Cross-country comparison of media selection and attitudes towards narratives on migration

David De Coninck, Stefan Mertens, Leen d'Haenens KU Leuven





Please cite this report as: De Coninck, D., Mertens, S., & d'Haenens, L. (2021). *Cross-country comparison of media selection and attitudes towards narratives on migration*. Deliverable 4.6. KU Leuven: OPPORTUNITIES project 101004945 – H2020.



DISCLAIMER This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research & Innovation program under Grant Agreement no. 101004945. The information in this deliverable reflects only the authors' views and the European Union is not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.

DISSEMINATION LEVEL: Public

Project: OPPORTUNITIES- Crises as Opportunities: towards a Level Telling Field on Migration and a

New Narrative of Successful Integration

GA: 101004945

Call: H2020-SC6-MIGRATION-2020

Type of action: RIA



Cross-country comparison of media selection and attitudes towards narratives on migration

Work Package 4 - Deliverable 4.6

Due date: October 2021

Submission date: October 2021 **Lead Beneficiary:** KU Leuven

Authors: David De Coninck, Stefan Mertens, Leen d'Haenens









Table of contents

1. Introdu	uction	6
1.1 Lite	erature review	8
2. Method	dology	11
3. Results	S	13
4. Conclu	usions	17
5. Refere	ences	19
6. Appen	dix	23

Abstract

In this report, we provide a cross-country comparison of news media consumption patterns and anti-immigrant, refugee, and Muslim sentiments in four European countries: Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Italy (N = 6,065). Data were collected among adults aged 25 to 65 through an online survey fielded during three weeks in May and June 2021. Our findings show that there are notable differences, but also various similarities, in news media consumption patterns: newspaper and digital news consumption is clearly lower than television or radio consumption, in all countries. Furthermore, German, Austrian, and Italian respondents hold relatively similar television and radio news consumption patterns (high public service media exposure, lower commercial), but this is quite different among Hungarians. They consume more news on commercial outlets. As for newspaper and digital news, Germans and Italians mostly consume quality (or broadsheet) newspapers or digital news, while Austrians and Hungarians report higher consumption of popular (or tabloid) newspapers or digital news. Linking the effects of this media consumption to attitudes, results show that exposure to news on public service networks, local television networks, quality newspapers, and quality digital news outlets is linked positive attitudes towards outgroups. Based on earlier findings regarding the rather neutral narratives on migration on several of these media outlets, this was in line with our expectations. However, we also find that exposure to popular newspapers and digital news is related to more positive attitudes among German, Hungarian, and Italian respondents. Among Austrians, there is a clear difference in the relationship depending on the outlet: exposure to quality or (to a lesser extent) moderate outlets is related to positive attitudes, while exposure to popular outlets is associated with negative sentiments. Our findings provide new insights into the complicated association between news media consumption (and their respective narratives on migration) and attitudes in the four countries under study. This signals the need for a continued fine-grained analysis of news media effects on outgroup attitudes.



1. Introduction

For many years, migration has been a highly salient topic in societal and political debates in the European Union (EU). However, since 2015-2016, when a large number of refugees and asylum seekers entered the EU as (amongst others) a result of the Syrian civil war, the situation has increasingly been characterized as a 'crisis' by media and political actors, and as a result, by the public as well. Over time, this crisis narrative has deepened existing cleavages, or opened up new ones within the EU. There was a lack of cross-country coordination in the reception and integration of these many asylum seekers and refugees. Thus, the migration crisis evolved into a crisis of the EU as well. The ambition of the OPPOR-TUNITIES project is to develop a 'new' narrative on migration that acknowledges that every crisis is also an opportunity: a chance to revisit foundational principles, create new knowledge and initiate forward-looking narrative strategies which allow us to come to terms with a world in flux. Grounded in an ethics of dialogue and a human rights approach, the narrative of OPPORTUNITIES redirects attention to the benefits from migration, as suggested in the European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals (2011) and moves towards a more successful integration of migrants. The objectives of the project are eight-fold, but this report focuses on the Task 1 in Work Package (WP) 4, which attempts to provide an answer to the fourth objective of OPPORTUNITIES:

To analyse the changing attitudes of citizens towards migrants in European member states using quantitative methods, and develop a clearer understanding of the cumulative effects and consequences of media selection behaviour on individual attitudinal outcomes when adopting narratives on migration.

In WP4, titled 'Analysis of changing attitudes and understanding', the main goal is to quantitatively analyze dynamics and outcomes of narratives. This WP is grounded in Slater's (2007) theoretical framework of Reinforcing Spirals. The fundamental premise of this theory is that media selection (i.e., choices made by individuals as to which media they choose to consume) is a dynamic outcome driven by one's beliefs, values, and personal- and collective identity, while at the same time one's beliefs, values, and identity are mutually influenced by one's media use. These reciprocal associations move forward in time and produce reinforcing or cumulative effects. These dynamic spirals of media selectivity and influences are considered to be particularly strong in social groups and networks that seek closure to outside perspectives and influences (cf. 'echo chambers', see also Sunstein, 2007). In such closed and often ideologically homogeneous communication systems, selective exposure to media and information as well as selective avoidance generate polarized and extremist beliefs and behaviors, while such beliefs and behaviors would in turn result in a greater likelihood of seeking out more polarized and extremist mediated (as well as interpersonal) communication experiences. Ultimately, the closure to outside ideas, values, and information has the potential to generate a spiral toward polarization that may lead in some cases to out-group hostility (Slater, 2007; Sunstein, 2007). Particularly, in the context of online social networking sites and with the advances of Internet technology the theory of reinforcing spirals has proven to be meaningful. In the current state of the empirical literature, however, a comprehensive, integrated study that investigates both "the reciprocal nature of [media] selectivity and media effects" as well as the role of network structure in this process is largely absent (Song & Boomgaarden, 2017). Therefore, this study proposes a systematic and integrated approach to investigate a mutually reinforcing spiral model within the context of changing attitudes towards migration.







With regards to Task 4.1, we know that a number of public survey platforms exist that are measuring public opinion on migration and immigrants. However, fundamental shortcomings in these national and international surveys oblige us to collect new data. Comprehensive, integrated empirical studies that investigate the reciprocal nature of media selectivity and media effects in relation to attitudes towards narratives on migration are largely absent. Previous large-scale public opinion studies (e.g., European Social Survey) have not, or only scarcely investigated which role digital and social media play in shaping attitudes towards migration.

Hence, this task consists of developing a new questionnaire for an online survey in Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Italy. This online survey will be representative for the adult population aged between 25 and 65 and will consist of several sections: demographic information alongside several pre-tested questions regarding attitudes towards migration/migrants from large-scale surveys such as the European Social Survey and other national surveys. (Social) media consumption will be assessed in a detailed manner, highlighting comparisons of attitudes towards migration/migrants on both legacy media (with their respective narratives on migration) and social media.

With this task, we seek to contribute to a better understanding of the role of (news) media consumption in the development of public attitudes in four European countries towards a "Black Swan" event: the arrival of millions of refugees in Europe - many of which travelled through or towards the countries under study - in 2014/2015. Furthermore, the results of this task will show if and how public attitudes differ between residents of a non-compliance country (Hungary) and those who live in countries who are compliant with EU law. A brief overview of the countries (Table 1) shows that Germany in particular received the most asylum applications in 2015, while Austria and Italy received about the same number of applications during this year. Nonetheless, all four countries under study received a high number of applications when compared to certain other neighbouring countries (for example, Belgium received 38,990 applications in 2015). Table 1 briefly compares integration policies in 2019 of the four countries under study, using data from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX; www.mipex.eu). The overall policy score is calculated based on the subscores of eight policy themes, listed in Table 1. Here, we note that Germany and Italy have the most favorable integration policies overall, while Hungary has the least favorable policies. Each country appears to favor specific elements of integration: Germany has favorable labour market policies, Austria and Italy stimulate access to health services for immigrants, and Hungary (and Italy, to a lesser extent) focuses on anti-discrimination policies.



Table 1. Comparison of 2019 integration policy scores of Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Italy

	Austria	Germany	Hungary	Italy
Asylum application in 2015	88,160	476,510	177,135	83,540
Overall policy score	46	58	43	58
Labour market mobility	59	81	37	67
Family reunion	36	42	58	64
Education	52	55	0	43
Health	81	63	29	79
Political participation	20	60	15	25
Permanent residence	50	54	81	67
Access to nationality	13	42	25	40
Anti-discrimination	53	70	96	78

Note: Scores range from 0 (very unfavorable policies) to 100 (best possible policies).

In this report, we will provide a brief overview of the relevant literature and theories that guided the data collection and methodological choices. Subsequently, we describe the media and a number of attitude measures used.

1.1 Literature review

The study of immigration-related attitudes has received much attention in the social sciences, resulting in many studies dealing with this topic. While research in the 1990s and early 2000s mostly focused on the role or influence of individual characteristics like educational attainment (Hagendoorn & Nekuee, 1999; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007) and religiosity (Billiet, 1995), the latter 2000s and early 2010s saw a growing number of studies that investigated the role of contextual characteristics at the regional or country level like the economic situation (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Meuleman et al., 2009; Schlueter et al., 2013) or migration-integration policies (Callens & Meuleman, 2017; Van Hootegem et al., 2020). Many of these studies have contributed to our understanding of the ways in which attitudes towards immigrants and migration are shaped.

During and following the European migration crisis, the number of studies on migration increased sharply (Eberl et al., 2018; Pisarevskaya et al., 2020). More specifically, between 2015 and 2018 numerous studies focused on the European migration crisis, but studies also focused more on investigating specific groups of immigrants than prior to the crisis. The number of studies that investigated support for immigration in general declined sharply (Eberl et al., 2018). With this increased scholarly interest in migration, there has been a popularization of several strands of migration-related research. Given the large-scale news media coverage of the migration crisis (Lucassen, 2018), the popularization of digital media in society at large, and the recent political gains of right-wing political parties, the years following the crisis saw a growing interest in the role of (news) media in the formation of attitudes towards immigrants.

Given the lack of widespread face-to-face contact with immigrants across societies, the media thus shoulder a responsibility to accurately frame them in their news coverage (De Coninck et al., 2021;







Ogan et al., 2018). For several decades, *framing theory* has been an often-used theoretical frame in this regard. Frames can generally be described as schemes of interpretation that enable the efficient contextualization, classification and understanding of information (Entman, 1993; Gebauer & Sommer, 2021; Goffman, 1974). Framing stresses specific aspects of reality while pushing others into the background (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2011). By emphasizing and selecting certain aspects of reality (and thus, making them more salient), chances increase that recipients will adopt the narratives, interpretations, judgements and decisions that have been put forward (Entman, 1993; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007).

Two main mechanisms can be discerned in the framing process: frame building and frame setting (Scheufele, 1999). Frame building refers to the process in which news frames are shaped by certain actors, for example journalists. Typically, journalists tend to find new events or subjects that readers or other recipients are familiar with (Boesman et al., 2015). Beyond this, journalists themselves also look for possible explanations and those responsible for the issue under consideration. This indicates that each news message is the result of a process of selection, emphasis or exclusion of certain elements. It follows then that based on the use of certain definitions, explanations and solutions, and the emphasis on each of these, media frames can be discerned in news messages (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Frame setting refers to the effects that media frames and narratives have on individual attitudes (Scheufele, 1999). When recipients are exposed to a particular narrative through framing, the latter may affect their individual frames of reference. However, they are more likely to do so when they already have existing schemes for the proposed elements in the frames. In short, the more recipients know about the events or subject in news media, the more effective the frames are (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2011).

McNeil and Karstens (2018, p. 35) highlight that each journalist operates within a "distinct and complex situation of competing pressures and influences. Factors that shape their journalistic outputs include: their preconceptions about their roles as journalists; the nature of the media they work for and its place in the particular political context of their society; and the nature of migration and EU mobility [in the case of migration coverage] as a factor within this understanding of the world around them". For example, Hungarian journalists are forced to navigate the increasingly autocratic efforts by their government to control media content and nationalist narratives that focus on security and a 'clash of civilisations'. As a result, they often adopt either a pro- or anti-governmental stance that largely shapes their narratives in migration coverage (McNeil & Karstens, 2018). In Germany, journalists tend to exhibit more nuanced narratives on migration. Although the recent migration crisis heightened the awareness for migration issues in Germany, journalists show a clear understanding of various dynamics related to migration which indicates intense discussions and self-reflection in the newsrooms. In Italy, many journalists tend to hold a more specialist view on migration. Given Italy's status as a high-profile receiving country of refugees and asylum seekers, many journalists worked as specialists on the subject at this time - which may in turn affect the narratives they adopt. These mostly focus on poverty or refugee-related migration is found, rather than a focus on other types of migration (e.g. intra-EU mobility) (McNeil & Karstens, 2018).

Not only at the level of the journalist, but also at the level of the media organizations can differences in narratives or framing about migration be found. Jacobs et al. (2016) found that Flemish news media differ in their representational preferences: frames on public media are more likely to emphasize the positive consequences of migration, while commercial media use more sensational elements that refer to negative emotions and conflict. This is also true for newspaper coverage: quality newspapers adopt more left-leaning, liberal viewpoints towards migration, while popular newspapers apply more sensationalized frames (Blinder, 2015; Eberl et al., 2018; Gabrielatos & Baker, 2008; Strömbäck, 2008).



To summarize: public media and quality newspapers tend to adopt somewhat neutral narratives to talk about migration, while commercial media and popular newspapers lean more towards negative or sensationalist narratives. In the British coverage of immigration, the economic frame, the social benefits frame, and the employment frame are frequently used by popular newspapers. However, the educational frame (which is less negative) and the EU-policy frame (a 'constructive' frame) are more salient in quality newspapers or broadsheets (Eberl et al., 2018; Gottlob & Boomgaarden, 2020). However, other studies indicate that there are no clear differences in the framing of migration between quality and popular newspapers (Carvalho et al., 2015; Greussing & Boomgaarden, 2017).

Aside from framing theory, the *cultivation theory* posits another theoretical perspective of media effects (Gebauer & Sommer, 2021). This theory, developed by Gerbner and Gross (1976), suggests that people who spend more time watching television are more likely to perceive society or their social reality in ways that reflect the lessons or narratives on the 'television world', rather than those who spend less time watching television. The term 'cultivation' "thus refers to the independent contribution television viewing makes to audience members' conceptions of social reality.

Television viewing cultivates ways of seeing the world—those who spend more time 'living' in the world of television are more likely to see the 'real world' in terms of the images, values, portrayals, and ideologies that emerge through the lens of television" (Morgan, Shanahan, & Signorielli, 2008, p. 35). The cultivation differential is the observed difference in conceptions of reality (e.g., outgroup attitudes) between lighter and heavier viewers in the same demographic subgroups or populations. Previous meta-analytic research has confirmed the stability of the cultivation differential across different variables and populations, showing a large consistency in the direction predicted by the theory (Gerbner, 1998; Shanahan & Morgan, 1999). Following this theory, it should follow that exposure to stereotypes or negative framing about migration or migrants on television has a greater impact on attitudes of heavy viewers than of light viewers (Shanahan & Morgan, 1999).

A few years after its initial conception, Gerbner and colleagues (1980; 1998) expanded this theory after receiving some criticism regarding the proper application of statistical controls in initial cultivation studies. Two new concepts were introduced: mainstreaming and resonance (Shrum, 2017). Mainstreaming refers to a sharing or convergence of world views among heavy viewers in otherwise disparate groups (gender, education, income...). People in these different groups tend to have different views of the world. Gerbner and colleagues found that heavy television viewing should cause the outlooks of disparate groups (high vs. low income, higher educated vs. lower educated) to move closer to one another (hence the term mainstreaming) (Gerbner, 1980). Resonance suggests that those audience members with life experiences that are congruent with television portrayals will be most affected by its consumption, essentially providing a 'double dose' of the television message and thus boosting cultivation (Gerbner, 1980). For example, viewing portrayals of refugees should resonate particularly strongly with audience members who have had direct experiences with refugees (Shrum, 2017; Shrum & Bischak, 2001).







2. Methodology

Public opinion research may be conducted in various ways, but one of the most common methods is survey research. In this methodology, researchers pose a set of questions – either online or face-to-face – to participants. Although the (often closed question) format has some drawbacks, the main advantage is that it provides a relatively easy and, in the case of online surveys, cost-effective methodology to gather data among a large sample of the population. It is a widely used methodology to assess public attitudes, as evidenced by large-scale, high-quality European studies like the European Social Survey or the Eurobarometer that both utilize survey research.

The current survey was fielded to investigate the dynamic interplay between media representations of and narratives on different migrant groups and the governmental and societal (re)actions on the other. With these data, we provide more insight into these societal reactions by investigating attitude formation. Through an online survey, we collected quantitative data on attitudes towards outgroups (e.g., immigrants, refugees), exposure to and trust in news media, intergroup contact, and political attitudes (e.g., right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation) among the adult population aged 25 to 65 in four European countries: Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Italy. We collected the data in cooperation with Bilendi, a Belgian polling agency, and selected the methodology for its cost-effectiveness in crosscountry research. Respondents received an e-mail asking them to participate in a survey without specifying the subject matter, which was essential to avoid priming. Three weeks of fieldwork in May and June of 2021 resulted in a dataset of 6,065 respondents (a little over 1,500 per country). Sample weights were included in the dataset and can be applied to ensure that the sample is representative for gender and age in each country. The cooperation rate ranged between 19% and 31%, in line with similar online data collections (see De Coninck et al., 2019). More information on the data collection procedure, sample distribution, and measures included in the survey can be found in a recently published data article (see De Coninck, Duque, Schwartz, & d'Haenens, 2021). The English-language version of the online survey can also be found in the appendix of this report.

To assess traditional and digital news media consumption of respondents in each country, it is important to (1) provide a detailed overview of all main types of news media consumption and (2) to acknowledge and distinguish clearly between media brands between the different countries. In all countries, television and radio news consumption was split into three categories: public service, commercial, and local/regional networks. Examples of each network were provided per region to ensure that respondents knew which networks belonged to each category. For newspaper and digital news consumption, the most commonly read newspapers and commonly visited news webpages in each country were included separately (about 10 per country). Because these categories differ for each country, cross-country comparison of this type of media consumption is not possible. Because of this, we aggregated the individual types of newspaper/digital news consumption per country into two categories: quality or left-leaning (digital) news(paper) consumption and popular or right-leaning (digital) news(paper) consumption. We used information from Media Landscapes (https://medialandscapes.org/) to determine which outlets belonged to which of these two categories. For each television, radio, newspaper, and digital news medium, respondents were asked how often they had consumed it over the past month. Answer categories ranged from 1 = never to 7 = every day.



To assess sentiments towards outgroups in each country, we presented feeling thermometer questions. Here, respondents were asked to indicate how they felt towards immigrants, refugees, and Muslims with a score of 0 representing very cold or negative feelings while a score of 10 indicates very warm or positive feelings. In order to ensure that all respondents had a uniform understanding of the individuals that we considered to be an immigrant or a refugee, we presented the UN definition of these groups:

"An immigrant should be understood as covering all cases where the decision to migrate is taken freely by the individual concerned, for reasons of 'personal convenience' and without intervention of an external compelling reason (e.g., war, natural disaster, ...)" (UNESCO, 2017).

"A refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group" (United Nations, 1951).

We clearly highlighted these two definitions so that respondents would be able to distinguish between immigrants and refugees and provide a reliable measurement of attitudes for each group.

We also measured the perceived threat that respondents held towards refugees through six items: (1) 'Would you say that refugees who come to live here generally take jobs away from workers in [country], or generally help to create new jobs?'; (2) 'Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that refugees from other countries come to live here?'; (3) 'Most refugees who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think refugees who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out?'; (4) 'Have the country's crime problems increased or decreased by refugees coming to live here from other countries?; (5)'Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by refugees coming to live here from other countries?'; and (6) 'Generally speaking, values and beliefs of refugees are not compatible with those of the country'. All items were answered on an 11-point scale, with the high end of the scale indicating high threat perceptions.







3. Results

In Table 2, we provide a descriptive overview of news media consumption variables and attitudes towards outgroups per country. Results indicate that respondents in Austria, Germany, and Italy generally consume more news on public service media than on commercial media, both on radio and television. The exception here is Hungary, where commercial media news is clearly more frequently consumed than public service (or, in Hungary's case, state) media news. Local television news is consumed considerably less than the 'main' outlets, but local radio news is the highest consumed radio outlet among Germans and Italians report high consumption as well. As for newspaper consumption, results indicate that quality newspapers are consumed more frequently than popular newspapers among Italians and Germans, while the opposite is true among Austrians and Hungarians. As for digital news consumption, Italians are found to consume more popular digital news than quality digital news, while respondents in other countries favor quality digital news. An overview of results per individual newspaper or digital news outlet per country can be found in Table A1 in the appendix.

The results on outgroup attitudes indicate that, when considering the comparison of sentiments towards immigrants, refugees and Muslims, respondents in all countries clearly hold more negative sentiments towards Muslims than towards the other two migrant groups. The cross-country comparison of attitudes indicates that Italians hold the most positive attitudes towards these groups, while Hungarians are clearly the most negative. Germans and Austrians take up moderate positions. When looking at the perceived (refugee) threat, variables, a growing crime rate in one's country appears as one of the main concerns among respondents in all countries.



Table 2. Descriptive overview of news media consumption and outgroup attitudes per country

Table 2. Descriptive overview of news medi				
	Austria	Germany	Hungary	Italy
	(N = 1,520)	(N = 1,521)	(N = 1,510)	(N = 1,514)
Television consumption	2.06	4.47	2.04	4.54
Public service news	3.96	4.47	3.01	4.51
	(2.20)	(2.09)	(2.06)	(2.03)
Commercial news	3.89	3.88	3.93	4.38
	(1.94)	(2.05)	(2.15)	(2.03)
Local news	2.31	2.39	1.96	2.65
	(1.74)	(1.79)	(1.48)	(1.88)
Radio consumption				
Public service news	3.42	3.42	2.41	3.10
	(2.27)	(2.21)	(1.83)	(1.99)
Commercial news	3.38	3.24	3.51	3.19
	(2.02)	(2.09)	(2.07)	(2.03)
Local news	3.06	3.74	2.56	3.18
	(2.06)	(2.22)	(1.82)	(1.99)
Newspaper consumption				
Quality newspapers	2.16	1.82	1.64	2.37
Quantity memopapare	(1.37)	(1.26)	(1.11)	(1.46)
Popular newspapers	2.43	1.70	1.79	2.04
	(1.32)	(1.17)	(1.18)	(1.60)
Digital news consumption				
Quality news websites	2.35	2.23	2.75	2.59
Quality Hews Websites	(1.38)	(1.38)	(1.52)	(1.52)
Popular news websites	2.00	2.18	2.74	2.80
·	(1.23)	(1.51)	(1.39)	(1.59)
Outgroup attitudes				
Feeling thermometer: Immigrants	5.20	5.42	4.07	5.59
reemig thermometer miningrants	(2.44)	(2.41)	(2.48)	(2.59)
Feeling thermometer: Refugees	5.04	5.29	4.42	6.07
reeming thermometer. Refugees	(2.44)	(2.37)	(2.42)	(2.55)
Feeling thermometer: Muslims	4.13	4.55	3.61	4.71
reening thermometer. Musimis	(2.58)	(2.55)	(2.34)	(2.63)
Perceived threat: more crime	6.97	6.72	5.97	6.53
reiceived tilleat. Hole tillle	(2.07)	(2.04)	(1.82)	(1.99)
Darsaiyad throaty jaha	5.09	4.89	5.57	5.03
Perceived threat: jobs	(2.18)	(2.22)	(2.17)	(2.36)
Dorocius d throat: seeial herefit-	5.96	5.58	5.83	4.99
Perceived threat: social benefits	(2.52)	(2.48)	(2.09)	(2.39)
B	5.19	4.66	5.78	4.88
Perceived threat: economy	(2.49)	(2.46)	(2.35)	(2.48)
	/	/	,	/







	Austria	Germany	Hungary	Italy
	(N = 1,520)	(N = 1,521)	(N = 1,510)	(N = 1,514)
Derecived threats cultural life	5.53	4.89	5.54	4.54
Perceived threat: cultural life	(2.77)	(2.70)	(2.50)	(2.60)
Daniel and those to control	4.90	4.84	5.97	5.11
Perceived threat: values	(2.79)	(2.60)	(2.38)	(2.58)

Note: Means are reported, standard deviations in brackets. News media consumption: 1 = never; 7 = every day. Feeling thermometer: 0 = very negative; 10 = very positive. Perceived threat: 0 = low perceived threat.

Subsequently, we conducted a partial correlation analysis (controlling for country) to investigate how the different news media consumption variables are associated with outgroup attitudes. In order to enable cross-country comparison, we use the aggregated quality and popular newspaper/website consumption. An analysis per country can be found in the appendices, in which the individual newspaper/digital news indicators were used. Table 3 shows that news media consumption is associated with feelings towards immigrants, refugees, and Muslims in several ways. Regarding television news consumption, correlation coefficients show that consumption of public service and local news is associated with positive sentiments towards these outgroups, while commercial news consumption is associated with negative sentiments. The link between radio news and sentiments is weaker: only the consumption of public service radio news is (positively) associated with outgroup sentiments. Although different newspapers and digital news outlets adopt different narratives to talk about migrants and migration, the effects of newspaper and digital news consumption are relatively uniform. This was confirmed by additional correlation analyses that related 1) the correlation between newspapers and outgroup attitudes with 2) the correlation of digital news outlets and attitudes. The result was - in all countries and for all outlets with both an online and offline version - clear: correlation coefficients exceeded .85 in all cases and .90 in most, which indicates that the effect of (the same) offline and online outlets on attitudes are highly similar. Consuming news on quality outlets is strongly associated with more positive sentiments towards immigrants, refugees, and Muslims. However, and perhaps contrary to some expectations, consuming news on popular outlets is also associated with positive attitudes in some instances, although the link is weaker than for quality outlets.

When individuals hold greater perceived threat towards refugees, they also hold more negative attitudes. Although the link between all threat variables and sentiments is negative, it is most pronounced for the item regarding refugees' threat towards the country's cultural life: when respondents believe refugees will threaten their culture, their attitudes towards refugees and other outgroups will be negative.



Table 3. Partial correlation analysis of outgroup attitudes with news media consumption, and perceived threat (N = 6,065), controlled for country

	Feelings: Im-	Feelings: Ref-	Feelings:
	migrants	ugees	Muslims
Television consumption			
Public service news	.07***	.11***	.04**
Commercial news	07***	05***	07***
Local news	.07***	.06***	.06***
Radio consumption			
Public service news	.09***	.10***	.08***
Commercial news	.01	01	00
Local news	.03*	.01	.02
Newspaper consumption			
Quality newspapers	.17***	.18***	.18***
Popular newspapers	.03**	.02	.06***
Digital news consumption			
Quality news websites	.16***	.17***	.17***
Popular news websites	.07***	.07***	.07***
Outgroup attitudes			
Perceived threat: more crime	38***	43***	42***
Perceived threat: jobs	47***	51***	48***
Perceived threat: social benefits	56***	64***	60***
Perceived threat: economy	59***	66***	60***
Perceived threat: cultural life	62***	69***	66***
Perceived threat: values	21***	22***	21***

Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.







4. Conclusions

In the context of WP4 of the OPPORTUNITIES project, whose aim it is to analyze changing attitudes of citizens towards migrants in European member states using quantitative methods and develop a clearer understanding of the cumulative effects and consequences of media selection behaviour on individual attitudinal outcomes when adopting narratives on migration, we fielded an online survey in four European countries (Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy; N = 6,065) in May and June of 2021. In this survey, we collected detailed data on individual news media consumption, which included exposure to media narratives on migration. We asked about their consumption of news on public service, commercial, and local television and radio networks. Beyond that, we also asked about the consumption of about 10 newspapers and digital news outlets in their country. To link this to outgroup attitudes, we also collected data on sentiments towards immigrants, refugees, and Muslims.

The data and these findings indicate that there are notable similarities and differences in news media consumption patterns between countries. A first finding is that newspaper and digital news consumption is clearly lower than television or radio consumption, in all countries. Second, while German, Austrian, and Italian respondents hold relatively similar television and radio news consumption patterns (high public service media exposure, lower commercial), the pattern is quite different among Hungarians. They clearly consume more news on commercial outlets. As for newspaper and digital news, Germans and Italians mainly appear to consume quality (or broadsheet) newspapers or digital news, while Austrians and Hungarians report higher consumption of popular (or tabloid) newspapers or digital news.

The correlation analysis indicates that news media consumption – and exposure to different narratives on each media type - is strongly associated with attitudes towards outgroups. Exposure to news on public service networks (both radio and television), local television networks, quality newspapers, and quality digital news outlets is associated with positive attitudes towards immigrants, refugees, and Muslims. Based on previous findings regarding the narratives on migration on several of these media outlets, this was largely in line with our expectations. An exception here is Hungary, where exposure to public service network (or here: state media) is linked with more negative attitudes. However, this is not surprising given the government's strong influence on this network, which thereby serves as a medium to disseminate the government's anti-immigrant rhetoric. Somewhat surprisingly, results also indicate that exposure to popular newspapers and digital news is also related to more positive attitudes among German, Hungarian, and Italian respondents. This indicates that – in some countries – the amount of media exposure in general may play a significant role in the development of outgroup attitudes, rather than the type of media that individuals are exposed to (in line with cultivation theory). Among Austrians, there is a clear difference in the relationship depending on the outlet: exposure to quality or (to a lesser extent) moderate outlets is related to positive attitudes, while exposure to popular outlets is associated with negative sentiments. When individuals consume more news on commercial networks, they will hold negative attitudes.

With these findings, we provide new insights into the link between news media consumption and attitudes in the four countries under study: not only does the amount of exposure to a certain medium (television, radio, newspaper, digital news) play a vital role in the development of outgroup attitudes, but the specific network or outlet – along with its specific narratives on migration - consumed on each



medium also have a clear effect. This signals the need for a continued fine-grained analysis of news media effects on outgroup attitudes.



5. References

Billiet, J. B. (1995). Church involvement, individualism, and ethnic prejudice among Flemish Roman Catholics: new evidence of a moderating effect. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, *34*(2), 224–233.

Blinder, S. (2015). Imagined immigration: The impact of different meanings of 'immigrants' in public opinion and policy debates in Britain. *Political Studies*, *63*(1), 80–100.

Boesman, J., d'Haenens, L., & Van Gorp, B. (2015). Triggering the news story: Reconstructing reporters' newsgathering practices in the light of newspaper type, newsroom centralization, reporters' autonomy, and specialization. *Journalism Studies*, *16*(6), 904–922.

Callens, M.-S., & Meuleman, B. (2017). Do integration policies relate to economic and cultural threat perceptions? A comparative study in Europe. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, *58*(5), 367–391.

Carvalho, J., Eatwell, R., & Wunderlich, D. (2015). The politicisation of immigration in Britain. In W. van der Brug, G. D'Amato, D. Ruedin, & J. Berkhout, *The politicisation of migration* (pp. 159–173). Routledge.

Ceobanu, A. M., & Escandell, X. (2010). Comparative analyses of public attitudes toward immigrants and immigration using multinational survey data: A review of theories and research. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *36*(1), 309–328.

De Coninck, D., d'Haenens, L., & Joris, W. (2019). Investigating intergroup attitudes in Europe: Crossnational data on news media, attitudes towards newcomers, and socio-psychological indicators. *Data in Brief*, *26*, 104535.

De Coninck, D., Duque, M., Schwartz, S. J., & d'Haenens, L. (2021). Public attitudes towards immigration, news and social media exposure, and political attitudes from a cross-cultural perspective: Data from seven European countries, the United States, and Colombia. *Data in Brief.*

De Coninck, D., Ogan, C., Willnat, L., & d'Haenens, L. (2021). Mediatized realities of migrants in a comparative perspective: Media use, deservingness, and threat perceptions in the United States and Western Europe. *International Journal of Communication*, *15*, 2506–2527.

Eberl, J. M., Meltzer, C. E., Heidenreich, T., Herrero, B., Theorin, N., Lind, F., Berganza, R., Boomgaarden, H. G., Schemer, C., & Strömbäck, J. (2018). The European media discourse on immigration and its effects: a literature review. *Annals of the International Communication Association*, *42*(3), 207–223.

Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, 43(4), 51–58.









Gabrielatos, C., & Baker, P. (2008). Fleeing, sneaking, flooding: A corpus analysis of discursive constructions of refugees and asylum seekers in the UK press, 1996-2005. *Journal of English Linguistics*, 36(1), 5–38.

Gamson, W. A., & Modigliani, A. (1989). Media discourse and public opinion on nuclear power: A constructionist approach. *American Journal of Sociology*, *95*(1), 1–37.

Gebauer, C., & Sommer, R. (2021). *Migration and narrative. Key terms and concepts*. Bergische Universitaet Wuppertal.

Gerbner, G. (1980). Aging with television: Images on television drama and conceptions of social reality. *Journal of Communication*, *30*(1), 37–47.

Gerbner, G. (1998). Cultivation analysis: An overview. *Mass Communication and Society*, 1(3–4), 175–194.

Gerbner, G., & Gross, L. (1976). Living with television: The violence profile. *Journal of Communication*, 26(2), 172-199.

Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. Harvard University Press.

Gottlob, A., & Boomgaarden, H. (2020). The 2015 refugee crisis, uncertainty and the media: Representations of refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants in Austrian and French media. *Communications*, 45(s1), 841–863.

Greussing, E., & Boomgaarden, H. G. (2017). Shifting the refugee narrative? An automated frame analysis of Europe's 2015 refugee crisis. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *43*(11), 1749–1774.

Hagendoorn, L., & Nekuee, S. (1999). Education and racism. A cross-national inventory of positive effects of education on ethnic tolerance. Ashgate.

Hainmueller, J., & Hiscox, M. J. (2007). Educated preferences: Explaining attitudes toward immigration in Europe. *International Organization*, *61*(2), 399–442.

International Centre for Policy Advocacy. (2018). *Understanding the power of frames*. https://www.narrativechange.org/toolkit/01-understanding-power-frames

Jacobs, L., Meeusen, C., & d'Haenens, L. (2016). News coverage and attitudes on immigration: Public and commercial television news compared. *European Journal of Communication*, *31*(6), 642–660.

Lecheler, S., & de Vreese, C. H. (2011). Getting real: The duration of framing effects. *Journal of Communication*, 61(5), 959–983.

Lucassen, L. (2018). Peeling an onion: the "refugee crisis" from a historical perspective. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *41*(3), 383–410.

McNeil, R., & Karstens, E. (2018). *Comparative report on cross-country media practices, migration, and mobility*. European Journalism Centre and University of Oxford.

Media Landscapes. (2021). *Media landscapes. Expert analyses of the state of media*. https://medialand-scapes.org/

Meuleman, B., Davidov, E., & Billiet, J. (2009). Changing attitudes toward immigration in Europe, 2002–2007: A dynamic group conflict theory approach. *Social Science Research*, *38*(2), 352–365. MIPEX. (2021). *Migrant Integration Policy Index*. https://www.mipex.eu/

Morgan, M., Shanahan, J., & Signorielli, N. (2008). Growing up with television. Cultivation processes. In J. Bryant & M. B. Oliver (Eds.), *Media effects. Advances in theory and research*, third edition (pp. 34-49). Routledge.

Ogan, C., Pennington, R., Venger, O., & Metz, D. (2018). Who drove the discourse? News coverage and policy framing of immigrants and refugees in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. *Communications*, 43(3), 357–378.

Pisarevskaya, A., Levy, N., Scholten, P., & Jansen, J. (2020). Mapping migration studies: An empirical analysis of the coming of age of a research field. *Migration Studies*, *8*(3), 455–481.

Scheufele, D. A. (1999). Framing as a theory of media effects. *Journal of Communication*, 49(1), 103–122.

Scheufele, D. A., & Tewksbury, D. (2007). Framing, agenda setting, and priming: The evolution of three media effects models. *Journal of Communication*, *57*(1), 9–20.

Schlueter, E., & Davidov, E. (2013). Contextual sources of perceived group threat: Negative immigration-related news reports, immigrant group size and their interaction, Spain 1996–2007. *European Sociological Review*, *29*(2), 179–191.

Shanahan, J., & Morgan M. (1999). *Television and its viewers: Cultivation theory and research*. Cambridge University Press.

Shrum, L. J. (2017). Cultivation theory: Effects and underlying processes. In P. Rössler (Ed.), *The international encyclopedia of media effects*. Wiley-Blackwell.

Shrum, L. J., & Bischak, D. (2001). Mainstreaming, resonance, and impersonal impact. *Human Communication Research*, 27(2), 187–215.

Slater, M. D. (2007). Reinforcing spirals: The mutual influence of media selectivity and media effects and their impact on individual behavior and social identity. *Communication theory*, *17*(3), 281–303.

Strömbäck, J. (2008). Four phases of mediatization: An analysis of the mediatization of politics. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 13(3), 228–246.

Sunstein, C. R. (2007). Republic.com 2.0. Princeton University Press.

Song, H., & Boomgaarden, H. G. (2017). Dynamic spirals put to test: An agent-based model of reinforcing spirals between selective exposure, interpersonal networks, and attitude polarization. *Journal of Communication*, *67*(2), 256–281.



UNESCO. (2017). *Migrant/migration*. http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/international-migration/glossary/migrant

United Nations. (1951). Convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees. http://www.un-hcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocolrelating-status-refugees.html

Van Hootegem, A., Meuleman, B., & Abts, K. (2020). Attitudes toward asylum policy in a divided Europe: Diverging contexts, diverging attitudes? *Frontiers in Sociology*, *5*, 35.



6. Appendix

Table A1. Descriptive overview of newspaper and digital news outlets per country (Q = quality newspapers, M = moderate newspapers, P = popular newspapers)

	Austria (N = 1,520)	Germany (N = 1,521)	Hungary (N = 1,510)	Italy (N = 1,514
Newspaper consumption	(14 - 1,320)	(14 - 1,321)	(14 - 1,510)	(14 - 1,31-
Austria				
Q: Der Standard	2.39 (1.87)			
Q: Die Presse	1.99 (1.53)			
M: Falter	1.54 (1.12)			
M: Kurier	2.09 (1.61)			
M: Neue Vorarlberger Tageszeitung	1.35 (1.05)			
M: Neues Volksblatt	1.29 (0.89)			
P: Heute	2.22 (1.74)			
P: Kleine Zeitung	2.04 (1.72)			
P: Kronen Zeitung	3.04 (2.11)			
Germany				
Q: Süddeutsche Zeitung		1.87 (1.48)		
Q: Die Tageszeitung		2.55 (2.08)		
Q: Neues Deutschland		1.49 (1.22)		
Q: Die Zeit		1.81 (1.41)		
Q: Der Spiegel		2.09 (1.61)		
Q: Handelsblatt		1.71 (1.38)		









	Austria (N = 1,520)	Germany (N = 1,521)	Hungary (N = 1,510)	Italy (N = 1,514)
M: Frankfurter Allgemeine	(14 - 1,320)	1.75	(14 - 1,510)	(14 - 1,314)
Zeitung		(1.39)		
_		1.86		
M: Die Welt		(1.49)		
P: Frankfurter Rundschau		1.57		
P: Frankfurter Rundschau		(1.28)		
P: Bild		2.06		
1. Bild		(1.76)		
P: Express		1.46		
		(1.19)		
lungary				
Q: Népszava			1.63	
Q. 14CP32d4d			(1.21)	
Q: Megyei napilaphálózat			1.91	
□eg/ capapa.c.a.c			(1.57)	
Q: Világgazdaság			1.79	
7			(1.31)	
M: Pesti Hírlap FM			1.45	
			(1.07)	
P: Blikk			1.94	
			(1.42)	
P: Bors			1.77	
			(1.33)	
P: Metropol			1.65	
			(1.25) 1.80	
P: Nemzeti Sport			(1.53)	
			1.63	
P: Ripost			(1.21)	
			1.67	
P: Magyar Nemzet			(1.28)	
			1.63	
P: Magyar Hírlap			(1.23)	
aly			(=:==)	
Q: La Repubblica				2.50
C. La ricpubblica				(1.80)
Q: La Stampa				2.19
Q. La Stampa				(1.70)



Q: Il Sole 24 Ore	2.29 (1.71)
Q: Il Fatto Quotidiano	2.24 (1.75)
M: Avvenire	1.80 (1.46)
M: Corriere della Sera	2.52 (1.82)
M: Il messagero	2.02 (1.59)
P: Il Giornale	2.04 (1.60)
P: Il resto del Carlino	1.88 (1.56)
P: Il Gazzettino	1.82 (1.49)

Digital news consumption

Austria

Q: Orf.at	2.84
•	(2.10)
Q: Derstandard.at	2.50 (1.97)
	1.96
Q: Diepresse.com	(1.51)
O. Duefil et	1.61
Q: Profil.at	(1.20)
M: Kurier.at	2.10
Wi. Kurici.ac	(1.66)
M: Falter.at	1.58
Will Faller at	(1.21)
M: tt.at	1.53
	(1.29)
P: Krone.at	2.61
	(1.99)
P: Oe24-netzwerk	2.03
	(1.66)
P: Kleinezeitung.at	1.91
	(1.57) 2.05
P: Heute.at	(1.63)
	1.81
P: News.at	(1.41)
	(+.7+)









Germany

Q: Spiegel online	2.31
Q. Spieger offinie	(1.82)
Q: ARD online	2.61
Q.7.II.D OTHING	(1.99)
Q: Zeit online	1.98
	(1.55)
Q: Suddeutsche.de	1.93
	(1.55)
Q: ZDF news online	2.08
3 = 1	(1.62)
Q: Stern.de	2.00
	(1.54)
M: FAZ.net	1.80
	(1.44)
M: Welt online	2.02
	(1.61)
M: Focus online	2.14
THE TOTAL STATE	(1.69)
M: Web.de	2.19
The treatae	(1.88)
M: N24.de	2.13
171. TV2 1.GC	(1.69)
M: Gmx.de	1.95
W. Gillaide	(1.69)
P: t-online	2.19
. Te crimic	(1.85)
P: Bild.de	2.17
Sharac	(1.86)
P: n-tv.de	2.45
	(1.94)
inaarv	

Hungary

Q: Index.hu (1.89)
(1.83)
Q: 24.hu 3.14
Q. 24.11u (1.86)
2.71
Q: Telex (2.05)
2.82
Q: 444 (1.87)



Q: Szabad Európa	1.76 (1.36)
M: Indapass.hu	1.60 (1.21)
M: Nlcafe.hu	2.32 (1.53)
P: Origo.hu	2.79 (1.77)
P: Startlap.hu	2.37 (1.76)
P: Blikk.ru	2.26 (1.62)
P: Ncore.cc	1.88 (1.52)
Italy	(1.52)
Q: La Repubblica	2.76
,	(1.92) 2.39
Q: La Stampa.it	(1.75)
Q: Il Fatto Quotidiano	2.53
Q. II l'atto Quotidiano	(1.82)
Q: Il Sole 24 Ore	2.48
	(1.74) 2.72
M: Corriere della Sera	(1.90)
M: Il Massaggara	2.16
M: II Messaggero	(1.62)
M: Huffington Post Italia	2.19
•	(1.64) 2.59
M: Fanpage.it	(1.80)
	3.02
P: TGCOM24	(1.94)
P: ANSA	3.16
I . AUNA	(1.96)

Note: Q = quality newspapers; M = moderate; P = popular newspapers.









Table A2. Pearson correlation analysis of outgroup attitudes, news media consumption, and perceived threat in Austria (N = 1,520)

	Feelings: Immigrants	Feelings: Refugees	Feelings: Muslims
Television consumption	mmigrants	Relugees	IVIUSIIIIIS
Public service news	.06*	.10**	.04
Commercial news	12**	11**	11**
Local news	.00	.00	.00
	.00	.00	.00
Radio consumption			
Public service news	.08**	.11**	.08**
Commercial news	10**	13**	11**
Local news	04	05	04
lewspaper consumption			
Q: Der Standard	.18**	.22**	.20**
Q: Die Presse	.10**	.12**	.12**
M: Falter	.19**	.20**	.22**
M: Kurier	.04	.06*	.04
M: Neue Vorarlberger Tageszeitung	.01	.01	.06*
M: Neues Volksblatt	.03	.04	.10**
P: Heute	04	06*	03
P: Kleine Zeitung	.04	.05	.05
P: Kronen Zeitung	14**	11**	10**
Digital news consumption			
Q: Orf.at	.11**	.15**	.12**
Q: Derstandard.at	.21**	.24**	.23**
Q: Diepresse.com	.12**	.13**	.13**
Q: Profil.at	.09**	.08**	.12**
M: Kurier.at	.07**	.07**	.09**
M: Falter.at	.20**	.20**	.22**
M: tt.at	.05	.05	.10**
P: Krone.at	09**	10**	09**
P: Oe24-netzwerk	04	06*	02









P: Kleinezeitung.at	.04	.05	.07*
P: Heute.at	05	07*	02
P: News.at	.05*	.04	.08**
Outgroup attitudes			
Perceived threat: more crime	44**	54**	54**
Perceived threat: jobs	43**	52**	48**
Perceived threat: social benefits	.51**	62**	59**
Perceived threat: economy	55**	67**	59**
Perceived threat: cultural life	58**	70**	67**
Perceived threat: values	.14**	.18**	.17**

Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; Q = quality news outlet; M = between quality and popular news outlet; P = popular news outlet.









Table A3. Pearson correlation analysis of outgroup attitudes, news media consumption, and perceived threat in Germany (N = 1,521)

	Feelings:	Feelings:	Feelings:
	Immigrants	Refugees	Muslims
Television consumption			
Public service news	.08**	.12**	.04
Commercial news	07**	08**	07**
Local news	.06*	.04	.04
Radio consumption			
Public service news	.13**	.12**	.13**
Commercial news	.11**	.11**	.08**
Local news	03	06*	04
Newspaper consumption			
Q: Süddeutsche Zeitung	.18**	.15**	.17**
Q: Die Tageszeitung	.10**	.10**	.10**
Q: Neues Deutschland	.13**	.11**	.16**
Q: Die Zeit	.18**	.16**	.15**
Q: Der Spiegel	.17**	.14**	.15**
Q: Handelsblatt	.16**	.11**	.10**
M: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	.14**	.12**	.14**
M: Die Welt	.13**	.10**	.13**
P: Frankfurter Rundschau	.13**	.10**	.14**
P: Bild	.03	.00	.01
P: Express	.12**	.09**	.14**
Digital news consumption			
Q: Spiegel online	.21**	.17**	.15**
Q: ARD online	.16**	.15**	.14**
Q: Zeit online	.20**	.15**	.16**
Q: Suddeutsche.de	.16**	.14**	.15**
Q: ZDF news online	.18**	.15**	.16**
Q: Stern.de	.15**	.12**	.13**
M: FAZ.net	.16**	.11**	.13**









	M: Welt online	.12**	.09**	.11**
	M: Focus online	.11**	.06*	.08**
	M: Web.de	.05	.05	.06*
	M: N24.de	.07**	.02	.05*
	M: Gmx.de	.04	.01	.05
	P: t-online	.11**	.10**	.07**
	P: Bild.de	.03	01	01
	P: n-tv.de	.09**	.08**	.07*
Out	group attitudes			
	Perceived threat: more crime	43**	52**	47**
	Perceived threat: jobs	48**	53**	44**
	Perceived threat: social benefits	57**	66**	60**
	Perceived threat: economy	55**	65**	54**
	Perceived threat: cultural life	62**	70**	66**
	Perceived threat: values	.24**	.24**	.22**

Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.











Table A4. Pearson correlation analysis of outgroup attitudes, news media consumption, and perceived threat in Hungary (N = 1,514)

	Feelings: Immigrants	Feelings: Refugees	Feelings: Muslims
Television consumption			
Public service news	13**	10**	12**
Commercial news	03	01	05
Local news	.08**	.05*	.07**
Radio consumption			
Public service news	01	02	02
Commercial news	.02	.02	02
Local news	.05	.01	.01
Newspaper consumption			
Q: Megyei napilaphálózat	.05*	.03	.04
Q: Népszava	.18**	.16**	.17**
Q: Világgazdaság	.15**	.14**	.14**
M: Pesti Hírlap FM	.14**	.07**	.14**
P: Blikk	.07**	.05*	.07**
P: Bors	.08**	.06*	.10**
P: Metropol	.08**	.05*	.08**
P: Nemzeti Sport	.05	.02	.03
P: Ripost	.11**	.07**	.12**
P: Magyar Nemzet	.06*	.05*	.07**
P: Magyar Hírlap	.11**	.10**	.13**
Digital news consumption			
Q: Index.hu	.12**	.15**	.09**
Q: 24.hu	.17**	.20**	.13**
Q: Telex	.25**	.26**	.21**
Q: 444	.22**	.26**	.19**
Q: Szabad Európa	.20**	.18**	.20**
M: Indapass.hu	.12**	.10**	.14**
M: Nlcafe.hu	.09**	.10**	.12**









Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; Q = quality news outlet; M = between quality and popular news outlet; P = popular news outlet.









Table A5. Pearson correlation analysis of outgroup attitudes, news media consumption, and perceived threat in Italy (N = 1,510)

	Feelings:	Feelings:	Feelings:
	Immigrants	Refugees	Muslims
Television consumption			
Public service news	.07**	.10**	.02
Commercial news	12**	08**	11**
Local news	.04	.01	.07**
Radio consumption			
Public service news	.14**	.12**	.13**
Commercial news	.03	01	.05*
Local news	.06*	.02	.06*
Newspaper consumption			
Q: La Repubblica	.19**	.18**	.19**
Q: Il Sole 24 Ore	.09**	.08**	.14**
Q: La Stampa	.09**	.05	.15**
Q: Il Fatto Quotidiano	.14**	.12**	.19**
M: Avvenire	.12**	.07**	.20**
M: Corriere della Sera	.13**	.14**	.17**
M: Il messagero	.11**	.08**	.18**
P: Il Gazzettino	.10**	.04	.18**
P: Il Giornale	.04	.01	.12**
P: Il resto del Carlino	.06*	.03	.13**
Digital news consumption			
Q: La Repubblica	.22**	.23**	.23**
Q: La Stampa.it	.14**	.13**	.18**
Q: Il Fatto Quotidiano	.16**	.17**	.20**
Q: Il Sole 24 Ore	.09**	.11**	.13**
M: Corriere della Sera	.13**	.17**	.17**
M: Il Messaggero	.15**	.11**	.21**
M: Huffington Post Italia	.17**	.17**	.23**
M: Fanpage.it	.16**	.14**	.17**









P: ANSA	.12**	.16**	.14**
P: TGCOM24	.02	.03	.03
Outgroup attitudes			
Perceived threat: more crime	35**	37**	35**
Perceived threat: jobs	46**	48**	49**
Perceived threat: social benefit	ts57**	62**	59**
Perceived threat: economy	65**	68**	64**
Perceived threat: cultural life	65**	69**	65**
Perceived threat: values	62**	63**	66**
Perceived threat: more crime Perceived threat: jobs Perceived threat: social benefit Perceived threat: economy Perceived threat: cultural life	46** ts57** 65**	48** 62** 68** 69**	49** 59** 64** 65**

Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.



35







HUMMINGBIRD: SURVEY QUESTIONS

Socio-demographics

1.	I am
	1. Male
	2. Female
	3. Other
2.	In which year were you born?
3·	What is your current marital status?
	1. Unmarried, never been married
	2. Cohabiting
	3. Married
	4. Divorced
	5. Widow/Widower
 4·	Were you born in <i>country</i> ?
	1. Yes
	2. No
 5·	ONLY IF Q4 = 2 Where were you born?
	1. In a different country inside the European Union
	2. In a different country outside of the European Union
	3. Don't know

6.	Were both	your parents born in <i>country</i> ?
	1.	Yes, both parents were born in <i>country</i>
	2.	No, one parent was born in another country
	3.	No, both parents were born in another <i>country</i>
7.	ONLY IF	$\mathbf{Q6} = 2$ Taking about the parent that was born outside of <i>country</i> , where were they born?
	1.	In a different country inside the European Union
	2.	In a different country outside of the European Union
	3.	Don't know
8.	ONLY IF	Q6 = 3 re they born?
	1.	Both were born in a different country inside the European Union
	2.	Both were born in a different country outside of the European Union
	3.	One was born in a different country inside the European Union, another was born outside of the
		European Union
	4.	Don't know
9.	Which situ	nation applies to you? Multiple options are possible.
	1.	I have a full-time job
	2.	I have a part-time job
	3.	I am temporarily or permanently disabled
	4.	I am a student
	5.	I am a houseman/housewife
	6.	I am unemployed

7. I am retired

9. Other

8. In compulsory military service

10. What is	your highest educational degree?							
1	Uneducated – no diploma or certificate							
2	. Primary education							
3	. Lower secondary education							
4	. Higher secondary education							
5	. Higher non-university education							
6. University education								
7	. Do not know							
	ch was the total net income (income from property, labor and/or replacement income) sehold in this past month?							
1	Under €1500							
2. €1500-€2499								
3. €2500 - €3499								
4	. €3500 - €4499							
5. €4500 - €5499								
6. Over €5500								
7	. Do not know							
8	. I would rather not say							
9	. I do not yet have an income (because I'm studying, for example)							
	$\mathbf{Q11} = 9$ icult or easily does your household make ends meet with the available income of this ld?							
1	Very difficult							
2	. Difficult							
3	. Rather difficult							
4	. Rather easily							
5	. Easy							
6	. Very easy							

of

13.	When it comes to politics, people sometimes talk of 'left' and 'right'. Where would you place your-
	self on the scale below, where 1 stands for the left and 11 for the right?

1 Left	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11 Right
О	О	О	О	О	О	О	О	О	О	О

14.	How much would you say the political system in [country] allows people like you to have	e a say in
	what the government does?	

Ο	0	0	0	Ο
1	2	3	4	5
Not compatible	Very little	Some	A lot	A great deal

15. And how much would you say that the political system in [country] allows people like you to have an influence on politics?

Ο	0	0	0	0
1	2	3	4	5
Not compatible	Very little	Some	A lot	A great deal

16. How able do you think you are to take an active role in a group involved with political issues?

O	O	O	O	O
1	2	3	4	5
Not at all confident	A little confi- dent	Quite confi- dent	Very confi- dent	Completely confi- dent

17. And how confident are you in your own ability to participate in politics?

O	O	O	O	O
1	2	3	4	5
Not at all confident	A little confi- dent	Quite confident	Very confi- dent	Completely confident

18. How much do you agree with each of the following statements?

	1 Strongly disagree	2 Somewhat disagree	3 Neither agree nor dis- agree	4 Somewhat agree	5 Strongly agree
MPs in Parliament lose touch with ordinary people.	0	О	О	О	О
The differences between ordinary people and the ruling elite are much greater than the differences among ordinary people.	0	О	0	О	0
Politicians talk too much and take too little action.	0	О	О	О	О

19. I think that...

	1 Cer- tainly not	2	3	4	5	6 Un- de- cided	7	8	9	10	11 Cer- tain
many very important things happen in the world, which the public is never informed about.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	O
politicians usually do not tell us the true motives for their decisions.	0	O	O	О	О	О	0	0	О	О	О
government agencies closely monitor all citizens.	O	O	0	О	O	O	0	0	О	О	О
events which superficially seem to lack a connection are often the result of secret activities.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	О
there are secret organizations that greatly influ- ence political de- cisions.	О	O	О	0	О	0	0	0	О	О	О

20. Which re	ligion or denomination do you belong to?					
1.	Roman Catholic					
2	Protestant					
3	Other Christian denomination					
4	Muslim					
5	Jewish					
6	Other denomination – Which one?					
7	Atheist (do not believe in God)					
8	Agnostic (not sure there is a God)					
9	Don't know					
21. How im	oortant is religion or are religious beliefs to you?					
1	Very important					
2. Somewhat important						
3	Not very important					
4	Not at all important					
22. Would y	ou say you live in ?					
1	A farm or home in the country					
2	A country village					
3	A small city or town					
4	4. The suburbs or outskirts of a big city					
5	A big city					
23. Fill in th	e postal code of your main residence.					

Media and news consumption

- 24. How often did you come across news on refugees on television, radio, or in newspapers (on- or of- fline) during the past year?
 - 1. Never
 - 2. Rarely
 - 3. Sometimes
 - 4. Often
 - 5. Very often

25. To what extent did you watch news programmes on the broadcasters mentioned below in the past month?

	1 Never	2	3	4 Every week	5	6	7 Every day
Public broadcast (examples by region)	0	0	0	0	О	О	0
Commercial broadcast (examples by region)	0	О	О	О	0	О	О
Local television (examples by region)	О	0	0	0	0	0	О

26. To what extent did you listen to news and current event programmes on the broadcasters mentioned below in the past month?

	1 Never	2	3	4 Every week	5	6	7 Every day
Public broadcast (examples by region)	О	0	0	0	0	0	0
Commercial broadcast (examples by region)	О	0	0	0	0	0	0

27. To what extent did you read newspapers mentioned below in the past month?

	1 Never	2	3	4 Every week	5	6	7 Every day
[examples by region]	О	0	0	О	0	0	0
[examples by region]	О	0	0	О	0	0	О
[examples by region]	О	0	0	О	0	0	О
[examples by region]	О	0	0	О	0	0	О
[examples by region]	О	0	0	О	0	0	О
[examples by region]	О	0	0	О	0	0	О
[examples by region]	0	0	0	О	0	0	О
[examples by region]	О	0	0	О	0	0	О

28. Please tell me how important you consider the following characteristics of news media and journalistic production.

	1 Not at all important	2 A little important	3 Somewhat important	4 Very im- portant	5 Extremely important
Report things as they are.	О	0	0	0	О
Set the political agenda.	О	0	0	0	0
Support government policy.	0	0	0	0	0
Provide the kind of news that attracts the largest audience.	0	0	О	О	О
Promote tolerance and cultural diversity.	0	0	0	О	О

29. To what extent did you read online news sources mentioned below in the past month?

	1 Never	2	3	4 Every week	5	6	7 Every day
[examples by region]	О	0	0	О	0	0	О
[examples by region]	О	О	О	0	0	0	О
[examples by region]	О	О	0	О	0	0	О
[examples by region]	О	0	0	0	0	0	О
[examples by region]	О	0	О	О	0	0	О
[examples by region]	О	0	0	О	0	0	О
[examples by region]	О	0	0	О	0	0	О

30. Do you have a	profile on any	social media	ı website (e.g	., Facebook,	Twitter,	LinkedIn,	Instagram,
YouTube, Redo	dit)?						

- 1. Yes
- 2. No

ONLY IF Q30 = 1

31. On average, about how much time do you spend on online social network sites?

1 No time at all	2 A few times a month	3 Every week	4 Multiple days a week	5 Every day	6 Less than an hour every day	7 Several hours every day
0	0	О	0	0	0	0

ONLY IF Q30 = 1 32. How often do you use social media to...?

	1 Never	2	3	4	5	6	7 All the time
to stay informed about current events and public affairs.	О	О	0	0	0	0	О
to stay informed about the local community.	О	0	0	0	0	0	О
to get news about current events from mainstream news media.	О	0	0	0	0	0	О
to get news about current events through friends.	О	0	0	0	0	0	О
to meet new people who share my interests.	0	0	0	0	0	0	О

ONLY IF Q30 = 1 33. Please indicate how often you engaged in the following social media activities in the last month.

	1 Never	2	3	4	5	6	7 Very often
Read a blog about current affairs or politics.	0	О	0	О	0	0	0
Write a blog post or vlog about current affairs or politics.	0	О	0	О	0	О	О
Commenting on/discussing current affairs or politics on social media.	0	О	О	О	0	О	О
Following a politician on social media.	О	О	О	О	О	0	О
Following a political party on social media	О	О	О	О	0	0	О

Trust
34. Indicate to what extent you trust the news coverage from the institutions below.

	1 No trust at all	2	3	4	5 Complete trust
Public television broadcasters (examples by region)	О	0	0	О	О
Commercial television broadcasters (examples by region)	О	О	О	О	0
Local television broadcasters (examples by region)	О	О	О	О	О
Public radio broadcasters (examples by region)	О	О	О	О	О
Commercial radio broadcasters (examples by region)	О	О	0	О	О
Quality newspapers (examples by region)	О	О	0	О	О
Popular newspapers (examples by region)	О	0	0	О	О
Newsapps/newswebsites (examples by region)	О	О	О	О	О
Social media (examples by region)	0	О	0	О	0

35. Indicate to what extent you trust each of the institutions below.

	1 No trust at all	2	3	4	5 Complete trust
Your country's parliament	О	0	О	0	0
The legal system	О	0	О	0	0
The police	О	0	0	0	0
Politicians	О	0	О	0	0
Political parties	О	0	О	0	0
The European parliament	О	0	О	0	0
The United Nations	О	О	0	0	О

Political attitudes

36. Indicate to what extent you agree with the statements below.

	Stro ngly dis- a- gree	2	3	4 Neither agree e nor disagree	5	6	7 Stro ngly agre e
It's great that many young people today are prepared to defy authority.	О	О	О	О	О	O	О
What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity.	О	О	О	О	О	О	О
God's laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed before it is too late.	О	О	О	0	0	О	О
There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse.	О	О	О	0	0	О	О
Our society does NOT need tougher government and stricter laws.	О	О	О	О	О	О	О
The facts on crime and the recent public disorders show we have to crack down harder on troublemakers, if we are going preserve law and order.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

37. Show how much you favor or oppose each idea below by selecting a number from 1 to 7 on the scale below. You can work quickly; your first feeling is generally best

	1 Strongly op- pose	2	3	4 Nei- ther op- pose nor fa- vor	5	6	7 Strongly favor
An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom.	0	О	О	О	О	О	О
Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.	0	О	О	О	0	О	О
No one group should dominate in society.	О	0	О	0	О	О	О
Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top.	0	О	О	О	О	О	0
Group equality should not be our primary goal.	0	О	О	О	О	О	0
It is unjust to try to make groups equal.	0	О	О	0	О	О	0
We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.	0	0	О	О	0	О	О
We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed.	0	0	О	0	О	О	0

38. How close do you feel to ...?

	1	2	3	4	5
	Not close at all	Not very close	Somewhat close	Close	Very close
[region – if applicable]?	О	0	0	0	0

[country]	0	0	О	0	0
Europe?	О	0	0	О	0

Outgroup attitudes


39. Over the past years, many migrants have come to Europe. Some have been allowed to permanently stay in *country*, and others haven't. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the statements below about which migrants should be allowed to stay in *country* permanently.

	1 Strongly disagree	2 Disagree	3 Neither agree nor disagree	4 Agree	5 Strongly agree
Migrants who are allowed to remain in [country] should be grateful for that.	0	О	О	О	О
Migrants who are allowed to remain in [country] do not have a right to complain about their circumstances.	0	0	0	О	О
Migrants that decide to come to [country] only for work and wages should not be allowed to stay.	0	0	О	О	О
Refugees who are fleeing from armed conflicts in their home country should be allowed to stay in [country].	0	0	0	О	О
Refugees who are fleeing from the consequences of climate change in their home country should be allowed to stay in [country].	0	0	0	О	0
Only migrants with work skills from which the economy of [country] can profit, are allowed to stay in [country].	0	0	0	O	О
Only migrants who have a job and pay taxes should be allowed to stay in [country].	0	0	0	О	О
Only migrants who can positively contribute to the culture of [country] are allowed to stay.	0	0	0	О	О
Only migrants with a similar cultural background as the [country] population are allowed to stay.	0	О	0	О	0
Only migrants with similar religious backgrounds as the [country] population are allowed to stay.	0	0	0	О	0

Only migrants with a similar ethnic background as the [country] population are allowed to stay.	О	О	О	О	О
Only poor migrants with dependent young children are allowed to stay in [country].	0	0	О	О	О
Only migrants who are truly poor are allowed to stay in [country].	0	О	О	О	О
Unaccompanied minors who decide to come to [country] should be allowed to stay in [country].	О	О	О	О	О

40. We'd like to get your feelings toward a number of groups in your country on a "feeling thermometer." A rating of zero degrees means you feel as cold and negative as possible. A rating of 100 degrees means you feel as warm and positive as possible. You would rate the group at 50 degrees if you don't feel particularly positive or negative toward the group. Using this scale, how would you feel towards IMMIGRANTS?

An immigrant should be understood as covering all cases where the decision to migrate is taken freely by the individual concerned, for reasons of 'personal convenience' and <u>without intervention</u> of an external compelling reason (e.g. war, natural disaster, ...).



41. When you think about immigrants coming to [country], how strongly do you feel the following emotions?

	1 Not at all	2	3	4	5	6	7 A lot
Anger	0	О	О	О	О	О	О
Fear	0	О	О	0	О	О	О
Норе	0	О	О	О	О	О	О

Sympathy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Disgust	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Happiness	О	О	О	О	О	О	0

Contact with/knowledge on immigrants

42. How often do you personally come into contact with ...

	1 Never	2 Seldom	3 Some- times	4 Often	5 Every day
Immigrants from other European countries?	О	0	О	0	0
Immigrants from non-European countries?	0	0	О	0	О

43. How many of your friends or acquaintances are from the following groups?

	1 None	2 Few	3 Some	4 Many	5 All
Immigrants from other European countries?	О	О	О	0	О
Immigrants from non-European countries?	О	О	О	О	О

44. If you think about all the experiences with immigrants you have in the present or had in the past. How would you rate your experience with ...

	1	2	3	4	5
	Very neg- ative	Quite negative	Neutral	Quite positive	Very positive
Immigrants from other European countries?	0	О	О	О	О
Immigrants from non-European countries?	О	О	О	0	О

Attitudes/knowledge on refugees

Below you will find a definition of 'refugee' that we ask you keep in mind when answering questions during the next section of the survey:

A refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group.

45. Inc	dicate how	many re	fugees yo	u believe h	ave mig 	rated	to [<i>c</i>	ount	<i>ry</i>] ii	n the	past	year	•		
GE de	EES? A rat grees mea	ing of ze ns you fe	ro degree el as warr	nometer," I s means yon and posit ive or nega	ou feel a tive as p tive tow	as coloossible ard re	d and le. Yo efuge	d neg ou wo ees.	gative	e as ate t	possi he g	ible. roup	A rat at 50	ing (of 100
					COI	d/neg	gative	9		V	varm	/posi	tive		
					0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
Refu	gees ()				=		_			_	_	_			
47. Ha	ve [count	ry]'s crim	e probler	ns increase	ed or dec	erease	d by	refu	gees (comi	ng to	live	here	?	
0	0	0	0	0	0		0		0		0		0		0
1 Crime de- creased	2	3	4	5	6		7		8		9		10)	11 Crime increased
				no come to create new		e gene	erally	z take	e jobs	s awa	y fro	om w	orker	s in	
0	0	0	0	0	0		0		0		0		0		0
1 Take jobs away	2	3	4	5	6		7		8		9		10)	11 Create new jobs

On		do you th			x and pay ta me here tak					
0	0	0	0	Ο	0	Ο	0	0	0	0
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Take out more										Put in more
		ay it is ge ountries?		ad or good	for [country	y]'s econo	my that re	efugees co	me to liv	e here
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Bad for economy										Good for economy
			ountry]'s ther cour		fe is genera	lly undern	nined or e	nriched by	y refugee	s com-
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Cultural life un- der- mined										Cultural life en- riched
52. Ger	nerally sp	eaking, va	alues and	beliefs of 1	refugees are	not comp	atible wit	h those of	[country	⁷].
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Not com- patible										Highly compati- ble

53. When you think about refugees coming to [country], how strongly do you feel the following emotions?

	1 Not at all	2	3	4	5	6	7 A lot
Anger	0	О	О	0	О	0	О
Fear	0	О	О	О	О	0	О
Норе	0	О	О	О	О	0	О
Sympathy	0	О	О	0	О	0	О
Disgust	О	0	0	0	0	0	О
Happiness	О	0	0	0	0	О	0

54. How would you rate your overall feelings toward MUSLIMS? As before, a rating of zero degrees means you feel as cold and negative as possible. A rating of 100 degrees means you feel as warm and positive as possible. You would rate the group at 50 degrees if you don't feel particularly positive or negative toward Muslims.

Cold/negative warm/positive

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Muslims ()

Psychological indicators

 $55. \ Please indicate below to what extent you agree with the following statements.$

	1 Strongly disagree	2	3	4	5 Strongly agree
I tend to manipulate others to get my way.	О	О	О	О	О
I have used deceit or lied to get my way.	О	О	О	О	О
I have used flattery to get my way.	О	0	О	О	О
I tend to exploit others towards my own end.	О	О	О	О	О
I tend to lack remorse.	О	О	О	О	О
I tend to not be too concerned with morality or the morality of my actions.	0	О	О	О	0
I tend to be callous or insensitive.	О	О	О	О	О
I tend to be cynical.	О	О	О	О	О
I tend to want others to admire me.	О	О	О	О	О
I tend to want others to pay attention to me.	О	О	О	О	О
I tend to seek prestige or status.	0	О	О	О	0
I tend to expect special favours from others.	0	О	О	О	0

56. How much of a threat, if any, is the coronavirus outbreak for...

	1 Not a threat	2	3	4	5 Major threat
The rights and freedoms of the [country] population as a whole.	0	0	О	О	О
What it means to be [country].	О	0	О	О	0
[country] values and traditions.	О	0	О	О	0
[country] democracy.	О	0	О	О	0
The maintenance of law and order in [country].	О	0	О	О	0
Your personal health.	О	0	О	О	0
The health of the [country] population as a whole.	0	0	О	О	0
Your personal financial safety.	О	0	О	О	0
The [country] economy.	О	0	О	О	0
Day-to-day life in your local community	О	0	О	0	О

