


縦横—クロスロード—크로스로드

The “Indo-Pacific” Crossroads:
The Asian Waters as Conduits of Knowledge,
People, Cargoes, and Technologies



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Special Issue



Crossroads

Studies on the History of Exchange Relations
in the East Asian World

OSTASIEN Verlag

Vol. 16 (Oct. 2017)

Crossroads

Studies on the History of Exchange Relations in the East Asian World

縦横

東亞世界交流史研究

クロスロード

東アジア世界の交流史研究

크로스로드

東아시아世界の交流史研究

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**The “Indo-Pacific” Crossroads:
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The depiction of the Inner Audience Hall of a Japanese *daimyō* on the cover is taken from: *The History of Japan, Giving An Account of the ancient and present State and Government of that Empire; of Its Temples, Palaces, Castles and other Buildings; of Its Metals, Minerals, Trees, Plants, Animals, Birds and Fishes; of The Chronology and Succession of the Emperors, Ecclesiastical and Secular; or The Original Descent, Religions, Customs, and Manufactures of the Natives, and of their Trade and Commerce with the Dutch and Chinese. Together with a Description of the Kingdom of Siam. Written in High-Dutch by Engelbertus Kaempfer, M.D. Physician of the Dutch Embassy of the Emperor's Court; and translated from his Original Manuscript, never before printed, by J. G. Scheuchzer, F. R. S. and a Member of the College of Physicians, London. With the Life of the Author, and an Introduction. Illustrated with many Copper Plates* (London: John Gaspar Scheuchzer, 1727), Vol. 2 [archive.org/details/historyofjapangi02kaem], Tab. 32.

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
Introductory Remarks: What Is the “Indo-Pacific”?

Angela Schottenhammer

Since 2011, the term “Indo-Pacific” is being used more and more frequently in global strategic and geo-political discourse. Although not new,¹ the term has recently enjoyed increasing popularity, above all among US, Australian, and Japanese officials and politicians. Viewed from an etymological perspective, “Indo-Pacific” describes a large oceanic macro region, a body of water. In this context, Wikipedia explains the expression as follows:

The Indo-Pacific, sometimes known as the Indo-West Pacific, is a biogeographic region of the Earth’s seas, comprising the tropical waters of the Indian Ocean, the western and central Pacific Ocean, and the seas connecting the two in the general area of Indonesia.²

Map 1 shows which regions are covered by this term.



Map 1 “Indo-Pacific”³

- 1 The term was apparently first used in an article by Gurpreet S. Khurana (2007). “Indo-Pacific” refers in this case to the maritime space stretching from the East African and West Asian littoral across the Indian and western Pacific Ocean to the littorals of East Asia.
- 2 en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pacific, acc. Nov. 23, 2017.
- 3 Map by Eric Gaba (Sting), from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pacific#/media/File:Indo-Pacific_biogeographic_region_map-en.png. Own work coast lines: U.S. NGDC World Coast Line; Reference for the limits of the Indo-Pacific biogeographic region: Spalding *et al.* 2007.

The Indo-Pacific stretches from the east coasts of Africa across the Indian and Pacific Oceans, as far as the American mainland. But rather than strictly denoting a biogeographic oceanic macro region, the term is primarily being used for geopolitical, that is, strategic and economic purposes and claims, especially by the more powerful and ambitious countries neighbouring the macro region. The Australian Defence Department's *Defence White Paper 2013*, for example, dedicated whole sub-chapters to considering the growing military-strategic and economic importance of the macro region. The following quotations are typical of the discussion:

The 2013 White Paper addresses the range of significant international and domestic developments since 2009, which influence Australia's national security and defence settings, [...]. These include the ongoing economic strategic and military shift to the Indo-Pacific [...].


1.12 China's continued rise as a global power, the increasing economic and strategic weight of East Asia and the emergence over time of India as a global power are key trends influencing the Indian Ocean's development as an area of increasing strategic significance. In aggregate, these trends are shaping the emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a single strategic arc.

2.4 Second, a new Indo-Pacific strategic arc is beginning to emerge, connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans through Southeast Asia. This new strategic construct [...] is being forged by a range of factors. Notably, India is emerging as an important strategic, diplomatic and economic actor, "looking East", and becoming more engaged in regional frameworks. Growing trade, investment and energy flows across this broader region are strengthening economic and security interdependencies. These two factors combined are also increasingly attracting international attention to the Indian Ocean, through which some of the world's busiest and most strategically significant trade routes pass.

2.5 [...]. The Indo-Pacific is a logical extension of this [i. e. the Asia-Pacific, A.S.] concept, and adjusts Australia's priority strategic focus to the arc extending from India through Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia, including the sea lines of communication on which the region depends.

2.9 The emerging Indo-Pacific system is predominantly a maritime environment with Southeast Asia at its geographic centre. The region's big strategic challenges will last for decades and their mismanagement could have significant consequences. [...].⁴

4 *Defence White Paper 2013*, 1, 2, 7, 8.



Map 2 Major Shipping Lanes in the “Indo-Pacific”⁵

The *White Paper* quite directly expresses the ideas behind the usage of the term “Indo-Pacific” as a “new strategic construct” aimed at stressing one’s own influence and interests in the macro region.

The concerns of the Australian government are still more of interest to the world’s leading global power, the USA, which considers itself as a region adjacent to the immense “Indo-Pacific” macro region with all its associated countries. It sees itself as “a Pacific nation with deep, enduring, and long-standing ties to the countries of the Pacific region.”⁶ The USA also claims vital political-economic interests there. US involvement in the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific has of course a longer history – if we think, for example, of the annexation of Hawai’i in 1898,⁷ the Spanish-American War, or US engagement in

5 *Defence White Paper 2013*, 13.

6 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Fact Sheet, “U.S. Engagement in the Pacific”, Washington, DC, Jan. 17, 2017 [www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/2017/267084.htm, accessed on November 24, 2017].

7 “America’s annexation of Hawaii in 1898 extended U.S. territory into the Pacific and highlighted resulted from economic integration and the rise of the United States as a Pacific power. For most of the 1800s, leaders in Washington were concerned that Hawaii might become part of a European nation’s empire. During the 1830s, Britain and France forced Hawaii to accept treaties giving them economic privileges. In 1842, Secretary of State Daniel Webster sent a letter to Hawaiian agents in Washington affirming U.S. interests in Hawaii and opposing annex-

World War II – but it is not the purpose of these brief introductory words to recapitulate the history of US-America’s engagement in this oceanic space. In fact, I would like to focus on the recent political debate on the “Indo-Pacific”, seeking to show why suddenly this term has become so popular.

The USA sees the entire Pacific and Indian Ocean as a US-dominated sphere of economic growth and political-military control. The idea of focusing policy more on the Pacific region was already part and parcel of Barack Obama’s approach, when his administration announced the 21st century as America’s “Pacific Century”. A whole security strategy was developed for the Obama administration:

The Asia-Pacific region is more important to the United States today than ever before. A geopolitical shift toward Asia is underway which could easily be accelerated as a result of the ongoing global economic crisis. The region is re-emerging as a central political and economic player and is already an engine of the global economy.⁸

Drawn up in 2009, this security strategy spelled out the urgent interest to focus more on the Asia-Pacific region rather than Afghanistan and Iraq. In any case, one thing is obvious, whether we look back to America’s engagement in the Pacific in the nineteenth century or concentrate on current politics – the USA considers its engagement in this macro region essential and what is happening there is regarded as directly linked to its economic, political and strategic interests. In the words of the 2009 security strategy this reads as follows:

American engagement with and commitment to Asia is not a recent phenomenon or passing fancy. From its earliest days, the United States has been deeply involved in Asia. In February 1784, The Empress of China left New York harbor, sailing east to China and arriving in Macau in August of that year. It returned to the United States the following May carrying a consignment of Chinese goods that generated a profit of \$30,000.⁹

ation by any other nation. He also proposed to Great Britain and France that no nation should seek special privileges or engage in further colonization of the islands. In 1849, the United States and Hawaii concluded a treaty of friendship that served as the basis of official relations between the parties. [...]. Spurred by the nationalism aroused by the Spanish-American War, the United States annexed Hawaii in 1898 at the urging of President William McKinley. Hawaii was made a territory in 1900.” See U.S. Department of State, Archive, “Annexion of Hawaii, 1898” [2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/gp/17661.htm, acc. on Nov. 24, 2017].

8 Cossa *et al.* 2009, 9 (Introduction).

9 Cossa *et al.* 2009, 10 (Enduring U.S. Interests).

In 1835, the US Navy’s East India Squadron was established and initiated US military presence in the Pacific. In 1844, China was forced to sign the Treaty of Wangxia 望廈 with the USA, officially entitled “Treaty of peace, amity, and commerce, between the United States of America and the Chinese Empire” (dated July 3, 1844).¹⁰ Well-known are also the developments related to the forceful opening of Japan by Commodore Matthew C. Perry (1794–1858), who threatened to bombard Tōkyō if the country would not open itself to trade with the USA. As a result, on March 1854, the Treaty of Kanagawa 神奈川 was concluded. In 1898, also a result of the Spanish-American War, Guam and the Philippines were ceded to the United States as prizes. US interests in the region, thus, have a long history.

Today, as in these historical times, the United States not only wants to use the macro region economically but also to control it strategically. But it has become much more ambitious and coercing. Its policy is now directed above all against an increasingly powerful competitor and rival – China. Already under Obama, the USA was expanding its relations with the Asian-Pacific Economic Forum (APEC). It joined the “Trans-Pacific-Partnership” (TPP) free-trade agreement.

The primary purpose of the new arrangements and contacts has consisted in keeping China — which unlike Japan has not been invited to participate — away from the intensified trade that the USA expects to take advantage of. On the one side, America wants to use China and the region economically, on the other, it is America’s policy to control the complete hemisphere strategically, clearly containing the political and military ambitions and capacities of China. As it is evident that China cannot be permanently excluded from the region, its exclusion is rather aimed at providing a basis to coerce China into fulfilling US conditions so that the country can be integrated into the system and exploited to the benefit of US interests. This was expressed in the following terms at the time of Obama’s state visit to Australia:

Barack Obama’s visit to Australia carries an invitation. It’s an invitation to take America’s side in its rivalry with China.

[...]. The wise and far-sighted US policy for the past couple of decades was to work hard to bring China into the global rules-based system. Rather than having a rising giant outside the system breaking the rules, Washington wanted China in the system, playing by the rules.

10 For a scan, see babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.hncv31, acc. Nov. 24, 2017.

It worked. China signed up to, among other things, the World Trade Organisation. But now the Obama administration is seeking to shift the ground rules, moving the goalposts.

A bizarre contrast presented itself in Hawaii at the APEC gathering at the weekend – the Chinese President, Hu Jintao, argued world trade agreements should be based on the global WTO system, while the US president recruited other countries, including Australia, for his little regional trade sub-group, the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

[...]. The White House is hoping that if this thing gets big enough, China will one day want to join. The hidden agenda is that they will only admit it if China accepts a high standard of policing for its state-owned enterprises.¹¹

At the same time, the political message was clear. In terms of geopolitical and strategic interests, America considers any military activities of China as a challenge to itself, and seeks to guarantee the “freedom of the seas”, that is, its own interests in and control of the gigantic macro region. Already under Obama, the USA consequently launched a strategic reorientation of its plans and armaments in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The US military is establishing a network of military “bases” for air and sea forces at various strategic points across the oceans in order to contain China, for example, joint bases at the coasts of Australia. Officially, most of these are called “joint facilities”, such as the Pine Gap defence facility, run by the NSA and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) along with the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD).¹² This new strategic policy includes a “shift in US military assets to the region, the extension of US defence ties, an increase in US defence exports and foreign military training programs, more frequent US warship visits and the expansion of joint military exercises”.¹³ The fact that US government has assigned an entire century, the 21st, to the political-economic and military-strategic control of the Pacific region demonstrates the essential role and dimension the USA attaches to it:

It is becoming increasingly clear that in the 21st century, the world’s strategic and economic center of gravity will be the Asia Pacific, from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas. And one of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decades will be to lock in a substantially increased investment – diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise – in this region. [...].

Events elsewhere in the world have also lined up in a way that helps makes [sic!] this possible. The war in Iraq is winding down. We have begun a transition in Afghani-

11 Hartcher 2011.

12 Scappatura 2014, 14; see also Reynolds 2016.

13 Scappatura 2014, 1.

stan. [...]. We now can redirect some of those investments to opportunities and obligations elsewhere. And Asia stands out as a region where opportunities abound.

[...]. The 21st century will be America’s Pacific century, [...].¹⁴

Meanwhile, under President Trump, America’s claims and goals have become even more ambitious, and the intention to include the Indian subcontinent and beyond in them have become still more pronounced. The new US president, Donald Trump, repeatedly speaks of the “Indo-Pacific” instead of the “Asia-Pacific” region – extending America’s political, economic and geo-strategic vision to an even larger, a gigantic world region:

Throughout his tour of five countries, Trump made a point of labelling the region the “Indo-Pacific.” Not “Asia.” And not the more common “Asia-Pacific,” which was what predecessor Barack Obama mostly used.

In a speech to business leaders on Friday in Vietnam, Trump repeatedly called for a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” describing a region where independent nations could “thrive in freedom and peace” and all states “play by the rules.” He also used the phrase repeatedly at the start of a meeting Monday in the Philippines with President Rodrigo Duterte.

His choice of words reflects the desire of the U.S. for India, the region’s third-largest economy, to play a bigger role in its security matters. As China expands its economic and military clout, India could offer a potential buffer for smaller states, especially in Southeast Asia.¹⁵

This new terminology is said to reflect the US desire to pay still more attention to India and the increasingly responsible role India would play in the “security matters”¹⁶ of the US, in other words, in the geopolitical confrontation with China. But, at the same time, this new merger of what was formerly separated as Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific also brings together US essential interests in both macro regions, stressing that these are in all respects inseparably linked with one another and constitute an entire world region that has to be made subject to US control and influence. The use of the term “Indo-Pacific” implies the emphasis of US politicians no longer to intend to treat China, India, or Southeast Asia as separate bilateral cases. The enforcement and implementation of their political and economic interests in the huge “Indo-Pacific” macro region and its bodies of water can only be efficiently guaranteed when even mi-

14 Clinton 2011.

15 Peter Martin *et al.* 2017.

16 *Ibid.*

nor concerns with one or the other country are subordinated to the major US concern: guaranteeing freedom for US military and politico-economic purposes, especially against and in face of the increasing influence of China, its largest competitor in the region. In this respect, the term “Indo-Pacific” is both ambitious and demanding: no less than the entire oceanic space including all maritime routes and strategic crossroads from the US west coast to the African east coast have to be subdued to American geopolitical interests. President Trump stresses this not only by his consciously frequent use of the term “Indo-Pacific”; asked about the difference to Obama’s “Asia-Pacific”, for example, Trump stated that “he would not tolerate the ‘chronic trade abuses’ by Asian nations and would ‘always [...] put America first’”.¹⁷ He clearly pronounces that America’s economic (and political) interests have to be served first. To many Asian countries this is an unambiguous, explicit rejection of multilateral trade liberalisation.¹⁸ And in this respect, one may perhaps compare the conscious use of this term to other expressions used in similar contexts by former US presidents, launched to send a message to the world, announcing a new focus of political strategy with a catchy phrase. Such phrases included, for example, Barack Obama’s “pivot of Asia”, Georg W. Bush’s “axis of evil” or Ronald Reagan’s “evil empires”.

Against this background, the *Washington Post* recently even issued warnings of a new Cold War.¹⁹ Speaking of a Cold War, however, misses the point – after all the USA wants to use China and other “Indo-Pacific” countries economically. And unlike the Soviet Union in the past, the modern PRC does not abscond from mutual business – on the contrary. In this respect, there is a common basis for both the USA and China. But in face of China’s increasing

17 In Sevastopulo 2017, Trump is also quoted with the words: “I’ve had the honour of sharing our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific,’ Mr Trump told delegates at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum in Da Nang, Vietnam. The US Congress had approved the first deployment of an American warship to the Pacific in 1817, he added. ‘We have been friends, partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific for a long, long time, and we will be friends, partners and allies for a long time.’”

18 Ibid.

19 Khurana 2017: “The new term changes the mental map that has prevailed since the end of the Cold War and since China’s ‘reform and opening’ policies in the 1980s. ‘Asia-Pacific’ invoked an image of a community of interests that linked America and East Asia. ‘Indo-Pacific,’ as Trump uses it, implies a new configuration in which India and America, along with the other major democratic nations in Asia – Japan and Australia especially – join to contain China’s growing influence in an updated version of the Cold War.”

economic and political success, a China that steadily increases its own sphere of influence, also into regions that the US used to claim as influence spheres for itself, the final message is clear. China and its periphery has, on the one hand, to be forced to accept the US political-economic rules of business to guarantee America’s economic success; on the other hand, China’s on-going economic success and political-military engagement and growing influence in the region is increasingly considered a risk and threat to US interests. Just a few days ago, a new US American strategy document designated Russia and China as “revisionist powers” working to undermine and roll back US interests. At the same time, Donald Trump seeks strong relations with China and welcomed, for example, anti-terror cooperation with Moscow.²⁰ Still more efforts have to be invested to control the entire macro region and to launch a kind of arms diplomacy, involving partners from Japan to Australia, and India, in order to contain China. And the US government has decided to even more firmly integrate India – China’s old rival with also a continental land access to its neighbour – into this anti-China alliance. The entire “Indo-Pacific” sphere has thus gained in geo-strategic importance.

In this present special issue of *Crossroads*, we introduce one contemporary and five historical examples of human, cultural, commercial and political confrontations and encounters between Asian and European peoples at what might be called the “Indo-Pacific” crossroads. At first sight, the Spanish long seemingly dominated large parts of America and the Pacific²¹, although in reality many more actors were operating in these waters.²² Against this background, the Pa-

²⁰ “China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity”, the document says. It warns that “Russia aims to weaken US influence in the world and divide us from our allies and partners”, while Russian nuclear weapons are deemed “the most significant existential threat to the United States”. It accuses China of seeking “to displace the United States” in Asia, listing a litany of US grievances, from deficits, to data theft to spreading “features of its authoritarian system”. “Contrary to our hopes, China expanded its power at the expense of the sovereignty of others”, it says. This is quoted from www.dailysabah.com/americas/2017/12/18/new-strategy-document-calls-russia-china-revisionist-powers-working-to-undermine-us-interests (acc. Dec. 24, 2017); but many newspapers worldwide quote essential parts of the new strategy paper.

²¹ A recent publication investigating the Spanish presence in the Pacific is Slack *et al.* 2014.

²² Bonialian 2012; Bonialian 2014; Crewe 2017. This later article is specifically of interest because it reconsiders the place of colonial Latin America in global history by examining historical trans-Pacific interactions, conflicts, and exchanges between Latin America and Asia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As the author stresses, he conceptualizes a “Hispano-Asian Pacific World that was forged by a myriad of actors in and around the Pacific basin. In-

cific has at times even been designated as a “Spanish Lake”²³, a misnomer, as Ryan Dominc Crewe emphasizes, “since far-off imperial Spain was ambivalent, and at times even hostile, regarding Asian ties to its Latin American colonies”.²⁴ He introduces the trans-Pacific trade as a vivid multi-cultural and multi-ethnic interaction network:²⁵ Mexican creoles, Chinese traders, Japanese Christians, Filipino mariners, Spanish friars, and *mestizo* soldiers from both American and Asian coastal regions, among others. Although the trans-Indian-Ocean passage remained important for Spain, they started to cross the Pacific and initiated a lucrative trans-Pacific trade between Asia and Mexico (New Spain) that has become known as “Manila galleon trade” (1565–1815) in order to pursue their interests in Asia. While later also other European nations used the trans-Pacific passage more frequently, especially in the early eighteenth century the French via Peru,²⁶ the Spanish remained America’s major counterpart in the Pacific region between the Philippines and Latin America²⁷ but also a not unimportant trading partner.²⁸ Other Europeans, such as the Dutch and later the British, made their way to East Asia primarily by crossing the Indian Ocean. And already in these early times, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific were interconnected. Armenian merchants, for example, brought through their networks Persian rugs and Bengalese cotton from the Indian Ocean all the way to Mexico City.²⁹

In the early modern period it was primarily commercial interests – spices and the lucrative China trade – that shaped the motivation of Europeans in Asia (although especially the Portuguese and the Spanish were also driven by religious, missionary purposes). And many of the encounters between Europeans and Asians in Asia were anything but peaceful. A severe competition for access to and control of spice growing islands and Asian markets evolved. Port

stead of a Pacific dominated by far-off Spain, my research reveals a Transpacific world that in fact defied imperial efforts to claim, regulate, or convert it. I structure this study along three broad lines of inquiry: the economic ties that made the Asian-Latin American ‘Rim’, the consequences of human transits and cultural exchanges along new Transpacific conduits, and the barriers of distance and culture that limited both cosmopolitanism and imperialism.”

23 E. g. Spate 1979.

24 Crewe 2017.

25 See also Pierce and Otsuka 2009.

26 See, e. g., Bonialian 2012, esp. 228-258.

27 Vives-Anzacot 1991.

28 See, e. g., García Fuentes 1980.

29 Crewe 2017, with reference to Aslanian 2011, 254-257, and Schurz 1939, 136-138.

cities like Macao, Canton, Manila or Nagasaki in particular were places of cross-cultural and commercial encounters, but simultaneously places of conflict.

While the Portuguese, as well as later the Dutch or the British came to East Asia primarily by crossing the Indian Ocean, the Spanish preferred to come from the opposite direction as much as they could – a result of the Treaty of Tordesillas (June 1494) through which Pope Alexander VI (1431–1503) divided the world outside Europe between the Portuguese Empire and the Spanish Crown, granting the Indian Ocean to the Portuguese generating a tension only softened by the Spanish rule over Portugal as well as Spain starting with Philip II (King of Spain 1556–1598; King of the Portuguese 1580–1598).

The focus of the first five contributions is historical. The first article sheds light onto an important and very interesting chapter of the history of the Philippines, a country and region actually lying at the crossroads of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, and at the same time revealing a rich history of interaction, both violent and peaceful, between Asia and a European people, the Spaniards. Omri Bassewitch Frenkel discusses the colonization of the Philippines and the shift from a colonization concentrating on land control to one focused on trade, a shift that, as he expounds, created various social tensions and disappointments. Contrary to Spanish expectations, spices or precious metals were not abundant in the Philippines. In addition, the geographical dispersion and social organization of the local population made the islands hard to control. Bassewitch Frenkel argues that the Spanish plans for the invasion of China may have arisen out of Spanish society’s inability to adapt itself to the conditions of the Philippine Islands, and its failure to adopt new ideals of prestige and models of status.

Ubaldo Iaccarino subsequently focuses on the commercial role of Manila, making it a place of encounter for people from very different world cultures. Writing in the late 1610s, the Spanish cosmographer and *arbitrista* Hernando de los Ríos Coronel (ca. 1559–1624) stressed the position of Manila as the “centre of a circle” whose circumference included China, Japan, Indochina and insular India. Due to its favourable geographical position – as well as to political and economic factors – Manila created its wealth thanks to the commerce of such overseas merchants as the Chinese “Sangleys” from Fujian, the Portuguese ship-owners of Macao and Nagasaki, the Japanese *daimyō* of Kyūshū, as well as traders from Borneo, Siam and Cambodia. Iaccarino investigates foreign trade in the Philippines at the beginning of the seventeenth century, analysing exchanges of silver, gold, silks and cottons, porcelains, sulphur and quicksilver – as well as wax, honey, deer skins, turtles, *etc.*, with the aim of clarifying the role of Manila as an *entrepôt* situated between the Americas, East and Southeast Asia.

Cheng Wei-chung shifts to Taiwan as another crossroad of human encounter between Asians and Westerners, in his case the Dutch. In 1662, Taiwan was taken over from its former ruler, the VOC (Dutch East India Company), by the Chinese warlord Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功 (in the West better known as Co-xinga, 1624–1662). One of the deserters during the siege of the Dutch castle Zeelandia on Taiwan, Hugo Rozijn, survived under the Zheng regime, for more than twenty-one years. He established a family and was hired as a translator and medical practitioner. Later when the Zheng regime fell to the Manchus in 1683, Hugo Rozijn was released and returned to Batavia as a ship's surgeon. He then served again on the Company's ships, applying his knowledge in local languages and herbs, sailing from Batavia to Japan, China and the coast of Bengal in the 1690s. Cheng Wei-chung introduces his interesting life story here in detail.

Lee Chi-lin then sheds light on a special area of China's late imperial history Qing dynasty (1644–1911) shipbuilding. This case is particularly interesting, because the Qing are generally conceived as not having been very much interested in maritime space, especially not after the Kangxi 康熙 reign (1662–1722). Consequently, shipbuilding in Qing China has been almost absolutely neglected in scholarly research. Lee Chi-lin concentrates on the eighteenth century, that is, on a time when China had supposedly already retreated from the seas. He introduces various types of ships and analyses the policies according to which the Manchus established their shipyards. The chapter also pays special attention to the construction of warships.

Wim De Winter finally looks at cultural interactions between Europeans and Japanese in seventeenth-century Japan. He provides vivid examples of early encounters between Europeans and Japanese, discusses the crucial role of specific ceremonies and symbolic behaviour – banquets as tokens of hospitality were, for example, part and parcel of such intercultural encounters – and various visions of the “Other”.

We conclude this issue with a modern topic. It is of course related to the history described above, but brings a new perspective into the “Indo-Pacific” macro region, namely China's actual intention to integrate some Latin American countries into its One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. Whereas official imperial China in the past seems to have had little to no interest in establishing relations with the world on the other side of the Pacific, the PRC now is very keen on building up relations with Latin America. Leaders from Latin America were included in the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in 2017 and some Latin American countries received access as prospective non-regional members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

Fabricio Fonseca analyses the implications for Latin America emerging from the possible expansion of the OBOR in this direction. The article also considers the evolution of the initiative, some of the motivations behind it, and its gradual institutionalization. In a brief historical analysis, Fonseca demonstrates the potential for transformation offered by China, after centuries of bilateral trade being carried out mainly through the intermediation of Western powers.

In present times the area and the countries located at the crossroads of the Indian and the Pacific Oceans – larger parts of Southeast and East Asia – have again moved into the centre of global geopolitical and economic interests. Needless to say the politico-economic circumstances today differ in many respects. But today as in the past it is the most powerful countries that seek to implement and guarantee claims in the region in various ways.

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“The Centre of a Circle”: Manila’s Trade with East and Southeast Asia at the Turn of the Sixteenth Century

Ubaldo IACCARINO

A well-known memorial by the procurator general of the Philippine Islands, Hernando de los Ríos Coronel (1559–1624), published in 1621, portrayed Manila as “the centre of a circle”, whose circumference encompassed Japan, Korea, China, Siam, Cambodia, Sumatra, Java and the Moluccas.¹ In fact, if we take a look at some seventeenth century maps of the “Islands to the West” (*Islas del Poniente*) and the Far East, we find the Spanish port-city in the middle of a broad maritime region, from Malacca to Nagasaki, surrounded by East Asia, Southeast Asia and the North Pacific Ocean.

This study will analyse Manila’s trade inside that circle, trying to shed some light on the complex mechanisms of the intra-Asian commerce around the Philippines at the turn of the sixteenth century.

Genesis of the “Pearl of the Orient”

The arrival of Miguel López de Legazpi (d. 1572) in the Philippines, in 1565, took place at the conclusion of a long process of Spanish overseas expansion that had started in 1492 with the first voyage of Christopher Columbus to Central America. Throughout the first half of the sixteenth century, the Spaniards had carefully planned their entry in Asia, with the aim of expanding the influence of the Crown of Habsburg in the East Indies and to try new conquests and exploitations. In their eyes, this would bring several benefits related not only to the evangelization of the “infidels” and the establishment of a global

1 Ríos Coronel 1621; English translation in BR 19. The same image of a circle was used by the Jesuit Father Juan de Ribera for the first time in 1618 (Archivo General de Indias [henceforth: AGI], *Filipinas*, 20, r. 12, n. 80): *Esta ciudad de Manila, tan pequeña, es la escala para grandes reynos como Japón, Coria, la gran China, Sian, Patán, Camboja, las Xavas, la Sunda y el Maluco, de que está cercada como el centro de su çirconferencia*. “This city of Manila, [though] so small, is the stopover for great kingdoms such as Japan, Korea, great China, Siam, Patani, Cambodia, the Javas, Sunda and Maluco, by which is surrounded like the centre of its circumference.”

empire (a universal monarchy), but also to the acquisition of a great wealth derived from Spain's participation in the spice trade.²

Following the instructions of Madrid, Legazpi and his men settled in the isle of Cebu, hoping to gain access from there to the Moluccas. However, just a few years later, while still trying to expand their influence in the south of the Philippines through the "pacification" of the sultanates of Sulu and Mindanao, the newcomers started to look to the north, to the islands of Luzon and Mindoro, where the Chinese and the Japanese traded with the natives.³ In a letter of 1569, written in Panay, Legazpi explained to the king his future intentions and made clear the new strategy chosen by the small group of Spanish conquistadors:

I believe that [...] we shall [...] gain the commerce with China, whence come silks, porcelains, benzoin, musk, and other articles. Thus partly through commerce and partly through the articles of commerce, the settlers will increase the wealth of the land in a short time. In order to attain this, the first and foremost thing to be attempted is colonization and settlement.⁴

Accordingly, in 1570 the Spaniards reached Luzon, subjugated the Muslim settlement at the mouth of the Pasig River (1571), and founded the city of Manila: *Insigne y siempre leal ciudad* from 1574, and *Cabeza de Filipinas* in 1595.⁵

In the following years, Manila became an important hub for trade across the China Seas, and a crossroads between Asia and America. During the 1570s, while still consolidating their presence in the Philippines, the Spaniards started to harvest the profits of the Asian trade by welcoming foreign merchant ships in their new port-city. As is known, they exchanged American silver with the Chinese silk imported from Fujian that filled up the holds of the galleons dispatched to Mexico. The remittance of silver bullion to Manila was justified by the need to sustain the Spanish presence in the Philippines, and was the most practical way to give back to the Manilaños the 10 % of *almojarifazgo* tax collected in Acapulco.⁶

The silver exploited in the mines of Mexico and Peru financed several plans of conquest, settlement, and evangelization in the Far East and permitted the participation of the Spaniards in the intra-Asian trade. Almost everyone,

2 Gil 1989, 15-68.

3 AGI, *Filipinas*, 6, r. 1, n. 7; BR 2, 238.

4 BR 3, 58.

5 Díaz-Trechuelo 2001, 78.

6 The *almojarifazgo* was a customs duty on the merchandise imports and exports.

among them – governors, officials, *encomenderos*, private merchants and missionaries – had a right of percentage on the load of the ships sailing from Manila and could enjoy a profit that came from the sale of the Chinese silk in America, generally of 100 or even 200 %.⁷ The preponderance and the importance of the galleons' trade and the silk-for-silver exchange across the Pacific became so evident that, as the Mexican viceroy Manrique de Zúñiga (1585–1590) already noticed in 1586, it would have been impossible for the Spaniards to support their presence in Asia, “and achieve success”, without the commercial voyages to Acapulco, “since they, without their trade, are so poor”.⁸

In effect, in just a few years after their arrival in the Philippines, the Spanish settlers had contributed to alter the traditional patterns of the local economy, which went through a radical change. During the 1570s, the natives living in the provinces of Pampanga, Bulacan, and Nueva Ecija (Luzon's rice basket) were compelled by the Spaniards to leave the countryside in order to serve as timbercutters, rowers and miners.⁹ This eventually caused a severe shortage of food, which was aggravated in the following years due to the sudden growth of the resident population in Manila and the expansion of its Chinese quarter. In 1580, for example, the Philippine governor Gonzalo Ronquillo de Peñalosa (1580–1583), arrived in the city with a group of more than 1,000 new settlers from Spain and Mexico, and by 1584 the Chinese immigrants living in its outskirts were already 4,000.¹⁰

Inevitably, this situation led to a startling rise of the cost of food, and the Spaniards could not help but welcome the introduction of rice, wheat flour, salt-meats, vegetables and fruits from China and Japan, which became essential for the survival of the colony. The need for foodstuffs, along with ammunition and ship's supplies, like iron, copper, lead, sulphur and saltpetre, justified the growth of the Asian trade in Manila in front of the opposition of the merchants of Seville, and permitted to carry on undisturbed the trade in silks and porcelains. In addition to provisions and supplies, of course, because of the easy profits that could be obtained by shipping Chinese silk to Mexico and Peru, Manila was literally invaded by the plentiful goods of the Middle Kingdom, and so the Spaniards started to rely exclusively on the transpacific voyages of the galleons and on the trade of the Asian merchants. When in the early-1590s Philip II

7 Schurz 1939, 156-163.

8 Letter to Philip II of November 15. BR 6, 287.

9 Phelan 1959, 10.

10 Alonso Álvarez 2001, 197-198; Ollé 2002, 28; Díaz-Trechuelo 2001, 124-125, 127.

(1556–1598) declared the exclusiveness of the Manila-Acapulco route and forbade any direct contact between America and Asia, the dependence of Manila upon its maritime trade was eventually crystallized.¹¹

Manila in the Asian “Age of Commerce”

Before the arrival of the Spaniards in 1565, the Philippines were already part of a broad maritime region that linked India to China through the ports of Southeast Asia.¹² The products of the islands, especially gold and wax, were exchanged across the China Seas, and beyond, and carried as far as in Malacca and Japan.

In his *Suma Oriental*, written at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese apothecary and explorer Tomé Pires described the Tagalogs of Luzon, whom he calls *Luções* (in Spanish: *Luzones*), as expert seafarers, covering long distance trade. With all probability, they reached Malacca (as well as other ports of Southeast Asia) along the sea route that ran from the Philippines to the Malay peninsula through the island of Palawan and the northern coast of Borneo. According to Pires, the *Luções* also sailed to the port of Guangzhou, to trade with the Chinese.¹³ As a matter of fact, the natives of the Philippines were already sailing to China in early-Song times (eleventh century), and at the close of the fourteenth century they dispatched several embassies to the Middle Kingdom, from Luzon, the Visayas and Mindanao, to pay tribute to the emperors of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644).¹⁴ We know from Chinese sources that, about that time, the Filipinos exported beeswax, honey, cotton, betel-nuts, pearls and tortoise shells (from Mindanao), and a long list of aromatic woods and animal hides.¹⁵

Nearly two centuries later, when the first Spaniards reached the Philippines and the Moluccas, the trade in the region was still much the same. Pires confirms the exports of wax and honey from Luzon, and adds gold, telling us that it was shipped to Malacca “from the *Luções* [Luzon] and from the surrounding

11 Iaccarino 2011.

12 Reid 1988; Ptak 2004; Schottenhammer 2005; Schottenhammer 2008; Gipouloux 2009; Haneda 2013.

13 Cortesão 1944, 133-134; Ptak 2001.

14 Scott 1984, 75-78.

15 Scott 1984, 67-74, with excerpts from Zhao Rugua's 趙汝适 (1170–1228) *Zhufan zhi* 諸蕃志 (c. 1225) and Wang Dayuan's 汪大淵 (1311–1350) *Dao yi zhi lue* 島夷誌略 (c. 1339).

islands".¹⁶ Andrés de Urdaneta, eyewitness of Loaisa's expedition to the spice islands of 1526, stated the presence of Chinese junks in Mindanao (Butuan); and García de Escalante Alvarado, who took part in the following mission of Ruy López de Villalobos (1543), testified that the Chinese merchants brought to the Philippines porcelains, amber, officinal storax, and aromatic perfumes, in exchange for gold and precious stones.¹⁷ A few years later, in 1567, Miguel López de Legazpi described the Sino-Japanese trade of Luzon and Mindoro in a letter to Philip II written in Cebú on July 23:

The Chinese and Japanese [...] bring silks, woollens, bells, porcelains, perfumes, iron, tin, coloured cotton cloths, and other small wares, and in return they take away gold and wax.¹⁸

About this time, the Chinese merchants were sailing regularly to Luzon to trade with the natives living along its western coasts, especially in the Manila Bay and in the province of Pangasinan. Some of them had moved permanently to the Philippines in order to facilitate the practices of trade. After the arrival of Legazpi's group in 1570, a rising number of Chinese *Sangleyes*¹⁹ settled in Manila and took residence in the "Parián" (*alcaicería*),²⁰ a specific quarter destined to their trade and crafts that was built by the Spaniards outside the city's perimeter. The Chinese community in Manila increased from the forty people met by Martín de Goyti in 1570 to over 20,000 men at the end of the century.²¹ On the other hand, the number of junks visiting Manila and the other ports of Luzon grew radically, reaching an average of twenty ships per year, with peaks of thirty or even fifty ships in the mid-1590s.²²

The Chinese merchants trading in the Philippines were principally Fujianese. Most of them came from the prefectures of Zhangzhou 漳州 and Quanzhou 泉州, in the southern region of Fujian, historically known as Minnan 閩南.²³ The former sailed from the ports located on the estuary of the

16 Cortesão 1944, 134.

17 BR 2, 72.

18 AGI, *Filipinas*, 6, r. 1, n. 7; BR 2, 238.

19 The term indicates the Chinese merchants trading in Manila. Boxer 1953, 260; Chin 1998, 25.

20 This is a collective term for the several silk-markets located around present-day Intramuros. Gil 2011, 142-162; Chin 1998, 36-37.

21 AGI, *Patronato*, 24, r. 17; Felix 1966, 25, 77-78.

22 Gil 2011, 575-581; Chaunu 1960, 147-151.

23 Ptak 1998; Chang 1990.

Jiulong river 九龍, like Haicheng 海澄 (Yuegang 月港), Longhai 龍海 (Longxi 龍溪), and Xiamen 廈門 (Zhongzuosuo 中左所). The latter were from the area around Quanzhou, and sailed from Anhai 安海, Jinjiang 晉江, Tong'an 同安, etc.²⁴ To the Spaniards, all these places were known to be in the provinces (*provincias*) of “Chincheo” (Zhangzhou, or Quanzhou) and “Ucheo” (Fuzhou).²⁵ According to Morga, some traders also came from “Cantón”, which could refer to either the port of Guangzhou or the whole province of Guangdong.²⁶

The Chinese visited the ports of the Ilocos Region, especially in the gulf of Lingayen (at the mouth of the river Agno), where they bought gold, wax, cotton, sapan-wood (*sibucan*), and horns of *carabao*. In Manila, they obtained American and Japanese silver in exchange for several Chinese products, the most important of which was silk. The silks shipped to the city, and then loaded on board the Manila Galleons, were velvets, damasks, satins, taffetas, brocades, gorvarans (*gorvaranes*), and golden embroideries “in all sorts of colours and patterns”.²⁷ Raw silk was bought by the Japanese merchants of Kyūshū, who used it for their own manufacturing industry, and by the Iberians (both Spaniards and Portuguese) who sold it back in Mexico and Peru. Moreover, the Chinese carried several other goods to Luzon: precious stones, exotic animals, and food-stuffs, as well as iron, lead, sulphur, saltpetre, gunpowder and quicksilver.

Behind the captains who sailed every year to the Philippines with their own junks and champans, carrying on board several private traders and new settlers, there was the local gentry, which invested money in their overseas ventures.²⁸ Among the *Sangley* community of Manila there were the agents of the most influential merchants of Fujian and Guangdong, who set up complex shipping companies, sometimes involving the highest ranking officials of the Philippines. Such is the case, for example, of a certain “Tante”, who, in 1610, was entrusted by the Spanish captain Andrés de Obregón with the task to buy the present destined to the former *shōgun* Tokugawa Ieyasu 德川家康 (1543–1616).²⁹

24 Chin 1998, 25-27; Ptak 1994, 302-304.

25 Gil 2011, 568-570; Ollé 2002, 249, 263, 268.

26 Stanley 1868, 337.

27 Stanley 1868, 338.

28 Stanley 1868, 337: “These ships come laden with goods [...] with servants and the agents of other merchants who remain in China; and they come out from that country with permission from their viceroys and mandarins.” See Chuan 1975, 101-104; Chang 1983, 319-337; Oka 2013, 82-86.

29 Gil 2011, 175-176.

The Chinese trade in Manila was also stimulated by the presence of the Japanese, who regularly visited the ports of Luzon from the mid-sixteenth century (at least) until the enforcement of the *kaikin* policy (海禁政策) by the third *shōgun* 將軍 Tokugawa Iemitsu 德川家光 (1604–1651).³⁰ At the beginning of the 1580s there were already several Japanese settlements (*Nihonmachi* 日本町) in the provinces of Pangasinan, Ilocos and Cagayan. The town of Agoos, for example, located on the estuary of the Agno river, was known to the Spaniards as the “Port of Japan” (*puerto del Japón*), surely enough because of its trade with Kyūshū.³¹ In 1595 the Japanese community of Manila reached nearly 1,000 people and continued to grow in the following years as a result of the flowing of the Chinese trade.³² In addition to raw silk, the Japanese bought gold, wax, honey, deer-hides, sappan-wood, ceramics (especially the *Luzon tsubo* 呂宋壺),³³ cotton, and medicines, while they sold iron, copper, lead and saltpetre (to the Spaniards), side arms, furniture, manufactured silks, folding screens, etc.³⁴

Similarly to the Chinese, the Japanese traders in Manila were agents of the great merchants of Kyūshū and Kinai, and were supported and financed by several *daimyōs* 大名 and *tonos* 殿.³⁵ Among the principal investors there were the Sueyoshi 末吉 and Shimai 島井 families, and the guilds (*za* 座) and associations (*nakama* 仲間) of Hakata 博多, Nagasaki, Sakai, and Kyōto. Their ships sailed from the ports of Kyūshū (Hirado 平戸, Usuki 臼杵, Saeki 佐伯, Nakatsu 中津, Kyōdomari 京泊, Nagasaki, etc.) and the Inner Sea (*Naikai* 内海).³⁶

The residents of Manila's *Nihonmachi* (located in Dilao) acted as mediators for the traders coming from Japan, and as interpreters of Spanish (and Chinese?) language. The close relationship between the latter and the Franciscan missionaries who administered their Christian community in Dilao, is one of the reasons why the Spanish friars reached Japan in the early-1580s, and contributed to the establishment of trade relations with several *daimyōs*, among whom Matsuura Shigenobu 松浦鎮信 (1549–1614), Ōmura Sumitada 大村純忠 (1533–1587), and Konishi Yukinaga 小西行長 (1555–1600).³⁷

30 Boxer 1951, 362-397.

31 AGI, *Patronato*, 23, r. 9, f. 12v; BR 5, 106-107.

32 Iwao Seiichi 1940, 257.

33 These were old Chinese earthenware dating from late-Tang and Song times.

34 They also bought some Spanish products like wine, glasses, and hats. Stanley 1868, 341.

35 Oka 2013.

36 Iwao Seiichi 1940; Iwao Seiichi 1958; Arano Yasunori 2003, 14.

37 Iaccarino 2017, 31-41.

Among the traders who came to Manila from Japan there were also several Portuguese captains, who worked for the great shipowners of Macao or even for the Japanese government. Bartolomé Medina, António Garcês, Vasco Dias, and Pedro Gonçalves de Carvalhais, are just a few names of a larger group of Lusitanian seafarers that carried on a triangular trade between Macao, Manila and Nagasaki, and to a lesser degree with Malacca and the Malay archipelago.³⁸

In addition to the Sino-Japanese and Portuguese trade from Southeast Asia, Manila relied on the commerce with Indochina and Borneo, as well. Merchants from Cambodia and Siam started to reach the Philippine capital at least from the early-1590s to sell benzoin, ivory, and precious stones. They also brought “horns, hide, hoofs and teeth” of rhinoceros, and carried away cowries (*siguey*) and other Philippine “trinkets” (*bujerías*).³⁹ Trade with Borneo, on the other hand, was carried on principally in the Visayas, but in Manila it did not reach great proportions. According to Morga, some Bornean merchants came to the city to sell palm mats, sago, glazed jars, and camphor to the natives, and took in return supplies of rice and wine, cotton wrappers, “and other baubles of the islands which are wanting in Borneo”.⁴⁰

Mechanisms and Peculiarities of the Manila Trade

The growth of the Sino-Japanese trade in the Philippines and the establishment of commercial links with the countries of Southeast Asia turned Manila into “one of the greatest *emporía* of the world”, as the Archbishop Miguel García Serrano (1618–1629) would declare in 1620.⁴¹ Soon after its founding in 1571, the city became the principal destination of the junks, champans, and other smaller ships sailing from China (Fujian) and Japan (Kyūshū), and started to be visited by some traders from Indochina and Borneo, as well as from the Portuguese captain-merchants of Macao. But why Manila? Which were the reasons for such an important and sudden development of its trade? What turned the little port of Maynilad into the Spanish “Pearl of the Orient” and one of the principal centres of the intra-Asian trade? This questions can find an answer in

38 On the Portuguese trade from Malacca and the Moluccas see Stanley 1868, 341-342.

39 Stanley 1868, 343.

40 Stanley 1868, 342-343.

41 *Manila es uno de los grandiosos emporios que tiene el mundo, donde concurren de muchos Reynos, de que está cercada, como el centro de una circunferencia, que son la gran China, Xapón, Coria, Sian, Patán, Camboya, la India Oriental, Sunda, Jaba, Maluco y Burneo.* AGI, México, 2488.

the analysis of the particular conditions of trade in East and Southeast Asia in the second half of the sixteenth century.

In 1567, after nearly two centuries of prohibition, the Ming court opened the port of Yuegang (Haicheng) and officially permitted the reestablishment of private trade between Fujian (Minnan) and the Philippines. This measure was aimed at controlling the illicit trade and traffics of the *wokou* 倭寇, and at putting an end to their raids and pillages along the Chinese coast. It is a well-known fact that in early-Ming times, during the years of the imposition of the ban on maritime activities (*haijin* 海禁) many Chinese renegades, brigands or simple merchants had joined forces with the Japanese pirates from Kyūshū and Shikoku 四国, and by the mid-sixteenth century it had become quite impossible for Beijing to control their ventures overseas and contrast their smuggling activities. Many Japanese lords of Kyūshū, profiting from the anarchy of the *sengoku* period (戦国時代, 1467–1603), started to collaborate with these bands of pirates and carried on an illegal trade with China in several smuggling bases off its south-eastern littoral.⁴² This was in fact the only way to get the Chinese goods they needed, since in the aftermath of the incident of Ningbo (1523), Japan had been erased from the list of tributary states that could send embassies to the Son of Heaven and trade in China.⁴³

Finally, the end of the tally trade (*kanhe maoyi*, *kangō bōeki* 勘合貿易) between the Ming and the Ashikaga *shōguns* 将軍 in 1549 resulted in the prohibition for all the Japanese to enter China, and to the Chinese ships to sail to Japan. Still in 1565, despite the reestablishment of the Guangdong supervisorate (*shibosi* 市舶司), which regulated the maritime commerce, the Japanese were not permitted to trade neither in Guangzhou nor in any other port of China. Considering that the same prohibition was introduced in Macao after its cession to the Portuguese in 1557, from 1571 onwards the nearest place where the Chinese and the Japanese could trade by the light of the sun became, as a consequence, the port of Manila.⁴⁴

Furthermore, the emergence in China of a silver based economy in the mid-sixteenth century stimulated the Chinese demand for the American “eight royals” coins (*reales de a ocho*), that started to be minted in Mexico almost in the

42 So 1975, ch. 1; Tanaka Takeo 1982, 111-138; Carioti 2006, 27-35, 75-83.

43 The Ningbo Incident was a scuffle between the members of the tributary trade delegations of the Ōuchi 大内 and Hosokawa 細川 families, which broke out in 1523 for reasons related to the tally trade system. See Geiss 1998, 491-493.

44 Wang 1953; Tanaka Takeo 1961.

same years, and triggered off a hunger for silver all around East and Southeast Asia.⁴⁵ Already in the 1560s the Spaniards had noticed the advantage of exchanging silver bullion with Chinese goods and the strong interest that the *Sangleyes* showed for the Mexican coins. A memorandum of 1565, for example, written when Legazpi and his men were still in Cebu, asked for the dispatch from New Spain of “coins and small bars of fine silver for trade in China”.⁴⁶

It is a noteworthy coincidence that China’s increased demand for silver was concomitant with a sudden rise in its production in both America and Japan. The amalgamation process (*beneficio del patio*), which stimulated the productivity of the Spanish mines in Potosí (Cerro Rico), was introduced in Peru in the 1570s after the discovery of a rich mercury deposit at Huancavelica. At the same time, the Japanese started to exploit new silver mines in Kyūshū and Chūgoku and increased the output of their ores. The voyages of the Spanish ships across the Pacific permitted to concentrate in Manila great amounts of silver bullion that stimulated the Chinese trade in the Philippines and the development of several secondary routes from Southeast Asia and Japan. This was so especially after 1581, when the enforcement of the single-whip reform of taxation (*yi tiao bian fa* 一條鞭法) led to a general increase of the need for silver all over the Celestial Empire, for it had become, *ex jure*, the only accepted means of payment.⁴⁷

It goes without saying that the presence of so much silver coming to Manila from Japan, Mexico and Peru, all together, raised the price of silk and created a particular condition that favoured the *Sangleyes* and their purchases.⁴⁸ Accordingly, at the end of the sixteenth century, the easiest and most convenient way for the Chinese to obtain silver was to sail to Manila, where they could find both the Mexican coins and the Japanese bars. In the same way, the Philippine capital was the nearest place where the Japanese could meet the Chinese demand for their own silver and buy from them raw silk and other products. Moreover, in the Philippines, particularly in Luzon, they obtained gold, which was mined by the Igorot peoples in the mountains of the Central Cordillera and carried downstream to the provinces of Pangasinan, Ilocos and Cagayan.

Another advantage of trading in Manila was related to taxes. Throughout the 1570s, foreign traders were given the freedom to make their purchases in

45 Flynn and Giráldez 1995, 201-221; Flynn and Giráldez 1999, 23-35.

46 BR 2, 191.

47 This reform commuted most fiscal obligations to the government into a single tax paid in silver. See von Glahn 1996, 145-152.

48 AGI, *Filipinas*, 77, n. 1; BR 6, *Memorial to the Council*, III/1.

the city without the interference of the royal treasury. Only in 1581, after the appointment of Gonzalo Ronquillo de Peñalosa as new governor of the islands, a 3 % tariff of *almojarifazgo* was introduced, and anchorage dues were fixed to 12 *pesos* per ton.⁴⁹ However, these measures, especially the customs duties, caused the immediate reaction of the citizens of Manila, who expressed their dissatisfaction with the taxation introduced by Peñalosa and sent their protests to Madrid and Seville. According to what they wrote in a memorial to the Council of the Indies, dated April 19, 1586, the Chinese, because of the *almojarifazgo*, had experienced “many annoyances” (*mucha pesadumbre*) and threatened to abandon the trade in the Philippines.⁵⁰ Two months later, on June 26, the members of the Audiencia wrote a letter to Philip II explaining that

the fear of customs duties on such things as provisions and supplies, which are of great bulk, the great expense in lading, and their small profits here, induce[d] those merchants to discontinue bringing the above-named articles, substituting others in their place. Thus there has been a great scarcity of supplies, and considerable distress in the land.⁵¹

Accordingly, a royal decree was issued in 1589 exempting the Chinese, the Japanese, Siamese, Portuguese and Borneans from the payment of the *almojarifazgo* tax, as far as “provisions and ammunitions” (*bastimentos y municiones*) were concerned.⁵² Yet, in spite of the goodwill of the Spanish legislators, just three years later, in 1592, the Philippine governor Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas (1590–1593) lamented that the Chinese had severely reduced their imports of supplies, and that in Manila there was not even “a pound of powder, nor saltpetre, nor copper, or any other munitions”. That, according to him, was because the *Sangleyes* were too much afraid of the laws of their country and did not risk to ship them abroad.⁵³

49 AGI, *Filipinas*, 6, r. 4, n. 44; Ch'en 1968, 66-67; Gil 2011, 50-51.

50 AGI, *Filipinas*, 77, n. 1; BR 6, *Memorial to the Council*, II/3. When analyzing the *almojarifazgo* duty paid by the Chinese in the Philippines, one should not forget to consider the taxes that were levied in China, in terms of sailing licenses, tonnage of ships, and imports duties. See Chang 1991, 161.

51 AGI, *Filipinas*, 18A, r. 4, n. 24; BR 6, 259-260.

52 Archivo Histórico Nacional [de España], *Códices*, l. 690; BR 7, *Royal decree regarding commerce*. Only in 1610 the Spaniards were able to raise the tax to a 6 % tariff, which was kept unchanged until the end of the seventeenth century. Gil 2011, 50-54; Schurz 1939, 180.

53 AGI, *Filipinas*, 18B, r. 2, n. 8.

In fact, the selling of these products outside the country was considered illegal in China, and the transgressors of the law could be sentenced to death and suffer the confiscation of all their properties.⁵⁴ Inevitably, when the armies of Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豊臣秀吉 (1536–1598) invaded Korea in 1592, and the Ming were entangled in the conflict, the Chinese exports of gunpowder, saltpetre, sulphur and copper were reduced even further. As a consequence, the Japanese trade from Kyūshū and Kinai turned to be indispensable to the Spaniards, who could not depend exclusively on the Chinese imports and had to find other trading partners. This situation not only turned the Japanese into the principal suppliers of iron, gunpowder and saltpetre to the Philippines, but helped them to consolidate their independence concerning the purchases of raw silk in Manila, and confirmed the low taxes that they paid to the Spanish treasury.

That partly explains why the Spaniards did not burden the Chinese and the Japanese merchants with high duties on trade, and why the percentage of the *almojarifazgo* tax was kept so low. Moreover, it was in their interest to preserve good relations with all the communities of foreigners coming to the Philippines to trade, taking advantage of their enmities. Such, for example, is the case of the Chinese and the Japanese, as well as of the Siamese and the Cambodians.⁵⁵

Another important factor that stimulated the growth of commerce in Manila was the possibility to sell at retail, without the intervention of the Spanish government. In other words, the Spaniards did not apply the bulk-purchase system known as *pancada* to the foreign goods carried to the Philippines, and trade in Manila simply followed the rules of supply and demand, to the advantage of the Chinese and the Japanese.⁵⁶ Later on, in 1610, the Spanish captain Juan de Cevicos declared that the silk bought in Macao was far cheaper than that of Manila, because the Portuguese fixed the prices through the *pancada* system, whereas the Spaniards allowed the Japanese to buy Chinese silks freely, to the detriment of their own purchases and the reduction of their profits.⁵⁷

54 Von Glahn 1996, 118.

55 For a concise résumé of the Spanish involvement in the Indochinese wars of the 1590s, see Hall 1981, 279-283.

56 The Spaniards tried to introduce the *pancada* system in Manila already at the end of the 1580s, and a few years later, in 1593, a royal decree was issued for this purpose. However, the disposition was strongly opposed by the citizens of Manila, especially by the missionaries, and still at the end of the decade it had not been applied yet. Gil 2011, 54-55.

57 AGI, *Filipinas*, 4, n. 6.

This independence concerning purchasing and the low taxes imposed to foreign trade were among the reasons for the success of the Sino-Japanese trade in Manila. The commercial voyages of the Chinese between the ports of East and Southeast Asia permitted silver to circulate across the region, and they were also decisive for the establishment of new trade routes, which eventually stimulated the development of the intra-Asian commerce.

At any rate, foreign trade in Manila was not only a prerogative of the Chi-Chinese and Japanese merchants. As mentioned previously, there were several Portuguese traders who sailed to the Philippines from Macao, Malacca, and the Moluccas, as well as from Japan (Nagasaki). Many of them started to visit Manila in the early-1580s, after the union of the crowns of Spain and Portugal and the signing of the pact between Philip II and the *Cortes* of Tomar, which guaranteed to Goa the independence of the *Estado da Índia* and the exclusiveness of the Asian trade.

According to this, no Spanish ship was permitted to cross the line of demarcation of the Portuguese sphere of influence in the Far East and to engage in trade activities outside the geographical limits of the Philippine archipelago. In other words, the captain-merchants of Macao, Nagasaki, and Malacca, were the only ones allowed to cast anchor in the ports of China, Japan, Indochina, and Insulindia. It is, consequently, not surprising that the trade between Guangdong, Luzon, and Kyūshū fell largely if not exclusively in their hands. The Portuguese successfully expanded their commercial network through Manila and became the principal competitors of the Chinese merchants. The silver bullion carried to the Philippines from Mexico financed their commerce in the region and permitted the expansion of a far-reaching trade network.⁵⁸

After 1580, some Portuguese merchants took residence in Manila and started to participate in the city's daily life. They held a share in the load of the galleons bound to Acapulco and sent Asian goods to Mexico, Peru, Brazil, and the Caribbean, by means of their agents and associates. Moreover, they built up joint companies with the Spaniards and cooperated with the Japanese lords of Kyūshū, the Chinese mandarins of Guangdong, and other business partners.⁵⁹ Diogo Fernandes Vitória (Diego Hernández de Victoria), for example, a member of the City Council (*Cabildo*) and resident in Manila since 1580, supplied musk, Chinese silk, Indian cotton, diamonds, and other precious

58 Souza 1986; Boyajian 1993; Subrahmanyam 1993.

59 Ptak 2006, 472-473.

stones to the American market until his death in 1598. His associates were shipping goods to Manila from several ports of the Far East: in India, Southeast Asia, China and Japan. Among them, António Dias de Casseres (Antonio Díaz de Cáceres) made several voyages between Acapulco and Macao, via Manila, in those same years.⁶⁰

Besides stimulating the growth of Philippine commerce, the Portuguese also contributed to the establishment of new trade routes, like those from Macao and Nagasaki. In the early-1590s, the merchants of the “City of the Name of God” provided ammunition and provisions to the Spaniards, when the latter faced a shortage of imports from China. In 1608, the Macanese were officially authorized to send an annual ship to Manila in order to supply the Philippines with gunpowder, metals, and other strategic products.⁶¹ In later years, when the Dutch and the English appeared off the coast of Luzon, the commercial voyages from Macao became essential for the defense of Manila against a common enemy. More important still was the route Nagasaki-Manila, which was active at the turn of the sixteenth century until the expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan in 1639. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Spaniards started to visit the ports of Kyūshū to sell Chinese silk and other products obtained in the Philippines to the local *daimyōs*. From 1603 to 1609 they also sent one annual ship to Usuki (in the province of Bungo) to buy iron, copper, sulphur, saltpetre, and hemp for the royal warehouses.⁶²

By the 1620s, the Portuguese were sailing to Manila from several ports of Island Southeast Asia: Macassar, Brunei, and the Moluccas, as well as from India and the Malay peninsula. Manila’s customs records reveal that some Portuguese ships also arrived from the gulf of Siam and the Vietnamese coast.⁶³ With regard to Indochina, we have already enlisted the products that were carried to the Philippines by the merchants of Ayutthaya, Lovék, and Patani, but the arrival of Siamese ships to Luzon at the turn of the sixteenth century had less to do with trade than with politics and diplomacy. In fact, their visits to Manila, that happened “on rare occasions”, as Antonio Morga tells us, had begun just a few years before the writing of *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas* (which was published in Mexico in 1609) when King Satha (1576–1596) sent the first Cambodian embassy to the Philippines in order to gain the support of the

60 Boyajjian 1993, 76-81.

61 Boxer 1959, 74-75.

62 Gil 1991, 105-106; AGI, *Filipinas*, 20, r. 4, n. 35.

63 AGI, *Filipinas*, 24, r. 2, n. 14; Chaunu 1960, 156-157.

Spaniards against the armies of Ayutthaya (1593).⁶⁴ A similar mission also came from the Thais in 1595, with the intent to buy firearms and sell benzoin and ivory.⁶⁵

As a whole, the Indochinese trade in Manila did not reach such impressive proportions as the Sino-Japanese trade did. This can be explained with the lack of interest that the Siamese and the Cambodians (the same applies to Champa and Patani) had for the Philippine trade and for the Spanish silver in particular. As Father Francisco Combés wrote in 1662, silver from Peru and Japan

[...] attracted with powerful strength the trade of great China, Cochinchina, Cambodia, Siam, [...] and all the kingdoms of the Orient, and all of this mass of silver was converted in very precious goods that greatly ennobled the commerce.⁶⁶

In his nostalgic observation, the missionary included Indochina among the regions from where merchant ships sailed to Manila to get Spanish silver and Mexican coins. Yet, as we learn from the Franciscan missionary Marcelo de Ribadeneira (1527–1611), Siam had its own silver, which was used in Ayutthaya to trade with the Chinese, and it seems that no ship reached Manila from the ports of Vietnam at the turn of the sixteenth century.⁶⁷ Such Philippine products as wax, honey, palm leaves, civets (*gatos de algalia*), and others, were not needed in Indochina, and the Siamese merchants were far more interested in trading with the Chinese and the Japanese, on the same basis as the Spaniards.

64 “Siamese” ships were already visiting Manila in the 1580s, and probably even before the arrival of the Spaniards, but it is unclear whether they were sailing from the ports of the gulf of Thailand or from other places.

65 Rodao 1997, 26-38; Groslier and Boxer 1958, 39.

66 Boxer 1970, 472: *Llamava con fuerza poderosa el trato de la China, Cochinchina, Camboja, Siam, [...] y todos los reinos del Oriente, i toda esta masa de plata se convertia en géneros preciosísimos que ennoblecian grandemente el comercio.*

67 In Legísima 1947, 167; see also Reid 1988, 99. The dates of Ribadeneira's birth and death are unknown. He arrived in Manila in 1594 and was immediately destined to the Franciscan mission in Japan. He stayed in Japan until 1597, when he was expelled in the aftermath of the San Felipe affair. He arrived in Manila on January 1598 and finally sailed back to Europe. In 1600 he was in Madrid, and in 1601 his book (*Historia del archipiélago filipino y reinos de la Gran China, Tartaria, etc.*) was published in Barcelona.

Conclusion

Manila has been largely celebrated as the Spanish “Pearl of the Orient”, and, according to several accounts and memorials of the early-seventeenth century, as the centre of an imaginary circle, whose circumference encompassed the countries of the China Seas, and beyond. Because of its unique role as a link between two continents, Asia and America, and due to the great value of its Mexican silver, the city became one of the most visited ports of the region, attracting the trade from China, Japan, Indochina, and the Malay archipelago.

The particular conditions of the Sino-Japanese relations after the end of the tally trade (1549), as well as the peculiarities of the silk-for-silver exchange between China and Japan in the second half of the sixteenth century, favoured the establishment in Manila of an important community of overseas Chinese, and a smaller Japanese one, which contributed to the growth of the city and to the internationalization of its trade. The presence of silver bullion in the Philippines attracted a great number of Chinese ships from Fujian (and to a lesser degree, also from Guangdong), and stimulated the development of a quadrangular trade between South China, Luzon, Kyūshū, and Mexico, whose branches extended to India, Indochina, and Island Southeast Asia, through the Portuguese and Chinese maritime networks.

This long-distance transnational trade involved several actors, shipowners, captain-merchants, agents, and investors who moved their capitals between the Portuguese settlements of the *Estado da Índia* and the overseas Chinese and Japanese communities scattered around the region. Most of these communities were established in the same Southeast Asian countries which sent ships to Manila, or were commercially linked to the Philippines. Despite not having a great volume of trade with the Spaniards, the ports of Ayutthaya, Lovek, Brunei, and others, were nonetheless included inside Manila’s circle, and contributed with their products to the wealth of its commerce.

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Conquistadores or Merchants? Spanish Plans for the Conquest of China, 1565–1586

Omri BASSEWITCH FRENKEL

The last decades of the sixteenth century saw the Spanish empire at the height of its splendor. During that period it expanded its sphere of influence beyond the Americas. Motivated by the competition with Portugal over world hegemony, the Asian spice trade, and the desire to convert the people of China, Spain made great efforts to find an alternative route to the Far East, and to establish a foothold in Asian waters. These attempts culminated in 1565, when Miguel Lopez de Legazpi's (1502–1572) expedition had successfully colonized the Philippine Islands.

Contrary to Spanish expectations, spices or precious metals were not abundant in the Philippines. In addition, the geographical dispersion and social organization of the local population made it hard to control. This resulted in disappointment on the side of the Spaniards as for the profitability of the Philippine venture. What helped to preserve the Spanish colonization of the Philippines was the trade that evolved between the young colony and China; Chinese commodities, mainly silk products, were exchanged for American silver, and then shipped across the Pacific Ocean to Acapulco. The Chinese side of this commerce was managed by the Chinese merchant community in Manila.

However, as early as in the first decade of colonization, it became clear that the Spaniards in Manila were interested in no less than the conquest and evangelization of China. In the three decades that followed, such aspirations were manifested in several petitions sent to King Philip II (1527–1598; r. 1556–1598).

So far, scholars have treated these plans as a mere expression of Spanish hubris and religious and territorial aspirations. The following paper suggests that in evaluating this phenomenon, the social configuration of the Spanish-Philippine society is highly significant (although previously overlooked). The colonial society in the Philippines differed significantly from its prototypes in the Americas; from its very beginning it did not generate the resources needed for its existence by using the native labor force, but rather functioned, at least from an economic point of view, as a merchant society. The shift in colonial patterns from one that emphasizes control over land and people to one that relies on trade, was not a smooth shift for the Spanish settlers in the Philippines. This essay will argue that the Spanish plans for the conquest of China were, in

fact, manifestations of the social tensions that had appeared within the settler elite in the colony, as a result of the shift from a conquering society to a merchant community.

Spanish Conquistadores and Chinese Merchants: A Rendezvous in Manila

The Spanish experience in the Philippines was very different from their previous one in the Americas; the civilizations they encountered in the Philippines were not isolated from Asia and Europe, but were connected through trade and religion to the Muslim world, or to the regions defined by the Spaniards as “India” and “China”. In addition, the Spanish settlers of the Philippines had to cope with their Lusitanian counterparts, well established in Malacca and the Moluccas since the second decade of the sixteenth century.

Under these complicated conditions, the Spaniards aspired to establish a foothold in Southeast Asia to benefit from the spice trade in the region, and to compete with the Portuguese over imperial and religious hegemony. However, the Spanish settlers were soon disillusioned of the prospects of finding exportable quantities of spices or precious metals in the islands. This disappointment was evident in petitions sent from the islands to the king, suggesting the abandonment of the newly-founded colony.

Another cause for the bitter tone was the nature of the Filipino societies encountered by the Spaniards; traditionally, these peoples inhabited in small and relatively isolated communities, known as *barangays*, that produced little surplus.¹ Thus, when applied to the Tagalog and Bisayan peoples of the Islands, the systems of control over indigenous peoples, as imported from the Americas, failed to generate anything close to the profits made in New Spain or Peru. These conditions made the *encomiendas* in the islands a rather fragile economic solution for those colonizers who wished to live an easy life. The Spanish colonizers have realized as early as 1569 that their only salvation would be to develop trade with China and Japan.²

In 1573, when the first shipment of Chinese silk made its way from Manila to the Pacific port of Acapulco, it seemed that the sun began to shine over the

1 Nuchera 1995, 209-210.

2 Mirandaola, “Letter to Felipe II”, June 8 1569, BRB 3, 27-28.

young colony's economic horizon.³ As an incentive to settle in the islands, the Crown financed the construction of the galleons, and the residents of Manila were allotted lading space, so they could participate in the commerce. As a result many of the Spanish in Manila were involved in the trade, either as active participants or as dependents on its outcome. In the decades that followed, the quantity and quality of silk sent to Acapulco rose dramatically, competing successfully with Mexican and peninsular silk industries.

However, the Spanish that have settled in the Philippines were soldiers, administrators and missionaries rather than professional merchants. The latter, already well established in Mexico, did not care to risk the hazardous three month long journey across the Pacific Ocean, or worse even, the journey back, which extended to five or even six months. However, once the profitability of the trade with China could not be denied, the Manileños managed to control it through a set of unique trade mechanisms that evolved in Manila. These mechanisms allowed the Manileños to carry out international commerce without professionalizing in its practices, founding the local merchant guild (*consulado de mercaderes*) as late as 1769. Meanwhile, the Spanish in Manila did as much as they could to exclude the participation of Mexican and Peruvian merchants. As a result, the evolution of organized merchant elite in the Philippines was a considerably late phenomenon. Thus, the Spanish in Manila managed the trade, using vessels built with royal capital whilst competing with the Mexican and Iberian markets.

The trade with the Philippine Islands was not alien to the Chinese. Fujianese merchants have been frequenting them since the days of the Song 宋 dynasty (960–1279), trading silk, porcelain, glass beads and ironware for cotton, wax, pearls, turtle shells and canvas. Also, Moluccan spices were being carried by Chinese merchants passing through the Philippines on their way to China mainland.⁴

The origin of the permanent Chinese communities in the Philippines is not entirely clear. However, it was probably incepted by merchants from Fujian, which sojourned in the area at the beginning of the fifteenth century. Later in that century, a Chinese imperial decree banning maritime international trade was issued preventing those merchants from returning to their homeland. They married local women, but at the same time preserved their Chinese identity,

3 Hernando Riquel *et al.*, "News from the Western Islands", Jan. 1574, BRB 3, 220.

4 Ptak 1993, 7-9; Viliers 1981, 737.

and maintained illegal trade connections with their clans in the port cities of Eastern China.⁵

The Spanish colonization of the Philippines unintentionally altered the characteristics of the local Chinese merchant community, both in size, places of origin and professions. These developments were possible as a result of two major transformations that occurred in the Chinese empire during the second half of the sixteenth century. The first was the final stage in the Chinese economy's shift from paper-currency to silver. This move is attributed to the "single whip reform", a tax reform, issued in the 1570s, allowing the payment of taxes, previously levied in the form of labor, in specie. This fundamental change in the biggest market of the world, especially in an era of thriving internal trade, caused an infinite demand for silver. This demand led to a silver-gold exchange rate double the one in Europe at that time.⁶

The second occurrence was the lifting of the fifteenth century ban on international maritime trade in 1576. Although the prohibition did not prevent the Chinese merchants from conducting illicit trade, its legalization made trafficking easier and safer.⁷ In addition to a relatively free maritime trade, this legalization meant that non-merchant Chinese had the ability to travel and settle outside mainland China.

These favorable conditions coincided with equally auspicious factors in Spanish America; the amount of silver extracted from the mines of Potosí and Zacatecas, was increased in the 1570s–1580s, following the wide use of mercury amalgamation to recover silver from ore.⁸ The economic boost that followed resulted in a growing demand for Chinese luxuries in Peru and New Spain.

Non-merchant Chinese, attracted by the scent of silver, began immigrating to the city. These immigrants were Fujianese of lower economic status than their merchant compatriots, and soon, they dominated the local economy of Manila as garden farmers, fishermen shopkeepers and craftsmen. As opposed to the Chinese merchants and factors that sojourned in Manila, these laborers resided permanently in Manila, and seldom went back to their ancestral home.⁹

Soon after, Manila, the economic and governmental centre of the Spanish Philippine venture, became completely dependent on Chinese commerce and

5 Wang 1996, 58.

6 Glahn 1996, 61-63, 70-72, 146; Flynn and Giráldez 1997, 266.

7 Brook 1998, 210-215.

8 Cobb 1949, 36-37.

9 Chia 2006, 521-522; Cummins 1971, 307.

labor. While the trade with China not only provided to the Spanish colony regular supply of foodstuffs, domesticated animals, furniture, paper and ammunition, the silk-silver exchange between the Chinese and Spanish became the major source of income for the citizens of Manila. On their side, the Spanish acknowledged the Chinese as highly civilized, sophisticated people, and as essential business partners.

However, the early prosperity of the city did not satisfy its citizens, and by the end of the sixteenth century, six proposals for the entry into China or for its conquest were dispatched to the Catholic emperor. Of these, the proposal sent in 1586 by the General Assembly of the Estates of the Philippine Islands (*juntas generales de todos los estados de las islas Filipinas*) is the most striking. This plan not only embodies the way the Manileños perceived China and the Chinese, but also their perception of Spain as a global empire and their central role in it.

Early Misperceptions: Spanish Knowledge, Aspirations and the Chinese Project

The idea of the Philippine Islands as a stepping stone on the way to China originated even before the foundation of Manila and can be traced to the first description of China sent by Andrés de Mirandaola (1507–1568) to Philip II as early as 1569:

[...] All of us your Majesty's servants and vassals are quite sure that, in your time, China will be subject to your Majesty, and that in these parts, the religion of Christ will be spread and exalted, and your Majesty's royal crown increased, and all this in a very short time.¹⁰

Even if Mirandaola, as the royal *factor*, meant to please the emperor more than to suggest the next course of action, it is obvious that the theme of expansion into continental Asia was present in the hearts of the Spaniards, and perhaps also in the heart of the one who commissioned their voyage. Mirandaola's letter of 1569 supplies us with an early description of China and Chinese society by a Spaniard:

[...] It was learned from these men that China is a very important country and that its people are highly civilized, engage extensively in trade, and have a well-ordered government. They tell of thirteen cities called Chincheo, Cantun, Huechiu, Nimpou, Onchiu, Hinan, Sisuan, Conce, Onan, Nanquin, and Paquin. Paquin is the

10 Andrés de Mirandaola, "Letter to Felipe II", June 8 1569, BRB 3, 29.

court and residence of the king, Fuchu, Ucau, Lintam, and Cencay are cities of especial note. There are in all fifteen in which they say that the king has placed his governors. The king is named Nontehe, and a son of his Taycu. This is the relation that we have been able to get from these men – hitherto, outside of the ancients, the only description of the greatness of China that your Majesty has. They say that these people are so fearful of a prophecy related to them many times by their astrologers – namely, that they are to be subdued, and that the race to subdue them will come from the east – that they will not allow any Portuguese to land in China; and the king orders his governors expressly not to allow it. Throughout his land he has enforced great watchfulness, and stored military supplies, as these Indians give us to understand.¹¹

It is hard to ignore the similarity of the description given here to Spanish reports on the Aztec and Inca Empires. Considering that the Spaniards were already quite disappointed of the population they had encountered in the Philippines, the idea of moving on to conquer China was not out of context. The prophecy of the future falling of China to “a race that comes from the east”, so similar to the mythical Aztec prophecy propagated by the conquistadores following the conquest of Mexico. It is possible that this prophecy is repeated here to prepare the ground for a future conquest. However, it seems that at this early stage, the Spanish colonizers of the Philippines perceived China as another American Imperial Civilization. They did not yet comprehend the vastness, wealth or strength of China.

The following proposals for the entry into China appears in three letters from 1573, all of which addressed to Felipe II; the first one was written by Diego de Artieda Chirino y Uclés (?–1591), a captain and future conquistador of Nicaragua. The second letter was written by Martin Enriquez de Almanza (d. c. 1583; r. 1568–1580), the viceroy of New Spain, and the third by Hernando Riquel (b. 1498), the king’s notary in Manila, and others from the colony (names and positions are not specified). These proposals were preceded by a short summary of what was known of China and its people at the time of writing. However, none of the above writers ever visited China, and their knowledge of the Middle Kingdom was probably acquired from Portuguese and Muslim merchants that had contacts with China, or as is the case in the third letter, from Chinese merchants in Manila. Despite this fact, the picture brought in the descriptions of 1573 is very different from the one presented in the 1569 letter of Mirandaola.

11 Andrés de Mirandaola, “Letter to Felipe II”, June 8 1569, BRB 3, 28-29.

Artieda describes the Chinese civilization in a form of a *relación* surveying industry, military capabilities, governing system, agriculture and supplies, technology, dress and appearance:

The Chinese are highly civilized. They work iron with tools. I have seen iron inlaid with gold and silver, as cunningly and skillfully wrought as they could be in any part of the world. In like manner they work in wood and all other materials... They make gold into threads as is done in Milan, and weave raised designs of it on damasks and other silken fabrics. They possess all kinds of weapons that we have. Their artillery, judging it by some culverins I have seen that came from China, is of excellent quality and better cast than ours... In each city and province there is an armed garrison. The people dress well; they wear beards and are as white as ourselves. The women are very beautiful, except that they all have small eyes. They wear long shirts and robes, reaching to the ground. They dye and dress their hair carefully, and it is even said that they rouge and color their faces. It is said that the king of that land is so great a lord, that his camp is composed of three hundred thousand men, two hundred thousand of whom are mounted on horses. On painted articles I have seen pictures of horsemen armed with coats of mail, Burgundy helmets, and lances. The country is so fertile and well provisioned, that it is believed to be the best country in the world... They possess matrices with which they have printed books from time immemorial.¹²

The same form and order of description was applied by Artieda to describe the Filipino societies, and also by Legazpi himself in an earlier *relación* of 1569.¹³ Similar pattern of description was also evident in earlier chronicles of both conquistadores and religious that had encountered the indigenous civilizations of Hispañola, Mexico and the Andes.¹⁴

The first thing that Artieda mentioned in the description is the fact that the Chinese are excellent smiths. This fact is important, as neither the Aztecs nor the Inca had casted iron for weapons or tools. It is possible that the priority given by Artieda to mentioning the Chinese' ironworking proficiency served to differentiate the Chinese civilization from the previously encountered American civilizations. It is also noticeable that Artieda perceived the Chinese as superior, in some ways, even to the Spanish themselves.

12 Diego de Artieda, "Relation to the Western Islands Called Filipinas", 1573, BRB 3, 183-184.

13 Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, "Relation of the Filipinas Islands and of the Character and Conditions of their Inhabitants", July 7 1569, BRB 3, 39-47.

14 For example, see Elliott 1970, 9.

Artieda did not offer the king to conquer China but rather to enter it as a leader of a diplomatic mission. By doing so he proposed to reconnoiter the coast and check the possibilities of commerce and conquest:

If your Majesty desires to have this land explored, I am at your service provided I be given two ships of about two hundred and fifty tons each, with forty soldiers to each vessel, and all the artillery, ammunition, and provisions that will be necessary. With our Lord's help, and bearing some power of ambassador to the lord of the land, I will enter the country myself, returning by way of Nueva España after having explored the coast. I will ascertain how both trade and conquest must be carried on there [...].¹⁵

Considering that Artieda's declared intention was espionage, the number of vessels and soldiers he requested for the mission was not as ridiculous as later numbers for greater causes seemed to be.

Viceroy Enriquez' letter is not a clear plan, but it is quite possible that its part concerning China was written when a proposal for the entry of China was being discussed:

As for the mainland of China, it is so large a land and so thickly settled that one of its hundred divisions, according to report, is as big as half the world itself. It is learned from the Chinese that they admit strangers only with reluctance to their land. For this reason, more and better soldiers would be needful than those who could go from this land, for those born here are but little used to hardship – although it is also understood that the people of China, in spite of possessing weapons, horses, and artillery, are but little superior in valor to the Indians...¹⁶

Enriquez was probably relying on Artieda's report as his source on Chinese armament. However, the claim given by Enriquez that in spite of their advanced weaponry, the Chinese resemble the Indians in their courage and fighting ability, and so, make no match for the Spaniards in the battlefield, is a new one. This motif appeared in later proposals and constituted the rationalization given by their authors for the huge gap between the greatness of China and its military abilities, to the minute number of combatants requested in their conquest plans.

The next proposal, written by Hernando Riquel was already based on knowledge obtained from Chinese living in Manila. However, the details concerning China differ little from the information given in the other two pro-

15 Diego de Artieda, "Relation to the Western Islands Called Filipinas", 1573, BRB 3, 184.

16 "Letter from the Viceroy of New Spain to Felipe II", 1573, BRB 3, 211-212.

posals of the same year. The theme of a strong but easily subdued kingdom is repeated in Riquel's letter:

It must be understood that those people are very peculiar in their traffic, costume, and customs; every day this is more evident, since some of the inhabitants of this city are natives of China. From them it is learned that the land is very rich and thickly populated. The king is well prepared for war and the frontiers are well fortified with many forts with artillery and garrisons wherein strict watch is kept. They say that from the city of Canton, one of the strongest towns on the coast of the mainland, there is a distance of one year's travel before arriving at Paquin [Pekin], the residence of the king; this means from coast to coast of the land. There are many very populous cities on the way, but if his Majesty would be pleased so to command, they could be subdued and conquered with less than sixty good Spanish soldiers.¹⁷

While some of the information included in the last two proposals was probably taken from the one composed by Artieda, their nature is entirely different. If Artieda was impressed with the Chinese civilization, and offered the king to serve as an ambassador and a spy, the letters of Riquel and Enriquez simply petitioned for a conquest.

The next proposal, written in 1576, was sent to Philip II by the governor of the Philippines, Francisco de Sande. Stronger than its predecessors, this proposal reflects the desire prevalent in the Philippines to expand into mainland China. This petition for the entry and conquest of China was structured in the same manner, and was preceded by a comprehensive description of the land and its people. However, this time the petition was based on genuine knowledge collected in 1575 by a Spanish embassy to China led by the Augustin Fray Martín de Rada and Miguel de Loarca, a soldier and former companion of Legazpi. If the China described by Sande in his *relación* of 1576 lacked the greatness described by Artieda, the account given by him was much broader than the paradoxical axiom of a militarily strong but easily subdued kingdom, as found in the letters of Enriquez and Riquel.

It seems that the Spaniards finally began to grasp China as a real country rather than a distant, legendary kingdom. Sande describes such issues as governmental institutions, provinces, roads, commerce and trade, religion and superstition, attitudes and characteristics of the people, corruption and personal safety, land ownership, medicine, fashion and social habits. He also mentions customs and traditions such as the habit of drinking hot liquids, the custom of foot

17 Hernando Riquel *et al.*, "News from the Western Islands", 1574, BRB 3, 220-221.

binding and the technique of curing by cauterizing the wounds after blood-letting.¹⁸ However, it can be argued that these descriptions were given precisely in order to alienate the Chinese by showing how peculiar they are. This way, the Chinese would become the “others” that none can identify with, prior to a planned Spanish conquest.

While it is clear from Sande’s description that China is a huge, fertile, rich and developed country, it is also very corrupted; bandits, robbers and pirates swarm its roads and waterways, the people are immoral and involved in sexual perversions, and their laziness have them strive only for an easy gain. The common men are poor and wretched, and suffer from the tyranny of those in power – judges, governors and the king.¹⁹ As he had no acquaintance with Chinese history, governmental system or society, Sande did not know how to explain this duality. However, he did not have to; it is evident from Sande’s letter that the Spanish accusations of the Chinese’ tyranny, immorality and peculiarity were not there to provide some cultural background, but rather to justify the conquest of China:

The war with this nation is most just, for it gives freedom to poor, wretched people who are killed, whose children are ravished by strangers, and whom judges, rulers, and king treat with unheard-of tyranny. Each speaks ill of his neighbor; and almost all of them are pirates, when any occasion arises, so that none are faithful to their king. Moreover, a war could be waged against them because they prohibit people from entering their country. Besides, I do not know, nor have I heard of, any wickedness that they do not practice; for they are idolators, sodomites, robbers, and pirates, both by land and sea. And in fact the sea, which ought to be free according to the law of nations, is not so, as far as the Chinese are concerned.²⁰

In this context it is important to note that all along the sixteenth century, the China described by the Spaniards was mostly Guangdong and Fujian provinces, the homelands of the Chinese that came to live in Manila, also visited by de Rada’s embassy. Although (and because) both Fujian and Guangdong harbored China’s most prosperous trade emporiums at that era, they suffered from banditry, piracy and uprisings more than any other province in China during the late Ming (1506–1644).²¹ These phenomena caused by the rapid social changes China had undergone in the second half of the sixteenth century, mainly ur-

18 Francisco de Sande, “Relation of the Philippine Islands”, June 7 1576, BRB 4, 52, 56.

19 Francisco de Sande, “Relation of the Philippine Islands”, June 7, 1576, BRB 4, 50-52.

20 Ibid, BRB 4, 59.

21 Tong 1991, 58-63.

banization, industrialization and commercialization, were probably amplified by the distance from the Imperial Court and the endless possibilities created by international maritime trade.²²

Sande was not aware that, in fact, the eras of Longqing 隆慶 (1567–1573) and Wanli 萬曆 (1573–1620) had also brought China many transformations in military organization, a reformed taxing system and greater measures of control over trade and traffic.²³ Moreover, the pirates, that during the fifteenth and most of the sixteenth centuries brought the eastern provinces to their knees, capturing merchant ships and sacking coastal cities, were diminishing after the lifting of the ban on foreign trade and the introduction of the single whip tax reforms.²⁴

It is true that China of the late Ming had seen many changes, not all of them proved to be for the best of its people. However, even if he could grasp the greatness of China, I suspect that since Sande aimed to acquire permission to plan China's conquest, he emphasized its weaknesses, and not its size, multitude of population, or its military strength. This confusion is evident in the statement that the Chinese population is more numerous than that of Germany (*"más que alemania"*) on the one hand, and claiming that the population of the smallest province of China has more people than New Spain and Peru combined (*"La menor Prouinçia tiene más gente que la Nueva España y Pirú juntos"*) on the other.²⁵

The confusion regarding the ability of China to defend itself led Sande to believe that four to six thousand soldiers would be sufficient for its conquest. He imagined that these soldiers would take a whole province without much difficulty, as the population, suffering from great tyranny, will surely revolt against the local governors. Local pirates and the Japanese would come to the aid of the Spanish soldiers, Sande assured the king, and "...finally, the kind treatment, the evidences of power, and the religion which we shall show to them will hold them firmly to us."²⁶ Paradoxically, these same degenerated and inferior people, according to Sande, were nevertheless ripe for conversion.

At the time this document was composed, the trade with China was not yet stable, and both the Manileños and the Mexicans did not have high prospects

22 Ibid, 140-151.

23 Mote 1999, 730-731.

24 W. So 1975, 154-155.

25 Francisco de Sande, "Relation to the Philippine Islands", June 7, 1576, BRB 4, 50, 53.

26 Ibid, BRB 4, 59.

of it.²⁷ This, in addition to the poor profits of the Philippine *encomiendas*, might have been Sande's incentive to move on to China, a rich albeit wild east.

However, Don Felipe, perhaps out of cautiousness or by some other sense or wisdom, was not happy with the adventure offered, and instead he dismissed the overzealous governor stating that "the opinion here is that the matter should be dropped, and instead you should cultivate good relations with the Chinese and not give aid to the pirates who are their enemies, nor give them any just to cause for annoyance with us."²⁸

Seemingly, the proposals for the conquest of China were evolving from an idea based on out of date information and rumors, to a detailed proposal, supported by a wide range of sources. The Artieda letter is somewhat unusual among these proposals, although a man of arms, he did not elude himself that China could be easily conquered. Sande, however, was sure about the Spanish superiority and the positive prospects of an invasion of China. Although he had mentioned the vastness of China and the multiplicity of its population in his account, his proposal ignored them altogether. When observing China, Sande considered it to be inferior to Spain, similarly to the way the *conquistadores* perceived the imperial societies in America.

Dreaming Big: The Plan to Invade China of 1586

The 1580's saw Spain at its zenith; the annexation of Portugal (1580), the truce signed with the Turks (1581) and the peace made with the rich provinces of the Netherlands in 1585, provided Spain with new territories and income, but also relieved its economy from additional military expenditures. Success was also evident in the New World; Buenos Aires was re-founded by Juan de Garay (1528–1583) in 1580, further exploration into North America was in progress, and the Spaniards were firmly established in the Philippines. Considering these achievements, the concept of a Catholic world monarchy under Spanish rule did not seem so outrageous anymore. The land Spain claimed to control surpassed that of any other empire and encompassed all known continents.

The next plan for the conquest of China was formulated during this jubilant era. This time, the planners were all the officials of the young colony: secu-

27 Ibid, BRB 4, 59; Letter from the viceroy of New Spain to Felipe II, 1573, BRB 4, 212.

28 Quoted in Kamen 2003, 224.

lar administrators, military commanders and ecclesiastical leaders. All from governor and bishop on down gathered in the first General Assembly of the Estates of the Philippine Islands (*juntas generales de todos los estados de las islas Filipinas*) where among other issues this plan was conceived. The leading figures among the signatories seemed to be Santiago de Vera, the governor of the Philippines and head of the *audiencia*, the first bishop of Manila, the Dominican friar Domingo Salazar (1512–1594) and the Jesuit father Alonso Sanchez (1547–1593). Vera and Salazar, having been responsible for the material and spiritual aspects of the lives of almost twenty thousand Chinese in Manila, had an intimate acquaintance with their culture and local society. Sanchez himself had visited China twice but at both times was expelled from Guangzhou after attempting to arrange for proselytising.²⁹

Different from previous proposals discussed above, this plan does not appear as a part of a *relación* but as an appendix to the final protocol of the general assembly. Contrary to earlier plans, the 1586 document is a precise military plan, divided into consistent, carefully phrased and detailed closes. For the planners this proposal meant the fulfillment of both their religious duties to god, and temporal duties to their king and country. To them, the expansion into continental Asia was a step towards global redemption and the end of time.³⁰

The plan itself, composed by professionals, specifies much more than the number of soldiers needed for the operation, but also their origins, their expected salary, their equipment and armament. Similar description is given of the supply routes and recruiting methods, as well as of cooperation and coordination with non-Spanish forces. In light of the recent union of the Iberian crowns, and the expanding Portuguese sphere of influence in the East, the twenty thousand combatants included in the plan were not solely of Spanish origin, but included Portuguese soldiers, Japanese mercenaries, and even Indian slaves, brought from the viceroyalty of Goa. All participants were planned to rendezvous in the Philippines with Spanish forces from the peninsula and native Filipino auxiliaries.³¹ The use of forces and materials from all over the known world may imply that the composers of the plan perceived themselves as a part of a vast empire on its way to become a universal one.

29 Headly 1995, 638; see also Ollé 2002.

30 Santiago de Vera *et al.*, “Memorial to the Counsel by the Citizens of the Filipinas Islands”, BRB 6, 198.

31 *Ibid.*, BRB 6, 200–203.

However, while Artieda had offered to reconnoiter and Sande's proposal was one of conquest, the plan offered by the General Assembly is somewhat different. The subjugation of China was planned to be achieved through the conversion of its people, rather than by a pure military conquest. The assumption was that the Chinese were so ripe for conversion that, once preached to peacefully, they would revolt against their tyrannous Mandarins and welcome Spanish hegemony, religion and culture. Accordingly, the preachers were to enter China with an armed escort rather than an army.³²

The voice of Bishop Domingo Salazar is clearly dominant in this section, criticizing the Spanish expeditions in America for leaving the land desolate and depopulated. As a devoted student of Vitoria and Las Casas, Salazar worked against the oppression of the indigenous population, and defended the Chinese community in Manila when maltreated by Spanish officials. Gradually, he became an advocate of the Chinese and their culture, and as such, he did not wish China to be ravaged by greedy *conquistadores*. He supported a peaceful entry into China, stating that the wealth of that country is in its people, rather than in the imperial treasure houses. Therefore, if an orderly entry was not ensured, the Spanish would alienate the Chinese, and as a result, would be unable to rule the kingdom or to convert its people:

If the Spaniards go into China in their usual fashion, they would desolate and ravage the most populous and richest country that ever was seen; and if the people of China be once driven away, it will be as poor as all the other depopulated Yndias – for its riches are only those that are produced by a numerous and industrious people, and without them it would not be rich.³³

In the opinion of Salazar and his co-planners, the Chinese governing system would somehow be preserved in order to prevent havoc and anarchy, and to maintain the existing ideal Chinese society:

His Majesty should know that the government of that people is so wonderful, both for restraining and keeping in order so great a multitude; and because, although lacking the further light and aid of the faith, it is maintained with such peace and quiet, so much wealth, happiness, and plenty, that never since its foundation, so far

32 Ibid, BRB 6, 212-213.

33 Santiago de Vera *et al.*, "Memorial to the Counsel by the Citizens of the Filipinas Islands", BRB 6, 211.

as is known, has it suffered war, pestilence, or famine, in the main body of the realm, although there are wars on the Tartar frontiers.³⁴

The planners attributed many superlatives to the Chinese, concurrently, their opinion on the Spanish nature is not entirely positive. They went as far as to depict the Chinese as superior to the Spanish in every aspect save their faith and courage.

Since the people are so clever and intelligent, with agreeably fair complexions and well-formed bodies, and are so respectable and wealthy, and have nothing of the Indian in their nature, they have the advantage of us in everything except salvation by the faith, and courage.³⁵

Although the Chinese were highly esteemed by the Spanish for their industry, mental capabilities and developed governing system, the Spaniards never assumed that they might lose even a single battle to the Chinese. The only dangers anticipated for the Spanish forces were “confusion, discouragement or desertion” caused by sending to China unqualified commanders or undisciplined soldiers.³⁶ The justifications for this confidence were the same two aspects in which the Chinese were surpassed by the Spaniards: faith and courage.

It seems that, after having been in contact with China and the Chinese in Manila for almost twenty years, the thinking pattern of “China as another American kingdom” had almost completely disappeared from the minds of the Spaniards. Yet, from a military perspective, they had difficulty comparing China to Spain or to any other European or Mediterranean power.

One of the reasons for this difficulty, I would suggest, was the Spanish failure to perceive the characteristics of the East-Asian battlefield. Although at times technologically inferior to the European arena, when it came to the use of manpower, it ousted it by far. In the case of the Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598), over 150,000 soldiers took part in the first wave of the invasion alone. Facing a Korean army, reinforced by a modest Ming expeditionary force of about 40,000 soldiers, Japan had failed to take Korea.³⁷ Yet, to the Spaniards it was inconceivable that against an invasion of 20,000 men, China could easily muster several hundred thousand soldiers.

34 Ibid, BRB 6, 211-212.

35 Ibid, BRB 6, 219.

36 Ibid, BRB 6, 210-211.

37 Turnbull 2002, 42, 140.

The plan ends with a bold vision of a future Hispano-Chinese Utopian society. A civilization created by mixed marriages of Spanish soldiers and Chinese women, administered by native governors under Spanish rule. Carried away by their imagination, the planners went so far as to offer the foundation of new military orders in China, the creation of titles, division of *encomiendas* and the appointment of “four to six viceroys”. In addition, controlling China would enable Spain to subjugate all the kingdoms under Chinese sphere of domination, including Cambodia and Siam.³⁸ It can be argued that the values found in this utopian dream reflect a social continuation that altered little since the Spanish *reconquista*.

The Spaniards’ perception of the Chinese as a superior civilization was a very selective one; they chose to see those characteristics of superiority where it was suitable and useful, but on less convenient occasions, they totally ignored them. Therefore, the logic for China’s role as a major Asian power simply eluded them. Henry Kamen rightly summarized this misperception: “Spaniards like to think of Manila as an outpost of a universal Spanish empire. In reality, it existed only because of the tolerance of the Chinese and Japanese.”³⁹

So far, when not dismissed as a complete folly, the plan of 1586 was treated as a part of the “messianic imperialism” or “evangelic spiritualism” that pervaded the court of Philip II following the union of the crowns.⁴⁰ Manel Ollé, in his monograph *La Empresa de China*, perceived it as the zenith of Spanish aspirations in Asia, prior to a transition in policy towards peaceful trade. Without contradicting these scholarships, I would like to suggest a different approach to the Spanish aspirations manifested in this plan.

During the early years of the colonization of the Philippines, the Spaniards had frequently complained on the poor state of their new acquisition. This may have been one of the motivations for the early proposals for the conquest of China. However, by the mid-1580s the trade with China was thriving and the new colony was enjoying a relative prosperity. The cargo of the galleon *Santa Ana*, captured by Thomas Cavendish (1560–1592) in 1587 may serve here as an evidence for that fortunate state; the Englishman’s prize contained “more

38 Santiago de Vera *et al.*, “Memorial to the Counsel by the Citizens of the Filipinas Islands”, BRB 6, 217-227.

39 Kamen 2003, 220.

40 Parker 1995.

than a million [pesos'] worth of gold, pearls, musk, civet, and rich merchandise..."⁴¹

As I have mentioned above, most Spaniards in Manila invested in or were financially tied to the Galleon Trade. Since an established merchant elite did not evolve in Manila until well into the seventeenth century, those involved in the trade were mostly the colony's administrators, clergy, officers and soldiers. True, greed has no limits; however, considering that the colonizers were getting quite wealthy without much effort, a proposal of such magnitude had to have more motives than mere covetousness.

The same question arises regarding the missionaries. Assuming they were not driven by material greed (though quite often they were), the Philippine Islands had many souls awaiting to be saved. Yet the religious orders, led by the Bishop, also supported the entry. There is no clear answer to this question, but it seems that several factors were responsible for the motivation to conquer China, as expressed by both lay and religious colonizers of Manila.

It may be easier to explain the ecclesiastical plea for entry into China. Even before meeting any Chinese or setting foot in China, some of the religious had dreamt of its conversion. Bishop Salazar himself confessed it:

For a long time I have had the conversion of that kingdom at heart, and with that thought I came to these islands. One of the reasons which made me accept this bishopric was the fact that these islands were very near China, and that many Chinese had come to live here.⁴²

Salazar was not the only one to believe that in the matter of conversion, China would be a better target than the Philippine Islands; more than once, friars left their post in the Islands without authorization in order to go to China.⁴³ Additionally, the geographical characteristics of the archipelago, its linguistic diversity, and the lack of commonly used alphabet, made it difficult for the missionaries to reach their assigned parishes and to communicate with their flock.⁴⁴ The missionaries believed that they would not encounter similar difficulties in China, perceiving it as a big landmass, densely populated "with but one stock", and a long literary tradition.

41 Santiago de Vera, "Letter to Felipe II", BRB 7, 47.

42 Domingo Salazar, "The Chinese and the Parian of Manila", BRB 7, 161.

43 Domingo Salazar, "Affairs in the Philippine Islands", 1583, BRB 5, 238.

44 Phelan 1959, 17-18.

The drive of the officials and soldiers of Manila to invade China can perhaps be better explained in cultural terms; the nature of the Spanish conquest revolved mostly around the idea of acquisition of land and the subjection of people. In the Philippines, the *conquistadores* faced the same typical geographical and social difficulties as their religious brethren. The Castilians were never seafarers by nature, and often hired foreigners to act as explorers, pilots and commanders on their behalf. This disinclination made the Spanish pacification of the Philippines a slow and continuous process.

The relative unprofitability of the Philippine *encomiendas* caused the Spanish colonists to concentrate around Manila and its lucrative commerce. However, the Spaniards were neither merchants by ideal nor by lifestyle. Even in Mexico, where a prosperous merchant elite was established at that time, merchants did not enjoy the social status clergy and government officials did.⁴⁵ High officials in Manila (often, themselves, involved in the trade) had repeatedly criticized the new profitable vocation of the colony's soldiery, scorning them as slothful, corrupt and effeminate:

The Spaniards have become effeminate in spirit by their trading, and on various occasions have greatly lost their repute, for they are not as they used to be – having given themselves over to vices, luxuries, fine clothes, eating, and drinking; consequently they have not had their wonted success on several of the expeditions, and have come back without accomplishing what they set out to do, and the friendly Indians are making war, and going out to fight.⁴⁶

I believe that the shift from a colonization focused on land control to one focused on trade created a social tension, which became an important catalyst for the Manilaños' aspirations to conquer China. Land control was seen as dignified, masculine and important for the preservation of the colony, while trade was grasped as feminine, weak and lazy. The narrative of plans for the invasion of China may have arisen from the Spanish society's inability to adapt itself to the conditions of the Philippine Islands, and its failure to adopt new ideals of prestige and models of status. Thus, even if *de facto* the colony profited from trade rather than from *encomiendas*, the officials and military elite were unequipped to make the social and ideological change. This incapability led the secular and religious elites to look for other terrains for colonization and con-

45 Schell-Hoberman 1991, 281.

46 Pedro de Rojas, "Letter to Felipe II", June 1586, BRB 6, 270-271. For more examples, see: Domingo Salazar, "Letter to Philip II", 24 June 1590, BRB 7, 254; Antonio de Morga, "Letter to Felipe II", July 1596, BRB 9, 254.

quest that would enable them to maintain the tradition they had developed during the *reconquista* and established, later, in the new world. This state of stagnation had also limited the Spaniards' perception of newly encountered civilizations such as that of Imperial China.

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The Dutch Deserter Hugo Rozijn and his Activities in East Asian Waters during the Ming-Qing Transition

CHENG Wei-chung 鄭維中

The Long Siege and Defectors

From 30 April 1661 to 1 February 1662, the Chinese warlord Coxinga (a westernization of Chinese Guoxingye 國姓爺, literally “Lord with the Imperial Surname”; Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功, 1624–1662) laid siege to the headquarters of the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (short: VOC, Dutch East India Company) in Taiwan, Fort Zeelandia, with a vanguard force of about ten thousand soldiers, with whom he had crossed the Taiwan strait from his army base at Amoy on the Chinese coast. In May 1661, not long after his surprising appearance, a general survey was made of the garrison in the fortress. In total 1,733 persons were recorded to be in Fort Zeelandia, consisting of:

- 35 gunners
- 870 other soldiers and officers
- 63 male citizens
- 218 women and children
- 547 male and female slaves and slave-children¹

During the summer season, Coxinga’s troops (including fifteen thousand soldiers who landed later) suffered from food shortages, while the Dutch garrison and the slaves in the fort were ailing owing to the detrimental hygienic conditions and a lack of medicines and fresh vegetables. In the fortress, which was situated on a sand dune in the sea, they had only limited access to fresh water, because the connection with the mainland was cut off.² In the middle of July, 400 patients were in the hospital when the summer heat struck the island.³ By the beginning of September, the number of patients had dropped to 200. During the most severe summer heat, every day six to eight people died.⁴ A rescue

1 VOC1235, 374; *Dagh-Register 1661*, 498.

2 Andrade 2011, 190-191.

3 Herport 1930, 71.

4 *Dagh-Register 1661*, 425.

fleet led by Jacob Cauw (or Cau, 1626–?) arrived in September, and added 712 soldiers to the garrison of the castle, and on the sixteenth of that month the Dutch even launched an attack on Coxinga's siege-line, costing the former about 214 troops (killed or captured), but to little avail.⁵ After the Dutch fleet was forced to leave on account of stormy weather, there remained about 868 people in the garrison of the fort, including the newly supplied troops. Meanwhile, the number of patients in the hospital had risen to 300.⁶

Coxinga's soldiers were also considerably reduced in number and were waiting for the following harvest, seeking relief from the famine, but they still were able to deter the Dutch garrison from attempting to break the siege.⁷ They eventually obtained rice from other army stations on the Chinese coast.⁸ When the season turned into deep autumn, the besieged Dutch garrison found it was constantly lacking fuels.⁹ According to another survey, as of 20 November 1661, 378 military personnel had succumbed to illness since the siege began. Although it is said that 950 personnel (including 100 gunners) were still able to defend themselves when the rescue fleet was driven away by storms, this number was only a little more than when the siege began in May 1661.¹⁰ This means they could barely maintain their resistance against the siege by Coxinga's army. A new reinforcement fleet could not arrive before the following summer, so a counter-strike was out of the question. In the middle of November, governor Frederik Coyett (or Coyet, 1615–1687) ordered about 200 women, children and slaves to be shipped away by the *Rode Vos*, including his own family.¹¹ An-

5 *Dagh-Register 1661*, 512, 515. The newly arrived fleet led by Jacob Cau delivered 712 new soldiers and sailors and sent them to the battlefield. We know that only 498 soldiers of these survived after the siege-breaking attempt. Therefore it can be inferred 214 souls were lost during this unsuccessful attack. Because the unknown number of sailors who either survived and left or were lost after the battle is not counted into remaining new soldiers, this estimate of the number lost during the siege-breaking attempt is somewhat overestimated.

6 *Dagh-Register 1661*, 512, 515.

7 Andrade 2011, 189.

8 Andrade 2011, 238.

9 Andrade 2011, 272.

10 *Dagh-Register 1661*, 519; VOC 1238, 541'. Since the remaining earlier garrison in the fort amounted to 370, it can be inferred that in the 500 soldiers who perished during the siege, aside from those 378 who died in the fort, 122 must have been either killed or captured on the battlefield or became defectors.

11 VOC 1238, 580'; *Dagh-Register 1661*, 159; Elisii (1663), 94-97; Cheng Shaogang (1995), 494, 507.

other batch consisting of eighty high-ranking officials and their families sailed on 28 December 1661 on the ship *Hasselt* to Batavia.¹²

These evacuations must have been perceived by the soldiers as a foreboding of surrender. After all, governor Coyett and commander Jacob Cauw had sent their families to a safe place. The morale dropped, and therefore the only thing holding the army together was severe disciplinary punishment and promotions promising higher salaries.¹³

According to Tonio Andrade, late October and early November were the watershed for the defectors.¹⁴ Before autumn, Chinese soldiers ran over to the Dutch side, but from then on Dutch soldiers began to run over to the Chinese siege fronts. During the long siege, both camps relied on defectors to estimate the remaining strength of the opposite side. Three of the Chinese defectors had originally served as Manchu troops, before being captured by Coxinga's army in an earlier battle near Amoy.¹⁵

These Manchus ran over from the Chinese town on the east side of the fort. They must have looked up at Fort Zeelandia from the front line at the west edge of the Chinese town. The upper fort of Zeelandia was built on a small plateau on a sand hill in order to control the Canal connecting a lagoon inside, where vessels could take shelter in gale conditions. Four bastions were built on top of the hill, which extended from the four corners as the core part of the whole defence structure. Along the north slope of the plateau facing the canal, a large stone house was situated on the plain, which was to serve as the house of the governor and a warehouse. To defend this building and an open plaza in front of it that was surrounded by houses and served as accommodations for low-ranking employees, a lower fort was built. The second level under the upper fort was built as tall as the wall of the lower fort. Four half-moon bastions were situated on this level on the slope of the small plateau. According to the diary of Fort Zeelandia, at 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning of 26 December 1661, just one day after Christmas, a soldier named Hugo Rozijn ran away from his post under the east side bastion of the upper fort, when he took his night watch

12 Blussé *et al.* 2000, 610, 612, 617.

13 Blussé *et al.* 2000, 639-660.

14 Andrade 2011, 227-230, 272-273.

15 These soldiers were brought by the Dutch fleet under the admiral Balthasar Bort (see below) to seek aid of the Manchus on the Chinese coast in order to restore control over Taiwan in December of 1662. They may even have been the actual designers behind the scenes, taking certain parts in bridging between the Dutch and Manchus. Cf. *Ming Qing gongchang Taiwan dang'an huibian* 5, 86-87; Andrade 2011, 253-268.

shift.¹⁶ He had been guarding the post where the opposite Chinese soldiers must have been looking when they aimed with their muskets from the ditch on the siege front.

Since the whole fort was situated on a small plateau, the exposed soil base was covered with lime, while the second level of the fort and the uppermost castle were all well covered by stone walls. Hugo Rozijn was assigned to the southeast corner of the second level, using his musket to snipe at the Chinese town on the east side at about a cannon-ball-shot distance.¹⁷ The Chinese city was occupied by Coxinga's elite troops, who blocked the access of the Dutch to the bay.

The spot that Rozijn guarded was relatively remote from the residential area of the lower fort at the north side, and thus drew less attention during the night. This may have encouraged him to run to the Chinese siege front and to surrender. According to the VOC record, the platform on which Rozijn stood was 26 feet above sea level. The stone wall of the second level was 15 feet high and it was situated on the soil base, which was 11 feet high. Behind him there was the wall of the upper fort, approximately 18 feet high.¹⁸ It is said he took a belt to abseil the steep 26-foot slope. If his belt could extend about 6 feet (the length of one person) it should not have been very difficult to reach the level of the soil base. Once he could descend the first 15 feet, the remaining 11 feet would not have posed any difficulty for his escape.

After he ran over to the Chinese town, he was received by the Chinese troops, to whom he submitted. He had only served the VOC for two and half years. He sailed on the *Gekroonde Leeuw* of the Enkhuizen chamber to Batavia, departing on 25 June 1659 and arriving on 21 April 1660.¹⁹ He therefore quite likely belonged to the group of newly supplied soldiers that arrived on Taiwan on 6 October 1660. This batch of 600 personnel was sent by the Batavian authorities when they heard that the invasion of Chinese warlord Coxinga was brewing. In the two-and-a-half month journey from Batavia to Taiwan, the ships twice ran into fierce typhoons before they reached the Taiwanese shore, and only six vessels brought 250 soldiers onto land, while other people remained on board and returned to Batavia later. All of them had to be taken to

16 Blussé *et al.* 2000, 618.

17 About 250 metres. Cf. Satow 1900, 7, note 3.

18 VOC 1131, 263-264.

19 VOC 11709, 29^v; VOC 11711, 115^v; Bruijn 1987, 132.

the hospital right away.²⁰ Mostly they suffered from dropsy or “beriberi” and had to take some time to recover.²¹

Apart from defending Fort Zeelandia, this batch of soldiers was originally supposed to conquer Macau (Macao, Aomen 澳門) under the command of Jan van der Laan (or Joannes, who served the VOC in East Asia during 1643–1667, earning his reputation as a war hero during the siege of Colombo in 1655). The Batavian authorities were not convinced that Coxinga was going to invade Taiwan, but thought it was a golden opportunity to take over Macau. Hugo Rozijn, who was from Tournai (Doornik) in the Habsburg lowlands, apparently spoke Portuguese, which may have been a reason why he was picked up to join this expedition. Ironically, instead of exploiting his language skills to talk the Portuguese into surrender at Macau, he deserted the Dutch Fort Zeelandia and ran over to Coxinga’s camp. As far as we know, in the enemy camp there were indeed some Portuguese *mestizos* serving Coxinga as interpreters, and thus his language skill may really have been of some help in his post-desertion career.²² Another possibility was that he came to Taiwan with the second batch of troops carried by Jacob Cauw’s fleet during August 1662, just like another Danish defector, Jan Smits, who ran over to the Chinese side about one month earlier than him.²³

Living Together with Other Dutch Prisoners

On 25 January 1662, Coxinga’s troops conquered the elevated redoubt Utrecht on the Southwest side of Fort Zeelandia. The lower fort of Zeelandia from now on was exposed to Coxinga’s cannons. Facing an impossible situation, the Dutch negotiated surrender with honour a few days later, and arranged for their embarkment to Batavia. Governor Frederik Coyett requested that Coxinga release all those captured during the war, and this term was agreed on, but some Dutch prisoners eventually were left behind accidentally.

20 VOC 1235, 450-451; Herport 1930, 37-38.

21 According to Albrecht Herport (1930, 37-38), 600 people were sick and needed medical aid, while the minutes of the council of Fort Zeelandia revealed only 250 of them were soldiers. After the soldiers landed there, there were still fewer than 900 soldiers to guard the fortress, which is not far from the account given in May 1661.

22 Jiang Shusheng 2003, 45. Philip Meij met a Portuguese *mestizo* translator who worked for Coxinga and his father Iquan (Zheng Zhilong 鄭芝龍) for 18 years. Therefore Hugo Rozijn might have gotten this interpreter’s help to communicate with the Zheng authorities.

23 Blussé *et al.* 2000, 598; VOC 1328, 288°.

The smaller Dutch fort *Provincia*, situated across the bay on Taiwan, had already surrendered to Coxinga in May 1661 because the regional administrator (*Landdrost*) Jacob Valentijn (or Jacobus, arr. 1648, d. ca. 1663)²⁴ had no confidence he could hold that position for a long time. Several families were imprisoned during the period when Fort *Zeelandia* was still under siege. When the rescue fleet of Jacob Cauw arrived in September, Coxinga took them as hostages to Amoy (Xiamen, an island near the Chinese coast) in order to prevent the Dutch fleet from attacking his headquarters over there.²⁵ These prisoners did not join the Dutch personnel that departed from Taiwan in the following months after they surrendered on 1 February 1662. Later the Batavian authorities accounted for some thirty-eight personnel who were accidentally left behind.²⁶ They were transferred to Taiwan again in 1663 accompanied by Coxinga's son, Zheng Jing 鄭經 (1642–1681); Coxinga had died four months after the Dutch surrender. In contrast with those left-behind Dutch prisoners, it seems that Hugo Rozijn and other defectors preferred to stay in Taiwan rather than returning to Batavia with governor Coyett to confess their desertion.

The Batavian authorities later decided to dispatch a fleet under admiral Balthasar Bort (ca. 1620–1684, well known as governor of Malacca) to reconquer Taiwan in 1662. He was instructed to contact the Manchus in Fuzhou and organize a joint attack against Zheng Jing's base on the islands of Amoy, Quemoy (Kinmen, Jinmen 金門) and Taiwan. It took almost a whole year before the court in Beijing at last agreed to this alliance. Later when the fleet arrived again in August of 1663, admiral Bort soon dispatched expedition troops to Quemoy, but stiff resistance forced them to retreat.²⁷ When the fleet was mooring in Liaoluo 料羅 bay, Zheng Jing sent a letter to persuade them not to cooperate with the Manchus, and instead to conclude peace with his regime. He claimed not only that the widow of the regional administrator Jacob Valentijn was still alive, but also that there were about 100 Dutch persons (including teachers, women and children) still living well on the main island of Taiwan.²⁸

24 "arr." means "arrived in Asia"; "d." means "died"; "ca." means "circa".

25 Jiang Shusheng 2003, 43–44.

26 VOC 678, 53–54. According to the list there should have been 38 Dutch people.

27 Wills 1974, 71.

28 Valentijn 1724–1726, vol. 3, pt. 1, 10; Dapper 1670, 322. The widow of Jacob Valentijn is named Rachel Muller; Blussé *et al.* 2000, 517.

When the VOC troops re-occupied Jilong 基隆 at the north tip of Taiwan in 1664, Coxinga's son Zheng Jing dispatched an envoy to negotiate with them in 1666.²⁹ In the letter delivered to the Dutch commissioner Constantijn Nobel (arr. 1650, d. 1678), Zheng Jing tried to set new terms to establish trade relations with the VOC. This delegate also brought a letter written by the Dutch prisoners in Taiwan.³⁰ Nobel, however, refused to enter negotiations, and the prisoners had to stay in Taiwan. He later also heard that the defectors were treated well in the Zheng camp and had been transported to Amoy to serve in military actions against the Manchus.³¹

When the Batavian authorities found out that the English East India Company (short: BEIC) was going to dispatch ships from Bantam to Taiwan in 1670, they asked the English merchants to contact those prisoners in Taiwan and find a way to rescue them or bail them out. They listed eleven names for this rescue action.³² Upon their return, the English sailors said that they had met two Dutch males and a child about twelve years old during their stay. They also heard that the widow of Jacob Valentijn and their two children were still alive.³³ The English merchants in Taiwan actually obtained a reply from these people secretly, and delivered the letter to Batavia in 1673.³⁴ No records explain how those English merchants were able to make this contact. However, when Hugo Rozijn appeared again in the VOC's archive later, he was employed by those English merchants as a translator.³⁵ His acquaintance Alexander van 's-Gravenbroek (who served in 1685–1687 as a junior merchant in the tributary embassy to Beijing) was one of the Dutch prisoners left behind, so there may have been a link between them, and he could have become the core of this secret channel. Through this channel, the English merchant John Dacres (arr. 1669, Chief at Taiwan since 1672) passed two letters from the prisoners to Batavia in 1677.³⁶

Because none of these letters mentioned the names of the other VOC defectors, it is not possible to obtain information about how Hugo Rozijn lived

29 Vogels 1988, 26-29.

30 Vogels 1988, 26. VOC 1264. 186^r; *Generale Missiven* 3, 541.

31 Blussé *et al.* 2000, 484.

32 *Dagh-Register 1672*, 151-152; Wills 1974, 152.

33 VOC 1290, 65^r.

34 *Dagh-Register 1673*, 329-330.

35 VOC 1415, 965^r.

36 *Dagh-Register 1677*, 74-76.

under the Zheng regime in Taiwan. However, another defector suddenly appeared in the archival papers. Jan Smith, born in Copenhagen, was employed by the chamber of Amsterdam, and sailed to Batavia in 1660. He once was an apprentice officer (Adelborst) and was assigned to the bastion Groningen in the castle Batavia. He was a member of the new troops carried by Jacob Cauw's fleet in August 1661 to Taiwan. During the siege he ran over to Coxinga's side just a month ahead of Hugo Rozijn. Afterwards he served in Amoy as a soldier and was carried on a junk to Fuzhou during the 1670s, when Zheng Jing began to smuggle Chinese goods there to Japan despite the Manchu prohibitions on all sea-going traffic and the evacuation of the coastal areas. Smith married a girl from the Coromandel Coast. She may have been one of the female slaves who had run over during the siege of Fort Zeelandia. His wife gave birth to five children. When the VOC merchants in the 1670s met Jan Smith at Fuzhou, Zheng Jing's troops had been driven out from there by the Manchu troops. Either willingly or under coercion, Jan Smith surrendered to the Manchus and thus changed his hairdo to Manchu style to show his obedience. In Manchu fashion, he shaved his forehead and tied the remaining hair back in a queue. According to him, the Dutch prisoners always stayed together and were taken good care of by the Zhengs.³⁷ Hugo Rozijn's marriage may have occurred during this period. Although there are no records to trace his wife's origin, she may have been a left-behind Dutch prisoner or a female slave. His wife gave birth to two children.³⁸

As translator, Hugo Rozijn was exposed to a wide range of cultural encounters. Taking care of the needs of the weakened and aged Dutch prisoners, he may also have had access to Chinese medical treatments. In a letter sent by a Dutch prisoner, Harmanus Verbiest, who was a land surveyor, it is mentioned that his wife, a woman from Bengal named Antonica, once happened to be very ill. Due to a lack of western medicine, she got treatment from several Chinese doctors.³⁹ Since Hugo Rozijn served as translator at the time, he must also have become the intermediary in this medical practice.

37 VOC 1328, 288^r.

38 VOC 1440, 2301^r.

39 *Dagh-Register 1681*, 182.

Serving as Ship Surgeon

After the rebellion of the three feudatories began, Zheng Jing made an alliance with the lord of Fujian, Geng Jingzhong 耿精忠 (d. 1682), and thus re-occupied Amoy as his frontier harbour.⁴⁰ Zheng Jing was not able to keep this port in 1680 after the rebellions of coastal provinces of China were put down by the Manchus. The Manchus began to build up a navy and sent a long expedition to attack Taiwan in 1683. After the Zheng forces lost the Pescadores (Penghu 澎湖), they decided to surrender Taiwan on honourable terms. Although it was later decided to transfer most of the Zheng officials to China, the fate of the Dutch prisoners in Taiwan remained uncertain. At this juncture, admiral Shi Lang 施琅 (1621–1696) contacted one of the Dutch prisoners, Alexander van 's-Gravenbroek, in private to seek more possibilities of developing future business with the Dutch. During his years of detention, van 's-Gravenbroek had learned the Minnan (Southern Fujian) dialect well, and he soon gained admiral Shi Lang's trust.⁴¹ The last remaining Dutch prisoners were eventually able to leave Taiwan freely via the Chinese coast in the end of 1683. Because the Siamese king's junk the Syamea happened to anchor at Amoy, admiral Shi Lang signed the passes for the Dutch prisoners and let the Siamese junk carry them away on 30 December 1663.⁴² Including van 's-Gravenbroek, seven adults and ten children had survived. Because the Siamese junk was fully loaded, two widows (Susanna van Bercheim and Geertruy Totanus) with three children stayed behind until the next sea-going transport.⁴³ The BEIC used to have a factory at Amoy during the days of the Zheng regime's occupation in the 1670s. Shi Lang thus allowed the English merchants to be accommodated there. Since we know from later records that Hugo Rozijn was working there under the BEIC, he must have also helped the two widows and children settle down in Amoy. All three children of those two widows were born in Taiwan.⁴⁴

40 Wills 1974, 154-157.

41 *Generale Missiven* 4, 722; about the interactions between Shi Lang and 's-Gravenbroek, cf. Zheng 2016, 295.

42 Chang *et al.* 1995, 561.

43 Warnsinck 1930, 179; Farrington and Pombejra 2007, 881-888.; *Generale Missiven* 4, 722. According to this report sent by the Dutch authorities in Batavia to Amsterdam, there were another two people on board: Joan Brummer and Maria van Lamey.

44 Warnsinck 1930, 179. The three children were identified as borne in "Saccam" (Secamse ingebornen). Saccam indicated the town nearby the Fort Provintia. After the Dutch left Tai-

Among these five liberated people arriving in Siam, three clearly show the extent of mixed relationships at the time. The son of the local administrator Jacob Valentijn, Salomon Valentijn, had gotten married with a Formosan aborigine woman. A widow of the late sergeant David Kortenbergh (or Cotenburch, who in 1661 served in Fort Provintia as a deputy regional administrator), Maria van Lamey, was a Dutch-educated Formosan aborigine woman. The widow of the land surveyor Harmanus Verbiest, Antonica van Bengal, was as the name indicates from India.⁴⁵

When the five survivors arrived in Siam in February 1684, the last VOC vessel large enough to carry them had already departed to Batavia. They thus decided to take a good rest in Ayutthaya, and waited until the end of the year to continue their journey.⁴⁶ They eventually arrived in Batavia in February of 1685.⁴⁷ Alexander van 's-Gravenbroek was summoned to meet the governor general Johan Camphuys (1634–1695) in May on recommendation of the VOC merchant Joannes Leeuwenzoon (or Johan Lievezon, arr. ca. 1674, depd. 1687).⁴⁸

Meanwhile during van 's-Gravenbroek's stay in Siam, the Manchu Emperor had decided to allow all the coastal areas to be reopened to foreign trade. Shi Lang's special position as the conqueror of Taiwan was soon replaced by other imperial officials, and thus he could no longer intervene in imperial policy on foreign trade.⁴⁹

wan, it soon developed into a prosperous Chinese town where upper-rank Chinese officials in the Zheng administration dwelt. This message may imply that they were offspring of Chinese lords, because some Dutch females (either from Europe or other places) used to be distributed to Chinese families as concubines. However, it could merely be a way to comment on them, in order to differentiate them from those who were born in Fort Zeelandia during the war.

45 *Generale Missiven* 4, 722. Lamey (Xiao Liuqiu 小琉球) is an island near southwestern Taiwan. In the 1620s, a ship named Gouden Leeuw was stranded there, and the entire crew was killed by the inhabitants. The VOC took revenge in 1630s and massacred most of the inhabitants, while about 40 girls were raised with Dutch education and married to the VOC servants. Maria van Lamey must have been one of them. She got married with sergeant David Kortenbergh on 21 December 1659, when she was already the widow of Adriaen Juriaen Lambertsen. Cf. Heyns and Zheng Weizhong 2005, 252. A general account about the Dutch attack on Lamey Island. Cf. Blussé 1995, 153-182.

46 VOC 1403, 307-308.

47 *Generale Missiven* 4, 781.

48 VOC 700, 214-216.

49 VOC 700, 214-216. Stapel 1927-1954, vol. 2.1, 760.

This situation was described by the Dutch merchant Joannes Leeuwenzoon. Governor general Johan Camphuys considered the excellent personal connections between admiral Shi Lang and van 's-Gravenbroek, and thought this might help to obtain a better position for Dutch trade in China. He promoted van 's-Gravenbroek from assistant to junior merchant, and assigned him on a new mission.⁵⁰ Van 's-Gravenbroek thus joined a new tributary embassy led by ambassador Vincent Paets (or Paats, 1658–1702), and departed to Fuzhou in the summer of 1685.⁵¹

After the embassy arrived in Fuzhou, van 's-Gravenbroek did not have a chance to visit Shi Lang until November.⁵² On 15 October, van 's-Gravenbroek forwarded a letter written by Hugo Rozijn to ambassador Vincent Paets. Rozijn requested the Batavian authorities pardon him and allow him to return to Batavia with his family, even though they were not part of the left-behind Dutch prisoners. He mentioned that he was about to board a Chinese junk bound for Batavia.⁵³ He must have remained in Amoy, because later when van 's-Gravenbroek visited admiral Shi Lang in Amoy, he and his assistant kept their gifts in Hugo Rozijn's house there.⁵⁴

The letter arrived in Batavia during the spring of 1686. Because van 's-Gravenbroek emphasized that it would be unwise to let Rozijn serve the English merchants, as he could speak the local dialect fluently, the Batavian authorities decided to grant him a mercy letter and even hired him again.⁵⁵ The mercy letter was signed by the governor general Johan Camphuys on 29 June 1686, and attached to the letter of 11 July 1686 to Fuzhou.⁵⁶

In the summer, two ships, the *St. Maartensdijck* and *Draeckstein*, were dispatched to Macau and Amoy separately.⁵⁷ The latter may have delivered the letter to Fuzhou, where Hugo Rozijn had brought his family to the embassy's residence and hoped to sail together with the Dutch ships. Somehow Rozijn met a Jesuit father there. The father knew Rozijn was going to return to the Dutch Protestants, and was apparently angry about this plan, and must have shouted

50 VOC 700, 214-216.

51 Zheng 2016, 303-304.

52 VOC 1438, 738^v-739^r.

53 VOC 1415, 965^r.

54 VOC 1438, 739^r; *Generale Missiven* 5, 46.

55 VOC 701, 306.

56 VOC 913, 443; VOC 913, 432.

57 Stapel 1927-1954, vol. 2.1, 767.

and cursed at Rozijn in very unpleasant words.⁵⁸ Under such emotional bombardment, Rozijn brought the mercy-letter back to the VOC residency. Together with his family he returned to Amoy. Once he returned to Amoy and escaped from the control of the Jesuit father, he became extremely frustrated and turned to the Dutch merchants at Amoy again to file his complaints and regrets. Knowing the governor general had signed this mercy-letter, the Dutch junior merchant Pieter Goodschalk (or Godschalk, arr. ca. 1687, dept. 1698)⁵⁹ at Amoy immediately signed another letter to verify the validity of the mercy-letter, and began to arrange for the transportation of Rozijn, his wife and two sons. Additionally, the son's Chinese wife was also included.⁶⁰

On the final day of 1687, the ship *Drakenstein* departed from Amoy on its return journey to Batavia. The Rozijn family was on board. The junior merchant Goodschalk also recommended Rozijn to the Batavian authorities in an attached letter as a fine wound healer, and suggested therefore that he should be re-hired as a junior surgeon.⁶¹

The Rozijn family arrived in Batavia in January of 1688. On the thirteenth, the Batavian authorities examined him and thus confirmed that he had sufficient knowledge of Chinese medicine.⁶² Afterwards he was hired on a salary of twenty guilders per month. It was more than double the soldier's salary (nine guilders) that he had received when he arrived in Taiwan in his twenties.

One of his sons was still remaining in Amoy because he wanted to stay with his Chinese wife.⁶³ The Chinese subjects were free to sail abroad at the time, so his son must have bowed to his wife's wishes. The evidence shows that Rozijn returned to the Chinese coast the following summer. He served on a VOC ship as a junior surgeon, and when the circumstances required, he offered his special language skills. During February of 1689, he was on the *St. Martensdijk*, anchored near Macau. The merchant Goodschalk dispatched him to solicit a German sergeant, Frans Flettinger (who served the VOC during 1678–1680 and 1685–1687 in China), who had been captured by the Portuguese at Macau

58 There is no record that can prove who this Jesuit father was. Charles Maigrot or Bernardino della Chiesa are reasonable guesses. Another candidate is Juan de Yrigoyen S.J., who visited the Dutch embassy in Fuzhou in 1685. Cf. Wills 1985, 273.

59 "dept." means "departed from Asia and returned to Europe".

60 VOC 1440, 2301^r.

61 VOC 1440, fol. 2299^{rv}.

62 VOC 1432, 83^{rv}.

63 VOC 1432, 83^{rv}.

around 1688, and later Flettinger sent notes in secret, begging the Batavian authorities to rescue him from the Portuguese authorities.⁶⁴ Although Rozijn had done a great job as a Portuguese translator, the meeting ended up in conflict. The St. Martensdijk was even shot at by Macau cannons and was thus driven away. The Batavian authorities felt the tax was getting heavier under the new Chinese foreign trading system, and because the pepper market was blooming in Europe, they decided to terminate any further direct trade with China.⁶⁵

In the meantime the Chinese officials encouraged the VOC to import copper from Japan to China, thus the Batavian authorities assigned a smaller yacht, the *Wijk op Zee*, to test this business.⁶⁶ Since Hugo Rozijn preferred to serve in Chinese waters, he may have been transferred to the yacht, too. The other possibility was to serve on the ship the *Eemland*, which was under the command of Alexander van 's-Gravenbroek and departed from Batavia on 4 July 1689 to Amoy.⁶⁷ The voyage of the *Wijk op Zee* to Japan proved that the revenue in copper export business could not support the re-investment in the Japanese market exclusively, and therefore the ship sailed back to Batavia via Malacca in January 1690.⁶⁸ In the summer of 1690, it was sent to Bengal and returned to Batavia in December.⁶⁹ Before it departed again to Japan in the summer of 1691, its crew were counted. Hugo Rozijn was registered as a junior surgeon with a salary of 24 guilders per month.⁷⁰ In June 1692, the *Wijk op Zee* was dispatched to Bengal.⁷¹ Maybe because the *Wijk op Zee* was not dispatched to Japan in the following summer, Rozijn was moved to a flute ship, the *Walenburg*, and sent to Japan in 1693.⁷² In the summer of 1695, the *Walenburg* was dispatched to Bengal, while Rozijn was still serving on board.⁷³ After this voyage, all traces of Rozijn were lost.

64 VOC 1462, 43^r-44^r. About the career of Frans Flettinger and his role in the Dutch embassy to Beijing. Lots of details have been revealed by John Elliot Wills (1985, 275-277, 279-282).

65 *Generale Missiven* 5, 317.

66 *Generale Missiven* 5, 318.

67 *Generale Missiven* 5, 318.

68 *Generale Missiven* 5, 319, 361.

69 *Generale Missiven* 5, 414.

70 VOC 11706, 119^r-120^r; *Generale Missiven* 5, 464.

71 *Generale Missiven* 5, 540.

72 VOC 11709, 29^r; *Generale Missiven* 5, 628.

73 VOC 11711, 104^r-105^r; *Generale Missiven* 5, 758.

A Taiwanese Folk Tale

In 1951, a Taiwanese lyric writer, Chen Daru 陳達儒 (1917–1992), was commissioned to write the lyrics for a newly created melody. When he looked for inspiration in his wife's hometown in Tainan city, which the VOC used to control 289 years ago, a folk tale was told to him. The writer wrote the lyrics based on that story.⁷⁴ When the record was released, the song was overwhelmingly embraced by the Taiwanese audience in the 1960s because it merged exoticism with local nostalgia. The song told how a Dutch ship surgeon left behind a bastard child, a mixed blonde girl, who then fell in love with another sailor. It expressed her bitterness while contemplating her sorrowful fate.

Although the lyricist claimed that he was inspired by local folklore, similar stories could not be found in any known Chinese sources. Some people suspected that the story may have been a fabrication of the writer himself. As explained below, there's no other written evidence showing memories of the Dutch inhabitants which referred to any particular common person beyond the 1740s, although some vague general impressions were still alive then. A prefectural governor of Taiwan, Liu Liangbi 劉良璧 (who served at the Qing court during 1708–ca. 1747), inspected Fort Zeelandia in 1729, which were then in use as the barracks for 1000 Chinese soldiers. He climbed to the uppermost level of the fort, and found not only that the main structure of the upper castle was intact, but also the offices were still in good shape. He wondered why the military officers did not resume using the building as offices, but an officer replied that the place was said to be haunted by “ghosts wearing red robes”.⁷⁵ During the same period, on the main island of Taiwan, in the aborigines' villages on flat land, the Dutch figures on the front doors could still be identified.⁷⁶ These traces gradually faded away after the last generations bearing memories of Dutch people in Taiwan disappeared in the middle of the eighteenth century.

The famous pioneer of the history of the Dutch East Indies, François Valentijn (1666–1727), went to Java and Ambon in 1687 for the first time. Although he did not linger in Batavia for long, he still had the chance to meet those Dutch survivors from Taiwan, because they were liberated and returned to Batavia in exactly the same year. In his book, *Oud- en Nieuw Oost Indiën* (*Old and New East Indies*), written 30 years later, he devoted much space to the

74 Zheng Henglong and Guo Lijuan 2002, 118.

75 *Chongxiu Fujian Taiwan fuzhi*, 557.

76 *Chongxiu Fujian Taiwan fuzhi*, 437.

story of the VOC's business in Taiwan. Salomon Valentijn, the son of Jacob Valentijn (who surrendered Fort Provintia in Taiwan), belonged to the last survivors returning to Batavia in 1687. Salomon's son (a Dutch-Formosan mixed child) Jacob Valentijn, named after his grandfather, was hired by the VOC as a junior merchant and was one of the shipmates with François Valentijn on his second journey to the East Indies in 1705.⁷⁷ Jacob Valentijn later served as a chief merchant at Pulau Ai in 1711, and died there in 1715.⁷⁸

It is reasonable to infer that memories of the Dutch among the Taiwanese people gradually became vague and morphed after the 1740s, since no more Dutch people returned to Taiwan. If the folk tale collected by the lyric writer in 1951 was really a memory buried deeply in local oral tradition for three hundred years, the chance of it having turned into a legend in the middle of the eighteenth century is high. The legend may have been directly related to Hugo Rozijn's activities and indirectly to all other left-behind Dutch people, because they were still alive in the beginning of the eighteenth century. As a ship surgeon with a son married to a Chinese girl, Hugo Rozijn tallies with some features of the folk tale, although the most important figure, the bastard Eurasian daughter focused on by the lyrics, cannot not be found in Hugo Rozijn's documented story. She may have been unrecorded, or may have come from other left-behind people.

Just in the following year, 1689, when Hugo Rozijn took his family back to Batavia, so did another deserter, named Jan Roelofzoon Kloek, of Eurasian origin. After he begged for mercy, the VOC decided to pardon him and hire him as a gunner and translator, so he was allowed to bring his wife and children to Batavia from Amoy.⁷⁹ Due to lack of information, it is not possible to tell under what circumstances he began to live with the Chinese in Taiwan. He did bring his wife and three children to Batavia after receiving the mercy letter. For unknown reasons, his eleven-year-old daughter was kept in admiral Shi Lang's house after they left. In 1690, when Kloek returned to Amoy as a VOC gunner, he solicited the admiral Shi Lang to hand over his daughter. He got her after twenty-five guilders were paid.⁸⁰ Thereafter the girl was taken away to Batavia. In Kloek's case, the eleven-year-old daughter had to wait for her father in Amoy for at least half a year. The exotic scene of a Eurasian girl waiting for her father

77 Valentijn 1724–1726, vol. 3, pt. 1, 136.

78 Valentijn 1724–1726, vol. 3, pt. 1, 104.

79 VOC 1453, 293^a.

80 VOC 8361, 36-37.

at the harbour may have made a very dramatic impression. It may explain why the folk tale was focused on a Eurasian girl.

No matter whether the story was based on real stories or just coincidentally tallies with historical records, the popular song represents a strong desire of Taiwanese people to remember the historical scenes of Taiwan under the Dutch. Conventional historical research cannot verify whether it was true or not, unless new evidence is discovered. But whatever the case may be, the two stories of 1687 and 1951 may have more than random connections in common.

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The Development of Shipbuilding during the Qing Dynasty

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Introduction

A pervasive view has been that the Manchus, ruling élite of the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), were mainly good at land combat, using their cavalry, not knowing much about naval warfare and warship operations. During the early days, the Qing dynasty had only a few warships. Most of these came from surrendered generals of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). But the Qing government adapted quickly in spite of its lack of skill in shipbuilding. Soon they learned to use surrendered Han Chinese workmen to build warships to compensate for their own lack of the required skills.

In the third year of Yongzheng 雍正 (1725), one after the other, the coastal provinces established shipyards and began to build warships. A true warship-building industry took shape. Over the years, the Qing manufacture of warships changed correspondingly as opponents changed the types of warships that they were using, but the Qing never designed their own warships. Warships built in Qing yards were never original designs and most were copies of civilian ships. Thus warships and civilian ships were of more or less the same design during the Qing.

Given this reality, Qing rulers did not devote much effort to improving their warships in design and construction. As a result the quality of Qing warships was inferior to the quality of contemporary civilian ships. Qing had to continue requisitioning civilian ships during wartime to make up for the inadequacies of naval ships.¹

The development of a civil shipbuilding industry was similarly hindered by the Qing maritime prohibition policy (*haijin zhengce* 海禁政策). It was also limited by the demands of the official tribute trade system (*chaogong maoyi* 朝貢貿易).²

1 *Guangdong haifang huilan* 12.52a.

2 Gu Hongting 2002, 21.

That Qing warship building technology did not improve very much reflected the weakness of its opponents. Weak opponents actually allowed the Qing navy to achieve a certain amount of success, when fighting against pirates for example.

Fleet organization as well as the location of shipyards also had important influence on effectiveness. Figure 1 below shows where the Qing shipyards were located.



Fig. 1 The Locations of Qing Shipyards in the Coastal Provinces of Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong

The Qing navy was successful in dealing with the threat of pirates through its efficient sailing tactics and swift dispatch of appropriately-mixed forces of war vessels. Nonetheless, Qing warships proved vulnerable when confronted with modern Western steam-powered vessels.

Shipyards

Each coastal province established shipyards to repair and build warships. Shipyards were concentrated in Southeast China, that is, most were found in Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong provinces. Fujian had the most shipyards (tab. 1).



Fig. 2 Locations of Units in Shipyards in Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong Provinces

Tab. 1 Shipyards in Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong Provinces³

Province	Shipyards	Assigned Navy Units	Supervisors
Zhejiang	Ningbo shipyard (<i>Ningbo chang</i> 寧波廠)	Dinghai brigade (<i>Dinghai zhenbiao</i> 定海鎮標), Xiangshan regiment (<i>Xiangshan xie</i> 象山協), Wenzhou brigade (<i>Hangzhou xie</i> 杭州協)	circuit intendant of Ningbo, Shaoxing and Taizhou prefectures (<i>Ningshaotai daotai</i> 寧紹台道臺)
	Wenzhou shipyard (<i>Wenzhou chang</i> 溫州廠)	Wenzhou brigade (<i>Wenzhou zhenbiao</i> 溫州鎮標)	Wenzhou circuit intendant (<i>Wenzhou daotai</i> 溫州道臺)

3 Official titles in this paper are mainly translated according to Hucker 1985.

Province	Shipyards	Assigned Navy Units	Supervisors
Fujian	Fuzhou shipyard (<i>Fuzhou chang</i> 福州廠)	(Min'an regiment) <i>Min'an xie</i> 閩安協, Funing brigade (<i>Funing zhenbiao</i> 福寧鎮標), Haitan brigade (<i>Haitan</i> <i>zhenbiao</i> 海壇鎮標)	"grain and post" circuit intendant (<i>liangyi daotai</i> 糧驛道臺)
	Zhangzhou shipyard (<i>Zhangzhou chang</i> 漳州廠)	Nan'ao brigade (<i>Nan'ao</i> <i>zhenbiao</i> 南澳鎮標), right battalion of Jinmen brigade (<i>Jinmen zhen youying</i> 金門鎮右營)	Tingzhanglong circuit intendants (<i>Tingzhanglong daotai</i> 汀漳龍道 臺 of the Tingzhou, Zhangzhou prefecture and directly adminis- tered department of Longyan)
	shipyard of the Taiwan circuit (<i>jungong dao</i> <i>chang</i> 軍工道廠)	Taiwan brigade (<i>Taiwan</i> <i>zhenbiao</i> 臺灣鎮標), Penghu regiment (<i>Penghu xie</i> 澎湖協)	Taiwan circuit intendant (<i>Taiwan daotai</i> 臺灣道臺)
	shipyard of the Taiwan prefec- ture (<i>jungong fu</i> <i>chang</i> 軍工府廠)	military shipyard of the Taiwan prefecture (<i>jungong fu chang</i>)	Taiwan prefect (<i>Taiwan zhifu</i> 臺灣知府)
	Quanzhou ship- yard (<i>Quanzhou</i> <i>chang</i> 泉州廠)	left battalion of Jinmen brigade (<i>Jinmen zhen zuoying</i> 金門鎮左營), right battalion of Haitan brigade (<i>Haitan</i> <i>zhen youying</i> 海壇鎮右營)	Xingquanyong circuit intendants (<i>Xingquanyong daotai</i> 興泉永道 臺 of Xinghua, Quanzhou and Yongchun prefectures)
Guangdong	Henan shipyard (<i>Henan chang</i> 河南廠) ⁴	Dongguan regiment (<i>Dongguan xie</i> 東莞協)	salt distribution commissioner (<i>yanyun shi</i> 鹽運使)
	Anbu shipyard (<i>Anbu chang</i> 庵埠廠)	<i>Chaozhou zhenbiao</i> (Chao- zhou brigade 潮州鎮標), Na'nao brigade (<i>Nan'ao</i> <i>zhenbiao</i> 南澳鎮標)	"grain and post" circuit intendant (<i>liangyi daotai</i> 糧驛道臺)
	Zhiliao shipyard (<i>Zhiliao chang</i> 芷苧廠)	Longmen regiment (<i>Longmen xie</i> 龍門協)	Gaolian circuit intendant (<i>Gao-</i> <i>Lian daotai</i> 高廉道臺, circuit intendant of Gaozhou and Lian- zhou)
	<i>Longmen chang</i> 龍門廠 (Long- men shipyard)	Longmen regiment (<i>Longmen xie</i> 龍門協)	Qinzhou magistrate (<i>Qinzhou zhizhou</i> 欽州知州)
	<i>Haikou chang</i> 海口廠 (Haikou shipyard)	Haikou regiment (<i>Haikou xie</i> 海口協)	Qiongzhou prefect (<i>Qiongzhou zhifu</i> 瓊州知府)

4 I. e. Henan town in southern Guangdong.

Zhejiang Province

Before the shipyards were established, the system for Qing warship construction was disorganized and chaotic. Resulting were inadequate numbers of warships and corrupt governors. The Liangjiang governor-general (*Liangjiang zongdu* 兩江總督, governor-general of the two Yangzi provinces and surrounding areas) Heshou 赫壽 (1712–1717), wrote:

The ports of Guangdong province are the main areas for grain transport. But the warships there are seriously damaged and cannot be used anymore; therefore we have to hire civilian ships instead. I am afraid that this may cause delay.⁵

During the Kangxi 康熙 reign (1662–1722), the government began to pay more attention to warship construction, but discussions were protracted and inconclusive. At that time, numbers of naval warships were inadequate. The government had no choice but to requisition civilian ships. This situation continued until the early years of the Yongzheng period (1723–1735).

After the Yongzheng Emperor ascended the throne, he advanced various reforms. The warship-building system was one object. In 1725 the Liangjiang governor-general Zhabina 查弼納 (1722–1726) suggested:

We should set up shipyards in areas with access to rivers, lakes, and in various places where goods can be concentrated. It will be easier to find workers in such cases. We could appoint a circuit intendant-official in charge of the circuit (*daotai* 道臺) to supervise every year, and appoint regional vice commanders (*fujian* 副將), or assistant regional commander (*canjiang* 參將), to oversee the entire system.⁶

This suggestion was adopted. The government began to set up shipyards in the coastal provinces in accordance with their respective demands for warships.

The Zhejiang provincial government set up shipyards in Ningbo and Wenzhou. Warships of the Dinghai brigade (*Dinghai zhenbiao* 定海鎮標) and patrol ships of the Xiangshan regiment (*Xiangshan xie* 象山協) and the Hangzhou regiment (*Hangzhou xie* 杭州協) were constructed by the Ningbo shipyard (*Ningbo chang* 寧波廠). Warships of the Wenzhou brigade (*Wenzhou zhenbiao* 溫州鎮標) were constructed by the Wenzhou shipyard (*Wenzhou chang* 溫州廠). The shipyards' construction was under the control of the Ningshaotai circuit intendant (*Ningshaotai daotai* 寧紹台道臺) and the Wenzhou circuit in-

5 *Shengzu Ren huangdi shilu* 255.527: 廣東省運米，疏稱京口戰船今係大修之年，俱各修理，不堪應用。請雇民船運米等語。沿海各省，設立戰船者，特為防護地方，裨益民生、以備急需也。

6 *Taiwan zhibilie* 2.64: 雍正三年，兩江總督查弼納題准設立總廠於通達江湖百貨聚集之所，鳩工辦料，較為省便；歲派道員監督，再派副將或參將一員同監視焉。

tendant (*Wenzhou daotai* 溫州道臺). Officers chosen by the regional vice commanders and assistant regional commanders would be responsible for oversight.⁷ In 1728 the government issued a decree: each shipyard should deliver warships to the governor-general for inspection when completed. Although the shipyards were governed by fixed regulations, there were still problems with corruption. To prevent this, the government approved the following in 1793:

If anybody is involved in illegal activities or is receiving monopoly profits, they and the officials responsible for undertaking repairs (*chengxiu guan* 承修官) and the officials involved in the illegal activities or monopoly profits should be dismissed. And according to the new law, the responsible inspector should be downgraded three levels and transferred; the responsible *dufu* 督撫 (governor-generals and governors) by one level and transferred.⁸

Although Zhejiang province had two shipyards, and there were keel factories in Wenzhou prefecture (*Wenzhou fu* 溫州府),⁹ Fujian had the richest resources in keel lumber and in skilled shipbuilding labour and technology. Zhejiang thus often commissioned Fujian shipyards to manufacture its warships, in 1726 and 1784, for example. Thus, each province not only built ships of their own, but could also take orders from other shipyards.¹⁰

Fujian Province

In 1725, the Fujian government established shipyards in Fuzhou and Zhangzhou. Construction output from the Fuzhou shipyard was shared between two circuit intendants, “grain and post” circuit intendant (*liangyi daotai* 糧驛道臺) and Xingquanyong circuit intendants (*Xingquanyong daotai* 興泉永道臺), who oversaw the area’s courts, law enforcement, civic defense, canals, and customs collection. The Zhangzhou shipyard was established by the office of the Tingzhanglong circuit intendant (*Tingzhanglong daotai* 汀漳龍道臺).¹¹ The shipyards’ workers were commissioned by regional vice commanders (*fujian* 副將) and by assistant regional commanders (*canjiang* 參將). The Taiwan and Penghu regiments established shipyards in Taiwan under the control of the Taiwan circuit intendant (*Taiwan daotai* 臺灣道臺) and Taiwan regional vice

7 *Guangxu huidian shili* 936.315-316.

8 *Qianlong huidian zeli* 23.280: 水師修造戰船，如有不肖營員希圖射利、包修者，將承修官與該營將官皆革職，督修官照徇庇例，降三級調用，督撫降一級調用。

9 *Gongzhong dang Yongzheng chao zouzhe*, vol. 5, 655.

10 Li Qilin 2013, 17.

11 *Guangxu huidian shili* 936.316.

commanders (*Taixie fujiang* 臺協副將). The civil officials were commissioned by the Taiwan circuit intendant while the military officials were commissioned by the Taiwan regional vice commanders. Fujian now had what became standard shipyards, the first of their kind established during the Qing dynasty.

The early development of sea transportation there meant that Fujian shipbuilding carried on a long tradition. Early in the Song dynasty (960–1279), there was a saying: “The best seagoing vessels are from Fujian.”¹² During that time, Zhangzhou, Quanzhou, Fuzhou, and Xinghua, the so-called four great shipbuilding bases, could already build huge ships more than 30 metres in length.¹³ In the fifth year of Hongwu 洪武 (1372), the government ordered Zhejiang and Fujian to construct 660 ships as well as so-called *duolu kuaichuan* 多櫓快船 (lit.: many-oared fast boats) to overpower Japanese pirates.¹⁴

In 1725 the governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang (*Min Zhe zongdu* 閩浙總督), Gioro Manbō 覺羅滿保 (1673–1725), suggested establishment of shipyards in Fuzhou, Zhangzhou and Taiwan and the appointment of a high official to supervise them. His palace memorial reads as follows:

Both Fuzhou and Zhangzhou prefectures, located in estuaries have been all important ports for commercial cargos. Taiwan prefecture should have its own shipyards as Taiwan is located far across the ocean.¹⁵

The Quanzhou shipyard was established in 1729 (the seventh year of Yongzheng), but its workers had to be transferred from Fuzhou by Quanzhou prefecture. To make up for the deficiency in personnel, the governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang, Gao Qizhuo 高其倬 (1676–1738), assigned 53 warships from Jinmen and Haitan to the new Quanzhou shipyard. The circuit intendants of Xinghua, Quanzhou and Yongchun prefectures were overseers.¹⁶ After the Quanzhou shipyard had been established, the warship quotas of other shipyards were changed accordingly.

Quanzhou shipyard received the 53 warships transferred from the Fuzhou shipyards but because Zhangzhou and Quanzhou shipyard manufacturing were not on a par, the Qing government also transferred the Zhangzhou shipyard commander-in-chief (*shuishi tibiao* 水師提標) and the 26 warships of the

12 *Zhongmu ji* 2.14.

13 *Zhangzhou jiaotong zhi*, 241.

14 *Fujian tongzhi* 4.1686.

15 *Ming Qing shiliao* 7, 614-615: 福州府、漳州府二處地方俱通海口，百貨雲集，應於此二處設立一廠，臺灣水師等營戰船，遠隔重洋，應於臺灣府設廠。

16 *Xiamen zhi* 5.153.

middle and right anchorages to Quanzhou shipyard in 1736. Thus, Quanzhou shipyard became responsible for a total of 79 warships.¹⁷ After the Qianlong 乾隆 period (1736–1796), the assignment of the Zhangzhou shipyard remained only 73 warships, and Taiwan shipyard was also reduced from 98 to 96. At the same time, government established a Quanzhou shipyard branch in Xiamen, hence Quanzhou had two shipyards as a result (cf. tab. 2-4).

Tab. 2 Warships of Fujian in 1725¹⁸

Shipyards	Total Warships	Assigned Navy Units	Supervisors	Overseers
Fuzhou shipyard (<i>Fuzhou chang</i>)	133	Haitan brigade (<i>Haitan zhenbiao</i>)	Liangyi circuit intendant, Xingquanyong circuit intendants	regional vice commander (<i>fujian</i> 副將), assistant regional commander (<i>canjiang</i> 參將)
Zhangzhou shipyard (<i>Zhangzhou chang</i>)	101	Fujian navy provincial command (<i>Fujian shuisbi tibiao</i> 福建水師提標)	Tingzhanglong circuit intendants	regional vice commander, assistant regional commander
shipyard of the Taiwan circuit (<i>junong dao chang</i>)	98	Taiwan navy regiment (<i>Taiwan shuisbi xiebiao</i> 臺灣水師協標)	Taiwan circuit intendant	regional vice commander

Tab. 3 Warships of Fujian in 1729¹⁹

Shipyards	Total Warships	Assigned Navy Units	Supervisors	Overseers
Fuzhou shipyard (<i>Fuzhou chang</i>)	80	Haitan brigade	Liangyi circuit intendant, Xingquanyong circuit intendants	regional vice commander (<i>fujian</i>), assistant regional commander (<i>canjiang</i>)
Zhangzhou shipyard (<i>Zhangzhou chang</i>)	101	Fujian navy provincial command	Tingzhanglong circuit intendants	regional vice commander, assistant regional commander
shipyard of the Taiwan circuit (<i>junong dao chang</i>)	98	Taiwan naval regiment	Taiwan circuit intendant	regional vice commander
Quanzhou shipyard (<i>Quanzhou chang</i>)	53	Jinmen brigade, Haitan brigade	Xingquanyong circuit intendants	major (<i>youji</i> 遊擊)

17 *Guangxu huidian shili* 936.319.

18 Source: *Xiamen zhi*, 153.

19 Source: *Xiamen zhi*, 153; *Jiaqing huidian shili* 707.5a.

Tab. 4 Warships of Fujian in 1736²⁰

Shipyards	Total Warships	Assigned Navy Units	Supervisors	Overseers
Fuzhou shipyard (<i>Fuzhou chang</i> 福州廠)	76	Haitan brigade	salt control circuit (<i>Yanfa dao</i> 鹽法道)	regional vice commander, assistant regional commander
Zhangzhou shipyard (<i>Zhangzhou chang</i> 漳州廠)	73	Zhangzhou navy provincial command	Tingzhanglong circuit intendants	regional vice commander, assistant regional commander
shipyard of the Taiwan circuit (<i>jungong dao chang</i>)	96	Taiwan naval regiment	Taiwan circuit intendant	regional vice commander
Quanzhou shipyard (<i>Quanzhou chang</i>)	79	Jinmen brigade, Haitan brigade	Xingquanyong circuit intendants	major

The Taiwan shipyard was established in Tainan (fig. 3) and its importance was no less than that of the three shipyards of Fujian. It constructed 105 warships and became the largest shipyard of all.²¹ At one time, Taiwan had three shipyards. The Taiwan circuit intendant was established (cf. tab. 6.17) in 1727. But after it silted up, shipbuilding became difficult there, and orders could not be completed on time. At the suggestion of Sun Erzhun 孫爾準 (1772–1832), the shipyard of Taiwan prefecture (*Taiwan fu*) was established in the 5th year of Daoguang 道光 (1825). The Taiwan prefecture shipyard was a temporary one. Its mission was to build the ship that Taiwan circuit intendant shipyard could not finish. After these ships had been completed, it would be discontinued. In 1863 (the 2nd year of Tongzhi 同治, 1862–1875), in accordance with the suggestion of Taiwan circuit intendant Ding Yuejian 丁曰健, a new Taiwan circuit intendant shipyard was established to replace the old one.²² After the Fuzhou ship council (*Fuzhou chuanzhengju* 福州船政局) was founded in the fifth year of Tongzhi (1866), Taiwan nearly ceased shipyard operations. But in sum, the Qing government in the end established a total of three shipyards in Taiwan.

20 Source: *Jiaqing huidian shili* 707.10b.

21 *Ming Qing shiliao* 8, 773.

22 Li Qilin 2013, 40–46.



Fig. 3 Taiwan Circuit Shipyard (1778)²³

Guangdong Province

Before the establishment of its shipyards, Guangdong province had already begun building warships like other provinces. In the seventeenth year of Kangxi (1678), Guangzhou prefecture had built 20 “bird boats” (*niaochuan* 鳥船), around 50 “pursuers” (*ganzeng chuan* 趕繒船) and 30 “watercrafts” (*juchuan* 舢船).²⁴ In 1725, Guangdong province established four shipyards. The one established in Henan, at Quanzhou, served warships belonging to Guangzhou, Huizhou and Zhaoqing prefectures. The one in Anbu was responsible for the warships of Chaozhou. The one in Zhiliao was responsible for the warships of Gaozhou, Leizhou, and Lianzhou, and the one in Haikou for the warships of Qiongzhou. These four shipyards were supervised by circuit intendants (*daotai* 道臺), and military affairs were managed by regional vice commanders (*fujian* 副將), majors (*youji* 游擊), or captains (*shoubei* 守備).²⁵ In 1737, because of the

23 Source: *Chongxiu Taijun ge jianzhu tushuo*, 42. The Taiwan *dao* shipyard was located in the vicinity of today's Liren Elementary School in Tainan (Tainan shi Liren guoxiao 臺南市立人國小), Taiwan.

24 *Pingmin ji* 5.134.

25 *Guangxu huidian shili* 936.316.

shortage of wooden materials in Gaozhou, another shipyard was established at Longmen. The Longmen shipyard was to build warships for the Longmen regiment. The Qinzhou magistrate (*Qinzhou zhizhou* 欽州知州) was responsible for the construction, and the Gaozhou brigade (*Gaozhou zhen*) in charge of inspections.²⁶

Although Guangdong province had established five shipyards, some of them had to be shifted to other places due to shortages of lumber. For example, the Zheliao shipyard in Gaozhou had a sub-factory, but it had not built any ships even after twenty years of operation. The ships built by the Longmen shipyard were likewise few and far between. In order to solve such problems of ship shortage, in the eighth year of the Qianlong reign (1743) a new shipyard was constructed in Henan, at Guangzhou, to replace the Zhiliao shipyard.²⁷ Gaozhou and Leizhou officials were to be commissioned to supervise construction. Review and budgeting would be carried out by the circuit intendants (*daoyuan*). As construction of the new shipyard went forward, the Longmen sub-shipyard would remain as before. In addition, after establishing the new shipyard in Guangzhou, the “grain and post” circuit intendant (*liangyi daotai*) became the supervisor due to the changing of the location. In addition, supervision over the “oared and paddled boats” (*luxiang chuan* 櫓槳船) was assigned to Gaozhou dao circuit intendant and Leizhou circuit intendant on a fifty-fifty basis.²⁸

In 1752, most warships in Guangdong province were damaged; hence assignments to yard work were rearranged. The government approved the following:

The ocean-going shipbuilding of both Gaozhou and Leizhou in Guangdong province has become vulnerable since shipbuilding had been transferred from Zhiliao to Henan. Those ships have mostly suffered damage from strong winds while sailing in rough seas. The repairment of the warships of the Hai'an battalion (Hai'an ying 海安營) and the right battalion of Leizhou brigade (*Leizhou xie youying* 雷州協右營) should be realigned to the Haikou shipyard of Qiongzhou while those of Wuchuan 吳川, Dianbai 電白, and Naozhou 碓洲 should be realigned to the Zheliao shipyard in Gaozhou.²⁹

26 *Guangxu huidian shili* 936.319.

27 *Shengzu Ren huangdi shilu* 196.520.

28 *Guangxu huidian shili* 936.321.

29 *Guangxu huidian shili* 937.745. 廣東省高雷二府屬外海戰船。自改歸省城河南地方修造。緣屆修之船。已不堅固。遠涉重洋。多遭風擊碎。應將海安營、雷州協右營戰船大小修。歸瓊州之海口廠。吳川、電白、碓洲、三營戰船大小修。歸高州之芷芷廠。

Although there were five shipyards in Guangdong province, the building of warships could not be completed in time. Therefore, they had to be flexible in terms of the distribution of shipbuilding and support each other. This quotation ends with the thirty third year of Guangxu 光緒 (1908).

The Types of Warships

The Qing dynasty used various types of warships inherited from the Ming dynasty. During the Shunzhi period 順治 (1644–1661), warships were classified by styles and sizes, e.g. as small “water craft” (*shuiju chuan* 水艚船), “spiked boats” (*lizeng* 犁繒; literally “plow fishnets”, a type of spiked boat), sand boats (*sha chuan* 沙船), “bird boats” (*niaochuan* 鳥船), “fire boats” (*paochuan* 砲船 or 礮船, literally cannon boats), “patrol boats” (*shaochuan* 哨船) and “flat boats” (*yichuan* 戈船).³⁰ By function, there were two kinds of warships: those for fighting and those for patrol. The battleships were sailed by the navy, and the patrol ships were controlled by the sub-prefectures (*zhou* 州), county (*xian* 縣), and prefecture (*fu* 府) officials. There were no specifically naval patrol ships in the Qing dynasty.

After the Qing dynasty took control, it continued the traditions of Ming shipbuilding, mainly in Fujian and Guangdong ship styles, such as bird boats (*niaochuan* 鳥船), pursuers (*ganzen chuan* 趕繒船), and watercrafts (*juchuan* 艚船). These kinds of ships were all originally civilian and merchant ships, and fishing boats. In other words, the Qing government procured their warships by remodelling various kinds of civilian ships. Civilian shipbuilding technologies were of high standard, but further improvement in them was limited due to the restrictions placed on shipbuilding by the government.³¹

In the thirteenth year of Shunzhi (1656), Fujian established a navy with 3,000 serving crews and hundreds of *huchuan* 唬船 (also known as *balabu chuan* 叭喇唬船; the name comes from the Chinese transcription of Malay word for sailing vessels, *perahu*) (fig. 4), patrol boats, pursuers, and *shuanpeng chuan* 雙篷船 (double matted sail boats).³² The different types of ships varied in size. In the twenty ninth year of Kangxi (1690), there was a regulation for

30 *Yongzheng huidian* 209.13898.

31 Liu Xufeng 2005, 338.

32 *Qingshi gao* 135.4014.

building warships used for patrol.³³ In any case, according to the *Qingshi gao* 清史稿: “Fujian had many types of warships, just like Zhejiang and Guandong.”³⁴

The warships built by the three provinces of Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong were mainly pursuers and small watercrafts (*juchuan*). Warships of these two kinds were large and became the main warships prior to the Jiaqing 嘉慶 reign (1796–1821). When the pirate problem became more serious after the Jiaqing reign, the government built the more mobile Tong’an ships in order to fight the pirates. These in turn became the main warships during the Jiaqing and Daoguang reigns. Nearly all the warships destroyed by the British Royal navy during the Opium War were of these two types.



Fig. 4 *Balabu chuan* 叭喇唬船³⁵

Following are the various types of the warships in use:

Pursuers

Pursuers (*ganzeng chuan* 趕繒船), as depicted in *Minsheng shuishi ge biao zhen xieying zhanshao chuan zhi tushuo* 閩省水師各標鎮協營戰哨船隻圖說 (“Illustra-

33 *Fujian sheng waihai zhanchuan zeli* 1.1a.

34 *Qingshi gao* 135.4014.

35 Also known as *buchuan*. Source: *Wubei zhi* 117.1b.

tions of the ships of Fujian province's naval bases", fig. 5), were originally civilian fishing boats. In the twenty seventh year of Kangxi (1688), ships of this type became the main warships.³⁶ Pursuers usually had two sails. They had other key features: high bulwarks, broad hulls, tall battens, and round bottoms. This type of ship could sail very fast and navigate the open seas. There were three types of pursuers: large, medium, and small. The large one had an amount of 80 and 42 guns, the medium size of 60 and 30 guns, and the small one of 50 and 25 guns.³⁷

The largest pursuer was 29 metres in length, and the second largest was 23 metres long.³⁸ Huge pursuers could be used for "ploughing attack, collision combat" (*lichong* 犁衝). Other details can be found in the *Gazetteer of Jinmen*.³⁹




Fig. 5 Ganzeng chuan 趕繒船⁴⁰

36 *Minsheng shuishi ge biaozen xieying zhanshao chuan zhi tushuo*, 12v.

37 *Guangxu huidian shili* 710.835-836.

38 *Guangxu huidian shili* 936.316.

39 *Jinmen zhi* 5.95.

40 Source: *Minsheng shuishi ge biaozen xieying zhanshao chuan zhi tushuo*, 12r.

The pursuer was not only a warship, but was also often used for ocean-going voyages by civilians. Such ships carried passengers and traded with the Philippines (Luzon, Lüsong 呂宋). Pursuers were thus used for battle, commerce and fishing.⁴¹

Watercrafts

Watercrafts (*juchuan* 舢舨, *shuangpeng chuan* 雙篷船, fig. 6) were smaller than pursuers, but the shapes of the two types of warships were very much alike and it was hard to distinguish between them. Watercraft had a slightly lower bow and lacked the pursuer's lion's head carving at the bow.⁴² The stem was high.



Fig. 6 *Shuangpeng chuan* 雙篷船⁴³

41 Liao Dake, 2002, 296.

42 *Minsheng shuishi ge biao zhen xieying zhanshao chuan zhi tushuo*, 13v.

43 Also known as *juchuan*. Source: *Minsheng shuishi ge biao zhen xieying zhanshao chuan zhi tushuo*, 13r.

It entered navy service after 1688.⁴⁴ A white bottom was a distinguishing feature of the watercraft, so the ship was sometimes called *baidi juchuan* 白底艍船 (literally white-bottom *juchuan* boat); also *shui juchuan* 水艍船 (literally “water” *juchuan*, meaning, in this case, small *juchuan*). *Juchuan* are usually illustrated with double matted sails, and were also called *shuangpeng juchuan* 雙篷艍船 (double matted sail *juchuan*).⁴⁵ Pursuers and *Juchuan* were both originally varieties of civilian fishing boats. For this reason, they were similar, and the Qing government and common people sometimes referred to the ships together as *zeng juchuan* 繒艍船, meaning “pursuer and watercraft”.

Juchuan were found in several sizes. The small-sized watercraft could carry 21 people.⁴⁶ The medium-sized could carry 30 people. The Guangzhou general, Xiteku 錫特庫 (?–1666), suggested sending a type of medium-sized watercraft with a crew of 30 people to Humen 虎門, in Dongguan county in Guangdong province.⁴⁷ Watercrafts were also a kind of v-bottom ship and could navigate the ocean seas; thus it could be used to carry rice, and regularly voyaged between Taiwan and Fujian.⁴⁸ Zhejiang and Guangdong also had watercrafts, and the importance of this type was no less than that of the pursuer.

Tong’an Ships

Tong’an ships (*Tong’an chuan* 同安船, fig. 7) were merchant ships used in Tong’an, Fujian. These types of ships gradually replaced the pursuers and became the main warships of the Qing dynasty due to their good sailing qualities. Later, Zhejiang and Guangdong also began to use Tong’an ships. In 1805 (10th year of the Jiaqing reign), the pursuers in Taiwan were replaced by Tong’an ships. To confirm that Tong’an ship operations were superior to those of pursuers, in 1806 (11th year of Jiaqing reign), before wide-spread construction was undertaken, the governor-general of Zhili (Zhili *zongdu* 直隸總督), Wen Chenghui 溫承惠 (1754–1832), asked the provincial military commander of Zhejiang (Zhejiang *tidu* 浙江提督), Li Changgeng 李長庚 (1752–1807), and other related officials, about their use. They responded that the Tong’an ships were just as stable as commercial transport ships.⁴⁹ This shows that Tong’an ships were approved of by officials.

44 *Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu* 79.247.

45 *Shengzu Ren huangdi shilu* 79.247.

46 *Guangdong haifang huilan* 15.5b.

47 *Shengzu Ren huangdi Shilu* 462.996-997.

48 *Gaozong Chun huangdi shilu* 1357.188-189.

49 *Renzong Rui huangdi shilu* 161.87.

The redesigned Tong'an ships carried armaments vastly more powerful. *Ji* 集 and *cheng* 成 types were the first level of Tong'an ships and were relatively larger in size. The *ji* type could carry a crew of 50; the no. 1 subtype, according to the (*Qinding*) *Junqi zeli* 欽定軍器則例 (Imperially Endorsed Regulations and Precedents on Weapons), could carry a crew of 30-40. Other levels carried fewer crew members.⁵⁰



Fig.7 *Ji* Type Tong'an Ship⁵¹

The redesigned Tong'an ships carried armaments vastly more powerful. The *ji* type (fig. 7) was equipped with two 2,000 *jin* 觔 (1,180 kg) *hongyi pao* 紅夷礮 or 紅夷礮 (lit.: “red coating cannon” or “red barbarian cannon”, fig. 8), four pieces of 1,500 *jin* (885 kg) *hongyi pao*, one piece of 800 *jin* (472 kg) *xiben pao* 洗笨礮 (smaller cannon), sixteen pieces of 140 *jin* (82.6 kg) *pishan pao* 劈山礮 (literally “splitting mountain,” a smaller cannon), 400 *jin* (236 kg) of *wofengzi* 窩峰子 (lit.: “a nest of bees,” similar to grape shot), 30 *tengpai paidao* 藤牌牌刀 (rattan shields and sabres, fig. 9, 10), 60 *kouda dao* 口撻刀 (*kouta*

50 *Junqi zeli* 24.435.

51 Source: Chen Guodong 2013, 29. There is a Dutch flag on the Taiwan ship during the Qing dynasty!

blades, similar to machetes, fig. 11), and 60 *zhugao qiang* 竹篙槍 (long bamboo spear, fig. 12). The no. 1 type Tong'an ships were equipped with two pieces of 1000 *jin* (300 kg) *hongyi pao*, two pieces of 800 *jin* (472 kg) *hongyi pao*, two pieces of 500 *jin* (150 kg) *xiben pao* cannons, four pieces of 100 *jin* (59 kg) *pishan pao* cannon four pieces of 80 *jin* (24 kg) *pishan pao* cannons, 400 *jin* (236 kg) *wofengzi*, 20 sets of rattan shields and sabres, 40 *kouda dao* and 40 *zhugao qiang*.⁵² Judging from the lists of armament, it is clear that the Tong'an ships were quite powerful for their size.




Fig. 8 *Hongyi pao* 紅衣礮⁵³

The Qing navy's main warship was the Tong'an ship during the Opium War. But the outcome of that war clearly showed that the Tong'an ship could not contend against the British navy. Therefore after the Opium War, in the twenty third year of Daoguang (1843), there were discussions of the use of the Tong'an ship as the main navy warship. In the end, it was decided to continue to use it as a navy warship on account of its deep draft, which made it appropriate for the high seas.⁵⁴ Tong'an ships thus could still be found navigating the ocean until the late Qing dynasty.

52 *Guangxu huidian shili* 898.836-837.

53 Source: *Guangxu huidian tu* 100.132.

54 *Guangxu huidian shili* 712.860.



Fig. 9 *Paidao* 牌刀⁵⁵



Fig. 10 *Tengpai* 藤牌



Fig. 11, 12 *Kou da dao* 口撻刀, *Zhu gao qiang* 竹篙枪

55 Source for fig. 9-12: author's private collection.

Dragnet Boats

Miting 米艇 (lit.: “Rice boat”, a kind of dragnet boat), also called *Guangting* 廣艇 (Guangdong junks), were commercial ships from the Guangdong area. Dragnet boats consist of two types: single sail and double sail. If equipped with eight paddles, it could be used to patrol in the inland sea and could be sailed faster than other types of ships.⁵⁶ Therefore, it was called “spiked boat” (*tuozeng chuan* 拖繒船). It was originally created along the coasts of Eastern Guangdong and used for fishing at first. The navy found that the *miting* conveniently sailed the open sea, thus they equipped this type of ship with cannon and other types of armaments. It had great impact on the effort to restrain pirates in the Guangdong sea area. Its sharp bow and huge stern could help it withstand strong winds and waves quite well. Also, its hull was kept very low to make it impossible to attack. It could operate with paddle and scull, and was sailed well either on the ocean or on rivers.⁵⁷ It was thus chosen to be a warship for the navy.

The *miting* had inherited the traditions of Guangdong ships: It could control the enemy through fully exploiting the wind. *Miting* were also classified by size as large, medium, and small. The large one was 27.9 metres long, 6.2 metres wide, and had a draught of 2.9 metres; the medium one was 23.5 metres long, 5.58 metres wide, and had a 2.48 metre draught; the small one was 20 metres long, 5 metres wide, and had a draught of 1.5 metres.⁵⁸ Different sizes resulted in different capacities. The large *miting* could carry a crew of 80 like the larger pursuer.⁵⁹ The medium-sized boats, like no. 2 *miting* of the centre battalion of the Guangdong regiment, for example, could carry a crew of 70.⁶⁰

Before Tong'an ships became the main warships, *miting* were very important as a warship in the Guangdong area. There the dragnet boat was also used to carry rice and salt cargos. This was because of its high speed and broad hull. The salt merchants used *miting* as their main ships for transporting salt.⁶¹ After the Jiaqing reign, every province started using Tong'an ships 同安梭船 as warships because the Tong'an ship was faster than the *miting* and therefore replaced it. In the fourth year of the Daoguang reign (1824), the *miting* owned by the Fujian province were gradually disposed of at the suggestion of

56 *Jinmen zhi* 5.95.

57 *Ding Wencheng gong zougao* 8.21a.

58 *Guangxu huidian shili* 937.329.

59 *Junqi zeli* 23.435.

60 *Xuanzong Cheng huangdi shilu* 238.569.

61 *Renzong Rui huangdi shilu* 46.558.

the two *Min Zhe zongdu* (governor-generals of Fujian and Zhejiang), the former was Qingbao 慶保 (1759–1833) and the latter Zhao Shenzhen 趙慎畛 (1762–1826).⁶² Fujian shipyards started to build Tong'an ships, and *miting* gradually disappeared from the southeast coasts.

Gu Boats

The *gu* boat (*guchuan* 舢船) was a type of civilian boat and also came out in different sizes. Some of them could not navigate the oceans as their drafts were too shallow. For this reason the *zhougu chuan* did not become a main naval warship. In addition, the Wusong naval batallion 吳淞水師營 recorded that *gu* boats were formerly called “fast patrol boats” (*kuaishao chuan* 快哨船), and were used for patrolling around the coasts.⁶³ The large size *gu* boat could navigate the ocean, thus its bottom was made in a round shape. It had a double cover, and was thus called “double bamboo matting sailboat and round-bottom *gu* boat”.⁶⁴

Gu boats mostly navigated around the Zhejiang coastal areas. Fujian and Guangdong coastal areas also had *gu* boats, but they were of small sizes. *Gu* boats in the Zhejiang area were relatively larger. For example, there were the four *gu* boats belonging to Dinghai brigade with crews of 50.⁶⁵ The small *gu* boats had a 19.2 metre long hull and their planks were 7 centimetres thick,⁶⁶ the *gu* boats built in the Zhapu 乍浦 area had crews of 40, but were equipped with cannons.⁶⁷ This indicates that the *gu* boat could serve as a kind of medium-sized warship. The smaller *gu* boat was a kind of small-sized warship with a crew of 22. It was equipped with 2 cannons (*hongyi pao* 紅衣砲, *zimu pao* 子母砲 (breech-loading cannon, literally “child and mother cannon”, fig. 13), 2 *baizi pao* 百子砲), 2 rattan shields, 72 fire arrows (*huojian* 火箭, fig. 14), 8 spurt cylinder (*pentong* 噴筒, fig. 15), 8 fireballs (*huoqiu* 火毬), 100 *jin* (59 kg) of gunpowder, 100 iron cannonballs (*tiezi* 鐵子) and 30 lead balls (*qianzi* 鉛子) in different sizes.⁶⁸ This kind of *gu* boat was mostly distributed around Chaozhou prefecture and used between the borders of Fujian and Guangdong.⁶⁹

62 *Xuanzong Cheng huangdi shilu* 68.78-79.

63 *Zhili Taicang zhou zhi* 23.454.

64 *Fuzhou fuzhi* 12.335.



65 *Junqi zeli* 23.436.

66 *Baqi tongzhi* 40.41a.

67 *Junqi zeli* 23.435.

68 *Junqi zeli* 23.436.

69 *Shuishi jiyao*, 331.

Fig. 13 *Zimu pao* 子母砲⁷⁰Fig. 14, 15 *Pentong* 噴筒, *Huojian* 火箭⁷¹

70 Source: *Guangxu huidian tu* 100.130.

71 Source: *Guangdong haifang huilan* 21.41b (*pentong*, used to deploy a smoke screen), 42a (*huojian*, used to burn enemy riggings).

Galleys

A “galley” (*paijiang chuan* 排槳船, lit.: “bank-of-oar boat”, also named “*shao-chuan* 哨船, “patrolling boat”) was propelled mainly by rowing, not wind power, and was very flexible. It was usually employed on inland rivers and in coastal waters. Galleys were of different types and sizes. For the Qing navy there were two different kinds: the large one with eight paddles (*baqiang chuan* 八槳船, lit.: “eight-paddled boat”, fig. 16) and the small one with six paddles.⁷²




Fig 16 *Baqiang chuan* 八槳船⁷³

In 1728, it was employed for patrol and defence only. A cover and paddles were used. When the wind blew, the sail would be set; when it stopped, the paddles

72 *Xiamen zhi* 5.157.

73 Source: *Minsheng shuishi ge biaozen xieying zhanshao chuan zhi tushuo*, 21r.

would be used. Galleys had paddles positioned on both sides of the ship, a sharp bow, and a square stern. It was similar in type to a fishing boat. It was equipped with two fir masts. One of the cabins was used to store five sails. It was almost as fast as a small pursuer, but the flat bottom prevented it from navigating the open ocean.

Different sizes of galleys were equipped with different weapons.⁷⁴ The large ones were equipped with cannons and used for battle. The smaller ones were usually employed by sub-prefectures or counties to patrol and seize smugglers, because of their high speed and flexibility.

The galleys used for patrolling were small. The eight-paddle patrol ships, for example, had crews of four, including two musketeers (*niaoqiang bing* 鳥槍兵) and two rattan shielded soldiers.⁷⁵ Ships of this scale could not fight with pirates. They could only be used to catch smugglers and police the coastal areas.




Fig. 17 *Goulian qiang* 鉤鑣槍⁷⁶

If a navy galley were to be used for battle, it would need much more powerful weapons. For example, the anterior *dubiao* battalion 督標後營 (*dubiao houying*, governor-general's command) used a number two inland river galley with two

⁷⁴ Source: *Minsheng shuishi ge biaozen xieying zhanshao chuan zhi tushuo*.

⁷⁵ *Junqi zeli* 23.436.

⁷⁶ Source: *Guangxu huidian tu* 102.149.

paddles. It had a crew of 20, one *dadu* 大纛 (marshal's banner), three *muzisha pao* 母子砂砲 (literally "mother and child sand cannon"), 300 *qianfengkou danzi* 鉛封口彈子 (large lead balls), 1,500 *qian qunzi* 鉛群子 (small lead balls), 2.4 kg of gunpowder, six *biandao* 扁刀 (blades), six *kuaiba* 快鈹 (fast rakes), ten *zhugao qiang* long bamboo spear, four *goulian qiang* 鈎鎌槍 (hook sickle spears, fig. 17), one gong, one drum, and one flag.⁷⁷ A lion's head was painted on the bow (fig. 18: *chuantou zhengmian fenxing tu* 船頭正面分形圖, lit. "scheme of the ship's front face"). Galleys, depending on whether they were used for patrol or battle, showed differences in crews and weapons. Although the galley was not the main Qing warship, it was often used whenever there was a need for high speed or easy sailing, as it was effective as a raider.




Fig. 18 *Chuantou zhengmian fenxing tu* 船頭正面分形圖⁷⁸

Others

Besides those discussed above there were still other types of Qing warships. "Wind dragging boats" (*tuofeng chuan* 拖風船), for example, were often seen in

⁷⁷ *Junqi zeli* 23,440.

⁷⁸ Source: *Minsheng shuishi ge biaozen xieying zhanshao chuan zhi tushuo*, 23r.

the Huizhou prefecture area.⁷⁹ They were smaller than the *juchuan* watercrafts, and their beam was only 7 or 8 *chi* (c. 2.21-2.53 metres). Before becoming the main warship of the Guangdong area, it was used as a commercial ship to carry salt. Before 1735, all ships of this type had a carved animal head at the bow. Later, when officials operated them as warships, the name of the owning official was inscribed in order to distinguish it from a navy ship.⁸⁰ After that, commercial ships lacked sculptures or paintings. In this way commercial ships could be differentiated from warships.

“Large troop ships” (*huxun chuan* 唬巡船) were used in the Zhejiang area. Their sizes were small and ships of this type were used for patrolling. A large troop ship had a crew of 12, along with 6 musketeers. It had 4 *hongyi pao* cannon crews, 2 rattan-shield soldiers, and 4 *baize pao* cannons.⁸¹ The smaller troop ships only carried a crew of about 4.

Fishing boats (*diaochuan* 釣船) had a 12.4 metre long hull, a 2 metre draught, one oar and two paddles. They could sail before and after the wind, and were very fast.⁸² Ships of this type were used in the Ningbo area by civilians, and later became patrol ships used by prefectures, sub-prefectures, or counties. It was a small type of warship that carried a crew of only 10.⁸³ Such vessels were turned into naval warships for naval patrolling.

Another patrol ship was called *laozeng chuan* 撈繒船 (small pursuer). It was 18.6 metres long and about 3.2 metres wide and had 22 cabins.⁸⁴ Each ship could carry a crew of 27.⁸⁵ The *laozeng chuan* navigated along the southeast coast. This type of ship was used more commonly in the Fujian and Guangdong areas.

When the pirate Cai Qian 蔡牽 (1761–1809) was plundering the Chinese coast, the provincial military commander of Zhejiang, Li Changgeng 李長庚, reported that he was going to build *tingchuan* 霆船 (“thunder ships”). Their size was the largest among navy warships, and they were built by imitating the style of the Tong’an ship. There were a total of 30 newly built *ting* boats, each with numbers and the word *ting* 霆. Each *tingchuan* had a crew of 80. The bronze and iron cannons with which they were equipped were captured from foreign ships, also there were 58 *hongyi pao* and 340 large splitting mountain

79 *Shuishi jiyao*, 331.

80 *Guangdong haifang huilan* 12.41a-42a.

81 *Junqi zeli* 23.436.

82 *Gaozong Chun huangdi shilu* 157.1247.

83 *Junqi zeli* 23.436.

84 *Guangdong haifang huilan* 12.12 (45a-b).

85 *Zhaoqing fuzhi* 10.560.

cannons (*da pishan pao* cannons 大劈山炮). They were made at Hangzhou, Ningpo, and Wenzhou.⁸⁶ The *tingchuan* was a temporary warship, built especially to confront the Cai Qian pirate group.

Tab. 5 Types of Warships⁸⁷

Warship Name		Length (metres)	Width (metres)	Number of Soldiers	Weapons ⁸⁸	References
<i>niao chuan</i> 鳥船 (bird boat)	large bird boat	37.2	8	70	c + g	<i>Xuanzong Cheng huangdi shilu</i> 323.1077
	medium bird boat	25-31	6.1	30	c + g	
	small bird boat	13	3.4	20	c + g	<i>Quanzhe bingzhi</i> 3.84
<i>gan zeng chuan</i> 趕繒船 (pursuer)	large pursuer	30	6	80	c + g	<i>Guangxu huidian shili</i> 936.318
	medium pursuer	23	5.2	60	c + g	
	small pursuer	20	4.6	40	c + g	
<i>juchuan</i> 艍船 (water-craft)	<i>da juchuan</i> 大艍船	27.6	6.8	60	c + g	<i>Fujian tongzhi</i> 84.38a
	<i>shun zihao</i> 順字號 (<i>shun</i> type)	20	5.5	50	c + g	
	<i>bi zihao</i> 濟字號 (<i>ji</i> type)	17	4.6	40	c + g	
<i>Tongan chuan</i> 同安船	<i>ji zihao</i> 集字號 (<i>ji</i> type)	25.4	8	80	c + g	<i>Fujian tongzhi</i> 84.37b-38a
	<i>cheng zihao</i> 成字號 (<i>cheng</i> type)	24	7.4	70	c + g	
	no. 1 一號	22.3	5.8	60	c + g	
	no. 2 二號	19.8	4.9	50	c + g	
	no. 3 三號	18.2	4.6	40	c + g	
<i>miting</i> 米艇	large <i>miting</i>	28	6.2	80	c + g	<i>Guangxu huidian shili</i> 937.328
	medium <i>miting</i>	23.56	5.5	70	c + g	
	small <i>miting</i>	19.8	4.9	60	c + g	
<i>tingchuan</i> 霆船		32.8	9	80	c + g	c + g
<i>jiangchuan</i> 槳船 (galley)		15.5	2.8	10-40	c + g + s	<i>Minsheng shuishi ge biao zhen xieying zhanshao chuan zhi tushuo</i> , 13r
<i>shaochuan</i> 哨船 (patrol boat)		21.7	5.8	70	c + g + s	<i>Gaozong Chun huangdi shilu</i> 256.320

86 *Leitang'anzhu dizi* ji 2.29.

87 Source: *Guangdong haifang huilan* 12.45a.

88 Weapons: "c" short for "cannons"; "g" short for "guns"; "s" short for "spears".

Quantities of warships

The Qing government followed Ming dynasty practice and mainly distributed warships to Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong. During the Ming dynasty, Zhejiang had the most warships assigned, such as *fu* 福 (Fujian junk, like pursuer), *cang* 蒼 (Zhejiang junk, like bird boat) and *shabu chuan* 沙唬船 (Zhejiang junk, like *balahu*), a total of 1,008. During the Kangxi reign in the early Qing dynasty, the focus of coastal defence shifted from Zhejiang to Fujian due to the fighting against Koxinga's (Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功, 1624-1662) Ming loyalists. The number of warships reached its first peak in 1683, most of them stationed in Fujian (see tab. 7). Apart from the Zheng regime, another reason was that Fujian was located in the middle of the three provinces along the coast of southeast China, hence Fujian's defence forces were expanded. Furthermore, the piracy problem from Kangxi to Jiaqing reign occurred mostly along the coast of Fujian. Therefore, Fujian was assigned the largest quantity of warships.⁸⁹

There seems to have been a reduction of fleets during the Yongzheng reign (tab. 7). According to the *Yongzheng chao da Qing huidian* 雍正朝大清會典 (Collected Statutes of the Great Qing dynasty, Yongzheng reign), the total of warships in the three provinces were 118 in Zhejiang, 312 in Fujian, and 107 in Guangdong.⁹⁰ After the Qianlong reign, the numbers of warships were only slightly adjusted: 218 in Zhejiang, 338 in Fujian, and 166 in Guangdong. Zhejiang was always second in numbers of warships.

The piracy problem reoccurred during the late Jiaqing period. In the fifteenth year of Jiaqing (1810), the number of warships reached another peak. Fujian had 432 warships including some 300 seagoing ships, Zhejiang had 311 warships including 250 seagoing ships; and Guangdong had 455 warships including 277 seagoing ships (see tab. 6). If the patrol boats of sub-prefectures and counties are also counted, numbers would be even higher. Guangdong warships increased dramatically and started to surpass the number of Fujian's warships, because during the Daoguang reign maritime trade had increased at Guangzhou. In response, the Qing government gradually added more warships to Guangdong.

The types of warships that were in use also changed. The Tong'an ship had displaced the pursuers. According to *Junqi zeli* Fujian naval forces had 136

⁸⁹ *Zhejiang tongzhi* 90.21b.

⁹⁰ *Yongzheng huidian* 209.13901.

Tong'an ship and 38 *miting*, and Taiwan naval forces manned 73 Tong'an ships.⁹¹ This shows that Tong'an ships had already displaced other types. At the same time, Qing government also increased the patrol boats by hundreds, to police the coastal areas.

In general, the Qing government only increased their number of warships and crews when the circumstances required it, mostly to confront enemies. As soon as the situation eased, they would decrease the number of warships and crews again.

Tab. 6 Types and Numbers of Warships in Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong (Qianlong reign)⁹²

Types of Warships (in:)	Zhejiang	Fujian	Guangdong
patrol boat (<i>xunchuan</i> 巡船)	14		
flat-bottomed boats (<i>pingdichuan</i> 平底船)		20	
fishing boat (<i>diaochuan</i> 釣船)	36		
wind dragging boats (<i>tuofeng chuan</i> 拖風船)			5
patrol boats (<i>shaochuan</i> 哨船)	9		
patrol boats (<i>jushao chuan</i> 躡哨船)		2	
large troop ships (<i>dage chuan</i> 大舸船)	1		
small troop ships (<i>xiaoge chuan</i> 小舸船)	4		
galley (<i>pengzi chuan</i> 舟彭仔船)			17
total number of warships:	218	338	559

Tab. 7 Numbers of Warships in the Qing Dynasty

Era	Zhejiang	Fujian	Guangdong	References
Shunzhi reign	352	205	405	<i>Kangxi huidian</i> 139.6945
Kangxi reign	39	524	494	<i>Yongzheng huidian</i> 209.13900
Yongzheng reign	118	312	107	<i>Yongzheng huidian</i> 209.13901
	197	342	166	<i>Baqi tongzhi</i> 40.44b
Qianlong reign	196	338	166	<i>Qianlong huidian zeli</i> 115.1797-1798
Jiaqing reign	311	432	455	<i>Jiaqing huidian shili</i> 575.28b-30b
Guangxu reign	59	81	211	<i>Guangxu huidian</i> 712.856
	298	339	197	<i>Bingzhi kaolue</i> 6.37-40

91 *Junqi zeli* 23.435.

92 Source: *Qianlong huidian zeli* 115.1797-1798.

Conclusion

Shipyards were concentrated near the sea or tidal rivers to allow easy access for keel materials, transportation and subcontractors. In terms of the technology of warships, there were no research institutes for new designs and development of nautical vessels during the Qing dynasty. In the construction of warships they mainly learned from observing civilian ships. The number of warships assigned to a certain coastal area depended on current needs. Thus Qing warships could deal with aggression from other Asian countries and from pirates, but could not withstand the large, steam-powered ships of European countries.

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Dining with the *Daimyō*: Performative Intercultural Exchange and Border Thinking through Seventeenth-Century European-Japanese Banquets

Wim De Winter¹

Sakoku and Border Thinking: Global Designs Shaping Japan's Early Modern Frontiers

Upon investigating the history of intercultural interactions in seventeenth-century Japan, one ought to consider both its political borders and its conceptual borders within a broader world historical² context of East-Asian maritime exchange. It may be fruitful to apply the “border thinking” epistemology of Walter Mignolo to this context, as a tool to conceptualize these borders as forming specific meeting points of global designs and local histories, which are adapted, adopted, integrated or ignored at local levels,³ as reflected in practices of hospitality and recontextualising exchange in seventeenth-century Japan. Certain economic and political processes can subsequently be typified as “global designs” implemented on local scales, such as the global expansion of European maritime commerce and capital leading to English merchants settling in the coastal town of Hirado 平戸 in 1613, where they became embedded in the design of Tokugawa hegemony, and in the dynamics of local social and cultural exchange. This Japanese context differs from Mignolo’s perspective in the sense that colonial domination and its resulting subalternity, which often seemed to accompany European commerce elsewhere during the “early modern” period, did not develop there as such. This makes Japan into a potentially interesting counterexample for a history of diverging modernity, or as a mode of resistance

1 Thanks to Angela Schottenhammer, Tansen Sen, Geoff Wade, Christian Uhl and Mariko Fukuoka for their comments to my 2013 Crossroads-conference paper which has led to this article in its present form. Additional thanks go to my colleagues at the Ghent University Department of Languages and Cultures and at the Flanders Marine Institute (VLIZ), Belgium, for their additional support.

2 Meant here as a history of interactively created worlds of connection, interaction and exchange. Another approach of this perspective may be found in Bentley 1993.

3 Mignolo 2000, ix-x.

against certain global designs. According to Robert Hellyer, this is due to the *bakufu* 幕府 government's reaction to a nascent form of "proto-globalization", regulating the flow of interaction through a series of "domain agency" measures.⁴



Fig. 1 Map of Japan (Kaempfer 1729, Tab. viii)

The perspective on interaction of global and local dimensions in Tokugawa 徳川 Japan (1603–1868) is determined by the emergence of a historical concept of closure called *sakoku* 鎖国, as the development of a feudal Tokugawa hegemony with global aspirations, which influenced and was influenced by local histories and foreign exchange.⁵ The historical debate on “early-modern” Japan as a “closed country” still echoes into both European and Japanese historiography.⁶ However, Sepp Linhart has mentioned how contemporary re-

4 Hellyer 2009, 12, 49-50.

5 Conceptualised as such by Toby 1984, xiii-xvii.

6 And also beyond it, into fields of research such as literary studies or sociology, in which it is both critically appropriated or uncritically accepted. Kowaleski-Wallace 2007 is an example of

search still often circumvents the issue of “perceived closure”,⁷ which nonetheless remains of great contextual importance in considering the historical possibilities of intercultural interaction in Japan. The concept of closure itself refers back to German physician Engelbert Kaempfer (1651–1716), who commented on what he perceived as a closed Japan in an essay added to his *History of Japan* published 1727.⁸ This work was later translated by Shizuki Tadao 志筑忠雄 (1760–1806) into Japanese (*Sakokuron* 鎖国論, 1802) and eventually used as an argument to legitimise Meiji 明治 modernisation against so-called “Tokugawa backwardness”, and was again picked up by Japanese scholars and European historians to explain aspects of Japanese culture.⁹ Some scholars have convincingly argued that this presents a highly Eurocentric viewpoint, and that one should instead focus on a wider range of interactions. Marius Jansen considers it western ethnocentrism to think that a country that chooses to cut itself off from Westerners has cut itself off from the world, as there was still a trade in Chinese goods, and the limited presence of Dutch or Chinese foreigners still provided information on other parts of the world.¹⁰ Linhart also reminds us of Ronald Toby’s position that the *sakoku*-concept cannot adequately describe the reality of the Tokugawa shogunate’s (Tokugawa *bakufu* 徳川幕府) foreign policy of *kaikin* 海禁, which consisted of a series of edicts that restricted, but never closed off nor repelled, foreign contact in seventeenth-century Japan in order to establish a political unity and socio-cultural hegemony under Tokugawa reign.¹¹ Kato Eiichi 加藤栄一 interprets this hegemony as an internal establishment of central feudal control over border *daimyō* 大名, which would have influenced the development of Japanese culture, but definitely not as an isolation policy refusing to adopt anything foreign.¹² The *kaikin* policies instead created a selective range of channels and direct agents relating to the outside world, resulting in greater coherence in foreign relations, and in a firmly centralized feudal Tokugawa

the former, while H. Kato 1981 is an example of the latter, stating an approach concerning “Japan’s social energy” requiring some sort of outlet.

7 Linhart 2008, 312.

8 Kaempfer and Scheuchzer 1729.

9 Walker 2002, 62.

10 Jansen 2000, 85–87.

11 Linhart 2008, 311–312.; Meanwhile these edicts have been studied in detail as an evolving series of policies in Laver 2011.

12 E. Kato 1981, 209.

state expressing national power.¹³ Both Ronald Toby and Yasunori Arano 荒野泰典 have indicated a relative openness towards foreign encounters during the early Edo period (Edo jidai 江戸時代, 1603–1868), within the confines of *kaikin*, whereas scholars such as Satoru Fujita 藤田覚 (in his 2005 book named *Kinsei kōki seijishi to taigai kankei* 近世後期政治史と対外関係) tend to differ in noticing tendencies of closure within the Tokugawa or Edo-period, especially claiming that the period from the late eighteenth-century to the Bakumatsu 幕末 (1853–1868) period formed a kind of Shogunate seclusion policy as a process called *sakoku-soho-kan* 鎖国祖法観. This would imply a gradual move from openness towards more rigidly restrictive policies and inflexible practices during the Edo-period, not only by Shogunate officials but also by a general higher-class population during the Bakumatsu period.¹⁴

Within the process of feudal state formation as described by Ronald Toby, a diplomatic protocol had to be developed as a symbolic language expressing relationships among exchange-parties, forming the rules enabling exchange.¹⁵ Both Toby and Walker have argued that a specific way of dealing with “foreignness” was crucial in this development, and consisted of the “creation” of foreigners to fit in a version of diplomatic exchange, as the cornerstone of an identity politics following a logic of difference.¹⁶ Walker thus notices the magnification or creation of the exotic character of peripheral societies such as the Ainu or European foreigners, and of elaborately staged dramatizations of difference via tribute embassies and rituals.¹⁷ Such a foreign policy of selective exclusion required a proactive engagement with the outside world, which demanded the understanding of foreign culture and exchange.¹⁸ To create and understand “the foreign” then presupposes the transfer of cultural

13 Toby 1991, xiv-xv. This position is also shared in Japanese scholarship by Yasunori Arano in his 1988 book, replacing the *sakoku* view with a perspective of international relations structured through four specific locations known as “four mouths”, a common “sea ban” or “maritime prohibition” policy (*sakoku seikaku* 海禁政策) on foreign relations occurring throughout East Asia. See also Yasunori 2005.

14 The author is grateful to Mariko Fukuoka for providing this information, which clarifies this subject from the point of view of Japanese scholarship, and for providing the references to Arano and Fujita.

15 Toby 1991, 183.

16 Walker 2002, 51; Toby also mentions this as a new ideological conception of the Self and the Other, rather than as an absolute system, in Toby 1991, xviii-xx.

17 Walker 2002, 51-54.

18 Walker 2002, 4.

knowledge, which could occur through performative interaction, as an attempt at understanding, mediating or even creating foreignness as an essential aspect of Tokugawa identity politics. This implies the incorporation of difference on a local level while keeping the foreign at an exotic distance, in order to create a distinction while maintaining a hegemonious worldview, which incorporates the foreign exterior as an aspect of itself. Such a perspective would have enabled specific conditions and possibilities of exchange between foreigners and Japanese. The creation of this “design with global ambitions” then converged with the “global design” of maritime cultural exchange, both from within the expansion of European commerce and as an aggregate of pre-existing maritime practices occurring throughout maritime East Asia.

Sugata Bose suggests another interesting global historical perspective on this “design”, in which he disengages from traditional thinking about boundaries and instead looks towards the ocean as a space characterised by specialized flows of capital and labour, skills, ideas and cultures.¹⁹ This space is tied together by webs of economic and cultural relationships, with port cities as specific points of exchange and interaction.²⁰ Such tendencies are well-documented for the *Shuinsen* 朱印船 (Red Seal trade) period,²¹ which partly corresponds with the period of European stay in Hirado, when Japanese maritime trade was organized and stimulated by shogunal permissions. This trade had a specific cross-cultural character, as Japanese ships often employed European navigators or mixed crews.²² Peter Shapinsky argues for exploring cultural exchange in this maritime context as a non-linear series of translations where eclectic cosmopolitan sea-based identities were developed. He takes 16th and 17th century Portolan-maps, as palimpsestic maritime itineraries, to be exemplary products of such cultural translations.²³ Together with the development of hybrid ship craft integrating Chinese, European and Japanese influences, this demonstrates how Japanese-European interaction could result in what Shapinsky calls a hybrid, poly-vocal maritime culture.²⁴

19 Bose 2006, 3.

20 Bose 2006, 6.

21 Approximately dating from 1604 to 1635.

22 Mulder (1985, 155-156) mentions Dutch merchant Jan Joosten independently controlling his own Japanese junk, in order to participate in silk trade.

23 Shapinsky 2006, 4-5.

24 Shapinsky 2006, 22-24.

Sakoku and Liminal Praxis: Shaping Local Identities on the Intercultural Frontiers of Hirado and Deshima

The convergence of these tendencies of maritime cultural exchange with the aforementioned development of a Tokugawa hegemony incorporating foreign influences then suggests a border at which specific practices of exchange formed as adaptations or answers to both “designs”: the design of “maritime culture”, which implies foreign exchange as a common aspect of maritime practices, and the design of “Tokugawa hegemony”, which implies the foreign as a created Other in establishing difference. This convergence would shape and influence the practical lives and exchanges of people in the port of Hirado from 1613 to 1641, and Deshima from 1641 onwards, creating specific social identities and exchanges as its resulting adaptations, to be considered as forms of “border thinking” or “liminal praxis”. Contemporary cultural anthropology employs the concept of “liminal praxis” in order to designate those practices where cultural interaction and exchange cross boundaries, creating shared experiences and ways of thinking which can shape and create identities.²⁵ Anthropologists Donnan and Wilson also call this phenomenon the “frontier effect”, thereby denoting a specific set of practices and negotiated contacts occurring in a specific zone, where dynamic human relations form a mixed transborder society.²⁶ This concept seems to apply very well to interaction between Europeans, Chinese and Japanese in Hirado, where a local border praxis of exchange created identities from within shared social relations, as reflected in performative exchange of gifts and hospitality.²⁷ In his 2016 book chapter on Early Modern East Asia, Michael Laver has also recognised Hirado and Nagasaki as liminal spaces, yet he designates these as a neutral space for trade, or a “space between”.²⁸ Yet, this would not have been a neutral space at all, but rather a space in which certain “global designs” and power relations were active, and where the above border practices took place as processes of learning to which those already instructed had a clear advantage. The concrete aspects of such border practices can be analysed in their connection, adaptation, incorporation or resistance to the converging global designs of maritime cultures of exchange and Tokugawa feudal hegemony.

25 Pinxten and De Munter 2006, 146-147.

26 Donnan and Wilson 2010, 7-11.

27 De Winter 2013, 572-579.

28 Laver 2011, 31-33.

Hirado held an important legacy of foreign trade and seafaring, as a place where merchants gathered from throughout Japan in order to interact and to trade with Europeans,²⁹ and where local ship crews were ethnically and culturally mixed.³⁰ Frequent accommodation and reception of people from different areas made Hirado into a kind of intercultural crossroad which was generally considered as a hospitable place, or as Mulder describes it: “One of the main attractions was the pleasant stay at Kochi and Hirado, where food was cheap and plentiful, there was sake galore and the population was friendly”.³¹ Daily exchanges took place in Hirado, involving the Matsura *daimyō*, aristocratic ambassadors from Satsuma and elsewhere, English, Dutch and Chinese merchants, local villagers and craftsmen. These exchanges occurred beyond the diplomacy of commerce, on the scale of daily life, shaping Hirado into a diverse cultural landscape.³² Donnan and Wilson view such cultural landscapes as defined by the social interactions which construct them:³³ they study border cultures as ways of life and forms of meaning which are shared at a specific location, where certain symbols and rituals occur and cultural production takes place. Such border cultures are discernible to both residents and travellers, whose participation in them depends on their knowledge of the “cultural codes on display”.³⁴ The learning process of acquiring “cultural codes” implies intercultural interaction, such as took place in Hirado, to have been a cumulative learning experience. As other foreign travellers preceded those newly arrived, the Dutch residents already knew and shared certain codes of behaviour and involvement towards local aristocracy, whereas the English still had to learn them in 1613. Supposing the convergence of aforementioned “global designs” influenced this learning process, and therefore also the practical exchanges and foreign relations during the processual development of Tokugawa hegemony, specific symbols and performative changes in the cultural incorporation of the

29 Just as Mulder (1985, 2-3) portrayed Hirado as a place of intercultural interaction from the Dutch perspective, Derek Massarella (1990) has done so from the perspective of the English East India Company. Yet both have not considered it from the historical-anthropological or global historical outlook proposed in the present article, which aims to interpret and explain the moments of interaction as presented through banquets or shared meals.

30 Mulder (1985, 46-48) reports of Red Seal ships under the reign of the Hirado *daimyō*, carrying crews comprising Chinese and Japanese crewmen, usually with Dutch navigators.

31 Mulder 1985, 36-37.

32 De Winter 2013; De Winter 2014.

33 Donnan and Wilson 1999, 12.

34 Donnan and Wilson 1999, 64.

foreign could be traced in their significance for this process of acquiring “cultural codes”. These “cultural codes” can be discerned in practices of performative exchange and hospitality, for instance when meals were shared and gifts given, and reveal how the cultural landscape of Hirado was symbolically constructed through liminal praxis which defined the place of the foreign as incorporated by daily practices of English or Dutch merchants in Japan.

Dining with the *Daimyō* as Performative Intercultural Exchange

Learning the Cultural Codes on Display at Banquets and Dinner Parties

Gift-exchange and forms of hospitality appear as central topics throughout most European letters and journals from seventeenth-century Hirado, not merely as commercial leverage, but as daily recurring practices forming social relations.³⁵ As mentioned, these practices also reflect a process of learning to acquire “cultural codes” concerning behaviour of hospitality and giving, which was explicitly acknowledged in different instances: either in attending an artistic performance or a banquet, or in the direct advice European merchants were given by Japanese aristocrats on when to visit and what gifts to bring, such as English chief factor and cape merchant Richard Cocks (1566–1624) mentioned in his diary:

And after dyner Torazemon Dono sent me word that Cpt. Speck ment to vizez the kyng to wish hym a good new year, and gave me counsell to doe the lyke, this day being held a happie day, and taken in kynd parte by them which were vizezted. So i went and carid a jar of conservs, not to goe emptie handed.³⁶

Dining with the *daimyō* provided a near-daily occasion at which to learn the country’s customs. Of course one also had to learn the cultural codes or performative notions on how to dine, as demonstrated by Cocks mention of being invited by the Hirado *daimyō* to have dinner at the Dutch house, where the English merchants learned how to go about performing the Japanese way of serving food to guests. Here it is remarkable how the Dutch captain exhibits the performative gestures according to which food ought to be served, incorporating the country’s customs in his body language:

³⁵ De Winter 2013.

³⁶ Thompson 1883, vol. 2, 7.

[T]he old King sent for me to come to dinner to the Dutch House, and Master Eaton with mee, and to bring a Bottle of Wine. Master Eaton had taken Physicke and could not goe, but I went: wee had a very good Dinner at the Dutch House, the meate being well drest both after the Japan and Dutch fashion, and served upon Tables, but no great drinking. [...] Captaine Brower did not sit at all, but carved at Table, all his owne people attending and serving on their knees, and in the end, he gave drinke to every one of his ghests, with his owne hands, and upon his knees, which seemed strange to me, and when they had dined, all the Nobles went away, and Captaine Brower would needs accompany me to the English House. I asked him why he served these people upon his knees, they sitting at Table: he answered me it was the fashion of the Country; and if the King himselfe made a Feast, hee did the like for the more honour of his ghests. And before night the old king Foyne came to the English House, and visited all parts, and made colation, staying an houre talking of one thing and other.³⁷

Most Hirado banquets or dinners served as occasions for giving presents and for social bonding while sharing food and wine, which European merchants explicitly labelled as “Japanese customs”. These forms of hospitality often incorporated specific forms of entertainment such as *kabuki* 歌舞伎 theatre and musical performances. Michel Maucuer refers to such banquets as an essential element of Edo-period social life, where the household gathered to dine while accompanied by music or dance spectacles, calling it a quasi-ritual occasion for different social classes to meet and interact in public. These occasions also submitted guests to certain aesthetics, “inscribing the criteria of distinction into the principle of conviviality”.³⁸ Such events took place at sea as on land, and were often reciprocated. John Saris (ca. 1580–1643), the English captain who established the East India Company in Hirado in 1613, mentioned a highly entertaining visit from the *daimyō* and his courtesans who visited his ship “The Clove” on arrival:

The King requested that none might stay in the Cabbin, save my selfe and my Linguist, who was borne in Japan, and was brought from Bantam, in our ship tither, being well skild in the Malayan tongue, wherein he delivered to mee what the King spoke unto him in Japan language. The Kings women seemde to be somewhat bashfull, but he willed them to bee frolicke. They sung divers songs, and played upon certain Instruments (wherof one did much resemble our Lute) being bellyed like it, but longer in the necke, and fretted like ours, but had only foure gut-strings. Their fingering with the left hand like ours, very nimbly: but the

37 Purchas 1905b, 535-536.

38 Maucuer 2011, 709-713.

right hand striketh with an Ivory bone, as we use to play upon a Citterne with a quill. They delighted themselves much with their musicke, keeping time with their hands, and playing and singing by booke, prickt on line and space, resembling much ours heere. I feasted them, and presented them with divers English commodities: and after some two houres stay they returned.³⁹

A similar encounter took place nine days later, this time featuring Geishas⁴⁰ as actresses instead of musicians. This fragment also reveals Saris' understanding of their social role in aristocratic circles:

[T]he old King came aboard againe, and brought with him divers women to be frolicke. These women were Actors of Comedies, which passe there from Iland to Iland to play, as our Players doe here from Towne to Towne, having severall shifts of apparrell for the better grace of the matter acted; which for the most part are of Warre, Love, and such like. These Women are as the slaves of one man, who putteth a price what every man shall pay that hath to doe with any of them; more then which he is not to take upon paine of death, in case the partie injured shall complaine. It is left to his owne discretion to prize her at the first, but rise he cannot afterwards, fall he may. Neither doth the partie bargain with the Wench, but with her Master, whose command she is to obey. The greatest of their Nobilitie travelling, hold it no disgrace to send for these Panders to their Inne, & do compound with them for the Wenches, either to fill their drinke at the Table (for all men of any ranke have their drinke filled to them by Women) or otherwise have the use of them.⁴¹

Musical entertainment, in the context of a dinner party, could also be provided by blind musicians,⁴² which Cocks mentioned in a context of Japanese customs and gift-giving:

[T]he kyng and rest of noble men ut supra came to dyner and, as they said, were entertayned to their owne content, and had the dancing beares to fill their wyne, *nifon catange* (or Japon fation), with a blind fidler to singe, ditto. And in respect the king is going up to Edo, yt was agreed to geve hym a present.⁴³

39 Purchas 1905a, 445-464.

40 Purchas (1905a, 447) annotates this as "Woman Actors of Comedies in Japan, being also common women".

41 Purchas 1905a, 447.

42 Probably blind performers reciting the epic *Tale of Heike* while playing the *biwa* lute, in a genre known as *heikyoku*, which, as mentioned in Groemer 2001, 349-350, was performed by patronaged blind wanderers or guild-members.

43 Thompson 1883, vol. 2, 26-27.

However, such events were not exclusively limited to aristocratic interaction between Europeans and Japanese, and also occurred among Dutch and Chinese merchants, all of whom occasionally hosted performances of *kabuki* theatre. Cocks repeatedly reported European merchants hosting these either among themselves: “The Hollanders had the *cabo-ques* this day, and sent for me and Mr. Osterwick, and soe had a play”,⁴⁴ or in the presence of Japanese aristocratic company:

Capt. Camps and the Duch dyned with us this day, and envited the English to dyner to morow, and, after, to see a play or *caboque* [...] Capt. Camps envited us to dyner this day, and, after, to a Japon play or commody, all plaied by men and boyes, and noe woamen; at which was Torazemon Dono, with Jentero Donos secretary and Stroyemon Dono, our *bongew*; and divers others brought bankettes, as Capt. Camps host, Jno. Jossens sonne in lawe, and others.⁴⁵

Gastronomical Exoticism and Exchange

Besides providing occasions for social bonding and entertainment, meals also presented possibilities for getting acquainted with gastronomical habits and acquiring taste, sometimes tied to a mutual interest in exoticism. Banquets allowed participants to savour both European and Japanese food at the same occasion, at which the guests “dyned after the Japan manner, and supped after the English”.⁴⁶ This could also develop into a genuine preference for foreign food, as when Saris remarked the Hirado *daimyō*'s appetite for European food, who either just liked it, or perhaps ordered it as an exotic specialty carrying a certain social prestige:

I met the old king Foyne at his house, who desired to have two peeces English poudred Beefe, and two of Porke sod with Turnips, Raddish and Onions by our Cooke, and sent unto him, which I caused to be done.⁴⁷

44 Thompson 1883, vol. 2, 147.

45 Thompson 1883, vol. 2, 244.

46 Thompson 1883, vol. 1, 65.

47 Purchas 1905a, 474.

Cocks also mentions a similar occasion at which the *daimyō* was accompanied by his kinsmen:

The eleventh, I sent Migell our Jurebasso to the old King, with the Beefe and Porke accomodated as aforesaid, with a bottle of Wine, and six Loaves of white Bread: he accepted of it in very kind part, having in his company at eating thereof, the young king his Grandchilde, and Nabisone his Brother, with Semidone his Kinsman.⁴⁸

This kind of gastronomical appropriation occurred in both directions, as McOmie mentions VOC-chief Johannes Camphuijs (1634–1695), who served as Dutch chief factor on Deshima from 1671 to 1676, had a preference for incorporating Japanese food and clothing at his dinner parties on Bantam.⁴⁹ This reveals how both a Hirado *daimyō* and a Dutch chief merchant acquired tastes which they cultivated as a personal preference.

Wine, Tea and Tobacco as Signifiers for the Quality of Relationships

Dutch trading company delegate François Caron, the last director of the Dutch factory in Hirado (1639–1641), also reported on hospitality in Japan. His book was written as a response to an official questionnaire by European trading company directors, presuming questions on relationships and hospitality were important for their commercial designs and thus implying a certain sensitivity to aspects of cultural or social life. Under the heading “How they receive each other, and of their Hospitality”, Caron wrote:

The Jappanners are very hospitable and civil to such as visit them, they treat them with Tobacco and with Tsia, and if the friend be more then ordinary, with Wine: They cause them first to sit down, and setting a Lack bowl before them, will not suffer them to depart before they have tasted of it; they sing, they pipe, and play upon such stringed instruments as they have, to rejoyce their Guests, omitting no manner of carouses and kindnesses to testifie their welcome, and the value they put upon their conversation. They never quarrel in their debauches, but he that is first drunk retires and sleeps, until the fumes of the wine be evaporated. There is no such thing as Tavern or publick drinking House in all the Countrie; they eat, drink and are merry, but all in their own houses, not refusing lodging and refreshment for the traveller and stranger.⁵⁰

48 Purchas 1905b, 534.

49 McOmie 2005, 47.

50 Caron and Schorten 1663, 73-74.

Caron thus reveals the image of a hospitable Japan where visitors were regularly received with tobacco and tea, at occasions of performative cultural exchange characterized by the combined presence of music, conversation and food or drink. A revealing aspect here is the importance of wine as signifying “more than an ordinary friendship”, in forming an important social symbol as an essential element in gift-exchanges as well as hospitality. This aspect of social connection and identity can also be traced in other sources and contexts. In another fragment of his report, Caron mentions the ritual function of wine as sealing oaths or unbreakable bonds:

For confirmation of this (an oath) they drink a bowl of Wine together, which is solemn; for no covenants thus made are to be broken. Those that binde themselves cut their own bellies, and do it as followeth: They assemble their nearest kindred, and going to Church, they celebrate the parting feast upon mats and carpets in the midst of the Plain, where having well eat and drank, they cut up their bellies, so that the guts and entrails burst out.⁵¹

Saris recorded a similar function in his journal. He mentions a feast at which multiple gifts were exchanged, and where the drinking of sake was explicitly recognised as a pledge:

The thirteenth I went ashore, attended upon by the Merchants and Principall Officers, and delivered the presents to the King, amounting to the value of one hundred and fortie pounds or thereabouts, which he received with very great kindnesse, feasting me and my whole companie with divers sorts of powdered wild fowles and fruits: and calling for a standing Cup (which was one of the Presents then delivered him) he caused it to be filled with his Countrey wine, which is distilled out of Rice, and is as strong as our Aquavitaë : and albeit the cup held upwards of a pint and a halfe, notwithstanding taking the Cup in his hand, he told mee he would drinke it all off, for a health to the King of England, and so did, my selfe and his Nobles doing the like. And whereas in the roome where the King was, there was onely my selfe and the Cape Merchant, (the rest of our Companie being in an other roome) the King commanded his Secretarie to goe unto them, and see that everie one of them did pledge the health.⁵²

Besides signifying “friendship”, wine also held a symbolically important connotation as reinforcing oaths and covenants, as a rather explicit way of establishing social ties. Wine was not only a performative symbol in pledges or hospitality, it

51 Caron and Schorten 1663, 50.

52 Purchas 1905a, 446.

also seems to have been one of the most circulated gifts in aristocratic circles, and was often mentioned by Cocks as a “use of the Country”:

I sent presents to both the Kings (being informed that it was the use of the Country) of Wine and banquetting stuffe; as likewise to Nobesane the yong Kings brother, and to Semidone, the old Kings Governour, and Unagense, which were well accepted. Some Cavaleros came to visit our house, and received the best entertainment I could give.⁵³

Wine as a gift-object also represented relational identities through its material and symbolic value,⁵⁴ and would assert its status through its material circulation in an aristocratic environment, while also signifying close relationships or even oaths. Banquets were thus not only performative occasions for the symbolic creation or affirmation of relations between individuals or groups, but also involved symbolic gifts as representations or assertions of relational identities. The change of these relational identities over time, as signified by acts of hospitality or by symbolic objects such as wine, may be traced by comparing elements from the Hirado-sources on interaction with Engelbert Kaempfer’s later seventeenth-century descriptions of hospitality during the “Deshima period”. Institutionally, Leonard Blussé presents Deshima as a stricter place for the “hands-on” management of foreign presence by the Japanese government, through an apparatus typical of political structures making trade subordinate to the tributary system of the Edo hinterland.⁵⁵ We might therefore wonder whether dining customs, and their “cultural codes”, would have differed from the earlier Hirado period.

The significance of wine seems less prevalent for the Deshima period: Kaempfer mentions European travellers were nearly always served tea and tobacco while being received by guardsmen or nobility.⁵⁶ Meals differed as well, as during travels food was now mostly prepared according to European fashion by Japanese cooks.⁵⁷ As relationships represented by wine were indicated by Caron to explicitly differ from those accompanied by tea, the evolution of greeting guests with wine to primarily welcoming guests with tea can be considered as a

53 Purchas 1905b, 521.

54 A function which the anthropologists Comaroff and Comaroff (1992, 127-129) claim objects or commodities can fulfill as gifts.

55 Blussé 2009, 32-34.

56 Although *sake* was also offered, as is mentioned multiple times in Kaempfer and Scheuchzer 1729, 345, 379.

57 In Kaempfer and Scheuchzer 1729, 317, is mentioned that Japanese cooks were preparing European food, an interesting aspect of cross-cultural learning.

sign of change in Japanese relationships towards foreigners, who might have become “equal or less-than-ordinary friends”.

The rather open view on interactions during the Hirado-period may be contrasted with Kaempfer’s writings on foreign reception and hospitality in late seventeenth-century Japan, as the Deshima period appears in his writings as a more restricted and rule-bound context of interaction. Presuming foreigners to have been treated more distantly, while their main location on the island of Deshima was also keeping them at a spatial distance, corresponds with the aforementioned change from openness to restrictiveness during the evolution of Edo-period foreign relations. Nonetheless, Kaempfer reports throughout his book that meals with noblemen and civil servants still took place during tribute voyages to Edo. Some aspects of interaction and exchange remained present while exotic connotations seemingly increased, despite or perhaps because of a more regulated or restricted contact. This tendency becomes particularly clear in reported instances of the “exoticising gaze”, or what Toby calls the Japanese “viewing of the Hollanders” or “Royal Viewing” [*Jōran*], which he claims simultaneously served as a kind of entertainment and as protocol during official aristocratic encounters.⁵⁸ Jansen claims this “silly pantomime” rather served as a source of amusement than study, as the *shogun* 将軍 was also a serious student of Chinese culture, art and medicine.⁵⁹

The Exotic Gaze and the Spectacle: Perceptual Differences in Late Seventeenth-century Edo

Kaempfer reveals how meals still formed an excellent occasion for getting an exotic “glimpse” of foreigners and for the transfer of knowledge, which clearly occurred under different circumstances than during the Hirado-period. During courtly travel, most interactions took place with civil servants or aristocrats, and meals proceeded according to ceremonial etiquette, which mostly seemed to serve the Japanese in acquiring some exotic knowledge on the Dutch. Perhaps the more limited context of daily interaction made the Dutch appear more exotic than before, in both popular and aristocratic circles.

58 Toby 1991, 190-191.

59 Jansen 2000, 88.




Fig. 2 Courtly Travel (Kaempfer 1729, Tab. xxii, detail)

Kaempfer thus mentions specific instances of curiosity and “viewings of the exotic” in courtly encounters. He mentions being led into chambers containing pierced or barred windows, from behind which some women were curious to observe the exotic strangers while gifts were being exchanged. Tobacco was brought in and each participant was offered some cups of tea. Meanwhile, the hidden women examined the Dutch exotic clothing, which they were asked to show. They then proceeded to the next visit, where they were again received with tea and tobacco, and where women were again sitting behind barred windows.⁶⁰ Visiting the *shōgun*, a similar ceremony occurred at greater length, in which the Dutch were asked to lay down their clothes, perform some acts such as dancing, jumping, acting drunk, and speaking broken Japanese or singing. Elsewhere, they were again received with tea, tobacco and a banquet, in rooms where spectators were also sitting behind shutters in order to look at the peculiar European customs and behaviour.⁶¹ After the Dutch were asked to perform curious acts, probably for the exotic entertainment of spectators, a table was presented to them containing various Japanese sauces and chopsticks.⁶² Thus going from house to house, the Dutch were repeatedly offered a full banquet including tea, tobacco, sake and appliances for smoking.⁶³

60 Kaempfer and Scheuchzer 1729, 344-345.

61 Kaempfer and Scheuchzer 1729, 382-383.

62 Kaempfer and Scheuchzer 1729, 382.

63 Kaempfer and Scheuchzer 1729, 418.




Fig. 3 Inner Audience Hall (Kaempfer and Scheuchzer 1727, Vol. 2, Tab. xxxii)

Barnabas Suzuki has mentioned pipe smoking was introduced in Japan during the early Hirado-period by Chinese and European merchants, and eventually became a fixed social custom in which the *kiseru* 煙管 pipe accompanied the tea ceremony as part of Japanese high culture and education.⁶⁴ Kaempfer's frequent references to smoking can also be a sign of its increased use or general popularity during the second half of the seventeenth century, as the use of tobacco during hospitable gatherings was less prevalent or less mentioned in the Hirado-interactions. Apart from the importance of tea over wine, the most striking element of changed interaction during the Deshima period was the exoticising gaze as a symbol of increased distance and the creation of difference, from within the strict performative codes and protocols of courtly visits and hospitality.

Conclusion and Historical-Anthropological Considerations

Aforementioned European sources have thus far allowed a view on exchange and hospitality in the form of banquets, in which specific symbolic commodities and “cultural codes” were employed. Michael Laver has described such interactions as having “an almost postmodern feel to them in that Europeans and their trading partners celebrated each other's holidays without [...] any condemnation or smugness.”⁶⁵ yet it is not quite clear what he means by “postmodern feel”.

⁶⁴ Suzuki 2004, 77-78.

⁶⁵ Laver 2011, 31.

Instead, those interactions undoubtedly require closer scrutiny, as well as an attempt at a more profound explanation, which this article has attempted to provide through a historical-anthropological approach. This allowed for a description of intercultural interaction as an interactive experience forming a process of learning to perform cultural codes and acquiring taste, involving symbolic commodities such as wine or tobacco. The comparison between the Hirado and Deshima phases of European interactions in Japan has also revealed an increased difference in perception and identity throughout the seventeenth century, which can be considered from the vantage point of European others' integration in the design of a Tokugawa hegemonic identity, which eventually restricted the maritime commercial design as it gained in importance elsewhere.

One might question if it would be useful to consider certain symbols or aspects as “typically Japanese” in their origins and concrete manifestations. It might be more accurate to consider these specific practices or “cultural codes” to have been created as a mutual interaction or specific border praxis by all involved actors, each carrying their own legacies of cultural significance regarding hospitality, resulting in a convergence which could not have occurred elsewhere in that same configuration. Some symbols involved in seventeenth-century Hirado's interactions were also noticed by Harumi Befu, who investigated the contemporary folk origins of gift-giving as an important custom in Japan.⁶⁶ He describes the ritual importance of *sake* (rice wine), as originally offered to gods and communally consumed by villagers in order to receive divine power as well as partaking in shared union with the community's members. This would then indicate a belief in “magical contagion”, through the sharing of a communal meal as well as the giving of food.⁶⁷ This belief, which Befu claims originated in Shinto religious culture, became embedded in a traditional social framework where reciprocity formed a principle of interaction.⁶⁸

However, historical comparisons with medieval or early-modern Europe are equally possible, and reveal how similar practices existed there as well. For instance, Fernand Braudel (1902–1985) mentions that in Ancien Régime Europe (1400–1800), as in today's popular culture, “eating and drinking were not just necessities or social luxuries, but defined communal activities, as means of intercourse between man and society, men and the material world, and man

66 Befu 1968, 445.

67 Befu 1968, 447–448.

68 Befu 1968, 449–450.

and the supernatural universe⁶⁹. The scenes involving wine as described by Cocks or Saris also resonate remarkably well with Braudel's description of drinking scenes from early modern Dutch paintings, in which "wine, tobacco, women of easy virtue and the music of violinists (...) are combined for the drinker's delight"⁷⁰. Wine and tobacco thus prove to be interesting commodities for a comparative cultural history, their specific connotations differing according to context and environment, but their use and origins showing striking similarities. This indicates that not so much the specific symbolic commodities or practices themselves were distinctive, but rather the performative context and way in which they were used. This points towards the mutual creation of a border praxis through converging meanings, forming a "symbolic community" as an explanation for the above-described forms and symbols of hospitality. Cohen notes that the kinds of social interaction creating a symbolic community mostly concern symbolic transaction of meanings, rather than rules.⁷¹ This symbolic transaction of meanings takes place through rituals as a device to heighten a communal consciousness, using symbols to make meaning and to make sense of the world, signifying specific relationships of belonging.⁷²

In this sense, both community and difference were created through the meaning of rituals in the form of banquets or "Royal viewings" and their "cultural codes". Cocks or Saris' letters and diaries reveal specific processes of acculturation as learning the cultural codes and meanings of symbolic behaviour, learning how to use symbols such as wine or serving dinner in a specific way in order to make sense in social encounters.

The frequent intercultural contact in the border-site of Hirado, where such exchanges and mutual processes of learning developed through prolonged contact between Europeans and Japanese mediated foreignness and developed strong social ties. Moreover, the kind of hospitality embodied through banquets was also considered by Marcel Mauss as an occasion for exchange, sealing the relation between people.⁷³ He theoretically discerned particular acts of politeness, such as banquets or festivals, as part of a more general enduring contract under the voluntary guise of gifts,⁷⁴ yet whose refusal of acceptance is the rejection of the bond of alliance or

69 Braudel 1973, 126-127.

70 Braudel 1973, 167.

71 Cohen 1985, 16-17.

72 Cohen 1985, 50.

73 Mauss 1954, 24-25.

74 Mauss 1954, 7.

commonality.⁷⁵ His theory also indicates, in another way, how such hospitality relates to gift-exchange as establishing a commonality.

Mutually established shared interaction created a symbolic community in seventeenth-century Hirado, in a period showing informal interaction, perhaps reflecting the design of maritime culture. The Deshima context did not include this kind of local exchange, and marked a change in symbols and behaviour. It instead revealed an augmented exoticism, as in Kaempfer's accounts on the reception and viewing of foreigners. The replacement of Hirado by Deshima enforced different customs, through which the codes of symbolic behaviour changed, cancelling the symbolic community as it existed in Hirado and replacing it by a context founded on increased "exoticism" and the creation of "otherness".

Border knowledge as a process of learning changed when Europeans, as a category of "the foreign", were embedded differently in the developing "design" of Tokugawa hegemonic identity. This change in context comparatively limited the possibilities of performative interaction, making the Hirado-period appear as relatively open and the Deshima period as more restrictive as to intercultural interaction between Japanese and Europeans, which makes certain scholars' observations on the "restricted" nature of foreign interactions in the eighteenth-century Tokugawa period or the Bakumatsu period understandable. The processual view on "foreign encounters" from the Hirado to the Deshima context, or from Saris or Caron to Kaempfer, indicates this increasing restriction and might thus reveal the beginning of the evolution noticed by Satoru Fujita for the Bakumatsu period. However, none of this can be considered in terms of "closure": in agreement with Jansen, we can consider this term as a later construct incorporating a different "global design" or even a different conception of history, legitimising a modernity, which enforces another cultural history upon Japan in a seventeenth-century global context.⁷⁶ Instead it reveals how the contrasting design of European commerce, constantly seeking to expand itself, was being shaped and regulated according to the cultural and social requirements of the developing design of Tokugawa hegemony. This occurred through specific ceremonies and symbolic behaviour, which simultaneously created a symbolic community and established relations of difference. In that sense, the transfer of cultural knowledge as present in intercultural interactions through the enactment of banquets and hospitality, undoubtedly proved

75 Mauss 1954, 17.

76 Jansen 2000, 93-94.

a vital part of early Tokugawa identity politics. Hirado can resultingly be characterized as a cultural borderland between the designs of maritime cultures and Tokugawa courtly culture, creating its own dynamic of exchange involving symbolic codes and behaviour. In this behaviour, tendencies of formalization were contrasted with more spontaneous interaction each time a banquet or ceremony was performed, both at times reading more like a performative practice involving symbols and meanings than as rule-bound exchange.

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- de Geestelyke en Wereldlyke Keyzers. Van de Oorspronkelyke Affstamming, Godsdiensten, Gewoonten en Handwerkselen der Inboorlingen, en van hunnen Koophandel met de Nederlanders en de Chineesen. Benevens eene Beschryving van het Koningryk Siam. In 't Hoogduytsch beschreven door Engelbert Kaempfer, M. D. Geneesheer van het Hollandsche Gezantschap na 't Hof van den Keyzer, Uit het oorspronkelyk Hoogduytsch Handschrift, nooit te vooren gedrukt, in het Engelsch overgezet, door J. G. Scheuchzer, Lidt van de Koninklyke Maatschappy, en vn die der Geneesheeren in London. Die daar by gevoegt heest het Leven van den Schryver, Voorzien met kunstige Kopere Platen, Onder het opzicht van den Ridder Hans Sloane uytgegeven, En uyt het Engelsch in 't Nederduytsch vertaalt.* Amsterdam: Balthasar Lakeman, 1729 [archive.org/details/debeschryvingvan00kaem].
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The Chinese Initiative for a Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road: Opportunities and Challenges for Latin America

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Introduction

In his visit to Panama in September 2017, after establishment of official diplomatic ties with that Central American nation, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi 王毅 (born 1953) described Latin America as an “important direction for the natural extension of the Maritime Silk Road of the twenty-first Century”.² During the past two decades, economic ties between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have intensified. China has become the first or second trading partner for most of them, and the region has consolidated its position as one of the largest suppliers of raw materials for the emerging Chinese economy.³ Similarly, billions of dollars have been invested by Chinese corporations in different projects in the region. Many more have been announced by the leaders of countries in the area in the last few years. Therefore, the idea of extending China’s “Maritime Silk Road Initiative” to that part of the world is seen as a natural step.

Since its announcement in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, *yidai yilu* 一帶一路) has attracted the attention not just of China watchers, but of scholars and journalists across the globe. This paper analyses the implications of the BRI, and, within it, the “Maritime Silk Road Initiative”, for Latin America, emphasizing the opportunities and challenges it offers as times change in the

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2 MFA 2017.

3 Gallagher and Pozecanski 2010, 11-37.

macro-region. The first section introduces theoretical considerations that help explain the motivations behind the proposal, and the implementation of the initiative. The discussion takes into consideration not only increasing Chinese power, understood here as accumulation of material capabilities, but also the use and significance of certain key concepts, for example, the idea of a peaceful rise and rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, in terms of the construction of the BRI narrative and the transformation of international institutions.

Section two expounds how the Belt and Road Initiative is commensurate to a new Chinese emphasis on placing China's relations with neighbouring countries on the same level as those maintained by China with the world's major powers. A brief historical assessment is presented. It highlights the way trade between China and Latin America was carried on in past centuries, noting how, for the first time, China is taking an active role in the region, without the traditional intermediation of Western powers, something that was continuous from imperial times as the first Chinese goods arrived in the Americas and Mexican and Peruvian silver became highly valued in China. The third section evaluates the potential benefits of the BRI extension to Latin America, as well as the difficulties the process may entail.

Chinese companies, both state- and private-owned, have acquired a certain experience investing in the region, but their investments remain highly concentrated, by sector and country of destination.⁴ Extension of the "Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road" (Ershiyi shiji haishang sichoulu 二十一世紀海上絲綢路) should imply diversification of investments, with appropriate mechanisms encouraging transparency and reinforcement of the rule of law, dissipating fears of an imminent Chinese advancement into the region, fears detrimental to sustainable economic development. The final section follows this up by presenting preliminary conclusions.

Theoretical Considerations of the Belt and Road Initiative

During the past four decades, the road to economic modernization in China has been marked by a continuous process of trial and error, with a highly pragmatic vision, replicating those measures that proved successful, and, eventually, modifying or discarding those that have not. The process of Chinese insertion into the international system as an emerging power has followed the same pat-

4 Pérez Ludeña 2017, 8, 13.

tern. After being admitted to the United Nations in 1971, the government of the People's Republic of China has exhibited a gradual learning process, first experimenting with change on a small scale, before turning to more active involvement in world affairs, as China became assured of its ability to effect positive change, particularly regarding national interests.

The pattern initially followed the strategic thinking of Deng Xiaoping 鄧小平 (1904–1997). He believed in taking a low profile in the international arena, hiding China's real capabilities so that they would not be perceived as a threat to others.⁵

According to the theory of "Hegemonic Stability" in international relations, the hegemon or dominant power is able to maintain its position within the system and gain recognition through the provision of public goods. These ultimately benefit different actors, including those usually considered free-riders.⁶ After World War II, the allied winners, and particularly the United States, made sure to provide international public goods through the creation of various institutions, with the UN and the Bretton-Woods System as the most important ones. At the regional level, the US and the Soviet Union also pushed forward other institutions, aimed at the consolidation of their leadership, offering still other actors the opportunity to take advantage of the goods provided through them. In this sense, institution-building became an important factor in the consolidation of dominant power, while offering an opportunity to expand possibilities for cooperation between different actors, confirmed by the theoretical construct in international relations known as Neoliberalism.⁷

Nonetheless, the irruption of constructivism into the study of international relations has rendered important consideration also of other factors, including ideas and perceptions acknowledging that reality is socially constructed, and hence influenced by the people making crucial decisions as well as by different historical trajectories.⁸ In fact, despite the increased relevance of non-state actors in the international system, particularly after the economic neoliberal wave of the 1980s, and the deepening of the process of globalization, it is possible to see that the state remains the most important unit of study in international

5 Economist 2010.

6 Important works introducing the Theory of Hegemonic Stability include Kindleberger 1973 and Eichengreen 1996.

7 Keohane 1984, 135-181.

8 Among the most important theoretical works presenting constructivism are: Wendt 1992 and Campbell 1998.

relations, as well as that force most capable of having an impact on the system as a whole. Therefore, in a system still dominated by sovereign states, the element of power, measured primarily as the accumulation of material capabilities, and ability to use them to advance interests and ideas, can also be considered as a most important one in the relations of these sovereign states, as noted in the theory of structural realism.

In this sense, proponents of a so-called realist constructivism, involving the adoption of a set of constructivist assumptions on how to study politics, as suggested by Barkin, argue that it is necessary to keep in mind that while realism can help explain the process of global institutional change, it is not suitable to interpret the content of the transformations involved.⁹ As Sterling-Folker has suggested:

To complete its narratives of social reality, realism must collaborate instead with an approach like constructivism, which is capable of addressing the evolution of particular social content.¹⁰

For that reason, it is important to understand the content of the institutional change represented by the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, encompassing the Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road, as a way of better appreciating the challenges it poses, as well as the opportunities it offers to the different countries in Latin America.

Since the foundation of the PRC in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, *Zhongguo gongchandang* 中國共產黨) has made sure that it is perceived by the people as the sole actor capable of successfully achieving the so-called great “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (*Zhonghua minzu de weida fuxing* 中華民族的偉大復興).

After the death of Mao Zedong 毛澤東 (1893–1976), despite the accession to power of a group of leaders interested in following a different economic approach, the goal of rejuvenating the country remained unchanged. The process of economic reform, and of opening-up China, was intended to increase the material capabilities of the country. It aimed at achieving a higher level of development, and, as was later established by the party leadership, to allow China to reach the status of being a developed economy by 2049.

Despite numerous challenges that persist, both within and outside China, officials and diplomats have developed various tools to contribute to what they

9 Barkin 2003, 338.

10 Sterling-Folker 2002, 75.

perceive of as the ultimate goal of the nation.¹¹ With that in mind, the Chinese state eventually joined those very international institutions created after WWII, and has become one of the countries most benefited by the economic liberal international order, one characterized by a constant deepening of the process of globalization.

During the years (2002–2012) when Hu Jintao 胡錦濤 (born 1942) was at the head of the Chinese Communist Party, the term “peaceful rise” (*heping jueqi* 和平崛起) changed to “peaceful development” (*heping fazhan* 和平發展). This phrase was embraced as a state mantra, to portray the Chinese willingness not to change the international order through violent means, emphasizing instead the opportunities of win-win cooperation with developed and developing countries alike.¹² Nonetheless, this message has encountered difficulty in achieving unconditional acceptance by different actors in the international system. Some still hold suspicions regarding the real intentions of Beijing, making the “rise of China” a topic discussed for political reasons at different moments of time, during US electoral cycles, for example. At the same time, in part due to the constant attention paid to the idea by the media and politicians in the West and other parts of the globe, the image of China as one of the most powerful countries in the world has now become common place.

Under such circumstances, changes taking place in the West during the past decade have had a deep influence among Chinese policymakers. After the arrival of Xi Jinping 習近平 (born 1953) in the top leading position in the party, they have shown interest in creating new international institutions, including an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and a New Development Bank (NDB). These bodies, despite being a partial response to the refusal of the established powers to give China a higher representative voice within existing organizations, particularly the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, have also been presented by the Chinese government as complementary to the existing global institutions and not as opposed to them. It is in these terms that the Twenty-first Century Maritime Road initiative, part of the BRI, should be approached.

11 Wang 2014, 1-13.

12 Shambaugh 2013, 218-219.

The Evolution of the Belt and Road Initiative

Institution-building and the BRI

The end of the Cold War placed new strategic considerations in front of the PRC. These grew out of the need to delimit borders with the newly independent states in Central Asia, as well as with Russia. The views of the governments of the latter states coincided with those of the Chinese government in joint expectations of a new multipolar world, with the new states of Central Asia, Russia and China among the most important players.¹³

At the same time, moves towards a unipolar world, as manifested in the US response to the invasion of Kuwait, and later in different US interventions in Africa and the Balkans, made other actors aware of multi-polarity as a long-term process. After 1994, the Chinese leadership expressed its goal of recreation of the Silk Road, using the concept as a first step in the development of stable relations with neighbouring countries in Central Asia, but also keeping in mind the stability of Chinese Xinjiang.¹⁴ Confidence-building measures of this type continued to take place, allowing the Shanghai Five group, established in 1996, to evolve into the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization” (SCO) (Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi 上海合作組織) in 2001, after admitting Uzbekistan, not a country neighbouring China, as a new member.

Coincidental with a new emphasis in American foreign policy on the fight against terrorism, and after US intervention in Afghanistan, bordering some of the member countries of the SCO, the US began to prioritize the need for cooperation on security issues, in particular the need to avoid radicalization of Islamic groups. Circumstances showed that the Chinese government considered the SCO as an important partner in the security of its western regions, but, at the same time, the economic motivations were more difficult to advance.

After a long time under the control of others, first as part of the Russian Empire, and later of the USSR, the states of Central Asia were at the time still transitioning to market economies. They were also highly dependent on trade with China, and with Russia. During most of the twentieth century, and before the year 2000, China was not among the major trading partners of the countries in Central Asia. Their trade was important but at the same time the export-driven growth model adhered to by the Chinese government since reform

13 Wohlforth 2009, 55-56.

14 Xing 1998.

and opening, also required access to developed markets in Western Europe and North America. A major breakthrough came in this area in late 2001, with China's admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO). In this regard, the focus on economic growth and the accumulation of material capabilities made China's relationships with developed nations the most important area in Chinese foreign policy-making.

PRC interactions with the major powers, particularly the United States, became the focus of Chinese foreign policy-making during the first decade of the twenty-first century.¹⁵ During those years, China and the United States developed an important economic interdependence. The US became the largest consumer of Chinese manufactured goods, and the PRC grew into the largest creditor of the US government through acquisition of treasury bonds, managing to attract large investments from American pension funds, among other financial institutions.¹⁶ Similarly, the arrival of transnational corporations and foreign investments in China made possible modernization of local industries and adoption of better corporative practices and technologies, enabling Chinese companies, either state-owned, or private or semi-private, to become important competitors, not only domestically, but internationally.

Industrial diversification in the PRC required a constant supply of raw materials that could not be obtained domestically. Chinese corporations began investing abroad, in different regions of the world, seeking to have access to natural resources. These were to be used in the production of manufactured goods back home, both for domestic consumption and for export.

Through commodity importation while exporting industrial goods, eventually, China became the major trading partner, or one of the largest trading partners, of most countries in the world. The neighbouring nations in Central Asia, the main actors for the recreation of a new Silk Road, were not the exception. Being a region well-endowed with natural resources, members of the SCO, especially those in Central Asia, have increased their shares in the supply of commodities to China. Nonetheless, and despite their geographic locations, the countries of the region have not been able to surpass other parts of the world as the most important exporters to the PRC.

Chinese imports from the SCO countries in 2015 were similar in magnitude to those from the South American regional economic organization, Mer-

15 Xu Liping and Wang Xiaoling 2016, 36.

16 Fonseca 2014, 257-274.

cosur. Latin America in general was a more important trading partner for China than the countries in Central and South Asia (tables 1 and 2).

Table 1 Evolution of China's foreign trade with specific regions, 1995–2015 (millions USD)¹⁷

Region	1995		2005		2015		2015 (% of total)	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	X	M
World	148,779	132,083	761,953	659,953	2,281,856	1,681,671	100.00	100.00
East Asia	84,853	61,102	314,815	338,923	910,369	754,073	39.90	44.84
North America	26,262	18,800	174,956	56,253	440,599	176,825	19.31	10.51
Europe and Central Asia	22,426	26,810	175,184	100,354	438,234	311,159	19.21	18.5
Latin America and Caribbean	3,123	2,967	23,268	26,665	130,946	103,802	5.74	6.17
South Asia	2,511	685	15,961	10,725	94,333	16,972	4.13	1.01

A critical juncture in China's foreign economic relations were the 2008–2009 financial crises in the United States and Europe. The difficult situation in those developed economies not only boosted confidence among Chinese leaders about the viability of their model, but also pushed them to action regarding the need to find alternative places for trade to resume the Chinese path to high economic growth. The implementation of a mega stimulus-package in the Chinese economy, and diversification of import sources and export markets, together with a gradual withdrawal or pause of Western investment, led the PRC to become the third largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world, after the United States and Japan.¹⁸ The recently acquired competitiveness of Chinese corporations also moved them to engage in the four different types of foreign investment as defined by Dunning, namely: 1) investment for the acquisition of natural resources; 2) investment for the procurement of strategic assets; 3) investment for access to third markets; and, 4) investment for the reduction of costs.¹⁹ Due to the special position of China as an emerging economy, with a still important role for the state in it, Chinese FDI has tended to be concentrated in the first three types, although with an increasing emphasis on the development of its domestic market, but the ensuing increase of labour

17 Source: Data obtained from The World Bank – World Integrated Trade Solution, 2017.

18 Pérez Ludeña 2017, 9.

19 Dunning 1981.

costs are making the fourth type of investment more attractive for many companies, primarily those in the private sector.

This situation has led to an important change in Chinese foreign policy, particularly with the arrival of Xi Jinping in the CCP top leadership position, elevating relations with neighbouring countries to the same level as those with the major powers, particularly the United States.²⁰ A more assertive behavior of the Chinese leadership when dealing with regional issues has been observed since 2009, including a more visible Chinese presence and the reinforcement of Chinese claims in the disputes in the South China Sea. This has raised fears among its neighbours. These circumstances prompted, in part, a response from the Obama administration in the form of its Pivot to Asia policy, whereby it devoted more material and human resources to increasing the US presence in the region, looking to reassure its traditional allies in East Asia regarding the American commitment to regional peace and security. At the same time, the new importance of good relations with its neighbours has led Beijing to push for the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative, seeking to offer better protections for increased Chinese investment abroad, as well as buttress China's image as a power concerned with win-win relationships, and in economic cooperation with the rest of the world. Nonetheless, some analysts also point to a concealed goal of decreasing US influence in the region.²¹

An important part in the process of rapid economic growth in the PRC during the past four decades is related to massive investments in infrastructure projects. The economic stimulus package also consisted in accelerating the construction and modernization of infrastructure at all levels, allowing domestic companies to elevate their competitiveness, while improving skills and practices, and motivating them to continue their expansion within China and beyond. The BRI also offers a platform for those companies to improve their performance, and by maintaining an open attitude towards enterprises from other countries, it also allows them to learn from others, with a strong emphasis in emulation and innovation. Similarly, it encourages emerging and developing countries across the belt and road to invest in projects that may contribute to economic growth, and hence to social stability, in the future.²²

20 Xu Liping and Wang Xiaoling 2016, 36.

21 Zhao Jianglin 2017, 147-157.

22 Huang 2017.

Criticism of China in this connection tends to pay attention to how many of its investments are still concentrated in the exploitation of natural resources, and in the infrastructure needed to support their exportation to China, without any attempt to offer better alternatives leading to a sustainable path of economic growth. The situation could have a negative impact on the future development of some of the countries involved; in spite of increasing levels in infrastructure spending, the strengthening of domestic inclusive institutions remains weak or non-existent among them.

This situation means that some projects end up becoming white elephants, with states unable to attract further domestic and foreign investments, therefore making it hard for them to recover the necessary means to fulfil their original obligations. Projects in Sri Lanka and Nepal have been pointed out as possible future shortfalls for the BRI.²³

The Twenty-first Century Silk Road Maritime Initiative, as presented in October 2013, focuses on the creation and modernization of ports, tourist centres, and oil terminals, among other things, to create an interlinked passage crossing the South China Sea, the Malacca Strait, the South Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, the coastal area of East Africa, the Red Sea, and finally, the eastern Mediterranean Sea. The initiative overall was received positively; nevertheless, its institutionalization has proven to be a slow process, and not an easy one. Unlike other major powers and developed economies, the PRC does not possess a single, unified institution in charge of centralizing its international cooperation and aid.²⁴ Related activities are carried on by multiple institutions, at different levels, making it difficult to provide any continuity or trace failures and successes, as well as deal with matters of transparency, or identify any potential overlapping of functions.²⁵ The BRI can thus be seen as a step in the right direction. The creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), with the inclusion of most of the beneficiaries of the BRI, serves the purpose of funding projects within the maritime initiative, as well as in terms of the Silk Road Fund. These institutions are also thought of as the financial pillars of the BRI. It is under such circumstances that the potential incorporation of Latin America into the Chinese initiative should be considered.

23 Parameswaran 2017.

24 Shambaugh 2013, 202-205.

25 Lancaster 2007.

Historical Developments in China-Latin America Trade Relations

Despite scholars claiming that the Chinese arrived in the Americas much earlier than Christopher Columbus,²⁶ supposedly as a result of the vast investment made in navigation and exploration during the early Ming Dynasty 明朝 (1368–1644), particularly during the reign of Emperor Yongle 永樂 (1402–1424), there are no specific discoveries or signs showing direct contacts between Chinese subjects and American indigenous populations before the arrival of the Spaniards in 1492. In fact, to the contrary, the main purpose of Columbus' travels was to explore a new maritime route to Asia. Even after Hernán Cortés (1485–1547) conquest of Mexico in 1521, Spanish explorers continued to look for ways to access Chinese goods, using one of the few products sought after by Chinese merchants: New World silver. The discovery of large silver deposits in what is now Mexico, Peru and Bolivia, enabled the Spanish Empire to become a world power in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, establishing a sustained large scale trade between China and the Americas for the first time in history.

After the discovery of the *tornaviaje*, the way for a voyage to the Philippines and back, by Andrés de Urdaneta in 1565, the Manila Galleon trade was established three years later. This made Spanish-controlled Manila into one of the most prominent trade centres in East Asia. Thousands of Chinese, mainly from the southern part of Fujian 福建 province, established themselves there at El Parián, right next to the Spanish settlement, now known under the name of Intramuros.²⁷ In spite of limitations imposed by the Ming 明 and Qing 清 courts on Chinese settlement in coastal regions, as well as on trade with the outside world, many Fujianese or Hokkien people continued migrating to Manila, looking for the silver and other goods arriving every year from Acapulco, in exchange for Chinese silk, porcelain, tea, lacquerware, ivory and other luxury goods that were later sent to Mexico, and then transported to Spain through the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean.

The Chinese community became one of the most important economic actors in the Philippines, regardless of failed and sporadic Spanish attempts to control its growth and penetration, as can still be witnessed from the streets of Binondo. The colonial administration of the Philippines, as supported through Mexico City, also facilitated human exchanges. Some indigenous Americans and *mestizos* born in Mexico established themselves in Cebu, Manila and other

26 Kahn 2006.

27 Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 41-74.

parts of the archipelago, and some native Filipinos and Chinese travelling to Mexico established small communities, particularly in Acapulco and Mexico City, as early as the 1620s.²⁸ Due to the policy of closed seas, *Mare Clausum*, observed by the Iberian powers through the treaties of Tordesillas and Zaragoza, most of the trade between China and the Americas, particularly trans-Pacific commerce, was carried out in Spanish galleons.²⁹ Spanish mercantilism made sure that all the trade between the Philippines and the Spanish dominions was carried only through Acapulco. Some of the Chinese traded goods remained in the Americas. The rest crossed the Atlantic Ocean to Europe. The influence of powerful guilds and other organized interest groups in Spain also moved the Crown to impose a monopoly on trade, with severe restrictions at different periods of time, giving way to an important black market of counterfeited goods traded on both sides of the Pacific Ocean.³⁰

For almost three hundred years, the galleons sailed at least once every year between Manila and Acapulco, providing China with the silver it much needed for its daily transactions. In 1815, as a result of the Mexican War of Independence, the galleon trade stopped. For centuries, Spanish officials kept to themselves not only the sailing routes but also discoveries made during their trans-Pacific journeys, to protect their goods from piracy and prevent the incursions of other European powers. The British government promoted the concept of freedom of the seas or *Mare Liberum*, thus defying Iberian control of the sea routes connecting Europe with the rest of the world.³¹

Even the New World was out of the loop. As a way of keeping tighter control while maximizing resources, Spanish authorities promoted the galleon-construction industry in the Philippines. They limited the creation or expansion of shipyards in Acapulco or at other ports on the Pacific coast of the Americas. Therefore, once Mexico and other countries in Latin America became independent, their fragile finances and difficult state-building processes made it impossible for them to develop a prosperous shipbuilding industry to support maritime trade during the nineteenth century.

Aware of the importance of the Philippines as a go-between in their trade with Asia, particularly with China, the leaders of the newly independent nations in Latin America declared their willingness, as early as 1826, during the

28 See the discoveries made by Dubs and Smith 1942.

29 Flynn and Giráldez 1995, 209-213.

30 McMaster 1959, 376.

31 Hayton 2014, 38-39.

Congress of Panama, to support the independence of the archipelago and the other Spanish possessions in the Western Pacific.³² Despite this, facing difficulties due to multiple domestic challenges, as well as pressure from European powers, Latin American governments never advanced an organized opposition to Spanish control of the Philippines. The loss of its former colonies in the New World, and the emergence of Britain as the hegemonic power in world trade, also led Madrid to change its economic institutions in the Philippines. The changes promoted a boom of the plantation economy in that part of the world.³³ As a result, while goods produced by Latin America, mainly minerals, continued to arrive to China, it was now in ships controlled by the British, Dutch, French, and later, Americans.

As has been noted by Eduardo Galeano, as well as by other prominent Latin American historians, British diplomats and businessmen played influential roles in the foreign trade of the nascent republics, particularly in terms of some of their decisions regarding the adoption of the principles of *laissez-faire* commerce and in free trade policies.³⁴ New ports in the Western Hemisphere were now fully open to trade, and soon dominated by European entrepreneurs, in what later became a new era of gunboat diplomacy. Goods exported by Latin American countries were consumed across the world and the Mexican and Peruvian silver was still much appreciated in Qing China, but it was now transported through Europe, and, later in the nineteenth century via the Suez Canal, India and the Malacca Strait.

The Opium Wars (1839–1842; 1858–1860), changed the balance of power in East Asia, affecting also the way trade was carried out in that part of the world. British control of Hong Kong (Chin. Xianggang 香港) and the opening of ports generally to foreign trade in China further enabled the European powers to take the lead in a profitable trade with the East. These changes also made them the best positioned actors for negotiating with Latin America.

The British were the largest foreign investors there, having also a strong influence in infrastructure, mainly in terms of ports and the development of important trade routes. In fact, when Latin American governments, for example, Mexico during the years of Porfirio Díaz (1830–1915; president of Mexico 1877–1880, 1884–1911), attempted to promote creation of domestic shipping companies, their efforts usually failed and local firms involved rarely prospered.

32 For a comprehensive study of the Congress of Panama see de la Reza 2006.

33 Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 102-132.

34 Galeano 2004, 225-236.

The experience convinced Latin American countries about the difficulties involved in competing with the Europeans, who possessed vast experience and could offer lower prices for the shipment of goods to Asia and other parts of the world.³⁵ It was also the Europeans who had the highest profit margins in the trade, making it even harder for Latin American countries to accumulate the resources to strengthen public treasuries and promote needed protectionist measures. Still by the late nineteenth century, commodities from Latin America were again crossing the Pacific Ocean, but were mainly traded in Hong Kong and Yokohama, and not Manila. Simultaneously, Latin America's neighbour to the north began to take the lead.

Having achieved independence under very different circumstances than its southern neighbours, the United States was able to send its own merchant ship to Asia as soon as 1784–1785. The voyage of the “Empress of China” made an important case for the profitability of developing direct trade routes between New York and Guangzhou 廣州.³⁶ Part of that success contributed to the development of the idea of Manifest Destiny, which, among other things, made American leaders conscious of the need for access to the Pacific Ocean, shortening travel time to East Asia, among other important political and ideological considerations. Similarly, a latecomer in the China trade, the US government became the major promoter of a China “Open Door Policy”. This policy opposed further creation of spheres of influence within China, and defended the idea of free trade in all of China. By the end of the century, US control of the Philippines and Guam, gained during the American war against Spain, and the construction and control of the Panama Canal in the early twentieth century, finally made Washington an important player in trans-Pacific trade, and dominant power in the Western Hemisphere.

The first half of the twentieth century also saw a major increase in US investment in Latin America. The US shared a similar position to the UK, including dominion of the sea lanes connecting South America with North America and Europe, and connecting the Latin American ports in the Pacific Ocean with those from East Asia. Similarly, due to its impressive industrial growth and economic development, the United States became the largest trading partner of the Latin American countries, thereby decreasing the importance of their trade with China, and Asia in general. Another outcome of the US economic rise, combined with the British hegemony in world trade, was the adoption of the gold

35 Mandujano López 2012, 70-104.

36 Schmidt 2017.

standard universally. Mexico and China were among the last countries to adopt it, abandoning silver as the major means of exchange between 1895 and 1910, thereby decreasing Chinese demand for silver, particularly Mexican pesos.³⁷

Revolutions and world and other wars in the twentieth century further disrupted trade between China and Latin America. Besides the political changes taking place domestically in Latin America and China, European and American economic intermediaries were also busy struggling in other parts of the world, often interrupting the free flow of goods from them. The import-substitution industrialization (ISI) policies followed by some Latin American governments after the 1940s, especially those of Mexico and Brazil, involved use of protectionist measures, was also reducing trade. Another important event was the triumph of the Communist Party in the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949). The change made it almost impossible to resume bilateral trade during those years. Latin American goods had to wait until the late 1970s to begin entering the Chinese market again. Two decades later, Chinese manufactures were increasingly in demand in Latin America.

The 1982 financial crisis in Latin America and its terrible consequences, forced countries in the region to adopt neoliberal policies fully, opening up their economies and abandoning the former efforts at protectionism. Nonetheless, despite having successfully developed local industries for the provision of domestic markets, Latin American companies were still unable to achieve an export-driven growth similar to that observed in Japan and in the newly industrialized economies of East Asia, namely in Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan.³⁸ In a weakened position, governments in Latin America once more decided that the best choice for them was to adhere to policies of free trade. Hence they welcomed again foreign investments in ports and other important infrastructure projects.

Therefore, in the 1980s and 1990s, Latin American goods were again being taken to Asia, not only on European and American ships, but increasingly on ships from Asian companies.³⁹ The PRC would soon learn from the developing

37 McMaster 1959, 393.

38 See Haggard 1990, 191-222.

39 The current world container shipping industry is dominated by European and Asian firms. During past decades, companies from Hong Kong, Japan and Taiwan have emerged as among the largest in the world. Of the top ten container shipping companies by market share, 6 of them are based in Asia, encompassing almost 25% of total turnover. Nonetheless, the turnover of these companies was still well below that of the top three, a ranking dominated by European companies, with 45.5% of the total market. The China COSCO Shipping Corporation has become the

states in East Asia, and PRC economic reforms would include similar policies, though assigning a strategic importance to state-owned corporations, and to the need to preserve a one-party rule in the country. This was named “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” (*You Zhongguo tese de shehui zhuyi* 有中國特色的社會主義). The impressive economic growth of China that resulted had an impact on international commodity prices, especially after Chinese membership in the WTO, in 2001. Chinese policy turned Latin America into one of its most important providers of certain types of goods. The Chinese strategy of “going out” (*zouchuqu* 走出去) made it possible, for the first time, for companies from China to become interested in investing in Latin American ports, whereby China gained important influence in Latin American regional markets. The expansion of the proposed Belt and Road Initiative, particularly the new maritime silk road, should be analysed taking this historical background into consideration.

Implications of the Twenty-first Century “Maritime Silk Road Initiative” for Latin America

Opportunities Derived from the “Maritime Silk Road Initiative”

The attendance of the presidents of Argentina, Mauricio Macri, and of Chile, Michelle Bachelet, in the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF), held in Beijing 北京 on May 2017, was presented as a potential base for expansion of the BRI to include Latin America. The latter has increased its importance for the economic development of the PRC during the past decade, with China becoming an important source of investments and credits for some of the countries in the region. South America has consolidated itself as an important provider of natural resources for China, with the sub-region supplying more than 6% of Chinese imports. This is much more than the amount of imports from all the countries of the SCO combined (3.32%, see table 1). Therefore, if we consider the BRI as an important step in the centralization of China’s international cooperation, it is natural to consider the inclusion of Latin

largest Asian company, with 8.5% of world market share. See “Alphaliner Top 100,” in *AlphaLiner Sarlu*, online, alphaliner.axsmarine.com/PublicTop100 (accessed 1 January, 2018). On the other hand, through their developmental policies of past decades, South Korea, Japan and China, in that order, have become the largest shipbuilding nations in the world, having an increasingly influential role in world maritime trade. See “Largest shipbuilding nations in 2016, based on completions in gross tonnage (in 1,000s),” in *Statista*, online, www.statista.com/statistics/263895/shipbuilding-nations-worldwide-by-cgt (accessed 1 January, 2018).

America in this process. The opportunities for the increased cooperation of both sides of the Pacific Ocean are significant.

The first decade of the twenty-first century was a time of rapid economic growth for many countries in Latin America, mainly due to the high prices paid for their natural resources, major export goods for nations in the region. With Chinese demand one of the main reasons for the surge in commodity prices, countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay managed to maintain a surplus in bilateral trade with the PRC. Similarly, the arrival of left-wing governments in those countries contributed to a sustained growth of their middle classes, due to the implementation of poverty alleviation policies benefitting millions of households. At the same time, radicalization of some governments in the region, following the lead of Venezuela in the creation of a Bolivarian alternative to the free trade policies defended by the United States, and some of its regional allies, offered an important opportunity for cooperation with China.

Reluctance of international financial institutions to extend credit to countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, among others, that, combined with the withdrawal of Western investors during post 2008-crises years, made those countries turn to the PRC for loans and investments. Chinese officials and entrepreneurs also saw a great chance to access natural resources in the countries, and to promote exports, and expand PRC companies capacities through the increasing exchanges with those nations. The PRC's major oil companies became the largest foreign investor in Ecuador and Venezuela.⁴⁰

The Chinese government has also promoted creation of strategic partnerships with the largest countries in the region, including Argentina (2001), Brazil (1993), Chile (2012), Mexico (2003), and Peru (2008), later upgrading some of the partnerships to the level of comprehensive strategic partnerships.⁴¹ Economic cooperation has become an important component in those partnerships, but results remain uneven.

Since the earlier visits of Chinese leaders to the region, billion USD investments have been announced, but many of them have failed to go through or materialize, in many cases, due to the lack of knowledge of local practices, the changing plans of corporations, as well as domestic developments in receiving countries in terms of opposing social movements. Similarly, as a recent study has shown, those investments which have materialized have been highly concentrated in the mining and hydrocarbons (90% of the total) industries, as well

40 Chen and Pérez Ludeña 2014, 17-19.

41 Feng and Huang 2014, 18.

as being mostly destined for only four countries: Brazil, Peru, Venezuela and Argentina (fig. 1). The analysis commissioned by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America, and the Caribbean (ECLAC), also notes that after 2010, Chinese investment in the region has stagnated, with inflows from the PRC averaging about 8 billion USD a year. There is major room for growth and diversification of sectors and countries of destination.⁴²

The official historical justification for the Belt and Road Initiative is the millenarian Silk Roads, once connecting Eurasia and serving as transmission routes for goods, people and ideas, with China occupying a predominant position within the eastern half of the routes. Nonetheless, as noted in the previous section, the relationship between China and Latin America also has its own historical component. The historically more recent maritime route known as Galleon Trade provided Asian goods to be used throughout the Americas, while also taking thousands of Chinese families off to find new opportunities. It has become the historical foundation for a deeper cooperation between China and Latin America, in an extension to the Belt and Road Initiative.




Figure 1 Composition of Accumulated Chinese FDI in Latin America by country of destination, 1990-2015⁴³

It is relevant to note that, different from the prevailing situation during the Cold War, ideological considerations have been put aside by the Chinese government when extending offers of cooperation to Latin America. As it can be seen from the establishment of strategic partnerships, Beijing has encouraged

⁴² Pérez Ludeña 2017, 7-13.

⁴³ Source elaborated with data found in Pérez Ludeña 2017, 13.

deeper ties with governments from different political orientations, and with different visions of economic integration. Since its creation in 2011, the Pacific Alliance, formed by Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, has been presented as an alternative model of regional integration, based on open markets, encouraging foreign investment and the creation of public-private partnerships. The rapid progress of this trade pact has contrasted with the perception of a stagnated Mercosur, originally formed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Its future has been constantly challenged by the inability of its members to agree on a common free trade agreement with the European Union. A third option, the Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of our America, or ALBA, led by Venezuela, and incorporating Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, among others, represents a firm opposition to indiscriminate free trade, and has served as an important forum working against US-sponsored policies in the region, but it has recently lost some of its influence.

Table 2 China's Foreign Trade with Latin American Countries, 1995–2015 (millions USD)⁴⁴

Country	1995		2005		2015		2015 (% of total)	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	X	M
Argentina	274	370	1,324	3,799	8,890	5,714	0.39	0.35
Brazil	759	1,231	4,827	9,993	27,428	44,339	1.20	2.64
Uruguay	47	85	283	173	1,959	2,410	0.09	0.14
Paraguay	105	27	253	59	1,273	42	0.06	0.00
Venezuela	69	16	908	1,234	5,315	6,888	0.23	0.41
Mercosur	1,254	1,729	7,595	15,258	44,865	59,393	1.97	3.54
Chile	410	230	2,149	4,992	13,296	18,680	0.58	1.11
Colombia	52	14	930	205	7,588	3,539	0.33	0.21
Mexico	195	194	5,538	2,225	33,810	10,082	1.48	0.60
Peru	146	460	609	2,278	6,355	8,181	0.28	0.49
Pacific Alliance	803	898	9,226	9,700	61,049	40,482	2.67	2.41
Latin America and Caribbean	3,123	2,967	23,268	26,665	130,946	103,802	5.74	6.17

Despite this difference in the political landscape within the region, the Chinese government, characterized by an increasing pragmatism, has tried to maintain good relations with all the countries from the indicated blocs, as noted by the

⁴⁴ Source: Data obtained from The World Bank – World Integrated Trade Solution, 2017.

surge in bilateral trade with members of both the Pacific Alliance and Mercosur (table 2). The current changing scenario, with countries like Brazil and Argentina turning to the right, and other governments moderating their policies, is in part due to the financial crises caused by the decreasing price of commodities during past years. This fact also demonstrates that continued Chinese cooperation with the region goes beyond ideological considerations. In fact, countries from the different sub-regional blocs have been invited to take part in the institutionalization process of the initiatives, with Brazil becoming a prospective founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru and Venezuela, have also been admitted as non-regional prospective members during past months. Similarly, Sino-Brazilian cooperation has expanded through the institutionalization of BRICS, The Association of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, while the Mexican president, Enrique Peña Nieto, was invited to attend a 2017 summit. He was a participant in the Dialogue of Emerging Market and Developing Countries, in Xiamen 廈門, taking place between the BRICS and other strategic actors, signalling a mutual approach of the two largest economies of Latin America and China.⁴⁵ Such circumstances offer important space for an extension of the BRI to Latin America, although there are also challenges to be considered as well.

The BRI in a Changing Regional Scenario in Latin America

Governments in Latin America have been increasing their expenditures in infrastructure during the past decade. Nonetheless, they are still far from reaching levels comparable to those of the East Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs) and China, where building and modernization of infrastructure has been seen as an important component of sustained economic growth.⁴⁶ Investments in this sector are also one of the major investment elements for the BRI, and the possible inclusion of Latin America in the initiative could represent a great opportunity for states in the region to enhance their economic development.

Chinese corporations have been investing in infrastructure in some parts of Latin America since 2010. They have mostly been interested in the acquisition of existing facilities for the generation and distribution of electricity, through hydropower plants and grids. During the worst years of the European crisis, Chinese companies also secured infrastructure sold by third parties, especially

⁴⁵ NDB 2017.

⁴⁶ ECLAC 2017.

Spanish firms, who nonetheless still remain among the largest foreign investors in the region.⁴⁷ Minor investments from Chinese companies have also been made in roads, railways, and ports, where there is substantial room for growth and improvement. This can be seen as complementary projects within the Twenty-first Century “Maritime Silk Road Initiative”.

Nevertheless, Chinese companies have struggled to become successful bidders in infrastructure projects across the region, and some of their winning tenders ended up being cancelled or halted, mainly for domestic reasons. One example was the projected first high-speed railways in Mexico and Brazil presented between 2013 and 2014. Similarly, the ambitious construction of a railroad connecting the Brazilian Atlantic with the Peruvian Pacific coasts, another important project where Chinese interests are deeply involved and promises of huge investments were made by Premier Li Keqiang 李克強 in 2015, is still far from becoming a reality.⁴⁸ The same could be said for the construction of an interoceanic canal in Nicaragua, announced by that Central American country in 2013, as a viable alternative to the increasingly saturated Panama Canal. The project was assigned to the Chinese entrepreneur Wang Jing 王靖, and his Hong-Kong-based company, HKND (Hong Kong Nicaragua Canal Development Group – Xianggang Nijialagua yunhe kaifa touzi youxian gongsi 香港尼加拉瓜運河開發投資有限公司) but the project has encountered the fierce opposition of local environmental organizations and civic groups, including potentially affected peasants, and construction has been virtually stopped, owing partly to the fears of Wang’s insolvency. He lost part of his fortune after the bursting of the Chinese stock market bubble in the summer of 2015.⁴⁹

Other strategic and political considerations are involved in the future of Chinese investments in infrastructure in Latin America as well. One of the main concerns lying behind the decision to choose Fuzhou 福州, in Fujian Province, as the starting point of the planned “Maritime Silk Road Initiative” is related to security matters, particularly regarding the situation in the Taiwan Strait. Cross-strait relations have deteriorated since the return to power of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP – Minjindang 民進黨) in the island, in 2016, including a break in the so-called “diplomatic truce,” as demonstrated with the establishment of official diplomatic relations between Beijing and Panama in June 2017. Of the 20 countries that currently maintain diplomatic

47 Pérez Ludeña 2017, 8.

48 Lissardy 2015; Martínez 2016.

49 Reischke 2017.

ties with Taipei (Taipei 台北), half of them are located in Latin America and the Caribbean, making it hard for companies from the mainland to obtain full guarantees when approaching or investing in those nations. Nevertheless, through the creation of the China-CELAC Forum, established after the first China-Latin America and the Caribbean nations summit in 2014, a platform for interaction between the PRC and the Community of States of Latin America and the Caribbean (CELAC) was offered, as well as for announcement of special programs such as Preferential Loan (US\$ 10 billion), a Special Loan Program for China-Latin America Infrastructure Project (US\$ 20 billion), and the China-Latin America and the Caribbean Fund (US\$ 5 billion). Through the forum, the Chinese government had a chance to approach countries it has no official diplomatic relations with, as well as improve the chances of cooperation with the region in general.⁵⁰

The conditions for those loans and the implementation of the funding still need to be detailed, with persisting fears among scholars and officials regarding the feasibility of some of the projects.⁵¹ One of the main concerns, regarding the current political situation in most of the region, is related to official corruption and increasing social discontent. The Brazilian political crisis, initiated after judicial investigations of a corruption scheme known in Portuguese as *Operação Lava-Jato* (Operation Carwash), has involved politicians from all levels and from all political parties. It has now spread to the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean through a scandal connecting the Brazilian construction conglomerate, Odebrecht, with other regional governments. In an investigation, carried out by Brazilian, American and Swiss authorities, high profile politicians and bureaucrats from Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, among other countries, have been identified as beneficiaries of corrupt practices, largely bribes and donations from Odebrecht, involved in the awards of lucrative infrastructure projects in those countries. Local investigations in those states have advanced at different speeds, with a former Peruvian president currently in jail, and incumbent President Pedro P. Kuczynski recently accused of having received money from the Brazilian conglomerate. Similarly, many nations in the region have started suggesting and debating legal reforms to reinforce the fight against corruption and strengthening the rule of law.

If Latin America is to be included as an extension of the Twenty-first Century “Maritime Silk Road Initiative”, it is vital that governments in the region

50 MFA 2016, 39-47.

51 ECLAC 2015.

commit themselves to more transparency regarding infrastructure projects, in order to ensure the quality of public works, and to safeguard investments made by third parties, both public and private firms, and to contribute to the economic development of local communities and the people in general effectively. Institutional strength in the region, despite being weak in comparison to Western Europe and North America, is still more advanced than in other sub-regions included within the BRI, hence through solving pending issues, Latin America could transform itself into a more reliable partner, and a model for other emerging and developing economies. At the same time, the region has been presented with the challenge of definition of the future of its own integration, facing a northern neighbour which has changed its priorities and has not been able to redefine its policy towards Latin America since the arrival of Donald Trump in the White House and his “America First” narrative.⁵²

Uncertainties arising from threats to impose protectionist measures, and the president’s insistence on terminating the legacy of the previous Obama administration, have made the United States seem lose direction in its relations with the other countries in the Western hemisphere, particularly in the economic field.

Aware of the need to maintain open markets and free exchanges, many governments in the region have turned to Europe and Asia-Pacific, including China, as powerful alternatives to the perceived US retreat from Latin America. American interests will still be protected and advanced in the region, but the negative effects provoked by the current qualms in Washington, including the possible suspension of the free trade agreement with Mexico (NAFTA), will take years to be reversed. Therefore, nations in the region should work together to improve the institutionalization of multilateral cooperation, including, as the leaders of Argentina and Chile have suggested, a convergence of the different mechanisms of integration, particularly Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance. As part of its “Maritime Silk Road Initiative”, the Chinese government could contribute to this process, by encouraging the nations in the region to remain open to trade, while also fulfilling their own potentials, in order to achieve sustainable economic growth, thereby helping to alleviate numerous problems in the region, arising from its lack. There is also the need for these countries to learn from each other regarding the best roads for strengthening inclusive institutions and the rule of law in their own countries.

52 Hsiang and Fonseca 2017.

Concluding Remarks

The Twenty-first Century “Maritime Silk Road Initiative” is consistent with the Chinese government’s goal of rejuvenating the nation, meaning a consolidation of the country as a world power, and as one of the supports of an evolving multipolar world. The constant accumulation of material capabilities during the past decades has allowed Chinese corporations, both public and private, to expand their horizons and join the ranks of transnational firms from developed countries, in their search for better investment opportunities at home and abroad. At the same time, lacking a centralized body in charge of its international cooperation, the Chinese authorities can advance the idea of the BRI as an important step in the institutionalization of its collaboration with foreign nations, while reinforcing a Chinese narrative of win-win relations and the Chinese interest in peaceful coexistence. Many challenges remain to an effective implementation of the initiative, including its further institutionalization.

Being a region in urgent need of the creation and modernization of infrastructure, Latin America offers itself as a natural expansion of the “Maritime Silk Road Initiative”. The expansion of bilateral trade between China and the region during the last fifteen years has created many opportunities, with many nations in South America benefiting greatly from the rise in commodity prices as a result of an increasing Chinese demand.

With companies from the West holding back in investment projects as a reaction to the 2008–2009 financial crises, China, for its part, became an important source of FDI for the region, although this investment has been highly concentrated in minerals and oil, and has shown a particular focus on Brazil, Peru, Argentina and Venezuela. Therefore, the Chinese initiative presents the opportunity to diversify investments and their destination, by including projects in various countries, looking thereby to integrate the region’s economy not only with China, but also among the regional countries themselves, and with other nations in the Asia-Pacific. Other steps in multilateral cooperation between the PRC and Latin America, such as the China-CELAC Forum, are also powerful incentives in the expansion of the “Maritime Silk Road Initiative” into the region and its institutionalization.

Nonetheless, many challenges lie ahead. Previous failures to materialize Chinese planned investments in the region show the complexities involved in expanding the initiative, not in terms of the changing plans of the companies involved, but also due to shifting circumstances in the receiving societies, including powerful local interests or mobilized civic groups opposing some of the projects. Important ventures have failed to evolve, or have advanced at an

unusually slow pace, in spite of grandiose announcements, the case with the Trans-Amazonian Train, an extensive railway line connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans across the Amazon rainforest and the Andes. Similarly, fears of an overconcentration on projects designed to access strategic natural resources for export to China have also created suspicions between groups concerned with environmental protection, sustainable development, and national security issues. Overcoming those challenges will require a joint effort by the different states in the region, which may prove more difficult in a changing political scenario throughout Latin America. These matters have now become more urgent, especially after the emergence of an enhanced social awareness of the need to end corrupt practices in those countries, combined with the US government's lack of clarity in its relations with the region under the Trump administration. If those difficulties are taken into consideration, and eventually tackled in a positive way, the extension of the Chinese "Maritime Silk Road Initiative" to include Latin America can prove truly valuable for the economic development of all the nations involved.

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Abstracts

Angela SCHOTTENHAMMER, Introductory Remarks: What Is the “Indo-Pacific”

Since 2011, the term “Indo-Pacific” is being used more and more frequently in the global strategic and geo-political discourse. Although the term is not absolutely new, it has recently received increasing popularity, above all among US, Australian, and Japanese officials and politicians. The introduction briefly discusses the actual meaning and implication of the recent usage of this term and introduces the articles of this special volume.

蕭婷，引言

自 2011 年以來，“印度—太平洋”一詞在全球戰略和地緣政治話語中的使用越來越頻繁。雖然這個詞不是全新的詞彙，但最近受到越來越多的歡迎，尤其是美國、澳大利亞和日本的官員和政界人士。引言部分簡要論述了這一術語用法的現實意義和含義，並介紹了本次特輯的諸文章。

蕭婷，引言

自 2011 年以來，“印度—太平洋”一詞在全球戰略和地緣政治話語中的使用越來越頻繁。雖然這個詞不是全新的詞彙，但最近受到越來越多的歡迎，尤其是美國、澳大利亞和日本的官員和政界人士。引言部分簡要論述了這一術語用法的現實意義和含義，並介紹了本次特輯的諸文章。

Angela SCHOTTENHAMMER, 序論

2011 年以降、「インド・パシフィック」という用語は、グローバルな戦略・地政に関する議論においてますます頻繁に使用されてきている。この用語は全く新しいものではないが、最近、米国、オーストラリア、日本の政府関係者や政治家の間で、良く使われ始めている。先ず、はじめに、この序論では、この用語が、最近、実際にどのような意味と含意を以て使用されているかを、簡単に説明し、この特別号の序論とする。

Angela SCHOTTENHAMMER, 서론

2011 년 이후 “인도 퍼시픽” 이라는 용어가 글로벌 전략·지정학(地政學) 적 논의 속에서 점점 더 빈번히 사용되어왔다. 이는 아주 새로운 용어는 아니지만 최근 미국, 호주, 일본 정부 관계자와 정치인 사이에서 많이 사용되기 시작했다. 이 서론에서는 먼저 이 용어가 최근 실제로 어떤 의미와 암시로써 사용되고 있는지를 간단히 설명하고 이 특집호에 실린 논문들을 소개하고자 한다.

Ubaldo IACCARINO, “The Centre of a Circle”: Manila’s Trade with East Asia and Southeast Asia at the Turn of the Sixteenth Century

The commercial role of Manila made it a place of encounter for people from very different cultures worldwide. Writing in the late 1610s, the Spanish cosmographer and *arbitrista* Hernando de los Ríos Coronel (c. 1559–1624) indicated Manila as the “centre of a circle” whose circumference included China, Japan, Indochina and insular India. Due to its favourable geographical position – as well as to political and economic factors – Manila created its wealth thanks to the commerce of such overseas merchants as the Chinese “Sangleys” from Fujian, the Portuguese shipowners of Macao and Nagasaki, the Japanese *daimyō* of Kyūshū, as well as traders from Borneo, Siam and Cambodia. Ubaldo Iaccarino investigates foreign trade in the Philippines at the beginning of the seventeenth century, sulphur, the exchange of silver, gold, silks and cottons, porcelains, sulphur and quicksilver – as well as wax, honey, deer skins, turtles, etc., with the aim of clarifying the role of Manila as an *entrepôt* situated between the Americas, the East and Southeast Asia.

Ubaldo IACCARINO, “圓心”: 十六世紀之交的馬尼拉與東亞及東南亞的貿易

馬尼拉的商業地位，使它成為世界各地不同文化背景之人的相遇之地。1610 年代末，西班牙宇宙學家和仲裁人埃爾南多·德·洛斯里奧斯上校(1559–1624)指出，馬尼拉是“圓心”，其周長包括中國、日本、印度支那和印度群島。由於其有利的地理位置—以及政治和經濟因素—馬尼拉創造了財富，這得益於來自中國福建“商旅”，澳門和長崎的葡萄牙船東，日本九州的大名，以及來自婆羅洲、暹羅和柬埔寨的貿易商。Ubaldo Iaccarino 研究了十七世紀初菲律賓的對外貿易，分析銀、金、絲綢和棉花、瓷器、硫磺和水銀的交易，以及蠟、蜂蜜、鹿皮、海龜等，目的是澄清馬尼拉作為一個位於美洲、東亞和東南亞之間的轉口港的作用。

Ubaldo IACCARINO, “圓心”: 十六世紀之交的马尼拉与东亚及东南亚的貿易

马尼拉的商业地位，使它成为世界各地不同文化背景之人的相遇之地。1610年代末，西班牙宇宙学家和仲裁人埃尔南多·德·洛斯里奥斯上校(1559-1624)指出，马尼拉是“圓心”，其周长包括中国、日本、印度支那和印度群岛。由于其有利的地理位置—以及政治和经济因素—马尼拉创造了财富，这得益于来自中国福建“商旅”，澳门和长崎的葡萄牙船东，日本九州的大名，以及来自婆罗洲、暹罗和柬埔寨的贸易商。Ubaldo Iaccarino 研究了十七世纪初菲律宾的对外贸易，分析银、金、丝绸和棉花、瓷器、硫磺和水银的交易，以及蜡、蜂蜜、鹿皮、海龟等，目的是澄清马尼拉作为一个位于美洲、东亚和东南亚之间的转口港的作用。

Ubaldo IACCARINO, 「円の中心」: 16世紀の轉換期マニラにおける東アジアと東南アジア貿易

マニラの商業活動によって、マニラは、異なる世界からの人々の出会いの場となった。1610年代後半、スペインの宇宙論家であり、17世紀スペインの社会改革者である Hernando de los Ríos Coronel (1559-1624) は、マニラを中国、日本、インドシナ、インドの島を含む「円の中心」として示した。その有利な地理的位置と政治的および経済的要因のおかげで、福建省からの中国の「Sangleys」、マカオや長崎在のポルトガル人船主、九州の日本の大名など、また、ボルネオ、シャム、カンボジアからの海外貿易商人たちのおかげで、マニラは、富を創出した。ウバルド・イアカリーノは、17世紀初頭におけるフィリピンの対外貿易を調査し、蠟、ハチミツ、シカの皮、カメなどと同様に、銀、金、絹と綿、陶器、硫黄と水銀の交換を分析した。その分析に関する本章の目的は、17世紀初めにアメリカ、東アジアと東南アジアの間に位置する貨物集散地としてのマニラの役割を明確にすることである。

Ubaldo IACCARINO, “원형 네트워크의 중심”: 16세기 전환기 마닐라의 동아시아와 동남아시아 무역

상업 활동을 통해 마닐라는 세계의 서로 다른 문화권의 사람들이 와서 만나 교류하는 장소가 되었다. 1610년대 후반에 활약한 스페인의 우주론 작가이며 *arbitrista* (17세기 스페인의 개혁가들)인 Hernando de los Ríos Coronel (1559-1624) 은 마닐라를 중국, 일본,

인도차이나, 인도의 섬을 연결하는 “원형 네트워크의 중심”으로 표현했다. 그 유리한 지리적 위치 및 정치 경제적 요인 덕분에, 북건설성에서 오는 중국의 “Sangleys” 라는 상인들, 마카오와 나가사키에서 활동하는 포르투갈인 선주들, 큐슈의 일본의 다이묘들, 보르네오, 시암, 캄보디아의 해외무역 상인들의 상업활동 덕분에 마닐라는 부를 창출해낼 수 있었다. Ubaldo Iaccarino 는 17세기 초반의 필리핀의 대외 무역을 조사하면서 은, 금, 비단, 면화, 도자기, 유황, 수은 및 밀랍, 꿀, 사슴 가죽, 거북이 등의 물품의 교환을 분석했다. 이 분석을 통해 17세기 초에 아메리카 대륙, 동아시아와 동남아시아의 사이에 위치하는 화물 집산지로서의 마닐라의 역할을 명확히 하고자 한다.

**Omri BASSEWITCH FRENKEL, Conquistadores or Merchants?
Spanish Plans for the Conquest of China, 1565–1586**

During the process of the Spanish colonization of the Philippines we can observe a shift from a colonization concentrating on land control to one focused on trade, a shift that created various social tensions and disappointments. Contrary to Spanish expectations, spices or precious metals were not abundant in the Philippines. In addition, the geographical dispersion and social organization of the local population made it hard to control. In this sub-chapter, Omri Bassewitch Frenkel argues that the Spanish plans for the invasion of China may have arisen out of Spanish society's inability to adapt itself to the conditions of the Philippine Islands, and its failure to adopt new ideals of prestige and models of status.

**Omri BASSEWITCH FRENKEL, 征服者或商人?
西班牙征服中國的計畫, 1565–1586**

在西班牙殖民化菲律賓的過程中，我們可以觀察到，發生了從集中于土地控制的殖民統治向專注貿易轉變的過程，這一轉變造成了各種社會緊張和失望情緒。與西班牙的期望相反，香料或貴金屬在菲律賓並不豐富。此外，當地人口的社會組織和地域性分散和使其難以控制。在本文中，Omri Bassewitch Frenkel認為，西班牙入侵中國的計畫的產生，可能是由於西班牙社會無法接受菲律賓的國情，而且沒能採納關於特權和地位的新理念。

**Omri BASSEWITCH FRENKEL, 征服者或商人?
西班牙征服中国的计划, 1565-1586**

在西班牙殖民化菲律宾的过程中, 我们可以观察到, 发生了从集中于土地控制的殖民统治向专注贸易转变的过程, 这一转变造成了各种社会紧张和失望情绪。与西班牙的期望相反, 香料或贵金属在菲律宾并不丰富。此外, 当地人口的社会组织和地域性分散和使其难以控制。在本文中, Omri Bassewitch Frenkel 认为, 西班牙入侵中国的计划的产生, 可能是由于西班牙社会无法接受菲律宾的国情, 而且没能采纳关于特权和地位的新理念。

**Omri BASSEWITCH FRENKEL, コンキスタドール、または、商人?
中国征服のためのスペインの計画, 1565-1586**

フィリピンのスペイン植民地化の過程で、土地支配に焦点を当てた植民地化から、貿易に焦点を当てた植民地化への移行、つまり、様々な社会的緊張と失望を引き起こした移行を見ることが出来る。スペインの期待とは対照的に、フィリピンでは、スパイスや貴金属は豊富ではなかった。加えて、地方人口の地理的分散と社会的構成は、フィリピンを支配することを困難にした。この章では、Omri Bassewitch Frenkel は、中国侵略のためのスペインの計画は、フィリピン諸島の状況に適應することができないという事、また、威信への新たな理念と高い社会的地位を取ることができなかった事から生じている、と論じている。

**Omri BASSEWITCH FRENKEL, 정복자 또는 상인?
스페인의 중국 정복 계획, 1565-1586**

스페인이 필리핀을 식민지화하는 과정에서 토지 지배로부터 무역으로 초점을 전환하면서 다양한 사회적 긴장과 실망감을 불러일으키게 되었다. 스페인이 기대했던 것과는 달리 필리핀에서 풍부한 향신료와 귀금속을 찾을 수 없었다. 또한 지방 인구의 지리적 분산과 사회적 구성 때문에 필리핀을 수월하게 지배할 수 없는 딜레마가 있었다. 본고에서 Omri Bassewitch Frenkel 는 중국을 침략하려는 스페인의 계획이 스스로 필리핀의 상황에 적응할 수 없었고 명성과 신분 모델을 위한 새로운 이념을 수용하지 못했기 때문에 비롯된 것이라고 주장한다.

CHENG Wei-chung (鄭維中), The Dutch Deserter Hugo Rozijn and his Activities in East Asian Waters during the Ming-Qing Transition

This contribution shifts to Taiwan as another crossroad of human encounter. In 1662, Taiwan was taken over from its former ruler, the VOC (Dutch East India Company), by the Chinese warlord Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功 (1624–1662). One of the deserters during the siege of the Dutch castle Zeelandia on Taiwan, Hugo Rozijn, survived under the Zheng regime, for more than twenty-one years. He established a family and was hired as a translator and medical practitioner. Later when the Zheng regime fell to the Manchu attack in 1683, Hugo Rozijn was released and returned to Batavia as a ship's surgeon. He then served on the VOC's ship again, applying his knowledge in local languages and herbs, sailing from Batavia to Japan, China and the coast of Bengal in the 1690s. His interesting life story is introduced here in detail.

鄭維中，明清時期的荷蘭逃亡者雨果·羅贊及其在東亞水域的活動

這篇文章討論臺灣作為人類遭遇的另一個十字路口。1662年，臺灣被中國鄭成功(1624–1662)從其前統治者荷蘭東印度公司(VOC)手中接管。在熱蘭遮城的荷蘭城堡被圍攻後，雨果·羅贊成了眾多逃兵中的一個，並在鄭成功統治下倖存了超過二十一年。他成了家，並被聘為翻譯和醫生。後來，鄭氏政權在1683年的滿清政府攻擊下潰敗，雨果·羅贊被釋放，並返回到巴達維亞，成了一個船上的外科醫生。此後他再次在公司的船上服役，運用他對當地語言和草藥的知識，在十七世紀九十年代，從巴達維亞航行到日本，中國和孟加拉海岸。這篇文章介紹了他有趣的生活故事。

**郑维中，明清时期的荷兰逃亡者雨果·罗赞及其在东亚水域的活动
窗体底端**

这篇文章讨论台湾作为人类遭遇的另一个十字路口。1662年，台湾被中国郑成功(1624–1662)从其前统治者荷兰东印度公司(VOC)手中接管。在热兰遮城的荷兰城堡被围攻后，雨果·罗赞成了众多逃兵中的一个，并在郑成功统治下幸存了超过二十一年。他成了家，并被聘为翻译和医生。后来，郑氏政权在1683年的满清政府攻击下溃败，雨果·罗赞被释放，并返回到巴达维亚，成了一个船上的外科医生。此后他再次在公司的船上服役，运用他对当地语言和草药的知识，在十七世纪九十年代，从巴达维亚航行到日本，中国和孟加拉海岸。这篇文章介绍了他有趣的生活故事。

鄭維中, 오ランダ人脱走兵 Hugo Rozijn と明清征服時の東アジア 水域における彼の活動

本章において、焦点を、「人間との出会い」という、もう一つのクロス・ロードとして台湾へ移行する。1662年、台湾の支配は、元の統治者であったVOC(オランダ東インド会社)から中国の武将鄭成功(1624-1662)に引き継がれた。台湾のオランダのゼーランディア城包圍戦中の逃亡者の1人、Hugo Rozijnは21年以上にわたって鄭政権下で生き延びた。彼は家族を持ち、翻訳者と医師として雇われた。その後、鄭政権が1683年に満州攻撃に落ちたとき、ヒューゴ・ローゼンは解放され、船舶乗船外科医としてバタビアに戻った。そして、彼は、東インド会社の船に再び乗り、地元の言語やハーブの知識を使いながら、1690年代にバタビアから日本、中国、ベンガル海岸まで航海した。興味深い彼の人生物語を、この章において、詳細に紹介する。

CHENG Wei-chung(鄭維中), 네덜란드인 탈영병 Hugo Rozijn 과 명청 (明清) 정복 시기 동아시아 수역에서의 그의 활동

이 장에서는 초점을 “인간과의 만남” 이라는 또 다른 크로스로드로서의 대만으로 이동한다. 1662년 대만의 지배는 원래 통치자였던 VOC(네덜란드 동인도 회사)에서 중국 무장 정성공(鄭成功, 1624-1662)으로 넘어갔다. 대만에 있던 네덜란드의 Zeelandia 성을 포위했을 때 탈영한 병사 중의 한 명인 Hugo Rozijn은 21년 넘게 정성공 정권 하에서 생존했다. 그는 가족을 두고 통역관과 의사로 고용되었다. 이후 정성공 정권이 1683년에 만주 공격에 패배했을 때, 휴고 로젠은 해방되어 외과의사로 선박 승선하여 바타비아로 돌아왔다. 그 후 그는 동인도 회사의 배를 다시 타고 현지의 언어와 약초에 대한 지식을 사용하면서 1690년대에 바타비아에서 일본, 중국, 벵갈 해안까지 항해했다. 흥미로운 그의 인생 이야기를 이 장에서 상세하게 소개한다.

LEE Chi-lin(李其霖), The Development of Shipbuilding during the Qing Dynasty

Lee Chi-lin eventually sheds more light on an interesting special case, Qing dynasty (1644-1911) shipbuilding. This case is particularly interesting, because the Qing are generally conceived as not having been interested in maritime space, consequently absolutely neglecting areas, such as shipbuilding. Lee Chi-lin concentrates on the eighteenth century, that is, on a time when China had

supposedly already retreated from the seas. He introduces various types of ships and analyses the politics according to which the Manchus established their shipyards. The chapter also pays particular attention to the construction of warships.

李其霖, 論清代造船業的發展

李其霖, 討論了一個有趣的特殊案例, 清代 (1644–1911) 的造船業。這個案例特別有意思, 因為清朝一般被認為是對海洋空間不感興趣的, 因此他們完全忽略了造船等領域。他關注的是十八世紀, 即中國按理說已經從海上回撤力量的時段。李其霖介紹了不同類型的船舶, 分析了滿洲人建造船廠的政策。本章還特別關注了戰艦的建造。

李其霖, 论清代造船业的发展

窗体顶端李其霖, 讨论了一个有趣的特殊案例, 清代 (1644–1911) 的造船业。这个案例特别有意思, 因为清朝一般被认为是对海洋空间不感兴趣的, 因此他们完全忽略了造船等领域。他关注的是十八世纪, 即中国按理说已经从海上回撤力量的时段。李其霖介绍了不同类型的船舶, 分析了满洲人建造船厂的政策。本章还特别关注了战舰的建造。

李其霖, 清朝造船の發展

本章において、李其霖は、大変興味深い、特別な事例である清朝 (1644–1911) の造船に焦点をあてる。この事例は、特に興味深いものとなる。なぜかという、一般に、清は海洋空間に興味を持っていなかった、と言うように、一般に、考えられており、それゆえに、造船などの分野は、概ね無視されてきたからである。李其霖は 18 世紀に、すなわち中国が、既に海から後退していた時期に焦点をあてる。彼は様々なタイプの船を紹介し、満洲人たちが造船所を設立した政治状況を分析する。この章では、特に、軍艦建造を注視する。

이기림 (李其霖), 청나라 조선업 (造船業) 의 발전

이 장에서 이기림은 매우 흥미롭고 특별한 사례인 청나라 (1644–1911) 왕조 시기의 조선업에 초점을 맞춘다. 이 사례는 특히 흥미로운 것인데, 그 이유는 일반적으로 청조는 해상 쪽에 관심을 가지지 않아 궁극적으로 조선업과 같은 관련 분야를 신경 쓰지

않았다고 간주되었기 때문이다. 이기림은 18 세기, 즉 중국이 이미 해상으로부터 후퇴했다고 알려진 시기에 초점을 맞춘다. 그는 다양한 종류의 선박을 소개하고 만주인들이 조선소를 설립하게 된 정치 상황을 분석한다. 이 장에서는 특히 군함 건조를 제시한다.

**Wim DE WINTER, Dining with the Daimyō:
Performative Intercultural Exchange and Border Thinking
through Seventeenth Century European-Japanese Banquets**

Wim De Winter looks at cultural interactions between Europeans and Japanese in seventeenth-century Japan. This sub-chapter provides vivid examples of encounters between Europeans and Japanese, discusses the crucial role of specific ceremonies and symbolic behaviour – banquets as tokens of hospitality were, for example, part and parcel of such intercultural encounters – and various visions of the “Others”.

**Wim DE WINTER, 和大名一起吃飯:
17 世紀在日本德川の歐洲人和日本人進行宴會的過程透視**

Wim De Winter 討論了在十七世紀的日本, 歐洲人和日本人的文化交往。本文舉出了歐洲人和日本人之間相遇的生動例子, 討論了特定儀式和象徵性行為的關鍵作用—比如, 作為好客標誌的宴會, 這種文化交往的必要部分—和對“他者”的不同看法。

**Wim DE WINTER, 和大名一起吃饭:
17 世纪在日本德川的欧洲人和日本人进行宴会的过程透視**

Wim De Winter 讨论了在十七世纪在日本, 欧洲人和日本人的文化交往。本文举出了欧洲人和日本人之间相遇的生动例子, 讨论了特定仪式和象征性行为的关键作用—比如, 作为好客标志的宴会, 这种文化交往的必要部分—和对“他者”的不同看法。

**Wim DE WINTER, 大名との食事:
17 世紀德川日本におけるヨーロッパ人と日本人が出席した宴席
を通しての儀式・儀礼的な文化交流について**

ウィム・デ・ウィンターは、17 世紀日本におけるヨーロッパ人と日本人の文化交流を考察する。この章では、ヨーロッパ人と日本人との出会いの鮮明な例を提供し、特定の儀式や象徴的な行動の重要な役割を演ずる、例えば、異文化間の出会いの一環

となる客人をもてなすしとして宴席や「他者」に関するいろいろな解釈などを論ずる。

Wim DE WINTER, 다이묘와의 식사:

17세기 도쿠가와 일본에서의 유럽인과 일본인이 참석한 연회에서 이루어진 의례적인 문화교류에 관하여

Wim De Winter 는 17 세기 일본에서 이루어진 유럽인과 일본인의 문화 교류를 고찰한다. 이 장에서는 유럽인과 일본인과의 만남의 생생한 예를 제공하고 특정 의식과 상징적인 행동—예로서 손님 대접의 표현으로서의 연회는 그러한 다문화간의 만남의 일환이었다—의 중요성, 및 “타자”에 대한 다양한 해석을 논한다.

Fabricio A. FONSECA, The Chinese Initiative for a Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road: Opportunities and Challenges for Latin America

The inclusion of leaders from Latin America in the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, on May 2017, and the admission of some Latin American countries as prospective non-regional members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, demonstrate the Chinese government's intention to look at the region as a natural extension of the Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road. This paper analyzes the implications for Latin America derived from the possible expansion of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), taking also into consideration the evolution of the initiative, some of the motivations behind it, and its gradual institutionalization. A brief historical analysis is also in place to demonstrate the potential of transformation offered by China, after centuries of bilateral trade being carried mainly through the intermediation of Western powers. Despite offering important opportunities for economic cooperation and growth, the expansion of the new maritime silk road into the region still needs to address different challenges at all levels and has considerable room for improvement.

**Fabricio A. FONSECA, 中國第二十一世紀海上絲綢之路的倡議：
拉美的機遇與挑戰**

2017年5月中國邀請拉丁美洲領導人參加國際合作的一帶一路論壇，並接納一些拉丁美洲國家作為亞洲基礎設施投資銀行的准區域成員，這表明中國政府有意將該地區視為第二十一世紀海上絲綢之路的自然延伸。本文分析了中國一帶一路倡議擴張，及其對拉美的影響，並考慮到該倡議的演變、其背後的動機，以及它漸進的制度化。幾個世紀以來，中國拉美雙邊貿易主要通過西方列強的仲

介而進行，本文也簡要地通過歷史分析來展示中國所提供的轉型潛力。儘管一帶一路倡議為經濟合作和增長提供了重要的機會，但將新的海上絲綢之路擴大到該區域，仍然需要在各個層次面對不同的挑戰，並有很大的改進餘地。

Fabricio A. FONSECA, 中国第二十一世纪海上丝绸之路的倡议： 拉美的机遇与挑战

2017年5月中国邀请拉丁美洲领导人参加国际合作的一带一路论坛，并接纳一些拉丁美洲国家作为亚洲基础设施投资银行的准区域成员，这表明中国政府有意将该地区视为第二十一世纪海上丝绸之路的自然延伸。本文分析了中国一带一路倡议扩张，及其对拉美的影响，并考虑到该倡议的演变、其背后的动机，以及它渐进的制度化。几个世纪以来，中国拉美双边贸易主要通过西方列强的仲介而进行，本文也简要地通过历史分析来展示中国所提供的转型潜力。尽管一带一路倡议为经济合作和增长提供了重要的机会，但将新的海上丝绸之路扩大到该区域，仍然需要在各个层次面对不同的挑战，并有很大的改进余地。

Fabricio A. FONSECA, 21世紀海洋シルクロードのための中国のイ ンシアチブ：中南米の機会と課題

2017年5月に開催された国際協力のための「一带一路」フォーラムにラテン・アメリカの指導者を含めることと、アジア・インフラ投資銀行の将来の非地域メンバーとして中南米諸国の一部を認めることは、中国政府が、21世紀の海洋シルクロードの自然の延長地として、この地域を見なしていることを明らかに示している。本章では、指導力の展開、その背後にある動機、および徐々に進行している制度化を考慮しながら、中国の「一带一路構想」Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) の拡大の可能性から導き出されるラテン・アメリカへの影響を分析する。幾世紀にもわたる二国間貿易が主に西欧諸国の仲介を通じて行われた後に、中国が提供する変革の可能性を示すために、歴史的な分析も、簡便に行う。経済協力と成長のための重要な機会を提供しているにもかかわらず、新しい海上シルクロードがこの地域へ拡大することに関して、あらゆるレベルで異なる課題に取り組む必要があり、改善すべき余地がかなりあるのである。

**Fabricio A. FONSECA, 21세기 해양 실크로드에 대한 중국의 주도권:
중남미의 기회와 도전**

2017년 5월에 개최된 국제 협력을 위한 “일대일로 (一帶一路)” 포럼에 라틴 아메리카의 리더들을 포함하고 아시아 인프라 투자 은행의 잠정적 지역 밖 구성원으로 몇몇 중남미 국가를 인정한 사실은 중국 정부가 21세기 해양 실크로드의 자연적 연장선상에서 이 지역을 주시하고 있음을 분명히 보여주고 있다. 이 장에서는 중국의 일대일로 구상 (BRI)의 확대 가능성으로부터 도출된 라틴 아메리카의 의미를 분석하는데, 그러한 중국 주도권의 발전 경로와 그 뒤에 숨어있는 몇 가지 동기, 및 그것의 점진적인 제도화를 고려한다. 간단한 역사적 분석을 통해 수세기에 걸쳐 서방 국가의 중재를 통해 양국 간에 무역이 이루어진 후에 중국이 제시한 변혁의 가능성을 보여줄 것이다. 경제 협력과 성장을 위한 중요한 기회를 제공하고 있음에도 불구하고 새로운 해상 실크로드가 이 지역으로 확대하는 것은 모든 수준에서 제기되는 다양한 문제들을 논하고 개선해야 할 여지가 많이 있다.

