss of her language may result in her loss of the context that informs her of the significance of her linguistic background, as both a tool and a heritage. Furthermore, she may face impoverished context of choice, where she no longer gets to enjoy a context where she can reflect on how her linguistic background shapes the scope of communication, mobility, opportunities, identity and life-world, so that she may build and revise the beliefs and values she has in regard to her linguistic community. In a nutshell, language loss hinders one's autonomy. Therefore, linguistic survival – which is the conceptual foil of language loss – is necessary for individuals to exercise their autonomy. Let us call this the autonomy-based approach to language loss.

There are numerous critiques of the autonomy-based approach. In fact, especially those who approach language loss through the lens of language rights expressed suspicion towards the autonomy-based approach. Namely, language loss may threaten autonomy, but doing something to protect specific languages may, in effect, be inimical to equality of autonomy. This counterargument illustrates the limit of using autonomy as a value – it may fail to critically conceptualize language loss.

For example, Denise Réaume (1994), while testing the limits of a group right to linguistic survival, argues that a group's right to linguistic survival "could impose obligations on other individuals to stay or become members of the group, thus conflicting with personal liberty" (Réaume, 1994, p. 128). Again, this shows that even if language loss threatens individuals' autonomy, remedying language loss cannot be justified based on the value of autonomy.

Lewis echoes this view (Lewis, 2013a, 2013b). He claims that if group X, that speaks Xish, has the right to linguistic survival as a group right, this would entail that "generation after generation of Xish speakers would be expected, regardless of their own personal opinions, to continue to use the language as their normal medium of communication and to transfer it to their children" (Lewis, 2013a, p. 96) A group's right to linguistic survival, then, lends itself to problematic duties that may be oppositional to individual autonomy. Satisfying endangered linguistic communities' need for linguistic survival may prioritize some individuals' autonomy, but it may violate basic liberties, such as the right to exit and freedom of expression, among many others (Lewis, 2013b, pp. 677-8).[3]

Even when linguistic survival is conceptualized as an individual right, autonomy seems to play a crucial role in rejecting such a right. Lewis, again, argues that an individual's right to linguistic survival poses a threat to personal autonomy (2013a, p. 91). Individuals may experience serious harm when their languages face death, since language is significant for

[3] It is interesting to note that Lewis' criticism entails an act of balancing the burden or linguistic survival to the harm of language loss. Lewis makes a crucial, yet rather brief, observation that construing linguistic survival in terms of rights misconstrues the gravity of the harm that individuals undergo when they lose their languages, claiming that "[t]he harm in question is simply not one that can be placed on such a high moral plane" (2013a, p. 91).

individuals' sense of identity as well as for their communication. For Lewis, however, these harms are not enough to defend linguistic survival as an individual right, because of the problematic duties that follow from it. If an individual X, who is an Xish speaker, has the right to linguistic survival as an individual right, this would mean that she may "tie his/her fellow Xish speakers to a particular linguistic and cultural path, regardless of their own personal views and aspirations" (Lewis, 2013a, p. 91). In fact, these duties are crucial since a language can only survive based on a high level of cooperation among many individuals. These burdens are simply unfair. So far, the first counterargument for the autonomy-based approach to language loss.

The second counterargument to the autonomy-based approach is developed by Alan Patten, who claims that language loss may occur in the form of a gradual transition, thereby respecting individuals' autonomy. Consider the following hypothetical case that Patten illustrates in order to argue against linguistic survival:

> Imagine that language *L* did gradually decline in use – to the extent that it fell below the threshold in which it offers a context of choice. It would be a mistake to conclude from this fact alone that *L*-speakers would be left without a context of choice. It would only be unilingual *L*-speakers who would necessarily have lost their context of choice since multilingual *L*-speakers may find meaningful options and opportunities in other languages. And the very same processes that generated the decline in usage of *L* in the first place – the massive attraction of some other language, for instance – would help to ensure that there are very few unilingual *L*-speakers. (Patten, 2001, pp. 707–708).

This case illustrates how language loss may not entail a restriction on the context of choice, where individuals may exercise their autonomy. This is due to the fact that individuals often undergo a gradual language shift. This means that even if L-speaker faces language loss, it does not entail an end of a context of choice for L-speakers. They would most likely have access to an alternative context of choice by speaking, say, the dominant language D. Based on the likelihood of multilingualism among the individuals who undergo a language loss, where the context of choice offered by D would gradually replace the context of choice offered by L, Patten argues that insofar as autonomy is the value at stake, neither can one problematize language loss nor argue for linguistic survival.

What Patten illustrates is the importance of being able to speak *a* language. It may be argued that there is not much relation between individuals' exercise of autonomy and being able to speak particular languages (see Waldron, 1992, who argues that loss of one's culture may not be an issue of justice if there is an alternative culture where she may have access to sufficient beliefs, values and materials).

However, I do not think that this argument is entirely convincing for two reasons. First, although this is not an objection to the principle itself, but an objection to the application of the principle, Patten's scenario of a gradual language shift may not be likely to happen in the actual world. In fact, one could argue that many concrete language shifts would be better described as being abrupt (Bougie et al., 2003, p. 354). A realistic hypothetical scenario, then, would involve L dying out due to an abrupt language shift, where older generations – who are unilingual L-speakers – simply fail in a language shift while new generations quickly succeed in a language shift and become unilingual speakers of some other language. (I will develop this argument further in chapter 3.)

Second, similarly to the first, integrating or assimilating to other languages is likely a costly process for individuals. Some people may simply not afford such costs. Furthermore,

individuals cannot reasonably be expected to forego their languages if the costs are high. If a few people choose to do so, they should be seen as foregoing something to which they are entitled. Furthermore, this would raise fairness concerns. These costs, moreover, concerns of fairness, matter for justice. This argument is adapted from what is said about culture by Kymlicka (1995, pp. 85-86). I piggyback on Kymlicka's argument.

The third counterargument goes as follows. The autonomy-based approach seems to work insofar as the present generation is concerned. However, linguistic survival, either via language rights or language policies, demands the continuous survival of a language or linguistic community not only in the present but also well into the future. Consequently, when a state adopts language maintenance policies, this is supposed to have far-reaching effects for future generations. As Charles Taylor argues, the autonomy argument only discusses the importance of a context of choice and individual autonomy for "*existing* people who find themselves trapped with a culture [or language] under pressure" and "doesn't justify measures designed to ensure survival through indefinite future generations" (1994, footnote 16, his emphasis). The present-oriented character of the autonomy argument limits its force in defending linguistic survival.

1.3.2. Dignity-based approach

Now, I turn to the dignity-based approach. According to this approach, language loss may violate individuals' equal sense of esteem. Van Parijs' defense of linguistic territoriality principle is particularly relevant to our topic, as it indirectly supports linguistic survival to mitigate concerns that may arise in relation to individuals' self-esteem. The so-called territorial regime, which adopts the territoriality principle, divides the state's territory into multiple monolingual regions. Each region promotes and protects one chosen language by making it the only admissible language for public services, political participation, legal systems and public

education within circumscribed territories (Van Parijs 2011, Chapter 4).

Van Parijs' territorial regime indirectly offsets the threat of language loss, while fostering parity of esteem among individuals of any linguistic background. This is because the territorial regime is particularly helpful in ensuring that vulnerable linguistic groups, as linguistically weak groups, do not face "colonial" attitudes from linguistically dominant groups, where the former is pressured to "bow down" to the latter by assimilating into the dominant language (Van Parijs, 2011, 146). Eradicating this power imbalance may ensure promotion and protection of those vulnerable linguistic groups, moreover, the territorial regime demands and incentivizes any newcomers and settlers to learn the local language. As a result, the territorial regime may indirectly foster the survival of vulnerable languages.

However, the dignity-based approach does not necessarily succeed in illustrating that language loss is always harmful to dignity. Similar to the autonomy-based approach, it is not necessarily the case that language loss always occurs with the violation of individuals' sense of dignity. Consider again Patten (2001). Patten is critical of dignity-based approach for two reasons. Firstly, even if an individual's self-esteem diminishes due to the dwindling of her language, it may not be normatively significant. Her lack of self-esteem may not be enough to trigger social and political arrangements to combat language loss, for example, by supporting linguistic survival. This is either because the diminished self-esteem may only have minimal normatively significance, whereas the states' other obligations may weigh heavier than its responsibility to remedy such harms.

Secondly, even if one's lack of self-esteem is enough to arrange social and political institutions that protect certain languages, induced remedy may be disproportionate to the actual harm that is caused by diminished self-esteem. Imagine that language is just one component of a person's collective identity, and she may be faring well in other terms. If the state intervenes to offer this person some remedies, such an exercise of power may no longer

be justified. So, Patten rejects that language loss is harmful in a significant sense, enough to defend linguistic survival.

There are other voices that criticize the idea of linguistic survival. For instance, Helder De Schutter (2020) argues that not all linguistic subordination leads to dignity-based claims. Contrasting standardized speakers and dialect speakers, the state recognition dialect speakers receive, may be justifiably subordinated to the state recognition that standard speakers receive based on the fact that dialect speakers still identify as a part of the group of standardized speakers. This does not mean that dialect speakers will hold dignity-based claims due to their inferior positions. The dialect speakers may draw a significant sense of dignity from the standardized language. Similarly, individuals who face language loss may derive a sense of dignity from speaking a dominant language. Or, speakers of an endangered language may derive a sense of dignity based on another language, which may mean that dignity may no longer defend linguistic survival.

1.3.3. Language loss and its relation to individuals' enjoyment of fundamental interests in language

While there is much to admire to both approaches, they do not provide an exhaustive analysis of the harms of language loss. In this concluding section of chapter 1, I aim to illustrate how language loss, which may occur either at family- or societal-level, may be accompanied by linguistic isolation, linguistic alienation and language extinction. These three phenomena may be harmful, as they may hinder individuals' enjoyment of fundamental interests in language. This analysis goes beyond the scope of the violation of individuals' autonomy and dignity. (Later, in chapter 3, that linguistic isolation, linguistic alienation and language extinction are harmful circumstances will play a significant role in my conceptualization of structural linguistic injustice.)

1.3.3.1. Linguistic isolation

In this subsection, I aim to illustrate the fact when individuals face language loss, they may undergo linguistic isolation, which may be a harmful circumstance. In scientific studies on mental health, isolation is generally defined as the absence of contact with other people. Social isolation is distinct from the subjective emotional experience of loneliness, as it is measured by "objective characteristics of the situation individuals are confronted with and refers to shortcomings in the size of their network of social relationships" (de Jong Gierveld & Havens, 2004, p. 110). Social isolation is "a key factor when exploring the influence of the social environment on people's quality of life" as there is growing evidence that social isolation is related to a negative impact upon people's well-being (Hawton et al., 2011, p. 57).

There is a wide range of indicators for social isolation. For instance, an individual's marital or partnership status, living alone, having a weak social network and infrequent social interactions are examples of such indicators (Chen et al., 2014). This indicates that an individual's access to human relations and social networks in which they may sustain intimate or friendly relations is crucial when determining whether or not they are experiencing isolation.

Another important indicator for social isolation, I argue, is whether individuals face a language barrier. When individuals undergo language loss, as did Lum's family, certain individuals may face social isolation that is caused by a language barrier. Recall the example of Lum's mother. Informed by her circumstance, I define linguistic isolation as follows:

> Linguistic isolation refers to the situation where individuals face social isolation due to a language barrier.

I argue that linguistic isolation is a harmful circumstance, as individuals' instrumental interests in language are not robustly realized.[4] To grasp my point, consider the following example. Imagine an elderly couple, recently married, of a Japanese woman A and a French man B. They reside in Brussels. A, despite her efforts, maintains an intermediate level of French. B, despite his efforts, only understand a handful of Japanese words. Consequently, in daily contexts, A barely participates in talks with her family, who mostly converse in French, and understands only 40% of what is going on. Due to this language barrier, she often retires early from the dinner tables to sit in her room alone. Other than her husband, B, who occasionally checks in on her to ask "how are you?" or "do you want some more wine?" A mostly resorts to personal activities without much interaction with the family.

Now imagine how A's relation to the host country, to her role as a citizen and to her role as a contributor to the economy. If A was only able to develop limited proficiency in French, the dominant language of the host country, her activities as a citizen, as an employee, as a neighbor or as a family member will be partly influenced by a language barrier. Her world of possibilities may shrink, due to the language barrier. As a result, she may develop a pattern of

[4] This harm may come in degrees, depending on how much individuals' instrumental interests are realized. Furthermore, individuals' experience of linguistic isolation may have both objective and subjective dimensions. That is, for instance, individuals who are more outgoing may feel more isolated than others. Accordingly, a metric, which may evaluate when and how harm arises in circumstances of linguistic isolation, may be developed in order to judge the reasonableness of such harm becoming a concern of justice. However, I do not go into this discussion, as my primary aim is to illustrate that linguistic isolation may be a circumstance where harm arises.

living, where she may feel insulated from her surroundings. I refer to this situation as being placed in a position of linguistic isolation.

Furthermore, Linguistic isolation has a particular character that should be accentuated. Depending on an individual's social identity, linguistic isolation may be normalized. This means that certain individuals, whose instrumental interests in language are dissatisfied, may not be considered morally worrisome. Above-mentioned example of A, who is an elderly first-generation immigrant woman, faced linguistic isolation. Interestingly, those who surround A may come to accept and normalize the circumstances in which her instrumental interests in language are not satisfied. For example, A's family members may take for granted that A is linguistically isolated and that A will not be fully integrated within the family due to the language barrier. Moreover, A's co-citizens may accept that A only gets to experience the host country in a limited scope due to language barrier.

What I want to illustrate is the social position in which A is placed, where she is surrounded by habits, norms, practices and relations that normalize and take for granted the fact that A is linguistically isolated. I argue that this aspect should invite our normative scrutiny, which I aim to achieve in this dissertation by employing the structural injustice approach to analyze the issue of language loss.

1.3.3.2. Linguistic alienation

Linguistic alienation is another type of potentially harmful circumstances that may arise due to language loss. I intend to use the following as a working definition of linguistic alienation:

> Linguistic alienation refers to the situation where members of certain linguistic groups are placed in social positions where their intimate relation between themselves and their language of origin or socialization are severed.

I argue that when individuals face linguistic alienation, they are hindered from enjoying identity interests in language, either it be dignity or lifeworld interests.

Many postcolonial scholars describe in unison that colonial suppression and the denigration of local languages or varieties leave undeniable mark on one's linguistic condition. This "mark" is often described as alienation. In fact, numerous postcolonial theories explore the concept of alienation exclusively in the context of language. For our purpose, it is crucial to grasp these works that attempts to conceptualize a phenomenon in which a previously established relationship between A and A's language is severed as an instance of alienation (see also Honneth, 2008, p. 27, who argues that the specific relationship that individuals have with their surroundings (as well as the relation to themselves) may become atrophied and distorted, thereby estranging the person from his/her surroundings).

The analogy stands between an individual and a language, in which the relation between the two may be alienated. For instance, in his critique of colonial hierarchy, Frantz Fanon gives an example of middle-class Martinicans who learn French diction – the language they already speak as their native language – to adopt the European French accent:

> The Negro arriving in France will react against the myth of the R-eating man from Martinique. He will become aware of it, and he will really go for war against it. He will practice not only rolling his R but embroidering it. Furtively observing the slightest reactions of others, listening to his own speech, suspicious of his own tongue—a wretchedly lazy organ—he will lock himself into his room and read aloud for hours—desperately determined to learn *diction*. (Fanon, 2002, p. 11, author's emphasis).

Here, Fanon uses this example of the colonial dialectic – a unilateral dependency that the colonized subjects have upon the colonizers, who never provide desired recognition to the colonized – plays out at the level of language. Unlike the Hegelian dialectic, in which the master and the slave interdependently exchange mutual recognition with each other, the colonized subject receives none. This lack of recognition causes the colonized subject to strive even harder to achieve recognition, usually by adopting the standards of the master, thereby only affirming the master's position of superiority even further. As a result, the colonized become alienated from their language, by objectifying and becoming suspicious of the way they speak their native language, i.e., they become alienated from their own mother tongue.

Jacques Derrida describes a similar situation in his autobiographical piece "Monolingualism of the other" how he becomes alienated from French (his native tongue) (Derrida, 1998). Arguing that the process of alienation is a fundamental condition of language, Derrida admits that any speakers of any language, regardless of their status as a native or non-native speaker, undergo a certain level of alienation due to the process of learning a language. However, Derrida points out that postcolonial subjects are greatly influenced by persisting colonial hierarchy, which suggests that a severing of one's relationship to one's language could be to a greater extent for postcolonial subjects than in others. For instance, Derrida describes, with a sense of shame and guilt, how he prioritizes European French above Algerian French (Derrida, 1998, p. 46). The alienation that the colonized subjects experience is more severe compared to non-colonized subjects, as the former accepts the superiority of the colonizers. The acceptance of hierarchy attests to a greater degree of alienation because one subjects oneself to constant evaluation and objectification.

The experience of alienation is present in many other postcolonial contexts. Rey Chow, for example, provides an autobiographical analysis of post-colonial language education in

Hong Kong, which asserted the priority and superiority of English over Cantonese. She states how

> the Chinese culture was devalued (even as things Chinese were visibly and audibly present everywhere in the colony), it became, for the colonized, a lesson in none other than the continual, disciplined objectification of an intimate part of themselves [i.e., Cantonese, one's native tongue]. This process, in which to learn [English] is simultaneously to *alienate or estrange from oneself what is closest to one, should be recognized as the condition a priori to the postcolonial scene of languaging*. (Chow, 2014, p. 45, author's emphasis removed and mine added).

Chow further points out how colonial education induces an objectification of the language that is one's native tongue, thereby alienating individuals from their native language.

Based on numerous works of decolonial and postcolonial scholars, I argue that linguistic alienation is a circumstance where individuals may be harmed. As illustrated above, linguistic alienation occurs partly due to hierarchal relationships among linguistic groups, for example, between the colonizer's languages and local languages (the languages of the colonized subjects).

I want to focus on what kind of harms individuals face whenever individuals are alienated and lose their intimacy with their languages of origin. (As mentioned above, later in chapter 3, this aspect of harm will play a role when I establish the notion of structural linguistic injustice.) I argue that linguistic alienation is harmful because individuals are prevented from enjoying identity interests from their languages of origin. Because their languages of origin are denigrated, individuals are no longer able to draw a full sense of worth or value, i.e., their dignity interest is violated. Furthermore, their life-world interest is also violated.

First, to illustrate how linguistic alienation violate individuals' enjoyment of dignity interest, let us return to Fanon. Fanon describes how the colonizers were recognized as having the ability to express themselves as competent linguistic beings, while the colonized were denied this recognition in two ways. On one hand, when the colonized spoke local languages, they were given less respect as they were considered to be linguistically inferior. For instance, when black Martinicans spoke Creole – a language as complex and intricate as French – they were considered to speak a "savage" language that reflected the Martinicans' lesser linguistic competence in comparison to the French. On the other hand, when the colonized subjects spoke the colonizer's language, they were considered to be imitating the colonizers, as opposed to being linguistically competent speakers (Fanon, 2002). Black Martinicans were seen as inauthentic French speakers, despite being natives in French, because they were at best considered to be mimicking the European French or were considered to have less competence in French in comparison to the European French speaker. The colonized were placed in a double bind – whether they spoke their local languages or the colonizer's language, they were considered as inferior linguistic beings. As a result, when the colonized subjects adopted the colonizer's language, they remained alienated from the language, forming an awkward, nervous and insecure relation with the newly adopted language.

Moreover, individuals who face linguistic alienation are also disrupted from having full access to the life-world interest. Consider Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o's analysis, who illustrates that the colonial education may, in part, cause linguistic alienation by severing a link between individuals and their language of origin. Kenyan children spoke Gikuyu before colonial education as the "language of our evening teach-ins, and the language of our immediate and wider community, and the language of our work in the fields," where Gikuyu connects the world in harmonious unity (Ngũgĩ, 1994, pp. 437–439). Upon entering the colonial education, however, the world of harmony and unity became severed, as the world was divided into two

registers: the “higher” realm where English is spoken (where English is “the ticket to higher realms” as Ngũgĩ terms it) and the “lower” realm where the original language remains (Ngũgĩ 1995, p. 438). By having to oscillate between two realms, children became alienated from the lifeworld Gikuyu had provided. Not only does colonial education result in a loss of intimate medium of communication, the children also lose, in part, the connection that they used to have to certain ways of living, i.e., to certain lifeworld. In short, when individuals undergo linguistic alienation, they are not able to enjoy their lifeworld interest to the fullest degree.

1.3.3.3. Language extinction

The final type of potentially harmful circumstance I want to discuss is language extinction. By language extinction, I refer to a specific type of language loss, i.e., the loss of language at a societal level. In other words, language extinction refers to the situation in which a language ceases to be used.

Language extinction occurs as a process. If numerous individuals of the same linguistic group undergo language loss, their language becomes vulnerable, endangered, and ultimately result in its death. Language death is considered to be caused by several factors (nine in total, as proposed in a UNESCO document published in 2003 and summarized in Brenzinger, 2007). These factors concern intergenerational transmission of language (Fishman, 1991; Krauss, 2007), the number of speakers, the degree of loss, speakers’ attitudes towards their own languages (Bell, 2013) and how much work is being done to maintain the language (through documentation, standardization, etc.).

Although there is no consensus on the definition of language death, I stipulate a working definition of language death, drawing from the definition offered by Tasaku Tsunoda (2017):

> Language death refers to a situation where a language ceases to be used due to the deaths of last of native or fluent speakers.

I will argue that language extinction may cause harms because individuals are not able to enjoy, first and foremost, security interest in language, although other interests may also be violated. I will not expand on this harm in detail, as it has been laid out at length in section 1.2.6. Here, I only briefly remind ourselves that this harm consists of not being able to enjoy the inherent value of being able to hold human relations and interactions in the language of one's origin or socialization.

Language death is harmful, not only because the speakers' security interest is dissatisfied, but also due to other reasons. The literature in sociolinguistics suggests other types of harm that also arise from language endangerment and death (for a summary of literature that provides conclusive evidence of the harms caused by language shift, see Skutnabb-Kangas, 2018). For instance, indigenous people who lose their languages experience a decline in their mental and physical health, while those who have regained their languages through revitalization processes experience increased health, self-esteem and sense of dignity. Even after a successful language shift, people mourn if languages of their ancestors die and at times desire the revival and maintenance of those languages (Bell, 2013). Also, with a loss of language, its speakers lose a unique ways to express themselves, which reduces their linguistic capacities (Nowak, 2019). Each language provides a particular way to capture and express life experiences, and when a language is lost, the intelligibility of these life experiences is also lost.

1.4. Conclusion

This chapter established the state of the art of linguistic justice debate. Especially, the interest theory of linguistic justice was introduced, which identified five fundamental interests held by

individuals with in language: (1) democracy, (2) unity, (3) opportunity, (4) life-world and (5) dignity interest. Then, I stressed importance of including the security interest in language in the analysis. The security interest referred to a person's interest in continuing to speak the language of origin or socialization. I developed a theory of relational linguistic continuity, which provides a theoretical framework of security interest. Lastly, I discussed why language loss deserves normative scrutiny. It was because language loss may give rise to harmful circumstances, such as linguistic isolation, linguistic alienation and language extinction.

Chapter 2: Employing the structural injustice approach for linguistic justice

2.1. Introduction

The structural injustice approach is an exploding field of literature, which began with Iris Marion Young's monograph *The Responsibility for Justice* (2011). The structural injustice approach has since been extended to many other topics, such as to past injustices that left many legacies in the present or to social justice issues that are produced as a result of collective action. Interestingly, the structural injustice approach has so far bypassed the debate on linguistic justice. The aim of this chapter is to introduce the structural injustice approach as the theoretical framework that I will use to fill this gap. In short, I will establish the structural injustice approach as my normative framework that will be used for the remainder of this dissertation.

The structural injustice approach identifies objectionable or unjust social structures that enable structural injustices, so that they can be remedied by responsible agents. For the purpose of my dissertation, I will focus on two benefits of this approach. Namely, the structural injustice approach is well-suited as a means of explaining the normative significance of the following two aspects commonly observed in reality: (1) individuals' innocent and harmless actions that nonetheless could lead to serious harms on a collective level, and (2) present circumstances that are linked to past injustices.

Employing the structural injustice approach, with specific attention to these two aspects, enables us to obtain two original insights that have hitherto been absent in the debate on linguistic justice: (1) by actively reflecting on how innocent and harmless attitudes and assumptions we hold towards languages result in a harmful type of language loss at a collective level and (2) by revealing the connection between currently manifest patterns of language shift

and past injustices where minority languages were denigrated and suppressed.

The first insight will bring new attention to the debate about linguistic justice by broadening the scope of social structures. Social structures, as employed by the structural injustice approach, refer to any sort of social processes that are produced by individuals' actions, which includes individuals' daily actions (such as beliefs, habits, norms, or practices), human relations and social positions, which is much broader than what is typically assumed in the debate on linguistic justice.

The second insight will fill in the gap in the linguistic justice debate by reflecting on different types of responsibility we may have towards linguistic groups. Going beyond the typical scope of linguistic justice, which has been mostly oriented towards the present, the structural injustice approach offers a richer understanding of responsibility by critically appraising both backward- and forward-looking temporal orientations of justice.

After introducing the structural injustice approach as the framework that I will employ for my dissertation in this chapter, the remainder of this dissertation will consist of my application of this framework to the issue of language loss.

2.2. The structural injustice approach: social structures, structural injustice and structural remedy

Iris Marion Young, Catherine Lu and Alasia Nuti are the three most notable figures who have contributed to the development of structural injustice approach, due to their development of comprehensive frameworks. Instead of introducing the structural injustice approach based on the individual authors, I will introduce the approach thematically. I will focus on three core concepts that constitute the basis of the structural injustice approach: (1) social structures, (2) injustice and (3) remedy.

2.2.1. Social structures

This subsection explains the concept of social structures. Social structure is an overarching term that takes in numerous aspects that constitute a society. However, social structures, as established by the existing literature on the structural injustice approach, specifically refer to social processes that are produced and maintained by individuals' actions. They constitute material or immaterial background conditions within which individuals lead their daily lives and which shape individuals' lives by either constraining or enabling their prospective choices, by mitigating their interactions with other individuals, and by placing them in specific social positions in relation to others.

2.2.1.1. Objective social facts

The first way to understand social structures is to look at how they make up the world we inhabit in both material and non-material ways. Our lives take place in certain environments made up of roads or buildings. Not only that, our lives are also situated within specific contexts, customs or rules. When individuals go about their everyday lives and projects, they are situated within specific material and immaterial objective social facts.

One part of these objective social facts is made up of social structures. Some of these objective social facts enable, and constrain, thousands of individuals' lives, by shaping their mundane material and immaterial conditions. In short, objective social facts may, in part, constitute social structures.

On the one hand objective social facts, which make up social structures, may be material. For instance, sets of steps are a part of social structures because they constitute the material condition of our lives. In specific terms, a set of steps enables an able-bodied individual to enter to a building, while preventing a wheelchair user from doing the same.

Another example of such material social structures is signage. In buildings, signage indicating directions is usually provided in the official languages of the region. This signage enables speakers of specific languages to navigate their way through the building, while constraining non-speakers from doing so.

On the other hand, objective social facts that constitute a part of social structures may be immaterial. For instance, norms, rules, customs, conventions, or laws that people either implicitly or explicitly follow constitute references to immaterial objective social facts of that type (Young, 2011, p. 55). For instance, due to gender norms that are prevalent in Western societies that people either implicitly or explicitly follow, certain life-choices that are stereotypically conceived to be "feminine" (such as wearing a skirt) appear more accessible to individuals who identify as female, while the same choices do not appear as accessible for individuals who identify as male (Young, 1980). Another example of immaterial objective social facts of this type exists in the form of the linguistic norms that we follow, e.g., a linguistic norm to speak in English in multilingual contexts.

Social structures of this type determine the scope of potential life-choices that individuals may make as they go about their business in their everyday lives. The things that are possible for us in life are presented to us differently depending on which social facts we encounter. These material and immaterial objective social facts often result from a sedimentation of cultural preferences, policies, exclusionary ideologies or hegemonies (Young, 2011, p. 54). Material objective social facts are made up of "physical imprints on our surrounding world that result from many persons' deeds and decisions over time" (Nuti, 2019, p. 33). Immaterial objective social facts are also a sedimentation of customs that have been perpetuated over generations. Unlike material social facts, immaterial social facts channel individuals' choices "indirectly and cumulatively as blocking possibilities," and do "not constrain in the form of a direct coercion of some individual over others" (Young, 2011, p. 55).

In most cases, the existing literature discusses examples of objective social facts that enable or constrain individuals in an unequal manner. However, there may be objective social facts that influence individuals in positive ways. For instance, it may be true that many contexts within society are shaped by the binary gender norms, which situate individuals in either one of two gendered categories (e.g., binary public toilets). In contrast, there may also be material and immaterial social objective facts that assert non-binary norms (e.g., neutral public toilets), thereby achieving more equal and constructive enabling of individuals' choices. Despite the diverse effects of social structures, most of the scholarly debates have been devoted to objectionable or unjust social structures. In the section 2.2.3., I will discuss the importance of conceptualizing constructive social structures, which counterbalances objectionable or unjust social structures, which is a perspective that is underdeveloped in the existing literature.

2.2.1.2. Social positions

Social structures also refer to the way individuals are positioned within society. Social positions refer to the way individuals are, more often than not, categorized into specific groups in our societies, typically based on their class, race, gender, class, ability, etc., in other words, on the basis of unchosen membership of a social group. These categories situate individuals in specific social positions, determining individuals' access to resources, social support, or relations.

Social positions, in which individuals are categorized into certain groups, often provide a macro-level perspective into individuals' relations to others. An example is class-based privilege. In India, for example, the privilege of the Brahmin caste (upper caste) cannot be fully grasped if their privilege is not compared to the marginalization experienced by Dalits (the lowest caste). Depending on one's social positions, individuals end up in hierarchal relations with others, e.g., Brahmins end up as the higher strata of society enjoying access to socio-economic opportunities such as stable housing, well paid jobs, or professional connections,

whereas Dalits often face societal marginalization by being reserved to socio-economic opportunities often accompanied by low wage, little welfare, or precarious job contracts.

Moreover, social positions also filter individuals' everyday experiences by providing contexts in which their experiences gain relative significance. Because the typical wages that Dalits earn is juxtaposed against what Brahmins earn, Dalits may be explained as being situated in lower strata of the social hierarchy compared to Brahmins.

Furthermore, social positions illustrate how social structures are both relative and persistent in character. Social positions, such as the caste system, which lasted for centuries illustrate how "structural inequalities […] are far-reaching in their implications for people's life courses […] persist over time, often over generations" (Young, 2011, p. 57).

2.2.1.3. Action-dependence and unintended consequences

There are two remaining aspects that constitute social structures. Firstly, social structures are always the result of action, i.e., they are action-dependent. An example that may illustrate this aspect is habit. A common habit displayed by individuals, such as taking a car to get to a place instead of taking a train, may end up constituting a part of social structures. As much as habits are the result of actions taken by individuals that simultaneously shape the individuals to produce them, social structures are the result of actions taken by individuals that shape the individuals who produce them.

Social structures, in other words, produce and intervene in an individual's social facts and relations while the individual's own actions perpetuate those structures. This aspect illustrates the fraught tension that exists between social structure and agency, in which structures are recursive, but possess the innate possibility to change. Structures, as Young argues, are "produced only in action without being reduced to action in their description, and

[…] persons act in relation to their knowledge of structures" (2011, p. 60). The concept Young relies on to illustrate this idea of structure is that of routine or habit.

The fourth aspect of social structures is that they may have unintended consequences. Furthermore, these accumulated outcomes are often not intended by any of the individuals who participate in social structures. Social structures, collectively produced by thousands of individuals, result in "[m]any large-scale social processes in which masses of individuals believe they are following the rules, minding their own business, and trying to accomplish their legitimate goals" (Young, 2011, p. 63).

Consider the following hypothetical scenario, which aims to capture the four aspects of social structures referred to above:

There is a village called Wet Village. The village is divided in half by a large river. On the one side of the river, there are farmers' houses and, on the other side, there are farmers' fields. The two parts of the village are connected by a bridge. Now, in this village, there are two groups of people: those who live on the ground and those who live in houses that are suspended from the bridge. Farmers use this bridge daily, as they need to go to work. So do other random pedestrians who must pass through the village. The problem is that the construction that holds the house sinks by 0.0000000001mm to the river every time a person uses the bridge, due to wear and tear. Everyone knows that there are houses tethered to the bridge, in which people reside. However, people are unaware exactly how much bridge houses



sink nearer to water every single time they use the bridge.

Consider the layout of the villager as well as the villagers' norm of using the bridge. The former is a type of material objective social fact, while the latter is a type of immaterial objective social fact. These social facts were created, maintained, or reproduced by villagers' actions. Furthermore, both seem to form part of social structures, which either enable or constrain villagers' everyday choices. Lastly, their actions divide the villagers in two groups of people. One group is those who live on the ground and the other group is those who live under the bridge. These two groups occupy a different level of privilege and disadvantage in terms of their living situations, placing them in unequal social positions, i.e., unequal enjoyment of safe housing.

Now, imagine that at a certain moment, the bridge houses submerge under the water and people who live under the bridge drown. In other words, the social structures, produced and reproduced by villagers' choices, resulted in an unintended consequence that are harmful, i.e., the death of the villagers who live in bridge houses. The death of these people shows how social structures may result in unintended consequences as a result of indirect, collective, and cumulative actions of numerous individuals (Young, 2011, p. 96). I will return to this aspect below, where I will expand on the concept of injustice employed by the structural injustice approach in the next subsection.

For now, I will conclude by drawing attention to two aspects that are highlighted by the concept of social structures employed by the structural injustice approach. Firstly, the structural injustice approach focuses on social facts, relations and positions. Social structures include habits, norms, practices or ideologies that may be produced by individuals' actions, which constitute a part of social facts, relations and positions. Secondly, the structural injustice approach focuses on social structures that result in consequences at a collective level, either

they be intended or unintended.

2.2.1. Injustice

An important contribution of the structural injustice approach consists of exposing so-called structural injustice. It detects harmful consequences that arise from the accumulation of thousands of people's everyday, innocent and norm-abiding actions. Some of these consequences constitute a specific type of injustice, i.e., structural injustice. To this end, the structural injustice approach subjects the social structures to normative scrutiny.

In order to explain the idea of structural injustice, it is important to begin with the traditional approach toward injustice, i.e., the interactional approach. The interactional approach identifies injustices as wrongs, harms or injuries committed during interactions between moral agents. In contrast, structural injustice identifies objectionable or unjust social processes that may place groups of people in unequal social positions. In short, the structural injustice approach begins by identifying certain social structures as objectionable, due to the fact that they place groups of individuals in unequal positions of privilege and disadvantage, which is something that an interactional approach to injustice is unable to pick out. By doing so, the structural injustice approach brings a novel and complementary perspective to the understanding of injustice. I will explain each approach in more detail below.

2.2.2.1. Interactional approach to injustice

In *Responsibility for Justice*, Young distinguishes between two models of moral responsibility: the liability model and the social connection model (2011, p. 96). The first model, the liability model, is often assumed in legal reasoning to assign responsibility to moral actors. It is also the framework that endorses an interactional approach to injustice. The second model, the social connection model, is what Young develops in order to articulate her idea of structural injustice.

In this subsection, I will introduce the liability model, as a means of understanding the interactional approach to injustice.

Young argues that the liability model requires three conditions: (1) autonomous agents, (2) interactions among moral agents and (3) epistemic competence of moral agents (2011, p. 97).[5] The first condition requires a moral agent to be autonomous for them to be able to assume any moral responsibility. That is, a moral agent may be exempted from bearing moral responsibility – in this case, the burden of liability – for actions that it may have committed if it was non-voluntary. Imagine that an individual is held at gunpoint to commit certain injurious actions against its will. In this case, the condition of autonomy will exculpate this wrongdoer from bearing the liability. The second condition requires that an interaction must exist between one moral actor to another, so that there is a clear causal relation between the two parties. The purpose of this is to ensure that, if a moral agent were to be held responsible, it must be the direct cause of certain outcomes. The third condition concerns whether the moral agent is epistemically competent. For instance, if a moral agent had no access to epistemic resources and evidence that would allow them to develop the capacity to make critical epistemic judgements and thereby can be regarded as being excusably ignorant, it may be exculpated from the burden of moral responsibility.

Based on Young's concept of the liability model, Catherine Lu conceptualizes interactional injustice as follows: during an interaction among moral actors, one moral actor

[5] This requirements mirror the agent-responsibility condition, which is often assumed as the three conditions of liability: 1) moral agents are able to act autonomously, 2) moral agents cause an injustice, and 3) moral agents hold the correct belief that its action would lead to the outcome it caused (Wündisch, 2017, p. 841).

voluntarily causes outcomes that were wrongful, harmful or injurious to another moral actor (Lu, 2017, p. 19). Lu specifies two characteristics of interactional injustice. Firstly, injustice is considered to occur as a part of an interaction between individuals, in which one mistreats, wrongs, harms, or injures another (Lu, 2017, p. 33). This means that an injustice must be traced back to specific actions, conducted by specific perpetrators. Furthermore, moral actors are often clearly bifurcated into two parties: one party who suffers injuries or losses as a result of the wrong and another party who draws benefits. Many kinds of moral agents can commit an interactional injustice, such as individuals, group, corporates, collectives, or, states, either as sole agents or as members of groups who share joint intentions (Lu, 2017, p. 34).

As Young argues, the interactional approach has been the typical perspective that was assumed in areas such as legal theory. While laying out the fundamental characteristics of corrective justice, for instance, Jules Coleman conceptualizes injustice in an interactional way, i.e., as an incident by means of which wrongful gains or losses are originated. Consequently, Coleman conceives corrective justice as an annulment of wrongful gains or losses, as a response to an injustice that has already occurred, as a concept that entails transactional measures to annul unjustifiable and deleterious disruption of distributive pattern (Coleman, 1991).

Likewise, Ernest Weinrib conceptualizes an injustice in an interactional way, as an occurrence that violates the equal relations that once existed between the injurer and the injured (Weinrib, 2012, p. 9). Otherwise normal relationship is transformed into a correlative relationship, in which the injurer and the injured become causally linked through injustice. In other words, the normatively significant relationship justifies the imposition of corrective justice. In specific terms, relationship-centered interactional corrective justice offers remedies to move moral agents “from one pole of the relationship to another, so that, to the extent

possible, the relationship ends up as free of injustice as it was at the beginning" (Weinrib, 2012, p. 88).

The concept of interactional injustice was predominantly used to analyze historic injustices, political catastrophes, or social justice issues (for information concerning the application of interactional injustice in the context of reparative justice, see Butt, 2009; Miller, 2007). The interactional approach to injustice, however, does not cover all kinds of injustices that occur in the actual world. Let us recall, for example, the hypothetical scenario of the Wet Village as set out above. We had imagined that numerous villagers' continuous use of the bridge ultimately led to the death of the people who lived under the bridge in bridge houses.

Imagine, now, that we apply the interactional approach in order to analyze this scenario. It is difficult to pinpoint which act has caused the people to drown and which moral agents are responsible for the people's death. Firstly, we may hold all pedestrians who used the bridge culpable for the people's death. However, this seems quite disproportionate an accusation. Firstly, the impact that each pedestrian has enacted upon the bridge house does not constitute a harm, since the effects they have caused are trivial and reasonable. It is impossible to identify a harm in each individual's choice to walk across the bridge. Not only were their actions harmless, but it could also be argued that farmers were expected to cross the bridge in order to go to work. Secondly, surely some villagers used the bridge more frequently than one-time passengers. Condemning all users to the same responsibility may seem unfair.

Secondly, we may attempt to trace a strict causal relationship between the last pedestrian to use the bridge and the bridge houses submerging under water. This would also be an unfair accusation. The effect that this pedestrian had on the bridge house is too small to be counted as a harm. The submerging of the bridge house only occurred due to an accumulation caused by numerous individuals' repeated use of the bridge. Therefore, holding one person accountable would be an unfair call.

Thirdly, we may hold that there are simply no culpable perpetrators as far as the death of the family living in the bridge house is concerned. We may blame the circumstances that resulted in the houses being built in such a precarious way, that the bridge was incorrectly constructed, or that it is the people's fault for choosing such an unusual place in which to live. The point would be that this occurrence is not an injustice, just a lamentable happenstance. But, what if we change our hypothetical case and imagine that half of the village population lived in bridge houses? What if numerous individuals who were living in such precarious living conditions all died? Should we continue to assume the interactional approach and assume that there is no injustice?

No. To reach that conclusion after a serious harm at a collective level seems to be morally abhorrent. Focusing exclusively on interactional injustice should be critically appraised, in order to broaden the scope of its analysis. In short, we should be able to say that some injustice had occurred, although not in the interactional way.

The concept of structural justice was developed in order to supplement this narrow conception of injustice. Going beyond the interactional injustice approach, the structural injustice approach argues that the people's drowning surely constitutes an injustice, because their death was enabled by numerous individuals' actions that placed them at a higher risk of death while not placing others at the same type of risk. Let us take a look at the concept of structural injustice in more detail.

2.2.2.2. Structural injustice

In our actual world, many currently manifest injustices are impossible to understand on the basis of the presence of interactions among specific moral agents or based on specific actions that cause wrongs, harms or injuries. So many of social justice issues arise due to accumulation of individuals' actions, which themselves did not cause harm, but enabled serious harms at a

collective level. Interestingly, these injustices are also beset by the problem that moral actors find themselves in the condition of ignorance, where they have difficulties understanding how their actions enable harms.

Consider the following hypothetical scenario, which builds on the Wet Village scenario I introduced above. Imagine that there is another village called Dry Village, 100,000 km away from Wet Village. Let us add that Wet Village often suffers flooding, due to the way that the river passes through the middle of the village, thereby increasing the risk of death in the case of the people who live under the bridge. In Dry Village, in contrast, there is no flood. Now, imagine the following:

> People who live in the Dry Village happen to live in one big building. This building has an elevator and a staircase. Every single time villagers use the elevator in this building, the chances of a flood occurring in Wet Village increases infinitesimally. In contrast, nothing happens when Dry Village people use the staircase. People who live in Dry Village know that in Wet Village, there are houses under the bridge that may be irreparably damaged if flood occurs. Furthermore, people who live in Dry Village know that their use of the elevator is somehow linked to the increasing frequency of floods in Wet Village, which may threaten the people who live in the bridge houses even further. Their knowledge is vague, however, and they cannot really prove it nor illustrate a clear causal link. Moreover, they also know that there is a myriad of other reasons that may threaten the people who live in the bridge houses, such as the wear and tear suffered by the construction that connects the bridge and the houses (as illustrated in the previous hypothetical scenario). Now, the inhabitants of Dry Village must work every day, to the point of physical exhaustion. Accordingly, from time to time, they choose to take the elevator rather than to walk up the stairs. After years of using the elevator,

Wet Village floods and the people who live under the bridge die.

This hypothetical scenario aims to illustrate three things. Firstly, there are there are no direct interactions among two villagers. The connection between these two groups of people is the fact that they participate in the production of shared material and immaterial objective social facts. These villagers' daily actions – the Wet Villagers using the bridge to go to work and the Dry Villagers using the elevator when they are tired – result in social processes. Villagers are share a connection based on their participation of same social structures.

Secondly, the villagers' actions produce and reproduce a hierarchal relation among individuals, placing Dry Villagers in positions of privilege and placing Wet Villagers in positions of disadvantage in terms of living conditions. On the one hand, Dry Villagers enjoy the privilege of safety, not facing the threat of floods. On the other hand, Wet Villagers face the threat of flood, especially those who live under the bridge.

Lastly, the group that are placed in disadvantageous position faces serious harms. The hierarchal social processes, which were produced by thousands of individuals' daily actions, enables Wet Villagers, especially those who live under the bridge, to drown.

The concept of structural injustice aims to demonstrate that the deaths of the people who live under the bridge is a type of injustice. Structural injustice refers to a situation in which individuals' banal actions produce and reproduce social structures in which privilege and disadvantage groups differently, and which, on a collective level, place certain groups of people in positions of privilege while other groups of people are placed in positions characterized by potential exclusion, domination, subjugation and violence (Young, 2011, p. 62-63).

The structural injustice approach argues that an injustice may occur even in the absence of responsible moral agents who commit certain actions that directly cause the injustice. Instead of focusing on specific actions, it urges us to scrutinize individuals' actions that are innocent,

yet nonetheless result in unintended consequences on a collective level. Furthermore, the structural injustice approach aims to reflect on individuals' actions that we assume to be normal, in order to identify which of them enable a hierarchy between groups of people that favors certain groups of people over other groups of people. While such actions may not be morally abhorrent or legally punishable, it can be argued that they are enabling objectionable social structures. Upon identifying objectionable social structures, the structural injustice approach argues for the need for structural remedies to be carried out by responsible moral agents.

Furthermore, there is an epistemic barrier. The villagers cannot clearly illustrate how their daily actions enable deaths of the people who live under the bridge. They are aware that there is a connection, however, to which degree each individual's action has contributed to their deaths is difficult to pinpoint. The only thing the villagers may agree with certainty is that each villager's contribution to the difference in privilege and disadvantage is trivial, almost unnoticeable. Yet, because thousands of individuals' actions accumulate over lengthy period of time, they have contributed to the deaths of people who live under the bridge.

In short, structural injustice invites the application of moral scrutiny to our daily actions (such as beliefs, habits, norms, or practices) in order to induce change so that they do not enable injustices.

2.2.2.3. Historical-structural injustice

The uniqueness of the structural injustice approach not only lies in its exposure of thousands of individuals' everyday actions that have unintended consequences on a collective level, but it also lies in the way individuals' everyday actions perpetuate the history of injustices over time. The structural injustice approach, shortly put, identifies two types of social structures: (1) *objectionable* social structures illustrated in the previous section and (2) *unjust* social structures that perpetuate historical injustices. In this subsection, we focus on the latter.

It is important to illustrate, first and foremost, that social structures are conceptually distinct from short-lasting incidents. Social structures are considered to be long-lasting. By drawing attention to two conceptualizations of time, based on the German conceptual historian Reinhart Koselleck, Alasia Nuti distinguishes between "events" and "long-term structures" (2019, p. 23). She argues that only one temporal extension, i.e., events, is implicitly assumed in interactional injustice, to be an occurrence that is confined within determinate moments with a clear beginning and end. In contrast, the structural injustice approach assumes long-term structures, which may continue to endure even when injurious interactions have ceased to exist.

In order to illustrate how this assumption of temporal longevity of social structures impact upon our understanding of injustice, let us consider Nuti's criticism of the interactional approach toward injustice. Because the interactional approach toward injustices always assumes the occurrence of certain actions, which causes harms, wrongs, or injuries, injustices are conceptualized as having a clear beginning and an end.

However, many cases of atrocious injustices illustrate that injustices cast a long shadow. Consider colonial injustices, which do not seem to come to an immediate halt, once formerly colonized countries declare their independence. In certain cases, injustices can more effectively be conceptualized as phenomena that endure and outlive a chronological sequence of determinate moments.

The structural injustice approach illustrates that one of the ways historical injustices may endure is due to thousands of individuals' daily actions, which are considered to be normal and banal, that, in fact, originate from historical injustices. For instance, consider how people often assume racial stereotypes, i.e., associate other individuals with specific, determinate features or characteristics based on their perceived racial identity (Nuti, 2019, p. 36). Nuti argues that certain types of racial stereotypes stem from historical injustices.

Myriad of examples of racial stereotypes could be found, ranging from positive to negative associations. On the one hand, racial stereotypes are banal. Unlike racial discrimination, where people explicitly engage with detrimental racial stereotypes when making certain decisions so that negative consequences are drawn (e.g., when building personal networks, during hiring processes, etc.), some racial stereotypes constitute a part of our daily lives as somewhat banal and mundane facts. For instance, within the context of the US, Asian Americans are often associated with the idea of "model minority," as "Whiz kids" who excel at education and social advancement (Yee, 1992).

On the other hand, there are clearly harmful racial stereotypes are should be subject to normative scrutiny, as one of the leading factors that contribute to racial discrimination For instance, consider the association of blackness with idleness. Upon reflection, we realize that this racial stereotype has its roots in slavery and racial segregation in the US (Nuti, 2019, p. 43). After the abolition of slavery, laws called "the black codes" were implemented, which specifically targeted blacks by criminalizing certain actions, such as idleness, only if the person in question was black (Nuti, 2019, p. 36).[6] In short, the association of African Americans with idleness began with the abolition of slavery, in order to justify criminalization of blacks. This racial stereotype is being reproduced today, albeit in a different form. For instance, consider

[6] An example is the Mississippi vagrant law, one of the infamous black codes. It states that "idle and dissipated persons … shall be deemed and considered vagrants, under the provisions of this act, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars, with all accruing costs, and be imprisoned at the discretion of the court, not exceeding ten days."(Mississippi Black Codes, 2010). The black codes consisted of legislation that were used as ammunitions by whites in order to criminalize free blacks and ultimately force them back to unpaid labor as punishment.

the fatal police shootings of black people in the US. The wide-spread association of African Americans with criminality may be connected to historical injustices, such as the implementation of the Black Codes that criminalized the normal and lawful behaviors of African Americans.

The structural injustice approach illustrates that such racial stereotypes, which may have connections to the history of injustice, are reproduced right through to the present because of individuals' everyday reproduction of racial stereotypes. In other words, our seemingly banal actions are a part of enduring social structures that has roots in historical injustices.

This example of racial stereotypes illustrates that there may be two types of social structures that the structural injustice approach may identify: (1) objectionable social structures that arise from innocent actions that are not related to historical injustices and (2) unjust social structures that arise from seemingly banal actions that reproduce historical injustices.

If presently manifest unjust social structures may be linked to historical injustices, whereby both in historical injustice and current social structures place similar groups of people in vulnerable positions, then this connection reveals a distinct type of structural injustice, i.e., a historical-structural injustice (Nuti, 2019, p. 52). Unlike structural injustice that has no roots in the past history of injustices, historical-structural injustices present us with systemic marginalization, domination or violence that is applied to specific groups of people and is more deeply entrenched in our social structures.

Thus far, I have explained two specific perspectives that the structural injustice approach provides: (1) individuals' innocent actions that are innocent but nonetheless could lead to serious harms on a collective level, which results in structural injustice and (2) individuals' seemingly banal actions that reproduce past injustices, which results in historical-structural injustice.

This distinction illustrates that there is a difference in normative weight between objective social structures and unjust social structures. We may endow distinct normative significance to the connection that exists between the daily actions we rehearse today to the history of injustices. For instance, the normative weight of unjust social structures that have connection to historical injustice, which place certain groups of individuals in positions vulnerable to exploitation, domination, or violence, may be considered to be heavier than objectionable social structures without any connection to historical injustices. This is because the former groups of people are structurally marginalized for a lengthier period of time. In short, structural injustice and historical-structural injustice will demand a different type of remedy compared to the structural injustice that does not have any connection to the past injustice.

2.2.2. Developing a concept of constructive social structures

Having outlined the state of the art, I briefly wish to turn to a critical remark regarding social structures and structural injustice, before discussing remedy. My argument is that the literature mostly focuses on conceptualizing *objectionable* or *unjust* social structures, that is, social structures that have deleterious effects. Objectionable social structures, as a concept, successfully identify and problematize how seemingly innocent habits, norms or practices of well-meaning individuals may nonetheless commit gross injustices on a collective level. However, I argue that the analysis should go beyond the focus on objectionable social structures and uncover constructive social structures.

Constructive social structures refer to individuals' norm-resisting practices that aim to resist objectionable social structures. I would emphasize that uncovering constructive social structures may reveal experiences of marginalized individuals that we want to reproduce in the present. On the contrary, if we only focus on objectionable social structures, theories of social structures may exclude the creative ways in which structurally marginalized individuals have

fought against social structures that place them in marginalized positions and may therefore perpetuate victimizing narratives of marginalized groups.

In order to develop the concept of constructive social structures, I would like to put forward a novel analytic distinction of social structures. Social structures may be 1) *option-providing* by virtue of allowing possibilities that condition individuals' context of choice, 2) *option-abiding* in a sense that they reproduce the aforementioned possibilities that have already been produced, and 3) *option-developing* in a sense that they develop and change the possibilities that have already been produced. (Option-eradicating social structures may also exist, however, as this indicates that certain social structures will cease to exist, but I do not intend to consider those here, as I intend to focus on presently manifest social structures.)

These distinctions are not meant to be mutually exclusive, but only to distinguish different paths they pave by configuring the different possibilities available to individuals, thereby placing them in specific positions. Based on this distinction, I will argue that as much as there could be social structures that are objectionable or unjust, there could also be social structures that are constructive. As individuals go about their business, they may produce and reproduce habits, customs, practices, norms or institutions that resist and counteract objectionable social structures that enable structural injustices. By utilizing my analytical distinction, I will argue that social structures do include changes and that a part of those changes intend to make things better.

First of all, social structures may be option-providing because they create and produce new possibilities that individuals may (or may not) choose. Iris Marion Young compellingly describes structures as being analogous to "channels," which condition individuals by "guiding and constraining them in certain directions, but not disabling their flow" (2011, p. 53). As channels provide the option that enables water to flow in certain directions while also preventing it from flowing elsewhere, social structures analogously provide the condition in

which individuals find themselves to be confronted with socially salient options. That is, social structures are those that cause a person P to view options A and B as the salient options available. What I would emphasize here is the fact that social structures are precisely those that create options A and B to appear to P as viable. In other words, social structures are those that frame P's choice *as if* it is limited to those two options. As Nuti wrote, "structures should be regarded as *providing* 'rules and resources' for agents to orientate their actions in the world" (2019, p. 34, emphasis added).

Secondly, social structures may be option-abiding because they reinforce and entrench the possibilities already rendered salient by option-providing social structures. Here, it is important to note that social structures are not entities or states that exist independently from individuals. Rather, social structures are processes that are produced and reproduced "only in the action and interaction of persons" (Young, 2010, p. 95). Social structures are reproduced by individuals who intentionally or unintentionally reenact them while pursuing their own projects (Young, 2011, p. 62). That is, the options that were provided by past individuals' actions are reproduced by individuals' daily actions today.

Thirdly, social structures constantly change while they are being reproduced, thereby providing alternative possibilities. This aspect illustrates the fraught tension that exists between social structures and agency, in which structures are recursive, but possess the innate ability to change. Structures, as mentioned above, are "produced only in action without being reduced to action" (Young, 2011, p. 60). The dependency upon individuals' actions also provides the scope for structures to change over time. To be clear, structures do not persist over time as if they are simply inherited, that is, if the past generation leaves a legacy behind that the future generation passively receives. Changes of structures resemble parodies: structures are reproduced and reactivated in the present, while infused with change. Structures exist, in other words, through the dynamic interaction between change and endurance.



I argue that the difference between objectionable (or unjust) and constructive social structures becomes apparent when we focus on option-developing social structures. Let us recall our distinction between structural injustice and historical-structural injustice. The latter, historical-structural injustice, referred to a specific type of structural injustice, which was enabled by unjust social structures that reproduced, with few changes, habits, norms, or practices that were implemented due to historical injustices.

Here, I argue that historical injustice constitutes a period where option-providing social structures arise. Then, historical-structural injustices are sustained by option-abiding objectionable social structures, which reproduce the option-providing social structures that originate from historical injustice. I argue that we can, moreover should, also identify option-developing social structures, which refer to the type of social structures that arose thanks to individuals' venerable efforts to resist, combat and counteract option-providing social structures induced by historical injustices. In short, as much as there are option-abiding social structures that reproduce injustices, there are option-developing social structures that are created as a result of venerable resistance against the said past injustices.

I suggest that uncovering constructive social structures is important as a means of understanding suitable remedies for structural injustices for two reasons. First, constructive social structures will uncover specific ideas for structural remedies, informed by the individuals who are often marginalized by structural injustices. Their perspectival privileges, i.e., their immense epistemological insight, knowledge, and access, will strongly inform the decision for

structural remedies (Young, 2000, p.136). Second, by conceptualizing structural remedies based on constructive option-providing social structures, structural remedies will either draw on pre-existing practices or consist of enhancing the support for pre-existing practices. This may allow the fluid and gradual induction of structural change.

In Chapter 3 and 4, I aim to illustrate how analytic distinctions of social structures and structural injustices may be utilized. For now, my only aim was to introduce the framework, so that I may apply the framework to my principal subject matter (i.e., language loss). Before doing so, however, I will turn to issues pertaining to remedies for structural injustice.

2.2.3. Responsibilities and structural remedies

In this subsection, I will discuss the importance of remedying objectionable social structures so that structural injustices may no longer be enabled. Because the structural injustice approach assumes that the everyday actions of thousands of individuals produce and reproduce social structures, thereby perpetuating past injustices into the present, history has an important normative significance in assigning responsibility for remedy.

In order to introduce the idea of structural remedy and responsibility, I will introduce how responsibility is differently assigned, based on the normative significance of history. Depending on the normative significance assigned to history, responsibility will either be backward-looking or forward-looking in its orientation. On the one hand, backward-looking approaches assume that an injustice, once committed, should be rectified. Likewise, the present generation has obligations to rectify historical injustices today. On the other hand, forward-looking approaches take historical injustices to be relevant as long as they help improve the present relations or reduce present inequalities.

The first way in which the structural injustice approach looks to history is for its *diagnostic* benefits. Structural injustices arise from objectionable social structures, such as

rules, norms, and conventions of communities and institutions that we habitually enact (Young, 2011, p. 107). Due to the fact that the everyday and norm-abiding actions of individuals produce and reproduce social structures that conspire to structural injustices, we face difficulties in realizing why these structures are objectionable. Furthermore, because structural injustices are usually caused by an accumulation of myriad individuals' actions, it is impossible to identify which of those actions are the ones causing collective harms.

To counter these difficulties in identifying which social structures conspire to cause injustices and which phenomena are structural injustices, we may examine the past. This helps us understand historical injustices that relate to atrocious events that occurred in the past and are decried in the present. Historical injustices of that type are either reproduced into the present as a form of historical-structural injustice, or, they provide us with an epistemic access that allows us to deepen our understanding of structural injustices that manifest themselves in the present and what constitutes structural injustices. It does not, however, include a normative consideration. Historical injustice has a *diagnostic role* because understanding social structures that manifest themselves in the present through the lens of historical injustices can reveal why some conspire to bring about structural injustices that have roots in past injustice.

In contrast, the second role of historical injustice is the *prescriptive role*. Consider Lea Ypi (2017), who argues in a forward-looking way that historically focused claims such as attachment-based claims do not have a normative force in deciding what justice demands. Imagine that a law that bans hunting threatened species has been implemented in Canada, effectively banning both fox hunting by aristocrats and seal hunting carried out by Canadian Inuits. Ypi argues that structurally marginalized groups may be exempted from this ban as we have a present obligation to decrease structural disadvantage. An exemption may be required to correct those structural disadvantages (Ypi, 2017, p. 17). However, if there are other "special

claims [that] are plausibly made on grounds of forward-looking aspirations" that resist structural injustices, they may be granted, in lieu of an exemption (Ypi, 2017, p. 12).

My interpretation of Ypi's analysis is that when assigning remedies to structural injustice that manifests itself today, we should still remain attentive to historical injustices. Historical injustices play a prescriptive role when deciding forward-looking structural remedies. In short, historical injustice functions as an indicator of groups who may be provided with special treatment. Historical injustice therefore matters because it helps us understand what we should do as a matter of justice. The prescriptive role of historical injustice remains highly forward-looking, since historical injustice plays no role in justifying the remedies.

These two roles of historical injustice are forward-looking, taking historical injustices to be relevant as long as they help improve relations in the present or lessen present inequalities. This orientation of justice assigns to moral agents a type of responsibility called political responsibility, which is a responsibility to reform or abolish unjust social structures that all members of a society must bear by virtue of their participation in the social structures that enable structural injustice (Young, 2011, p. 180). Furthermore, members share solidarity with other members – a sense of hope that their communal social institutions and practices could be improved. In short, members of a society have a duty "not to be indifferent to the fate of others and the danger that states and other organized institutions often pose to some people" (Young, 2011, p. 92).

Moral agents with political responsibility bear the burden of organizing collective actions to foster social change for the better (Young, 2011, p. 120). While all members share the same political responsibility, honoring that responsibility may differ from person to person depending on their positions within social structures. Depending on a person's social structural position, their capacities to work towards change will differ. Structurally marginalized individuals have less capacity to induce change, while structurally privileged individuals, in

contrast, have greater capacities to induce change. Moreover, more is expected of structurally privileged individuals than from those who are relatively disadvantaged (Young, 2011, p. 180). This does not mean, however, that individuals' capacities or privileges change the type of responsibility they may have to bear. The responsibility remains the same – all share political responsibility to induce change for a better future. However, the type of actions that must be carried out in order to fulfil the political responsibility may differ from person to person.

Other theorists, however, have demanded a more backward-looking orientation in the case of the structural injustice approach. For instance, Catherine Lu highlights the importance of the past for extending the scope of individual responsibility for structural remedy. Lu argues that if politically responsible moral actors fail to organize and carry out structural remedies, they become liable to become derelict in fulfilling their political responsibility and offering additional compensations (2017, p. 156). Therefore, it seems to me that Lu's structural injustice approach includes a new remedial responsibility, in which backward-looking dimensions may be prescribed according to a recent past – a record of whether there was any failure of obligations. Compare Lu's view to Young, who claims that by realizing that "current structural injustices have some roots in past injustice," we can apply "additional weight to moral arguments for remedying these current injustices" (2017, p. 182). These two thinkers indicate the possibility of adopting a backward-looking structural injustice approach, but only in a minimal sense, in which historical injustice adds additional obligations (or an additional motivational element underlying those obligations) that we bear today.

Going a step further, Nuti demands that a structural injustice approach must incorporate a stronger backward-looking dimension, especially as a response to the type of structural injustices that have connections to historical injustices (2019, Chapters 8 and 9). Especially, historical-structural injustices have compounding effects, in which past injustices are

reproduced into the present. Accordingly, the responsibility to remedy such injustices should be specified in both forward- and backward-orientations.

With the specific aim of spelling out backward-looking responsibility, Nuti argues that the obligations with regard to past injustices should not end with the death of perpetrators and victims. Such injustices may persist, especially in the case of powerful corporate agents such as the state, which possess "significant power to influence structural processes but [that] instead have sustained unjust structures or failed to intervene to address them" (Nuti, 2019, p. 160). They must therefore provide reparation for past injustices.

Furthermore, Nuti argues that powerful agents such as the state have a *structural debt* to pay. They must not only provide reparation but also compensation for the way in which their "pattern of enablement or negligence has contributed to the new reproduction of unjust history over time" (Nuti, 2019, p. 160). Here, Nuti identifies an original role played by history: *a justificatory role* that increases the level of accountability that powerful agents must face. Nuti also argues the importance of developing counter-historical institutional justifications as a structural remedy, which refers to "discourses and narratives that directly question our institutional set-up in connection with unjust histories" (2019, p. 171).

Before I conclude my introduction to the structural injustice approach, I will specify the foci I aim to adopt by applying the approach to my principal subject matter. As we have seen above, the structural injustice approach characterized by Young makes use of a forward-looking conception of responsibility. This wholly forward-looking orientation has been critically revised by Lu and Nuti, who have illustrated two ways in which the structural injustice approach may assign backward-looking responsibility.

Going beyond the discussion of temporal orientations of justice, I aim to broaden the scope of structural remedies by mapping out its epistemic dimensions (see chapter 4). Recall the hypothetical example with the Dry and Wet Villages in which numerous people died due

to villagers' innocent actions, who did not have the knowledge of how their actions result in serious harms. Later, I will illustrate that the moral actors such as those villagers may have a particular responsibility to know which of their actions enable objectionable or unjust social structures, which accompanies their backward- and forward-looking responsibilities for structural remedies. This responsibility to know will be argued to be a type of responsibility for structural remedies, which should be satisfied for the responsible agents to achieve successful structural remedies. This will be elaborated upon in more detail in chapter 4.

2.3. Language and structural injustice

Now that I have provided an extensive introduction to the structural injustice approach, I will apply it to issues relating to language in order to illustrate how the structural injustice approach may provide two original insights to the debate on linguistic justice.

Imagine the following:

> A group of Arabic speakers, conversing loudly, walk into a room in Flanders, in which Dutch speakers are sitting. A Dutch speaker turns to her friend and says, "When in Flanders, they should speak Dutch instead of Arabic." Arabic speakers overhear this.

Now, imagine that I rely on two predominant approaches I introduced in chapter 1 in order to normatively scrutinize this scenario. I would evaluate whether anyone's enjoyment of autonomy or dignity is being violated.

The threatened value of this scenario seems to be particularly relevant for individuals' sense of dignity. It seems intuitive to assume that the Arabic speakers would experience disrespect after overhearing this comment. The pioneer of the dignity argument, Van Parijs,

would argue in Rawlsian fashion, as we have seen in chapter 1, that just social conditions should satisfy all individuals' equal enjoyment of self-respect as one of the primary goods that allow individuals to lead a full life. One may argue that this incident suggests that Arabic speakers may not enjoy equal self-respect due to a hierarchy among Dutch and Arabic speakers in Belgium.

Irrespective of where Van Parijs wants to take his argument, I wish to use his argument in the following manner. Van Parijs would argue that languages that face inferior treatment should receive the institutional support. Furthermore, those languages may even receive even more protection within specific territories in order to relieve issues such as a violation of parity of esteem. This is called the principle of territoriality, which demands certain languages to be promoted and protected within specific territories (2011, Chapter 5).[7] For example, if there is a palpable social hierarchy between Dutch and Arabic speakers, this hierarchy could be remedied by making Arabic into one of the official languages of Belgium. That is, Van Parijs would argue that institutions should recognize and assert the principle of parity of esteem among linguistic groups and provide a social basis for self-respect to mitigate asymmetrical linguistic practices (2011, p. 123). This is because institutions directly shape background conditions in which the actions of individuals take place, hence, regulating them may counterbalance the influence of unfair social contingencies, or of unfair end-results caused by the accumulated actions of individuals, such as the asymmetrical linguistic practices. As Rawls

[7] An actual example of this is the current context of Belgium, in which Dutch is promoted and protected within Flemish territory so that only Dutch speakers' language-related interests may be prioritized above those of French-speakers, insofar as they are in their circumscribed linguistic territories.

argues, major social institutions should play a crucial part in securing this condition of equal self-respect (Rawls, 1999, p. 469).

Let us imagine that, in the spirit of commitment to achieve genuine remedy, the Belgian government actually does decide to carve out a territory where Arabic is promoted and protected by the state.[8] My question is whether these drastic institutional measures, while meaningful, may *fully* solve the issue, namely a systematic hierarchy between two linguistic groups, that is captured by above utterance.

There are reasons to believe that those measures would not be successful. Whether social bases of self-respect are capable of successfully assuring individuals is at least partly dependent on social contexts. Consider Rawls, who argues that social bases of self-respect only work when there is a public recognition – supported and signaled by public officials – of the equal status of all citizens (1999, p. 477). I do not think this stress on the "public recognition" is altogether sufficient. In my opinion, the success of institutional measures, such as the one presented by Van Parijs, depends on other contingent facts. Social bases of self-respect for all linguistic groups, even if the bases are provided on a basis of equality, may not be as impactful in the absence of a shared recognition among citizens that all of their languages are in fact of equal worth.

Such shared recognition, that all Dutch, French, and Arabic speakers are equal citizens of Belgium, is often communicated and established in both public and private senses. Public

[8] Not all who employ Van Parijs' framework, and not even the author himself, argue that Arabic should be recognized as the official language of Belgium. However, to illustrate why we must include other social structures beyond public institutions, I assume that the framework proposed by Van Parijs would mandate this remedy.

recognition may be established by major social institutions.[9] But what is to be said about private recognition, which is dependent on individuals' every day, habitual, and ordinary actions and relations? So far, the dignity framework developed by Van Parijs does not offer much thought with regard to the private dimension, and this weakens the thrust of his argument.[10]

In my view, the alternative structural injustice approach may offer a reliable analytic toolkit to normatively assess the abovementioned scenario. As mentioned above, the structural injustice approach reevaluates two things: (1) the normative significance of individuals' actions, and (2) the normative significance of the resemblance that exists between the past and the present. These two foci may offer an enriching analysis of what the Arabic speakers may undergo in this scenario. Namely, the Dutch speaker's comment is an action that helps

[9] An additional problem is that Arabic speakers may experience distrust, so that even if they do receive public assurance of institutional support, they may not believe that the society is actually willing to provide equality of status between French, Dutch and Arabic. That distrust would be particularly poignant if, as a result of informal practices, Arabic speakers continued to be stigmatized even after the state officials had condemned any stigmatization of linguistic groups. Or, even in the absence of any currently manifest discrimination, there are reasons to think that Arabic speakers' distrust would be reasonable especially if the groups have suffered from a history of injustice (for instance, a history of discrimination against immigrants), even if those injustices are unrelated to language.

[10] This critique may appear rather problematic for anyone who values legal impartiality and the rule of law. However, I am challenging the distinction between private and public, as this distinction may be one of the social structures that can perpetuate linguistic injustices that violate parity of esteem.

reproduce an objectionable social structure. His comment expresses a pejorative attitude towards Arabic, portraying it as out of place within Belgian public life.

The case referred to above is an overt example involving the othering of a language. Now, I want to introduce a more normatively challenging example, i.e., insidious forms of marginalization that occur due to individuals' habitual, routine and everyday actions – seemingly harmless actions – that nonetheless play a crucial role in perpetuating pejorative attitudes towards a language. Let me illustrate my point my revising my abovementioned example involving the Arabic speakers:

> A group of Arabic speakers, conversing loudly, walk into a room where Dutch speakers are sitting. A Dutch speaker turns to her friend and says, "Arabic sounds *interesting*." with a smirk. Arabic speakers do not overhear this comment.

This example clearly is less detrimental than my first version for two reasons. First, Arabic speakers are not harmed. The interaction in which harm could be done (i.e., overhearing) does not take place in the updated scenario. Second, the Dutch speaker's comment is situated too far inside the gray area to call it a wrongdoing. Even if the Dutch speaker had malintent towards Arabic speakers, her comment that she finds Arabic "interesting" seems to pass our moral scrutiny without raising serious concerns. However, this does not mean that the Dutch speaker's comment is without consequences. In fact, it clearly has a structural consequence in a sense that it reproduces the othering treatment toward Arabic, which is one of the pejorative stereotypes that continue to denigrate its value. These harmless, norm-abiding, and everyday actions are normatively important because they may endure, even if institutional measures assert social bases of equal respect by decrying any practices that violate principles of justice.

What I would like to emphasize is that the individual's utterance is, first of all, innocent. It is a type of speech that should be protected by the freedom of speech. It is a rightful speech, even if we were to agree that it is not beyond social criticism due to its morally objectionable nature. Even if the utterance were rightful, I would emphasize the fact that it plays a crucial role in perpetuating and reinforcing social processes. In fact, the Dutch speaker's comment surely plays a very small part in producing and perpetuating prejudice against Arabic speakers, yet, if such actions are taken thousands of times by numerous others, even small actions can then become sufficient to constitute serious harms on a collective level. In short, there will be many people like the Dutch speaker who makes similar comments, which, in the end, will culminate in harm being caused on a collective level.

The structural injustice approach will connect these innocent actions by thousands of individuals to the phenomenon in which certain linguistic groups are placed in disadvantageous positions within society, while other linguistic groups are placed in privileged positions within society. Those linguistic groups that are placed in disadvantaged positions will not only face insidious forms of othering but will suffer other types of serious harm as well. Furthermore, the possible connection between insidious forms of othering treatment of Arabic may be connected to the history of injustices, such as xenophobic treatment of migrants. The structural injustice approach may illustrate the normative significance of such aspects.

This dissertation employs the structural injustice approach in order to illustrate how certain linguistic groups end up in social positions where they are less likely to have access to linguistic resources, such as enjoyment of fundamental interests in language, while other linguistic groups do not face such conditions. While doing so, this dissertation will highlight the role of thousands of individuals' innocent actions and the connection between the past and the present. It aims to go beyond the focus on social institutions. Now that I have introduced two debates, linguistic justice and the structural injustice approach, I will merge them from

now onwards. As a result, I will put forward a concept of structural linguistic injustice. Moreover, I will identify potential structural remedies for structural linguistic injustice.

2.4. Conclusion

This chapter introduced the state of the art of the structural injustice approach. The structural injustice approach was thematically introduced, based on the core concepts that constitute the approach: social structures, injustice and remedy. I offered an original analysis of social structures, namely, that we should further explore its constructive dimension. I demonstrated that the structural injustice approach is well-suited as a means of explaining the normative significance of the following two aspects commonly observed in reality: individuals' daily and norm-abiding actions that are innocent and harmless, but nonetheless could lead to serious harms on a collective level, and the normative significance of the resemblance between the past and the present. Then, I illustrated the gains of applying the structural injustice approach to issues of language.

Chapter 3: Identifying and remedying structural linguistic injustice

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I will develop a notion of structural linguistic injustice and discuss how they may be remedied. The chapter will proceed as follows. Firstly, I will distinguish linguistic injustices that may be conceptualized based on the interactional approach from structural linguistic injustice. Structural linguistic injustice will refer to objectionable or unjust social processes, which are produced by thousands of individuals' daily and innocent actions that position linguistic groups in hierarchal social relations. I will provide a working definition of structural linguistic injustice.

Secondly, I will demonstrate my notion of structural linguistic injustice based on a specific example. In particular, I will zoom in on individuals' language attitudes, which refer to systematic and wide-spread behaviors exhibited towards languages that exert an influence on individuals' language choice or usage. I will argue that peoples' language attitudes constitute a part of objectionable or unjust social processes that allow hierarchal relations to exist among linguistic groups. To demonstrate my argument in more detail, I will distinguish between two different types of language attitudes that warrant normative scrutiny: (1) language attitudes unconnected with historical injustices and (2) language attitudes that are connected to historical injustices. The former usually enables family-level language loss and the latter usually enables societal-level language loss. Then, I will suggest two types of structural remedies for these language attitudes. I will argue that the former type requires family-level remedies and the second type requires state-level remedies. I will illustrate structural remedies based on the concrete examples of language planning.

While this chapter only discusses two examples of remedies, this dissertation will put forward, in total, three types of remedies. The third type of structural remedies, for which I will offer a detailed theory, will be introduced in chapter 4. This theory will explicate the epistemic dimensions of structural remedies.

3.2. Beyond the interactional approach to linguistic injustice: structural linguistic injustice

Let us begin with a case of Phanna Xieng, a Cambodian American who was employed at Peoples National Bank of Washington, who faced linguistic discrimination. Xieng was repeatedly denied a well-deserved promotion for a position, which he had already been "filling in" as a part of his daily responsibilities for several years. The reason for the denial of his applications had to do with his linguistic identity. Xieng's superiors had "told Xieng that he was not being promoted because he could not speak 'American'" due to his accent (Lippi-Green, 1994, p. 175). After years of being denied promotion, Xieng suffered from severe depression and other physical illnesses.In 1993, the Washington Supreme Court in United States found that Xieng was discriminated against in his employment (see the court case *Xieng v. Peoples National Bank*, 1993).

Xieng's situation, in which a person is discriminated against due to their accent, is not an isolated one. Rosina Lippi-Green illustrates that there are numerous cases in which individuals with "foreign accents" are discriminated against in the workplace (for a selective summary of court cases on accent-based discrimination in the workplace in the context of the United States (25 in total), see Lippi-Green, 1994, p. 173). This would suggest a pattern of behaviors among white-collar professionals.

Endorsing an interactional approach to injustice, this pattern of discrimination may be conceptualized as an interactional linguistic injustice. Clearly, in Xieng's case, there are identifiable interactions between specific moral actors, as Xieng and his superiors were in

direct interaction for several years wherein discrimination occurred. Furthermore, there are specific actions carried out by perpetrators, which caused wrongs, harms or injuries to a specific victim, namely, the repeated discriminatory decisions to deny Xieng's promotion, which had a detrimental effect on Xieng's mental and physical health.

In contrast, imagine a situation in which certain linguistic groups are placed in a disadvantageous position, but in which there are no clearly identifiable responsible moral actors that caused them to be in such situations. Furthermore, imagine that there are no direct interaction among moral agents, which it is possible to identify as having caused the linguistic groups' position of disadvantage. The aim of this chapter is to illustrate that such type of linguistic injustice, which I will call structural linguistic injustice, may occur.

Marrying the framework of structural injustice approach to the linguistic justice debate, I offer the following working definition of *structural linguistic injustice.*

> Structural linguistic injustice refers to objectionable or unjust social processes, which are produced by thousands of individuals' daily and innocent actions, that position linguistic groups in hierarchal social relations by placing certain linguistic groups in positions of privilege while placing other linguistic groups in positions of disadvantage. As a result, the disadvantaged groups face the threat of harm while the privileged groups do not face the same threat.

I reiterate three features that constitute structural injustice, which I already introduced in chapter 2: (1) individuals' daily and innocent actions that produce and reproduce objectionable or unjust social processes, (2) social processes that enable hierarchal relations among groups of people and (3) situations in which disadvantaged groups of people may face the threat of serious harms. When three aspects come together, structural injustice occurs.

Structural linguistic injustice exhibits all three aspects of structural injustice mentioned above. (1) Structural linguistic injustice arises due to individuals' innocent or seemingly banal actions. (2) Due to these actions, hierarchal relations are formed among linguistic groups, which place them either in privileged or disadvantaged social positions and determine their possibilities of enjoyment of fundamental interests in language. (3) The disadvantaged linguistic groups suffer from the threat of abrupt language loss, a type of language loss that disallows individuals from enjoying their fundamental interests in language. In contrast, privileged linguistic groups may face no hurdles hindering their enjoyment of fundamental interests in language.

Although all three aspects are important, I will focus on elucidating the details of the first two aspects throughout this chapter. The majority of chapter will explain how thousands of individuals' innocent actions produce and reproduce hierarchal relations among linguistic groups. The third aspect, which refers to the potential threat of serious harms faced by disadvantaged linguistic groups, will be only discussed briefly so as to provide a complete analysis of structural linguistic injustice.

I will only demonstrate that hierarchal relations among linguistic groups place disadvantaged linguistic groups under the threat of abrupt language loss, which may give rise to harmful circumstances. My argument here will not illustrate why abrupt language loss is harmful to avoid reperition. Instead, I piggyback on the arguments I provided in chapter 1, section 1.3.3. I had outlined three harmful circumstances that may accompany language loss, i.e., linguistic isolation, linguistic alienation and language extinction. I will only show that abrupt language loss is accompanied by linguistic isolation, linguistic alienation and language extinction.

Now, let us turn to concrete examples that may illustrate what I mean by structural linguistic injustice. My principal example will be language attitudes.

3.3. Language attitudes as a part of social structures

In this section, I will illustrate structural linguistic injustice based on the example of language attitudes. Language attitudes are commonly observed in everyday settings. Regardless of its truth value, people hold that French is beautiful or that German is harsh. We also judge others' social, economic or educational background based on their accents. We may personally hold that being proficient in English, the global lingua franca, may be conducive to social advancement, therefore, we should teach English to our children. In short, we often associate particular social meanings to particular languages, and therefore harbor linguistic attitudes. I argue that language attitudes enable hierarchal relations among linguistic groups, which constitute a part of objectionable or unjust social structures that conspire to abrupt language loss.

Although the structural injustice approach has not yet been applied to the concept of language attitude, the significance of language attitudes is extensively discussed within the literature of sociolinguistics (for seminal works, see Lambert et al., 1960). Language attitude is a term that has been used with heterogenous foci (for a summary of its various definitions, see Garrett, 2012). However, the term language attitudes may be summarized as individuals' predispositions, judgments, values or beliefs towards languages.

The existing sociolinguistic literature distinguishes between three different categories of language attitudes: (1) language attitudes in the form of individuals' personal evaluations or ratings of language (e.g., French is beautiful), (2) language attitudes that are not held by a few individuals but are widely shared by many individuals, establishing social significances of language (e.g., British English is a "proper" version of English, whereas other varieties of English are "improper"), or (3) language attitudes as behaviors that influence language choice

or usage (e.g. because English is beneficial, children are educated in English) (Agheyisi & Fishman, 1970, p. 141).

In order to narrow down the scope of the term befitting to the purpose of my dissertation, I will examine the second and third categories in greater detail. The purpose of this is to focus on language attitudes that are more normatively significant than others, are widely shared and influence individuals' language choice, at least in part. Accordingly, I intend to make use of the following working definition of language attitudes:

> Language attitudes refer to systematic and wide-spread behaviors exhibited towards languages, which have an influence upon individuals' language choice or usage.

By stipulating this definition, I aim to conceptualize language attitudes as a part of social processes. Language attitudes, in other words, have impact. They are not isolated thoughts, beliefs, or predispositions that have no effect on our actual world. Instead, they shape our world, especially by guiding our language choices.

Furthermore, as mentioned above, I aim to go a step further and illustrate that even if language attitudes are innocent in nature, they may end up enabling hierarchal relations among linguistic groups by placing certain linguistic groups in positions of privilege while placing other linguistic groups in positions of disadvantage. In short, they play a role in enabling a type of structural linguistic injustices.

I stated above that individuals' language attitudes could be only one of a number other of factors that enable structural linguistic injustices. Faced with this fact, one may question why we should focus on language attitudes in order to understand structural linguistic injustices. Surely there are other, more urgent, factors that enable said hierarchal relations among linguistic groups, which should be subject to normative scrutiny. As Ruth Rubio-Marín argues,

there is a “grossly unfair distribution of resources” among linguistic groups, which has an “impact on the [poorer linguistic groups’] possibility to enjoy the minimal conditions for a dignified life” (Rubio-Marín, 2003, p. 141). Moreover, there are unequal representations in the media, where certain linguistic groups’ way of living overshadows other ways of living.

Not only do manifest inequalities exist at present, but there is also the lingering impact of historical injustices. For example, during the colonial period, the colonizer’s language was imposed upon the colonized peoples, while their local languages were denigrated and suppressed. Individuals’ language attitudes may partly reproduce the history of injustices. Although these atrocious practices are nowadays decried, socio-economic or political hierarchies that are currently manifested among linguistic groups may partly arise from the lingering effects of historical injustices.

While it is true that there are other important factors that enable hierarchal relations among linguistic groups, I have chosen to examine language attitudes for the following reasons. Firstly, language attitudes are not unrelated to other patterns of inequalities that exist among linguistic groups. In fact, we may observe that language attitudes may either mirror or work in tandem with already existing patterns of inequalities. This means that language attitudes will not be a significant outlier compared to other patterns of inequality. Moreover, language attitudes may also fulfil certain roles in entrenching already existing hierarchal relations further. This provides us with a reason to carry out a normative assessment of language attitudes.

One may ask, again, whether we should delve directly into the effects of socio-economic or political inequalities, instead of language attitudes. I have two answers to these questions. On the one hand, the effects of these inequalities were identified to be normatively relevant for lengthy period of time. We observe, however, that it is difficult to mitigate said inequalities. There may be reasons to think that challenging objectionable or unjust language attitudes may be dealt with, faster than socio-economic inequalities would. On the other hand,

I wish to focus on innocent little actions of individuals, which still enable serious harms at a collective level. This focus may show us that even if people regard themselves to be unrelated to structural linguistic injustices that are happening today, they may be perpetuating those injustices. Because this aspect has not yet been discussed in detail in the existing literature, I choose to focus my attention on language attitudes.

The language attitudes that I am about to address are often innocent, seemingly banal and can even be considered to form part of common sense. If language attitudes are often assumed to be unproblematic, yet play a role in entrenching patterns of inequalities by producing and reproducing objectionable or unjust social structures, then they should be subject to normative scrutiny. This is the very aim of structural linguistic injustice: to normatively scrutinize social processes that we take for granted, to reveal that even seemingly trivial and normal actions may still play a role in enabling serious harms.

Having established that language attitudes may deserve normative attention, even if they may appear peripheral when compared, for example, to factors that directly relate to socio-economic inequalities, I will now conceptualize language attitudes as a part of social processes. I claim this based on the fact that language attitudes influence language choices or language uses. Then, I will show that language attitudes result in certain linguistic groups facing the threat of abrupt language loss, which is a specific type of language loss that is harmful, while other linguistic groups do not face the same threat.

Abrupt language loss refers to a process in which members of certain linguistic groups undergo rapid language shift. As a result, there is a change in the language within one generation. A typical form of abrupt language loss is that of a younger generation that adopts (a) new language(s) and abandons its heritage language(s) or language(s) of origin while an older generation retains the heritage language and fails to obtain proficiency in (a) new language(s). In short, it is a specific kind of language loss, where harms arise to both

generations. In the long run, abrupt language loss may culminate in the assimilation of one linguistic group within another linguistic group.

How, then, do language attitudes enable abrupt language loss? I argue that language attitudes enable abrupt language loss as a part of objective social facts that either enable or constrain individuals' choices. In chapter 2, I introduced the concept of social structures employed by the structural injustice approach. Social structures refer to objective social facts, relations and positions that place certain groups of people in a position of privilege while placing other groups of people in a position of disadvantage. Social structures include habits, norms, practices, or institutions that were produced and reproduced by individuals' actions. Furthermore, social structures have either intended or unintended consequences on a collective level. At times, these consequences are harmful.

Language attitudes form part of immaterial objective social facts that produce specific relations among diverse linguistic groups. One should recall that that one part of social structures is made up of material or immaterial objective social facts. Language attitudes, just like rules or norms that individuals implicitly or explicitly follow, are an example of immaterial objective social facts that influence individuals' language choices. Language attitudes either enable or constrain individuals' choices of specific opportunities, and therefore form part of social structures that place linguistic groups in specific positions in a linguistic context.

In short, language attitudes exert an influence on our language choices or language uses, especially by offering justification for our language-related decisions. Language attitudes, the type of language attitudes that place different languages in a hierarchal order, may exert an influence on individuals' intergenerational language transmission in particular. This may, in turn, result in abrupt language loss.

To demonstrate my argument in more detail, I will distinguish between two different types of language attitudes that warrant normative scrutiny: (1) language attitudes that are

unconnected to historical injustices and (2) language attitudes that are connected to historical injustices. Both language attitudes enable hierarchal relations among linguistic groups. However, I have chosen to distinguish these two because the former usually enable family-level language loss and the latter usually enable societal-level language loss. Furthermore, as the nature of language attitudes that enable abrupt language loss differs, the possible remedies will also differ. I will address both types one by one.

3.3.1. Identifying and remedying language attitudes that are not connected to historical injustices

The first type of language attitudes I will discuss have no connection to historical injustices, yet, enable hierarchal relations among linguistic groups. This type of language attitudes can be subdivided into two categories: (1) those that are morally problematic and (2) those that are innocent.

On the one hand, there are language attitudes that mirror presently manifest patterns of inequalities among linguistic groups, which we may judge to be problematic. For example, in Sweden, both native and non-native Swedish speakers hold language attitudes that place standard Swedish and "Rinkeby Swedish" (the variety of Swedish spoken by individuals with immigrant origin) in a hierarchal relation. While standard Swedish is considered to be authentic and proper, "Rinkeby Swedish" is regarded as an inauthentic and improper version of Swedish (Stroud, 2004; Wee, 2011, p. 45).

It is argued that such language attitudes mirror currently manifest stigmas towards the speakers' social identities, which are in part informed by socio-economic inequalities. Lionel Wee, as introduced above, explains that immigrant contact varieties are often considered to be an "improper and inauthentic" version of the standard variety spoken by the natives. The reason behind this negative attitude is related to the preceding stigmatization of immigrants. When individuals apply a negative value to the identity of persons who speak a particular variety of

language, i.e., individuals of immigrant origin, this may translate into language practices associated with immigrant speech (Wee, 2011, p. 10).[11]

On the other hand, there are language attitudes that enable hierarchal relations among linguistic groups, but which we can regard as being innocent, even reasonable or common-sensical. The innocent type of language attitudes will be the principal subject matter in this subsection, as my aim is to discover how they nonetheless enable hierarchal relations among linguistic groups, which entrench already existing patterns of inequalities.

To that end, I will introduce an actual case reported by Myung-sup Byun, who analyzes the assimilation of Korean migrants to English in Hawaii, in the United States, who develop the language attitudes that enable hierarchal relations among linguistic groups, i.e., privileging linguistically dominant groups and disadvantaging linguistic minority group with migrant origin by imbuing relatively higher instrumental value in the dominant language over languages of migrant origin.

Byun recounts the history of the Korean migrants in Hawaii.[12] The Korean migrants arrived to Hawaiian sugar plantations in 1902 to work as laborers. The majority of the Korean

[11] I do not aim to argue that all language attitudes towards accents, dialects or language varieties are pejorative. There are also language attitudes that value different accents, dialects or varieties. However, for the purpose of my analysis, I focus on language attitudes that form hierarchal relations among linguistic groups, which are often pejorative.

[12] Byun illustrates that there were two waves of Korean migrants in Hawaii. I will only focus on the first wave of migrants, as the first wave of Korean migrants were not privileged in terms of socio-economic status. In contrast, the second wave of Korean migrants, who arrived after the Second World War, were made up of "highly educated middle class, such as medical doctors, government officials, businessmen, and skilled technicians" (Byun 1990, p. 112). The second

migrants were from poor, lower-class backgrounds and were often illiterate. It is reported "that Korean immigrants had difficulty in understanding English at work," suggesting that the first-generation migrants, who arrived in Hawaii as laborers, often failed to adopt dominant languages of the host country (Byun, 1990, p. 113). This is argued to be partly due to the fact that the first-generation Korean migrants, after arriving in the host country, were kept undereducated and received no institutional support to learn English.

Byun's analysis further reveals that the second-generation Korean migrants (i.e., the children of first-generation Korean migrants who were recruited to work at plantations) underwent rapid process of assimilation to the English language, so that "the language of the Korean stock has shifted to English monolingualism" (Byun, 1990, p. 117). In other words, while first-generation Korean migrants mostly remained as monolingual Korean speakers, the second-generation Koran migrants became monolinguals English speakers.

Interestingly, Byun reveals that Korean migrants' language attitudes may have partly induced the occurrence of abrupt language loss. Byun reports that the first-generation Korean migrants who arrived to Hawaii, who obtained no or limited proficiency in English, "emphasize[d] the importance of English to their children," often "[i]n compensation for their bitter past experiences" of language barrier (Byun, 1990, p. 126). This illustrates that these migrants held that the dominant language of the host country, English, was important for social advancement.

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wave Korean migrants who arrived after the war quickly obtained proficiency in English, as they were highly skilled professionals who had prior knowledge of English before emigration. Since the majority of actual people on the move in our real world may not enjoy the same sort of privilege as the second wave of Korean migrants, I choose to focus on the first wave so to bring some reality to my analysis.

On the other hand, Byun reports that,

> the second generation, having little in common with their parents who did not have an English education, doubted the practical need to learn the Korean language. The second generation believed that the key to social success in American society was dependent on proficiency in English, or an English language H, if possible. (Byun, 1990, p. 113).

What we can draw from Byun's analysis is that there were two contrasting language attitudes towards English, the dominant language of the host country, and Korean, the heritage language of immigrant origin. While English was regarded to be conducive to social advancement, Korean was regarded as not having much "practical need."

Based on Byun's report, I hereby propose a hypothetical scenario that captures that essence of language attitudes that enable hierarchal relations among linguistic groups.[13] I note two things about these language attitudes. First, I note that language attitudes, which enable structural linguistic injustice, are innocent. It may be reasonable, or even commonsensical, for the family to assumed that English is conducive to social advancement. Furthermore, it seems reasonable that the family assumed that there is not was much practical need for Korean. For example, it is indeed justifiable to think that in order to be competitive in the job market in the United States, fluency in English languages is beneficial, rather than Korean.

[13] Again, I model this hypothetical scenario after the first wave of Korean migrants because they are not privileged in terms of socio-economic status. Since the majority of actual people on the move in our real world may not enjoy the same sort of privilege as the second wave of Korean migrants, I choose to focus on the first wave so that my hypothetical scenario has higher resemblance to our actual world.

Second, language attitudes may differ across generations. On the one hand, the older generation may hold the following attitudes:

> A Korean couple, who are unilingual-Korean speakers, permanently immigrate to the United States. They share the following language attitudes. (1) They believe that raising their children in English will be conducive to their children's social advancement. (2) They hold that if children are raised in Korean they will be perceived as foreigners in the United States, which not be conducive to social advancement.

On the other hand, the younger generation may hold the following language attitudes:

> The children of the Korean couple, who are Korean-Americans with immigrant roots, hold that learning English is important for their social activities. In contrast, they hold that there is not much practical need to learn the Korean language, which is limited to the interaction with their family members.

Informed by Byun's analysis of the first wave Korean migrant who arrived in Hawaii, let us assume that in this hypothetical scenario the following occurs. On the one hand, the older generation remain proficient in Korean, but develop limited proficiency in English. On the other hand, the younger generation become proficient in English, but do not develop high proficiency in Korean. In short, the family undergo abrupt language loss.

I argue that language attitudes are objectionable social processes that enable hierarchal relations among linguistic groups, i.e., privilege the linguistically dominant group (i.e. group of English speakers) and disadvantage the linguistic minority group with immigrant origin (i.e. group of Korean speakers). Let me unpack this claim further. Even though the two generations hold different language attitudes, their language attitudes work in tandem to inform individuals' language choices. As Byun illustrates, Korean migrants did end up prioritizing English, the dominant language of the host country, above Korean, the heritage language of migrants, based on the perceived instrumental value. As a result, they underwent abrupt language loss. It seems plausible to argue that while the linguistic minority group with immigrant origin face the threat of abrupt language loss, such circumstances do not arise among linguistically dominant group. This contrast indicates that the linguistic minority group is relatively disadvantaged, having to face the threat of abrupt language loss, while the linguistically dominant group is structurally privileged. In other words, structural linguistic injustice occurs.

What I want to illustrate here is that the occurrence of abrupt language loss is not a neutral phenomenon. Rather, it is a situation in which serious harms occur. More precisely, when individuals undergo language loss, they may undergo harmful circumstances, such as linguistic isolation, linguistic alienation or even language extinction. I have already illustrated why these three situations may be harmful in chapter 1. It was because individuals do not get to enjoy the fundamental interests in language. Assuming that these three circumstances are harmful, I will illustrate how abrupt language loss may give rise to these harmful circumstances.

Firstly, abrupt language loss may give rise to linguistic isolation. Recall how, in my hypothetical scenario above, the older generation Korean migrant developed limited proficiency in English. These older generation migrants who fail to adopt the host country's dominant language may undergo linguistic isolation. Going back to the actual case provided

by Byun, his analysis seems to suggest that the first-generation Korean migrants who were working at sugar plantations did, in fact, undergo linguistic isolation:

> Korean immigrant mothers, grandmothers, and grandfathers suffer the most from language barriers due to their limited contacts with American society. Their daily activities are composed mostly of contacts between Koreans, and there is not much demand for the use of English. Generally, these first-generation immigrant parents do not have opportunities to have any additional education in the United States. Poor English ability often prevents Koreans from seeking jobs outside Korean communities. For example, 88 percent of Korean workers think that their occupation is not commensurate with their education because of a language barrier (Byun, 1990, pp. 124-125).

We observe here that first-generation Korean migrants had "limited contacts" with the host society at large, which is due to language barriers. Furthermore, it is reported that the first-generation Korean migrants have experienced difficulties finding employment at the American job market due to language barrier. It seems reasonable to suggest that the first-generation Korean migrants were not able to fully enjoy certain fundamental instrumental interests in language.

This is not all. Abrupt language loss may also give rise to linguistic alienation, especially for the second-generation Korean migrants. Byun's report also illustrates that the second-generation who grew up to be English-speakers faced the threat of linguistic alienation. That is, they may not have been able to enjoy identity interests in language:

> Even native-born Korean-Americans and the third generation whose mother tongue is English have begun to realize that, in the long run, they cannot be completely assimilated into American society, like other European immigrants. (Byun, 1990, p. 127).

This report suggests that the migrants who faced abrupt language loss, especially the younger generation who quickly underwent assimilation, may not be able to enjoy identity interests in language as much as those who have never underwent assimilation. Monolingual English speakers, who were ethnically Korean, failed to experience themselves as "fully American". This may curtail their enjoyment of identity interests in, say, the English language.

At this point, I want to scale up the analysis I have provided thus far. I argue that similar language attitudes, which privilege the dominant language above the heritage language, are not limited to the Korean migrant case. It is also exhibited by many other migrant groups, or so I argue. Sociolinguistic studies illustrate that hierarchal language attitudes are observed in a migrant context.[14] Going beyond the empirical facts, it may be reasonable to assume that migrants, upon arriving in the host country, hold that being proficient in the dominant language of the host country is more conducive to social advancement, to a greater extent than would be the case for those who are proficient in one of the minority languages of migrant origin.

[14] For example, German-speaking migrants residing in urban Canada were found to associate "German with the local and low culture, and English with the worldliness of the wider community and high culture" (Dailey-O'Cain & Liebscher, 2011, p. 129), indicating a formation of a hierarchy between the majority language and the minority language. This hierarchal language attitude may be reinforced by the status of English as the global lingua franca.

There may in fact be a pattern, in which the dominant language and the minority languages form part of a certain hierarchy. In other words, it may be reasonable to argue that thousands of individuals share certain language attitudes that enable hierarchal relations among linguistic groups, which privilege the linguistic majority group that speaks the dominant language above linguistic minority groups that speak languages of migrant origin. My point is to connect these hierarchal language attitudes to the threat of abrupt language loss. My contention is that linguistic minorities of migrant origin, who are placed in disadvantageous positions due to language attitudes, are faced with the threat of abrupt language loss to a greater extent than linguistically dominant groups, who are placed in privileged positions.

In fact, studies seem to concern that there may indeed be a pattern, in which abrupt language loss occurs in many different migrant contexts.[15] For example, Barbara J. Merino (1983) illustrates that language attrition (loss of heritage language) occurs to bilingual Chicano children who reside in California, in the United States, even in households where Spanish is actively spoken. Camilla Bettoni (1985) also provides a case study of second-generation Italian migrants in Australia, who undergo language attrition. Their fluency in Italian decreased as "Italian is for them an oral tool only, used almost exclusively in the family context dealing with obvious topics and simple tasks, involving face-to-face communication within a small group of intimates" (1985, p. 79). (For a summary of research into language attrition, see Monika

[15] It should be mentioned that language attitudes are not the only reason that causes abrupt language loss. The linguistic minorities may have limited resources when it comes to funding private education for the children to learn their heritage languages, which results in language attrition. The minorities themselves may lack the resources to adopt the dominant languages. They may lack the know-how that may help them to gradually undergo language shift. And so on.

Schmid (2016).) These facts seem to suggest that linguistic minorities of immigrant origin do face a structural linguistic injustice in our actual world.

I argue that seemingly innocent, even commonsensical language attitudes that prioritize the dominant languages over languages of migrant origin enable hierarchal attitudes that place the linguistically dominant groups in privileged positions and place the linguistic minorities with immigrant backgrounds in disadvantageous positions. As a result, the linguistic minorities with immigrant backgrounds face the threat of abrupt language loss. Because of the unequal exposure to this threat of abrupt language loss among linguistically dominant groups and linguistic minority groups, I argue that this is one type of structural linguistic injustices.

Having illustrated what I mean by structural linguistic injustice, before I conclude this section, I would like to articulate potential structural remedies for structural linguistic injustice. Especially in this section, I will explain structural remedies for above-mentioned type of structural linguistic injustice, which is enabled by language attitudes that are unconnected with historical injustice. I will argue that language status planning may be conducted at a family level as a kind of structural remedies. (In the next section, where I discuss another type of structural linguistic injustice that is enabled by unjust social structures that are connected to historical injustice, I will suggest a different kind of structural remedies.)

Let us, however, first revisit what structural remedies meant. Structural remedies refer to collective actions that attempt to change social structures for the better so that structural injustices are longer being facilitated. Because the idea of structural remedies is often canvassed based on specific structural injustices and take the form of corrective responses to those injustices, it is difficult to stipulate an abstract concept of structural remedies. In fact, upon close examination of Young's theory, we confirm that there is indeed no one-size-fits-all notion in the case of structural remedies. Rather, structural remedies should be recommended that specifically refer to moral actors' social positions, which depend on the parameters of

connection, power, privilege and interest – components that shape moral agents' capacities (Young, 2003).

Yet, specific foci could guide structural remedies. For example, Alasia Nuti presents an interesting goal that should be pursued by structural remedies. Namely, she attaches importance to the concept of changing individuals' beliefs and mindset as structural remedies. For example, Nuti argues that in order to remedy sexist social structures that enable violence against women, especially intimate partner violence, there is a need for "transformative measures" to be taken as a type of necessary, structural remedy (2019, p. 105, 131). These transformative measures aim to transform the persistent expectations and relations individuals hold, so as to dismantle "the ways historical structures are reactivated in daily interactions" (Nuti, 2019, p.131). For instance, in order to correct the structural component that enables intimate partner violence, Nuti advocates the "bystander approach" that will attempt to transform our shared beliefs, attitudes and engagement towards intimate partner violence. By means of transformative measures, Nuti attempts to transform patterns within society that are considered to exist within the private realm.

Going back to my case of structural linguistic injustice, I also identify that there exists a need to change individuals' mindset. Especially for language attitudes that are unconnected with historical injustice, I argue that challenging individuals' mindset should be introduced by family-level language planning.[16] The type of family-level initiatives I have in mind makes use

[16] While I apply Nuti's intuition to structural linguistic injustice, I note here that I wish to go further than Nuti by extending the scope of structural remedies. While Nuti discusses community-level initiatives, stressing the public dimension of structural remedies, I argue that structural remedies may occur in fully private settings. That is, family-level initiatives may be introduced in order to fulfil the role of structural remedies for structural linguistic

of language status planning, i.e., family language planning. This is an example of language status planning that is implemented and carried out at the level of family. I argue that family language planning may fulfil the role of structural remedies for structural linguistic injustice.

The responsibility for this particular kind of structural remedies is forward-looking. As described in chapter 2, I argue that responsible moral agents for structural remedies are the individuals who produce and reproduce said language attitudes that enable said structural linguistic injustice. Here, I will exclusively address the individuals who, in fact, face the brunt of structural linguistic injustice as responsible moral agents for structural remedies. My decision to address the responsibility of structurally marginalized individuals is purposeful, as I will use my analysis I outline in this section as the context to further develop the importance of epistemic aspects of structural remedies in chapter 4.

Language planning usually includes three aspects: (1) status planning, (2) corpus planning and (3) acquisition planning (Haugen, 1959). Status planning refers to the aim to modify the nature of a language by changing its standing in relation to other languages and corpus planning refers to attempts to define or modify the spelling, vocabulary, or grammar of a language (Kloss, 1969). Acquisition planning refers to organized efforts to promote the learning of a language (Cooper, 1990).

Although language planning has been argued to be not committed to a specific goal (Haugen, 1966, p. 52), I will focus on particular kinds of language planning that do in fact aim to overcome particular problems that linguistic groups may face. To further narrow down the focus in a manner that befits the aim of this dissertation, I will focus on status planning. Status planning is argued to include three domains: (1) the active use of the language in educational systems, either as a medium of instruction or as a course, (2) support for implicit language

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injustice.

policies in families that use the language and (3) official recognition of the status of language by state institutions (Goundar, 2017, p. 85). In all three domains, status planning results in modifying the standing of a language, which may be lesser or better in comparison to the status of other languages.

In line with the analysis I provided above, where I illustrated that structural linguistic injustice was partly enabled by hierarchal language attitudes, I will suggest that a potential structural remedy may consist of status planning that deliberately modifies a language's standing for the better. One particular domain of status planning aims at reverting the hierarchal relations among linguistic groups. In short, I aim to illustrate the normative role that status planning may have as a type of structural remedy for structural linguistic injustice.

In order to explain how status planning may be practiced at family-level as a form of structural remedies, I would like to introduce another specific case study involving a Korean mother and a Korean American child in a multiracial family, which was conducted by Jungmin Kwon (2020). Kwon reports a linguistic context of a Korean immigrant mother, Mrs. Park, and Lydia, an eight-year-old second-generation immigrant child. Mrs. Park is married to an American, and resides with her family in the United States.[17] Mrs. Park speaks Korean as her mother tongue, and despite her efforts to acquire English she speaks English to an intermediate level only. Mrs. Park and Lydia are practicing a strict family language policy. In particular, they exercise a one-parent, one-language family language policy:

[17] Although Mrs. Park's husband is also a participant of the one-parent, one-language family language policy, the focus of Kwon's analysis is on Mrs. Park and Lydia. Arguably, Kwon's exclusive focus on mother and daughter may partly arise from the fact that in many multilingual families who adopt the same family language policy the duty to transmit heritage language is borne by the parent who speaks the language.

> At home, Mrs. Park deliberately enforces a one-parent, one-language (OPOL) policy, where the mother strictly uses Korean only despite her intermediate English proficiency, and the father primarily uses English with Lydia and her younger sibling. The mother's decision for the [one-parent, one-language family language policy] was carefully and strategically planned with a clear vision and aspiration of fostering and nurturing bilingualism and biliteracy in her children. (Kwon, 2020, p. 351).

Family language policy refers to "the explicit and implicit decisions that parents make regarding language us and practices in the home" (Kwon, 2020, p. 352). It is employed in order to "pass down heritage languages to their children," so "they either demand that their children use both English and their heritage language or enforce the exclusive use of the heritage language" (Kwon, 2020, p. 352).

Kwon reports that family language policy is often implemented by many families of immigrant origin. Mrs. Park and Lydia are only one example of numerous migrant families that exercise a family language policy, and which, moreover, hold bilingualism as the ideal to strive towards. Indeed, the one-parent, one-language policy, which is what Mrs. Park's family practices, is argued to be the best family language policy in which to raise bilingual children (Slavkov, 2017). Unfortunately, Kwon's analysis shows that Mrs. Park's and Lydia's one-parent, one-language family language policy faces conflicting "language ideologies," which hinders its success:

> Mrs. Park, like many other first-generation Korean immigrant parents … expressed a strong belief that learning Korean is necessary for her children to build a stronger sense of identity, accelerate academically, and develop

> biliteracy. … Lydia presented language beliefs and attitudes that were vastly different from what her mother shared. … [Lydia] often revealed a hesitancy about using Korean, saying "It's easier to speak in English because I am more used to it." In the questionnaire she completed at the beginning and end of my data collection, Lydia also confessed in both iterations that she does not enjoy reading and writing in Korean. (Kwon 2020, p. 357).

This analysis shows a clear gap between first-generation Korean migrant mother and second-generation Korean American daughter, especially in their language attitudes, despite their shared participation in one-parent, one-language family language policy. In particular, we observe that there is a limit to which Lydia may value the Korean language. Usually, Lydia perceived "Korean as her mother's language, which she learns and practices for her mother" instead of it having societal or practical value (kwon 2020, p. 357). Furthermore, the Korean language was not valued in other parts of Lydia's life:

> *as Lydia entered her school, where she is one of only two children with a Korean heritage, she soon realized that Korean language and culture were not considered as important as the dominant language.* … [Lydia] reveals her confusion and frustration about her heritage language and culture, which are not shared in the day-to-day curriculum, but are only superficially celebrated by peers and teachers on certain occasions. (Kwon 2020, p. 357-8, my emphasis).

Kwon's report illustrates one factor that greatly influences Lydia's language attitudes towards the Korean language: the restricted sense of worth and use of Korean in both family and societal levels. Lydia's exposure to the Korean language was limited to her interactions with her mother in the family. Furthermore, Lydia's proficiency in the Korean language was not recognized as

valuable, but rather only “superficially celebrated” and was not integrated to her everyday experiences.

Due to these factors, the family was not able to achieve their ideal of bilingualism. Mrs. Park’s English proficiency was intermediate at best, while Lydia’s proficiency in Korean remained at a basic level. Although Kwon’s report did not ascertain that the family would experience abrupt language loss, it seems reasonable to argue that the family may likely face the threat of abrupt language loss in the near future.

Again, as mentioned above, it may be reasonable to assume that many other families may be undergoing abrupt language loss, as would Mrs. Park and Lydia. This may indicate that the way the threat of abrupt language loss is distributed suggests certain pattern. If the threat of abrupt language loss is patterned in a way that more often target linguistic minorities with immigrant origin than linguistically dominant groups, then the issue at hand is not merely a tragic story of a migrant mother who fails to transmit language of origin. Instead, it may constitute structural linguistic injustice.

To remedy this structural linguistic injustice, I argue that status planning may be practiced at the level of families, with the aim of challenging preexisting language attitudes. One way in which to achieve this is by dismantling the restricted use of heritage language, so that the attitudes that dismiss the instrumental worth of heritage language may be mitigated. By facilitating greater use of the heritage language, individuals may be introduced to settings in which they may obtain positive language attitudes towards heritage languages. This may reverse hierarchal language attitudes.

To achieve this aim, the one-parent, one-language family language policy should be replaced by multilingual family language policy. Ideally speaking, Mrs. Park’s family should

all adopt Korean, so that the family interaction supports the use of the Korean language.[18] Of course, there could also be community-level initiatives, such as weekly exposure to heritage language outside of the familial settings. However, I remain focused on the family-level initiatives that may remedy hierarchal language attitudes. The other type of structural remedies will be discussed in the next section, where I discuss language attitudes that are connected to historical injustice.

3.3.2. Identifying and remedying language attitudes with a connection to historical injustice

Now, I will discuss language attitudes that have a connection to historical injustices. Unlike the language attitudes I discussed above, language attitudes that have a connection to historical injustices may not be wholly innocent, although individuals may wrongly assume that they are. Furthermore, language attitudes that are connected to historical injustices enable decidedly unjust social processes. An example I will focus on will concern explicitly pejorative attitudes towards minority languages with the history of injustices, which contrasts to positive attitudes towards dominant languages.

During the imperial expansion of territories, and also more generally during nation-building, many colonial powers were faced with the practical need for a lingua franca between the colonizer and the colonized. To fulfil this need, the colonized had the colonizer's languages imposed upon them and underwent long processes of linguistic suppression and denigration. Colonial suppression and denigration of indigenous languages affected many aspects of society,

[18] It may be disputed whether this family language policy is linguistically recommended. For example, in Mrs. Park's family, the non-native father may have to speak Korean at home, which may pass onto Lydia unwanted linguistic habits. I sidestep this practical issue here, since I want to focus on the difference in ideals that may define family language policies.

such as the educational systems, language policies, public spheres, and even the general attitude toward languages among their speakers.

For example, Hong Kong pupils faced corporeal and psychological punishment when caught speaking Cantonese in the school compounds under the British regime. Indigenous children, who were forcibly taken away from their families to English-only boarding schools in Canada, underwent severe alienation and disempowerment due to abrupt loss of their own languages. Korean scholars were jailed and tortured for working on the publication of the Korean dictionary during the period of Japanese occupation.

These colonial practices are decried nowadays, however their effects may persist as remnants of injustice today. One example of such remnants is the pejorative language attitudes towards minority languages, especially in many postcolonial contexts, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Kenya, Martinique, Hawai'i, and many more. In such contexts, minority languages are met with pejorative attitudes while dominant languages do not.

Consider the language attitudes that surround English. We often assume that it is beneficial to learn English, not only in English-speaking contexts but also due to the fact that it is the global lingual franca. One may argue that the fact that we hold such attitudes should not raise any moral worries. Given the fact that English is a prominent global lingua franca, this language attitude may simply reflect this fact. However, I think it is important to ask why English became a global lingua franca today and why speaking English grants people with more instrumental benefits. The answer seems to involve a history of injustice, at least in part. The global rise of English partly owes to colonization and British and American hegemony, in which English-speakers are currently reaping the benefits of past wrongdoings (Stilz, 2015).

I would like to add one more dimension to this. The positive attitudes on a dominant language, such as English, are sometimes combined with negative attitudes toward minority languages. One example of such a language attitude would be when an indigenous language is

underdeveloped and retrograde. This attitude, which often surrounds endangered languages and is clearly detrimental, partly originates in the history of injustice, i.e., the colonial history or xenophobia.

These language attitudes, which clearly enable hierarchal relations among linguistic groups, reproduce unjust social processes that were established by historical injustices, albeit in new forms (Nuti, 2019, p. 44). These unjust social processes that enable hierarchal relations among linguistic groups result in historical-structural linguistic injustices, in which past injustices are reproduced in different versions, even if the past injustices are currently decried and have come to an end. Historical-structural linguistic injustice is an enduring type of injustice that certain linguistic groups face, during the course of several generations, in which they are placed in the position of relational linguistic discontinuity in the same way their ancestors were in the past when historical injustices were in place.

However, I do note that language attitudes that are connected to historical injustices may also partly enable social processes that are only objectionable, not unjust. Individuals holding such attitudes might simply reflect the contingent fact that English is the dominant global lingua franca. Yet, imagine that thousands of individuals hold, alongside positive language attitudes toward English, pejorative attitudes towards other languages. If individuals hold that English is more valuable than any other languages, this may form a hierarchal relation between English and other linguistic groups. Even if attitudes towards English may be accompanied by positive attitudes towards other languages, if the attitude towards English is overwhelmingly positive, even when other languages are not considered to be inferior, individuals may nonetheless reasonably choose to educate their children in English and abandon their own languages. In such circumstances, if there are continuing effects of historical injustice that make the option to abandon one's language more viable than maintaining it, there would seem to be a reason to diagnose these social processes as unjust and to consider structural

reform. This is because of the consequences such language attitudes have on a collective level. These consequences, as I outlined above in the previous section, result in hierarchal relations among linguistic groups, thereby increasing the threat of abrupt language loss within linguistic minority groups compared to linguistic majority groups. This constitutes a structural linguistic injustice.

It is important to note that by conceptualizing historical-structural linguistic injustice, I am not attempting to identify specific wrongdoings carried out by identifiable moral actors. In fact, I am arguing that certain linguistic groups face linguistic injustices, even without cases of intimidation, discrimination or violence. They are not subjected to specific policies that exclude, subjugate or dominate them as minority groups. Nor do they face sheer bad luck (for example, in which most members of linguistic groups suddenly die as a result of natural disasters). Rather, linguistic groups face historical-structural linguistic injustice due to "the actions of thousands of individuals acting according to normal rules and accepted practices" that hold their languages in a negative light (Young, 2011, p. 48).

Now, as I did in the above subsection, I will turn to potential structural remedies for language attitudes that are connected to historical injustices. Unlike the migrant case that I elucidated above, language attitudes that are connected to historical injustice may result in two types of injustice: structural linguistic injustice or historical-structural linguistic injustice. As the structural remedies will be quite different for historical-structural linguistic injustice, I will dedicate my focus on identifying structural remedies for this type.

Consider Lu, who discusses the importance of structural remedies within the context of global justice, in which past colonial practices endure despite the fact that the colonial era has come to an end. As a response to structural injustices that reproduce colonial hierarchy among ex-colonizers and the ex-colonized, Lu offers *"*reconciliation*"* as a form of structural remedy. Reconciliation refers to "a regulative ideal that aims not only to reconcile parties

relationally to each other but, more fundamentally, to create a mutually affirmable and affirmed social/political order that can support the flourishing of nonalienated agents" (Lu, 2017, p. 38).

Reconciliation, especially, is divided up into two types: objective and subjective reconciliation. Objective reconciliation in the form of structural remedies entails constructing "social institutions, norms, practices and structures that mediate relations between agents" in such a way that "a social/political order that establishes rights and duties that allow agents to exercise their moral and political agency, in a set of background conditions that ensure the social bases of respect and dignity in their institutional relations and structural conditions" (Lu, 2017, p. 38). In contrast, subjective structural remedies must achieve "agents' nonalienation from the rules, norms, practices, relations, and conditions of the domestic and/or international social/political order" so that they may achieve self-realization in the social world (Lu, 2017, p. 38).

As an example of structural remedies for historical-structural linguistic injustice, which fall under Lu's category of objective reconciliation, I will consider here the implementation, by a state, of multilingual language policies. This responsibility of the state is more backward-looking than the responsibility I discussed with the example of Mrs. Park. As introduced in chapter 2, the state, as a powerful agent, had the "significant power to influence structural processes but instead ha[d] sustained unjust structures or failed to intervene to address them" (Nuti, 2019, p. 160). They must therefore provide reparation for past injustices by providing reparation, moreover, compensation for the way in which their "pattern of enablement or negligence has contributed to the new reproduction of unjust history over time" (Nuti, 2019, p. 160). Unlike the cases involving migrants, in which familial-level remedies were pursued, I would argue that hierarchal language attitudes connected to historical injustice may require such active support from the government, for example, in the form of implementing specific type of language policies.

I will discuss that mandating a specific type of resource-oriented policies may be a way of providing this reparation, i.e., equal-maintenance policies that give more priority to endangered languages in certain territories. These policies distribute more resources to endangered language speakers than to dominant language speakers (when compared to a purportedly "neutral" baseline, such a per-capita distribution (Patten 2014, p. 200)).[19]

To explain, a state can implement four different types of multilingual language policies: per-language, equal-services, per-capita, and equal-maintenance (Patten 2014; De Schutter 2017). In order to describe these four approaches in detail, I will assume that there are two language groups, a linguistic majority that constitutes 90% of a territory's population and a linguistic minority that constitutes the remaining 10%.[20] Per-language policies mandate a brute division of resources for both groups regardless of the number of speakers, mandating a 5:5 distribution of resources (De Schutter, 2017, p. 78). An equal-services policy requires that all languages receive an equal level of services regardless of the number of speakers, by focusing

[19] An alternative way to discuss language revitalization would be to compare language rights of dominant and non-dominant language groups. For instance, endangered linguistic groups may have promotion-oriented language rights in a territory where they are a member, instead of having toleration-oriented rights (Kloss, 1971).

[20] Different policies would be appropriate in cases where a non-dominant linguistic group significantly outnumbers the dominant language speakers. (Imagine an ex-colony where the local wide-spread language suffers symbolically inferior status and/or threats to its long-term vitality.) These cases may invite more radical versions of language revitalization, such as language policies that assert an endangered language as the monolingual 'queen' of the territory. See Van Parijs (2011, Chapter 5). However, for this chapter, I focus on endangered language groups that are usually small in size and spread across territories.

on the equal output of satisfied, language-based interests (De Schutter, 2017, p. 78). While a per-language policy focuses on the amount of resources distributed, equal-services focuses on the satisfaction of interests. An equal-services policy, therefore, may mandate a 6:4 or 7:3 distribution of resources, as long as the interests of the majority and minority groups are equally satisfied. Per-capita policies distribute resources according to the number of speakers. Alan Patten (2014, p. 200), who supports the per-capita approach in his ('full') proceduralist theory of equal recognition, argues that it is fair to distribute resources to linguistic groups (more) in proportion to the number of speakers. This means that resource distribution for language recognition should (more closely) follow the ratio of 9:1.[21] The equal-maintenance policies will distribute resources so to ensure an equal outcome, i.e., the successful maintenance of chosen languages so that each enjoys longevity and prosperity to an equal degree.

If currently manifest structural linguistic injustices exist, I argue that the fourth type, an equal-maintenance policy, is the preferable option as a means of successfully achieving language revitalization in the form of structural remedies. Equal-maintenance policies fall under the category of language maintenance policy, which aim at achieving a certain linguistic outcome by promoting and protecting chosen languages (Patten, 2007). Especially, equal-maintenance policies may give priority to vulnerable or endangered languages in order to bring about linguistic survival of those languages.

When an equal-maintenance policy is adopted, as a type of language status planning intending to give rise to structural remedies, strong governmentally supported language

[21] Patten develops his approach without assuming historical injustice as standard, and, on that basis, argues in favor of per-capita policies. However, Patten (2014) suggests that his approach could be adapted to consider "complicating factors" such as historical injustice (pp. 212-213).

revitalization policies may be mandated. Language revitalization refers to attempts to give vigor and prosperity to endangered languages (Hinton et al., 2018; Llamas et al., 2006; Paulston et al., 1993; Shah & Brenzinger, 2018). A successful result of revitalization would entail a decline in abrupt language loss and the reversal of language shift. Language revitalization partially consists of changing pejorative language attitudes towards minority languages that were formerly denigrated and suppressed.

An important aspect of language revitalization is the active revivification of the language through education, either by including suppressed languages as a part of school curriculum or by using them as mediums of instruction so that the students are familiar with the formerly suppressed languages. Keeping in mind that such institutional changes are mandated by resource-oriented policies, I discuss equal-maintenance policies as engaging directly with resource distribution.[22]

For example, in Hawaii, English is the dominant language and the indigenous Hawaiian language faces endangerment (spoken by approximately 9000 people) (Marlow & Giles, 2010, p. 239). The decline of the Hawaiian language and the rise of English was a gradual process, within which there was "no one turning point, no one piece of legislation, no royal decree that we can point to and say with confidence that it marked the time when Hawaiian lost

[22] My reasons to focus on resource-oriented policies is two-folds. Firstly, the revitalization process is resource-intensive. Education in endangered languages is necessary to successfully revitalize endangered languages (Fishman, 1991, 2002). To have endangered languages as the main or partial medium of education, schools must hire speakers of the endangered language, which is costly. Second, distributing less resources to dominant language speakers may require further justification. One of the justifications may be hinged on the reproduction of historical injustice.

to English" (Day, 1985, p. 172). A part of the gradual decline of indigenous Hawaiian language is argued to be attributable the language attitudes of individuals, which prioritized English above Hawaiian language. To reverse this, conscious efforts are being made to revitalize the indigenous Hawaiian language. In particular, language survival schools were introduced, which are referred to by the Hawaiians as "Language Nests" and immersion schools, which immersed young children in Hawaiian. Today, Hawaiian is considered to be one of the most successful cases of language revitalization, was as it has been successful in developing numerous new speakers of Hawaiian. Leanne Hinton argues that "education is more under the control of the speech community, which can model their children's education more to their own values and culture" (Hinton, 2011, p. 313).

Furthermore, in other postcolonial contexts, local languages that were formerly denigrated and suppressed may be mainstreamed, so that they are exposed in public places, international contexts, and political spheres. By increasing their presence, the formerly suppressed languages are returned once again to the center of the society. For example, New Zealand implemented policies that would elevate the Māori language from its formerly denigrated status. These policies mainstreamed Māori language in public places, schools, international contexts, and political spheres (Spolsky, 2003, pp. 560–563). As a result, bilingual signage in both Māori and English languages is now common in most public spheres in New Zealand. These governmental supports are argued to imbue Māori language with social value. It acknowledges Māori language as a national heritage. Furthermore, Māori language is either taught as a subject or used as a medium of instruction in public schools, education being the vehicle of active revival.

3.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I developed a notion of structural linguistic injustice and identified two types of structural remedies. Structural linguistic injustice referred to objectionable or unjust social processes, which are produced by thousands of individuals' daily and innocent actions, that enable hierarchal relations among linguistic groups. In particular, I discussed language attitudes as a part of social processes and distinguished two different types of language attitudes that warrant normative scrutiny: (1) language attitudes that are not connected to historical injustices and (2) language attitudes that are connected to historical injustices. The former usually enables family-level language loss and the latter usually enables societal-level language loss. After having illustrated my notion of structural linguistic injustice with concrete examples, I discussed potential structural remedies for structural linguistic injustice. In this chapter, I only discuss the two types of structural remedies: family-level remedies and state-level remedies. The third type of structural remedies, which I will develop in chapter 4, will focus on epistemic dimensions of structural remedies.

Chapter 4: Epistemic dimension of structural remedies

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I expand on the epistemic dimensions of structural remedies. Even when political responsibility is successfully assigned to responsible moral actors, as introduced in chapter 2, responsible moral actors may fail to achieve genuine structural remedies. This is due to the issues that relate to knowledge regarding structural remedies. Although the important role knowledge plays in structural remedies has been acknowledged in the existing literature, detailed accounts regarding the epistemic dimensions of structural remedies are lacking. In this chapter the aim is to fill this gap.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I will illustrate that moral actors may fail to achieve genuine structural remedies due to three reasons: (1) they may not know which social structures are objectionable or unjust, (2) they may not know how to remedy said social structures and (3) they may not know who should remedy said social structures. I refer to these three aspects as epistemic barriers.

After having identified these difficulties, I argue that there are two reasons for epistemic barriers. On the one hand, there are difficulties of establishing causal connections between the innocent actions of individuals and structural injustice. On the other hand, epistemic injustices may accompany structural injustices.

Third, I will demonstrate how epistemic barriers might be overcome. A theory of structural-epistemic responsibility will be developed, which pursues epistemic dimensions of political responsibility for structural remedies. That is, politically responsible moral actors have yet another important responsibility, what I call the structural-epistemic responsibility, which is a duty to satisfy the epistemic condition in order to bring about genuine structural changes.

4.2. The epistemic condition of structural remedies

Achieving genuine structural remedies may be a daunting task. Several conditions must be satisfied in order for structural changes to occur; one of these is an epistemic condition. That is, responsible moral actors must obtain "significant knowledge of how the actions of individuals and the rules and purposes of institutions conspire to produce injustice" (Young, 2011, p.153). This means that in order to change for the better, moral actors must have certain knowledge that is crucial for achievement of genuine structural change.

Despite an emphasis on the importance of knowledge in the existing literature, there has been no detailed discussion regarding exactly what kind of knowledge is required for achievement of structural changes, leaving a gap in the literature. I attempt to fill this gap by considering what can be regarded as the "significant knowledge" necessary for achievement of a successful structural remedy. I will offer an account that requires three different types of knowledge:

> Regarding the epistemic condition of structural remedy, there are three types of knowledge that must be acquired in order to achieve genuine structural changes. Responsible moral actors must have knowledge with regard to 1) which social processes should be changed and why (*diagnostic knowledge*), 2) how social processes should be changed (*knowledge for prescription*), and 3) who are the responsible moral actors who can bring about structural changes (*knowledge of accountability*).

I will explain each type of knowledge one by one.

The first type of knowledge concerns the successful identification of objectionable or unjust social processes for which structural remedies should be provided. This first type of knowledge is diagnostic in nature. This knowledge is crucial for achievement of a structural

remedy because change cannot be induced without knowledge of which social structures should be addressed. The aim of this knowledge is to identify objectionable or unjust structural processes that place certain linguistic groups under the threat of abrupt language loss. That is, responsible moral actors must realize that structural remedies are needed for some of the currently manifested social structures.

In order to provide further illustration, let us revisit the case of Mrs. Park and Lydia, whom I introduced in chapter 3. Despite an active attempt by the family to transmit both the dominant language (English) and the heritage language (Korean) based on one-parent, one-language family language policy, they were facing the prospect of abrupt language loss. For successful achievement of structural remedies, Mrs. Park's family must obtain diagnostic knowledge, i.e., they should know that their attitudes toward language is one of the factors that enable abrupt language loss.

For example, it should be made explicit that the language attitudes of Mrs. Park and Lydia (as well as those of the people who surround them) reduce the Korean language to a communicative tool between mother-daughter, enabling abrupt language loss. In addition, for successful achievement of family-level language planning as described above (where the family adopts a multilingual family language policy and abandons the one-parent, one-language family language policy), members of Mrs. Park's family should obtain the diagnostic knowledge that their one-parent, one-language family language policy, in part, produces and reproduces objectionable social processes that can lead to abrupt language loss.

The second type of knowledge is *prescriptive knowledge*, i.e., knowledge regarding which structural remedies should be induced in order to bring about change. Recall Lea Ypi (2017), whom I introduced in chapter 2. As she pointed out, our knowledge of historical injustices may play a crucial role in prescribing a remedy for currently manifested structural injustices. She uses knowledge regarding the history of injustices in order to provide specific

suggestions for what justice demands as a remedy today, so that when those remedies are implemented, they genuinely aid structurally disadvantaged groups. This is an example of successful use of prescriptive knowledge. Prescriptive knowledge usually requires moral actors to obtain knowledge of the contexts in which structural injustices occur.

To further illustrate the idea of prescriptive knowledge, let us return to the case of Mrs. Park's family. In order to prescribe structural remedies that would genuinely be helpful to structurally disadvantaged linguistic groups, such as Mrs. Park's family, responsible moral actors must obtain knowledge of the contexts in which abrupt language loss occur.

I argue that one method for attaining such knowledge is to perform an intersectional analysis of the factors that play a role in positioning Mrs. Parks' family vulnerable to abrupt language loss. Intersectionality, a form of critical inquiry within feminist theory, conceptualizes social inequalities as complex intersections of sexism, racism, classism, heteronormativity, ableism, ageism, or nationalism (Collins & Bilge, 2016; Crenshaw, 1991). It provides insight into the idea that individual features such as "race, class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nation, ability, and age operate not as unitary, mutually exclusive entities, but as reciprocally constructing phenomena that in turn shape complex social inequalities" (Collins, 2015). Theories of intersectionality are highly critical of policies that exacerbate preexisting social inequalities. Use of an intersectional approach will enable us to obtain a holistic understanding of a context wherein structural injustices may occur (see further Nuti, 2019, chapter 5, where she argues that conduct of an intersectional analysis of burdens of oppression that may be faced by structurally disadvantaged groups may be required).

By performance of an intersectional analysis of Mrs. Park's circumstance, we realize that other factors might enable the problem of family-level abrupt language loss. To provide further explanation, I refer to sociological research on experience of integration of first-generation immigrant women. This is to provide focus on the fact that Mrs. Park is also a first-

generation female immigrant, who may face certain burdens of oppression that place her in a social position that is particularly vulnerable to abrupt language loss.

In the United States, Kathleen Rockhill reported a higher rate of illiteracy for Hispanic female immigrants due to the burden of domestic labor, even when they expressed "a strong desire to take classes in order to learn English" (Rockhill, 1987, p. 163). Similarly, in Canada, among heterosexual immigrant couples, women reported staying home to care for children while men attended language classes (Giles, 2002). Tastsoglou and Preston also observed that "[t]he gender division of labour within the household and gender ideologies that emphasized the man's importance as a breadwinner contributed to *unequal access to language training* with long term consequences for Portuguese women's paid employment" (Tastsoglou & Preston, 2005, p. 52, emphasis added). The linguistic integration of men is often privileged over that of women due to sexism in the job market which often excludes women from entry. Moreover, the support for women's linguistic integration often receives no institutional support since women usually stay home, without work, to fulfil care duties.

Findings from this research illustrate how Mrs. Park, a first-generation immigrant woman of color and a stay-at-home housewife, may be placed in a structurally marginalized social position, where she faces barriers that hinder her from successfully integrating to the host country. As the primary caregiver in the family, Mrs. Park may be expected to stay at home in order to care for her two children. In addition, her linguistic integration to the host country may not be ensured due to lack of support. Without access to "forms of work or other forms of activity where they might learn the language informally" (Rockhill, 1987, p. 165), Mrs. Park may be hindered from further developing her English.

This knowledge should be obtained in order to properly understand what may enable Mrs. Park's family to undergo abrupt language loss. Moreover, to provide support so that Mrs. Park's family may successfully adopt a multilingual family language policy (which should

replace a one-parent, one-language family language policy), prescriptive knowledge may be crucial. Based on this awareness, we may suggest genuine structural remedies, challenging the burdens of oppression that may be faced by structurally marginalized individuals. This knowledge constitutes the type of knowledge known as prescriptive knowledge.

The third epistemic condition concerns *knowledge of accountability.* This type of knowledge requires that moral actors know who among them is responsible for providing structural remedies, yet has neglected to provide it until now, thereby enabling structural injustice. This knowledge is important in order to assign proper responsibility, either backward- or forward-looking, to powerful moral actors depending on their role in perpetuating structural injustices.

As illustration, let us revisit the case of Hawaii, which has a history of injustice involving denigration and suppression of indigenous Hawaiians. As a result of unjust social processes where hierarchal attitudes toward language continued to be produced and reproduced between English and the indigenous Hawaiian language, the latter faced engenderment, constituting historical-structural linguistic injustice. To succeed in attainment of structural remedies for historical-structural linguistic injustice, a powerful moral actor whose significant power to influence structural processes should have been exercised, yet, there was no intervention or attempt to redress said injustice, should be identified. For example, going back to the Hawaiian case, it should be made explicit that the government of the United States should have played a role in intervention and reversal of the hierarchy between English and the indigenous Hawaiian language. Based on this knowledge regarding accountability, structural remedies should be further specified, e.g., “Language Nests” and immersion schools where the indigenous Hawaiian language is reintroduced should be subsidized by the government.

I will now conclude by explaining what I mean by “knowledge” and “knowing.” Because such notions are taken completely for granted in the debate on structural injustices

and political responsibility, I refer to another debate on epistemic responsibility. The debate on epistemic responsibility addresses specific responsibilities for knowers and learners.

By knowledge, I refer to individuals' awareness of their position and the position of others in social structures. To explain further, I offer a definition of knowledge according to José Medina. Knowledge may be analytically distinguished according to three types: 1) self-knowledge, 2) knowledge of others, and 3) knowledge of social contextuality (Medina, 2013, pp. 133–134).[23] The last type of knowledge is particularly relevant with regard to the epistemic condition of structural remedy. It is important to distinguish these types of knowledge in order to determine the type of knowledge for which individuals may be responsible (further discussion of the responsibility for knowledge will be provided in the next section).

Self-knowledge refers to the empirical facts, social and political realities that shape an individual's existence, informed by personal memories or experiences. For example, a Mapuche is aware that he speaks Mapuche as his first language, that he has integrated to Spanish, and that Mapuche is a severely endangered language. Knowledge of others refers to how a person may relate to other people by understanding that he and others hold "relations of proximity or distance, relations of similarity or difference, relations of being affected or unaffected by others in particular ways, and relations of dependence (which are not hard to imagine in the globalized world of today) or independence" (Medina, 2013, p. 134). For example, the Mapuche speaker may know that the Argentinian state is the government that exerts power in the territory where he resides.

These two types of knowledge inform the knowledge of social contextuality, which for our purpose is the most important. Knowledge of social contextuality refers to how a person's

[23] While these types of knowledge may be analytically distinguished, in practice they often overlap and are interrelated.

life relates to the lives of others by participating in certain positions or relations alongside one another. This type of knowledge has two parts, "the knowledge of our social *positionality* and our social *relationality*: that is, it involves knowing the array of social positions/locations one comes to occupy and the network of social relations in which one's life becomes enmeshed" (Medina, 2013, p. 134, his emphasis). In short, knowledge refers to the awareness individuals have of themselves and of others as producers of social processes that place them in specific positions and relationships.

In order to satisfy the epistemic condition of structural remedy, moral actors must have heuristic, prescriptive, and accountability knowledge that relates to their social contextuality. This means that when moral actors are aware that certain social processes are objectionable, thereby having heuristic knowledge, they know which positions they hold in those objectionable social processes. Furthermore, in order to obtain satisfactory prescriptive knowledge, moral actors should have knowledge of the ways in which their own positions should be transformed and the relations they hold with others. Last, in order to successfully obtain knowledge regarding accountability, moral actors should know whether their positions or relations neglected the duty to provide structural remedy in the past.

4.3. Two reasons for epistemic barriers

However, it is often argued that obtaining such knowledge is difficult. In this section, I will illustrate that this limited knowledge may be a common finding among individuals for two reasons: (1) technical difficulties of establishing exhaustive knowledge regarding the innocent actions of individuals and structural injustice and (2) epistemic injustices that accompany structural injustice.

First, technical difficulties may be encountered when moral actors attempt to obtain the abovementioned types of knowledge. Recall that structural injustices are enabled by the actions

of thousands of individuals that result in social processes. Social processes involve myriad of factors and enablers, therefore moral actors may have difficulty understanding in precise detail how their actions result in serious collective harms.

As we have observed to date, attitudes toward language are only one factor enabling hierarchal relations among linguistic groups. A number of other factors may work together in order to entrench structurally marginalized linguistic groups under the threat of abrupt language loss. In addition to multiple enabling factors, there are also technical difficulties conveying clear links between individuals' attitudes toward language and abrupt language loss.

Second, a weightier normative concern than the former reason, structural injustices may be accompanied by a specific type of injustices that limit the capacity of individuals to obtain knowledge. Structural injustices often occur as a result of actions taken for granted, meaning that the enabling factors are often regarded as normal, commonsensical, and not problematic. I will argue that these normalizing tendencies may often work in tandem with unfair patterns that may be associated with the manner by which knowledge is distributed. I will try to explain my meaning based on the literature on epistemic injustice, which includes the debate illustrating how people can be wronged as knowers. This literature, which is based on the debate regarding social epistemology, illustrates how individuals may have differentiated access to knowledge, as such, which may constitute a distinct type of injustice, i.e., epistemic injustice.

The literature on epistemic injustice is rich. For the purpose of this chapter, I will focus on Miranda Fricker's concept of *hermeneutical* and *testimonial* injustice, which ignited the debate on how people who are knowers can be harmed. I will then focus on the issue of hermeneutical injustice, which may play a significant role in achievement of structural remedies for structural injustices.

Testimonial injustice occurs when a Speaker (S) is wronged, causing harm to her capacity to participate in the social act of testimony as a giver of knowledge. Testimonial injustice occurs when a Hearer (H) attributes less credibility than warranted to S based on a negative prejudice held by H towards the social identity of S (Fricker, 2007, p. 20).[24] H has an agential power to determine whether S can be regarded as a trustworthy source of knowledge. If H feels distrust for S's competence in understanding and transmitting knowledge, he will attribute deflated credibility to S. If H attributes a deficit of credibility simply because of a prejudice he holds toward the social identity of S, then he has committed a testimonial injustice.[25] [26]

Hermeneutical injustice occurs when an individual is wronged and her capacity to understand her social experiences is harmed. Imagine that the abovementioned S, a female living in a sexist society, is excluded from accessing and contributing to the collective forms of social understanding (Fricker, 2007, p. 148). For example, imagine that S is a first-generation female immigrant facing the aforementioned barriers that hinder her process of linguistic

[24]A speaker may also face an excess of credibility, placing the speaker in a disadvantageous position. However, as argued by Fricker, this does not always constitute testimonial injustice. See chapter 2 of Jose Medina's critique on Fricker's focus on credibility deficit (2013).

[25] Now, under some circumstances H may have a good reason for attributing a credibility deficit to S. Or, a credibility deficit may be the result of an innocent error or bad luck (Fricker, 2007, p. 33, 41). In such cases, credibility deficit is ethically and epistemically non-culpable.

[26] Social identity refers to a conception shared by people who participate in the collective social imagination, which informs people what it is or what it means to be of certain gender. age, race, etc. (Fricker, 2007, p. 14).

integration to the host country. Imagine that other listeners do not give her experiences proper consideration, simply because they do not understand what kind of mechanisms are placing S in her marginalized position. As a result, S and other women in similar situations are not able to partake in a crucial cognitive achievement that requires a collective process of sharing, reflecting, and building their experiences into knowledge. S and other women who are excluded from the collective process of cognitive achievement lack the conceptual and linguistic resources to make sense of what happens to them. Specifically, they are impaired in their ability to understand their own experiences as a source of knowledge and from fully flourishing as a knower (Fricker, 2007, p. 154).

Unlike testimonial injustice, with hermeneutical injustice the victims as well as the perpetrators or third parties are harmed. All suffer from the incapacity to understand the experiences of another person due to the shared insensitivity towards the experience as such, or, due to the shared insensitivity towards the manner in which certain experiences are expressed (see Medina, 2013).

I argue that structural injustice may be accompanied by hermeneutical injustices. In our case of structural linguistic injustice, recall how first- and second-generation immigrants faced the threat of abrupt language loss. The phenomenon of abrupt language loss is often not regarded as a harmful circumstance; moreover, it is rarely regarded as an occurrence of injustice. I argue that the reason for this is that experiences of abrupt language loss have been hermeneutically marginalized, resulting in an absence of understanding of the phenomenon as experiences of harm, moreover, potential occurrences of structural linguistic injustice.

When attempting to achieve structural remedies for structural linguistic injustice, I argue that there should also be specific epistemic remedies. Responsible moral agents who may bring about actual changes must obtain relevant knowledge regarding which phenomena are, in fact, unjust and what kinds of structural remedies are required.

4.4. Structural-epistemic responsibility

Young argues that two remedies are required for mediation of epistemic barriers. First and foremost, collective reflections and discussions are required in order to achieve successful structural remedies. In order to achieve a shared recognition of which actions by individuals conspire to structural injustices, conduct of collective discussions regarding these issues with the intention of improving the situation is required (Young, 2003, p. 17).

Second, priority should be given to the voices of those who suffer from structural injustices in order to determine which structural changes should be considered appropriate remedies. As Young argues, structurally marginalized groups of individuals often have "perspectival privilege," which provides "particular location-relative experience and a specific knowledge of social processes and consequences" (Young, 2000, p.136). Their epistemic insights regarding the function of social structures provide necessary information for achievement of a genuine structural remedy. Therefore, the lived experiences of those who suffer from said structural injustices must be revealed during the collective debates and referenced as a standard of structural remedies. In chapter 2, I had stressed the importance of uncovering constructive social structures. I argue that mitigating epistemic barriers is one way to inch closer to uncovering constructive social structures.

However, it is unclear how these two remedies might mitigate epistemic barriers. The vagueness of the two solutions mentioned above is troubling, not only due to the critical role of knowledge in achieving genuine structural remedy, but also because of the theoretical shortcoming that appears to limit the strength of structural injustice approaches that have been developed to date. I will now demonstrate that in order to achieve structural remedies, politically responsible moral actors must fulfill yet another distinct responsibility. Moral actors

have what I call the structural-epistemic responsibility, which is a duty to satisfy the epistemic condition in order to achieve genuine structural changes.

I present the following concept of structural-epistemic responsibility:

> *Structural-epistemic responsibility* refers to the duty of all politically responsible moral agents to fulfill the epistemic condition of structural remedy. Structural-epistemic responsibility includes two sub-categories: moral actors have the duty to 1) actively participate in social acts of testimony that transmit necessary knowledge of structural remedy (*testimonial structural-epistemic responsibility*), and 2) organize shared actions in order to spread necessary knowledge at a collective level (*organizational structural-epistemic responsibility*).[27]

In accordance with the contextual approach to the epistemic condition outlined above, I present a similarly contextual concept of structural-epistemic responsibility. Recall that while the same political responsibility to organize collective actions to induce structural change is shared by members of a society in virtue of participating in a social order that is structurally unjust, this does not mean that all individuals have the same tasks. Honoring political responsibility may be viewed differently from person to person, depending on a person's capacity to enact change, which is determined by positions held by these individuals in social structures. Drawing on this view, where responsibility is informed by an individual's privilege,

[27] I point out that structural-epistemic responsibility is mainly forward-looking, drawing from a team of social epistemologists who have developed a forward-looking concept of epistemic responsibility.

I argue that while structural-epistemic responsibility belongs to all politically responsible individuals, the expectations may differ from person to person.

From here onwards, I will demonstrate how structural-epistemic responsibility differs depending on the privilege of moral agents. First, I will address structurally disadvantaged individuals (henceforth SDI). It is important to note that while SDI are marginalized economically, socially, and politically, they enjoy a contrasting "perspectival privilege," characterized by "particular location-relative experience and a specific knowledge of social processes and consequences" (Young, 2000, p.136). SDI experience first-hand potential or actual vulnerabilities of exclusion, exploitation, and domination, therefore they have an easier time understanding social processes that conspire to structural injustices.

There two vantage points with regard to the epistemic privilege of SDI. On the one hand, SDIs have an understanding of why certain social processes may be objectionable. They understand that some currently manifested social structures are, for example, reproductions of past injustices. For example, negative racial stereotypes such as "the association of blackness with danger and criminality" that are prevalent today "is closely connected to the historical injustice of slavery and racial segregation in the US as, for example, it was used to justify unequal criminal legislation" (Nuti, 2019, p. 43). Black Americans may have an epistemic privilege in understanding why association of blackness with danger and criminality is an example of objectionable social processes that reproduce historical injustices. In addition, they may have immediate, first-hand understanding of how these typical racial stereotypes conspire to cause serious collective harms such as police brutality (Nuti, 2019, p. 44).

In order to further present my argument, let us return to our case of structural linguistic injustice. Members of structurally disadvantaged linguistic groups may have an epistemic privilege in understanding the harms of abrupt language loss, which may not be obvious to those who are not members of structurally disadvantaged linguistic groups. While the

difficulties of abrupt language loss, where individuals are not able to enjoy fundamental interests in language, are well known among second-generation migrant children, for instance, speakers of the dominant language may not even be aware of the occurrence of such a phenomenon for other co-members of society. My argument would demand structurally marginalized linguistic groups to transmit the knowledge of abrupt language loss to those who do not share their vantage point of first-hand experience.

This is not all. SDIs have an understanding of why certain social processes may be *constructive*. More specifically, they have an understanding of which social processes should be encouraged and extended rather than remedied in order to counteract objectionable social processes. For example, women have epistemic privilege in understanding why small actions such as discussing their experiences of sexual harassment with others (e.g. including a person's experiences as a part of the #metoo movement) may culminate into collective activisms that may induce structural changes to combat misogyny.

Again, regarding linguistic groups who face structural linguistic injustice, they may be aware of certain constructive social processes, which may counterbalance the objectionable or unjust social processes that place them in a position of disadvantage. For example, Mikaela Marlow and Howard Giles discuss how speakers of Hawaiian pidgin have developed numerous methods for responding to attitudes toward language that enable hierarchal relations among linguistic groups (2010). Ranging from avoidant to aggressive attitudes that clap back to hierarchal attitudes toward language, members of structurally disadvantaged linguistic groups have first-hand knowledge on how they have produced and maintained constructive attitudes that combat structural linguistic injustices. Unfortunately, this knowledge may not be so accessible for structurally privileged individuals who rarely have to clap back to any pejorative or hierarchal attitudes. In order to mitigate this gap of knowledge, structurally marginalized linguistic groups have the responsibility to transmit the knowledge of resistance.

The structural-epistemic responsibility of SDIs is influenced by their epistemic privilege. Regarding the testimonial structural-epistemic responsibility of SDI, as knowledge-givers they have a duty to participate in social acts of testimony in order to transmit necessary knowledge to those who may not have it. This might seem controversial. Consider the following argument that SDI bear an intellectually and emotionally exploitative burden of having to educate structurally privileged individuals about the oppression they face:

> Epistemic exploitation is a variety of epistemic oppression marked by unrecognized, uncompensated, emotionally taxing, coerced epistemic labor … [such as] exploiting the emotional and cognitive labor of members of marginalized groups who are required to do the unpaid and often unacknowledged work of providing information, resources, and evidence of oppression to privileged persons who demand it. (Berenstain, 2016, p. 570).

As argued by Nora Berenstein, there is a long history of epistemic exploitation, which occurs ubiquitously in many parts of society. For example, "[i]nstitutions of higher education often demand that faculty of color provide knowledge or education for diversity training and other programs that specifically depend on marginalized people sharing information about their experiences, perspectives, and marginalization within the academy." (Berenstein, 2016, p. 574). Or, when college courses are designed to address the issues of racism, "so far more the norm for these courses and programs to use racially coded language such as 'urban', 'inner city', and 'disadvantaged' but to rarely use 'white' or 'overadvantaged' or 'privileged'." (DiAngelo, 2011, p. 55). People of color or those who face structural disadvantages shoulder the burden of having to explain what it means to participate in a society that is racially oppressive.

The argument that SDI have the duty to participate in testimonies in order to transmit necessary knowledge, then, may be reinforcing already prevalent epistemic exploitation that

may be faced by SDI. I take this point and present an idea that may mitigate exploitation. I argue that *discernment* should be fostered by SDI as a testimonial virtue that constitutes a part of testimonial structural-epistemic responsibility (for an alternative understanding of testimonial virtue, see Fricker, 2007, Chapter 4). The virtue of discerning whether social acts of testimony in which they participate are exploitative or non-exploitative should be fostered by SDI.

For example, imagine that a female, as SDI within a misogynist society, confront "that white guy in an Ethnic Studies class who's exploring the idea that poor people might have babies to stay on welfare" or "some person arguing over drinks that maybe a lot of women *do* fake rape for attention" (Britto Schwartz 2014, her emphasis). Upon initiation of such a testimonial transaction, SDI should regard it as exploitative and abandon the transaction as a form of self-preservation. However, if the testimonial transaction is an earnest attempt to gain knowledge necessary for attainment of a structural remedy, SDI should participate as competent knowledge-givers.[28]

Going back to the case of language loss, it may be the responsibility of members of structurally disadvantaged linguistic groups to share the fact that they face certain threats not

[28] Even when testimonial transactions are identified as non-exploitative, SDI may still decline to share their knowledge: "Sometimes oppressed or marginalized publics do not communicate about certain things with other publics not because they are hermeneutically incapable of doing so, but because, given the special vulnerabilities they have accrued, it is not in their interest to do so. This amounts to a hermeneutical injustice because these publics—unlike hermeneutically privileged ones—are forced to inhabit communicative contexts in which they cannot exercise their hermeneutical capacities to make sense of their experiences, or they can only exercise them at high costs that others do not have to pay." (Medina, 2013, p.101).

faced by structurally privileged linguistic groups, such as the prospect of abrupt language loss. This might necessitate active resistance at an individual-level. For example, when students are banned from conversing in their heritage language in school compounds, members of structurally disadvantaged linguistic groups may be required to exercise their structural-epistemic responsibility to challenge implementation of such norms. However, while doing so, in order not to fall to epistemic exploitation, it is important for members of structurally disadvantaged linguistic groups to discern which other moral actors will be alleys and which may not be.

What about structurally privileged individuals (henceforth, SPI)? Unlike SDI, SPI often do not have epistemic privilege, where they are placed in social positions where they may have a reasonable understanding of how innocent and norm-abiding actions may conspire to cause serious collective harms. As a result, they often suffer from ignorance of social processes in general. In addition, SPI often develop a self-serving insensitivity toward knowledge that is necessary for achievement of a structural remedy. Spoiled by structural privileges that constantly place them in a position of power, SPI develop a habit of "carrying with them the presumption of knowing, of speaking authoritatively, of not being cognitively suspect, have but rare opportunities to find out their own limitations" (Medina, 2013, p. 30). As a result, their ignorance is actively perpetuated.

Regarding this ignorance as a serious matter, I argue that it is the testimonial structural-epistemic responsibility of SPI to actively participate in social acts of testimony that transmit necessary knowledge – as ignorant hearers. In order to avoid reproducing and perpetuating the epistemic exploitation mentioned above, participation of SPI in testimonial transaction must be a sincere pursuit of knowledge. While testimonial transactions may be conceived as discursive acts, I stress that SPI may also obtain necessary knowledge by examining already existing educational materials such as the literature, media and so on. In addition, as

individuals who enjoy economic, social, and political privileges, SPI have an additional organizational duty that SDI do not have: SPI have an organizational structural-epistemic responsibility to initiate and carry-out collective actions in order to spread necessary knowledge to other ignorant people.

In conclusion, I discuss the result that might be obtained when a person's structural-epistemic responsibility is successfully satisfied. Epistemic barriers that may disrupt the efforts of individuals to induce structural remedies may be mitigated by fulfillment of structural-epistemic responsibility. As a result, individuals would be able to obtain knowledge of constructive social structures, which may provide a reliable basis for planning and implementing structural remedies.

The notion of constructive social structures, which refer to habits, customs, practices, norms, or institutions that reproduce venerable resistances enacted by marginalized individuals, who have responded, fought, and resisted against objectionable social structures that enable structural injustices is introduced in chapter 2. Constructive social structures that resist structural injustices can be identified when individuals successfully satisfy structural-epistemic responsibility. Based on this knowledge, thousands of individuals may collectively organize and implement constructive actions that may function as structural remedies.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter theorized the epistemic dimensions of structural remedies. I mapped out three different types of knowledge that should be obtained to achieve successful structural remedies for structural linguistic injustice. Then, I identified two epistemic barriers that may disallow moral agents from obtaining said knowledge: (1) difficulties of establishing causal connections between individuals' innocent actions and structural injustice and (2) epistemic injustices that accompany structural injustice. Finally, I demonstrated how these epistemic barriers may be overcome. I argued that politically responsible moral actors have yet another distinct

responsibility, what I call the structural-epistemic responsibility. When these duties are fulfilled, epistemic barriers may be mitigated.

Chapter 5: Superseding structural linguistic injustice

5.1. Introduction

In this final chapter, I discuss the limits of structural remedy. By way of doing so, I link my analysis of structural linguistic injustice to the supersession thesis (Waldron, 1992b). Supersession occurs if it is no longer justified to correct past injustices in the present due to changed circumstances. I will map out the possibility of supersession of structural remedies for structural linguistic injustice. Especially, I will focus on language revitalization as a type of structural remedies and discuss whether the need for revitalization may be superseded.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I introduce Waldron's supersession thesis. Second, I consider two hypothetical cases where the requirement to revitalize endangered languages may fade and structural linguistic justice may be superseded. I distinguish between *full* supersession and *limited* (or partial) supersession. Third, I argue that three historically-sensitive dignity-based criteria are relevant for judging whether structural linguistic injustice has been superseded: (1) Are members of a non-dominant group who assimilate to a dominant group treated as inauthentic speakers of the dominant language even when they become fluent (and may other non-assimilated members of this group demand protection for their language on the assumption that assimilation would lead to persisting indignities)? (2) Do members of a non-dominant group have a reasonable complaint that, by speaking the language of the dominant group, they feel they are 'bowing down' (where what counts as 'reasonable' depends in part on past and present hierarchies)? (3) Do the state or other relevant agents provide a public assurance that non-dominant groups will receive justice and the social bases of self-respect (where what counts as appropriate assurance and forms of respect depends in part on the history of injustice)? I conclude by highlighting the limits of my analysis.

5.2. Supersession of structural linguistic injustice

In this section, I will consider when it might be appropriate to judge that the supersession of structural linguistic injustice, and the supersession of the requirement for language revitalization, has occurred. When, if ever, can it be said that such demands to reform unjust social processes should no longer result in language revitalization? I will not focus on all possible ways that supersession may occur. Rather, I will focus on when and whether dignity-based concerns provide barriers to concluding supersession has occurred.

I will begin by introducing Jeremy Waldron's supersession thesis. The supersession thesis raises one of the most noteworthy challenges in redressing historical injustice. It argues that changing circumstances can make it so that it becomes unjust to return to a situation like the one that existed before the injustice. Jeremy Waldron theorizes this thesis through a series of articles, which may be summarized in the following three steps (Waldron, 1992b, 2002, 2004):

1) If an injustice has occurred in the past,
2) And if there are morally relevant changes in circumstances,
3) It is no longer justified to correct the past injustice in the new set of circumstances.

Waldron argues that factual changes are important for normative considerations. Insofar as normatively relevant circumstances change, what justice demands may also change. Waldron applies the thesis to historical entitlements and argues that they may no longer persist as legitimate entitlements today due to changes in circumstances. According to Waldron, in such a case, we could say that historical injustice has been superseded (1992, p. 24).

I examine here the question of when, if at all, structural linguistic injustice may be superseded, such that justice no longer demands structural remedies (e.g., language

revitalization). I ask whether *unjust* social processes that cause language endangerment may be superseded. That is, I analyze whether the structural injustices that arise from these unjust social processes may be superseded.[29]

In the structural injustice approach, agents that participate in unjust social processes have a forward-looking political responsibility to intervene and reform objectionable social processes that cause language endangerment (Young, 2011; Lu, 2017). The requirement that structural reform take the form of language revitalization becomes especially apparent when we consider dignity-based concerns, explored further below. If efforts to reform unjust structures do not occur, this non-response may be an additional injustice.[30] However, structural remedy in the form of language revitalization may no longer be justified due to changed circumstances. For instance, instead of correcting negative language attitudes that lead to language endangerment, it might be better to not take any action. By discussing the possible supersession of unjust social processes, the first two issues present in the entitlement approach do not occur. The structural injustice approach does not focus on corporate agents existing through time, but on how structural processes form disadvantaged social positions that are

[29] The supersession thesis, as I introduced above, concerns historic injustices. However, because I am applying the supersession thesis to structural linguistic injustice, the focus is no longer on injustices that occurred in the past. Rather, I discuss how social processes, which have endured from the past into the present, may be superseded due to changes in circumstances. For this reason, I do not specify that whether analysis concerns social processes that have occurred in the past.

[30] Non-response may lead to additional liability for the state and its members, giving the structural injustice approach an interesting backward-looking dimension (Lu, 2017, pp. 258-259).

produced and reproduced through time (Young, 2011; Lu, 2017). As to the third issue, I will explain in a later section that linguistically endangered groups may require language revitalization as a specific type of structural reformation, especially in order to respond to their historically-sensitive dignity-based complaints. However, with changed circumstances, justice may no longer require revitalization. The requirement to reform unjust social processes may be superseded.

Catherine Lu briefly asks: "If the colonized people continue to adhere to certain 'ideas, values, or social structures of the former colonizer,' does this fact signify the perpetuation of colonial oppression or 'neocolonialism,' or do such developments indicate that historic injustice *may have been superseded?*" (2017, p. 174, my italics). My analysis similarly asks whether and how structural injustice can be superseded. (However, unlike Lu, my focus extends beyond the issue of the internalization of the colonizer's values.) I will examine the conditions under which supersession might occur by introducing two hypothetical cases.

5.3. My hypothetical cases

Consider two hypothetical cases, A and B, for judging when and whether supersession has occurred. Case A has a linguistic minority group that faces structural linguistic injustice. I will name this group Endangers, who speak Endangerish. Suppose that there is a dominant linguistic group, which I will name Safe, who speak Safen. Some Endangers may undergo assimilation to Safe, partly due to unjust social processes as I have outlined in chapter 3. I consider two aspects of assimilation: language shift and internalization of language attitudes. Assimilating Endangers may speak Safen at various levels and regard Endangerish as retrograde, and

therefore not conducive for social advancement, while viewing Safen as offering many opportunities.[31]

Supersession may occur in another way. Endangers may completely assimilate, so that they speak Safen and share Safe's language attitudes. Furthermore, former members of Endanger do not have dignity-based complaints and the justificatory bases of language revitalization (in terms of dignity) would no longer exist. In this case, the unjust social structures that lead to language endangerment would be *fully superseded* (on full supersession, see Meyer & Waligore, 2018). Language policies should then no longer aim at revitalization. It would no longer be just to revive lost or almost dead languages and the minority language speakers will only be entitled to structural support that does not exceed the scope of fairness.[32] This means that the state may implement per-capita language policies, where endangered language groups receive sufficient governmental support to sustain their current size and prosperity, but not enough to increase them. Or, language policies may even drop the

[31] I acknowledge that this treatment of assimilation is rather selective, leaving out culture, customs, speech habits, ideology, and other aspects. I narrow my scope to make my analysis of supersession clearer.

[32] The supersession may also be *final* (supersession occurs permanently and for-all-time) or *dormant* (supersession occurs for-the-time-being) (Meyer & Waligore, 2018). With dormant supersession, even if there are fully assimilated minority groups, it might be considered just in the future to revive dead languages in newly risen circumstances. I think that whether supersession is final or dormant depends on a number of factors. For instance, whether Endangers identify as Safes after assimilation or whether newly assimilated Endangers are accepted by Safe could be relevant. Furthermore, an occurrence of injustice may give rise to the need for nation building. Hebrew is arguably an example of such revival.

multilingual assumption and provide monolingual language policies that only protect and promote dominant languages within its territory (van Parijs, 2011).

However, I am doubtful how useful it would be to assume that a very high degree of assimilation would occur. Case A seems much too idealized. Instead of an idealized hypothetical case, I offer case B, a more realistic hypothetical case of limited assimilation. (This realistic scenario is, in fact, modeled after actual examples, which I will discuss in detail in section 5.4.). In my more realistic case, I want to assume a lower degree of assimilation. By doing so, I may highlight issues that are also present in the real world.

Imagine that in case B Endangers still face structural injustice, but most are only partially assimilated. Endangers adopt Safen and lose Endangerish in varying degrees, so that only a few Endangers perfectly assimilate, while the rest do not. Moreover, Endangers adopt Safe's language attitudes to varying degrees. For example, Endangers who do not currently speak Safen well may accept that Safen is conducive for social advancement, while valuing Endangerish for identity or life-world related reasons. They might (or their children might) pursue assimilation, while possibly feeling regretful, stigmatized, and disrespected. In other words, partially assimilated Endangers adopt language attitudes where they feel that Endangerish has instrumental and non-instrumental value in a limited fashion.

In case B, it is unlikely that partially assimilated Endangers do not have any dignity-based concerns. With limited assimilation, dignity-based concerns may persist, although they may be less weighty. In case A, I suggested that *full* supersession could occur if Endangers no longer have any dignity-based concerns. In case B, I argue that *limited* supersession may occur (cf. Meyer & Waligore, 2018, for a slightly different idea of *partial* supersession). Limited supersession translates into changes in language policies, but less ambitious policies than if no supersession at all occurs. If structural reform demanded language policies that mandated a 5:5 distribution of resources between the majority and the minority, limited supersession may

demand policies that mandate a 6:4 or 7:3 distribution of resources. This means that language policies after limited supersession occurs could fall between non-revitalization policies (such as monolingual or per-capita policies) and revitalization policies (per-language or equal-services). Responsibilities to reform structures through language revitalization policies would remain, but in a more limited form.[33]

5.4. Dignity-based concerns and supersession

So far, I have discussed how supersession of the requirement to revitalize endangered languages may occur. In this section, I present three historically-sensitive dignity-based concerns that may arise from structural linguistic injustice. These provide three criteria for judging whether supersession has occurred. If dignity-based complaints may be considered reasonable due to the history of injustice, we have less reason to think supersession has occurred. The analysis could be developed further, by looking into other criteria (dignity-based and otherwise) and how these criteria interact or overlap with each other. However, I limit myself to introducing three dignity-based criteria. These criteria will usually argue against the possibility of supersession of language revitalization. In other words, structural remedies for structural linguistic injustice should occur.

5.4.1. Treatment as inauthentic speakers

The first criterion is drawn from Frantz Fanon. Fanon's analysis of colonial injustice (1986) shows how formerly colonized subjects may hold dignity-based concerns based on how they

[33] Alternatively, if we consider the interests of dominant language speakers (which is outside the scope of this paper), then monolingual or per-capita policies may be considered unfair. However, a limited shift to an intermediate ratio may still be justified.

are treated after having assimilated to the colonizer's language. Fanon argues that the colonized who adopted the colonizer's language were treated as second-rate speakers. Even if they had developed full competence in the imposed language, and even if they went beyond achieving mere competence (e.g. developing novel ways to speak these languages in ways that contest colonial hierarchy by imbuing them with unique vocabulary, grammar, and historical-political contexts), they were not treated as authentic speakers. Rather, they were viewed as mimicking the colonizers. (Fanon also says that the colonized may internalize a sense of inferiority, but that is not my focus here.) I think Fanon's analysis provides an interesting criterion for supersession, because it shows that assimilating to a dominant language does not promise respect. More precisely, his analysis offers grounds to argue against supersession.

I stipulate the first criterion that argues against the possibility of supersession as follows:

> If speakers are treated as inauthentic speakers, after the assimilation to another language, this treatment may suggest that the speakers are not treated as equals. Such treatments indicate that the possibility of supersession of language revitalization would be minimal.

Consider again my hypothetical case B, this time with additional details: highly assimilated Endangers (who now speak Safen) are considered to be inauthentic speakers of Safen. This on its own will result in assimilated Endangers experiencing disrespect or humiliation and having dignity-based complaints. Imagine this humiliation were made known to other, less assimilated Endangers. Endangers would hold dignity-based concerns that may require revitalization of Endangerish. This demand seems especially reasonable, as partially assimilated members could anticipate similar treatment even if they were to achieve perfect assimilation. They could point to precedents. In such a context, there is less reason to think supersession has occurred.

Consider now the not-so-hypothetical case of Martinique. Fanon describes how French-speaking Martinicans were treated as if they are 'aping' the European French. This concrete case shows how assimilated speakers may experience disrespect through being treated as inauthentic speakers (another example is being treated as speaking the dominant language in an 'improper' way). If, in this case, Martinicans continue to face processes of assimilation while being denied recognition as authentic speakers of French, it raises issues of justice. Furthermore, if highly assimilated Martinicans have remaining dignity-based concerns, then full supersession has likely *not* occurred. Limited supersession might occur; however, this occurrence would raise a strong interest in resisting further assimilation. Historically-sensitive dignity-based complaints may block us from judging that supersession has fully occurred, even if other reasons for structural reform fade away.

5.4.2. Power hierarchies: past and present

Fanon's extensive analysis also includes two other phenomena. One is diglossia, which refers to a circumstance where the colonizer's language functions as the 'high' language, being spoken in public domains, while the local language becomes the 'low' language limited to private spheres. The other was negative language attitudes people held towards local languages and their speakers. These phenomena point to the issue of power, which is linked to my second criterion, which I draw from Anna Stilz (2015). Stilz argues that current power relations may function as a reliable criterion for distinguishing reasonable dignity-based complaints (of not being able to speak one's language) from unreasonable ones. Some speakers of minority languages may feel like they are 'bowing down' to a dominant language group. Stilz argues that if current power hierarchies accompany their feeling, their dignity-based complaint may be considered reasonable (or more reasonable):

> It is reasonable to feel insulted by the choice of a social standard that diverges from one's preferences where background power inequalities between groups have caused that social standard to be structured in the way it is. (Stilz, 2015, p. 183-4).

I agree with this line of argument, but wish to go further than Stilz does.

The complaint of feeling that one is 'bowing down' may have more weight if the power structure endures from the past into the present. Recall my hypothetical case B. I argue that there is less reason to think supersession has occurred in case B if there is a power imbalance between Endangers and Safe, in particular, if Endangers are dominated. If assimilated or assimilating Endangers are treated as inferior by Safes, while being situated in the context of power hierarchy highlighted by diglossia or negative attitudes, there is less reason to think that the requirement to revitalize Endangerish has been superseded.

Moreover, the complaint of 'bowing down' may be stronger if there is a history of domination that continues into the present, which is something Stilz does not consider. Imagine that in my case B, a new group arrives, named Migrant. Imagine, now, that Endanger has a history of being dominated by Safe while Migrant does not. In the present, Endanger and Migrant both face domination. There is less reason in Endanger's case (as compared to Migrant's) to think that supersession has occurred.

On these bases, I articulate the second criterion that may argue against the possibility of supersession of the need for language revitalization. Note that this criterion comes in two versions, one informed by Stilz and one informed by my attention to enduring power structures:

> Version 1: If there are currently manifest power structures and if speakers who underwent assimilation are placed in powerless positions, this may

indicate that the possibility of supersession of language revitalization would be minimal.

Version 2: If there are power structures that endures from the past into the present and if speakers who underwent assimilation are placed in powerless positions, this may indicate that the possibility of supersession of language revitalization would be minimal.

Again, consider an actual case where the criterion of 'bowing down' helps us understand how to judge whether supersession has occurred. Consider how British English was (and often still is) thought to be superior to US English. This actual case has colonial roots. The past colonial hierarchy between the British and Americans is now inverted due to changed circumstances, with the US becoming a global superpower. US English now enjoys more linguistic privilege than British English (or roughly as much). The injustice that occurred during the development of US English is superseded after a change in who occupies a higher position in the hierarchy. Similarly, if India becomes more powerful in the future, a comparable inversion of hierarchy may occur between British English and Indian English. People may increasingly develop positive attitudes towards Indian English. However, racialized hierarchy might still remain between India and Britain (unlike in the British-US example). This shows the importance of considering different types of hierarchies when examining supersession.

Now consider Finland, which has a history of lingusitic domination, in addition to being one of the most successful economies in Europe today (Singleton, 1998, p. 2). Until the 19th centry, Finland was governed by Sweden. During that period, Swedish and Finnish formed a diglossia, as '[t]he Swedish language made headway amongs the commercial middle classes in the towns, amongst the professional classes and, of course, as the langauge of the nobility … [while] Finnish continued to be the language of the peasants, the fisherfolk and the mass of ordinary people' (Singleton, 1998, p. 53). Now imagine a future where Finland gains more

international status and power, yet the Finnish language faces endangerement, despite the new circumstances. If there are reasons of justice to protect Finnish, they will not be based on my dignity-based concerns. Any concern Finnish speakers once had about having to 'bow down' would not be relevant to judgments about supersession.

5.4.3. Historically-sensitive assurance and the social-bases of self-respect

The third criterion is drawn from Timothy Waligore (2016), who analyzes the relation between the history of injustice and what John Rawls (1971) calls the social bases of self-respect. Waligore argues that public displays of respect and disrespect shapes whether people trust the government and fellow citizens to treat them as equals. For instance, when the government or public buildings display the Confederate battle flag, African-Americans experience disrespect and distrust towards the state. Even if (which is doubtful) the government and citizens do in fact enact just policies, it may not be known to African-Americans that they do so. In a very real sense, the government and citizens fail to provide justice because they fail to provide a *public assurance* that justice is done. Waligore argues that the history of injustice makes African-Americans' experience of disrespect and distrust reasonable. Removing the flag and ending other overtly odious policies might not be enough because it may be difficult for African-Americans to know that citizens and the government are acting justly (Waligore, 2016, p. 46). Given the history of injustice, Waligore argues that the state should offer African-Americans historically-sensitive assurances that the state aims to provide justice and the social-bases for self-respect. He argues that one way to do this is through a costly signal: providing reparations-like policies that aim at reducing group inequalities. Although these policies may resemble group-based reparations that a historical entitlement approach might argue for, Waligore supports these policies based on the need to provide an assurance that is attentive to how past injustice changes what can be publicly known (2016, p. 49).

While Waligore does not discuss language specifically, his argument can easily be applied to linguistic justice. Imagine that in my hypothetical case B (and its variants), Safe's state pushed Endangers to assimilate through stigmatizing policies. Even if those policies end, it may be hard for them to know they are accepted as equals. If they lack a historically-sensitive public assurance from Safe's state or other relevant actors, there is less reason to think that the requirement to revitalize the language Endangerish has been superseded.

On this basis, I articulate the third criterion that may argue against the possibility of supersession:

> If there are presently implemented policies that stigmatize speakers who underwent assimilation, this may indicate that the possibility of supersession of language revitalization would be minimal.

To see this, consider a counterfactual case drawing from Belgium's history. Until 1898, Flemish speakers (in fact) underwent a history of linguistic domination, because French was imposed as the only official language of Belgium and no public service, signage or higher education were provided in Flemish. Imagine (counterfactually) that the Belgian government did not recognize Flemish as its official language after 1898. If, in my counterfactual case, the Flemish continued to face stigmatization, they may reasonably distrust the state. One way the state could publicly signal respect is by implementing costly linguistic policies. Again, these policies would be justified not through any backward-looking entitlement, but because they provide historically-sensitive social bases of self-respect for the Flemish. Without public assurance, there would be a barrier to judging that supersession had occurred.

5.5. Conclusion

As my final chapter, I showed that the requirement of structural reform for language revitalization may or may not be superseded, especially with regard to historically-sensitive dignity-based concerns. It is important to note that my analysis only concerned a localized effect of structural injustice, namely, loss of langauge, and whether the requirement to revitalize a language is superseded with changed circumstances. Given the broad scope of social processes, structural injustice may include cultural, physical, and psychological harms that go beyond language endangerment. Even if supersession of structural *linguistic* injustice occurs, there still may be persisting reasons to redress general structural injustice. Assessing other persisting reasons would require analysis of each harm caused by structural injustice, reasons for reform, and factors and criteria that may be relevant for supersession.

Conclusion

The aim of this dissertation was to merge the debate on linguistic justice and the debate on structural injustice approach together, in order to addressed the phenomena of language loss. Based on novel insights drawn from both debates, this dissertation argued that our own daily actions, which appear to be innocent and banal, may place linguistic minorities under threat of a particular type of language loss, i.e. abrupt language loss, while linguistic majorities do not face such a threat. If certain groups of people face the threat of abrupt language loss, while other groups do not, I find that there is a serious moral issue, especially since abrupt language loss may undermine a person's enjoyment of a set of fundamental interests in language.

The contribution of this dissertation was two-fold. First, I introduced the structural injustice approach to the debate on linguistic justice, which was an original contribution to the literature. Thanks to the structural injustice approach, the normative significance of the actions of individuals that enable serious harms at a collective level was highlighted. This focus offered an enriching analysis of language loss, which had not yet been reported in the existing literature on linguistic justice. Second, the dissertation contributed to the literature on the structural injustice approach. I broadened the scope of analysis of the structural injustice approach in two ways. On the one hand, I developed a novel concept of structural linguistic injustice, a type of structural injustice that has not yet been discussed in the existing literature. On the other hand, while developing the notion of structural linguistic injustice, I will also offer a novel perspective on structural remedies that accounts for a hitherto underdeveloped dimension, i.e., epistemic dimension.

Because my engagement with the debates were purposeful, more research could be done to broaden the scope of the debate on linguistic justice as well as the debate on the structural injustice approach. In chapter 1 I developed the theory of relational linguistic

continuity to support the security interest as one of the fundamental interests in language. Further research could be done on how the theory of relational linguistic continuity could justify the right to linguistic survival. Furthermore, in chapter 2 I argued that we should broaden the scope of analysis by attempting to identify which social structures are constructive, i.e., resist and counterbalance said structural injustices. More research is need to further unpack the relation between constructive social structures and epistemic dimensions of structural remedies, as my theory of structural-epistemic responsibility is but one way to address the relation between the two.

Notwithstanding these additional research objectives that should be addressed in future research, I hope that my dissertation has provided an example of a work that aims to broaden the debates on linguistic justice and structural linguistic injustice.

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