This is a draft version (accepted manuscript)

Can pro-equity hybrid governance shape an egalitarian city?
Lessons from post-Katrina New Orleans.

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Abstract

This paper examines how different housing actors (Social Resilience Cells and their partners, Institutional Structures, Neighborhood Communities) in post-Katrina New Orleans have activated their social capital into institutional capital. It uses a critical up-to-date synthesis of social capital enriched by governance theories to investigate how new governance hybridities can be shaped in order to guide the city's housing redevelopment. Furthermore, the paper seeks to evaluate the potential these governance hybridities have in redeveloping the city toward an egalitarian post-disaster city. By this, we mean a city in which all affected neighborhoods are recognized for their unique housing and social needs as well as for their distinct socio-demographic and physical characteristics, and where different Social Resilience Cells are responsive to the needs of specific communities. The paper examines the unique rebuilding footprint and governance formation potential of eight Social Resilience Cells in New Orleans. Our results show that governance-improving fermentations were mostly brought to life by pro-equity and pro-comaterializing Social Resilience Cells and their alliances at the local level during the late recovery years. Nonetheless, the new forms of governance are dominated by the pro-profit political economy paradigm. As such, the potential of the improved governance hybridities in facilitating egalitarian socio-spatial effects has remained moderate.

Keywords: social resilience cells, social capital, institutional capital, governance hybridity, egalitarian city

Introduction

This paper presents *Social Resilience Cells (SRCs)* as central actors of the post-Katrina redevelopment governance and process in New Orleans. Introduced by Paidakaki and Moulaert (2017, 2018), SRCs are housing policy implementers that play a significant role in the redevelopment of the post-disaster city by activating, promoting and implementing their specific views on what target groups (high-medium-low income), neighborhoods (strategic, ghettoized, underinvested) and types of housing (market rate, low-income, subsidized) should be prioritized in post-disaster redevelopment strategies, policies and programs. The SRCs' role is manifest in the way they capitalize projects, seek access to public and charity funding and mobilize technical and managerial skills. To promote their views and become leading agents in the post-disaster redevelopment experiment, SRCs seek partnerships with *institutional structures* to foster a more influential collective agency. Institutional structures are defined as established organizations, public or state entities (state agencies, governmental authorities, elected officials), semi-public (public-sponsored enterprises) or private bodies (lobbying firms, foundations, faith-based organizations, intermediaries, consultancies, financial institutions), dedicated to the promotion of a cause or program – in this case, affordable housing provision (Paidakaki and Moulaert, 2018).

Through our research, we identified three types of SRCs within the housing system in New Orleans*. Pro-growth SRCs* work together with powerful institutional structures to generate and extract exchange values from land use intensification; these SRCs treat houses as profitable commodities (Paidakaki and Moulaert, 2018, p. 7-8). *Pro-equity SRCs* work intimately with progressive institutional structures and social movements to advocate primarily for the use value of houses and a fairer distribution of financial resources across affordable housing providers. *Pro-comaterializing SRCs* are housing providers engaged in co-materializing initiatives such as housing cooperatives, community land trusts and grass-roots rebuilding initiatives, collectively erecting houses in "solidarity" (Paidakaki and Moulaert, 2018, p. 8). While their general philosophy, competences and alliance building significantly overlap with pro-equity SRCs, pro-comaterializing SRCs are less dependent on public funds and operate as critics of the dysfunctionalities of public housing programs that fail to target the poorest of the poor and secure true longevity of housing affordability.

Previous research on SRCs emphasized the role of their *discourse* and *activism* in shaping recovery processes in post-disaster conditions, in particular in post-Katrina New Orleans (Paidakaki and Moulaert, 2017, 2018; Paidakaki and Parra, 2018). The present paper provides a real-life grip of the various ways in which SRCs in New Orleans have mobilized their *social capital* during the post-Katrina recovery years. This has involved making connections, steering institutionalization processes and building rich social networks as a resource of new *institutional capital* capable of transforming enduring pro-growth and exclusive governance arrangements that traditionally accommodate the interests of pro-growth SRCs and their well-off clientele in US cities (Brenner and Theodore, 2005; Peck, 2006; Gotham, 2012; Gotham and Greenberg, 2014). Thus, the paper seeks answers to the following three pressing questions: What are the features of SRCs' social capital? In what ways do different SRCs activate their social capital and valorize it into institutional capital that can create new forms of redevelopment governance hybridities? To what extent have novel post-disaster governance formations led to the development of egalitarian cities?

To answer these questions, the paper provides a critical reading and an up-to-date synthesis of *social capital theory*. We analyze how, through the social dynamics of SRCs, social capital is valorized into *institutional capital* (alliance-building, partnerships). Insights from *governance theories* cast light on the *institutional* and *relational character* of SRCs' heterogeneous social capital features; these reveal the types of governance hybridities that provide fertile ground for different SRCs to survive and grow. The paper is inspired by a vision of an *egalitarian city*: that is, a city where *all* neighborhoods are recognized for their unique housing and social needs as well as for their distinct socio-demographic and physical characteristics and where SRCs and institutional structures are jointly responsive to the specific needs of communities. Building on this vision, the paper seeks to identify equity-inspired democratic governance hybridities that guide the development of such a city and accommodate the needs and aspirations of all SRCs, their partners, as well as their target social groups and neighborhoods (see also Mathie and Cunningham, 2003; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; Saleebey, 2006 in Ennis and West, 2012).

How do these governance hybridities materialize? We examine governance formations by focusing on the relational performance of social capital within intra-and-inter level housing governance

arrangements. *Intra-level governance* includes the social capital features that are part of the SRCs' endogenous governance arrangements. These features refer to SRCs' own social capital, the impact of horizontal interactions with other SRCs on their social capital as well as the manner in which they (co)construct institutional capital (alliances, federations) essential for the building of the inter-level governance edifices. *Inter-level governance* is built on social capital features that constitute the exogenous governance structures of SRCs, i.e. the socio-institutional and political 'terrains' in which SRCs are embedded (Kearns, 2003). These arrangements are divided into two categories: (i) the interactions of SRCs with institutional structures embodying various adversarial and non-adversarial logics and cultural frames with the purpose of leveraging additional support and entitlements; and (ii) the interactions of SRCs with their target populations in order to revitalize local participation, knowledge transfers and technical and personal skills for capacity building and to invigorate human, social and political capital. These interactions could produce exogenous institutional capital in various forms, such as neighborhood associations, inclusive public participation forums and human-centered public-private partnerships.

Methodology

The nature and transformative impact of SRCs' social capital features and institutional capital on post-disaster housing (re)development were empirically examined in a six-month, short-term ethnographic research conducted by the first author in New Orleans. This ethnographic study reviewed eight SRCs: *A Community Voice – Louisiana/Southern United Neighborhoods[i] (ACV and SUN), Jericho Road Episcopal Housing Initiative (JREHI), Broadmoor Development Corporation (BDC), HRI Properties (HRI), Gulf Coast Housing Partnership (GCHP), Providence Community Housing (PCH), New Orleans Area Habitat for Humanity (NOAHH), Crescent City Community Land Trust (CCCLT)*. The purposive selection of these eight SRCs had a dual aim: (i) to gain a deeper insight into the nature and variability of SRCs' roles in socio-spatial redevelopment or rebuilding processes and (ii) to develop a broader understanding of SRCs' different social capital features and diverse activations to form novel, more democratic, governance arrangements.

For the ethnographic study, the first author spent two weeks at the offices of each SRC[ii] to gain a deeper insight into their unique housing development model and social relations with peer SRCs

and institutional structures. During these two weeks, she collected and analyzed organization documents (annual reports, evaluation studies, programmatic audits, funding applications, community stories) and conducted 35 semi-structured interviews with key staff members (presidents; vice presidents; executive directors; directors of infrastructure, fund development, volunteer services; community and homebuyer outreach officers; project managers, lead organizers, real estate partners). She also visited construction sites and participated in staff meetings, community meetings and meetings of the SRCs with their alliances. The ethnographic research was complemented with participant observation and note-taking in three meetings of the Greater New Orleans Housing Alliance – GNOHA (an alliance of mainly pro-equity and pro-comaterializing SRCs), four meetings of HousingNOLA (a GNOHA-led initiative to co-produce a housing plan for the city of New Orleans) as well three in-depth interviews with the president, the program manager and the program coordinator of GNOHA.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 1. reviews the essentials of leading social capital theories and highlights their merits and lacunae. This in turn is used to theorize the reproduction of institutional capital and the governance of urban (re)development processes. Applying theories of social capital, institutional capital and governance to SRCs, we further explain the formation of intra-and-inter-level governance hybridities by documenting the relational character of social capital and its metabolism into institutional capital. Section 2. examines SRCs' potential roles in housing (re)development as well as the social capital features active in forming novel governance hybridities in post-Katrina New Orleans. Section 3. reflects on the empirical findings and draws conclusions about the opportunities and limitations of governance hybridization processes for fostering egalitarian redevelopment outcomes.

1. Social capital: literature gaps and new linkages with institutional capital and governance

In its most general meaning, social capital is considered as a set of qualitative social relations attributed to widely defined members of 'civil society' (civic groups, neighborhood associations, individuals). The term mainly focuses on the positive consequences of sociability. In its most mainstream interpretations, social capital tends to disconnect civil society from coercive power (Eizaguirre et al., 2012) and dysfunctional political and institutional arrangements. Some authors

even consider social capital theory as an analytical instrument of utilitarianism and neoliberal public choice theory (Somers, 2008). We do not share this position but rather see social capital as a concept that can be used to analyze changes in social relations – including governance relations from the bottom-up – to transform socio-political institutions that frame urban development. To understand how SRCs' social capital is activated and translated into institutional capital with the ambition of transforming governance structures, it is essential to engage with social capital's more societal and political definitions (see Fine, 2002; Moulaert & Nussbaumer, 2005; Humphreys, 2007). To this end, we first turn to the essentials of emblematic social capital theories developed by Bourdieu (1980, 1985, 1986), Coleman (1988, 1990), and Putnam (1994, 1995, 1996). We highlight the merits as well as the lacunae of these theories and their potential to theorize the genesis of institutional capital and the governance of urban (re)development processes (section 1.1). We then build up linkages between social capital manifestations and different inter-and-intra-linked governance arrangements and their institutional capital (section 1.2) and analyze the catalytic role of the interactions of SRCs with target communities and institutional structures, thus building institutional capital steering governance fermentations.

1.1. Social capital theory: state of the art and literature gaps

Though Pierre Bourdieu was a pioneer and a prominent scholar in social capital theory, his work is less influential in the dialogue on social capital in the community literature development (DeFilippis, 2001). Bourdieu defined social capital as the *sum of resources* and *packages of capitals* and *power* that accrue to a socially privileged individual or group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition (DeFilippis, 2001; Fine, 2002; Siisiainen, 2003; Farr, 2004). This appropriation does not relate to altruistic, free of interest actions but reflects power asymmetries in people's opportunities to pursue their interests (Siisiainen, 2003; Obrist et al., 2010). These asymmetries are essential for the accumulation of social capital and the establishment as well as the consolidation of certain governance forms that cater to particular interest groups. Coleman, in contrast to Bourdieu, developed a less political understanding of social capital by interpreting the concept in normatively and morally neutral terms (DeFilippis, 2001; Farr, 2004). For him (1990), social capital is defined as a function of social structure facilitating productive social interactions

(Burt, 2001; Farr, 2004). For Coleman, social capital is inherently functional, allowing people or institutions to meet their goals and to act by activating their resources (Taylor, 2000; DeFilippis, 2001; Fine, 2002). Putnam, with his utopic definition of social capital, is probably the most influential scholar of social capital theory. He argues that social capital is a resource possessed by individuals or groups of people that enables them to act towards their shared interests and goals. The pursuit of shared interests (which rise above individual interests) and collective conflict resolution are coordinated in a horizontal/participatory way and are always based on t*rust, common values and reciprocity* (Taylor, 2000; DeFilippis, 2001; Putnam, 1993, p.167 in Burt, 2001; Siisiainen, 2003; Farr, 2004; Putnam, 1996, cited on p.34 in Moulaert & Nussbaumer, 2005). Putnam builds on Coleman's work but focuses on specific aspects of social interaction that contribute to the improvement of democratic functions (Putnam, 1995; Farr, 2004).

The perspectives on social capital of these three emblematic scholars (Bourdieu, Coleman, and Putnam) reveal significant gaps in their connections to institutional and political capital and, therefore, their potential to analyze social capital's role in governance formation and transformation. Putnam's analysis of an idealized homogeneous community misrepresents the pluralism and fragmentation of real life's civil society and its governance. Emphasising trust and solidarity, he neglects to incorporate the important social capital features of conflictual interests, asymmetric power relations, inequalities/unevenness in accessing resources and opportunities, suspicion, contestations, trust interruptions (or distrust manifestations), as well as the roles of culture, norms and institutions in the real hetero-production of cities (see also DeFilippis, 2001; Siisiainen, 2003; Somers, 2008; Moulaert, 2017). In reality, civil society consists of associated and disaffiliated groups with different levels of trust and distrust between and across them, but also with different political and economic power. In such heterogeneous societies, distrust*,* just like trust, expresses a democratic quality reflecting plurality and (in)toleration of cultural differences. A less attractive aspect of heterogeneity, at least with respect to social justice, is the power asymmetries across groups and the use of foul strategies or shirking by groups and powerful agents to check and dominate other groups and agents. Bourdieu rightly argues that better-connected individuals and groups are in a more privileged position to access resources and influence (re)development processes; this in turn has the capacity of hampering the development potential of other groups and agents. What Bourdieu fails to incorporate in his theory however is that power

asymmetries do not necessarily remain stagnant but are often reshaped as a result of trust and distrust building, varying relations of power and power positions, activism, resistance and cooperation. Contrary to Coleman's ethical neutrality, this development is not only witnessed when people or collectivities seek to satisfy their interests in the pursuit of material assets (e.g. housing). Indeed, immaterial functional uses of social capital are also expressed in the form of (spontaneous) solidarity and reciprocity actions taken by groups and individuals without the expectation of mutual benefits.

1.2. Linking social capital, institutional capital and governance hybridization

To understand how SRCs can steer governance fermentations for the redevelopment of a post-disaster egalitarian city, we focus on the inextricable nexus between social capital, institutional capital and governance forms. In real life socialization processes, particular features of social capital metabolize into institutional capital with hybridized value-systems, institutional forms, durable mobilization and collective agencies/leaderships. The literature on institutional capital or institutional capacity recognizes various features of institutional capital; many of these features overlap with those of social capital, and even more so with those of institutional capacity or political capital (Khakee, 2010). But institutional capacity and political capital focus on mobilization capacity and building power to achieve collective decision-making.

Following Amin and Thrift (1995, quoted by Vanebo & Murdock, 2012, p.147), institutional capacity rests on six criteria: (i) the persistence of local institutions; (ii) a deepening 'archive' of commonly-held knowledge (both formal and tacit); (iii) the ability of organizations to change; (iv) high innovation capacity; (v) capacity to develop relations of trust and reciprocity; (vi) a sense of a common project. Features (v) and (vi) are also commonly assigned to social capital. Healey et al. define three components of institutional capital: shared knowledge resources, relational resources and mobilization capacity (Healey, 1998; Healey et al., 1999). Political capital then integrates most of the features of institutional capital but stresses mobilization for (countervailing) power building and the valorization of financial and material assets.

SRCs, individual agents and institutional structures work together on projects aiming to satisfy their mutual development ambitions (González & Healey, 2005; Swyngedouw & Jessop, 2006). The interactions between institutional structures, SRCs and individuals heavily depend on the convergence or complementarity of their social capital, the capacity of building institutional capital and, hence, on the potential to formulate *hybrid governance formulation.* Important lessons regarding the true nature of democratic governance structures can be learned in analyzing SRCs' various value-oriented social capital features that mobilize various forms of institutional capital. Such governance structures are usually hybridizations of what Jessop and Swyngedouw have identified as four (basic) governance forms: (i) coordination or anarchy through market exchange; (ii) the hierarchy of imperative coordination in and through organizations, including the state; (iii) the heterarchy of self-organization in networks; and (iv) the unconditional commitment associated with love, loyalty, and solidarity (Swyngedouw & Jessop, 2006, p. 9) and of which Manganelli and Moulaert (2018) have analysed the hybridization dynamics. Democratic governance forms will especially be hybrids of forms (iii) and (iv), which in reality often act as corrections to market anarchy and top-down control systems.

We now "map out" social capital features of SRCs and the manner in which they metabolize into institutional capital within multi-level endogenous and exogenous governance arrangements. In the endogenous governance arrangements, the building of institutional capital highly relies on internal social capital dynamics. In contrast, in the exogenous governance arrangements the metabolization of social capital (e.g. lobbying, cooperation, community outreach) into institutional capital (e.g. public-private partnerships, neighborhood associations, public participation forums) is quintessential.

1.2.1. Building endogenous governance edifices

The vast majority of SRCs advocate for and implement various kinds of governance hybridities and revitalization projects. In particular, alternative pro-equity and pro-comaterializing SRCs activate their social capital and interact with their peers in order to: build up larger alliances/movements/coalitions; develop common visions and joint actions to support capacity building in neighborhoods; and trigger wider urban socio-political transformations (see also Gittell

& Wilder, 1999; Bratt 2006; Seidman, 2013). The intra-linked relational webs (social capital) within which SRCs foster their institutional capacity usually take the form of alliances, partnerships and associations. These collective agents, embodying institutional capital, challenge ill-defined/dysfunctional governance arrangements and advocate for new relationships with institutional structures, policy frameworks and governmental policy improvements that would benefit both the SRCs and their target communities (see also Healey, 1998; Moulaert & Cabaret, 2006; Smith, 2008). Hence, the two types of alternative SRCs – the pro-equity and the pro-comaterializing – inherently actuate their social capital to establish more solidarity-inspired governance forms.

1.2.2. Building exogenous governance edifices

SRCs and their alliances are situated in environments in which a variety of multilevel institutional structures shape housing systems (Healey, 1998). In democratic societies, all SRCs – individually and through their networks – build up institutional and political capital (movements, lobbies, countervailing powers) thus seeking to sustain or transform prevailing institutional structures. This political objective is pursued through various mechanisms such as formal and informal partnership agreements for housing policy implementation and co-production of housing plans and strategies. In these governance-forming processes, institutional structures play an instrumental role. On the one hand, when responsive to SRCs' institutional and political capital build-up, institutional structures are ready to: break up traditional institutional arrangements; question their underlying values; and open up to innovative institutional capital. This creates new opportunities for new governance hybridities that favor heterarchy and solidarity forms of governance. On the other hand, when persistently maintaining certain governance forms that radically constrain the political transformative potential of some SRCs' social and institutional capital, institutional structures can be a block to necessary redemocratization processes.

Enduring interactions, alliances and struggles between pro-growth SRCs and institutional structures promoting speculative land and housing profits have been amply covered in the urban studies literature, mainly through the concept of powerful urban 'growth machines' and 'urban regimes' (see also Molotch, 1976, 1993; Cox & Mair, 1989; Stone, 1989; Harding, 1995; Lauria

& Whelan, 1995; Kantor et al., 1997; Jonas & Wilson, 1999). This literature has cast light on how institutional structures have traditionally privileged growth actors. It has also revealed how, in their closed-shop commissions, institutional structures have co-produced and promoted a growth culture that (i) favors profit-oriented public-private partnerships and rising land and housing prices, (ii) restricts the sufficient provision of affordable housing, and (iii) underplays the potential of governance hybridizations for more egalitarian urban (re)development.

Just as pro-growth SRCs, alternative SRCs and their networks negotiate, enter into conflict and seek consensus with institutional structures. Especially in times of crisis, alternative SRCs act discursively and materially to rearticulate power asymmetries in the housing/real estate sector (Moulaert et al., 2007; Paidakaki and Moulaert, 2018). In accordance with their interests, they act to advance the (housing) conditions of the poorest and most disadvantaged; gain better access to and improve the usability of economic capital; and inform the modus operandi of affordable housing provision (Paidakaki, 2017). Thus, alternative SRCs (and the communities they represent and are part of) have multiple objectives in their interaction with institutional structures. These objectives include: coproducing novel institutional capital and new or transformed institutional structures (e.g. pro-poor/anti-speculation public institutions); forming new open/transparent socio-political arenas; setting in motion new solidarity-informed governance arrangements (governance forms iii and iv); and – together with an inter-institutional network –putting in place human-centered public-private partnerships and socially innovative strategies to democratize the right to the city (Evans, 1996; Healey, 1998; Raco, 2007; Moulaert, 2010; Moulaert, 2013; Metzger et al., 2014).

The social and institutional capital building and interactions of SRCs with institutional structures provide evidence of the socio-institutional reproduction of the city as a housing system. These encounters represent only one part of the governance formulations in the housing system; concurrently, many SRCs interact with their target populations, adding an extra layer to the social capital dynamics within housing systems' governance arrangements.

Thus, SRCs are also distinguished according to their community engagement in housing production. Alternative SRCs tend to be more committed to and solidary with their target

communities and hence become more active in identifying, generating and maintaining the conditions under which the human and social capital of their target populations may have an impact on the housing system (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000; Marshall et al., 2016). The engagement and commitment of the SRCs to their communities take many forms: problem solution, development and/or support of local civic networks, promotion of associational activity, community organizing and leadership skill cultivation (Moulaert, 2000; Forrest & Kearns, 2001; Smith, 2008). By virtue of these practices, alternative SRCs leverage themselves as community builders, neighborhood representatives and/or community advocates (Gittell & Wilder, 1999). Their governance modes form a hybrid of solidarity and cooperative network governance, yet leave room for ethically acceptable market allocation (governance form i). Table 1. summarizes the conceptual linkages between SRCs' social capital features, their reproduction to institutional capital and governance formations.

Table 1. Conceptualizing the SRCs social capital, institutional capital and governance nexus

SRCs	Main social capital features	Endogenous Institutional capital	Exogenous Institutional capital	Governance forms
Pro-growth	Exclusionary visioning, dominance, interest consolidation, cooperation, advocacy, lobbying, trust and trust interruptions, information exchange	Pragmatic/market-mediated/strategic partnerships, (in)formal interactions for information exchange	Maintenance and growth of pro-market/pro-deregulation public institutions, profit-oriented public-private partnerships, exclusive decision-making platforms	Market and hierarchy, Growth machine

Pro-equity	Campaigns, watchdogging, cooperation, lobbying, advocacy, reciprocity/solidarity, trust and distrust, participatory/collective visioning, information exchange, open communication, shared leadership, community outreach and organizing, leadership skill cultivation, development and/or support of local civic networks, promotion of associational activity	Solidarity-based alliance/movement formulation, formal joint ventures for development, satisfaction of organizational complementarities, (in)formal interactions for information exchange	Development of neighborhood associations, growth of pro-poor/anti-speculation institutional structures, development of open/transparent/inclusive public participation forums, human-centered public-private partnerships	Heterarchy and solidarity, Regulated markets
Pro-comaterializing	Cooperation, lobbying, advocacy, reciprocity/solidarity, shared leadership, community outreach, information exchange, development and/or support of local civic networks, promotion of associational activity	Solidarity-based alliance/movement formulation, formal joint ventures for development, satisfaction of organizational complementarities, (in)formal interactions for information exchange	Growth of pro-poor/anti-speculation institutional structures, development of open/transparent public participation forums	Heterarchy and solidarity, Regulated markets

(Source: Authors' elaboration)

To further probe, unpack and expose the inextricable nexus between social capital, institutional capital and governance hybridization in housing systems, in the next section we empirically examine the catalytic role of SRCs' social capital features in forming novel post-disaster governance hybridities in post-Katrina New Orleans and scrutinize the potential of these hybridities in redeveloping a more egalitarian New Orleans.

2. SRCs in post-Katrina New Orleans: urban development, social capital and governance formations

Before turning to the investigation of SRCs' diverse governance formation potential in post-Katrina New Orleans, we briefly bring to light the panorama of SRCs' (potential) roles in urban, especially housing, (re)development. We study eight different SRCs in New Orleans and identify

the financial, material and human resources they employ to build or provide housing under the prevalent governance arrangements. These resources largely determine what type of housing they seek to build and for whom and in which communities (affordable housing, up-market housing, ...) they do so.

Table 2. gives an overview of the SRCs in New Orleans that we studied. According to our findings, hegemonic pro-growth SRCs mainly include *regional and/or national housing builders* that are sufficiently capitalized, business savvy and generally appreciated for their *financial management capacities* and strong *real estate development records*. Due to this track- record and their general professionalism and technical expertise in writing competitive proposals for public funds (e.g. tax credits), these SRCs are evidently skilled in accessing financial resources under governance hybridities characterized by (state-regulated) market. When involved in publicly-subsidized affordable housing projects, they prefer to build large-scale, mixed-income settlements for mixed-income clientele (giving preference to market-rates). Such housing projects are strategically located in areas with substantial public infrastructure, high demand for financeable investment, ease of access and density of opportunities to leverage existing relationships and resources (e.g. Central business district, Central city in the Orleans Parish). These SRCs do not limit their spatial intervention to the area(s) where they are based, but seek markets (areas/spaces) for development interventions by following the money, favorable politics and the web of opportunities. Their motivation for building affordable housing varies. Few pro-growth SRCs integrate a straightforward social mission into their practice; most are stimulated by the high levels of public funds funneled in crisis moments in certain devastated cities/neighborhoods hit by a natural hazard, a manmade catastrophe or extreme blight and their high developmental potential, as well as the profit generated by development fees.

Table 2. SRCs in Post-Katrina New Orleans

Type		SRCs in New Orleans	General Description
Hegemonic	Pro-growth	HRI Historic Restoration Incorporated (HRI)	Full-service real estate development company founded in 1982
		Gulf Coast Housing Partnership (GCHP) Pro-growth, pro-equity hybrid	Regional nonprofit real estate development company established in 2006. Born into an enterprise financial model. Fiscally driven, run more like a for-profit.
Alternative	Pro-equity	Jericho Road Episcopal Housing Initiative (JREHI)	Neighborhood-based nonprofit homebuilder/affordable housing developer founded in 2006
		Broadmoor Development Corporation (BDC)	Community Development Corporation created in 2006, part of a multi-entity neighborhood structure
		Providence Community Housing (PCH)	Non-profit real estate development organization established in 2006
	Pro-comaterializing	A Community Voice – Louisiana (ACV) and Southern United Neighborhoods (SUN): Sister pro-equity groups	ACV is a non-profit membership-based community organization founded in 2009 and SUN is non-profit public charity founded in 2010
		New Orleans Area Habitat for Humanity (NOAHH)	Non-profit corporation/organization incorporated in 1983
		Crescent City Community Land Trust (CCCLT)	Non-profit corporation incorporated in 2011

(Source: Authors' elaboration)

Alternative pro-equity SRCs are mainly *small size community developers* located in the neighborhoods where they build or rehabilitate affordable housing for their low-and moderate-

income clientele. These neighborhoods are either strategically located where there is substantial public infrastructure (e.g. Central city, Treme, Broadmoor) or in isolated, poor and underinvested areas (e.g. Upper and Lower Ninth Ward). All target neighborhoods suffer from specific so-called societal ills (crime, poverty, underinvestment, blight, drug culture, physical vulnerability to flooding). Addressing these concerns is the main compass of these SRCs. Their general recovery philosophy and main competence is the promotion of healthy and affordable housing coupled with *community development components*. These SRCs are for the most part community builders with charismatic female leadership who initiate community-bonding initiatives and provide a wide range of free social services to their target communities (e.g. community gardening, healthy living initiatives, employment services and job training, children and adult education, mental health services, seniors activities). Often missing beyond-the-market and hierarchy-led governance hybridities, the majority of these SRCs have insufficient access to financial capital and tend to be *undercapitalized.* They are often dependent on scarce public subsidies to build affordable housing; as a result, they tend to claim for more pro-poor regulation in housing markets and are forced to mobilize varied strategies based on solidarity (membership dues, parcel fees, charity/foundation funds and donations) to secure financial sustainability.

Alternative pro-comaterializing SRCs are also small size community developers who have a lot in common with pro-equity SRCs (general philosophy, target populations, main competences). What makes pro-comaterializing SRCs distinct from pro-equity SRCs is their low level of dependence on public funds and their more forceful claims for heterarchy-and-solidarity-inspired governance of housing development; this is pursued by criticizing the dysfunctionalities of existing public housing programs (which do not target the poorest of the poor and do not extend the housing affordability lifespan) and by promoting alternative housing tenure systems and the merits of collective building processes. To ensure their financial independence, pro-comaterializing SRCs develop internal mechanisms to secure constant sources of internal funding (home improvement store, internal mortgage mechanisms, ground lease fees, shared-equity). The rebuilding areas (Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Wards, Hollygrove, Carrolton, Central City, Mid City, New Orleans East, Westbank of New Orleans) where they operate are mainly selected with two criteria in mind: (i) the economy of the land market (weak markets, disinvested neighborhoods, cheap land, escalated real estate costs) and (ii) demographic characteristics (low-income population stressed

by escalated real estate costs). Often the choice of space is used symbolically to stress important issues heavily affecting specific neighborhoods, such as those of *underinvestment* in the Lower Ninth Ward and/or processes of *internal displacement* and *gentrification* in Mid City. Table 3. recapitulates the main roles and development resources of the three types of SRCs in the New Orleans reconstruction.

Table 3. SRCs' urban (re)development potential

SRCs	Roles / Development potential and resources	(Re)development footprint
Pro-growth	Financial management capacities; strong real estate development records; general professionalism; technical expertise; skilled in accessing financial resources	Mainly large-scale settlements; strategic locations; mixed-income clientele (preference to market-rate)
Pro-Equity	Social mission; holistic community development; cultural embeddedness; charity fund raising; charismatic (female) leadership; social service provision	Mainly small scale settlements; Strategic and/or isolated, poor and underinvested locations; mainly low-and-moderate-income clientele
Pro-Comaterializing	Social mission; holistic community development; cultural embeddedness; low level of dependence on public funds; criticism against the dysfunctionalities of public housing programs; promotion of alternative housing tenure systems and collective building processes; internal funding	Mainly small scale settlements; underinvested or gentrified areas; mainly very low-low-and moderate-income clientele

(Source: Authors' elaboration)

To pursue their individual and collective goals, deploy their potential and mobilize their resources, the three types of SRCs seek for improved governance hybridizations by valorizing their social capital to form novel institutional capital. In the next subsection, we shed light on activations of social capital in the city of New Orleans, looking at how social capital dynamics have generated institutional capital capable of exploring new governance arrangements and public instruments, fiscal possibilities and regulation of the financial capital market beneficial to more equitable housing markets. The activation of social capital has especially taken place in the late recovery years (2008-2015), when the issue of capitalization became a true challenge for many SRCs[iii].

During this period, alternative pro-equity and pro-comaterializing SRCs became fully aware of the fact that their long-term presence in the post-Katrina rebuilding arenas was highly dependent on restructured endogenous and exogenous governance edifices embracing the values of solidarity, pragmatism and constant commitment.

2.2. Endogenous governance formations in post-Katrina New Orleans

During the late recovery years, pro-growth SRCs mobilized their social capital and sought strategic partnerships for market-mediated co-venture projects with their peers or with alternative ones that commonly met the following value-based criteria: material resourcefulness, political connections, institutional longevity, credibility and project feasibility. In partnerships with other SRCs, they mainly offered real estate development services and technical assistance (design, construction, mortgage financing). The main benefit they drew from partnering with alternative SRCs was the experience of the latter in dealing with social issues, as well as their easier access to charity capital. In these socialization processes, pro-growth SRCs did not activate their social capital with the aim of confronting well-established market-and-hierarchy informed governance hybridities. On the contrary, they sought optimal conditions to produce affordable housing within the rationale of market-mediated housing systems.

Alternative pro-equity and pro-comaterializing SRCs also benefited from their partnerships with 'community-oriented' pro-growth SRCs through market-informed real estate services and consultancy (GCHP, Alembic Community Development, Green Coast Enterprises). Nevertheless, alternative SRCs mostly interrelated with their peers by activating the social capital features of *trust, solidarity* and *open communication* which fostered institutional capital: *formal joint ventures for development, satisfaction of organizational complementarities, informal and formal interactions for information exchange and coalition building* (e.g. Greater New Orleans Housing Alliance – GNOHA, see 2.2.1). By counting on each other's expertise, alternative SRCs became increasingly focused on valorizing their particular capacities. For instance, some SRCs narrowed down their focus (BDC), clarified their unique identity and niche in the housing market (JRHI, CCCLT), and adjusted themselves to the new policy priorities that shifted from new construction to home rehabilitation (BDC, NOAHH).

Since 2018, and because of GNOHA and the institutionalization of interactions building institutional capital, alternative SRCs have become more strategic in cross-benefiting from each other's competences; they also collectively develop and implement actions (campaigns, advocacy) that benefit the alternative housing sector as a whole. To illustrate the institutional transformation in the endogenous governance of housing systems in New Orleans, we elaborate on GNOHA, — the most prominent housing coalition emerging in post-Katrina New Orleans.

2.2.1 GNOHA: new institutional capital in New Orleans's endogenous housing system

GNOHA is an initiative taken by the former president of Providence Community Housing. Established in 2007, its initial goal was that of creating a solidarity platform where non-profit builders (alternative SRCs) could exchange donated construction materials, discuss (un)workable policies and develop advocacy strategies[iv]. Between 2008 and 2013, GNOHA remained a small and loose (pre-institutionalized) coalition and met once a month to discuss policy issues (e.g. the soft second mortgage program). During this period, it ran 'Own the Crescent', a housing marketing campaign aimed to persuade people (particularly low-income African American and Latino families) to buy houses from non-profit developers. In 2014, GNOHA became a more solid organization, institutionalizing membership dues and becoming a prominent coalition receiving funding to lead HousingNOLA, a 10-year partnership that develops strategies for improving housing policies in New Orleans (see section 2.3.2.). In 2015, the alliance reached out to pro-growth SRCs sharing the mindset of alternative SRCs (interest in the community development component of housing, i.e. Alembic Community Development). Pro-growth SRCs were considered an added value to GNOHA because they added an element of 'realism' to the work, had a better sense of the pulse of the market, and were able to sway public officials due to their proven track record in delivering quality housing within the expected time frame and budget.

GNOHA compellingly manifests the building up of new institutional capital and endogenous governance arrangements in the housing system of New Orleans. The alliance has not only provided its members with a platform where valuable information is openly exchanged (e.g. funding opportunities) and advocacy strategies are designed and implemented. It has also become a source of income for non-profits to hang on to their missions and an opportunity for them to

provide inputs to important GNOHA-led initiatives (shared leadership). Moreover, GNOHA (whose governance can be considered a hybrid of heterarchy and solidarity forms of governance) has been viewed by most SRCs as a powerful advocacy vehicle through which policy makers and politicians can be persuaded to formulate institutional frameworks and set up programs and policies in which non-profits are sufficiently enabled to provide human-centered affordable housing.

2.3 Exogenous governance formations in post-Katrina New Orleans

Due to their preference for governance arrangements based on market exchange and pro-profit state regulation, pro-growth SRCs in New Orleans seldom activated their social capital during the late recovery years to interact with their target communities. This interaction was limited and mainly materialized when the implementation of 'community development initiatives' was legally required/mandated in housing programs and funding mechanisms (e.g. Federal Neighborhood Choice Program; Employment, Training and Contracting Policy of the Housing Authority of New Orleans). In most cases, this interaction was indirect and worked through partnerships with alternative SRCs and other civil society actors that organized small sized participation forums or provided social services (e.g. HRI partnered with UNITY, a non-profit homelessness service provider, for housing provision to homeless people).

Alternative pro-equity and pro-comaterializing SRCs, on the contrary, were the main protagonists of community engagement in the housing system of New Orleans during the late recovery years and, as such, were catalytic actors in the inclusion of ordinary citizens in the governance modes needed for the co-development of the city. By highly valuing political empowerment, alternative SRCs were instrumental in engaging residents in political actions and giving them a place in the solidarity-oriented governance modes. Alternative SRCs were important driving forces in setting up novel exogenous institutional capital through their creation of platforms in which residents collectively develop leadership skills and strategies to influence housing policies and programs that impact their lives (e.g. neighborhood associations, bottom-up planning committees, housing workshops). To this end, most of these SRCs activated a variety of community-oriented social capital features through four main activities: (i) *collective visioning and practice*, including

neighborhood perception surveys, needs assessment surveys, dissemination of questionnaires, community and neighborhood association meetings and neighborhood planning processes; (ii) *open channels of communication* and *free information flows* regarding housing units for sale or rent, grants for low-and-medium income people, housing education workshops, informing on recent political developments through a series of community outreach methods (weekly e-blasts, monthly newsletters and meetings, community bulletin boards); (iii) *bridge building with other community-based civic groups* in target neighborhoods through a series of local shared initiatives (building strategies for stabilizing vacant lots, growing food and boarding up blighted structures, developing local alliances to share information and discuss issues that concern the area); (iv) promotion of *leadership development* and *associational activity* by facilitating the formation of neighborhood associations and/or by supporting, materially and symbolically, new and existing associations and resident councils.

What does this mean in terms of governance hybridities? In their non-adversarial interactions with institutional structures, pro-growth SRCs activated various social capital features, such as cooperation, exclusionary visioning and direct lobbying, to maintain and reinvigorate market-and-hierarchy informed governance hybridity. Implementing low-income housing policies and programs only when sponsored by public and private institutions, pro-growth SRCs did not prioritize affordable housing for low-income populations. Pro-growth SRCs were comfortable with the existing market-mediated affordable housing financing system and, hence, it was never in their interest to lobby against pro-market financial tools or shallow public budgets for low-income housing.

Alternative SRCs, on the contrary, have been engaged in adversarial and non-adversarial/collaborative ways with institutional structures to formulate a novel governance hybridity in New Orleans informed by: (i) a more open and inclusive institutional capital in the city's housing system (e.g. HousingNOLA, more in section 2.3.1); (ii) the introduction of more pro-poor housing policies and legislation (e.g. property tax abatement to control internal displacement); and (iii) a change of the types, level and distribution of public funds for affordable housing production and provision (deeper direct subsidies for low-income housing, extension of traditional community development programs that are currently short-term investments). To

formulate and solidify such a governance hybridity based on pro-equity state regulation and heterarchy, alternative SRCs activated several social capital features through *campaigns* exposing community issues such as blight, area underinvestment and low salaries, as well as through *grassroots lobbying*, *direct lobbying* (letters to politicians and administrators, presence in the Congress) or *indirect lobbying* through national organizations and intermediaries. Several alternative SRCs also became watchdogs of public funding distribution and ensured that budgets were allocated correctly (e.g. the Small Rental Property Program, Non-Profit Rebuilding Pilot Program).

Through the aforementioned initiation of the Housing NOLA 10-year partnership, alternative SRCs increasingly institutionalized their interactions with institutional structures in the exogenous governance of housing systems in New Orleans. Section 2.3.1 briefs the significance of HousingNOLA in mainstreaming alternative claims in public policy making.

2.3.1. HousingNOLA: new institutional capital in New Orleans's exogenous housing system

The HousingNOLA partnership is a notable example of the building up of institutional capital in exogenous governance arrangements. During the late post-Katrina years, the lack of an official policy on housing in New Orleans triggered a planning process of inter-institutional linkages aimed at co-producing a housing plan for the city. It emerged in 2014 from exchanges between the Foundation for Louisiana and GNOHA. With the financial support of the Foundation and other fund providers (JP Morgan Chase, Ford Foundation, W.K. Kellogg Foundation), and the political support of the director of housing policy in the City of New Orleans at the time, GNOHA received a mandate to lead a multipartner collaborative planning process to co-produce a housing plan focusing on how New Orleans can ensure affordable, high quality housing for all residents over the course of 10 years (2015-2025). The rationale behind this co-production process was to avoid a repetition of previous redevelopment planning processes that were presumably governed by strictly market and hierarchy logics and ultimately led to a fragmented and spontaneous rebuilding outcome. Instead, HousingNOLA focused on a common blueprint for a stronger city as a whole, manifesting the governance value of *solidarity* and *loyalty* towards all affected neighborhoods as well as *self-organization,* based on insights from a wider public including SRCs and residents

living and working across the city. The leadership board and working groups of HousingNOLA provided multiple platforms of interaction between SRCs and GNOHA, residents of different neighborhoods and institutional structures, formulating an overall more holistic governance hybridity characterized by heterarchy, solidarity and regulated markets in the city. Since 2014, HousingNOLA has become a multi-linked platform through which alternative SRCs and GNOHA obligate institutional structures to: (i) address the issues that are documented in the housing plan (gentrification, internal displacement, lack of affordable rental housing), (ii) demand efficient and effective funding allocation, and (iii) start discussing housing finance alternatives such as Housing Trust Funds as opposed to tax credits and unnecessary complex leveraging. The full potential of HousingNOLA in molding socially just governance hybridities that guide the development of the city remains yet to be seen in the years to come.

3. On the materialization of post-disaster egalitarian cities

Reflecting on our findings, this last chapter scrutinizes the potential of the governance-improving fermentations in post-Katrina New Orleans for guiding the redevelopment of an egalitarian city. To this purpose, it reiterates the dynamic connections between SRCs, their social and institutional capital, and the ways they have formulated hybrid internal and external governance arrangements.

As the case of New Orleans has revealed, social capital features metabolized into new institutional capital that collectively partly improved the recovery governance in the city, both endogenously (see GNOHA) and exogenously (see HousingNOLA). Pro-growth, alternative pro-equity and pro-comaterializing SRCs activated their social capital features to promote different governance hybridities with different socio-spatial outcomes. Being well capitalized, business-savvy and development-rent focused, most pro-growth SRCs evidently activated their social capital into comfortable and well-established governance hybridities built on market exchange and corporate as well as state hierarchy. Arguably, hybrid governance between the market and state was materially beneficial to this type of SRC and left alternative SRCs undercapitalized and poorly connected to traditional decision-making centers. This resulted in unmet housing needs of the poorest and most needy, especially of those living in the most devastated areas that could only count on alternative SRCs.

To address this constant risk of producing a disparate, socio-spatially uneven and fragmented New Orleans, most alternative SRCs activated their unique social capital features to redirect governance hybridities (characterized by solely market or hierarchy-equality rationales) to new governance hybridities that privileged heterarchy and commitment based on loyalty and solidarity, yet without dismissing market logics. The most significant development was the endogenous empowerment of alternative SRCs through the cultivation of a new spirit of cooperation and networking and the discovery of horizontal partnerships as a survival tool during times of fiscal austerity. Many of those SRCs adapted their endogenous governance relations and practices with a focus on bolstering their own particular capacities and counting on the expertise that other SRCs bring to the table. By discovering and valorizing the potential of innovative collaboration in more institutionalized forums (such as GNOHA), many alternative SRCs managed to survive in the local housing system and to stay committed to their target neighborhoods and populations. They were also able to influence powerful institutional structures as the main shapers of the general legislative, regulatory and financial framework of housing systems.

Unsurprisingly, most exogenous interactions manifested as advocacy efforts and novel forms of cooperation between alternative SRCs, institutional structures and resident associations aiming for more and better targeted and socio-spatially distributed public funding for subsidized low-income housing. HousingNOLA showed evidence of an emerging new institutional capital in the city that promoted governance hybridities increasingly taking up the social capital values of alternative SRCs, valorizing their unique (re)development potential and beginning to nurture a wider range of housing options for all New Orleanians in the later recovery years (2015-2025).

In light of the observed governance formations, can we then claim that the increasingly democratic recovery governance hybridities formed by alternative SRCs in New Orleans led to the development of a more egalitarian city?

The concurrent and enduring endogenous and exogenous governance formations initiated by alternative SRCs were a precondition for imagining and rebuilding a more egalitarian city. However, the materialization of egalitarian cities not only requires open, democratic and holistic

governance. It also requires a democratized economy that supports socio-economic forms of organization based on human values (such as mutuality, reciprocity, solidarity). When the development of egalitarian cities is constrained by the narrow frames of existing housing policies and program implementation and their improvement, any governance hybrid will be confronted with the stubborn profit-oriented financialization paradigm dominating the U.S. housing systems.

In the city of New Orleans, despite alternative SRCs' meritorious efforts to support each other in building up more effective institutional structures, budget increases and more tailor-made housing programs, the very structural issues (promotion of market tools and budget cuts mandated by neoliberal political logics) that ultimately inhibit their actions were only meagerly challenged. Most SRCs' governance fermentations rolled out within the existing political economic structure. There was indeed a lack of (political) interest among most alternative SRCs in performing influential politico-institutional roles that would substantially challenge plain market-mediated logics informing the development of New Orleans. Due to their political modesty, alternative SRCs did not manage to shake the foundations of the political economy that have enduringly privileged the pro-growth SRCs and have failed to connect governance fermentations with a new political economy that conceives, affirms and produces egalitarian urbanities as a universal political ideal.

Why have most alternative SRCs' impact proved to be politically modest? Is there a limit to the politico-institutional transformative potential of alternative SRCs and their networks to fully materialize egalitarian cities? How can SRCs have a more radical socio-political transformative impact? These questions are at the top of the list of research priorities to be addressed by scholars researching urban politics and the politics of resilience. More research should be conducted on the politico-institutional transformative impact of SRCs' actions, and on how these actions can shape 'neo-welfare' frameworks within which (i) all SRCs can fully play their role in building inclusive housing systems and (ii) a wider range of substantially-financed rebuilding possibilities for the heterogeneous neighborhoods of the post-disaster cities is publicly deliberated and offered.

Acknowledgements

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[i] A Community Voice – Louisiana /Southern United Neighborhoods are sister non-profit organizations sharing the same offices and working together. We treat both organizations as one SRC. However, they are legally separated with different boards and funding sources. A Community Voice – Louisiana is responsible for community organization, whereas Southern United Neighborhoods is responsible for the service part of housing. Southern United Neighborhoods was set up with the purpose of building synergies with A Community-Voice - Louisiana and becoming the latter's 'branch' for housing policy implementation.

[ii] Except for HRI. HRI offered in-depth interviews with their higher-ranked staff (president and vice-presidents) and a visit to the Iberville construction site.

[iii] During the early recovery years when disaster funding was more abundant, most SRCs were financially sufficiently equipped to serve their mission, and hence less motivated to activate their social capital to trigger institutional transformations for more productive governance frameworks. In the later and more austere recovery years, many SRCs became undercapitalized and under stress to stay active in the 'reconstruction scene' and to avoid mission drift.

[iv] GNOHA has a 501c4 tax status, which allows it to be an advocacy organization. Non-profit housing builders with a 501c3 status (most alternative SRCs) are not legally allowed to advocate.