縦横—クロスロード—크로스로드

Ethnicity and Sinicization Reconsidered

Workshop on non-Han Empires in China

Workshop Proceedings

Edited by
Francesca Fiaschetti,
Julia Schneider and
Angela Schottenhammer

Special Issue

Crossroads
Studies on the History of Exchange Relations
in the East Asian World
Vol. 5 (April 2012)

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東亞世界交流史研究

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東アジア世界の交流史研究

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The photo on the front-cover was selected for the workshop as a symbol for the multi-ethnic society of the Qing dynasty. It is depicting an inscription board with the names of the Lamaistic Yonghe Temple, "Palace of Harmony and Peace" above the entrance to the main hall, written in the four official languages of the Qing empire (Manchu, Chinese, Tibetan and Mongolian), carved in the handwriting of the Qianlong 乾隆 Emperor (r. 1736–1796): Hūwaliyasun hūwaliyaka gung – Yonghe gong 雍和宮 – Gàndên Chìnchagling – Nairalt Nairamdakh Suum. The temple, established in 1694 on the base of the Ming period building, in 1744/45 was proclaimed a sacred site of Buddhism by this emperor. Cf. the article on the Yonghe Temple in Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yonghe_Temple.

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Prolegomena

Francesca FIASCHETTI and Julia SCHNEIDER

The present volume is the result of the academic discussion on non-Han Dynasties which took place at the workshop "Ethnicity and Sinicization Reconsidered: Workshop on Non-Han Empires in China" (June 15th to 17th 2011, Ghent University, Belgium).

Non-Han empires have always provided a special challenge for historians. Although they governed regions inhabited by Han people, the founders of these empires belonged to other ethnicities in Central and East Asia. However, many important sources about these empires and dynasties were written in Chinese and often pay special attention to those regions inhabited by Han people. Also, these sources tend to follow a unitary view of Chinese history embedded in a so called "culturalism", which integrated times of foreign rule in a sinocentric perspective of dynastic succession. Especially after historiography became mostly nationalist historiography in the first half of the twentieth century, it has been neglected that the ethnical and cultural identities of these dynasties were different from the Han, usually explained by the assumption of their gradual assimilation to their Han Chinese subjects, i. e. sinicization. It has not been until the last two decades of the twentieth century that scholars refuted this approach, basing their critique on more and more works, which take the non-Han perspective into account and definitely show that a multifaceted analysis of these dynasties and empires leads to a much more differentiated and colourful picture. These critiques were led by scholars like Evelyn S. Rawski and Pamela Kyle Crossley, both speakers at the workshop.[1]

Moreover a renewed interest for disciplines like Mongolian, Manchu, Tibetan and Central Asian studies, and the translation and

1 They especially approach the problem of the "sinicization hypothesis" in these two works: Crossley 1990; Rawski 1996.

analysis of documents in non-Chinese languages allowed for the development of a comparative view on the history of these people.

Still, the sources existing in the languages and scripts of the founders of these empires are often difficult to access and to interpret and therefore remain outside the focus of the main academic research.

For these reasons the discourse of the workshop gave particular attention to the analysis of sources of different kinds (textual as well as archaeological) and to the issues they present. Seven speakers had been invited to give lectures on their various fields of expertise all to be found in the area of non-Han empires and states in China. Moreover, they guided the workshop attendees through the translation and analysis of related primary sources. A similar approach has been experienced in a series of six workshops entitled "Research Training in Old Chinese", organized between 2009 and 2011 by Dirk Meyer (The Queen's College, University of Oxford) and Joachim Gentz (University of Edinburgh). During these workshops, a focused approach to the texts has proved very productive in the ambit of Chinese language and history. Therefore we decided to follow a similar pattern in the framework of a workshop on non-Han dynasties, whose documents often pose a special challenge to historians, due to their multilingualism and to the multicultural context of their production.

Moreover, we felt the need to bring together researchers on non-Han dynasties, a field which can count on many voices in the current worldwide scholarly panorama, but nevertheless still needs canals of stable communication and exchange.

The attendees came from U.S. American and European institutions, many of them graduated from Chinese universities, showing a wide scholarly interest in the topic. They gained new impulses and deeper insights, not only regarding non-Han empires in China, but also in a more general way regarding the writing of history. The essential idea was to combine sinological perspectives with sociological and anthropological approaches in order to deal with the problematic concept of sinicization in historiography and the challenges for Sinologists when dealing with non-Han empires in China. The twofold approach of the workshop – lecture and translation session – enabled all attendees to take part in lively and illuminating discus-

sions and to get deeper insights into the philological work of senior scholars in this field of study.

Comparative methodology and international communication were therefore the inspiring criteria of this workshop, which has become possible through the efforts and support of many individuals and institutions. It is here the right place to mention the financial support of the Gerda Henkel Foundation, the Doctoral School of Arts, Humanities and Law at Ghent University, the Münchener Universitätsgesellschaft and the China and Inner Asia Council of the Association for Asian Studies (Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation). It is also the place to mention the kind cooperation of the speakers with their most interesting lectures and of all attendees with their animated participation in the discussions and last but not least of Angela Schottenhammer (Ghent University) who made the publication of this volume possible. Our hope that the workshop could be the beginning of a series of meeting has been fulfilled by a second workshop on "Political Strategies of Identity-Building in Non-Han Empires in China" (Munich, June 18th to 19th 2012). We moreover hope that this workshop has provided encouragement to others to organize similar events in order to strengthen the communication and collaboration between scholars studying non-Han Empires.

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Introduction

Nicola DI COSMO

Ethnic affiliation and ascription, identity and representation have been for some time the subject of historical investigation. The emergence of ethnicity as an analytical category has generated new approaches to the past and at the same time stimulated a reexamination of national myths and the creation of ancient and modern communities.[1] Generally speaking, the representation of others requires a sense of belonging to one's own "community" (be it a people, a nation, a state, or a town) which is then defined by contrasting it with other communities, regarded as alien. The process of self-identification through the description of differences and the establishment of boundaries is as old as any account that can be defined as "history".[2] Ancient historians recognized and reported the existence of communities of others, often labeling them by assigning ethnic names whose origin is often uncertain, or, vice versa, colored ethnic names by ascribing to their bearers distinct qualities and features.

The sources of ethnic names, their changes, their significance in relation to both textual sources and material records, their linguistic import and cultural valence, are intrinsically linked to our definition of ethnicity and germane concepts, such as ethnic identity and ethnogenesis. It is possible that a definition of ethnicity may be of very limited use, especially in the absence of a critical interpretation of what an "ethnos" was in a given literate tradition or, worse, in case of a simple transfer of modern categories to ancient contexts. In modern Chinese historiography, for instance, the concept of *shaoshu minzu* 少數民族 (national minority, or minority population) is often used to refer to ancient peoples who, however they were constructed and understood, surely did not fit a twentieth-century concept. On the other hand, the wholesale elimination of "ethnic" categories from the realm of history would be ill-

1 For instance, see Geary 2002, 15-40; Smith 2000.

2 An argument made most cogently, albeit controversially, in Hartog 1988.

advised, given the omnipresent representation of "others" in literate civilizations from ancient times. The construction of the other is surely subject to the cultural forms, historical conditions, and intellectual environments from which the narrative emerges, but the overwhelming evidence is that "ethnic identities", if by this terms we understand a set of distinctive attributes connected to a name or location, are common in every historical tradition.

The process of creation of an ethnic community (ethnogenesis) is a historical process that changes from case to case, and could be born out of an internal political or social process, registered by the historian on the basis of his cultural parameters, no less than of an external one, whereby states and nations established, and sometimes imposed, ethnic names and boundaries on peoples they saw as discrete and conspicuously different. The effort that is required of the modern historian is to interpret the intellectual and other processes at work in different traditions to establish categories, boundaries, and communities, and thus, in a word, make history. While not every literate culture and historical tradition constructed these categories in the same way, there are at times resemblances having to do with perceptions of behavioral traits (cruel, untrustworthy, prone to violence, degenerate, or courageous, peaceful, generous, and nurturing), culture (habits, customs, rituals, religion, language, entertainment), geography (location, climate, and land features), economy (life ways, sustenance, special skills and products), society (kinship, social classes, laws, military organization), and, often most importantly, politics and history (the names and *gesta* of kings and princes, legends and myths, sagas and speeches, wars, migrations, and contacts with other peoples). This is the "stuff" of ethnic representation, which, because it springs from a common need of differentiation and identification, tends to be broadly similar. The descriptions of Inner Asian nomads from ancient Greece to China are singularly similar and yet significantly different, because while they were to a certain degree observing broadly similar societies (societies of pastoralists who lived in tents, led a nomadic life, and were dominated by a warrior aristocracy) their viewpoint was different. Among other things, Herodotus (ca. 484–425 BC) and Sima Qian 司馬遷 (ca. 145–86 BC) observed their respective nomads from different cultural traditions, within a different literary milieu, and under very different historical

circumstances.[3] What their descriptions can tell us is not just something about the nomads, but how their own literary traditions organized ethnographic knowledge. The "ethnicity" issue, in this light, becomes an epistemological issue, and one that deserves attention in order to understand the development of one of the central issues in Chinese civilization: its perception of the surrounding world and of itself in relation to it. At the same time, ethnographic information conveys knowledge about others that we can use, assuming this is not pure invention, to follow the development of other societies for which the only sources are Chinese. Coupled with knowledge about material culture from archaeology, and thanks to modern scientific advances in the study of ancient environments and population movements, we can hope to reconstruct at least in broad contours the history of one of the most important phenomena not just in East Asian but in world history: the rise of Inner Asian empires and the formation of an imperial culture that dominated for long historical periods large Eurasian regions.

Whether ethnicity and ethnogenesis are meaningful analytical categories to address specific historical processes and interpret sources is something that has been widely debated in European history, where much interest has been devoted to the study of ethnic groups especially after the fall of the Roman empire and the post-Roman rise of barbarian states.[4] No analogous effort can be registered in the realm of Chinese history, which has suffered, in a way, from the existence of both a long history of ethnic representation and a discourse of ethnic differentiation deeply ingrained in Chinese historiography and cultural history. If we were to draw, in extreme synthesis, a trajectory of that discourse through history, we might see (without intending to establish normative categories) a three-fold development that proceeds from simply registering the existence of undifferentiated others to the establishment of cultural boundaries, and to the development of ethnographic descriptions. Cultural distinctions and ethnographic descriptions were, then, adopted in the making of various theories that meant to explain China's checkered history of relations with its neighbors, the dark ages of foreign domination, the diplomatic and political interactions between

3 For a comparison between the early Greek and Chinese treatment of nomads see Stuurman 2008.

4 See for instance Pohl 1998; Heather 2008. See also the synthesis of the debate (from a polemical position) by Gillett 2006.

Chinese dynasties and other peoples, including a panoply of "tribute-bearing" states (*guo* 國). The relative strengths and weaknesses of these foreign states, nations and peoples may had added dynamism to the Chinese civilization or, on the contrary, sapped its vital energy. Moreover, the cultural superiority of the Chinese has often been contrasted with the military vigor of some foreign peoples, to create an image of China whose intellectual strength eventually transformed and cured the social pathologies associated with rebellion, war, chaos, and disorder, even when these resulted in foreign domination. No such characterization, so deeply rooted in the self-representation of China, could be possible without the parallel development of a history of the other that, while a cultural product and an ideological abstraction, still contained elements derived from the observation of realities that needed to be documented in order to be accounted for. Hence, the dual path of the development of a Chinese approach to historical ethnography. On the one side, it was an instrument to understand and cope with a dangerous world in which foreigners constituted a real and present danger, and also acquire knowledge to exploit resources controlled by these people that China might need. On the other side, the utilization of these accounts for the ideological construction of the other and self-representation of China, still enduring in the modern Chinese nation as a union of peoples (*minzu tuanjie* 民族團結), was a basic element in the making of internal and external policies throughout Chinese history, as every dynasty had to seek accommodations with "unreconstructed" ethnic groups.

These foreign peoples and alien communities, on the other hand, were not always passive recipients of Chinese descriptions. As I have argued elsewhere, the Chinese ethnographic accounts included in the dynastic histories became wells of information that could be also used by other peoples as sources to build their own political or ethnic identities.[5] Foreign leaders and empire builders developed a sense of history (their own history) by freely accessing the Chinese historical accounts and constructing analogies, genealogies, and political linkages with a past they appropriated in order to bolster their claims to legitimate rule and find useful precedents for diplomatic and political action, all enshrined by the authority that derived from the Chinese historical re-

5 Di Cosmo 2010.

cords. Hence, Turks and Uighurs could claim the Xiongnu as their political and cultural ancestors, and later foreign dynasties could establish ethnic genealogies by recourse to the Chinese records (see, for instance, the beginning of the *Jin shi*, the dynastic history of the Jurchen dynasty[6]). As a container of historical knowledge, these accounts ceased at some point to be the sole property of China but became key to the transmission of knowledge that foreign dynasties of different ethnicities, languages, and origins could still claim as their own. It is possible, although this is so far insufficiently studied and as yet unproven, that Chinese ethnographic histories were a key element of the ethnogenetic processes involved in the formation of Inner Asian polities and states.

The study of processes of ethnic differentiation, attribution of ethnic categories, and identification of ethnic boundaries in Chinese history requires a complex heuristic apparatus, since the meanings that ethnonyms may carry, as well as the contexts in which they appear, have to be mediated through a long history of reception and interpretation. When Mencius said that Emperor Shun 舜 was a man of the Eastern Yi 夷 and King Wen 文王 a man of the Western Yi (*Mencius*, 4B1)[7] we have absolutely no clue of what this means except to assume that the Yi formed a community of people recognized in ancient Chinese traditions as separate from other communities, such as the Hua 華 and Xia 夏. The fact that Shun and Wen belonged to this community, however, may have no historical grounding whatsoever. It could be the ingredient of a legend or a myth, as it almost certainly was. Ethnic attribution, in this interpretation, was used to create a myth, and almost every time we speak of ethnicity we should be conscious of the fact that ethnic affiliation has been for ages an excellent tool for mythmaking. Nonetheless, a cultural valence must be attributed to the notion of "Yi" for Mencius' statement to have any significance. The myth contains in itself an irreducible element of ethnic identification that must have meant something outside the myth, whether we can grasp its meaning or not. Our knowledge of the Eastern Yi (or just Yi) people, however, being limited to statements that provide no clue other than a name, can only serve to demonstrate a moment in China's intellectual history, in which ethnic differences were recognized even though any other feature re-

6 *Jinshi* 1.1.

7 Bloom and Ivanhoe 2009, 86.

mained undifferentiated. This is the first stage of recognition of alien communities. The oracle bones of the Shang dynasty document the existence, by citing their names, of communities of peoples (*fang* 方) located outside the Shang domain that were hunted down, enslaved and used in human sacrifices, but this is an ethnically undifferentiated world, in which no specific attributes are provided to describe the other.

A higher level of consciousness, which develops during the long Zhou dynasty consists of the description of cultural differences. Yet the descriptions of these differences and their exact meanings remain a matter of complex and often uncertain interpretation. Referring to someone as a Di 狄, Rong 戎 or Yi person could reflect, at the time of the Springs and Autumns, as much a political as a cultural statement. The question of "ethnicity" in ancient China must take into account the context in which statements are made, because of the widespread use of cultural differences to make a political point or derive a philosophical concept. The emergence of cultural boundaries between a "Chinese" world enclosed in a common sphere of shared rituals, written language, and political forms, and the many peoples perceived as external to it, or at any rate collocated outside it, signals a stage in the formation of Chinese culture in which self-representation required the mirror of an alien other. Unlike the Graeco-Roman world, however, a notion of "barbarism" in Chinese culture did not arise as one half of a bipolar, dualistic world in which a single boundary separated civilized and uncivilized, but rather as a series of alterities located at different cardinal points and at different distances from the putative civilized center. The relativism in the description of cultural differences (in contrast to the universalism of Chinese cultural values) that we find in the earliest representations of ethnic groups could perhaps also be detected – as cultural archetype – in much later theories on "Sinicization" (to be discussed below) whereby the foreign conquerors' different degrees of assimilation and acculturation were assumed to be a factor of their greater or lesser cultural distance from China.

If Zhou-period China developed a more profound consciousness of the limits of its culture and acquired a sense of its own history, reflected in the prismatic mirror of their many neighbors, enemies, and outsiders, it did not develop a clear sense of these alien cultures, or of their historicity. While foreigners abound in Zhou records, and participate in

essentially every aspect of political life, from treaties, alliances and marital relations to military expeditions, battles and invasions, they do not have an independent existence, but come to life only in function of the history of the states that had relations with them. As a result, we know next to nothing about the features that may differentiate a Di from a Rong or a Man 蠻 from a Yi (except, perhaps, a vague sense of cardinal direction). What we know is that these peoples are said to behave in non-Chinese ways, that is, to be outsiders with respect to the Zhou "club". Very few references are reported in which we are allowed to perceive the "inside" of the outsider, beyond the wall of constructed cultural differentiation that surrounds these peoples. Episodic, if frequent, participation in the political affairs of the Zhou state, to the point of sacking its capital and endangering the very existence of the royal house, does not lead to the composition of chronicles and treatises that shed light on the ethnic characteristics of these people, on their "ethnogenesis" and emergence as political communities, on their history, or on their origins. The process of consolidation of political power in the hands of an ever smaller number of states that took place during the late Springs and Autumns and Warring States periods also led to confusion between outsiders and insiders and made such cultural boundaries fragile and easily permeable. Supposedly *bona fide* Chinese states were painted with negative cultural attributes normally reserved for foreign peoples, and territorial and cultural boundaries were redrawn as political circumstances changed. The referents of these names also shifted, disappeared, or acquired a metaphoric valence entirely divorced from whatever original ethnic meaning may have existed. Some terms changed over time from simple ethnonyms to ethnophaulisms. Not unlike the term Vandal in European languages, terms such as Di, Rong, and Man were used as synonyms for savagery or at the very least uncouthness. Taken as "absolutes", and therefore sublimated from their historical contexts to the level of cultural *topoi*, such names lost their already weak ethnic value (that is, the reference to a specific community of people) to become generically applicable to undifferentiated outsiders. Likewise, the term Hu 胡 used in pre- and early imperial times to indicate a specific ethnic type (the mounted nomad) and possibly at some point also a specific people akin to the Xiongnu 匈奴 (as in the term Dong Hu 東胡), in Tang times had turned into a term descriptive of a generic non-Han person and sometimes of a Persian, Sogdian,

and other Central Asian types that had nothing in common with the original mounted nomads or Xiongnu.[8] The terms that emerge from this pre-imperial tradition are especially plastic *because* they lack precise ethnic descriptions, and can therefore be adopted in various rhetorical forms (metaphoric, metonymic, *pars pro toto*, figurative, allegorical, and so on) to strike a political, philosophical, or ideological point.

The following phase can be regarded as one in which ethnic groups are studied in their own right, and therefore coincides with the development of ethnic narratives and ethnographic descriptions. The invention of ethnographic narratives is to be attributed to Sima Qian and the beginning of systematic historiography, both in its "universal" and "dynastic" forms. By systematic I mean the compilation of thematic accounts based on the collation, compilation, and organization of knowledge into a narrative structure. The first such work is the *Shiji* 史記 by Sima Qian, and it is in it that we find the first accounts specifically dedicated to foreign peoples. Of them we learn a great deal, and while we do not have access to the sources used by the historian, it is a reasonable assumption that they were of various types: direct observation, oral accounts, and written documents. The extent of the relations between the Han dynasty and its neighbors following the Han re-constitution of the unified empire may have been one of the motives behind the rise of a new, "imperial" ethnography, but the intellectual tools that were forged to investigate the other are Sima Qian's (and perhaps Sima Tan's) personal creation. Sima Qian's historical and ethnographic accounts of alien peoples produced also *topoi* which to a certain degree become later codified, used as blueprints for the description of different peoples, but the boundary between the mere making of cultural others and the understanding of others as separate societies and historical agents (who therefore deserved their own ethnographic and historical narratives) had been crossed once and for all.

The accounts of foreign peoples that we find in the dynastic histories are an altogether different intellectual operation than the value-laden attribution of difference found in previous historical works. They allow us to see beyond the fence and qualify the other by a series of attributes that we assume to be the product of ethnographic observa-

8 On the Tang view of barbarians and ethnic identity of Central Asians, see Abramson 2008.

tion filtered through the intellectual sensibilities and the intentionality of the author. Regardless of the specific process and operations involved, it is here that for the first time foreigners are configured as different cultures, and historicized as such, in an effort on the one hand to make them consistent with past records, but also, and especially, to define them as historical partners of China, whether they were in the position of subordinates, antagonists, or allies.

The Chinese historical tradition has preserved this level of ethnographic inquiry, and the study of these texts has made some steps forward in recent years, but has remained behind the levels of interest generated by similar accounts in European history, and has also lagged behind the considerable advances made in the identification of "non-Chinese" cultural areas in Chinese archaeology. This may be the effect of a historical tradition that has left those periods of Chinese history dominated by foreign invaders in relative obscurity, or that has been more interested in looking at foreign dynasties as essentially Chinese, thus sanitizing ethnic elements and playing down ethnogenetic processes. Be as it may, the study of "ethnogenesis" in Chinese history, because of the connections with material culture, of the potential interest derived from comparative studies between Europe and China (for instance, with regard to the phenomena of ethnogenesis and state building in both Europe and China between the fourth and the sixth century AD), and the novelty represented by a poorly explored textual tradition promise to quickly emerge from a position of marginality and "subalternity".

The four studies in this issue of *Crossroads* represent a cross-section of the ways in which historians have addressed ethnicity, or rather of ways in which historical questions require a reflection about ethnic issues. The levels at which ethnicity operates as a means of analysis are multiple, and are illustrated here as boundary crossing in Hans van Ess's essay, as political discourse in Pamela Crossley's study, and as debate over the origin and implications of "Sinicization" in Evelyn Rawski's paper.

Hans van Ess's study of diplomatic relations during the Han dynasty proposes the investigation of a particular kind of boundary-crossing by looking at the ethos of ambassadors and envoys. In the conclusion van Ess stresses three aspects, one that refers to relations between the Han and polities that could be regarded as inferior, and

were treated as vassal states, and two in relation to the relations between Han and Xiongnu, namely the issue of "trustworthiness" and the question of the detention of envoys.

Premising that diplomatic relations were in any case based on the mutual exchange of envoys, the Han behaved differently in relation to different states. Those regarded as vassal or "tribute bearing" were "rewarded" by the Han with titles and seals and thus effectively incorporated into the body of the empire as polities and regimes formally under Han suzerainty. These were not, however, static relationships. During the Han dynasty itself such relations could change, and formal vassalage be transformed into a much more concrete subordination, following military conquest and the establishment of prefectures that replaced the formerly *de facto* independent polity. During the reign of Emperor Wu 武帝 (r. 140–87 BC) several of these vassal states, such as that of the Southern Yue 南越, were turned into Han prefectures.[9] There is no doubt, as van Ess explains, that envoys were expected to be returned unharmed, and that there was an obligation on the party that received them to send envoys back. Envoys could also act as proxies for the ruler in paying ritual homage to the emperor, a practice that in itself, in virtue of its similarity to the missions sent to the court by regional lords, implied that Han sovereignty extended (in some form) to them.

Much more complicated was the relationship with the Xiongnu, which was regulated through actual treaties that placed the two states in a position of diplomatic equality. Yet there was constant diplomatic sparring between Han and Xiongnu, and while the Xiongnu, in van Ess's words, only wanted equality, this was not to be easily negotiated. If envoys had to respect the protocol of the hosting court, there were still issues at stake that placed one of the two sides in a position of potential inferiority. Han politicians complained that sending brides and valuables to the Xiongnu subverted the proper relationship by putting the Xiongnu on top, and the Xiongnu did not want to hear Han sermons on the presumed superiority of Han values and virtues.

Yet, as van Ess argues, the ethos of the envoy was one in which "trustworthiness" was a critical attribute, which was especially based on the ability of a given person to display appreciation for "the other". Zhang Qian 張騫 (2nd century BC) was trustworthy because he had

9 Di Cosmo 2009.

gone through a process of cultural transformation. Clearly not all envoys were fit to do that, and we can even say that, as a rule, envoys were more concerned with representing their own country and civilization in a manner that preserved dignity and honor than to make an effort to appear "friendly" (and thus trustworthy). The success of the mission, however, was not based on the ability of the envoy to represent his own civilization, or to score philosophical points, but on the actual outcome of the negotiation: obtaining favorable terms, spying on the strength of the enemy, ensuring that future diplomatic exchanges continued to take place. Hence, the envoy was supposed to convey the exact meaning of his side's arguments, and in that rested the need for trust. But trustworthiness, that is, the individual quality of the envoy, was not the sole or ultimate guarantee, and, judging from the frequent mutual accusations of having detained envoys, it remained in short supply. The concept of reciprocity in the exchange of envoys, rather, was meant to ensure that the promises and pacts were going to be ratified and observed. In practice, an agreement could not acquire political currency unless a firm understanding by both sides had been reached, and for that one needed confirmation.

As also argued in this essay, trust was something that, as even the Chinese authors state, was frequently betrayed. Why? Answering this question may require an analysis of the systems of international or interstate relations prior to the Han dynasty. Chinese political culture was anything but naïve. During the Warring States the treaties stipulated with non-Zhou states were regularly ignored in the name of *Realpolitik*, and it is highly doubtful that any moral imperative was observed in the relations with "barbarian" states. Political stratagems meant to outwit the enemy were common practice. Such concepts were not foreign to the Han dynasty, and if envoys were expected to be trustworthy, Han political culture allowed sufficient latitude to outwit the enemy, if necessary, by any means, including treachery. The very adoption of the *heqin* 和親 policy in its original Han formulation can easily be seen as a "confidence trick" meant to eventually bring the Xiongnu into a position of subordination and submission.[10]

At a different level, namely in terms of the relevance of certain moral concepts in the political arena, we should also recall that Naomi

10 Di Cosmo 2002, 193.

Standen, in her study of border-crossing in the post-Tang world, adopted "loyalty", rather than ethnicity, as a central category to explain the political world in which various agents operated. While "loyalty' and "trustworthiness" are concepts expressed differently in Chinese (*xin* 信 and *zhong* 忠) they are semantically close, in a political sense, and a comparison between the two would be useful to investigate the political culture of the frontier. On the other hand, there are clear differences between the Han-Xiongnu confrontation, which involved two empires locked in a prolonged and deadly war, and the post-Tang world of multiple polities, where political and ethnic boundaries were much more fluid.

Is there, beyond the question of political rationality and philosophical ethos, an ethnic "discourse" in the border crossing of envoys? We know nothing of the ethnic identity of the Xiongnu, except for what Sima Qian and Ban Gu 班固 (32–92 AD) tell us. Surely there is an ethnographic element in the depiction and representation of the world of the northern nomads, but we are not able to say whether the Xiongnu had "ethnic" consciousness, or what that may have meant to them, beyond the ethnographic codes introduced by Sima Qian. If the Xiongnu were a multiethnic empire, in the sense that its constituents parts, while recognizing themselves as members of the Xiongnu "polity", retained their own separate, local or tribal, identities, than it makes little sense to speak of a Xiongnu "ethnicity", except for something akin to that created by the Mongol conquest and by the Manchu state-building enterprise. What the Han records do is to represent the northern nomads, of which the Xiongnu were the most important (but not the only) political expression, as an "ethnographic type". Still what we can say with a certain degree of confidence is that the adoption of ethnic features, in the Han world, could carry political significance. As a telling example, Ban Gu reports the encounter between a Han envoy and Li Ling 李陵 (d. 74 BC). Li Ling was wearing nomadic clothes (*hufu* 胡服), and his hair was braided in Xiongnu style, and when pressed by the Han envoy to return home, "he went silent and made no reply, and after turning his gaze to the length of his hair, he answered, 'I am now dressed like a nomad!'"[11] This type of "ethnic" crossing probably went both ways, and is especially significant in a frontier context, where cul-

11 *Hanshu* 54.2458: 墨不應，孰視而自循其髮，答曰：吾已胡服矣。

tural hybridity was probably the norm rather than the exception, but how it played out politically depended on the context. Zhang Qian remained a loyal Han servant even though he lived with the Xiongnu for a long time and married a local woman, while Zhonghang Shuo (or Zhonghang Yue) 中行說, the eunuch who defected to the Xiongnu, retained the full appearance of a Han person while serving the nomads. Ethnic features, including the specific protocols that envoys were asked to (painfully) subject themselves to, remained significant elements in the definition of the frontier, and forced the Han to assess the "other" and its level of "outsideness" to the Han civilization in terms that were materially defined in customs, rituals, clothes, lifestyle, and every other aspect that the Han regarded as relevant to both the identification of a given people and assessing the distance between themselves and the group in question. In order to deal with the Xiongnu the Han had to invent, to a degree, a new diplomatic language. Former concepts, inherited from a pre-imperial age, were drastically modified and adapted to new circumstances. Exchanging, detaining, and even the possibility of killing envoys was an essential feature of Han-Xiongnu diplomacy, and concepts of trust or trustworthiness were critical to it, but the cultural environment and intellectual background in which these relations were "acted out" was indelibly colored by moral values. The great invention of Han historiography is to have begun *ex novo* a tradition of ethnographic inquiry about the "other", thereby enabling the acquisition of new knowledge and the forging of new instruments (political, diplomatic and military) to respond to foreign challenges, and therefore the ethos of the envoy during the Han period represents also something new, in which moral values and political realities meet ethnographic features and thus transform the frontier into an area in which cultural differences are negotiated through a much closer observation of the other.

Crossley's revisitation of a famous episode of Qing history, namely the trial for sedition of Zeng Jing 曾靜, the condemnation of Lü Liuliang 呂留良 (with the punishment of his descendants) and the writing by the Yongzheng 雍正 Emperor (r. 1723–1735) of the *Dayi juemi lu* 大義覺迷錄 and subsequent extraordinary censorship by the Qianlong 乾隆 Emperor (r. 1736–1795) of his father's work, examines, among other aspects, the nature of the Hua and Yi, taken as antithetical concepts. The term Yi had long become a proxy term for "barbarian" in the sense

of someone external to the Chinese ecumene. As such, Yi stood for the many different terms that had signified essentially the same thing, but had not "qualified" for the privileged position of "alter-ego" of Hua: it ceased to be an ethnic term and became a civilizational term, just as Hua. The fundamental nature of the barbarian, whether closer to humans or to beasts, is something that has been questioned since ancient times, and became a recurrent *topos* in policy debates on how to deal with foreigners, especially when aggressive, militarily stronger, or, in other words, not easily receptive to the blandishment of the goods that China had to offer.[12] Animal metaphors (wolves, birds, tigers) abound in China's descriptions of some of these barbarians, and even if contextually delimited they tended to acquire universal meaning, such as in Ban Gu's discussion of Han frontier policies.[13] Generally speaking, Chinese writers questioned whether the simple application of moral suasion was sufficient to educate the foreigners.

Much time had gone by since the time when these metaphors first arose (the cultural paradigm established in the Zhou period in works such as the *Zuozhuan* 左傳). Since then foreign dynasties had been accepted and rejected and it would have been difficult to see the "Yi" as being outside the human sphere, but animal analogies lingered on. Particularly vitriolic assessments of Mongol rule had led early Ming writers to conclude that no political compromise and no educational strategy could lead to an accommodation with the Mongols, who were again regarded as especially refractory to humanity or civilization. Yongzheng's appeal to the argument that the Yi lived under the same Tian 天 as the Hua, and obeying essentially the same rules, as Crossley points out, goes back to early Manchu ideology and to Nurhaci's "universalizing" of the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven. Yongzheng's position went also, possibly, beyond it, arguing for a non-ethnic and non-cultural but purely moral standpoint: the ability of a ruler to restore order, peace, security, and to prevail against wicked enemies (who had normally been previously accused of wronging him and his people) was protected and in certain sense guaranteed by a Heaven that recognized and supported virtue no matter who displayed it. From this position, it did not matter whether the cat was Hua or Yi (so to speak) as

12 See Pines 2004.

13 *Hanshu* 94B.3834.

long as order, security, morality, and a nurturing universal peace were restored. The notion of a "great unity" is therefore a moral, not a cultural one.

Yet, Crossley perceptively reads in this message a Confucian overtone towards "educating" oneself that may imply adherence to a special set of moral values, namely those that were closely associated with notions of cultivation and virtuous universal rulership that belonged to the Chinese philosophical tradition. Crossley argues that this line of argument, aside the issue of the possible defensiveness of Yongzheng over the controversial events that accompanied his own accession to the throne, displeased Qianlong as the latter was to promote an entirely new vision of the historical role of the Qing dynasty, in which cultural distinctiveness indeed had to play a central role. Manchu heritage was important to explain the specific position of the Qing dynasty in China's history. Had the ethnic and historical roots of the Manchus been subsumed into a discourse of a-cultural political theory, there would have been no defense against their eventual erasure, when confronted with the weight of Chinese civilization. The Manchus could not hold on to their right to rule over China simply by urging critics to look around and see peace as evidence of virtue. In the long run, this would have been a sterile argument, because to a large extent the Qing dynasty's right to rule rested on their distinctiveness and on the privileges acquired by a conquering caste. Institutions such as the Eight Banners – the Manchus' most important political creation – and the position of the Royal Household and the Bannermen in China's political order, could not be justified simply in terms of the "Yi" being just the same as the "Hua". The critical recognition that, in the rulership of China, culture and politics could not be divorced made it imperative to give ethnic and cultural coherence to the "Yi" (i.e., the "tartarized" ruling class, if we are allowed to use the Western writings' operative term for the Manchu-Mongol and Banner population). Once again, the ethnographic discourse of Chinese historiography comes to the rescue by making it possible for Qianlong to reconstruct the northeastern civilization as a separate cultural-historical entity.

It is worth reflecting whether we can see in the dual and opposite interpretation of the "Yi" the double path of China's history of the other, as moral entity and as ethnic reality. Both have agencies that can be mobilized around a political project but their "reach" is different, and in

Qianlong's "ethnic turn" we see how it is the Chinese ethnographic tradition (the only repository of northeastern history) that allows him to move away from any discussion about whether the Yi can be just as "humane" and "virtuous" as the Hua, and thus establishes the essential equivalence of different cultures and civilizations. It is possible that in this dependency upon long established paths towards the definition of ethnic and cultural distinctiveness, which had been surely to a degree "internalized" by the Manchus, lie also the different interpretations towards Manchu ethnicity. It seems to me that neither the construction by Qianlong of an essentialized Manchu heritage, nor the Qing discourse of Manchu ancestral virtues can be separated from questioning the process of "ethnogenesis" of the Manchus that preceded the conquest of China (and was ideologically modified after it). Neither the Yongzheng position expressed in the *Dayi juemi lu*, nor Qianlong's reaction to it can be properly assessed without a preliminary understanding of the political culture that allowed the emergence of the Manchus as a people and shaped its early history. Pamela Crossley indeed makes valuable references to several important concepts derived from the Inner Asian tradition. These concepts are not political abstractions, but were mobilized selectively in the course of a political project for the creation of an independent state, regime, or dynasty (*gurun* in Manchu) that coincided with a process of "ethnogenesis" at the end of which a people (the Manchus) and a dynasty (the Qing) emerged. Whether the process of state-building created the "people", or whether an ethnogenetic process already under way cohered into and gave rise to an independent political formation are classic "ethnogenetic" questions, which remain for the time being without a clear answer, but which can contribute to a better understanding of the "ethnicity" issue on Qing history.

Evelyn Rawski's essay links the development of "national histories" in China and East Asia with the theory of "Sinicization", adopted by modern China historians to explain and justify the essential unity of Chinese history notwithstanding long periods of political fragmentation and domination by foreign dynasties. The term "Sinicus" (Chinese) from which the word derives, is an ethnic term, whose Chinese translation is "Han" 漢. At its simplest level, it means that people who are not Chinese "become Chinese". The discourse of ethnicity is directly relevant to the making of this theory, not because, as in the construction of

other national histories, an original *ethnos* is mythicized and taken to be the core of the new nation, but because of the ways in which notions of cultural transformations that belonged to the "tool box" of Chinese political theory are woven into a new paradigm of historical representation. In a nutshell, the fundamental continuity of China as a unified political and cultural entity can be asserted and used as the foundation of the modern nation by assuming that the periods of disunion were only temporary hiatuses (and perhaps preparatory steps) for more elevated forms of unity, and that foreign domination was so only in name. The theory is meant to demonstrate that the conquerors had *de facto* become indistinguishable from the Chinese in matters of moral values, political forms, and cultural production.

Looking for the cultural foundations of this theory, it seems to me that it rests on two pillars. One of the elements in traditional Chinese philosophy that was summoned by the Sinicization theory was the assumption of the moral and cultural transformation of the other – traditionally not linked, however, to a discourse of nation-building, but rather to the elaboration of philosophical and political theories about the state, sovereignty, and the nature of emperorship – that was expounded in a series of ancient treatises. This discourse assumes that a superior virtue, expressed in rituals, music, religious cults, and moral norms, has a transformative power and thus can expand the range of civilization and forge a coherent community by its magnetic force. The centrality of the emperor as the catalyst of the transformative power of culture is key to this world view and thus foundational to a notion of universal emperorship. In the Sinicization theory the transformative power of Chinese culture appears to work, on the other hand, more in terms of "taming" the foreigners even when they occupied the imperial throne. In an apparent reversal of meanings, the position of the emperor, normally expression of virtue and Heavenly favor, ceases to be a source of "civilization" when the occupant is not Chinese. However, a central aspect (and something of a dogma) of "Sinicization" is the assumption that, in order to conquer China, a process of transformation of the foreign power, implicit in the adoption of an imperial "technology" made of administrative, political, ideological, linguistic, religious and moral elements had to be already under way. Thus, the cultural transformation can still take place from a position of political subordination. This type of moral discourse whereby what matters is to behave

"like a Chinese" and to adopt Chinese values goes back to philosophical theories of the construction of the "other" based on moral and cultural boundaries developed in the pre-imperial period and repeated ever since in different contexts.

The second pillar of the Sinicization theory is one that, on the other hand, has a more ethnographic content, and is related to the aforementioned differences in ethnic features that Chinese historiography has documented. Not all foreigners are the same, and therefore not all conquerors are the same. The categories of "cooked" and "raw" foreigners to be found in Chinese ethnographic accounts, and the notion of a frontier where the cultural distance increases with the geographical distance from the civilized center indicate that "Sinicization" also functions in degrees, building on different levels of receptivity to Chinese culture determined by the particular nature of the "barbarian".[14] The ethnic differences found in accounts of different foreigners, and in particular of the Inner Asian peoples who eventually conquered China (Turkic, Mongolic and Tungusic peoples) could therefore explain why certain peoples could attain a higher or lower level of Sinicization. The validity of the Sinicization thesis would therefore not be denied by the many original features that the "conquest dynasties" produced in their governance of China, or even by their resistance to cultural change. Not all foreigners were sinicized in the same way because not all foreigners are equal (each "barbarian", in other words, is a version of "non-Chinese").

The Inner Asian frontier is of course the source of all conquering dynasties, and therefore it is this frontier that has been the chief *locus* for the discussion of Sinicization, and it is not by chance that most discussions have revolved about the historical role of the Qing and other Inner Asian dynasties. The intellectual roots of the Sinicization thesis, mobilized to show the enduring power of attraction and transformation of Chinese culture, meet insurmountable challenges when confronted with the close study of specific institutions, political culture, social structure, and ideological tenets through Chinese history, which not only inevitably change (this would be a trivial consideration) but change through innovations that are contingent to the specific circumstances of the rise and establishment of a new power. This applies to

14 Fiskesjö 1999.

every dynasty in Chinese history, and the many assumptions inherent in the Sinicization theory (for instance that the Ming dynasty was, as a Han-dominated dynasty, closer to the Song than to the Jin or Yuan) remain open to challenge, as they require an amount of historical evidence that would be difficult to produce, and would also have to justify the purpose such a research might serve.

To conclude, I shall refer to the detailed essay by Veronika Veit on the text known in Mongolian by the abbreviated name of *Iledkel Šastir* as an indispensable source for Mongol history during the Qing dynasty. The theme of multilingual production under the Qing has been addressed elsewhere by Evelyn Rawski, and represents an important feature of Qing historiography.[15] Some of the documents reported in Veit's paper, when compared with earlier sources, show a degree of historical revisionism that Pamela Crossley has identified in *The Translucent Mirror* as a fundamental feature of the Qianlong period.[16] Without entering the details of the history of the Mongols under the Qing, the study of Mongol-language sources of the Qianlong period shows how deep and pervasive the re-writing of history could be. At the same time, the compilation of massive historical works allowed the preservation of the kind of records that Veit sees as critical to a reconstruction of Mongol history, such as people's names, genealogical data, summaries of documents, and accounts of events. Compiled after the conquest of the northwest (Dzungaria and the "western regions"), it was meant to provide a general record of the Mongol and Turkic (Muslim) aristocrats in the *wai fan* 外藩, the external territories of the Qing empire, namely Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang. It responded, therefore, to the Qing imperial design of rationalization of the conquered territories, and political integration of their history within the history of the Qing dynasty. As such, this is a document that can not only provide precious information on the over one hundred and fifty years of history between the Manchus and several Mongol nations, but does shed much light on the evolution of Qing historiography of the frontier, and of the place of the frontier in the creation of the Qing empire.

15 Rawski 2005.

16 Crossley 1999.

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The Ethos of the Envoy and his Treatment by the Enemy in Han History

Hans VAN ESS

Envoys that went back and forth in order to secure good interstate relations are an institution that is probably as old as Chinese civilization. At least, it seems plausible that they must have been important in the time from which our first traditionally transmitted written sources from China date, namely the beginning of the Zhou 周 dynasty (11th cent.–221 BC) when – at least according to the understanding of Chinese historiographers of later times – states had been established as fiefs that where governed by relatives and combatants of the Zhou family. We have ample evidence for the existence of an elaborated system of envoys from such convolutes as the *Guoyu* 國語, a collection of discourses from the Spring and Autumn Period (770–early 5th cent. BC), or the *Zhanguo ce* 戰國策 ("Strategies of the Warring States") which cover several centuries of pre-imperial Chinese history. However, the main purpose of these texts is a rhetorical one: They do not want to write history but to give examples of well-done speeches containing devices that had proven successful in persuasions of rulers who in difficult matters of state were known to be reluctant to accept advice.[1]

It is only with the Han 漢 (206 BC–220 AD), however, that we have historical accounts that relate to how and why Han envoys were sent to neighbouring states and also *vice versa* how and why these states sent envoys to the Han. Indeed, it can be said that this is the time when truly international relations were for the first time recorded in Chinese sources. In this paper I will concentrate on the material contained in the *Shiji* 史記 and the *Hanshu* 漢書 in order to elaborate on those envoys that we know a little bit more than just that they had been sent out. There is, for example, an account stating that several years after King Xiang 襄 of Zhou 周 (651–619 BC) had been driven away from the

1 See Britton 1935.

capital he sent an envoy to Duke Wen 文 of Jin 晉 to secure help from him – but we do not know much more than that this envoy was apparently successful and that Jin helped the Zhou to establish a new capital in Jin.[2] The next event that follows in the historical account of the *Shiji* is that the Eastern Hu 胡 barbarians several times sent messengers to the young chieftain Maodun 冒頓 of the Xiongnu 匈奴. But again, we do not learn much about the envoys themselves.[3] The Han, too, sent an envoy to the Xiongnu in the beginning of the reign of Gaozu 高祖 (r. 206–195 BC) when they wanted to establish the famous policy of *heqin* 和親 – harmony through family relations.[4] Not much more is said about this. Later we are informed about envoys delivering letters that apparently were sent back and forth.[5]

One should add here that very much like in the modern Chinese word for the ambassador the term used for "envoy" in Classical Chinese is *shi* 使, a word which is not only used as a noun but also as a verb meaning "to send", "to employ" or "to let someone do something". The term used for "sending an envoy" is thus *shi shi* 使使.

The first event from which we learn somewhat more about the reason for exchanging envoys between states in Han China is recorded in the biography of Lu Jia 陸賈. He was sent to the former Qin general Wei Tuo 尉他 who had pacified Southern Yue 越 and then proclaimed himself as king over this territory. The Han emperor sent Lu Jia to Wei Tuo with the charge to hand over a seal to him, making him a King of Southern Yue officially. Wei Tuo remained unimpressed at first. He received Lu Jia in a most impolite way, his hair bound in the way barbarians used to wear it, his legs crossed. Lu Jia reprimanded him, telling him about the glory of the Han and the fact that the Han generals planned to send a punitive expedition to Southern Yue because Wei Tuo did not join in the campaign against Xiang Yu 項羽, the competitor of Gaozu 高祖. Yet, he said, since the Son of Heaven felt pity for the people who had suffered many hardships during the wars he had decided instead to send him to bestow a

2 *Shiji* 110.2882; *Hanshu* 94A.3746.

3 *Shiji* 110.2889; *Hanshu* 94A.2750.

4 *Shiji* 110.2894; *Hanshu* 94A.2754.

5 Yü Ying-shih (1967, 59) writes: "From the economic point of view, it is well known that the barbarians always took the tribute as a cloak for trade." This article will show that this view is too simplistic.

king's seal on the King of Southern Yue, to split tallies with him and to exchange envoys or diplomats.[6] To establish diplomatic relations is called *tongshi* 通使 in the texts, and this *tongshi* implies a certain kind of equality between the two parties involved. Maybe this is the message that Lu Jia wanted to convey to Wei Tuo: By accepting the Han seal he is still being treated as an equal. Maybe this is the reason why Wei Tuo in the end decided to take the seal and even nominally called himself a "servant" or "vassal" (*chen* 臣).

This is a pattern that we can observe until the times of Late Imperial China: During times in which the central government is not strong enough, an envoy is being sent who bestows a high-ranking title to a person who could otherwise hardly be controlled. This occured frequently in the exchanges between the Qing court and its Central Asian neighbours in the eighteenth century. To some extent this holds true for official relations even today: Once you have accepted a honorary title or award, even though you may not be aware of it immediately, you get entangled in a whole web of dependencies and have already accepted the authority of the one who has the power to give you such an award.

It seems that the second step that is taken when the central government is slightly stronger but still cannot impose too much power on the other side is to press it to send delegations on a regular basis. These delegations are then seen as people who bring tribute. Several cases of this are mentioned in both the *Shiji* and the *Hanshu* chapters on Ferghana, the most famous one involving the North-Western state of the nomadic Wusun 烏孫. This state came into contact with the Han after Zhang Qian 張騫 (d. 114 BC) had been sent out as an envoy to the Yuezhi 月氏, maybe the Tocharians, who had settled to the North-West of the Xiongnu. The Han wished to establish diplomatic relations (*tongshi*) with the Yuezhi, because they hoped this would enable them to destroy the Xiongnu. Yet, the Xiongnu detained Zhang Qian remarking that the Yuezhi settled to their north and that the Han would certainly not allow an envoy of the Xiongnu to be sent to Yue in its south.[7] Only much later, Zhang Qian was sent on a mission to the Wusun, because he had told the emperor that one

6 *Shiji* 97.2697f; *Hanshu* 43.2111f: 遣臣授君王印，剖符通使。

7 *Shiji* 123.3157; *Hanshu* 61.2687.

could bring them into alliance by bribing them with lavish gifts. This is the first time that we see a delegation of Han-Chinese officials – 300 persons in total, 6 hundred horses and tens of thousands of cows and sheep as well as gold and silk worth millions of cash – going West.[8] They visited several states, among them Ferghana, Bactria, the Yuezhi, Parthia and Northern India. At first the Wusun treated Zhang Qian in the same way as the envoys sent out from the Xiongnu, but when Zhang Qian told them that he would not hand over the gifts to them that he had brought with him, they were willing to bow – and it seems that Zhang Qian achieved exactly what the Qianlong Emperor had hoped to get from Lord George Macartney (1737–1806) in 1793: a nominal gesture of submission, whatever it may have meant in reality.

Zhang Qian got it, and in the end the Wusun also prepared a delegation comprising several dozen people and the same number of horses to accompany Zhang Qian back to Han. When they realized that the state of Han really was a big state, they started to respect it, and the other states from Central Asia, too, sent out missions. This is the first time in history, the text says, that the Han entertained diplomatic relations (*tong*) with all these countries.[9] Later on the Wusun sent an envoy to present one of their heavenly horses because they were afraid of the might of the Xiongnu and hoped that an alliance with the Han would be of benefit. Although they demanded a princess of the Han in return, this gift was accepted by the Han with the greatest enthusiasm. From the "Treatise on Music" ("Liyue zhi" 禮樂志) of the *Shiji* we learn that in Han times even a song was written commemorating this event, which was presented to the ancestors during the regularly held ceremonies in the ancestral temple.[10] The horse is clearly seen as a tribute that was presented by the foreigners. Han Wudi 漢武帝 (r. 141–87 BC) liked the horse so much that he yearly sent out six to ten delegations with loads of presents to Ferghana in order to get more horses of this type until the Central Asian states were finally fed up with the presents that came from Han China – it is plainly stated in the *Shiji*-chapter on Ferghana that they did not value the goods from Han any more.[11]

8 *Shiji* 123.3168; *Hanshu* 61.2692.
9 *Shiji* 123.3169, *Hanshu* 61.2693.
10 *Shiji* 24.1178.
11 *Shiji* 123.3171. The text is not found in *Hanshu*.

What we see here is what also has become a pattern later on for many centuries and even for millennia to come: Recognition of the superiority of Chinese culture is so valuable for the rulers of a Chinese dynasty that they do not even care whether this recognition has to be bought at a high price. Just as it was the case in later centuries it seems that here as well the price that was paid in the form of gifts and presents to those states with whom the Han had diplomatic relations was much higher than the value of the tribute that was brought back to Chang'an in exchange.[12]

Apart from the remark in the chapter on Ferghana mentioned above, there is no mention of gifts brought to states with whom the Han wanted to have diplomatic exchange in other chapters of the *Shiji*. When the Imperial envoy Lu Jia went on his mission to see King Wei Tuo of Southern Yue, he reprimanded him for having established himself as emperor and also that Wei Tuo had never sent an envoy back.[13] Mutuality seems to be the least that the Han expected from their diplomatic relations. Yet, as soon as they felt strong enough they forced the other side to accept the status of the inferior party. This can be seen in the case of the successors of Wei Tuo. After it had turned out that the Han were much more powerful than Southern Yue, his grandson even sent his own son to the capital as a guard, obviously in imitation of the Warring States practice to exchange hostages among independent states. When this son later became king, he again sent his own son to Chang'an, too. But that son refused to go there himself, because he feared that he would be treated as a feudal lord and to be forced to use Han law.[14] A visit to the capital by the King of a state that is not a member of the Han *oikumene* is clearly seen as a sign of submission on his behalf.[15]

There are no cases recorded in the *Shiji* in which the king of a foreign state actually came to the court in Chang'an. There is one instance mentioned in the chapter on Eastern Yue that it was attacked

12 Cf. Britton 1935, 634; Yang Lien-sheng 1952; Selbitschka, 6, note 26.

13 *Shiji* 113.2970; *Hanshu* 95. 3852.

14 Ibid.

15 That observation, too, is interesting with regard to much later material on foreign relations: When the Dalai Lama or other high Tibetan religious dignitaries are invited to Peking and when they actually go, the Manchu side will always understand this as a sign that they accept the superiority of the court in Peking.

by Min Yue 閩越. When a punitive expedition was sent out from Han China the relatives of the King of Min Yue decided to kill him and let an envoy present his head to the emperor[16] – but although this is a serious matter, it is not quite the same as the new king traveling on his own.

Thus, we can see that envoys had a very important function: Since a ruler would never travel on his own to the neighbouring state of Han they were his representatives. And yet, even their coming to the Han court is understood as a sign of submission: In the chapter on the South-Western barbarians we read of several envoys from Han who travelled there. The activities of Han envoys are always described as some kind of scouting or as the delivering of messages issued by the emperor. On the other hand, the messengers had order firstly to convince the barbarians to have Han officials established in their territory,[17] and secondly to convince them that they should "come to court" (*ruchao* 入朝). For example, the Marquis of Yelang 夜郎, a state which is described as the biggest state among the South-Western barbarians, first sides with Southern Yue, but when that state is eliminated by Han, the ruler of this state decides to go to court or to send someone to court. Unfortunately, the text is not clear about this matter, but it does seem that he sends envoys[18] – and the emperor gives him the title of a King of Yelang in return. Afterwards the Han turn to the kingdom of Dian 滇. Their envoy tells the king of Dian that Yue has been crushed and the Southern barbarians had been impressed by the military might of Han, and he suggests that the King of Dian should "come to court". At first he is not willing to listen, but when an army of the Han arrives he submits, asks to be allowed to establish officials and "come to court".[19] Again, it is not clear whether this means that he comes himself or whether he accepts to send envoys on a yearly basis – I suggest the second option, although it seems that the Han tried to extend a system that had been invented for kings

16 *Shiji* 114.2981.

17 *Shiji* 116.2993f.; *Hanshu* 95.3838f.

18 *Shiji* 116.2996; *Hanshu* 95.3842: 夜郎侯始倚南越，〔...〕，夜郎遂如朝。"The marquis of Yelang at first sided with Southern Yue. [...]. Yelang thereafter went to court." The title is omitted in the second part of the sentence which suggests that the marquis did not go in person.

19 *Shiji* 116.2997: 諸置吏入朝。*Hanshu* 95.3842: 請置吏入朝。

and marquises within China proper – the duty to attend a yearly audience at the capital – to foreign states.[20] It does not seem plausible that given the infrastructure of Han times this could have worked. The rulers had to be represented by somebody else: envoys.

So the function of envoys sent out from foreign states who come to court is that it is made clear by their very presence that their states have become allies and are regarded as vassals by the Han. The only exception to this rule is the powerful state of the Xiongnu. We do not read anywhere in the text that their envoys were regarded as deliverers of gestures of submission. Rather than bringing gifts at an audience they come with diplomatic letters. It is in connection with the Xiongnu – and to a lesser extent also with some Central Asian states – that we can learn something about the *ethos* of the envoy who is coming as a diplomat on terms of equality.[21]

The virtue which, according to Sima Qian 司馬遷 (c. 145–86 BC), for the Northern nomads was most important regarding envoys is "trust" or "trustworthiness", *xin* 信. The first instance in which this virtue is mentioned, in the chapter on the Xiongnu, relates to a point in time long before the Xiongnu state had come into being. In Yan 燕 there is a "virtuous general" who had once been a "hostage" (*zhi* 質) among the Hu-barbarians. The Hu therefore "trust him very much". This trust is betrayed immediately: "After his return he led a surprise attack and put the Eastern Hu to flight so that they had to retreat more than a thousand miles."[22]

Interestingly, this passage has a close parallel in the chapter on Ferghana. Zhang Qian also is described as a strong man who is magnanimous and trustworthy so that the Man and Yi just love him.[23] Only a few pages later it is recorded that because Zhang Qian had once been a hostage in a foreign country – he had been detained by the Shanyu 單于 and during his more than ten years in the territory of the Xiongnu

20 See Dubs 1938–1955, vol. II, Appendix III to the Annals of Emperor Wu, "The Eighth Month Fermented Liquor Offering".

21 Cf. Psarras 2003–2004.

22 *Shiji* 110.2885f: *Hanshu* 94A.3748: 為質於胡，胡甚信之。歸而襲破東胡，東胡卻千餘里。

23 *Shiji* 123.3159; *Hanshu* 61.2689: 騫為人彊力，寬大信人，蠻夷愛之。

married a woman and had children with her – the leaders of the foreign states trusted him a lot.[24] But all he does later is to disappoint them.

It is important to insist on the word *xin* here because there are so many stories in the *Shiji* chapter on the Xiongnu and elsewhere that suggest that the Han themselves were not *xin* at all. When they establish a marriage relationship with the Xiongnu, the Empress is not willing to give the Shanyu a bodily daughter of herself so that a daughter descending from the lower echelons of the Liu 劉 family is selected.[25] Such conflicts made the marriage policy difficult right from the beginning.

The case is repeated later on in an even more problematic way: When the Han forge their alliance with the Wusun they send a princess from Jiangdu 江都. She is called "noble princess from Jiangdu" (*Jiangdu wengzhu* 江都翁主) in the chapter on Ferghana.[26] In the *Hanshu* she is called a daughter of King Liu Jian 劉建 of Jiangdu.[27] This King had committed suicide in 122 BC in the context of the alleged rebellion of Liu An 劉安, King of Huainan 淮南 (179–122 BC), an act from which it becomes obvious that this was not the best branch of the Liu family. Yet, elsewhere in the *Shiji* and the *Hanshu* where the biography of this king is also referred to mention is made that this king also committed numerous acts of incest.[28] Therefore we know that the Han did not care all too much about the policy of *heqin*, "unity by marriage ties":[29] They provided their allies with women from families that had been disgraced in their own country.

We find another important instance of trustworthiness in a passage that refers to an event that took place shortly after Emperor Wen of the Han (r. 180–157 BC) came to power. One of the kings of the Xiongnu had invaded the territory of the Ordos south of the Huanghe and plundered the Man and Yi barbarian tribes who protected that area for the Han. Interestingly, Ban Gu 班固 (32–92 BC) in his description of the events omits this important remark found in Sima Qian's account, a detail which may be explained by the fact

24 *Shiji* 123.3169; *Hanshu* 61.2693: 外國由此信之。
25 *Shiji* 99.2718; *Hanshu* 43.2122.
26 *Shiji* 123.3172.
27 *Hanshu* 96B.3903.
28 *Shiji* 59. 2096; *Hanshu* 53.2414-2418.
29 Cf. page 28.

that the territory that the Xiongnu king invaded was not Han Chinese at all. The Han drove the king back into Xiongnu territory. Afterwards, Maodun sent a letter to Emperor Wen in which he politely apologized for the behaviour of the king but blamed the frontier officials of the Han for the invasion. He then continued:

> 皇帝讓書再至，發使以書報，不來，漢使不至。
>
> Twice a letter of reprimand arrived from you, the August Emperor, so we sent an envoy to answer in a letter, too. But he did not come [back], and no envoy of the Han arrived here.[30]

He then goes on to explain that he punished the king by ordering him to lead an expedition against the Yuezhi, a military action which later led to the submission of all Western states to the Xiongnu. This, he argues, is a good precondition for making peace and restoring the former treaty. He then announces that he will send an envoy taking a letter with him with this wording and bringing also a camel, two horses and two quadriga teams. In the end he says: "When the envoy arrives, immediately send him [back]".[31]

The officials all tell the emperor that the Xiongnu are too strong to be attacked and that it would be best to continue the *heqin* policy. We do not know why Maodun ends his letter with the words that the envoy should be sent back immediately after he has delivered the letter, but we can guess that he is implying here that his former envoys had been detained and that the Han had been too arrogant to answer and send an envoy of their own simply because they did not think it appropriate to be asked to send an envoy. Be that as it may, Emperor Wen also writes a letter and apparently sends the Xiongnu envoy back, saying that he will agree with everything that the Shanyu has said, given that he was *xin* 信, "trustworthy". The letter is accompanied by gifts of gold and silk.[32]

When the *heqin* policy is renewed shortly afterwards, the Han force a eunuch to accompany the princess. The man at first refuses to go, but after he is forced to go he announces that the Han will regret that. He submits to the Xiongnu and teaches them how they should deal with the Han. Han envoys who seem to have been sent

30 *Shiji* 110.2896; *Hanshu* 94A.3756.

31 Ibid.: 使者至，即遣之。

32 *Shiji* 110.2897; *Hanshu* 94A.3758.

out fairly often – this must have been part of the *heqin* policy – and who on these occasions want to argue with the eunuch over the customs of the Xiongnu are quieted by him briskly:

> 漢使無多言，顧漢所輸匈奴，〔...〕，令其量中。
>
> You Han envoys should not talk too much. Just look that what you bring to the Xiongnu is up to the correct standard.[33]

The last sentence again suggests that trustworthiness was an important matter and that the Han probably did not always obey the treaty precisely in accordance with the law.

Yet there are no great problems reported between the Han and the Xiongnu for the rest of the reign of Han Wendi and his son Han Jingdi 景帝 (r. 156–141 BC). At the beginning of the reign of Emperor Wu, therefore, everything seems to be absolutely fine. Starting with the Shanyu all the Xiongnu came to the border and befriended the Han. In this situation we again encounter an envoy: Nie Wengyi 聶翁壹, an "envoy" from the Han and a lowly man from Mayi 馬邑[34], who in a treacherous way starts out to export goods and to deal with the Xiongnu. Maybe the text also wants to say that the Han on purpose "let him" do what follows, which would mean that the emperor himself was seeking for a reason to wage a war. Unfortunately, we cannot decide for certain whether *shi* 使 here means "to order" or "envoy" – but despite all the critical remarks found in the *Shiji* it would be strange if Sima Qian really openly accused Emperor Wu of intentionally breaking the treaty with the Xiongnu. So we have to assume that Nie Wengyi was indeed an envoy who pretends (*xiang* 詳) to be willing to sell Mayi in order to lure the Shanyu. The Shanyu "trusts him" (*xin zhi* 信之) and enters the frontier with a force of a hundred thousand men. The Han try to ambush him, but the Shanyu discovers the plot and manages to escape. This treacherous break of the treaty marks the beginning of the reign of Han Wudi.[35]

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33 *Shiji* 110.2901; *Hanshu* 94A.3760. This episode has been dealt with quite often in recent scholarship. See, for example, T.T. Chin 2010, 324ff. Di Cosmo (2002, 270) has said that Sima Qian may have been seen by his contemporaries as a "barabarophile" man.

34 *Shiji* 110.2905: 漢使馬邑下人聶翁壹.

35 *Shiji* 110.2905; the text in *Hanshu* 94A.3765 is slightly different. It omits, for example, that Nie Wengyi is a "lowly person".

We do not need to discuss here the various wars that are fought in consequence of the Mayi treachery. In passing it may be interesting that the story of the eunuch recounted before repeats itself when after an unsuccessful expedition a general of the Han surrenders to the Xiongnu. His name is Zhao Xin 趙信, "Zhao the Trustworthy".[36] Zhao Xin was first a king of the Hu barbarians before he had submitted to the Han. The name "Xin" was thus most certainly not his original name. Thus, it does bear significance, and it does seem that he was given this name or had chosen it by himself because others hoped that he would turn out to be trustworthy.[37] This person now teaches the Xiongnu what they should do against the Han – again, the reason for successes of the Xiongnu is ascribed to a man who was an unsuccessful general of the Han, not to themselves.

Even more interesting is the fact that at one point of that incident an official of the Han, Ren Chang 任敞, is recorded to have stated boldly:

> 「匈奴新破，困，宜可使為外臣，朝請於邊。」
>
> "The Xiongnu have only recently been destroyed. They are suffering, and it should be possible to let them become servants outside [of the frontier]. As far as the audience is concerned, we will demand that it will be held at the border."[38]

Ren Chang is then sent as an envoy to the Xiongnu. Yet, when the Shanyu learns about his plan, he is greatly enraged, detains him and does not let him go.[39] This measure reminds us of the previous case when the Shanyu had asked the Han to send his envoy back imme-

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36 *Shiji* 110.2908ff; *Hanshu* 94A.3768ff.

37 The name "Xin" occurs quite frequently in the *Shiji*, but it is interesting that in many instances those who bear this name are persons about whom one would think that one could trust them. This is true, for example, for Han Xin 韓信, the follower of Han Gaozu, who dies a tragic death because Gaozu does not trust him and drives them into a rebellion (*Shiji* 92). The same may be said about King Han Xin 韓信 (*Shiji* 93) who is also a follower of Gaozu and then a competitor because he meets with Gaozu's suspicion and surrenders to the Xiongnu. Also, it is very interesting that the *Shiji* chapter on the doctors mentions three doctors bearing the name "Xin": Qin Xin 秦信 (*Shiji* 105.2810), Feng Xin 馮信 and Du Xin 杜信 (both *Shiji* 105.2817).

38 *Shiji* 110.2911. Cf., slightly different, *Hanshu* 94A.3771: 匈奴新困，宜使為外臣，朝請於邊。

39 *Shiji* 110.2911; *Hanshu* 94A.3771: 留之不遣。

diately.[40] It seems as if there was a real problem here that is described by Sima Qian with the following words:

> 先是漢亦有所降匈奴使者，單于亦輒留漢使相當。
>
> Before, if the Han had had envoys from the Xiongnu who had surrendered [to the Han], the Shanyu also immediately detained envoys of the Han in order to get quits with [us].[41]

There is a lot of rhetoric in this passage, but we probably may guess that, according to Sima Qian, the Han had frequently detained envoys from the Xiongnu, claiming that they had surrendered to them. What is interesting here is that he also says that the Xiongnu did not want anything else than just "equality".

When an envoy afterwards arrives at the court of the Xiongnu and tries to intimidate the Shanyu in order to make him surrender to the Han the Shanyu immediately bans him to the north. *Shiji* states that

> 終不肯為寇於漢邊，休養息士馬，習射獵，數使使於漢，好辭甘言求請和親。
>
> He was not willing to rob the Han frontiers but rather gave rest to his men and horses, practiced hunting and sent envoys to the Han several times, with nice speeches and sweet words requesting a [renewal] of peace through marital relationship (*heqin*).[42]

Very interesting in the above passage is the word "not willing" (*bu ken* 不肯), because it seems to imply that Han had hoped that he would rob the frontiers. This would have been a good pretext for leading another war. The next entry in *Shiji* also describes how diplomatic relations worked:

> 漢使王烏等窺匈奴。匈奴法，漢使非去節而以墨黥其面者不得入穹廬。王烏，北地人，習胡俗，去其節，黥面，得入穹廬。
>
> The Han sent Wang Wu and his party to the Xiongnu to spy them out. According to Xiongnu law, if a Han envoy did not remove his insignia and tattooed his face with ink, he was not allowed to enter a yurt. Wang

40 *Shiji* 110.2896; *Hanshu* 94A.3757: 即遣之。
41 *Shiji* 110.2911; *Hanshu* 94A.3771.
42 *Shiji* 110.2912; *Hanshu* 94A.3772.

> Wu, as a man from Beidi, was familiar with the Hu customs, let go of his insignia, tattooed his face and was allowed to enter the yurts.[43]

Thus, it seems as if the Xiongnu demanded from the Han envoy what their own envoys had to do in Chang'an, namely to obey the customs of their country. When Wang Wu did so, the Shanyu loved him and even promised to send his own crown-prince as a hostage to the Han – because he wanted peace through marital alliance. The story is only told because the next envoy, a man called Yang Xin 楊信 – again a man named "The Trustworthy One" –, from the Han does the contrary: He is not a "noble servant" (*guichen* 貴臣) of the Han and he does not agree to remove his insignia. So the Shanyu receives him outside of the tents. The envoy tells him that he should send his heir as a hostage to the Han, whereupon the Shanyu answers that this contradicts the old treaty according to which the Han sent a princess to the Xiongnu and presented silk on top of that. So he declares that to send the crown-prince is impossible. The paragraph again ends with a sentence on the general practice of the Xiongnu concerning the exchange of envoys:

> 匈奴俗，見漢使非中貴人，其儒先，以為欲說，折其辯；其少年，以為欲刺，折其氣。每漢使入匈奴，匈奴輒報償。漢留匈奴使，匈奴亦留漢使，必得當乃肯止。
>
> According to Xiongnu custom, if they see that a Han envoy is not a noble man from the palace, they think that he wants to persuade if he enters like a Confucian scholar. Then they cut off his arguments. If he is [only] a young man, they think that he just wants to sting and so they cut off his courage. Whenever a Han envoy enters Xiongnu territory the Xiongnu immediately respond by recompensation. If the Han detain an envoy from the Xiongnu, the Xiongnu will also detain an envoy from the Han: Only if they have got equality will they be willing to stop.[44]

Here again we see that the Xiongnu are described as people that do not want anything else than just equality. Sima Qian suggests here that the Han always wanted the contrary: For them the purpose of sending envoys was to convince the other side of Han superiority.

43 *Shiji* 110.2913; *Hanshu* 94A.3772.

44 *Shiji* 110.2913; *Hanshu* 94A.3773.

He obviously criticizes this habit, as it estranged the other party. For Sima Qian, what the Xiongnu demanded was simply fair enough.

The story continues: after the envoy returns to the Han without having achieved any success the other envoy who knows and understands Xiongnu customs is sent out again. The Shanyu promises him to come to court in order to conclude a treaty to become "elder and younger brother" again. When the envoy reports this, the Han even build a residence for the Shanyu in Chang'an. Yet, the Xiongnu say: "We will only speak true words if a noble man from the Han comes."[45] Then they send an envoy who, upon his arrival in the territory of the Han, falls ill. The Han give him medicine "in order to heal him", but "unfortunately" he dies.[46] The Han then send a man called Lu Chongguo 路充國, saying that this is a "noble from the Han" and delivering presents worth millions of cash, but nevertheless the Shanyu thinks that the Han killed his envoy. Sima Qian also reports that everyone said that the Shanyu had never really meant to send his crown-prince to come as a hostage to Han whereupon the Xiongnu several times send troops to surprise the Han and attack.[47]

The whole paragraph is very ambiguous. One never knows whom Sima Qian is siding with. Both points of view seem to be equally reasonable: that the Han killed the Xiongnu envoy and that the envoy died a natural death, that the Xiongnu chieftain really wanted peace and also that he just wanted presents. We do not know the truth. Yet, precisely the fact that Sima Qian wants to be so impartial, has to render one suspicious – he simply does not want to say anything bad about either side, although one would expect him to be on the side of the Han.

Again there is an incident involving envoys in the lines that follow. A new Shanyu accedes to the throne. Because he is a minor, he is called the "Boy Shanyu" (Er Shanyu 兒單于). The Han see that as a chance to seed disagreement in the state of the Xiongnu, so they send two envoys, one to console the dead Shanyu, the other one to console the Worthy King to the Right who also has recently died. Yet, the Xiongnu bring both envoys to the Shanyu, and in a great rage he detains them both. Again Sima Qian inserts a sentence on this:

45 *Shiji* 110.2914; *Hanshu* 94A.3773: 非得漢貴人使，吾不與誠語。

46 Ibid.: 欲愈之，不幸而死。

47 Ibid.

漢使留匈奴者前後十餘輩，而匈奴使來，漢亦輒留相當。

There had been more than ten teams of Han envoys detained by the Xiongnu in the past, yet if a Xiongnu envoy came, the Han also immediately detained him in order to be quits with them.[48]

There is no real end to this story. It is just very interesting that the words that Sima Qian uses here are exactly the same as before, with the only difference that this time he says that the Han reacted in retaliation to what the Xiongnu did to their envoys whereas before he had said twice that the Han had detained Xiongnu envoys first.

先是漢亦有所降匈奴使者，單于亦輒留漢使相當。

Before, if the Han had had envoys from the Xiongnu who had surrendered [to the Han], the Shanyu also immediately detained envoys of the Han in order to get quits with [us].[49]

And:

每漢使入匈奴，匈奴輒報償。漢留匈奴使，匈奴亦留漢使，必得當乃肯止。

Whenever a Han envoy enters Xiongnu territory the Xiongnu immediately respond by recompensation. If the Han detain an envoy from the Xiongnu, the Xiongnu will also detain an envoy from the Han: Only if they have got equality will they be willing to stop.[50]

Sima Qian perhaps intentionally turns the wording into its opposite, in order to show that he thinks that once a war has started, human beings will get more and more atrocious and will forget about standards of behaviour they had agreed upon before and without which it is not possible to decide who was the one who had started with the atrocities. Yet, it is also possible that Sima Qian uses veiled language here: In the last passage he reports the point of view held in the empire of the Han who think that the bad guys must be the Xiongnu although any careful reader of the *Shiji* will understand that the practice of detaining envoys was actually begun by the Han, not the Xiongnu.

48 *Shiji* 110.2915; *Hanshu* 94A.3774.

49 *Shiji* 110.2911; *Hanshu* 94A.3771.

50 *Shiji* 110.2913: Instead of 每漢使入匈奴 *Hanshu* 94A.3773 has 每漢兵入匈奴.

Conclusion

It seems that in ancient China the mutual exchange of envoys (*tongshi*) originally suggested equality of both partners involved. There are several passages in the *Shiji* and also in later texts from which such an interpretation becomes quite obvious. Yet, it is also clear that, although the Han sometimes had to accept that they were actually on equal status with other states, they started a practice that was later to become much the standard practice: They conferred seals and titles on their neighbours once these had entered the Chinese cultural sphere. In this way they tried to get at least nominal gestures of submission from them. They also started a system that was to last for two millennia: They tried to bring their neighbours to their court. The visits of foreign envoys or even of kings themselves must have looked to the ordinary Han subject like a parallel to the yearly visits that the kings and marquises enfeoffed by the Han had to make – at least in theory. If a king, such as the king of Dian, came himself to an audience (*ruchao*), then this was a sign of his acceptance of Han rule. Presents brought by the envoys were seen as tribute whereas presents that the Han sent to their countries in order to make them bring tribute were understood as presents. Yet, incorruptible eye-witnesses such as Sima Qian did not buy this story. When the Han sent out delegations, they felt humiliated if a neighbour such as Wei Tuo, the king of Southern Yue, did not send a delegation in return.

There was a problem with a powerful and frightening neighbour such as the Xiongnu. During the time when Sima Qian was writing they could not be forced to deliver a gesture of submission. It is for this reason that we can analyze what sending out envoys among equals entailed in Han times: Their foremost quality was that they had to be "trustworthy", that one could believe in their words. Apparently, the Xiongnu several times felt and probably really were cheated by the Han, at least according to the narrative that we find in the *Shiji*. A serious matter was the practice to detain envoys. The first time that this is mentioned is in the letter by the Shanyu to the Han. This was obviously considered to be something that was against all good diplomatic custom and it could be a *casus belli*. When the war was at its height, both the Han and the Xiongnu detained envoys, a practice that slightened the chance of making peace.

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Beyond National History: Seeking the Ethnic in China's History

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Although the Chinese heartland (*zhongyuan* 中原, literally the "central plain") was ruled by non-Han peoples for over half of its recorded history, our understanding of their historical role has been obscured by what Peter Perdue has labelled the "hegemony of inscription".[1] Chinese regimes produced the overwhelming bulk of written materials describing these encounters, with the result that the scarcity of texts written in the language of the conquerors raises questions about our ability to understand historical events from their perspective. Current interest in focusing on the historical role of conquest dynasties resonates with the exploration of ethnic issues in contemporary China, which is constitutionally defined as a multi-ethnic state. Researchers who seek to understand just how Chinese culture came to be, and the historical contribution made by the various peoples who reside within the territorial confines of the People's Republic of China today, first need to dis-assemble the unilinear narrative created during the process of nation-building which stressed sinicization as a long-term historical process.

Sinicization, the thesis that all of the non-Han peoples who entered the Chinese-speaking realm have been assimilated into Chinese culture, provided a means by which the periods when non-Han peoples ruled portions of the present-day territory of China could be incorporated into a seamless narrative that culminated in the creation of the modern nation. In this paper, I outline the creation and institutionalization of national history, which accompanied the establishment of the modern nation state in China. National history stimulated interstate squabbles over history in East Asia that punctuated the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. I then examine scholarly developments that have created what some have called the "new Qing history".

1 Perdue 1996, 784.

The Creation of National History

In the late nineteenth century, history, once conceptualized in universal terms, became "national history". The traditional Chinese historical model was displaced by a new historical framework imported from Europe, which claimed scientific objectivity.[2] In China, the call for a national History, proclaimed by Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929) in his "New Historiography" (*Xin shixue* 新史學, 1902), was answered by participants in the New Culture movement. Gu Jiegang 顧頡剛 (1893–1980) used the "scientific method" to challenge the authenticity of the ancient canonical texts. He Bingsong 何炳松 (1890–1946) introduced the work of American historians to Chinese academics through his translations, just as Yao Congwu 姚從吾 (1894–1970), who studied in Germany under Otto Franke (1836–1946) and Erich Haenisch (1880–1966), brought European sinology to China.[3] These historians hoped to strip history of its explicitly didactic function, even as they tried to selectively re-integrate cultural traditions into a new national narrative. To a generation of scholars trained in the Confucian classics, the premises of "scientific historiography" as expounded by Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886) seemed to be a variation of principles espoused by the evidentiary school of Confucianism that flourished in the eighteenth century.[4]

Japan was the pioneer in incorporating Western historical models into its own academic structure. The Meiji 明治 government appointed historians to write a new official history and by 1895, the predecessor of today's Historiographical Institute, "Shiryō hensanjo" 史料編纂所, was established at Tōkyō Imperial History. Ludwig Riess (1861–1928), a student of Leopold von Ranke, came to teach history at Tōkyō Imperial University in 1887 and remained until 1902. European works of history were read by Meiji intellectuals. The eminent educational reformer Fukuzawa Yukichi 福澤諭吉 (1835–1901), founder of Keiō University, modelled his analysis of Japan's position in the world on Francois Guizot's *Histoire de la civilization en Europe* (1828) and Henry Buckle's *History of Civilization in England* (1871); these were among the first European histories to be translated into Japanese.[5]

2 Duara 1995, ch. 1.
3 These developments are described in Q. E. Wang 2001.
4 Breuker 2005, 78.
5 Brownlee 1997.

Although accepting the general rubrics of "scientific history", the new generation of historians also expressed the nationalist sentiments of their own academic environments. Under the leadership of Shiratori Kurakichi 白鳥庫吉 (1865–1942), a student of Ludwig Riess, *Tōyōshi-gaku* 東洋史學 ("Oriental History") emerged as a new historical field in the 1890s at Tōkyō University.[6] Reacting against the Europocentric Western model of history, Shiratori first culturally separated Japan from China, then presented the Orient, led by Japan, as the civilizational peer of Europe. Tōyōshi 東洋史 and Seiyōshi 西洋史 ("Western History") became the major divisions supplementing national history in Japanese education. The Ministry of Education approved Tōyōshi as a subject of middle school instruction in 1894, and in 1907 it joined other subjects as a scholarly specialization in higher education.[7]

Governmental interest in regions that would become parts of the Japanese empire helped fund the creation of new institutions specializing in the study of Korea and China. In 1907 Shiratori cooperated with Gōtō Shimpei 後藤新平 (1857–1929), then heading the South Manchurian Railway Company, to found a Research Bureau, the "Mantetsu rekishi chiri chōsabu" 滿鮮歷史地理調查部, that would collect data about Korea and Manchuria. The Bureau became a channel for the production of "Manchu-Korean History" which accompanied the expansion of Japanese empire in Northeast Asia. "Manchu-Korean History" was an attempt to merge Korean and Manchurian history because of the common blood of the peoples featuring in them. The merger was feasible because, scholars contended, Korea itself was "a country without its own historical destiny".[8] Korea had been subordinated to Japan from ancient times; its subsequent subordination to "continental influences" had hindered its historical progress.[9] In confrontations with the Mongols, Koreans showed they lacked "loyalty and courage as well as true strength".[10] Korea's lack of an autonomous past justified incorporating its history under the regional rubric and helped rationalize Japanese annexation.

6 Tanaka 1993.
7 Cf. Tonami Mamoru's introduction to Tonami, Kishimoto and Sugiyama 2006, 15.
8 Breuker 2005, 88; Sin Chubaek 2005, 111-114.
9 Allen 1990, 801; see Schmid 1997, 30-31 on the differences between the Japanese version of *ManSen shi* and Sin Ch'ae-ho's vision.
10 Breuker 2005, 89.

Social Darwinism also led Meiji and later scholars to drastically revise Japanese views of China. No longer an admired source of culture and civilization, China became a corrupt, weak, and backward society, which needed Japanese aid in order to modernize.[11] These new perspectives were expressed by scholars engaged in *Tōyōshi* and *Shinagaku* 支那學 ("China Studies"), a new school led by Kyōto University's Naitō Kōnan 内藤湖南 (1866–1934). Similarly, intellectuals in late nineteenth century Korea engaged in creating a new Korean identity first decentred the Middle Kingdom, replacing Confucianism with Social Darwinism and the concept of the nation-state, now rooted in a distinctive *ethnos*, the *minkjok* 民族 (Chin.: *minzu*).[12] As in Japan, the government established an agency to compile new histories for the schools. Korean intellectuals like Sin Ch'aeho 申采浩 (1880–1936) tried to write a new history that would stress the unique origins of the Korean people and arouse national pride. *Sadae* 事大, "serving the great [China]" (*sadaejuŭi* 事大主義), a principle at the core of Chosŏn 朝鮮 foreign policy, was now criticized as an obstacle to realizing an autonomous Korean identity. Sin also explicitly rejected a widely held theory, which identified Kijia (Ch. Jizi 箕子) as the progenitor of the Korean people: that model would have made the Koreans dependent on a Chinese ancestor. Tan'gun, by contrast, was a mythical figure born of a she-bear and a heavenly deity, who appears in the late thirteenth-century first Korean history, *Samguk yusa* 三國遺事. Tan'gun 檀君 as the primordial ancestor also linked the history of the nation to northeast Asia, in land that lay significantly north of the Korean peninsula.[13]

National history set off a search for primordial origins. In all three countries mythic first ancestors – China's Yellow Emperor, Korea's Tan'gun, born of a she-bear and a sun-god, and Japan's Amaterasu – competed with archaeological evidence in the creation of the national narrative. While archaeologists identified the Yellow River basin as the birthplace of Chinese civilization, the Japanese excavated Jōmon 縄文 and Yayoi 弥生 sites in the archipelago, and sought through excavations on the Korean peninsula proof that Koreans and Japanese shared a common ancestry, a major theme of Japanese colonial rule. Archaeology came to be regarded "as a branch of history".[14]

11 Fogel 1984.
12 Schmid 2000, 84.
13 Allen 1990, 796.
14 Nelson 1995, 218.

Quarrels Over History

The national histories of China, Japan and Korea set off disputes among the three countries, especially when they challenged attempts to write a seamless narrative of the territory under the control of the modern nation-state. Korean historians strongly opposed Japanese assertions that Japan had colonized parts of the Korean peninsula in ancient times; similarly, Japanese ignored evidence of the incorporation of elites form the Korean state of Paekche into Yamato court life during Japan's formative state-building phase in the seventh and eighth centuries.[15] The Kwanggaet'o (Gwanggaeto) 廣開土太王 stele, discovered in 1883 along the Yalu 鴨緑 River in present-day Ji'an 集安, Jilin 吉林 Province, was cited as evidence of Japanese presence in southeast Korea in the fourth century, prompting a dispute between Japanese and Korean scholars that lingered for decades.[16] These nationalist-inspired disputes over history continue into the present day, as illustrated by the 2004 competition between North Korea and the PRC concerning "ownership" of Koguryŏ (Gaojuli/Gaogouli) 高句麗.

The dispute between the two Koreas and the PRC over historical "ownership" of the ancient kingdom of Koguryŏ/Gaogouli which flared in 2004 and again in 2006 is a prime example of the inter-state tensions that erupt when nationalist histories clash. Koguryŏ was a northeast Asian state – its traditional dates are 37 BC to 668 AD – which at its peak, from the fourth to seventh centuries, ruled a territory that extended from the Korean peninsula into China's present-day northeastern provinces. Koguryŏ's history included a long span, from the end of the second to the end of the sixth century, when there was no centralized Chinese state. During the Later or Eastern Han 東漢 (25–220), Sui 隋 (589–618), and early Tang 唐 periods, Koguryŏ was one of several autonomous states in northeast Asia that contended with one another and with Chinese regimes for regional control.[17] Koguryŏ, Paekche and Silla, vying for control of the Korean peninsula, sought to overcome the others by allying with Chinese regimes. Silla eventually won this contest by allying with Tang to destroy Koguryŏ in 668 AD.

15 See Pai 1994; 2002.

16 See Pai 2000, 26-27, for the historical impact of the Kwanggaet'o stele. On the implications of new archaeological finds, see Park 2008.

17 Pan 1997, 54-58.

World Heritage Sites

The 2004 dispute between the two Koreas and the PRC over "ownership" of Koguryŏ began in 2001, when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (henceforth, North Korea) applied to UNESCO to register a complex of Koguryŏ tombs in P'yŏng'an 平安 and Hwanghae 黃海 Provinces as a World Heritage site. North Korea's application was supported by South Korea and Japan, but opposed by the People's Republic of China, which was in the process of preparing its own application. The North Korean application was discussed and rejected at the World Heritage general assembly sessions in 2003.[18] On July 1, 2004, at its Suzhou meeting, the World Heritage Committee approved both the North Korean application and an application by China to designate Koguryŏ capital cities and tombs located in Liaoning and Jilin provinces as World Heritage Sites, recommending that both countries "consider the possibility of a future joint, trans-boundary nomination of the Koguryŏ culture".[19]

In their applications, the two countries argued for World Heritage status on slightly different terms. The North Korean application stated that the murals on the walls of its Koguryŏ tombs were "masterpieces" and the tomb construction demonstrated "ingenious engineering solutions". The tomb complex was "an important example of burial typology". Moreover, the special burial customs of Koguryŏ influenced "other cultures in the region, including Japan".[20] China's applications to UNESCO were part of a cultural offensive to gain international recognition of the high achievements of Chinese civilization. Concretely, Chinese officials wanted to place more Chinese historical sites on the World Heritage list. China's application noted that "The tombs, particularly the important stele and a long inscription in one of the tombs, show the impact of Chinese culture on the Koguryo (who did not develop their own writing)".[21]

News of the Chinese success at winning World Heritage recognition for its Koguryŏ tombs and city ruins, coupled with Chinese press re-

18 See China Heritage Project 2007.
19 See Unesco, 28COM 14B.25 and 28 COM 14B.33.
20 Unesco, 28 COM 14B.33.
21 Unesco, 28 COM 14B.25.

leases describing Koguryŏ as a "subordinate state that fell under the jurisdiction of the Chinese dynasties and was under the great influence of China's politics, culture and other areas" aroused intense emotion in South Korea, where protestors dressed in Koguryŏ garb picketed the Chinese Embassy in Seoul. Official relations between the PRC and South Korea, begun in 1992, were strained over this matter. Earlier in 2004 the Chinese Foreign Ministry had deleted references to Koguryŏ from the Korean history section on its web site, so the World Heritage affair exacerbated Korean suspicions that China intended to remove any challenges to its incorporation of Koguryŏ into Chinese national history. A diplomatic "understanding" was hastily negotiated in an effort to ease tensions, but the underlying issues were not so easily resolved.[22]

National/nationalist history was a by-product of the state-building effort in the twentieth century. Attempts to trace the territories encompassed by contemporary nation-states backward in time distort the historical reality. When Chinese history is implicitly construed as the study of the governments that have ruled over Chinese speakers, nationalism creates problems of interpretation over conquest dynasties. Under the Mongols and the Manchus, China, defined as the territory occupied predominantly by speakers of Chinese, was itself incorporated into larger empires that spanned Inner Asia and East Asia, a historical feature that is ignored in the history of the Chinese nation.

Qing History Writing

To understand the 1990s movement to re-insert Manchu ethnicity into the history of the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), we should begin with a brief survey of how this history was constructed in the twentieth century. In keeping with the pre-1911 tradition, which was set within the idea of dynastic cycles, the task of writing the Qing history was left for scholars in the Republican era. The *Qing shigao* 清史稿 ("Draft History of the Qing") was compiled under the direction of Zhao Erxun 趙爾巽 (1844–1927) from 1914–1927; the Guomindang 國民黨 viewed it as biased in favour of the Qing and rejected it. The current Qing History project undertaken in the People's Republic of China picks up this task.[23]

22 Brooke 2004; also Klingner 2004.

23 See the articles in Q. E. Wang 2009–2010.

Despite the large number of books and articles on Qing history, there have been relatively few attempts to write a complete history of the dynasty. What we refer to as "standard views of the Qing" is derived from scholarship that focuses on only part of the whole. Based on the European historical model, the history written by Chinese scholars was echoed by Western academics and passed into the English language literature. In *Rescuing History from the Nation* (1996), Prasenjit Duara spoke eloquently to these issues and the problems of interpretation that result from them.[24] National history assumed that the nomadic rulers of conquest dynasties had to sinicize in order to rule the sedentary Chinese society. Although some scholars noted that the Mongols adopted multi-ethnic policies during the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), the foreign impact on China was assumed to be slight in the middle and long run. The major historical theme was *Hanhua* 漢化, i. e. "sinicization". For example, in a 1993 colloquium discussion on the historic accomplishments of the Qing dynasty during the eighteenth century, the eminent PRC Qing specialist Dai Yi 戴逸 noted that although the founder of the dynasty was not Han Chinese, "his reception of Chinese culture was rapid as compared with other minorities". When compared with earlier conquest dynasties, Qing rule was stronger and longer "because their sinicization was comparatively deeper, they rapidly sinicized, very quickly lost their own specific ethnic traits, and were completely transformed into Han people".[25]

Mary Wright, an eminent Qing historian writing in 1957, summed up a slightly different version of the "sinicization" thesis, which was later critiqued by Pamela Crossley. Wright responded to earlier scholarship arguing that conquest dynasties such as the Liao 遼 (947–1123) and the Qing were not assimilated but had "achieved a social and cultural symbiosis".[26] Rejecting this notion, Wright asserted that the Manchus lost their distinctiveness during their long sojourn in China. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the Manchu conquest group had become "virtually indistinguishable" from the Chinese. Manchu and Chinese officials attempting to halt dynastic decline in that period were united and, by implication, had a common understanding of a "China" which they tried to defend.[27]

24 Duara 1995, 5.
25 Dai Yi 1993, 1.
26 Crossley 1990a, 224.
27 Wright 1957.

The assumption that conquerors were all swallowed up into Chinese culture; that without adopting Chinese practices, the conquest regimes would never have been able to successfully create and maintain a complex bureaucratic state, was challenged in 1994. Editing a volume in the *Cambridge History of China* on the conquest regimes that ruled China in part or in whole from 907 to 1368, Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett introduced a provocative counter-thesis: that the Tangut (Xia 夏), Qitan 契丹 (Liao 遼), Jurchen 女真 (Jin 金) and Mongol (Yuan 元) regimes succeeded by adopting a different strategy than their predecessors.[28] Each was a hybrid regime, whose political skills were honed through interactions with other emerging states within a multistate context. Each ruled empires that encompassed nomads and agriculturalists. All applied different laws to different peoples within the empire, and employed non-Han as well as Han Chinese officials. All four created their own national writing systems, and pursued bi-lingual or multi-lingual language policies, translating Buddhist, Confucian and other works into their own languages. Each was determined to retain its distinctive identity and did so by segregating itself from the subjugated population. In short, the rulers who invaded Chinese territories in the tenth through fourteenth centuries pursued policies designed to govern Han Chinese and Inner Asian subjects simultaneously: sinicization was not the key to their success.

Meanwhile, in a number of seminal articles from 1983 onward, Pamela Crossley explored identity issues implicit in the top-down evolution of a Manchu group, the emergence of a creation myth, and the organization of a multi-ethnic military force.[29] In her 1990 study of three generations of the Suwan Gūwalgiya 蘇完瓜爾佳, a banner family living in garrisons in the Yangzi delta during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, she refuted Wright's assertion that the Manchus had "melded into the general populace" by 1850. Crossley argued that the reverse was true: bannermen, who had never been an ethnic group, developed ethnic consciousness for the first time in the late Qing. Further, this Manchu ethnic consciousness developed as a response to Han Chi-

28 Franke and Twitchett 1994, 1-42.

29 Crossley 1983; 1985; 1987; 1989; 1990b. Later (1997) Crossley published *The Manchus*, which covered their history from the ancestral Jurchen down to the 20th century.

nese hostility – bannermen were massacred by Chinese during the Taiping rebellion – and later to the emergence of Han nationalism.

Manchu ethnicity was nurtured in the segregated banner garrisons that were scattered throughout the Qing Empire. Crossley and Mark Elliott, author of an institutional history of the Eight Banner system, agree on this point. While also rejecting the sinicization thesis, Elliott departed from Crossley in arguing that ethnic consciousness emerged at an earlier stage and was a persistent influence on Qing policy throughout the entire dynastic period.[30] Through the banners, a "performative Manchu way" preserved the separate identity of the conquest elite through several centuries, even after many had lost the ability to speak their mother tongue.

The publications just cited turn the question of why the Manchus were so successful on its head. Instead of looking at China Proper, where the Chinese-speaking subjects of the Qing empire were clustered, they focused instead on the Inner Asian periphery. In my 1998 monograph, I argued that the Qing, precisely because of their non-Han origins, were able to successfully incorporate Inner Asian regions into the largest empire ever controlled from Peking, one which set the territorial boundaries of the modern Chinese nation.[31] Their origins enabled the early Manchu rulers to understand both Inner Asian (particularly Mongol) and Chinese culture, and synthesize elements from different political traditions. This theme – bringing a "frontier perspective" to bear on Qing expansion – has been further developed by Peter Perdue.[32]

Qing ruling ideology did not merely replicate Chinese paradigms. Previous generalizations about the Confucian commitment of the Qing rulers fail to capture their distinctive political and philosophical stance. In her 1999 monograph, *A Translucent Mirror*, Pamela Crossley traced the evolution of a distinctive Manchu ideology of rule, produced by the need to legitimate a conquest regime, from its origins in the late sixteenth century to its fruition in the Qianlong 乾隆 reign (1736–1795). This ideology was not merely Confucian. Whereas the Yongzheng 雍正 Emperor (r. 1723–1735) argued that the Qing deserved the Mandate of Heaven because they had been morally and culturally transformed, Hongli 弘曆

30 Elliott 1990.
31 Rawski 1998.
32 Perdue 2005.

(the Qianlong Emperor) based Qing legitimacy on the idea that the success of his founding ancestors was itself proof of the Heavenly Mandate.

The "early modern emperorship" constructed by the Qianlong Emperor over the course of his long reign was an amalgam of ideas drawn from different traditions. The diverse subjects of the empire were held together by the person of the emperor: "because the emperor's consciousness was an extension of the mind of Heaven, he maintained this connection through an encyclopaedic collection of rituals, and he reified Heaven's will in the magnificence of his regime".[33]

Studying the Qing court in its last decade, Edward Rhoads analyzed the efforts of Empress Dowager Cixi 慈禧太后 (1835–1908) and her successor, Regent Zaifeng 載灃 (1883–1951), to not only reverse the post-1861 trend towards decentralization of government authority but to "re-imperialize" decision-making processes. Both Cixi and Zaifeng appointed imperial princes to high decision-making posts, just as the early Qing emperors had appointed imperial princes and banner nobles to important posts, allowing them to operate with trusted subordinates in a timely and flexible fashion. During the early twentieth century, there were many political appeals to the throne that differences between Manchu and Han should be eliminated, even as the anti-Manchu writings of the period express a conscious separation on the Han Chinese side and an inner core of Manchu imperial kinsmen helped shore up dynastic rule.

Formerly neglected subjects in Qing history were also highlighted by the new focus. Wang Xiangyun's 1995 dissertation brought together important material on how the Qing court both patronized and exerted control over the Tibetan Buddhist hierarchy.[34] Chia Ning's 1993 article on the court's activities in its summer capital, Rehe 熱河 (Chengde 承德) examined the emperor's meetings with Mongol nobles, Uighur elites, and Tibetan Buddhist clerics there.[35] Patricia Berger's 2003 monograph analyzed how the Qianlong Emperor used the commissioning of Tibetan Buddhist religious art and the doctrinal framework of Tibetan Buddhism to explore issues of identity and meaning that were directly relevant to his style of rulership.[36]

33 Crossley 1999, 361.
34 X. Y. Wang 1995; 2000.
35 Chia 1993, 60-92.
36 Berger 2003.

The *Pax Manjurica*, which lowered the boundaries separating Tibet, Mongolia, and China, also stimulated a cultural efflorescence in Inner Asia. Qing Peking became the centre of book publishing in these languages.[37] From before 1644, the Manchu rulers commissioned translations not only of the Chinese Confucian canon but also of the Tibetan Buddhist Tripitaka. Multi-lingual dictionaries were also part of the court's on-going effort through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to demonstrate universal monarchy through cultural patronage. Cartography and geographic compilations of the newly conquered far west confirmed the incorporation of present-day Xinjiang into the empire.[38]

The cultural impact of the incorporation of Manchus, Mongols, and Tibetans into the Qing Empire can be evaluated by surveying the production of works in these languages during the dynastic period. A study of the body of Manchu-language editions (over 2,100 distinct titles/editions) published during the dynasty shows that 60 per cent were in more than one language, and many (over 48 per cent) were Chinese-Manchu editions.[39] The poly-lingual editions, which spanned the entire spectrum of subjects from philosophy to literature, were vital in bridging the linguistic boundaries that divided subjects in the empire and in disseminating Chinese literature to Mongol readers. According to Christopher Atwood, "Knowledge of the Manchu language was virtually universal among the nobility and high officialdom of Mongolia, both Inner and Outer".[40]

In contrast to the Manchu books, over 80 per cent of the Mongol works were in Mongolian alone. Mongol literature was bifurcated by genre and language. The larger portion (over 60 per cent), which were on Tibetan Buddhist subjects, were published in the "palm-leaf" format of the Tibetan book, and oriented towards Tibetan textual sources. A smaller number of books dealt with secular topics, notably commerce, administration and language; these books were constructed on the Chinese model, and might be Mongol-Chinese bilingual editions or trilingual Mongol-Manchu-Chinese texts. The coexistence of two contrasting types of books written in Mongolian accurately reflected the cultural dualism of

37 Rawski 2007, 197-235.
38 Millward 1999, 61-91.
39 Rawski 2005.
40 Atwood 2000, 124.

Qing Mongol culture: a strong orientation towards Tibet, the fount of the religion, and an orientation towards Peking and the Qing court.[41]

Tibetan-language editions were also published by the Qing government, by Mongols, and by Tibetans. The overwhelming bulk of these books was religious in content; the literary works that exist show an influence from Indian rather than Chinese culture. It was really only in the nineteenth century that several monastic centres began to print texts within Tibet itself. Tibetan was the prestige language in Mongol monasteries. Mongolian monks translated many Tibetan texts into Mongolian, but they also wrote biographies of religious notables, church chronicles, and philosophical treatises in Tibetan.

Inner Asian book culture expanded significantly during the Qing period. It was internally segmented by subject and language, reflecting the life circumstances of different groups. Bannermen who resided in Peking or in garrisons scattered throughout the empire were surrounded by Chinese speakers and Chinese culture; perhaps this is why the Manchu-language literature was dominated by translations of Chinese works and administrative documentation. Khalkha Mongols, who were distinguished from the Khorchin and other Mongol tribes inhabiting what later became Inner Mongolia, were in a different situation. With the exception of a few officials who served in Peking, most Khalkha Mongols lived in Mongolia, where their commitment to Tibetan Buddhism exposed them to Tibetan (and through Tibet, Indian) as well as Chinese culture. Tibetans were the group most insulated from Chinese materials. One specialist wrote that "Tibetan monks and lay scholars seldom, if ever, learned Chinese, thus remaining to this day generally ignorant of Chinese literature and religion".[42] Tibetan religious and secular literature was instead influenced by Indian works and by the extensive interaction between Tibetan and Mongol clerics.

The Qing court supported the printing of religious literature, administrative texts, and dictionaries. They tried to discourage translation of popular Chinese plays and novels from being published, and relatively few printed editions have survived. Nonetheless the repeated bans on immoral and lascivious literature during the seventeenth, eighteenth,

41 Atwood 1992, 1. For a challenge to the generalization that Qing patronage of Tibetan Buddhism led to their ability to control the Mongols, see Elverskog 2006.

42 Snellgrove 1971, 332.

and nineteenth centuries suggest that Chinese novels did circulate widely and not simply in their original Chinese versions. Some manuscripts even featured phonetic transcriptions of Chinese texts in Manchu letters, so that they could be read aloud to bannermen who could not read Chinese but understood the spoken language. Manchu translations of Chinese fictions were also read by Mongols. "Journey to the West" (*Xiyou ji* 西遊記) in particular familiarized Mongols with Xuanzang 玄奘 हेनसांग (c. 602–664), the Buddhist monk who travelled to India to obtain the Buddhist scriptures. He became known as the "Marvelous Lama" in Mongolia.[43]

Studying the Qing Empire from the perspective of its Manchu rulers permits us to reconsider our ideas about the way in which what we call China developed over the long span of history. Scholars of the ancient period cite archaeological findings to stress that many regional cultures, not just one, existed in the early stages of state formation. The existence of multiple cultural centres raises provocative questions about the accuracy of contemporary historical generalizations implying a unitary Chinese culture or civilization. Is that, too, a myth? Certainly recent work, such as the monograph by Matthew Sommer, suggests that there were still multiple cultures coexisting in China, even among Han Chinese, during the Qing period.[44] The criminal cases that Sommer studied show a husband exchange the sexual favour of his wife in order to obtain male labour on the farm. Other departures from the Confucian norms appear vividly in these cases.

What about the long historical span? Remove the blinders imposed by modern national territorial boundaries, and we see that the cultural interactions on the Shandong peninsula in ancient times was probably tied to non-Han peoples who also populated the present-day Liaoning plain into the Korean peninsula. The Tang 唐 (618–907) rulers came from non-Han origins, and many Tang policies were more typical of conquest than of Han Chinese dynasties. North China was under non-Han rule for 242 years after the Northern Song fled the region in 1126: How did the long occupation of the region by non-Han peoples affect its regional culture? The possibilities for altering the way in which we

43 Atwood 1992.

44 Sommer 2000.

have talked about Chinese history are many and varied. It is a very invigorating prospect.

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Dayi juemi lu 大義覺迷錄 and the Lost Yongzheng Philosophy of Identity

Pamela Kyle CROSSLEY

When I was a graduate student one of the enigmas of Qing history was the decision of the Qianlong 乾隆 Emperor to destroy his father's published propaganda work, *Dayi juemi lu* 大義覺迷錄,[1] in 1736. As in many other matters, we tended to rely upon the suggestion of the incomparable Fang Chao-ying, who stated,

> disliking the freedom with which his father had exposed the affairs of the Imperial House, ordered all copies of the book [...] returned to Peking and destroyed.[2]

Later one wondered how Fang knew this, since the Qianlong Emperor (r. 1735–1976) did not write down such a sentiment, and seems not to have been overheard conveying it to others. In time I believed that my researches into other aspects of the evolving Qing ideology, and particularly the strong themes established in Qianlong-era prolegomena of commissioned works on history and philosophy, raised more immediate and perhaps more convincing possibilities for explaining this extraordinary event. It may have turned on a very specific disagreement between the Yongzheng 雍正 (r. 1722–1735) and Qianlong Emperors on the source and substance of being civilized.

The Qing court would probably have remained ignorant of Lü Liuliang 呂留良 (1629–1683) had it not been for Zeng Jing 曾靜 (1679–

1 Various translations of this title have been used, all of them suitable but none perfect. I used "Great Righteousness Resolving Confusion" ("resolving" as in the ending of a dream or an illness) in *A Translucent Mirror* (Crossley 1999), Jonathan Spence used "Awakening from Delusion" in *Treason by the Book* (2002), which is also good but seems to leave off the first part of the title in Chinese. Today I would probably prefer "Great Righteousness Dispelling Confusion", but it is in any case an arbitrary matter. For this paper I will stick to *Dayi juemi lu*. I have used the facsimile reproduction published in Jindai Zhongguo shiliao congkan (pages cited from original *juan*, with additional pages from the reprint in brackets).

2 Hummel 1943, 749.

1735). The misadventures of Zeng and his ally Zhang Xi 張熙, leading to their arrest by Yue Zhongqi 岳鍾琪 (1668–1754) and subsequent interrogation by the Yongzheng Emperor, are well-known and need not be reviewed here.[3] What is more interesting was the reaction of the Yongzheng Emperor to Zeng Jing himself and to the prospect of a treasonous rebellion. The emperor seems to have comprehended from the first that there was no significant threat posed by the rather unstable and unprepossessing Zeng Jing, and that on the contrary an opportunity for some public suasion had arisen. Zeng Jing and Zhang Xi were described by the emperor as half-educated, easily-misled commoners who had attempted rebellion only because of the deviousness of the well-educated, well-fed, well-cared for descendants of Lü Liuliang. He assumed the public posture of educator and sponsor of Zeng and Zhang, both of whom were released and given employment .

Rebellious sentiments had of course to be punished, and for this punishment the emperor singled out the dead Lü Liuliang, on whom he time and time again heaped colorful invective; in the preamble to *Dayi juemi lu* alone, Lü is

> [...] the treacherous thief Lü Liuliang, with his ferocious stupidity and ungovernable hatred, his love of chaos and delight in suffering, pretending to have normal connections [to us] while privately writing his stories, absurdly claiming "After morality is protected [i. e. after the Qing are overthrown], there will be a great change in Heaven and Earth, not seen since ancient times, and only reappearing then."[4]

The price for the intent to rebel was to be paid by Lü Liuliang and his dead son Lü Baozhong 呂葆中, whose corpses were exposed and dismembered; Lü's son Yizhong 呂毅中 (d. 1733) who had met with Zhang Xi and evidently helped to work the rebellious delusion in the minds of Zeng and Zhang, who was sentenced to death by decapitation; and Lü's surviving grandsons over the age of sixteen, all of whom were sentenced to lifelong enslavement at Ninguta, in the Northeast. The harshness of the punishments visited upon the Lü lineage was shielded by a two-year period of consultation, after publication of *Dayi juemi lu* and concluding in 1733, in which the emperor invited literati to suggest just pun-

3 See Hummel 1943, 747-748, 957-959; Fisher 1976–1978; Crossley 1999; Spence 2002.

4 *Dayi juemi lu* 1.2ab (3-4): 乃逆賊呂留良，凶頑悖惡，好亂樂禍，攘彝倫，私為著述，妄謂「德祐以后，天地大變，亙古未經，於今復見」。

ishment for the family. A few interesting ideas surfaced, but in general the throne's correspondents concurred that Lü Liuliang was in fact an ingrate, a liar, a strange and unsociable person, and that two of his sons had actively worked to spread Lü's seditious thoughts to Zeng and Zhang (who appeared to be the sole participants in the planned "rebellion").[5] It was suggested that the Lü family had been the source of sedition in Zhejiang, their home, for years, and that they had probably been in some way responsible for earlier literary crimes by Wang Jingqi 汪景祺 (1672–1726) and Zha Siting 查嗣庭 (1664–1727).[6] In accord with basic principles of collective guilt in the law, and as a reminder to the literati of their special status and responsibility in the empire, heavy penalties were demanded from the family – namely desecration of ancestor's corpses, decapitation of living seniors, and lifelong abasement of juniors.

The careful distinctions of class and obligation that the emperor limned in the judicial aspects of the handling of the case are an interesting corollary of the literary inquisitions that took place in limited form during the Yongzheng years and on a greater scale during the Qianlong era.[7] The two-year round of solicited recommendations on the fate of the Lü family – certainly peers and in some cases acquaintances of the respondents – was in itself a veiled literary inquisition.[8] To assess Lü Liuliang's guilt, several writers found it necessary to invoke other writers who might also be viewed in a treason-

5 On the latter point see Spence 2002, 54-56.

6 See also Crossley 1999, 255-259.

7 See also the comments in Wu 2008, 181-183, comparing the Yongzheng Emperor's tactics in combatting the influence of the school of Hanyue fazang 漢月法藏 (jap. Kangetsu Hōzō, 1573–1635, also Sanfeng heshang 三峰藏和尚) of Chan Buddhism with his refutation *Jianmo bianyi lu* 揀魔辨異錄 to those of combatting the influence of race-based sedition in *Dayi juemi lu*. The Hanyue lineage were critics of Huineng 慧能 (638–713) and, in their own time, Miyun Yuanwu 密雲圓悟 (1566–1642). The emperor's specific political concerns are somewhat elusive, but he certainly sought to rebut – rather than outright ban – the mystical and supernatural arguments of the Hanyue school. He was particularly concerned that the school was gaining traction among the literati – especially the literati of Zhejiang, whom he also cited as a concern of *Dayi juemi lu*. His denunciation of Hanyue was made required reading among Chan monks from its publication in 1733 to the abolishment of the government system of control over ordination in 1754, well after the emperor's death.

8 On this point see Crossley 1999, 254.

ous light; Yan Hongda 嚴鴻逵 (?–1732), specifically condemned by the emperor in the preface to *Dayi juemi lu*, was uncovered in such a process. Good works and bad works were cited, and vows of loyalty to the throne were implicitly invited. The theme of education and responsibility paralleled the content of the emperor's commissioned work, *Dayi juemi lu*. Indeed it was directed precisely at the very class being pressured in the two years of consultation and the resulting destruction of the Lü lineage. It was to become required reading of all aspiring to the licenciate (perhaps not coincidentally, the highest formal academic status Lü had achieved in his lifetime), the lowest and most inclusive level of aspiring degree candidates. This would have guaranteed its reach to every corner of the Qing literate world. Its message of personal identity and transformation would have been embedded in early-modern philosophical and political discourse in China, and perhaps in other quarters of the Qing empire.

Dayi juemi lu comprised the ostensible interrogation of Zeng Jing – which in its published form appeared more like a classroom exchange than a product of torture, terror and deprivation – together with a prolegomenon apparently written by the emperor himself.[9] In this preamble, the emperor points out that it has been eighty years since Lü Liuliang wrote down his vicious slanders, implying that only the Lü lineage and collaborating literati could have preserved the message for the gullible Zeng Jing to happen upon after such a lapse of time. In both this short introduction and in his lecturing of Zeng Jing in the subsequent volumes of *Dayi juemi lu*, the emperor strikes an interesting poise between the naturalism of traditional Northeastern political thought and conventional Chinese teachings on ethics, with Northeastern ideology and culture dominating the preamble itself.

There is an insistence on specific, material indications of Heaven's favor of the Qing. In the struggle against the Ming, it was after all the Qing who had been victorious. I read this as an appeal to the concept of *urušembi* – to support one side in a fight – as a decisive demonstra-

9 The original publication of *Dayi juemi lu* was bound together with Zeng Jing's confession, "Why I have Returned to the Humane" (*Guiren shuo* 歸仁說, in 4.32b-45b, 482-509) and published in tandem with Zhu Shi's 朱軾 commissioned essay, "A Refutation of Lü Liuliang's Interpretation of the Four Books" (*Bo Lü Liuliang sishu jiangyi bo* 駁呂留良四書講義). See also Fisher 1984, 95-96; Crossley 1999, 255.

tion of Heaven's favor. This idea was deeply embedded in Northeastern and Inner Asian political thought. It was the basis of Joseph Fletcher's theory of "tanistry" among the Mongols, Manchus and Ottoman Turks,[10] and was tied to the notion of *sechen* – the natural intelligence of a leader, the quality that guides his arrow to its mark. Closely connected to it is the emperor's proclamation that since the Qing had taken control of China and cleaned up some of the chaos lingering from the Ming, the country had been free of devastating natural disasters. And the emperor manages to make his case for the rectitude of Qing pacification of China without employing a Confucian convention such as *ren* 仁 as a virtue of the ruler or of the government (the emperor uses *ren* as a quality of universalized sympathy among all humans, which I take to be the meaning of Zeng's written confession, *Guiren shuo* 歸仁說, "Why I have Returned to the Humane.") The closest he gets is *en* 恩, which in most Qing translations was Manchu *kesi*, which is perhaps best rendered as the blessings that flow (material and emotional) from a superior to a dependent. Such ideas of being materially supported by Heaven and receiving a gift of communicated intelligence from Heaven are strongly present in Manchu historical and political writing. The number of references in the *Dayi juemi lu* to "holy virtue" (*shengde* 聖德) is a case in point. It is an evident calque for Manchu *enduringge erdemu* (e.g. *mujilen i meni han be kunduleme, enduringge erdemu be algimbume*)[11] and *Geli ejen oho niyalma i enduringge erdemu in genggiyen be inu elden sembi*.[12] The clear implication is that the emperor has innate and probably supernatural virtue, perhaps shamanically imbued.[13]

Equally suggestive of a Northeastern political framework is the emperor's repeated use of the terms "lord, ruler" (*zhu* 主 and *jun* 君) to describe himself and the dynasty. This very strongly evokes of the Mongolian and Manchu concept of *ejen*, meaning not only a dynastic ruler and lord of an empire, but a keeper of slaves and owner of

10 See particularly Fletcher 1979–1980.

11 *Mambun rōtō* 2:2:15.

12 *Han i araha manju gisun i buleku bithe, ujui debtelin*.

13 There is probably a strong connection on this point to the ideological premise of the Qing emperors as imbued with the consciousness of Chinggis and Khubilai, an idea that Qing apologists in Mongolia such as Lomi seem to have embraced. See Rawski 1998, 251-258; Crossley 1999, 240-242, 323; Elverskog 2006, 63-85.

livestock. In *Dayi juemi lu*, *zhu*'s connotations rarely resemble the Chinese meanings of "host", the very meaning played upon (unknown to the emperor) by Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 (1610–1695);[14] and *jun* rarely has the connotation here of the auditor and sponsor of scholars. Slavery in Northeastern political discourse is not chattel slavery, but the dominance implied in Latin *famulus*, a servant, from which is derived *familia* as a word meaning the dependents of a household, whether servants or kin. In Manchu *aha* as a word for slave was more explicit than *familia*, since it excludes kin. But over the course of the Qing it took on similar connotations to Chinese *chen* 臣, which originally meant servant but in imperial times meant an official. In the political rhetoric of the earlier Qing empire, the *ejen/aha* relationship was one defined by the obligation of the *ejen* to nurture (*ujimbi*)[15] his children, slaves and livestock.[16] When the emperor says, in the preamble to *Dayi juemi lu*, that Lü Liuliang and his ilk "do not know the great righteousness between lord and servant"[17] – he is speaking at least as much in the Northeastern frame as in the Chinese frame.

The greatest protection offered dependents in the traditional system was peace; it was the basis of the original claims to rulership of Nurgaci, echoed in the *Kaiguo fanglue* 開國方略 / *Fukjin doro neihe bodogon-bithe*,[18] where the bandits are described as infesting the countryside "like bees" in the early Qing records, and visitors to Nurgaci's compound were reminded that he had made roads safe for travel.[19] The first line of the emperor's prolegomenon introduces this theme of late Ming chaos and Qing peace, in the closest possible association with the theme of dominance and dependence:

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14 On Huang Zongxi's *Mingyi daifang lu* 明夷待訪錄, see de Bary 1993.

15 Norman (1978, 292) gives *ujire hafan* (literally "nurturing official") as the Manchu translation of *mufu* 牧夫, a general word for a herdsman but in Zhou times a term for a warder of royal property.

16 Usually translated into Chinese as *yu* 育. It might be significant that Zeng chose the literary name of "lordless vagrant of the South" (南海無主游民), probably an accidental irony, since Zeng is usually depicted as poorly educated and even more poorly informed.

17 *Dayi juemi lu* 1.3a (5): 不知君臣之大義。

18 On this and other works providing a self-narrative of Qing conquest, see Crossley 2012.

19 Crossley 1999, 149.

> 夫我朝既仰承天命，為中外臣民之主，則所以蒙撫綏愛育者，何得以華夷而有更殊視？
>
> It being the case that our dynasty succeeded to the Mandate of Heaven, and became the lord of ministers and common people in China and without, then how can it be that those who would inculcate peace and love nurturance (*yu* 育) can still claim a distinction between the Hua and the Yi?[20]

Political unity and social coherence are first-order extensions of this peace:

> 海隅日出之鄉，普天率土之眾，莫不知大一統之在我朝。
>
> From the first seaside village to see the sun each day to the furthest inland reaches of the realm, every single person knows that unification is due to our dynasty.[21]

The preamble concludes with a similar point, which we can take as the primary argument of the work:

> 且以天地之氣數言之，明代自嘉靖以后，君臣失德，盜賊四起，生民涂炭，疆圉靡寧，其時之天地，可不謂之閉塞乎？本朝定鼎以來，掃除群寇，寰宇安，政教興修，文明日盛，萬民樂業，中外恬熙，黃童白叟，一生不見兵革，今日之天地清寧，萬姓沾恩，超越明代者，三尺之童亦皆洞曉，而尚可謂之昏暗乎？
>
> Moreover you could use all the energy of Heaven and Earth repeating this: Ming times from the Jiajing [1522–1567] period on saw a loss of morality among the lords and ministers, thieves came from all sides causing misery among the people and constant violations of the serenity of the borders – who would not say that was intolerable?
>
> From the time that our dynasty set the vessels upright, we swept out hordes of bandits and put the whole world at peace; teaching has been rectified, learning (*xiu* 修) has been revived, civility (*wenming* 文明) is burgeoning by the day, virtually all the people are prosperous, China and the outer regions are contented and healthy; from a yellow-haired infant to a white-haired oldster, a whole life passes without experiencing war or tumult. Today Heaven and Earth have pure peace, the people bask in our grace. The ways in which we surpass the Ming [are so obvious] even a child not a yard tall can get it, yet there are those who would call this "darkness"?[22]

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20 *Dayi juemi lu* 1.2a (3).

21 *Dayi juemi lu* 1.2a (3).

22 *Dayi juemi lu* 1.3b-4a (6-7).

In the interrogatory volumes of the *Dayi juemi lu*, the emperor elaborates a bit on his idea of the proper form of the state and the proper relationships between people and ruler. The ruler ensures peace. The absence of war leads to the flourishing of civilization and prosperity. The state as an agency of the emperor is hierarchical. The ruler speaks to the ministers (*chen* 臣), who speak to the people (*min* 民). Peace and the state as the medium through which the ruler maintains it are the attributes of the Yongzheng Emperor's civilization, and it is universal. The origins or even the culture of the rulers is immaterial, since only rulers are able to assure peace which will gain the favor of Heaven.

In the preamble the emperor is able to introduce his idea of what one might call civilized identity, something he elaborates upon in the following books. He repeatedly invokes the dichotomy of Hua 華 and Yi 夷, which he may have been told was a favorite oppositional pair in the writings of Lü Liuliang, who clearly used the two terms to mean "Chinese" and "barbarian".[23] But in the *Dayi juemi lu* the emperor construes these terms in the way they most likely were meant in the early classics, as the names for two separate peoples, one called Hua and one called Yi. Near the beginning of the essay he writes,

> 中外臣民，既共奉我朝以為君，則所以歸誠效順，盡臣民之道者，尤不得以華夷而有異心。
>
> [...] the ministers and people of China and outer regions have accepted and acknowledged our dynasty as their lord, and by this have returned to sincerity and emulation of discipline, fulfilling the moral obligations (*dao* 道) of minister and subject. Obviously it is impossible to have a difference of mind between Hua and Yi.[24]

And as a specific example of this transcendent virtue (*sheng de* 聖德 / *enduringge erdemu*), he points to the passage in the *Mencius* describing Shun 舜 as a "man of the Eastern Yi" by origin, and Zhou Wenwang 文王 as a "man of the Western Yi" by origin.[25]

Referring to Mencius's comment on Shun and Wenwang, "they were virtuous before [they migrated] and after",[26] the emperor con-

23 Fisher 1976–1978; Crossley 1999, 249-253.

24 *Dayi juemi lu* 1.2a (3).

25 *Dayi juemi lu* 1.2b-3a (4-5): 舜為東夷之人，文王為西夷之人。

26 The emperor was citing *Mencius* 4B.1 ("Li Lou xia" 離婁下): 先聖後聖，其揆一也。 The translation here is given from the viewpoint of *Dayi juemi lu*, and differs sub-

cluded with the question, "What detriment [were their origins] to their holy virtue?".[27] The difference in phrasing between Mencius and the emperor is significant. Unlike Mencius, the emperor attributes the moral perfection of Shun and Wenwang to their migration, both physical and moral – their naturalization in the zone of civilization. He says, before his reference to them, "Our dynasty considers itself Manchu, yet China is our place of residence."[28]

This apparent description of "China" as a place accommodating a variety of level cultural identities may be misleading. There has been a good deal of speculation on the use of the term *zhongguo* 中國 / *dulimba-i gurun* in Qing documents to suggest that the Qing considered their empire to be somehow Chinese.[29] The court used the term in Manchu as an occasional way of referring to the empire, particularly in communications with Russia during the treaty negotiations of the early eighteenth century. But it is probably unwise to leap to a conclusion that this can be globally glossed as "China". Zhao Gang is certainly right in stating that Manchus like all their Northeastern predecessors perceived the culture and location of "China" – however designated – to be real. That they accepted the "concept of China" is unproblematic, so far as I can see. This does not mean that describing China as contained within the empire equates China to the empire, or that the empire was ever equated with any single culture or space in normal Qing usage.

Whether *dulimba-i gurun* always meant the "China" that the Manchus accepted as a historical, cultural and geographical reality – both before and after its incorporation into their empire – is not simple. It is first of all unclear whether Chinese *zhongguo* is a unilinear source of Manchu *dulimba-i gurun*. Earlier Northeastern empires not in China, not Chinese, and often in some rivalry with a state based in China used "Central" as part of their state designation, and "central country" as a reference to themselves.[30] Both Aisin Gioro Ulhicun and Daniel Kane

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stantially from the more standard translations of Legge, Lau and others in which *xian* and *hou* are taken to refer to Shun and Wenwang respectively.

27 *Dayi juemi lu* 1.3a (5): 曾何損於聖德乎?

28 *Dayi juemi lu* 1.2b (4): 〔...〕本朝之為滿洲，猶中國之有籍貫。

29 For a good overview of Chinese scholarship asserting a direct equivalence between *zhongguo* and *dulimba-i gurun* see Zhao 2006, esp. 6-10.

30 For a discussion of the ambiguities and complexities of this relating both to the Jurchen Jin and Kitan Liao states, see Daniel Kane (forthcoming).

find that the Jurchens and the Kitans most likely in several contexts referred to their empires as "central" (corresponding to Chinese *zhongyang* 中央). The exact meaning is unclear. It could be used in rivalry or in parallel with the Song expressions *zhongguo* for China, but is equally likely to mean "middle" in the sense of a high point of an arc of time – more akin to modern Chinese *zhong* 仲 than to *zhong* 中. Such empires were often spatially segmented, with multiple capitals, and controlled by an imperial lineage repeatedly fending off challenges from other lineages. In such circumstances, "central" as an expression of relative political weight, or "central" as designating the high point in a dynastic cycle, had specific value. The source of Manchu *dulimba* is self-evidently Jurchen *dulin* (and *dulinni/dulingi gurun* is attested in Jin-period monuments) together with Manchu *ba*, designating a position (as contrasted to a time). The position need not be physical, as is evident from the Manchu title for the *Zhongyong* 中庸, *An dulimba*. These complexities of *dulimba* are, in this question, combined with the ambiguities of Manchu *gurun*, which – like Chinese *guo* 國 – may mean a people, a state, a dynasty or an empire. Even if, as I think likely, Manchu use of *dulimba* in *dulimba-i gurun* was primarily inspired by *zhongguo*, it is hard to see how the traditional connotations of *dulinni gurun* in Jurchen could have disappeared from Qing use of the Manchu term *dulimba-i gurun*.

Beyond that, use of *dulimba-i gurun* by the Qing is clearly heavily dependent on context. Before the conquest of Shenyang, Manchu documents show a normal use of *Ming-i gurun* or *Nikan gurun* for the "concept" of China; *dulimba-i gurun* became more common after Qing occupation of China, which suggests again the traditional Northeastern use of "central" country to mean the place where power is seated. The argument for identification of the Qing empire and "China" rests heavily upon the Treaty of Nerchinsk. The treaty was negotiated and ratified only in Latin (the first language), Russian and Manchu. Jesuits acting on behalf of the Qing designated the Qing as Sinarum Imperatoris, with "China" in the genitive case and "emperor" in dative case – "Emperor of/over/in China". In the Russian text, the Qing empire is referred to as *Chinskogo gosudartsvo* Хинского государство (nominative), in Russian convention using "Qing" as the modifier for "state" as paired with the Russian state *Rossi'iskogo gosudartsvo* Российского государство (nominative). And the Manchu text is exactly parallel: *Dulimba-i gurun*

enduringge hūwangdi – even to reproduction of the genitive case. But these are formal terms used to designate the entities engaging in the treaty. Territorial discussions much later in the treaty use "Sinico" and case variants, since the logical framework of the negotiations only required distinction between Russian territory on the one hand and Qing on the other and precision in proper names was of no value.

But in the treaty the occurrences of Sinico are infrequent in comparison to the instances of Хинского in relation to territory –"of the Qing". Translations into Chinese, which did not occur for perhaps two centuries, and were never ratified or reviewed by any state, are not important evidence of the Manchu use here of *dulimba-i gurun* and cannot precisely reproduce the sense of *dulimbai-i gurun i* because modern Chinese does not easily translate this use of the genitive case. The Yongzheng Emperor, however, was referring to a similar framework of meaning when he wrote, "Our dynasty considers itself Manchu, yet China is our place of residence." And case issues are again at work in Zhao Gang's assertion that "Tulisen often uses *meni Dulimbai gurun*, Manchu for 'our China [...]'."[31] Even in English genitive case "my" and "our" can have several meanings. They might specify a state of identification: "my country". Or, they might specify a state of ownership: "my car". Overall finding that Tulišen 圖麗琛 (1667–1740) "often" used *musei* (the inclusive "we") rather than *meni* (the exclusive "we") might have given Zhao's assertion here some support, but even then Tulišen's true meaning would be ambiguous to a modern reader.[32]

One source Zhao might have considered in refining his sense of this would have been the Manchu text of the *Huang Qing zhigongtu* 皇清職貢圖, in which frequent references are made to specific empires based in China in the past, and other references are clearly to the "concept" of China that Zhao reasonably concludes the Manchus recognized. Repeatedly, the text uses *dulimba-i gurun* to mean the continuing space, culture and history of China, but specifies empires (or, as Kane com-

31 Zhao 2006, 9. This is a reference to Tulišen's *Lakcaha jecen-de takūraha babe ejehe bithe*, written and published around 1712.

32 Li (2000, 351) indicates that *meni* is genitive case of *be*, "we" (exclusive of the listerner) and *musei* is genitive case of *muse*, "we" (inclusive of the listener), and this certainly covers a great many instances. Since Tulišen was in this case speaking to Mongols resident in the Russian empire, his "we" would have to be exclusive, but the rest of his implication is impossible to recover with precision.

mented in reference to the Northeast tradition of "centrality" in regime names, time periods) by name – *Han i gurun*, *Tang i gurun*, *Ming i gurun*, and so on.[33] While the concept of China is very definitely affirmed by such a text, the relationship of the Manchus and the Aisin Gioro lineage to it is not. Uses of the genitive case in Manchu to objectify China and place it in a dependent position to a subject do not aid in a conclusion that the Qing emperors at any time considered their empire to be China, or vice versa. The evidence suggests that the Qing took the meanings of both *dulimba-i gurun* and *zhongguo* literally – the location of their capital, the place from which they looked out to their borders and the countries beyond, the high point in the dynastic cycle and civilized development. Contextual consideration of the term suggests that the regime considered itself to be based in a historical China that was central to its empire, but not that the empire itself was Chinese. The emperor's statement that *zhongguo* was now the place of residence of the Manchus meant, in this case, that they belonged there, were there legitimately, and like Shun and Wenwang were being morally perfected by the process of transfer. He lays the foundation for his theory of transformational identity, which is elaborated in the following books of the *Dayi juemi lu*.

The emperor specifically points to some phrases evidently used by Lü Liuliang to praise ancient war leaders of Xia who claimed that making war against the Di 狄 was always justified and always virtuous, admitting no possibility that by doing so they could be making war on other civilized people.[34] Confucius, the emperor said, had distanced himself from such sentiments and even refused employment by King Zhao of Chu 楚昭王 because of disagreement with the policy.[35] But obstinate prejudice against outsiders had come, the emperor suggested, at a heavy cost:

> 蓋從來華夷之說，乃在晉宋六朝偏安之時，彼此地丑德齊，莫能相尚，是以北人詆南為島夷，南人指北為索虜，在當日之人，不務修德行仁，而徒事口舌相譏，

33 See Walravens 2006.

34 The proximate source for the emperor's quote was probably *Mencius* 3A.4 (滕文公上): 《魯頌》曰：『戎狄是膺，荊舒是懲。』周公方且膺之，子是之學，亦為不善變矣。」The citation is referring to *Shijing*, Ode 300 (Bigong 閟宮, the last of the praise-odes of Lu).

35 *Dayi juemi lu* 1.3a (5): 若以戎狄而言，則孔子周游，不當至楚應昭王之聘。

已為至卑至陋之見。今逆賊等於天下一統，華夷一家之時，而妄判中外，謬生忿戾，豈非逆天悖理，無父無君，蜂蟻不若之異類乎？

So despite this subsequent theory of the Hua and the Yi, from the [Eastern] Jin and [Liu] Song and during the periods of disunion (*bian an zhi shi* 偏安之時) the good and the bad was just about the same, none actually excelled the others. In fact the northerners were belittling the southerners as "island barbarians" (*daoyi* 島夷) and the southerners were pointing at the northerners as "roped slaves" (*suolu* 索虜), and the people of the time never worked at cultivating morality or behaving with humanity. Instead they just looked for occasions to argue with each other. It was a phenomenon of the crudest, meanest kind.

Now that all is united under Heaven and the Hua and Yi are one family, these treacherous thieves with their crazy condemnations in China and in the outer territories, fallaciously stirring up anger and violence, how can it be that they betray Heaven and repudiate reason, [recognizing] neither father nor lord, how are they any different from swarms of ants?[36]

The idea that there could be any enduring distinction between Hua and Yi in the new Qing world of political unity and orthodox teaching was one that the emperor and his amanuenses continued through *Dayi juemi lu* to reject as impossible.

所著逆書〔...〕既云：「天下一家，萬物一源」，如何又有中華、夷狄之分？

In your seditious book [...] you have said that "the world is one family, and all things have a single origin," so where does this "distinction between the Chinese and the barbarians" come from?[37]

Pointing repeatedly to Qing success in conquering and now ruling China, the Yongzheng Emperor claimed that the characterizations by Lü Liuliang and Zeng Jing of "barbarians" as nothing more than livestock meant that China was now ruled by livestock, and demanded that Zeng explain how this could be.[38] Fortunately for China, the emperor intoned, the Qing rulers had the power to make distinctions in this world, and they had determined that people were distinct from beasts, not from other people.[39]

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36 *Dayi juemi lu* 1.3a-b (5-6).

37 Crossley 1999, 256, from *Dayi juemi lu* 2.13b (178).

38 Crossley 1999, 256, from *Dayi juemi lu* 1.4b-5a (9-10).

39 Crossley 1999, 256-257 from *Dayi juemi lu* 1.11a-13b (22-26).

The Yongzheng vision of a universal civilization, improving all who inhabited it and protected by a strong, pacifying state, suffuses the *Dayi juemi lu*. It weaves in and out of commentary heaping invective upon Lü Liuliang, his family and associates, and some rambling historical commentary highlighting the lawlessness of previous regimes and the civilized accomplishments of empires – foremost Tang – with origins on the margins of the civilizational zone. Overall it conformed to standard Confucian teachings on the power of education to produce a civilized identity. The emperor intended that *Dayi juemi lu* would become preparatory materials for examination candidates, and a fundament of Qing state ideology.

To return to Fang Chao-ying's explanation for the decision of the Qianlong Emperor to suppress this work, we should note that the swiftness with which the new emperor acted is only hazily suggested by the entry in Hummel's *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*.

> In 1735, however, the succeeding Emperor Kao-tsung, after he ascended the throne, commanded that Tsêng and Chang Hsi be arrested and brought to Peking.[40]

Technically, the Qianlong Emperor had not actually ascended the throne, which he would not be able to do until the lunar new year of 1736. But he had evidently determined very firmly in his mind, perhaps years before, that Zeng Jing and Zhang Xi would both be arrested and killed by *lingchi* 凌遲 ("death by slow slicing" or "death by cutting") – which happened in February of 1736 – and that *Dayi juemi lu* would be suppressed. Copies of the book were ordered to be collected and burned.

Fang had suggested that the reason the Yongzheng Emperor had commissioned *Dayi juemi lu* in the first place was that he felt defensive (in Fang's term, "guilty") about the deadly conflicts that had accompanied his accession to the throne. Since the emperor supposed that all around him secretly condemned him and considered his rule illegitimate, *Dayi juemi lu* was an opportunity to justify himself with lengthy references to earlier regimes who had legitimated themselves by enforcing peace, even if harshly. As a corollary, Fang explains the Qianlong Emperor's rush to destroy the book as motivated by embarrassment over his father's now institutionalized references to the

40 Hummel 1943, 748.

internecine struggle as well as his father's excessive protests of righteousness, which only emphasized the late Emperor's guilt. There is indeed material in *Dayi juemi lu* that alludes to accusations that the Yongzheng Emperor illegitimately murdered his way into office, and the references are not fleeting.[41] Nevertheless they do not constitute anything like the bulk of the composition, and they do not account for the special essay commissioned from Zhu Shi refuting the cosmology and historical narratives of Lü Liuliang. Moreover, the sort of information and commentary that Fang sees as provoking the Qianlong Emperor to destroy *Dayi juemi lu* was not exclusive to that compilation; similar material was also included in *Jianmo bianyi lu* 揀魔辨異錄 (1733), which the emperor had also commissioned and at least partly authored as a refutation of the Hanyue fazang (also Sanfeng) sect of Chan Buddhism.[42] If the Yongzheng Emperor truly wanted to induce forgetfulness of the controversial nature of his accession in his court or among the empire's literati, he would clearly have done better to have never had *Dayi juemi lu* written, and should have executed Zeng Jing and Zhang Xi for their temerity. In Fang's view, this was the exact thought of the Qianlong Emperor, who rushed to undo the whole affair by administering the ultimate punishment to Zeng and Zhang and making *Dayi juemu lu* disappear. But things cannot be undone, and the fact was that the emperor risked making *Dayi juemi lu* even more alluring to curious minds than if he had merely expunged it from the preparatory reading for the examinations.

At the end of his entry on Zeng Jing, Fang suggests another factor that is, in context, more convincing. There he writes:

> There are numerous discrepancies between the official records of the life and sayings of Emperor Shih-tsung (compiled in Emperor Kao-tsung's reign) and the edicts printed during his life-time. Particularly in the *Ta-i chüeh-mi lu*, there are documents which have been omitted in other official compilations and which stand as proof of Emperor Shih-tsung's guilty conscience.[43]

Guilty conscience aside, the degree to which *Dayi juemi lu* reveals Qianlong editing of the Yongzheng era is important. Indeed I sug-

41 *Dayi juemi lu* 1.14-38a (27-75) and 3.30a-49b (343-382).

42 Wu 2008, 177-182.

43 Hummel 1943, 748.

gested in *A Translucent Mirror* that the Qianlong court had edited the entire earlier history of the dynasty to an extent that could make that history inaccessible without a sustained and conscious effort to discern, read around, and otherwise neutralize the overwhelming historical authority of the Qianlong court. That authority did not consist solely in emending or eradicating unwanted documents, it also consisted in generating new, large historical works and piling them atop the earlier record.

Between the philosophy of identity articulated in *Dayi juemi lu* and that which would be built strongly and consistently in the Qianlong era collections was a profound disagreement on the source and character of civilization, and the degree to which personal identity was relative to it. The underlying argument of *Dayi juemi lu* was that the Aisin Gioro lineage and by implication the Manchus generally had been culturally and morally transformed and that this was the primary reason they were fit to rule China. As in the cases of Shun and Wenwang alluded to in *Dayi juemi lu*, the Manchus had left their ancestral home and migrated to China, where they had been "educated/cultivated/repaired" (*xiu* 修), and this had preserved or enhanced their "holy virtue" (*enduringge erdemu*). It is certainly possible that the Yongzheng Emperor felt that this explanation organically ameliorated his own questioned legitimacy, since he himself hoped to undergo education/cultivation/repair by emulating the virtues of a sage-king and a *bodhisattva*. But a reference to the same *Mencius* passage on Shun and Wenwang appeared in the Qianlong Emperor's preface to "Research on Manchu Origins" (*Manzhou yuanliu kao* 滿洲源流考), published in 1783. There the emperor argued that Mencius cites the origins of Shun and Wenwang without hesitation or embarrassment because there was no reason to hesitate to name them as foreigners. The allusion precedes a discussion of the distinct origins of a civilization in the Northeast, culminating in the Manchus in the years before their conquest of China. That civilization, the emperor implied, had equal standing with that of China, and its inheritors had no reason to take on the civilization of others. Their identities, in other words, were absolute in themselves, and not relative to a universal civilization.[44] That essentialist refutation of Yongzheng transfor-

44 Crossley 1999, 259-262.

mationalist ideology, in the context of the long trail of Qianlong-era revisions of and commissioning of historical narratives, became the lasting foundation of Qing identity ideology.

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The Trilingual "Tables and Biographies" of 1795 as a Source for the History of the Mongols

Veronika VEIT

I

Possibly the most complex period in the history of the Mongols is their becoming a dependency – ultimately an integral part – of the Manjurian Ch'ing 清 Empire in the course of the seventeenth century. Nevertheless the significance of the role the Mongols played must not be underestimated – not least because the outcome of that political "fate" is still of consequence to this day. The course of events until the fall of the Ch'ing in 1911 has been the subject of manifold researches, mostly from the Chinese point of view – whereas (historiographically speaking at least) the Mongolian and Manjurian side tended to be rather neglected until fairly recently. Since archives in China have been opened so that original materials and facsimile-editions became easier accessible, the significance of Manju documents altogether has finally come into its own instead of continuing to be regarded as secondary in comparison with the Chinese material.

The case of the Mongols, however, is somewhat more complex. To begin with, their traditional historiography – from the thirteenth century well into the nineteenth, taking the "Secret History"[1] and the chronicle *Bolur Toli* by the monk Jimbadorji[2] as corner points – can be characterized as a mixture of family history and (Buddhist) church history. These chronicles (for want of yet a better term) contain genealogical tables, the heroic *res gestae* of the ancestors, legends, words of the old (*bilig*), verses, stories of the spread of Buddhism, the establishment of monasteries, miracles – briefly: a focus on the individual rather than on the more universal aspects of historical events, respectively their assessment in a broader context. Thus, Mongol chronicles are curiously silent on the subject of the Mongols' politi-

1 See e. g. de Rachewiltz 2004.

2 See Heissig 1962.

cal role in Ch'ing times – similar, perhaps, to the "curious incident of the dog in the night" (who did *not* bark!) in the famous Sherlock Holmes story "The Silver Blaze".[3] Mongol traditional historiography and its value should therefore be assessed in a different context from the present one – in the sense, possibly, that it could be likened to a mirror of the Mongols' own concept of politics, their own idea of what is worth recording, what, in fact, they consider to constitute "history". Until the end of the Ch'ing rule their concept remained an aristocratic, not a popular one; they were not postulating the existence of a nation in the modern sense, but of a people solely in relation to its ruler or rulers.[4]

Documents relating to administrative dealings between the Ch'ing and their Mongol subjects, however – "remains" in the historiographic sense of the word – are by their very nature another matter. Of these, we now also dispose of a considerable number, as we do in the case of Manju records.[5]

II

Since the traditional Mongol historiography will not yield much useful information – apart from occasional brief passages – and documentary material, although indispensable, tends to throw light on limited matters and events only – what, then, will permit the historian to ascribe to the Mongols the proper political part they played in the Ch'ing Empire, to what extent did they contribute towards its success?

It is the Ch'ing themselves, as we shall see, who provide the key to the solution. Let us recapitulate briefly: The Manjurian Ch'ing, the last dynasty to rule over the Chinese Empire, was a foreign one, of Central Asian origin. In the long history of China's dynastic reigns it must be regarded as unique in more than one respect – three of which will be pertinent to the study undertaken here:

1) It was during Qing rule when China reached its greatest territorial expansion in history, up to the present day, with the support of the Mongols.

3 See Doyle 1966, 326-327.

4 See Bawden 1968, 5-6.

5 For a recent list of such publications, see Weiers 2011, 1; see also Oyunbilig (2011).

2) It was the Qing who, for the first time, ruled a truly multi-national empire, with three official languages in use – Chinese, Manju and Mongolian.
3) It was the Qing whose original archival documents were mostly preserved, along with the official historiographic works – unlike the custom in other dynasties where these were habitually destroyed after the compilation of the official histories was completed.

The Ch'ing reached their apogee during the reign of the dynasty's fourth ruler, the Ch'ien-lung 乾龍 Emperor (r. 1736–1796). The northern and southern Mongols, as part of the "Outer Territories", had been divided into "Outer Mongolia" (the Khalkhas of the north) and "Inner Mongolia" (comprising the southern tribes, former allies of Nurhaci (1559–1626, Chin. Nu-erh-ha-ch'ih 努爾哈赤) and Hung Taiji (1592–1643, Chin. Huang T'ai-chi 皇太極)[6] in the process of conquering China). Both, however, were to change from allies to subjects – albeit special ones – and had indeed, by the end of the dynasty in 1911, turned from a foreign problem to a domestic one. As it was, in due course, the Mongols found themselves organized on feudal-military lines – in the words of Bawden:

> So as to constitute a reserve of mobile soldiery ruled by hereditary princes who were bound to the Manchu royal house by a system of hierarchical ranks and titles, by salaries and rewards, and by marriage alliances.[7]

Tibet had become a protectorate of the Ch'ing during the reign of the K'ang-hsi 康熙 Emperor (r. 1662–1722),[8] and the remaining Dzunghar-Mongols, the bane of Ch'ien-lung's father and grandfather for so long, were finally defeated by Ch'ien-lung's generals in 1760.[9] Their erstwhile domain was annexed and renamed "Hsin-chiang" 新疆 (to become a proper province in 1884)[10] – giving China her greatest territorial expansion in history to this very day.

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6 The different names/transcriptions of Nurhaci's eighth son and successor are easily explained: "Abahai" (e. g. Hummel 1943, 1-3) is an old historiographic mistake, corrected by Stary (1984). The Chinese name is rendered as Huang T'ai-chi, its Mongolian transcription is Hung Tayiji and the Manchu version Hung Taiji, the latter will be used throughout the present paper – unless following a quotation.

7 See Bawden 1989, 81.

8 See Petech 1972, 66-90.

9 See Hummel 1943, 72-74 (Chao-hui 兆惠), 369-370 (Hung-li 弘歷).

10 See Hummel 1943, 766 (Tso Tsung-t'ang 左宗棠).

It was therefore not only the Mongols whose fate had become more or less inseparably linked with China – albeit a China under Manju rule – a circumstance which put the Mongols in a privileged position: Unlike the other nations now forming part of the Empire, Manju-Mongol relations were of long standing, furthermore greatly facilitated by the fact that both spoke much the same political language and shared many of the same customs.[11] Besides, the K'ang-hsi Emperor, educated by his grandmother, a princess of the Khorchin-Mongol tribe,[12] truly succeeded in winning the hearts of the Mongols – best of all the Ch'ing rulers – as can be seen from many examples. Suffice it here to quote two of the emperor's own statements referring to the Mongols:

> The Chinese turn of mind is not straight. As to the Manjus and the Mongols, even several tens of thousands, are of one mind. In the years I have been on the throne, the reason why I have declared it difficult to rule the Chinese, is their not being of one mind.[13]

Furthermore:

> Of old, the Ch'in dynasty heaped up earth and stones and erected the Great Wall. Our dynasty has extended its mercies to the Khalkha and set them to guard the northern territories. This will be even stronger and firmer than the Great Wall.[14]

Accordingly, both Inner and Outer Mongolia contributed largely to the Ch'ing emperors' successful military campaigns, with troops and supplies.[15]

After the Ch'ien-lung Emperor's final defeat of the Dzunghars and the annexation of their territory, the Torgut-Mongols – a tribe of the old Dzunghar federation – decided to return to their original homeland, induced, probably, by the new conditions there. These Torguts had migrated from Ili to the Lower Volga Valley about the year 1616. In 1770/71, their Khan Ubasi felt encouraged to return to what was now part of the Chinese Empire. In December 1770 some 169.000 of them,

11 See explanations in Farquhar 1968, 198-205.

12 See Hummel 1943, 300-301 (princess Hsiao-chuang Wen Huang-hou 孝莊文皇后, daughter of Jaisang of the Khorchin).

13 See Natsagdorǰ 1963 (translation Veit according to the text quoted here).

14 See Natsagdorǰ 1963, 86 (as above).

15 For the amounts see Veit 1986, 453-455.

comprising more than 33.000 families, set out with all their belongings on the long treck eastwards. Pursued by Russian troops, attacked and waylaid en route, they lost more than half of their number and about two thirds of their cattle and other property before they reached the borders of Ili in 1771. Exhausted and destitute, there was no way but to cast themselves on the mercy of the local authorities. The Ch'ien-lung Emperor immediately took measures to come to their aid. The assistant military governor in Hsin-chiang, Šuhede 舒赫德 (1711–1777), among others, was ordered to receive the Torguts and to distribute to them clothing, cattle, grain and other necessities. Ubasi was received in audience in Jehol and awarded a title. Pasture was allotted to them at Urumchi and Tarbagatai where their descendants live to this day.[16]

The emperor's military victories, and presently the return of the Torguts to their homeland (now part of the Manju Empire!), after their most moving hardship and suffering on the way, induced the emperor to commemorate his triumphs by a number of measures,[17] of which, however, only the following example is relevant to the focus of this essay: By Imperial Order (dated 10.09.1779), a record of the merits of the leading princes of the "Outer Territories" (including the newly returned Torguts) was commanded, as a testimony to their exemplary loyalty and services to the dynasty, as a "heritage forever", in the emperor's own words.[18]

III

For the very first time we have here a historiographical record exclusively devoted to the merits of the leaders and representatives of the "Outer Territories" in the service of the Ch'ing.

It is indeed thanks to the unique conditions of the Ch'ing dynasty – which we have referred to above – that we dispose of such material at all. Its value to the history of the Mongols in particular is considerable – although, ultimately, it is the product of Ch'ing historiography and the rules that guide it. It helps to fill the gap between the scarce news of the Mongol traditional historiography and to form a bridge between archi-

16 For the story of the Torguts see Hummel 1943, 659-661 (Shu-ho-tê) and 784-787 (Tulišen 圖麗琛).

17 See Veit 1990, vol. I, 74.

18 See Veit 1990, vol. I, 75-77.

val documents and the narrative of the Chinese traditional historiography (as will be explained below, in more detail). This remarkable work was published in 1795, in the three official languages of the dynasty (Chinese, Mongolian and Manju) under the title: *Ch'in-ting wai-fan meng-ku hui-pu wang kung piao-chuan* 欽定外藩蒙古回部王公表傳 / *Jarliγ-iyar toγtayaγsan γadayadu muji-yin mongγol qotong ayimaγ-un wang küng-üd-ün iledkel šastir* / *Hesei toktobuha sirame banjibuha tulergi goloi monggo hoise aiman i wang gung sai ulabun* [Tables and biographies of the princes of the Mongol and Turkic outer districts, compiled by Imperial Order].[19] Research on this unique source is still on-going[20] – therefore only three examples of the preliminary findings, in collation with other texts, will be presented here.

To introduce the basis of our subsequent reasonings, the abovementioned *Iledkel šastir* (to quote it according to its abbreviated Mongol title), a few words as to its classification:

The official Chinese historiography in general, well established since the T'ang 唐 dynasty, follows certain principles, all of which are well known and sufficiently discussed in scholarly treatises.[21] The Ch'ing period, however, as briefly mentioned before, differs here from the other dynasties, in two respects:

1) Its multi-ethnic and multi-lingual structure provides source material in different languages.
2) The preservation by the Ch'ing of most of the original archival documents and materials, later to be used in compiling the official histories and biographies, make them still at the disposal of the historian.

In the other dynasties, these were habitually destroyed after their use. We are therefore in the unique position to examine the official historiographic products of the Ch'ing as to their truthfulness/falsification/modification of facts and the course of events by being able to compare them to the still extant original archival materials – a most fortunate circumstance which cannot be emphasized too strongly![22]

19 See Veit 1990, vol. I, esp. 74 ff.

20 See also Veit 1997, Veit 1999, Möngkedalai 2006 and Veit 2011.

21 One of the "classics" being Gardner 1938.

22 See Haenisch 1930, 422-442; Weiers 1983, 4-6; Weiers 2000, 125-127; Weiers 2002, 199-218. For an example of the process of collation see also Oyunbilig 1999.

The source at stake is entitled *piao-chuan* 表傳 in Chinese, which means "tables and biographies". By this title it may – according to Gardner – be classified as a sub-section of the historiographic category "Standard Histories". [23]

It is further referred to as a "semi-official" history, since not only the Kuo-shih kuan 國史館 – the State History Office – signed responsible for its compilation, but also the Ch'ing Court of Colonial Affairs (the Li-fan yüan 理藩院). Although we do not know who actually did the compiling – or, when necessary – the translations, we do know the names of the editors.[24] The work itself is divided into two sections – tables and biographies – and comprises altogether 120 chapters (*chüan/debter/debtelin*), listing more than 260 individual biographies (with sub-sections), and more than 1.300 persons named in the tables.[25]

In accordance with the category "Tables" (*piao*) we find genealogical data of the persons mentioned in section I, the year of their appointment and the sequence of the transmission of their ranks and titles (resp. their degradation). The "Biographies" (*chuan*) in section II, on the other hand, contain extended genealogical data as well as the *res gestae* of the persons honoured with such a biography. The accounts are doubtlessly based on archival material, imperial edicts, petitions and other documents, all properly dated – but unfortunately the texts do not appear in their original form. Historiographically speaking, they could therefore not be classified as "remains", but must rather be taken as "transmitted texts", which furthermore often appear to have been abbreviated, re-phrased, or placed in a different context; briefly: manipulated!

Allow me nevertheless to speak in favour of the "defendant", our *Iledkel šastir*, accused by some scholars of being "secondary" and therefore unworthy of consideration by serious historians. The question, rather, is here: *cui bono* – to whose benefit – does the work under discussion serve?

As a preliminary answer, two aspects seem to suggest themselves – one concerning facts, the other concerning method.

23 See Gardner 1938, 99.

24 See Veit 1990, vol. I, 77-88.

25 See Veit 1990, vol. I, 92-94.

To begin with the facts: There is no doubt, as we have discussed above, that the Mongols played an important role during the Ch'ing period. Few of their own autochthonous sources permit us to assess the extent of their contribution towards the political and military affairs of the empire, not to mention that of their relation between each other. As far as collections of archival documents are concerned, they have already been mentioned. The *Iledkel šastir*, for their part, contain a remarkably consistent and complete informative network of persons, their genealogical data and accounts of events, apart from – at least – remnants of documents. This source therefore presents a possibility to close the gap in our knowledge of the data mentioned above – it is far more than a mere enlarged "register of births, marriages and deaths"! What after all, is history, if not "the essence of innumerable biographies"? – to quote Thomas Carlyle.[26]

As to method: The *Iledkel šastir* offer us some insight into the Ch'ing traditional historiography's compiling process in practice – exemplified through the cases of the leaders and representatives of the "Outer Territories" – in accordance with the time-honoured Chinese principle of "praise and blame" (*pao-pien* 褒貶) applied by them when dealing with the "lesson of history".[27] We thus find evidence also of the Ch'ing view of history and evidence of how they made use of it as an instrument of power, with the intention of exercising a more effective control.

IV

The following examples of textual collations will show to what extent our *Iledkel šastir* (hereafter indicated as text a) will show their usefulness from the historian's point of view, respectively to what extent facts and events appear to have been manipulated in possible compliance with the politics of the day. Genealogical informations have not been considered in this context, as we have too little material to compare them with. The procedure is part of an on-going

26 Partington 1970, 125.

27 For more on the principle of *pao-pien* in traditional Chinese historiography, see also Franke (1925).

research, as has been stated before. It should therefore be regarded by the reader with some lenience due to its still being incomplete.

The First Case:[28]

The Manju-Khorchin Alliance of 1626

English summary of reported facts: Dates between the three versions vary slightly: a) *Iledkel šastir* has July 1626; b) *Chiu Man-chou tang* has 29.06.1626; c) *Huang-Ch'ing k'ai-kuo fang-lüeh* has 30.06.1626. b) and c) do not entirely correspond as to circumstances and reasons for the alliance and the formal oath between Nurhaci and Ooba of the Khorchin: the traditional ceremony of the Sacrifice to Heaven and Earth, customary when concluding an alliance in Central Asia, is omitted; a curious sense of equality between the two parties is suggested by the text. a) Omits the formal alliance altogether; instead, the relationship and oath between Nurhaci and Ooba is depicted as one of "sovereign and subject" (the allotment of the proper roles a clear hindsight manipulation!) Furthermore, priority is given to the praise of the dynasty's protective grace in guarding the Khorchin against Chakhar aggression.[29]

Text quotations in German:

a) Im Mittleren Sommermonat des 11. Jahres [Tngri-deče jayaγatu = Juli 1626] kam Ooba [der Khorchin] zur Audienz. Er überreichte Kamele, Pferde und Zobel. Anlässlich des vorgelegten Berichts bezüglich der Umstände, dass sie zuvor beraubt worden seien, beruhigte der Herrscher [= Nurhaci] sie und richtete ein Gastmahl aus. Er belohnte [Ooba] mit einem Hut, Gürtel und einem gesattelten Pferd; er vermählte ihn mit der Enkelin des Beile Šurhaci und machte ihn zum Qošoi Efu. Im letzten Sommermonat, [unter Beachtung der] angemessenen Verabschiedungszeremonie, wünschte [Ooba] nach Hause zurückzukehren. Anlässlich richtete er folgende Schwurworte nach oben: „Der Himmel hat mich, Ooba, hierher gelangen lassen. Es findet sich nun, dass ich dem Herrscher zu Diensten bin. Anlässlich der Tatsache, dass die Čaqar und die Qalqa uns zu überfallen gekommen sind, hat die Grosse Armee uns beschützt und Unterstützung gegeben, und durch glückliche Um-

28 This case has already been examined in Veit 2011, 251-253. See Weiers 1983, 412-435.

29 The Chakhar Ulus (or Nation) was traditionally subject to the claimant of the title Great-Khan of all the Mongols – the incumbent at the time being Ligdan (1592–1634).

stände sind wir gerade noch frei gekommen. Diese kostbare Gnade wagen wir ohne Zweifel in Generationen nicht zu vergessen! Wenn wir den geschworenen Eid brechen, möge ewiges Leid und Unglück uns treffen!" Nachdem er so gesprochen hatte, pries der Herrscher seine Aufrichtigkeit und eigens, durch herrscherliche Order, ernannte man ihn zum Tüsiyetü Qan und zeichnete ihn mit dem Geschenk einer Rüstung, eines Helms, eines geschnitzten Sattels und Brokatseide aus.[30]

b) Rotes Tiger-Jahr, am sechsten der ersten Dekade des 6. Monats (=29. Juni 1626) hält er (= Nurhaci) mit dem Tayiji Ooba eine [Begrüssungs-] Zeremonie ab und schlachtet für den Himmel ein weisses Pferd und für die Erde schlachtet er ein schwarzes Rind und [folgende sind] die Worte, die er geschworen hat.[31] [...] Mein Schwur: Unter den chinesischen, tsakharischen und khalkhaischen Bedrückungen und Beleidigungen gegenüber Menschen, die rechtschaffen leben, halte ich es nicht [mehr] aus. Als ich das dem Himmel klagte, hat der Himmel das mir gegenüber [auch] missbilligt. Nachdem dann die Tsakhar und Khalkha sich zusammengetan hatten, sagten sie, dass sie den Khung Tayiji Ooba von den Khortsin töten und wegschaffen wollten und kamen [mit] Truppen. Der Himmel hat das dem Khung Tayiji Ooba gegenüber [ebenfalls] missbilligt. Nachdem der Khung Tayiji Ooba über die Tsakhar und Khalkha erbost war, sagte er, dass er sich wegen dieser Handlungsweise beraten wolle, und das Zusammenkommen bei mir und unsere zwei Notumstände hat wohl der Himmel zusammengefügt. Wenn wir [nun] daran denken, dass der Himmel uns zusammengeführt hat, und wenn wir, ohne einander in die Irre zu führen, gut handeln, soll der Himmel uns gnädig sein und uns unterhalten! wenn wir [aber] ohne daran zu denken, dass der Himmel uns zusammengeführt hat, handeln, indem wir uns in die Irre führen und belügen, soll der Himmel das missbilligen und uns Schaden leiden lassen. Des Khung Tayiji Ooba Schwurworte. Der besonnene Gegen Khagan, der durch das Schicksal des hohen, ewigen Himmels sowie bei Himmel und Erde aufgrund [...] fruchtversprechenden Tuns [...] erfolgreich geworden ist, und den Stand von Herrschern ohne Schwäche erlangt hat, und der Khung Tayiji Ooba, der unverzüglich zum Treffen miteinander gekommen ist, werden vor dem Himmel ein Zeugnis ablegen.Während wir, die Noyane der Khortsin, mit fester und aufrichtiger Gesinnung gegenüber den Tsakhar und Khalkha [...] bis jetzt sagten, dass wir ohne Falsch Folgschaft leisten und uns wohl verhalten wollten, war das jetzt nicht mehr möglich, [denn]

30 See Veit 2011, 253 (translation Veit).

31 *Iledkel šastir* 17, 1831-19r1. Translation Weiers 1983, 414; see also Veit 2011, 251.

ihr Morden und Rauben stellten sie jetzt nicht mehr ein, und die einfachen Khortsin von uns haben sie [damit] fertig gemacht. [...] Der Khagan der Mandschu hat sich dann auch recht um uns gekümmert. [...] Wenn wir den vor dem Himmel abgelegten Schwur gebrochen haben, die vom Khagan der Mandschu erwiesene Fürsorge vergessen, und uns mit den Tsakhar und Khalkha verbinden, soll man den Khung Tayiji Ooba, darüber hinaus, dass er [den Schwur] missbilligt hat, [selber] missbilligen, darüber hinaus, dass er in Schwierigkeiten war, [ihm selber] Schwierigkeiten bereiten.[32]

c) Ich bin ursprünglich ein Mann, der dem Himmel gefügig und einem ruhigen Leben ergeben ist. Weil das Mingreich mit den Cahar und den Kalka mich allzu schwer beleidigt, kann ich es unmöglich hinnehmen. Wenn ich es aber dem hohen Himmel klar verkünde, wird der hohe Himmel dann Hilfe leihen. Aoba vom Stamm der Korcin ist von den Cahar und den Kalka mit vereinter Kriegsmacht überfallen und ausgeraubt worden. Nachdem er Groll und Kummer aufgehäuft hatte, ist auch ihm die Hilfe des Himmels zuteil geworden, und er ist gekommen und hat zusammen mit mir politische Angelegenheiten geprüft und überdacht. Wir sind alle beide Menschen, die Leid und Drangsal erfahren, gewiss hat der hohe Himmel uns zusammenkommen lassen. Wenn nach Abschluss des Bundes von Söhnen und Enkeln jemand den Bund verletzt, soll der hohe Himmel Unheil und Untergang auf ihn herabsenden! Wer aber den Bund und die Freundschaft zu erhalten vermag, den soll der hohe Himmel von selbst gnädiglich anschauen![33] – Ich, der Korcin Beile, habe keine Fehde mit den Cahar und den Kalka angefangen, sondern sehnlichst Ruhe und Freundschaft gesucht, aber nicht erhalten können. Von der Zeit des Jasaktu Khans an haben Überfälle und Räubereien kein Ende gehabt. Mein Taiji Dalai ist unschuldig getötet worden. Danach ist Jaisai wieder mit Truppen gekommen und hat sechs meiner Beile getötet. Als wir deswegen mit jenem die Beziehungen abbrachen, sind sie wieder mit vereinter Kriegsmacht gekommen und wollten töten und rauben. Dank der militärischen Hilfe des Kaisers ist es mir gelungen, der Gefahr zu entrinnen. Darum bin ich hierher gekommen und schliesse den Bund. Falls jemand den Bund verletzt, sich der Allerhöchsten Gnade unwürdig erweist und mit den Cahar und den Kalka Frieden macht, auf den soll der hohe Himmel Strafe herabsenden und ihn in Unglück und Schaden stürzen! Wer aber ständig den Bund

32 *Chiu Man-chou Tang*, Fol. 2080. Translation Weiers 1983, 419-421; see also Veit 2011, 251-252.

33 See Hauer 1926, 136; see also Veit 2011, 252.

der Freundschaft hält, auf den soll der hohe Himmel auch ständig gnädiglich herabschauen![34]

The Second Case: [35]

Letter sent by Hong Taiji to Tüsiyetü Qaγan of the Qorčin

English summary of reported facts: Summarizes an Imperial Order to assemble troops to fight the Chakhar. Ooba and his younger brother Büteči, however, chose not to obey, attacking the Chakhar themselves, in highhanded fashion. An Imperial reprimand follows immediately, handed over by the Said Soni, though it does not quote its wording. Shock, horrors on the side of Ooba; Soni tries to calm him down, saying that he is now an imperial relative. In February 1629, Ooba is received in audience by Hung Taiji and pardoned; b) provides the full wording of the Imperial Reprimand; c) mentions Ooba's highhanded action against the Chakhar and at a later stage also quotes the wording of the subsequent Imperial Reprimand. Besides, the circumstances of the meeting between Ooba and the Said Soni are related in great detail, such as the ceremonies observed at the reception of Hung Tayijis delegation, and the dialogue between Ooba and Soni. Similar to a) we also find here a special mention by Soni of Ooba's now being related to Hung Tayiji as a mitigating factor in the reconciliation with Hung Tayiji – which indeed proves to be the case.[36]

Text quotations in German:

a) Im letzten Herbstmonat des 2. Jahres T'ien-ts'ung 天聰 (=Oktober 1628), als der Herrscher selbst sich auf den Weg machte, gegen die Chakhar zu ziehen, hiess es, dass die zahlreichen Tayiji der unterstellten Distrikte (Ayimaγ) zum Coro Fluss kommen sollten, um sich den Truppen [Hung Tayijis] anzuschliessen. Die Truppenmobilisierung erfolgte – aber Ooba und sein jüngerer Bruder Büteči überfielen eigenmächtig mit ihren Truppen die Grenze der Chakhar. Ohne der Befolgung der herrscherlichen Anordnung, sich der Grossen Armee anzuschliessen, nachgekommen zu sein, kehrten sie dann [in ihr Gebiet] zurück. Im letzten Wintermonat entsandte man auf herrscherliche Anordnung den Said Soni und andere mit einem Schreiben, in welchem

34 See Hauer 1926, 136-137; see also Veit 2011, 252-253.

35 See Di Cosmo 2003, 55-61: "Document 12".

36 See Hauer 1926, 194, 196-199.

man das Vorgehen Oobas mit Tadel belegte. Zu dieser Zeit aber war Ooba erkrankt. Als man das Schreiben überreichte, erschrak er gewaltig und die Krankheit ertragend, erhob er sich dennoch und sprach mit Soni: „Wenn ich mich zum Herrscher begebe, um meinen Respekt zu entbieten, will ich mich ihm ausliefern und die Strafe ertragen. Allein, was ich fürchte, ist: Wenn der Herrscher, in mächtig flammendem Zorn, mich sogleich zurückweist, ohne dass ich mich erkläre, wohin werde ich dann gehen?" Nachdem er so gesprochen hatte, sagte Soni: „Wenn du wahrhaftig die Verfehlung auf dich nimmst und dich zur Audienz begibst, möge es sich dann finden und ergeben, dass er nicht anders kann als dich von der Schuld zu entbinden. Mit dem Argument, dass du zum gemeinsam nahen Verwandten geworden bist, ausserdem, dass du aus einem fernen Gebiet anreist, wird [der Herrscher] dich keinesfalls zurückweisen" – so sprach Soni. Im 3. Jahre (=1629), im ersten Frühlingsmonat, traf Ooba ein. Er überreichte zehn Kamele und einhundert Pferde. Als er untertänig bat, dass ihm die Schuld vergeben werde, verzieh ihm der Herrscher und betrachtete ihn wie immer der gewohnten Sitte.[37]

b) Since the English text is easily available, I will dispense here with a full quotation of the letter in favour of a brief summary[38] In his letter to the Tüsiyetü Qan of the Qorčin, Hung Taiji (the Sečen Qaγan) accuses the Qorčin of "three crimes" and "nine sins":

The "three crimes" refer to Ooba's acts of disloyalty towards Nurhaci (i. e. supporting inimical tribes on three different occasions). The "nine sins" Hung Taiji refers to comprise Ooba's acts of disloyalty towards Hung Taiji himself – e. g. failing to obey summons to meetings or join his troops to the army, despite his earlier oath of allegiance; failing to show his respects on the occasion of Nurhaci's funeral; accepting a bride (a cousin of Hung Taiji), but paying an insufficient price; denying the extradition of a "criminal"; refusal, first, to pay ransom-money, then later too little of it (described as "cheating and humiliating"!); disrespectful behaviour towards the Manchu bride – preference given to the Mongol bride; trading with China – Hung Taiji's declared enemy!

Yet, the entire letter is held in reasonable terms – like a father's who would hold his wilful son accountable – stressing the benefit and goodwill bestowed and the ungrateful acts of disloyalty received in return. Hung Taiji's disappointment shines through in his closing words, when

37 *Iledkel šastir* 17, 19v-20r. See translation Veit, Ms., not published.

38 See Di Cosmo 2003, 56-58 (translation), 59-61 (text in transliteration).

he reproaches Ooba despite having been held in high esteem, showered with rich gifts and honours, he kept up relations with the Chinese – whereas his cousin Khonggor, who had always been considered a shifty-shaky figure, had proven to be honourable after all – so: how could he, Hung Taiji, have any faith in Ooba? (Letter delivered by Ajuqu and Sonin to Tüsiyetü Efu on the first day of the 12th month of the second year of Sure Han [25 December 1628].

c) [Suffice it here to give the wording of Hung Tayijis reprimanding letter:] „Einst hatte dein Vater den Yehe geholfen, Truppen aufzustellen, [...] in der Absicht, unser Gebiet aufzuteilen. Glücklicherweise hat der Himmel unserer Nation geholfen und ihr habt euer Sehnen nicht gestillt. Als später unsere Truppen gegen den Rinderberg der Ula zogen, seid ihr, Vater und Sohn, mit Truppen den Ula zu Hilfe gekommen. Ferner habt ihr den Yehe zuliebe unseren Leibwächter Buyanngû getötet. Da die Verbrechen sich keineswegs auf einen Punkt beschränkten, hätte man das Heer zu einem Strafzuge aufbieten müssen, aber mein verewigter Vater war hochherzig und menschenliebend. Er schickte Gesandte zu Friedensverhandlungen, liess einen Bund vor Himmel und Erde schwören und stellte seinerseits die Freundschaft wieder her. Als du später selber zu Friedensverhandlungen kommen wolltest, und man einen Treffpunkt vereinbart hatte, begab sich mein verewigter Vater zum Stelldichein, du aber kamst wieder nicht. Das war Lug und Trug von dir. Als die Cahar Truppen aufboten und dich mit Krieg überzogen, haben wir keine Mühen und Anstrengungen gescheut und sind mit dem Heere unsererseits zu Hilfe geeilt. Nachdem die Truppen bis Nungganta gelangt waren, gaben die Cahar die dem Falle nahe Stadt auf und zogen ab. Falls damals unsere Truppen nicht zu Hilfe gekommen wären, würdest du dann am heutigen Tage noch das Leben haben? Nachdem die Cahar die Truppen zurückgezogen hatten, kamst du und pflegtest Freundschaft. Mein verewigter Vater hat dich wiederum mit Auszeichnung behandelt und dir ein Mädchen zum Weibe gegeben, auch hat er dir reiche Geschenke an Edelmetallen, Perlen, Pelzjacken, Seidenstoffen, Harnischen, Helmen und Gebrauchsgegenständen gemacht und dich in die Heimat zurückgeschickt. Als dann mein verewigter Vater in die Ferne aufgestiegen war, alle Fürstenhäuser an dem Trauerfalle tiefen Anteil nahmen, und ein jedes Grosswürdenträger oder jüngere Anverwandte zu kondolieren schickte, hast du erst nach zwei Monaten einen Beamten niederen Ranges hergesandt. Das ist der Dank von dir für alle Güte. Als seinerzeit freundschaftlicher Verkehr herrschte, war bezüglich sämtlicher feindlicher Reiche ausgemacht worden, dass, wenn Frieden, gemeinschaftlicher Frieden, und dass, wenn Krieg,

gemeinschaftlicher Krieg sein sollte. Du hast aber die Worte des Bundes gebrochen und mit dem mir verfeindeten Mingreiche zweimal Markt abgehalten. Deine Wetterwendigkeit ist eine ganz aussergewöhnliche. Da du dich an den Cahar rächen wolltest, hast du wiederholt Gesandte zu Vereinbarungen hergeschickt. Als dann mein Reich das Heer aufbot, bist du schliesslich nicht erschienen, hast mich den Feinden überlassen und bist fix zuerst nach Hause zurückgekehrt. Deine Taten entsprechen nicht deinen Worten, Arglist und Falsch sind wirklich übergross. Wie werde ich meinerseits von jetzt an deinem Herzen noch trauen können?"[39]

The Third Case:[40]

The First Exchange of Letters between the Khalkha and the Manchus and its Transmission

English summary of the reported facts: Dates similar in a) Spring 1636, b) 12.03.1636 and c) March 1636. b) and c) in agreement on reasons for waging war against Ligdan, the last Chakhar claimant for the title of "Great-Khan of all the Mongols";[41] a) has an interesting additional variant: accordingly, Ligdan supported the Ming because they had bribed him – hence he was punished by Heaven and his Chakhar were given to Hung Tayiji, who, on the contrary, enjoyed the support of Heaven! The Khalkha should therefore bear in mind the warning example of the Chakhar's fate.

Text quotations in German:

a) Frühling des ersten Jahres Degedü erdemtü (=1636). Weil die Bevölkerung seines [des Sečen Khan Šoloi] Aimaks auf eigene Faust mit dem Ming-Staat Pferde getauscht hatte, machte er (Hung Tayiji) Vorhaltungen, und [folgendes] ist das als Allerhöchste Order Hinabgesandte: "Was man den Ming-Staat nennt, so ist gerade er mein verhasster Feind. Ehedem war Ligdan Khan der Tsakhar durch die jedes Jahr geschenkten Sachen der Ming bestechlich, behinderte mich, und liess den Ming-Staat nicht bekriegen, und weil er darüber hinaus [auch noch] Truppen geschickt, und [damit den Ming] geholfen hatte, hatte ich nun meinerseits als Feind Truppen in Bewegung gesetzt, und die Tsakhar bekriegt. Weil [auch] der Himmel mit den Tsakhar nicht einverstanden war, hat er

39 See Hauer 1926, 196-197.

40 See Weiers 1987, 107-139.

41 See Heissig 1979, 7-40.

[i. e. der Himmel] nun seinerseits als Feind [der Tsakhar] deren Staat mir übergeben. Und jetzt tauscht ihr mit dem Ming-Staat Pferde. Genau das aber ist eine für den Ming-Staat gewährte Hilfe. Ihr solltet die [Handlungsweise der] Tsakhar als [Mahnung zur] Zurückhaltung ansehen! Ändert euch!" Das sagte er.[42]

b) Weisungsschreiben des Sečen Khan [i. e. Hung Tayiji]. An den Maha Samadi Sečen Khan von den Khalkha hat er es geschickt. „[...] Ich [halte es] gegenüber jeglichem Staatsvolk [nun so]: Ohne schuldhafte Ursache, [nur allein] wegen der Einnahme und Versorgung, haben wir nie Krieg geführt. Als wir gegen den [schon] von früher feindlichen Chinesen-Staat kriegerisch vorgingen, war, weil der Khan der Tsakhar in das Eigentum der Chinesen eingefallen war, und weil er die Truppen vermehrt hatte, dies unser Grund, dass wir die Tsakhar bekriegten. Darin haben auch Himmel und Erden den Khan der Tsakhar missbilligt und das Tsakhar-Volk mir gnädigst gegeben. Indem ihr jetzt den Chinesen eure Wallache verkauft, ist da euer Vorgehen nicht ein sich Bereichern, und eine für den Chinesen-Staat vollzogene Kraftmehrung? Dies euer falsches Vorgegangensein gedenken wir nun nicht zu verfolgen. [Vielmehr] wollen wir betreffs des Standes [der Dinge] für ein Zusammenbringen von Herrschaft und Gesetz eure Worte hören und [dann] eine Entscheidung treffen."[43]

c) „Wenn ihr sagt, dass Wir für den rechten Weg der Wünsche auf Weltfrieden selber weise Entscheidungen getroffen hätten, so sind diese Worte vollkommen richtig. Wir haben bei allen Kriegs- und Strafzügen gegen Reiche der Menschen noch nie ein Heer gehabt, das ohne Ruhm daraus hervorgegangen wäre, und haben nie aus Habsucht gehandelt. Bislang sind Wir, weil das Mingreich mit Uns seit Generationen verfeindet ist, mit Truppen dagegen ins Feld gezogen. Weil die Cahar aus Gier nach den Schätzen des Mingreiches ihm mit Truppen geholfen hatten, haben Wir sie für das offenkundige Verbrechen gezüchtigt und die gnädige Hilfe des hohen Himmels empfangen, der den ganzen Stamm der Cahar uns gegeben hat. Wenn ihr jetzt wieder Pferde dem Mingreiche verkauft, was anders ist das als Unterstützung der Ming? Wenn ihr die Sache so eigensinnig betreibt, werden Wir Uns auch nicht um euch kümmern. Was die Anbahnung guten Einvernehmens betrifft, so erwartet man lediglich Nachricht von euch."[44]

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42 *Iledkel šastir* 53, 37, 4v-5r. Translation Weiers 1987, 130-131; see also Veit 2011, 255.

43 *Chiu Man-chou tang*, Fol. 4637:3–4638:1. Translation Weiers 1987, 122-123 (transcription and translation), 138-139 (text in facsimile); see also Veit 2011, 254-255.

44 See Hauer 1926, 418; see also Veit 2012, 255.

V Conclusion

The above presented text-collation of three instances related to the history of the Mongols, as they are recorded in different sources, permits the following – albeit preliminary – conclusions; since some of them have been mentioned before in this paper, they will just be summarized here once more in a slightly different context.

First, as to facts: The Mongols undoubtedly played a significant role in the Ch'ing period. In order to assess it properly, it is essential to consult the different types of sources available, observing the historian's critical instruments – especially since we dispose of few autochthonous Mongolian accounts (see above). The *Iledkel šastir*, on the other hand, the case of which we are pleading here, prove to be of a surprising importance in this context, despite the fact that they must be classified as a traditional historiographic product of the Ch'ing. They contain a remarkably complete and consistent informative network, comprising persons, genealogical data, summaries of documents, accounts of events, briefly: information which will allow us to close not a small gap in our previous knowledge of given facts, e.g., to what extent the Mongols contributed towards most of the Ch'ing's military enterprises – from acting as a mobile taskforce, guarding the northern borders, to manning the postal relaystations, to providing troops, animals and provisions in support of the dynasty's successful campaigns, not to mention the numerous array of civil obligations. Furthermore, our source allows us an insight into the manner the Ch'ing recorded, and rewarded, the services rendered by the Mongols, their most special "subjects" among the multi-ethnic population of their Empire. Last, perhaps, but by no means least, it presents the historian with a contemporary "Who is Who", unique as far as the Mongols are concerned, for whom we have no such autochthonous recordings.

Second, as to method: The collation of the three texts in general, as well as the critical assessment of the *Iledkel šastir* in the given context, offer us an insight into the Chinese traditional historiography's compiling process in practice – exemplified through instances of

Mongol history. It reveals the principle of "praise and blame",[45] it reveals the Ch'ing view of the history of their domain, its honour, its dignity and its sovereignty. At the same time, nevertheless, it becomes evident that Ch'ing historiography – also, or perhaps in particular? – with regard to the recorded merits of the leaders of the "Outer Territories" ultimately proves itself as an instrument of power in order to exercise a more effective control.

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45 See note 27. The adherence to the said principle can be seen from many instances in the *Iledkel šastir* – the text under discussion. Suffice it here to quote two examples as an illustration:

a) Quoted from the Imperial introduction to the *Iledkel šastir*: "[…] Auch seit der Zeit meines kaiserlichen Großvaters und meines kaiserlichen Vaters bis zu meiner [i. e. Ch'ien-lung's] Thronbesteigung haben unzählige der mongolischen Fürsten sich getreulich eingesetzt und ausserordentliche Dienste erwiesen. Jeder von ihnen hat wahrhafte Taten von militärischem Verdienst erworben; gedächten Wir daher nicht jener früheren verdienstvollen Leistungen, faßten Wir sie nicht in biographische Abhandlungen und gäben sie nicht weiter, Wir täten der Tradierung der Verdienste zur Ermutigung für die Nachkommen nicht genüge." Original Mongol text cf. Veit (1990), I, 75 – translation Veit, I. š. (mong.) fasc. 1, 2r.

b) Quoted from the biography of the Jasaγtu Qan Cėwangjab, imperial edict by Yung-cheng: "Er [i. e. Cėwangjab] hat die Sorge der Dynastie für sein Wohlergehen auf das gröblichste missachtet; deshalb wäre es angemessen, dass er nach dem Verlust des Ranges umgehend mit dem Tode bestraft würde. Allein, eingedenk der bezeigten Loyalität seines Grossvaters und Vaters, durch Generationen, ertrage ich es nicht, ihn zum Tode zu verurteilen. Das Sterben soll ihm erlassen, aber Gefangenschaft auf Lebenszeit im Gefängnis zuteil werden!" Original Mongol text cf. Veit (1990), II, 182 – translation Veit, I. š. (mong.), fasc. 61, 45, 33r.

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Reflections on Qing Institutions of Governance: Chinese Empire in Comparative Perspective

Roy Bin WONG

It is difficult for scholars to settle on a common definition of empires since the term has been deployed in multiple ways by scholars seeking to make sense of diverse historical experiences. This was very visible at the beginning of this millennium with the spate of books about empires that aimed to put contemporary exercises of American military and political power into a global history perspective. I admit to have contributed an essay, "China's Agrarian Empire: a different kind of empire, a different kind of lesson", to one of those volumes, *Lessons of Empire*, edited by Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper and Kevin W. Moore. I suggested that the institutions of government in late imperial China differed from those in other empires with well over 90 per cent of the subject population under a single system of direct bureaucratic rule. The distinction between the Chinese case and other empires (including both continguous territorial or overseas empires) matters I believe because some of the strategies of rule developed in late imperial times have proved potent in the twentieth century and thus help us understand the institutional possibilities contemplated by Chinese rulers who have conceived their purposes and legitimacy in terms seemingly divorced from those of an earlier era. Other empires have largely or completely disappeared from the early twenty-first century global scene, and their logics of rule no longer command our curiosity for their imprint on present-day political practices.

Empire is a recurring form of rule on the Chinese mainland for some two millennia. No other world region has witnessed the repeated appeals to a common repertoire of ideologies and institutions extended and elaborated upon in multiple ways over many centuries. No territorially significant set of rulers in world history made claims for legitimacy and succession from previous regimes in an as coherent and insistent fashion as those ruling the Chinese mainland, whatever their particular geographical origins or initial identities. Alien regimes are

thus a fundamental feature of dynastic history. As the only historian invited to the meeting from which these essays have been gathered who lacks any plausible claim to expertise on the "alien" elements of these regimes, I want at the outset to affirm my conviction that such regimes are intrinsic to what became known in the twentieth century as Chinese history. Nicola Di Cosmo's work on early imperial history, *Ancient China and its Enemies*, persuasively shows the formation of ancient China within the political context of nomadic powers; subsequent regimes and the political competition they faced repeatedly involved peoples from beyond the sedentary soils composing the agrarian empire's early heartland and key portions of its subsequent expansion and development of areas to the south. The multi-state system that Morris Rossabi memorably called "China Among Equals" was succeeded by the Mongols whose Yuan dynasty enabled the subsequent possibilities for some form of agrarian empire to dominate the Chinese mainland, which in turn created an institutional legacy that survived dramatic ideological changes to become a usually unacknowledged resource for the political priorities and some of the strategies pursued by a government in the second half of the twentieth century able to rule almost all of the territory controlled by the Qing empire at its height. The contemporary Chinese state is perhaps more than any other state in the world the descendant of an empire. This fact can lead us to ponder the collection of traits in late empire that made it possible for a territorially and demographically large polity possible to be created once again after the mid-twentieth century.

The tradition of empire on the Chinese mainland matters for historians of China aiming to locate their topics and periods in the longer run of Chinese history and it matters for those interested in the kinds of empires that have existed in world history and their legacies for later eras. Specialists on Chinese history have labored at length to alert the larger community of historians against assuming Chinese history to be an unbroken tradition of continuous imperial rule. The current volume includes a marvelous example of such work in Evelyn Rawski's analysis of multiple regimes in north and northeast Asia, which encourages us to locate Chinese history in different regional contexts, which allows us to observe diversity and multiplicity of practices. Naomi Standen's essay presented at the workshop on the same region makes the important argument that an earlier division

between steppe and sown is less significant than that between wet-rice and mixed regimes that would divide the agrarian geography of the Chinese empires further south at the Huai River. Nicola Di Cosmo's essay presented at the workshop on the Xiongnu reframes early Central Asian history to reach both eastward and westward, thereby extending the terrain of some of his earlier work on the Xiongnu, which evaluated the importance of the Xiongnu to the political dynamics of sedentary empire on the Chinese mainland. The comparison between Xiongnu relations with sedentary people in West Asia to their relations in East Asia helps us, much as Naomi Standen's essay does, to advance the displacement of an earlier historiography that exaggerated the differences between "barbarians" and settled states.

Thanks to a developing scholarship on "alien regimes" and relations among numerous polities, we are able to formulate a more nuanced appreciation of the multiple ways in which peoples engaged each other within spaces occupied by dynastic regimes and beyond. In his article for this volume Hans van Ess captures a number of possibilities in early imperial history for relations between the Han empire and its neighbors; relations could be more or less hierarchical or reciprocal with the symbolic expressions of engagement often reflecting relative political strength and sometimes subject to competing expectations for proper form. The flexibility of forms to stretch across different concrete situations alerts us to a more complex world of political possibilities than we sometimes imagine there to have been. For the Qing empire, Veronika Veit's article shows the way in which Manchu relations with the Mongols were formulated to reflect both shared sensibilities and political hierarchy in terms very different from those utilized to formulate Qing administration over Han Chinese. The paucity of material allowing us to appreciate how Mongols viewed their relations to Manchus contrasts sharply with the information scholars have assembled about Manchu perceptions of their relations to Han Chinese.

The issue of how Manchus defined their relationship to Han Chinese and their own identity is discussed by Pamela Crossley in her essay on the Qianlong Emperor's suppression of the Yongzheng Emperor's self-presentation. The Yongzheng Emperor located himself in a large and long line of rulers who had achieved through education and effort the abilities to rule and the Qianlong Emperor buried that

image in favor of his own alternative affirmation of a distinctive identity as a Manchu with a cultural past different from and not inferior to what Han Chinese shared as a social identity. The Qianlong Emperor substitutes his promotion of a distinct Manchu identity for his father's emphasis on developing the abilities to rule. Yet, we could imagine a fictional Qing Emperor who made claims to having an identity distinct from Han Chinese and believed his preparation for ruling depended on a course of education and effort. In other words, the choice the Qianlong Emperor made to suppress the Yongzheng Emperor's self-representation may not have been logically necessary for him to have the conceptual space to promote his own ideas of Qing identity even if it turns out to have been cognitively appealing to him.

The essays at the June 2011 workshop and those in this journal volume also encourage us to think about the ways in which different parts of what is sometimes a unified empire span several distinct regional contexts that are themselves connected in changing ways through history. In contrast to the relations with regimes and peoples along the northern reaches of what we conventionally label as Chinese dynastic regimes, another set of relations characterizes the maritime realm between China's southern and southeastern coasts and Southeast Asia. That region in turn is further connected to maritime circuits that run among ports in northeast Asia. Geoffrey C. Gunn's *History Without Borders*, a 2011 synthesis of literature on this region placed in a far larger Asian world region, persuades us that China was not simply an agrarian empire, but had areas that were components of a larger cultural and material world through which different kinds of knowledge and taste traveled, again, in ways hard to see through the lens of a political and social order defined by Confucian ideas and institutions.

Scholars have de-centered and regionalized in multiple ways what was formerly thought of as the Chinese empire to undermine successfully any remaining notions of seamless continuity present in the textbook images of empire for Chinese history that once prevailed among specialists as well. But as we continue to move forward to destroy images of Chinese empire that once filled textbooks within and beyond China, what kinds of new pictures can we draw that place the Chinese mainland's repeated experience of large-scale political regimes in a broader perspective of world history? In an essay first published

in the French journal *Annales* in 2001 entitled "Entre monde et nation: Les régions Braudélienne en Asie" I noted the plausibility of expanding the inspirational influence of Fernand Braudel's work on the Mediterranean in Asia from maritime regions that included the Chinese coast to a consideration of late imperial northwest China as a Braudelian region. What distinguished the Europe about which Braudel wrote from the China that is the subject of the essays in this journal is the recurring presence of a large-scale territorial polity claiming authority over multiple Braudelian-like spaces. By the standards of historical experience at the western end of Eurasia, which have bequeathed to us a certain set of expectations about many types of historical change, Braudel's Mediterranean regional world dissolved as Europe shifted to an Atlantic focus and competing European states forged new political and economic relations to the Americas, Africa and Asia. In contrast, some regional spaces in Asia that span political boundaries also contain the common figure of a Chinese empire. Indeed, these regional spaces and the large territorial state that rules portions of them historically still exist or exist again today. They therefore constitute a history different from that followed within and beyond Braudel's Mediterranean Europe.

The balance of this brief essay explores further the multiple ways in which space can be constructed and analyzed by considering some ways in which the new Qing history helps us understand Qing strategies of governance and political leadership mindful of experiences of earlier regimes ruling the Chinese mainland, other empires, and European states. Relating the new Qing history to other times and places will, I hope, help us appreciate how Qing experiences confirm themes raised in the revisionist historiography sketched above. Comparisons to Europe are especially useful both for gaining a more global perspective on the Qing dynasty and for clarifying our assumptions about governance, which derive much of their logic from a distillation of European history. Political science makes a basic distinction between domestic and foreign that reflects the basic organization of an idealized political order associated with the Treaty of Westphalia which political scientists sometimes refer to as a document creating the logic of sovereign states treating each other as diplomatic equals. Concretely this treaty was an agreement resolving a large number of political and religious disputes and the affirmation of a principle of

peaceful relations among European regimes. In short, the Treaty was a document to improve relations within Europe; only in the second half of the twentieth century was it retrospectively celebrated as the symbolic starting point for modern international relations.

Within the China history field, the different sensibilities of Qing officials and Western diplomats has long been a major subject of study, from John K. Fairbank's impact/response model of nineteenth-century Chinese history through the revisionist interpretation of the MacCartney Mission by James Hevia in his *Cherishing Men from Afar* to Lydia Liu's more recent *Clash of Empires,* the differences between the sensibilities and expectations of the Qing dynasty and Western, especially British, officials has been a major subject. Indeed, the historiographical fixation on foreign relations with Western powers promoted by John Fairbank was an approach against which some of us trained in the 1970s and 1980s rebelled as graduate students by looking for domestic themes in our dissertation research. The new Qing history has been a key area of scholarship that moves us beyond the dichotomy between domestic rule and foreign relations.

Two of the great contributions of historians of the Qing dynasty in the past two decades have been to: (1) suggest multiple ways in which the Manchus contributed new and distinctive elements of political rule and social control that expanded the repertoire of strategies available to officials as they extended the effective reach of the state; (2) have shown ways in which the Qing was one of several empires relying on shared technologies, such as mapping, to compete with each other for territory in the nineteenth century. The new Qing history examines the ways in which Manchu leaders created a political integration of steppe areas into an agrarian empire with the elaboration of new institutions and effective appeal to older religious beliefs they shared with Mongols and Tibetans. The institutional distinctiveness of rule over Inner Asian territories contrasts with the spread of the civilian bureaucratic system of rule along the southwestern frontier. It also contrasts with the logic of tributary relations under the Board of Rites which provided a framework for political relations and at least some of the contexts within which economic relations with foreigners were pursued.

Earlier characterizations of what Fairbank called the Chinese world order contrasted Chinese practices implicitly (when not ex-

plicitly) with an idealized version of diplomatic relations preferred by Europeans (largely ignoring what kinds of relations they in fact pursued). We can reframe this older contrast by comparing the kinds of political relations basic to Qing era history to the political relations typical of Europeans during the same set of centuries. The Qing state pursued three largely distinct kinds of relations: (1) relations with those subjected to civilian bureaucratic rule; (2) relations with others, mainly in northeast and southeast Asia until the 1830s and 1840s when British gunboats ushered in a new kind of diplomacy; (3) relations with people of Inner Asia.

We can also distinguish three distinct sets of relations that major European states sought to manage during the Qing dynasty: (1) relations with their subjects; (2) relations between European regimes; (3) relations to peoples and authorities they encountered overseas. Making comparisons among these relations allows us to make some unconventional but potentially useful observations.

The taxonomies of relations for the Qing state and European states of the same era do not create simple correspondences. Instead, they help highlight the differences in the scales of independent polities in two world regions and the character of relations among polities in East Asia and Europe. First and most obviously, what are domestic and bureaucratically defined political relations in the Qing empire are a combination of domestic relations with subject populations and diplomatic relations with other rulers in Europe. The issues addressed in the Treaty of Westphalia concern relations among rulers that would be faced between provinces or even within provinces under the Qing dynasty. Of course the substance of the issues discussed between Chinese provinces or within them was structured within a vertically integrated framework of authority absent for inter-regime relations within Europe. I have offered one comparison of domestic governance issues in late imperial China and early modern Europe in *China Transformed*, the main elements of which stressed the contrasting ideological and institutional relations between rulers and elites and between rulers and common people which enabled different strategies for creating local order and demanded different policies to meet the distinct priorities regimes in China and Europe faced. Other contrasts one could explore concern the reconfiguring of administrative boundaries in the Ming and

Qing dynasties compared with the changing composition of territories ruled by a particular royal family in Europe. To point out one of the differences that upsets one conventional distinction between empires and modern states, the Ming and Qing dynasties rule large populations under a single bureaucratic system while early modern European regimes typically have no coherent bureaucratic system covering their varied and often non-contiguous domains brought together by marriage—they resemble far more the separate institutions of rule encountered in empires to Europe's east.

When we turn to the second group of relations for the agrarian empire, namely relations with northeast and southeast Asian polities, all of which were organized under the Board of Rites, as they often had been under earlier dynasties as well, we encounter what some scholars have considered to be a "tributary system". The concept has fallen on hard times because it is very clear that there was no clear and consistent structural framework within which all of the relations of the empire were contained. But this subjects a history of diplomatic relations to a very high bar of conceptual consistency. Real relations between regimes under the Westphalian ideals of European-defined international relations hardly provides coherent and constant empirical support for the principles and protocols promoted by Europeans only some of the time and for some of the regimes they encountered and subsequently engaged outside of Europe. If we turn to the political practices pursued by Europeans when they initially entered Asian settings (a part of the third category for Europeans noted above), they were basically ad hoc reactions to opportunities they created or forced into existence and largely driven initially by desires to establish positions of commercial privilege for trade in goods taken back to Europe. The tributary principles may not have yielded a real system but it created more powerful conventions and norms than any European practices did with respect to the spaces into which both the Qing and the Europeans entered.

Tributary norms have been criticized for their explicit hierarchy and they have been criticized for being inconsistently applied. Yet, we might also argue that tributary norms recognized that some dimension of hierarchy exists in political relations however varied that hierarchy might be and despite the degree of hierarchy open to competing interpretations. In contrast, a set of norms that claims the diplomatic

equality of sovereign states focuses on a narrow band of meaning and tells us nothing about how differences of economic wealth and political power are in fact expressed through relations among regimes. Thus, if we judge a set of principles by their conceptual clarity and the practices they help construct empirically, there is at least as much and typically far more connection between principles and practice in the agrarian empire's relations with northeast and southeast Asia than there is for European relations beyond Europe itself.

When we turn to the Qing state's relations with inner Asia, the third set of relations important to this state, we encounter a set of relations with no obvious parallels in European terms and we find ourselves in an area of the world into which Europeans would not enter in a major way until the late nineteenth century when the so-called Great Game was played. The new Qing history has done much to explain the nature of relations achieved by the Manchus with Mongols, Tibetans and Uighurs. The means of social and cultural engagement, especially through Tibetan Buddhism, combined with the elaboration of political institutions, most importantly the banner system, made the Qing state into a polity significantly different from earlier dynasties. The Qing elaboration of symbolic and institutional resources to govern inner Asia created in East Asia a kind of empire in important ways different from any preceding it. And it is here that the European-inspired distinction between domestic and international, enshrined in the concepts of sovereign states engaging each other according to Westphalian principles, is least helpful. Are the relations forged by the Qing in inner Asia going to tip toward the "domestic" or become clearly "international"? The imposition of civilian bureaucratic rule in late nineteenth-century Xinjiang suggests a tipping toward domestic, while the separation of Mongolian territories between "inner" and "outer" Mongolia shows the line between domestic and foreign could be drawn through a territory that was not clearly either in an earlier period. Of course the pressure to redraw East Asian political spaces more clearly and cleanly into domestic and foreign in the nineteenth century was not simply a Qing challenge. The transformation of the Ryūkyū kingdom from a tributary state of the Ming and Qing into Okinawa prefecture of the Meiji state signals changes in East Asian politics more generally under European pressures in the late nineteenth century.

The significance of inner Asian relations under the Qing for the twentieth century is obviously large even if complex and therefore not entirely clear. The desire and ability of the People's Republic to make claims over and devise systems of rule for areas of the former Qing empire that partially echo the institutional distinctions previously employed under the Qing tell us that the People's Republic inherits the possibilities and problems of an earlier empire in ways not found elsewhere in world history. The particular constellation of possibilities and problems faced by the People's Republic is itself a "success" of sorts, not in an ethically normative sense, but in the practical political sense of grappling with a history of empire that in other world regions becomes fragmented alongside the formation of far smaller and usually weaker states than the empires that preceded them. Perhaps one of the reasons that the Qing empire provided such a durable legacy to the People's Republic is that it infused some Chinese bureaucratic principles and political priorities into its practices of rule over some of its Inner Asian subjects.

Our reading back from the modern era to the pre-history of national states has been widely recognized to be a dubious enterprise and the general point has been taken seriously within the historiography on Chinese history. There never has been a single and continuous historical subject popularly known as "China", any more than any other state in the contemporary world has a necessary pre-history leading fatefully to the present. Yet this sensible insight doesn't help us account for the fundamental fact that state transformations at either end of Eurasia have followed intersecting, yet distinct, arcs over the past millennium. The distinct spectrums between "domestic" and "foreign" created by states in early modern Asia and Europe remind us of the different contexts within which modern states were formed in these two large regions of the world. What counts as "domestic" under the Qing imperium is a population and territory that are beyond the scales of most contemporary states in Africa, the Americas or Europe. We readily acknowledge that China is big without pondering either how this situation was created historically or how it influences present and future possibilities, let alone how to compare its transformations to the more familiar European cases. Accounting for the variety of ways in which today's states more generally have been put together has typically been conceived in one of two ways. On the

one hand, we have enriched our empirical grasp by multiplying the number of case studies that now exist. Yet, we have no new arithmetic to add them up into some coherent sum. On the other hand, we continue to imagine an idealized set of traits being added to a political regime in order to make it modern and normal which derive from European experiences. This works well for some white settler societies, but does less well for other places in the world. We need a new math to work out the significance of different paths of state transformation into the contemporary world. Unless and until we can create a new taxonomy of experiences of state transformation we cannot effectively join the scholarship historians of China, among many others, have produced, to the aspirations to explain political change championed by a variety of scholars, especially in political science and sociology.

Rather than grapple with these challenges it seems the limits of the European national state as the singular "end of history" is often appreciated by seeing such states transcended by the European Union. The EU thus becomes a new norm against which to evaluate other regional groupings of states. Somewhat akin to the case of European national states, the EU supplies a set of metrics of integration that no other regional association can reasonably aspire to achieve, even if they wished to do so. Yet, looking at the EU from a Chinese perspective, it was only in the late twentieth century that Europe, for the first time since the fall of the Roman Empire, is striving to attain the spatial scale of political integration achieved repeatedly in Chinese history by empires. Of course Brussels is a far weaker political center than Beijing in all manner of policy making and institutional operations. In fact, Brussels is not only weaker with respect to the EU than Beijing is to China, but it finds itself in a country that is itself threatened with dissolution! Reflecting upon the Qing Empire's place within a longer history beginning before and continuing long after Manchu rule may also help us think in fresh ways about how Europe has moved historically from empire through periods of fragmentation and national states to its present era of aspiration toward regional integration amidst threats of undermining by monetary and fiscal challenges. Such exercises may in turn help those of us who specialize on Chinese history to think about some of the topics we can and perhaps should talk about with people interested in and working on other parts of the world.

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Abstracts

Hans VAN ESS, "The Ethos of the Envoy and his Treatment by the Enemy in Han History"

The *Shiji* by Sima Qian is the first Chinese book of history from which we can learn something about the practice of sending out envoys to non-Han states in early China. This article will take a look at several passages that describe what functions envoys fulfilled in interstate relations between the Han and its neighbours. It will also deal with more subtle questions of diplomacy, i. e. the view that the Han had of presents, tribute and trade. It is interesting to see that as early as in the *Shiji* we find that the feeling of Han superiority expresses itself by the beginnings of the establishment of a system of tribute that others had to bring to Chang'an. Yet, the article will also show that in the relationship with a foreign power that was equally strong as Han China, namely the Xiongnu, bad treatment of envoys and breaking agreements on behalf of the Han was seen as a reason for war on behalf of the enemy.

汉代历史上派遣特使的影响及其对方国的对待

从司马迁的史记中，我们可以了解到关于早期中国向非汉民族派遣特使的事例。本文将对史记中几段有关描述派遣特使对汉民族及其邻邦之间的关系中的作用进行分析。并从汉朝所接受的礼物、供品和贸易等方面对双边外交关系上的问题进行阐述。有趣的是，在史记中我们能看出，从在建立朝贡制度的开始，汉朝就表现出优越感，即其它国得向其朝贡，并将朝贡物品送至长安。另外，本文还将介绍与汉朝势均力敌的匈奴国对汉派使节的冷落，并以汉朝打破朝贡协议为由从而引发战争的事实。

漢代歷史上派遣特使的影響及其對方國的對待

從司馬遷的史記中，我們可以了解到關於早期中國向非漢民族派遣特使的事例。本文將對史記中幾段有關描述派遣特使對漢民族及其鄰邦之間的關係中的作用進行分析。並從漢朝所接受的禮物、供品和貿易等方面對雙邊外交關係上的問題進行闡述。有趣的是，在史記中我們能看出，從在建立朝貢制度的開始，漢朝就表現出優越感，即其它國得向其朝貢，並將朝貢物品送至長安。另外，本文還將介紹與漢朝勢均力敵的匈奴國對漢派使節的冷落，並以漢朝打破朝貢協議為由從而引發戰爭的事實。

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漢王朝の歴史書に見られる使節と敵国の使節への待遇に関する傾向

司馬遷の『史記』は、中国最初の王朝が非漢国家へ使節を送る慣行について教えてくれる中国初の歴史書である。本論考は、漢王朝とその近隣諸国との相互国家関係において、使節がいかなる機能と役割を演じたかを記している『史記』中のいくつかの該当箇所を論じる。また、

本論考は、外交に関する微妙な問題、すなわち、贈呈物、朝貢、貿易に対して、漢王朝が持っていた考え方へも論及する。

大変に興味深いことに、『史記』のかなり早い記述においてすら、つまり、長安の朝貢制度が確立間もないころにすでに、漢が優越感を有していたことが読み取れるのである。また、本論考では、漢王朝期の中国と同等に強大であった外国勢力、すなわち、匈奴との関係の中で、使節に対する不当な待遇や条約違反などは、敵国に対して戦争を行う口実になった事をも論ずる。

한왕조 (漢王朝) 의 역사서에 보이는 사절 (使節) 및 적국 (敵國) 의 사절에 대한 대우의 풍조 (風潮)

사마천(司馬遷)의 『사기(史記)』는 중국 초기 왕조가 비한족 국가에 사절을 보내는 관행에 대해서 알려주는 중국 최초의 역사책이다. 본고는 한왕조와 그 주변 국가 간의 상호관계 속에서 사절들이 어떤 기능과 역할을 했는지에 관해 기술하고 있는 몇몇 구절들을 검토한다. 또한 본고는 외교에 관련해 더 민감한 문제들, 즉 한왕조가 선물, 조공, 무역에 대해 가지고 있던 견해도 논의할 것다.

흥미로운 사실은, 우리가 『사기』 만큼 이른 시기의 기술로부터 한왕조가 가지고 있던 우월감을 읽을 수 있다는 것인데, 이 때 다른 국가들이 장안으로 조공 사절을 보내야 했던 조공 제도가 확립되었던 사실이 이를 구체적으로 증명한다. 본고는 또한 한왕조 시기의 중국과 동등한 정도로 강대했던 외국 세력인 흉노(匈奴)와의 관계 속에서 한왕조의 관점에서는 사절의 부당한 대우나 계약 위반으로 비춰진 상황들이 적국의 입장에서는 전쟁을 위한 근거로 간주된 것을 논할 것이다.

Evelyn S. RAWSKY, "Beyond National History: Seeking the Ethnic in China's History"

Scholars who study the history of conquest regimes in China are confronted with primary and secondary materials that impose a Sino-centric perspective on events and institutions that is of long standing. On the one hand, this perspective is rooted in the fact that the earliest historical accounts of many non-Han peoples living in or on the peripheries of the Chinese-speaking world were written in Chinese, and Chinese political and cultural models exerted a profound influence on the Khitan, Tangut, Jurchen and Mongol empires that during the tenth to fourteenth centuries challenged or conquered Chinese states.

This essay examines another aspect of Sino-centrism, namely the ways in which the needs of building a nation-state shaped the writing of "national history." Importation into Asia of a European historical framework shaped the creation of the university curriculum and set off a search for primordial origins as historians attempted to write a seamless narrative of the territory within the boundaries of the modern nation. Contemporary inter-state disputes over ownership of ancient kingdoms are one consequence of national history. Regional and world history frameworks are raised as an intellectual antidote to the problems produced by national history.

超越国史：追寻中国史中的民族性

长期以来，研究中国历史上通过武力征服建立政权的学者们往往将其研究立足于以中国中心说为出发点的有关事件或机构的原始资料或有关论文。一方面，中国中心说的角度根植于一个事实，那就是对生活在汉语区或其边缘区域的非汉民族的生活的最早记载是用汉语写出来的；其次，中国的政治和文化模式对契丹、西夏、女真和蒙古帝国等这些在十至十四世纪期间曾挑战或征服过中国的少数民族 产生了深远的影响。

本文旨在探讨中国中心说的另一个方面，即在“国家历史”中所述的建立一个民族国家的途径。将亚洲放在欧洲历史的框架中具体表现在在大学设立有关课程，并且历史学家将尝试在现代民族国家领土范围内写述完整的疆域史以追溯其起源。当代国家之间对古代王国所有权的争论，是一个民族的历史所造成的。区域史和世界史架构的兴起可看作是对由国家历史所产生的问题的知识型解毒剂。

超越國史：追尋中國史中的民族性

長期以來，研究中國歷史上通過武力征服建立政權的學者們往往將其研究立足於以中國中心說為出發點的有關事件或機構的原始資料或有關論文。一方面，中國中心說的角度根植於一個事實，那就是對生活在漢語區或其邊緣區域的非漢民族的生活的最早記載是用漢語寫出來的；其次，中國的政治和文化模式對契丹、西夏、女真和蒙古帝國等這些在十至十四世紀期間曾挑戰或征服過中國的少數民族產生了深遠的影響。

本文旨在探討中國中心說的另一個方面，即在“國家歷史”中所述的建立一個民族國家的途徑。將亞洲放在歐洲歷史的框架中具體表現在在大學設立有關課程，並且歷史學家將嘗試在現代民族國家領土範圍內寫述完整的疆域史以追溯其起源。當代國家之間對古代王國所有權的爭論，是一個民族的歷史所造成的。區域史和世界史架構的興起可看作是對由國家歷史所產生的問題的知識型解毒劑。

国家史を越えて：中国史における民族性研究

中国の征服政治制度史を研究する者は、長年にわたり、事件や社会制度の根底をなす中華思想が強調されている第一資料や第二資料の問題に直面している。一方、これらの記録中に見られる中華思想の視点は、中国語圏内やその周囲に住んでいた非漢民族の多くに関して、かなり古い時代の歴史的な記録が中国語で書かれているという事実と、中国の政治的、文化的規範は、１０世紀から１４世紀にかけて、中国王朝を攻め、または、征服した契丹、タングート、女真、モンゴル帝国に対して、深遠な影響を及ぼしたという事実とに根ざしている。

本論考は、中華思想のもうひとつの側面、つまり、民族国家を構築するために必要な「国家史」を形成していく過程を検証する。ヨーロッパの歴史研究の体制が、アジアの学界へ導入され、現在の大学教育課程の基盤を形成しながら、歴史家たちが、近代国家の境界内の領域の途切れなく続く歴史的発展過程を記録しながら、その根本的な起源を追求する研究に着手したのである。古代王国の所有権をめぐる近代国家間の紛争は、国家史研究がもたらしたのひとつの結果である。地域と世界史の枠組みは、国家史研究を介して引き起こされた問題への知性的な解決方法として提起されるのである。

국가사를 초월하여: 중국사의 민족성 연구

중국의 정복왕조(征服王朝)의 역사를 연구하는 학자들이 직면하는 문제는 관련된 일차 사료와 이차 사료가 모두 역사적 사건이나 사회제도에 대해 중국 중심적 관점을 종용한다는 사실이다. 한편, 이러한 기록들의 중화(中華)사상적 시각은 중국어권 내와 그 주변에 살고 있던 많은 비한족(非漢族)인들에 대한 가장 초기의 역사 기록이 중국어로 쓰여졌고, 또 중국의 정치 문화적 모델이 10 세기부터 14 세기에 걸쳐 중국 왕조들에 도전하거나 정복까지 했던 거란, 탕구트, 여진, 및 몽골 제국에 심오한 영향을 끼쳤다는 사실에 기반하고 있다.

본고는 중화 사상의 또 다른 측면, 즉 민족 국가를 구축하기 위해 필요한 "국가사 (國家史; national history)" 기술을 발전시켜 나간 과정을 검증할 것이다. 유럽의 역사 연구의 체제가 아시아의 학계에 도입되어 현재의 대학 교육 과정의 기반을 형성하면서, 역사가들이 근대 국가의 경계 안에서 그 영토 안에서 끊김 없이 이루어진 역사적 발전과정을 기록하고자 하면서 그것의 근본적인 기원을 찾는 연구에 착수한 것이다. 고대 왕국들이 소유했던 영토에 대한 현대 국가들 간의 분쟁은 국가사 연구가 초래한 하나의 결과이다. 지역과 세계 역사 체제는 국가사 연구를 통해 야기된 이러한 문제들을 지성적으로 해결하기 위한 방법으로 제기되고 있다.

Pamela Kyle CROSSLEY, "The *Dayi juemi lu* 大義覺密綠 and the Lost Yongzheng Philosophy of Identity"

This long essay written in the name of the Yongzheng Emperor responded to essentialist challenges originating with Lü Liuliang and is reflected in the writings of Zeng Jing, discovered in 1727. The emperor intended his response to become integrated with examination preparation. In essence the work was a continuation of the early Qing universalism, which proposed that the Manchus and their allies within the empire had undergone a process of perfection through education and self-examination, and as such were the proper protectors of civilization. In this Kangxi-Yongzheng style of universalism, civilization was the absolute and cultural or genealogical particulars were all relative. The essentialistic cosmology of Lü Liuliang, which derived from a late Ming anthropology of moral evolution, which cast certain peoples – including the Jurchen/Manchus — as irremediably barbaric, was the particular target of the emperor's argument. Cheng-Chu legitimations of rulership and custodianship over tradition, as well as basic theories on the transformative power of education, were employed to excoriate the *hua/yi* (Chinese/barbarian) distinctions that Lü claimed were rooted in material as well as cosmological processes. Ironically, the *Dayi juemi lu* was destroyed and its planned incorporation into the examination syllabus was vacated by the Qianlong Emperor, on the apparent grounds that the constructions of civilization as absolute and culture as relative were intolerable to the new emperor, whose cultural absolutism – while different in meaning from Lü Liuliang – established essentializing history, law and ethical discourse as the new fundaments of imperial universalism in the eighteenth century.

《大义觉密录》和清代思想界的宇宙神论

以雍正皇帝署名的长文《大义觉密录》回应了最初由吕留良发起的、并于 1727 年在曾静著作中发现的对雍正皇帝提出的本质性的挑战。皇帝打算将这一回应与科考的准备有机地整合在一起。从本质上讲，它是对清初流行的宇宙神论的一种延续。文中指出，满清帝国的满族和其协约国通过教育和自学考试经历了一个完善的过程，并正因如此，文明也得到了的适当的保护。在这种康熙、雍正风格的宇宙神论下，文明是绝对，而文化或家族的特殊性都是相对的。吕留良的宇宙论的基本点在于，从明末道德进化的人类学角度导出一些群体，包括女真族、满族等，都是无可救药的野蛮民族。这也是雍正皇帝文中特别针对的问题。用程朱理学对传统意义上统治者和其资格的认定，以及对教育的变革力量的基本理论，来痛斥吕留良所声称的无论是在物质进程还是宇宙的进程中已深

深扎根的华夷有别论。具有讽刺意味的是，《大义觉密录》被毁，其将纳入考试大纲的计划被乾隆皇帝取消。其显而易见的理由是其中与吕留良持异见的文明建设的绝对性和文化建设的相对性对这个新登基的文化专制主义皇帝来说是无法容忍的。这种文化专制主义对历史、法律和道德观的影响为十八世纪的皇家宇宙神论奠定了新的基础。

《大義覺密錄》和清代思想界的宇宙神論

以雍正皇帝署名的長文《大義覺密錄》回應了最初由呂留良發起的、並於 1727 年在曾靜著作中發現的對雍正皇帝提出的本質性的挑戰。皇帝打算將這一回應與科考的準備有機地整合在一起。從本質上講，它是對清初流行的宇宙神論的一種延續。文中指出，滿清帝國的滿族和其協約國通過教育和自學考試經歷了一個完善的過程，並正因如此，文明也得到了的適當的保護。在這種康熙、雍正風格的宇宙神論下，文明是絕對，而文化或家族的特殊性都是相對的。呂留良的宇宙論的基本點在於，從明末道德進化的人類學角度導出一些群體，包括女真族、滿族等，都是無可救藥的野蠻民族。這也是雍正皇帝文中特別針對的問題。用程朱理學對傳統意義上統治者和其資格的認定，以及對教育的變革力量的基本理論，來痛斥呂留良所聲稱的無論是在物質進程還是宇宙的進程中已深深紮根的華夷有別論。具有諷刺意味的是，《大義覺密錄》被毀，其將納入考試大綱的計劃被乾隆皇帝取消。其顯而易見的理由是其中與呂留良持異見的文明建設的絕對性和文化建設的相對性對這個新登基的文化專制主義皇帝來說是無法容忍的。這種文化專制主義對歷史、法律和道德觀的影響為十八世紀的皇家宇宙神論奠定了新的基礎。

『大義覚迷録』と清王朝イデオロギーの普遍主義の変遷

雍正皇帝の権威において書かれたに長編の論文『大義覚迷録』は、本質主義者の挑戦への雍正皇帝の反論である。本質主義者たちの挑戦は、呂留良に端を発したのものであり、この挑戦は 1727 れた曽静の文書の中にも反映されている。

皇帝は、本質主義者の挑戦に対して皇帝の反論を、取り調べ調書の中に取り入れたのである。本質的には、この『大義覚迷録』は清の初期に発展した普遍主義の延長線上にあり、皇帝の下で満州族とその同盟者たちが、教育と自己反省を介して完成し、そうすることにより、清朝の皇帝たちが文明の正統的な保護者になるというものである。この康熙帝・雍正型の普遍主義では、文明は絶対的であり、文化的または系統的な事柄は、すべて相対的なものとみなされたのである。

呂留良の本質主義的世界観は、特定の民族は一女真族・満州族を含む一矯正できないほどの野蛮人とみなす、明王朝末期の道徳進化論に基

ずく人類学に由来するもので、これが、雍正皇帝が行った批判の標的であった。雍正皇帝の議論は、伝統的な支配権や保護任務に対する程朱学派の合法性、および教育を通じた啓発の可能性についての基本的理論を使用しながら、呂留良が唱えている宇宙論的かつ物質的過程に根ざしている「華/夷（中国人/野蛮人）の区別」を厳しく非難しているのである。

皮肉なことに、乾隆帝によって『大義覺密綠』が破棄され、これを取り調べ調書の中へ組み入れようという雍正皇帝の計画は無効にされた。その明らかな理由は、絶対的、文化的、同様に相対的な文明の建設は、新しい皇帝ー乾隆帝ーには耐えられないものであったからである。乾隆帝は、１８世紀の帝国の普遍主義のための新たな基礎理論として、文化的絶対主義を、呂留良が主張する意味とは違ってはいるが、本質的な歴史、法律、倫理的な理論を確立したのである。

『대의각밀록(大義覺密綠)』과 청왕조(清王朝)데올로기에서의 보편주의의 변천

옹정제 (雍正帝) 의 명의로 쓰여진 이 긴 논평은 본질주의자 (本質主義者; essentialist) 들의 도전에 대한 반론이다. 이 본질주의자 (本質主義者) 들의 도전은 여유량 (呂留良) 이 시작한 것으로, 1727 년에 발견된 증정 (曾靜) 의 문서에도 반영되어 있는 것이었다. 옹정제는 그의 반론을 신문조서 (訊問調書) 에 넣고자 했다. 사실 이 글은 청나라가 초기에 발전시킨 보편주의 (普遍主義; universalism) 의 연장선상에 있는 것인데, 이는 청제국내의 만주인들과 그들의 동맹자들이 교육과 자기 성찰을 통해 완벽의 과정을 거치게 되었고, 또 그렇게 함으로써 문명의 타당한 보호자가 되었다고 제시하고 있다. 이러한 강희 (康熙) • 옹정 형식의 보편주의 하에서 문명은 절대적인 것이고, 문화 또는 계보적인 내용은 모든 상대적인 것이었다.

여유량의 본질주의적 세계관은 명왕조 말기에 특정 민족들 – 여진족/만주족을 포함 – 을 구제 불능의 오랑캐로 간주하는 도덕적 진화의 인류학에서 유래된 것으로, 이는 옹정제의 논의의 특정한 비판 대상이었다. 이 옹정제의 논의는 전통적인 지배권과 보호 임무에 대한 정주(程朱) 학파의 합법성, 및 교육을 통한 교화의 가능성에 대한 기본적 이론들을 사용해서 화이(華夷; 중국/오랑캐)의 구별을 비판했는데, 여유량은 이 화이의 구별이 우주론적이고 물질적인 과정에서 형성된 것이라고 주장했던 것이다.

아이러니하게도, 『대의각밀록』은 파기되고, 이를 신문조서에 넣으려던 옹정제의 시도도 건륭제에 의해서 취소되었는데, 그 명백한 이유는 이 새

황제가 문명의 건설을 절대적인 것으로 보고 문화를 상대적인 것으로 간주하는 것을 받아들일 수 없었기 때문이다. 건륭제는 여유량이 갖고 있던 개념과는 다른 문화적 절대주의의 개념을 가지고 18 세기의 제국의 보편주의를 위한 새로운 기본 이론로서의 본질적인 역사, 법, 윤리 이론을 확립했다.

Veronika VEIT, "The Trilingual 'Tables and Biographies' of 1795 as a Source for the History of the Mongols"

The Manjurian Qing, the last dynasty to rule over the Chinese Empire, was a foreign one, of Central Asian origin. In the long history of China's dynastic reigns it must be regarded as unique in several respects – three of which will be of relevance in connection with the paper presented here: 1) It was during Qing rule that China reached its greatest territorial expansion in history, up to the present day. 2) It was the Qing who, for the first time, ruled a truly multi-national Empire, with three official languages in use – Chinese, Manju and Mongol. 3) It was the Qing whose original archival documents were mostly preserved along with the official historiographical works – unlike in other dynasties where these were habitually destroyed after the compilation of the official histories.

The Qing reached their apogee during the reign of the Qianlong Emperor, a fact that this ruler wished to commemorate through a number of measures. One of the most far-reaching, perhaps, was to be the special recording of the merits of the leaders of the so-called "Outer Territories", i. e., the dependencies, of the Empire, of which the realm of the Mongols was, perhaps, the most important. The result, a monumental work in 120 *juan* each in the three official languages – Chinese, Manju and Mongol – was intended to serve as a testimony to the exemplary loyalty of those honoured by a biography. Its title reads: *Qinding waifan Menggu Huibu wanggong biaozhuan* / 欽定外翻蒙古回部王公表傳 / *Jarliy-iyar toγtaγaγsan γadaγadu muji-yin mongγol qotong ayimaγ-un wang güng-üd-ün iledkel ßastir* / *Hesei toktobuha sirame banjibuha tulergi goloimonggo hoise aiman i wang gung sai ulabun – Tables and biographies of the princes of the Mongol and Turkic Outer Districts*, compiled by Imperial Order.

The proposed paper intends to deal with preliminary answers to two of the principal questions based on the material provided by the source mentioned above – 1) Regarding facts: The remarkably complete and consistent network of politically relevant members of the Mongolian

aristocracy, as to their family connections and their "*res gestae*" on behalf of the Qing. 2) Regarding method: An insight into the Chinese official historiography's compiling process by exemplifying it through some Mongol "case histories".

从 1795 年三种语言的"表和传记"探索蒙古族的历史

满族统治了中国历史上的最后一个帝国，也是起源于中亚的外族。在中国帝王统治 的悠久历史中，它具有以下几个方面的特征。本文将介绍其中三个相关方面：1）清朝在其统治中国期间在领土扩张上为历史上之最，直到今天。2）清朝是第一个真正的多民族帝国，同时使用三种官方语言，即中文、满文和蒙古文。 3）清朝在编撰官方史的同时保存了与其相关的原始资料。不像其它朝代通常是编纂正史后即将其原始档案文件销毁。

清朝在乾隆皇帝在位期间通过多项举措来达到其鼎盛期。其中最具深远意义和重要作用的，也许可以说是对那些所谓的"界外"的统治者优点的特别记录，比如蒙古王国对清帝国的依赖。于是，在用三种官方语言 — 汉语、满语和蒙古语 — 写成的 120 卷的巨著中，传记成为模范忠诚的见证。

本文旨在以上述提及的材料为基础，对以下两个主要问题给出初步答案。1）从事实上，值得注意的是与蒙古贵族有关的从政人员完整和谐的关系网，以至于为他们家庭关系的维系以及他们为清朝的利益之所作所为。 2）从方法上：通过以一些蒙古人的"个案故事"为例，来洞察中国官方史学的编纂过程。

從 1795 年三種語言的"表和傳記"探索蒙古族的歷史

滿族統治了中國歷史上的最後一個帝國，也是起源於中亞的外族。在中國帝王統治的悠久歷史中，它具有以下幾個方面的特徵。本文將介紹其中三個相關方面：1）清朝在其統治中國期間在領土擴張上為歷史上之最，直到今天。 2）清朝是第一個真正的多民族帝國，同時使用三種官方語言，即中文、滿文和蒙古文。 3）清朝在編撰官方史的同時保存了與其相關的原始資料。不像其它朝代通常是編纂正史後即將其原始檔案文件銷毀。

清朝在乾隆皇帝在位期間通過多項舉措來達到其鼎盛期。其中最具深遠意義和重要作用的，也許可以說是對那些所謂的"界外"的統治者優點的特別記錄，比如蒙古王國對清帝國的依賴。於是，在用三種官方語言 — 漢語、滿語和蒙古語 — 寫成的 120 卷的巨著中，傳記成為模范忠誠的見證。

本文旨在以上述提及的材料為基礎，對以下兩個主要問題給出初步答案。 1）從事實上，值得注意的是與蒙古貴族有關的從政人員完整和諧的關係網，以至於為他們家庭關係的維繫以及他們為清朝的利益之所作所為。 2）從方法上：通過以一些蒙古人的"個案故事"為例，來洞察中國官方史學的編纂過程。

モンゴル史の歴史資料としての 1795 年に編纂された三ヶ国語で記された『目録と評伝』

満洲族王朝である清王朝は、中華帝国を支配した最後の王朝であり、中央アジア起源の外国人である満洲族が統治した王朝であった。中国王朝治世の長い歴史の中で、清王朝は、いくつかの点から見て、ユニークなものであり、その内の三点は、本論文と関係するものである。（1）清王朝統治下で、中国の領土拡張が頂点に達し、史上最大の領土を統治し、その領土は現在までに至っている。（2）清王朝治世下において、中国が初めて、真の意味での多民族国家となり、公用語として「中国語」、「満洲語」、「モンゴル語」の三ヶ国語を採用した。（3）清王朝治世下において、原本として使用した公文書のほとんどが、公式の歴史資料と一緒に保存された。これは、公式記録が編纂された後、常に、原本として使用した公文書を破棄してきた他の歴代王朝とは違うという点である。

清王朝は、乾隆皇帝治世下において、絶頂期に達し、この乾隆皇帝は、いろいろな方法をもってして、この皇帝の治世を記念しようと計画した。その内の最もすばらしいものは、おそらく、『外部領土』、すなわち、帝国領域内の従属国の指導者たちの優秀さを具体的に記録したものであり、これらの従属国の中で最も重要なものは、以前にモンゴル帝国の領域であったものである。その結果として、模範的に忠誠を見せてくれた人々の評伝を記録して優遇し、証言として残すために、120 伝の記念碑的な記録を三つの公式言語である中国語、満洲語、モンゴル語で、それぞれ編纂させたのである。

そのタイトルは下記である：モンゴルやチュルクの外部領土の君主たちの『目録と評伝』は、帝国の政令で編纂された。

本論文では、上記の史料が提供する資料に基づいて二つの主要問題についての予備的な答えを提示する。（1）事実について：モンゴル族貴族に関する驚くべきほど完成され、かつ、一貫性のあるネットワーク、つまり、家族関係と清の代わりとして成し遂げた「事跡」について。（2）方法について：いくつかのモンゴルの「歴史的事例」を 通して、中国の正史の編纂過程への考察を行う。

몽골의 역사를 위한 사료로서 1795 년에 편찬된 3 개국어 『목록 및 평전』

만주족 왕조인 청왕조(清王朝)는 중화 제국을 지배한 마지막 왕조로서, 중앙 아시아에서 기원한 외국인인 만주족이 통치한 왕조였다. 중국 왕조 통치의 긴 역사 속에서 청왕조는 몇 가지 면에서 독특하게 간주되어야 할 필요가 있다: (1) 청왕조의 통치 하에서 중국의 영토 확장이 정점에 달해 역사상 최대의 영토를 통치했고, 그 영토가 현재까지 이르고있다. (2) 청왕조 시기에 중국이 사상 최초로 진정한 다민족 제국을 통치했고, 그 공식 언어로 "중국어," "만주어," "몽골어" 세 언어를 사용했다. (3) 청왕조의 통치 시기에 원본으로 작성된 공문서의 대부분이 공식적인 역사 저작들과 함께 보관되어져 왔는데, 이는 공식 역사서들이 편찬된 후 그 원본 자료들이 파기된 다른 왕조들의 상황과 다른 부분이다.

청나라는 건륭(乾隆) 황제 통치 하에서 절정에 달했는데, 건륭제가 여러 방안을 가지고 이를 기념하고자 했다. 그 중 가장 원대한 것은 아마도 "외부 영토," 즉 제국의 속령의 지도자들의 우수함을 특별히 기록한 것인데, 이들 속령들 중 가장 중요한 것은 전에 몽골 제국의 영역 이었던 부분일 것이다. 그 결과로서 모범적으로 제국에 충성을 보여준 이들을 평전으로 기록해 예우하고 증언으로 남기고자 120 전(傳)의 기념비적 기록을 3 개의 공식 언어인 중국어, 만주어, 몽골어로 각각 편찬한 것이다.

그 제목은 다음과 같다: 제국의 주문에 의해 편찬된 몽골과 터키 외부 지역의 군주들의 목록 및 평전.

본고는 상기한 사료가 제공하는 정보에 바탕을 둔 두 가지 주요 문제에 대해 예비적인 답변을 제시하고자 한다: (1) 사실에 대하여: 몽골 귀족 내의 정치 권력자들이 보유하고 있던 놀라울 정도로 완전하고 일관성 있는 네트워크, 즉 그들의 가족 관계와 청나라를 위해 이룩한 "사적(事跡)"에 관해. (2) 방법에 대하여: 일부 몽골의 "역사적 사례"를 통해 중국 정사의 편찬 과정을 고찰함.

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Crossroads is an international forum for contributions related to the history of exchange relations in the East Asian world focussing on both its continental (overland) and maritime (overseas) exchange relations of bilateral and multilateral interaction structures. Emphasis is placed on the transfer of culture, science, religions, commodity and product exchange, trade, as well as migration and the organisation of functioning networks across continental and maritime borders, all of which have to be defined in their respective historical and cultural contexts.

縱橫—東亞世界交流史研究　/　纵横—东亚世界交流史研究

『縱橫』是一個研究東亞世界交流關係史的國際論壇，特別重視它的陸上與海上交流關係的雙邊和多邊的互相影響體制。其重點在於文化，科技，宗教，商品和土產的交流，貿易和移民，以及沿陸上與海上邊境的網絡組織，所有這些都必須在其各自的歷史和文化環境下予以定義。

『纵横』是一个研究东亚世界交流关系史的国际论坛，特别重视它的陆上与海上交流关系的双边和多边的互相影响体制。其重点在于文化，科技，宗教，商品和土产的交流，贸易和移民，以及沿陆上与海上边境的网络组织，所有这些都必须在其各自的历史和文化环境下予以定义。

クロスロード — 東アジア世界の交流史研究

『クロスロード』は、相互・多角的に行なわれてきた東アジア世界における交流の歴史を、陸路・海路の観点から、総合的に研究・討論する学際的な国際フォーラムである。このフォーラム『クロスロード』が目指すものは、広大な大陸を越え、大海原を航海し綿々と行なわれてきた人々の交流は言うに及ばず、その交流において往来・伝播した文化、科学、宗教、また、実際に取引された各地域の商品と物産、その商業活動をも研究・討論するものである。

크로스로드 — 東아시아 世界의 交流史 研究

『크로스로드』는 동아시아 세계의 교류의 역사를 硏究 討論하는 국제 학술 포럼으로서, 서로 다른 사회 간에 陸路와 海路를 통해 相互 多角的으로 이루어진 교류관계의 照明에 초점을 맞춘다. 이 포럼에서 특별히 주목하는 主題는 각사회의 다양한 역사 문화적 배경하에서 이루어진 文化, 科學, 宗敎의 傳播, 物産과 生産品의 貿易活動, 移住와 移民, 육로와 해로를 연결하는 네트워크의 構造와 역할 규명이다.

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