Combined evaluation of the European Union's humanitarian interventions in Afghanistan 2014-2018 and DG ECHO's partnership with the Norwegian Refugee Council

Final report

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July 2019

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Final Report - Combined evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian interventions in Afghanistan 2014-2018 and DG ECHO's partnership with the Norwegian Refugee Council

Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations

2019

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014

ISBN 978-92-76-09126-4
doi: 10.2795/886070

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Combined evaluation of the European Union's humanitarian interventions in Afghanistan 2014-2018 and DG ECHO's partnership with the Norwegian Refugee Council

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Date: July 2019

List of acronyms

AAP	Accountability to Affected Population
ACF	Action Contre la Faim
ACTED	A French NGO
ADE	Analysis for Economic Decisions (consultancy)
AFN	Afghan Afghani national currency (€1=AFN 88.5)
AHF	Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund
ALCS	Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey
ALERT	Acute Large Emergency Response Tool
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
ANDMA	Afghanistan Natural Disaster Management Authority
ANPDF	Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework
AREU	Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
AOG	Armed Opposition Group
BPHS	Basic Package of Health Services
CaLP	Cash Learning Partnership
CBPF	Country Based Pooled Fund
CO	Country Office
CVWG	Cash and Vouchers Working Group
CW	Conventional Weapons
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DACAAR	Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees
DFID	Department for International Development
DG	Directorate General
DG DEVCO	DG for International Cooperation and Development
DIPECHO	Disaster Preparedness Programme – DG ECHO
DG ECHO	DG European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
DoRR	Directorate of Refugees & Repatriation
DO	Desk Officer
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
EC	European Commission
EiE	Education in Emergencies
EPHS	Essential Package of Hospital Services
EQ	Evaluation Question
ERM	Emergency Response Mechanism
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
ET	Evaluation Team
EU	European Union
FAFA	Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement
FATP	First Aid Treatment Post
FCS	Food Consumption Score
FEWSNet	Famine and Early Warning System Network
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FichOp	Fiche opérationelle
FPA	Framework Partnership Agreement
FSAL	Food security Agriculture & Livelihoods

FSP	Financial Service Provider
FTS	Financial Tracking Service
GB	Grand Bargain
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GoIRA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GVCA	Global Vulnerability Crisis Assessment
HAG	Humanitarian Access Group
HAR	Humanitarian Aid Regulation
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HEAT	Humanitarian Emergency Assessment Tool
HIP	Humanitarian Implementation Plan
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview
HO	Head Office
HOPE	DG ECHO online database
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICF	ICF Strategic Consulting
ICRC / CICR	International Committee of the Red Cross / Comité International de la Croix-Rouge
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IDMC	International Displacement Monitoring Centre
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
INFORM	Index for Risk Management
INSO	International NGO Safety Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
IR	Inception Report
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISG	Inter Services Group
JHDF	Joint Humanitarian Development Framework
KI	Key Informant
KII	Key Informant Interview
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoPH	Ministry of Public Health
MoRR	Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation
MPCA	Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance
MYF	Multi Year Funding
NFI	Non-Food Item
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NMFA	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NPP	National Priority Programmes
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
PDM	Post Distribution Monitoring
PRC	Physical Rehabilitation Centre
QA	Quality Assurance
RC	Resident Coordinator
SF	Single Form

SGA	Specific Grant Agreement
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SMEB	Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket
SRP	Strategic Response Plan
TA	Technical Assistant
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of reference
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
US	The United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VfM	Value for Money
VOICE	Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

Abstract

This report presents the findings of an independent evaluation *for the combined evaluation of the European Union's humanitarian interventions in Afghanistan 2014-2018 and DG ECHO's partnership with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC).* While these two strands of the combined evaluation were undertaken by the same team and ran in parallel, they constitute two different subjects of analysis. The report is broken into two main parts; part A which focuses on the Afghanistan country evaluation and Part B which focuses on the partnership evaluation.

The country evaluation found that DG ECHO's evidence-based advocacy positions it as a key player in the Afghanistan aid context and that it is working towards enhancing the synergy between development and humanitarian actions. At the community level, DG ECHO's lifesaving and protection actions, were found to be helping target communities to partly cope with immediate after-effects of conflict and disasters. It's Emergency Response Mechanism and cash assistance was found to deliver need-based response to conflict-affected IDPs relatively fast (although not always). It's health and trauma-related actions and support to provincial hospitals for communicable disease surveillance were found to meet critical needs.

The partnership evaluation found a high-quality partnership existed. There is strong evidence of regular, comprehensive and transparent exchange of information at all levels. The weakness is that the simplified and efficient procedures are not realised in practice. Some processes are inefficient, there are some lapses in internal communications, and audit requirements are perceived to be over-stringent in the context of humanitarian crisis. The key factor influencing perceptions of quality is trust between partners. This was found to be strong at policy level and very strong at country level.

Glossary of terms

Awaaz: a toll-free hotline in Afghanistan for disaster-affected communities to lodge complaints about humanitarian response. Operated by UNOPS, the complaints are then forwarded to relevant agencies for action and the caller is informed of the outcome/decision. Funded by DG ECHO, it is part of beneficiary accountability system.

FCS: The Food Consumption Score (FCS) is an index that was developed by the World Food Programme (WFP). It aggregates household-level data on the diversity and frequency of food groups consumed over the previous seven days, which is then weighted according to the relative nutritional value of the consumed food groups. For instance, food groups containing nutritionally dense foods, such as animal products, are given greater weight than those containing less nutritionally dense foods, such as tubers. Based on this score, a household's food consumption can be further classified into one of three categories: poor, borderline, or acceptable.

FichOp: The FichOp is a DG ECHO internal file with all observations, comments, and initial appraisals, report of monitoring and final decision from Field and Desk staff on a project funded by DG ECHO.

Hawala: *Hawala* is an alternative remittance channel that exists outside of traditional banking systems. Transactions between *hawala* brokers are made without promissory notes because the system is heavily based on trust and the balancing of *hawala* brokers' books.

IPC Classification: The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is a set of standardised tools that aims at providing a "common currency" for classifying the severity and magnitude of food insecurity. The IPC-Acute scale categorises the severity of acute food insecurity into Five Phases: Phase 1 – minimal; Phase 2 – stress; Phase 3 – crisis; Phase 4 – emergency; and Phase 5 – famine.

1. **Minimal.** Up to 20 per cent of households must take drastic steps to meet basic needs, for example, selling assets to pay for food or shelter.
2. **Stressed.** Households cannot get enough food without meeting other non-food needs through unsustainable means.
3. **Crisis.** Households either experience stretches of acute malnutrition or must deplete assets to meet food needs, leading to gaps in food consumption.
4. **Emergency.** Households experience long stretches of acute malnutrition and excess mortality or see the extreme loss of assets.
5. **Catastrophe/Famine.** Households experience an extreme lack of food, leading to starvation and death. When at least 20 per cent of households in an area are affected, this phase represents the minimum threshold for famine. There are degrees of famine characterised by an increasing death rate and more rampant starvation.

Petition System: In Afghanistan, the first step in identifying recently arrived internally displaced people is through a petition system. Households submit a formal petition to the local Directorate of Refugees and Repatriation (DoRR). The DoRR does an initial check of the legitimacy of claims and organises a 'screening meeting' with OCHA and NGOs active in the area.

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Part A – Afghanistan Country Programme Evaluation

Executive Summary Part A: Afghanistan Country Programme

Introduction

The Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid (DG ECHO) commissioned an independent evaluation of its humanitarian actions in Afghanistan for the period 2014-2018, combined with an evaluation of DG ECHO's global partnership with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). While these two strands of the combined evaluation were undertaken by the same team and ran in parallel, they constitute two different subjects of analysis. This part (Part A) of the report presents the methodology, findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Afghanistan country evaluation, conducted during January-April 2019, with an intensive field visit undertaken during March-April. The report on NRC partnership is presented in Part B.

Objectives, methodology and context

The evaluation's objectives were to: (a) assess performance, including identifying internal and external enabling factors, and challenges to delivery of assistance and protection to people affected by conflict and disasters, and (b) identify lessons and good practices, using the following evaluation criteria:

a) *Relevance*
b) *Coherence*, both internally and with interventions by other donors
c) *Effectiveness* (including in respect to advocacy and visibility)
d) *Efficiency*
e) *EU added-value*; and
f) *Sustainability* through contribution to humanitarian-development nexus.

The evaluation followed a mixed methods approach. This involved document research, purposively selected key informant interviews with major stakeholders, visits to project sites/communities and beneficiary interviews. Besides extensive desk research covering 56 published documents and over 150 pieces of grey literature, a total of 86 key informant interviews and 19 group discussions with communities were conducted during the evaluation. Field visits covered activities of 16 partners who accounted for €161.3 million (88.67 %) of the total €181.9 million grants contracted by DG ECHO during the evaluation period. Findings and conclusions presented here are drawn from all of these methods and multiple sources, analysed for their strength of evidence and triangulated.

Afghanistan is a country in protracted conflict and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. Both the scale and nature of displacement have changed, with the latter becoming more protracted and with multiple waves of displacement over time. Increased insecurity and increasing territorial control by Armed Opposition Groups (AOG) of large parts of the country will require changes to the way humanitarian and development assistance is delivered in future.

Afghanistan is as much a development crisis as it is a protection crisis. Although development efforts immediately after the fall of Taliban made enormous strides in increasing access to health,

education and livelihoods, this trend was reversed after 2011, when the conflict started to escalate. The failure of development aid over the past decade, compounded by protracted conflict, has caused increased impoverishment, to the extent that the norm borders on emergency threshold. With the poverty rate rising at an annual rate of 3.5 per cent during 2011-12 to 2016-17, it now stands at 55 per cent. These figures do not account for those who have subsequently been pushed into poverty following the drought and floods in 2018. It comes as no surprise that 6.3 million people are now in need of humanitarian aid in 2019, of which 3.6 million people are experiencing emergency levels of food insecurity, a 24 per cent increase on the same period in 2017. In addition, the number of internally displaced people increased from over 1 million in 2015 to over 3.5 million at the end of 2018. Most displaced people and returnees have moved to the cities, where the provision of basic services is struggling to cope, given the limited capacity of the government, leading to increased vulnerability and suffering.[1]

It is important to recognise that the state building and security agenda that have dominated all aid discourse and assistance to Afghanistan will continue to dominate in development aid, and any genuine effort on pro-poor development strategy has to be predicated on this dominant narrative in order to gain traction. **DG ECHO has positioned itself as a key interlocutor, with its credentials as a neutral (non-political) multilateral humanitarian organisation not influenced by any government agenda, and a leader in the current discourse on resilience and nexus[2]**. As a major humanitarian donor, DG ECHO has been a vocal advocate of the need to manage the development and humanitarian interface in the country better, with a focus on the poor and vulnerable in all development policies.

Key findings

Relevance

DG ECHO uses its grant making flexibly to ensure that the response adapts to the needs as they emerge or change, and its partners have focussed their actions in areas where humanitarian needs have been either neglected or inadequately met by other providers. However, Education in Emergencies (EiE) remains a neglected area in the humanitarian response. DG ECHO's flagship project, the Emergency Response Mechanism (ERM), concentrated on responding to the needs of Internally Displaced Person(s) (IDP) in urban areas, and DG ECHO and its partners are now gradually increasing their footprint in rural areas to provide assistance in the places of origin of the conflict and disaster affected communities, especially in AOG areas where some partners have good access.

Partners use multiple methods for needs assessments and the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) coordinates the joint needs assessment process. However, evidence suggests there is weak beneficiary consultation and participation of women in this process. Weakness in incorporating age and disability factors was also evident. There is limited data sharing amongst partners on needs assessment and the use of the complaint's mechanism was weak for most of the evaluation period, however this is now being strengthened by DG ECHO partners.

Coherence

DG ECHO Afghanistan's humanitarian actions are fully aligned with DG ECHO mandates and thematic policies. DG ECHO's humanitarian actions operate at two levels – ***funding*** to projects for specific activities, and ***non-funding actions*** in the form of lobbying, advocacy and thought leadership that are not tied to any direct project actions. Its grant-funded humanitarian actions attempt to address short-term needs only, and through its non-funding actions, DG ECHO has been making significant contributions to longer-term issues of disaster risk reduction and resilience. DG ECHO is seen as a strong advocate of humanitarian principles, and its contribution to strengthening humanitarian system is acknowledged by

[1] DG ECHO (2018). 2018 Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran And Central Asia, Version 3 – 24/06/2018

[2] When the report refers to 'nexus', it is referring to humanitarian development nexus

all stakeholders. **DG ECHO is a member of various senior level humanitarian forums in the country where its voice has been critical in shaping debates and humanitarian response, far beyond the volume of its funds.** At the country level, though there is informal coordination between senior staff of DG ECHO and DG for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), there is no formal institutional mechanism to promote dialogue or a joined-up approach between the European Union's (EU) humanitarian and development arms. DG ECHO's inputs are highly valued by Member State donors present in the country.

EU added value

The EU is recognised by all as the most significant humanitarian actor. DG ECHO's independence from foreign policy, political and security agenda of any government earns it huge respect, thereby opening doors for dialogue with various parties.

Efficiency

DG ECHO staff review all actions it supports through a cost lens to assess cost-efficiency. DG ECHO's emphasis on cash response has ensured faster delivery of response. The ERM makes administrative savings through common formats, partner co-ordination and coverage, without putting undue co-ordination burden on partners. However, it did not always provide a timely response due to delays endemic in the vetting system of the government. This is likely to change in future as the Government has recently agreed to waive the current vetting system for humanitarian response. As needs assessment data is not shared amongst agencies, there are errors of inclusion/exclusion and double counting in cash programmes. At the level of budget allocations to projects, DG ECHO bases the size of its budgets on a costed assessment of the results to be achieved. However, across the organisation there was no systematic or standardised consideration of cost-effectiveness.

Effectiveness

Effectiveness of humanitarian interventions in Afghanistan has to be seen in the context of the fact that most of the conflict/disaster affected victims are also victims of chronic poverty and vulnerability. DG ECHO's evidence-based advocacy positions it in the Afghanistan aid context as a key player, working with others, in shaping the overall humanitarian system and its performance, as well as influencing development debates. At the level of affected-communities, DG ECHO's life-saving and protection actions are helping target communities cope with the immediate after-effects of conflict and disasters. DG ECHO's ERM is recognised by all stakeholders as one of its kind in Afghanistan, capable of delivering need-based response to the conflict IDPs, with nationwide coverage, though it had its limitations when responding to the drought and dealing with a large number of IDPs in 2018. DG ECHO supported actions in trauma care, mental health, mobile health/first aid teams, provision of water, sanitation and hygiene education, and cash assistance. This assistance is highly appreciated for its quality and coverage. DG ECHO's support to hospitals and physical rehabilitation centres which meet critical needs should have a clearer strategy.

In Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) response, water was provided inside or close to the settlements, and communities are aware of and knowledgeable about basics of personal and communal hygiene, acquired through hygiene promotion work of partners. However, examples of using innovative approaches and market-based solutions in the sustainable provision of water were not found. Besides cash, which is definitely preferred by beneficiaries as it gives them flexibility and dignity, sometimes in-kind support is also necessary. Complicated vulnerability assessments under ERM with differentiated level of assistance for households caused confusion and anger among beneficiaries as the process/criteria for judging who was vulnerable, or who was not, was not seen to be transparent and objective. The protection sector as a whole has underperformed as the cluster lacks a coherent strategy. DG ECHO partners' performance on this score has also been weak.

DG ECHO's contribution to OCHA helped strengthen the latter's capacity in the regions to coordinate actions of humanitarian organisations, and during 2018, working with other organisations, strengthened mechanism for community feedback through setting up a nationwide hotline. There is need for the

standardisation of data collection and training of partner staff in collating and analysing Post-Distribution Monitoring (PDM) and needs assessment data.

Sustainability:
DG ECHO's short-term assistance to conflict and disaster-affected communities cannot be sustained, unless development interventions are able to provide basic services to people. Exit strategies for some of the major health facilities supported by DG ECHO are now being developed.

Summary of conclusions

1. DG ECHO humanitarian actions are fully aligned with DG ECHO global mandates and thematic policies, and it is seen as a strong advocate of humanitarian principles, contributing to strengthening humanitarian system in the country.

2. DG ECHO's evidence-based advocacy positions it as a key player in the Afghanistan aid context. DG ECHO is working towards enhancing the synergy between development and humanitarian actions, and this can be further strengthened by leveraging the Union dimension through formal institutional mechanism to promote dialogue or a joined up approach between the EU's humanitarian and development arms.

3. DG ECHO has been making significant contributions in the country with regard to meeting some of the Grand Bargain commitments and strengthening and sustaining the humanitarian ecosystem to ensure that organisations are able to deliver their services effectively.

4. At the level of affected-communities, DG ECHO's life-saving and protection actions, though short-term, are helping target communities to *partly* cope with immediate after-effects of conflict and disasters, before they are able to access more longer-term support and move towards recovery.

5. DG ECHO's ERM and cash assistance is capable of delivering need-based response to conflict-affected IDPs relatively fast, although it did not always provide what beneficiaries consider a timely response due to delays endemic in the petition system.

6. DG ECHO supported health and trauma-related actions and support to provincial hospitals for communicable disease surveillance meet critical needs.

7. DG ECHO partners have been gradually increasing their footprint in rural areas to provide assistance in the places of origin of IDPs, especially in AOG areas.

8. At delivery level, DG ECHO supported actions can provide enhanced value to the disaster/conflict-affected communities if the following shortcomings are addressed:
    - weak coordination and sharing of needs assessment data among partners;
    - weak focus on protection issues, beneficiary consultation, participation of women and incorporating age and disability factors;
    - exclusion of eligible beneficiaries in non-Government controlled areas;
    - lack of innovative approaches and market-based solutions in sustainable provision of water.

Lessons for future programming

1. The multiple overlapping shocks and stresses – conflict, drought, floods, earthquakes, cross-border migration - that affect Afghan communities, brought home the lesson that **development and humanitarian actions cannot be delinked from each other and ways must be found to better address acute and chronic vulnerabilities that mediate all disasters**.

2. Tertiary healthcare requires long-term investment which humanitarian agencies may get into only if there is a clear time-bound exit strategy. **An element of redundancy needs to be built into the project design right from the start**; otherwise, humanitarian organisations remain saddled with the burden of running these facilities for an indefinite period of time, creating parallel structures outside the government systems.

Recommendations

Institutional level:

R1: At the Head Office (HO) and Country Office (CO) levels, reinforce formal links with DG DEVCO to ensure greater coherence and complementarity between the two services in development and humanitarian programmes focused on ultra-poor, poor and those vulnerable to shocks and stresses. In the Afghanistan context, using DG DEVCO's off-budget support, joint work on social protection, basic services (water, sanitation, education facilities for IDPs, basic healthcare, vocational training) in urban areas where there is a high concentration of IDPs and trauma care services should be explored.

R2: DG ECHO Afghanistan should continue strengthening its current initiative towards working with other major donors, the World Bank and the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA) on forging synergy between development and humanitarian actions in the country.

Strategic programming (DG ECHO Afghanistan):

R3: Working with IPC, Famine and Early Warning System Network (FEWSNet), the Department for International Development (DFID), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other key operational humanitarian agencies, conduct a lessons review of the 2018 drought response to analyse the reasons why good early warnings did not create enough impetus for early action during the drought of 2018. This will contribute to a better understanding of how to respond to slow onset emergencies (drought) in future.

R4: Develop a clear strategy on emergency healthcare, ensuring that any tertiary health action DG ECHO supports is backed by an exit and sustainability strategy. Working with the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), DG DEVCO and humanitarian organisations now running hospitals that are partly funded by DG ECHO, develop a time-bound transition plan for the hospitals to be integrated into the healthcare system.

R5: DG ECHO and its partners (as well as other humanitarian organisations) need to expand their footprint in AOG areas through negotiated access, wherever feasible, and through increasing engagement with local and national NGOs. This will also be in line with the localisation agenda of the Grand Bargain commitments and will place the humanitarian system in a stronger position to influence the development aid system fixated on conflating development, state building and the security agenda.

Operational issues:

R6: Using its influence in the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), and working with other humanitarian donors, DG ECHO needs to continue pushing for a clearer protection strategy in the country. The strategy needs to focus on Gender-Based Violence (GBV), disability, undocumented returnees and IDPs without *tazkira,*[3] in addition to addressing the issue of (former-refugee) returnees from neighbouring countries.

R7: DG ECHO should continue to support OCHA in strengthening joint needs assessment and information sharing on needs amongst all agencies, including DG ECHO partners. In this regard, a lesson learning workshop focusing on the needs assessment during the 2018 drought and the migration crisis would be a good start, including examining the duplication of needs assessment by various partners and ways to improve this in the future. This should also include examining how ERM's needs assessment can contribute to strengthening the joint needs assessment process and ensure that ERM actions are coordinated with clusters.

R8: DG ECHO partners need to continue the work of strengthening Accountability to affected Population (AAP) practices and beneficiary participation in all their actions through greater use of *Awaaz*[4] and internal (organisation-specific) complaints and response mechanism.

[3] The electronic Afghan identity card (e-Tazkira) is a national identity document issued to all citizens of Afghanistan. It is proof of identity, residency and citizenship.

[4] It is a toll-free hotline in Afghanistan for disaster-affected communities to lodge complaints about humanitarian response. Operated by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), the complaints are forwarded to relevant agencies for action and caller informed of the outcome/decision. Funded by DG ECHO, it is part of beneficiary accountability system.

1. Introduction, scope and methodology of the evaluation

1.1. Introduction

This report relates to an independent evaluation of the Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid's (DG ECHO) humanitarian programmes in Afghanistan for the period 2014-2018. The exercise was undertaken in combination with an evaluation of DG ECHO's global partnership with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). While these two strands of the combined evaluation were undertaken by the same team and ran in parallel, they constitute two different subjects of analysis. There are common elements of methodology that apply to both components of the evaluation, each requiring distinct research, analysis and synthesis, in line with the key evaluation questions in the combined Terms of Reference (ToR, as in Annex 1). This part of the report presents the methodology, findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Afghanistan country evaluation, conducted during January-April 2019, with an intensive field visit undertaken during March-April. The report on NRC partnership is presented in Part B.

The evaluation started with an inception phase during which the Evaluation Team (ET), in consultation with and guidance from the Inter Services Group (ISG) of DG ECHO, produced a detailed methodology for conducting the evaluation. This was followed by an extensive desk research to map all available evidence from secondary sources before the ET undertook the country visit to gather field data.

1.2. Humanitarian context and DG ECHO priority actions in Afghanistan

1.2.1. Key humanitarian issues and challenges

Protracted conflict, deteriorating security situation and challenges of access

Afghanistan is one of the countries listed in the top quartile in DG ECHO's Crisis Assessment Index (score 3),[5] and the security situation has been deteriorating rapidly since the withdrawal of international troops in 2014. Large swathes of the country are now under the control of armed opposition groups (AOG), most notably by the Taliban which now controls more districts than ever since its ouster in 2001. Continuing insecurity and violence has rendered humanitarian access difficult for relief agencies, with increased numbers of incidents targeting aid workers. A UN Strategic Review[6] at the end of 2017 observed that, instead of a post-crisis/transition context, Afghanistan is in a situation of *protracted conflict*.

Forced displacement, migration and increasing number of returnees from neighbouring countries

Afghanistan has witnessed numerous waves of forced displacement and migration, associated with four decades of conflict. Escalating insurgency in several provinces over the past four years[7] has created a

[5] The Crisis Assessment Index scores countries in the three dimensions, namely: uprooted people index, natural disaster index and conflict index. Each dimension has a value that is the result of combining indicators. If countries are in the top quartile (25%), they score 3; in the bottom quartile, they score 1; in the middle 2 quartiles, they score 2. (*Source*: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/annex_3_inform-ci_2019_new.pdf; accessed 11 January 2019)

[6] United Nations (2017). Special report on the strategic review of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Report of the Secretary-General A/72/312–S/2017/696, 2017

[7] An indication of the escalation in conflict affecting civilians is evidenced in the civilian deaths due to conflict, as reported by UNAMA: during 2014, there were 3,188 recorded civilian (non-combatant) deaths due to conflict, which increased to (highest levels recorded

steady flow of Internally Displaced Person (IDP) who are fleeing to the cities, adding pressure to the absorptive capacities of both provinces and the capital city, Kabul. As of December 2018, the International Organisation for Migration's (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) indicated a total of more than 3.5 million IDPs.[8] Besides the internally displaced due to conflict, hundreds of thousands of Afghans have been deported from Iran and Pakistan during the past three years. In 2016, more than 600,000 documented and undocumented Afghans returned from Pakistan and Iran. During 2018, the IOM reports that nearly 773,125 Afghan migrants returned or were deported back to Afghanistan from Iran,[9] driven by political and economic issues in that country.[10]

Natural disasters

In addition to conflict, Afghanistan is highly exposed to natural disasters and climate-related shocks, which affect a larger share of the population (59 per cent), especially in the poorer regions, than security-related shocks (15 per cent).[11] The Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) (update December 2018) records as many as 6.3 million people in need of humanitarian aid in 2019, including 4 million due to drought in 2018 which affected more than two-thirds of Afghanistan.[12] By October 2018,[13] the drought alone displaced a total of 275,000 people, with more than two million threatened by the effects of water shortages. Of the 6.3 million in need of humanitarian aid, 3.6 million people are experiencing emergency levels of food insecurity, a 24 per cent increase on the same period of 2017.

Increasing poverty is eroding people's capacity and compounding humanitarian needs

Poverty has been increasing exponentially in the country. The latest data from the Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey (ALCS), a joint study by the European Union and Afghanistan's Central Statistics Organisation, released in May 2018, shows that the national poverty rate rose sharply from 38 per cent in 2011-12 to 55 per cent in 2016-17.[14] The chronic poverty coalescing with vulnerability arising from acute crises in a country where the local capacity of national and provincial governments is extremely weak multiplies humanitarian needs. There is a significant lack of access to health services, nutrition, markets, schools and employment opportunities for displaced populations, returning refugees/ immigrants and other vulnerable groups, amidst growing pressure on the country's already weak infrastructure and services. These circumstances seriously hamper the ability of the country's population to recover and build resilience to ongoing and future shocks, and their vulnerability is further exacerbated by associated problems such as gender-based violence and trauma.

National capacity and policy framework

The capacity of government remains limited. Afghanistan remains highly reliant on aid, with domestic revenues sufficient to finance only around half of budgeted expenditures.[15] Donor funding through multi-donor Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the International Development Assistance constitute the main source of Government's funding for the National Priority Programmes (NPP). There are two key institutions in the country overseeing humanitarian response by the Government, the Ministry of Refugees & Repatriation (MoRR) responsible for displacement and migration, and the Afghanistan

since 2001) 11,002 and 11,500 during 2015 and 2016 respectively. During the first nine months of 2018, UNAMA reported 8,050 civilian deaths (in 2017, the corresponding number was "more than 10,000").

[8] https://displacement.iom.int/afghanistan

[9] International Organisation for Migration (2019). Return Of Undocumented Afghans, Weekly Situation Report JAN— DEC 2018 / 01– 05 JAN 2019

[10] Source: https://afghanistan.iom.int/sites/default/files/Reports/iom_afghanistan-return_of_undocumented_afghans-_situation_report_06_-_12_jan_2019_0.pdf

[11] World Bank Group (2016). Country Partnership Framework For Islamic Republic Of Afghanistan For The Period FY 17 to FY 20, 2 October, 2016

[12] https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/asia-and-pacific/afghanistan_en

[13] DG ECHO (2018). 2018-2021 Humanitarian Response Plan, December 2018 update

[14] http://blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/latest-poverty-numbers-afghanistan-call-action-not-reason-despair

[15] http://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2018/10/01/supporting-inclusive-growth-in-afghanistan (accessed 28-12-2018)

National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA), responsible for disaster response. The first *National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons* was agreed in November 2013 to strengthen migration governance. The *Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework* (ANPDF, 2017 to 2021) has a focus on durable solutions and protection principles and aims at including the needs of returnees and IDPs in all key NPPs, including the Citizens' Charter.

1.2.2. Humanitarian needs in the country and response by the international humanitarian system

An overview of humanitarian needs across the country is provided in the UN-coordinated HRP for each year. The following Table (Table 1) summarises the scale of need over the period 2014-2018, based on humanitarian needs overview for each year compiled by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Afghanistan. Since 2014, the interagency HRP have come to focus on acute emergencies, as opposed to chronic needs, resulting from intensification and spread of conflict as well as the needs arising from natural disasters. International humanitarian funding for Afghanistan has been based on the instrument of HRP, which on an average has been funded 77-90 per cent during the period 2014-2018 (Table 1). Amid increasing needs, actual funding had declined between 2014 and 2017, recovering during 2018, though still leaving a funding gap of 23 per cent for the year.

Table 1: Scale of humanitarian needs, 2014-2018

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
People in need of humanitarian assistance	9 million	7.4 million	8.1 million	9.3 million	6.6 million
People targeted by Humanitarian Plan	5 million	3.8 million	3.5 million	5.7 million	5.2 million[16,17]
Total request (US$ million)	**406**	**405**	**393**	**409**[18]	**599**[19]
Funds mobilised (% of total request)	90	80	87	81	77

(Source: Annual Humanitarian Response Plans for Afghanistan for 2014-2018)

Major contributions to humanitarian appeals have consistently come from the Governments of the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), DG ECHO, Japan, Korea, Sweden, Germany and Australia, in particular. The US, UK and DG ECHO have been the top three major donors for each appeal during 2014-2018. Afghanistan is one of the countries with a Country Based Pooled Fund (CBPF), managed by OCHA on behalf of the Humanitarian Coordinator and donors. The Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund (AHF),[20] established in 2014, has the following specific objectives:

- to support humanitarian partners (national and international NGOs, UN Agencies) to address the most pressing evidence-based needs in accordance with humanitarian principles;
- to improve the relevance and coherence of humanitarian response by strategically funding assessed humanitarian action as identified in the HRPs;

[16] Original number in the HRP was put at 3.3 million and revised subsequently

[17] *Revised figure from:* Afghanistan: Humanitarian Response Plan (2018-2021) Mid-year Review, July 2018

[18] This was revised from initial estimate of US$ 550 million.

[19] Revised upward from US$ 430 million, as per Afghanistan: Humanitarian Response Plan (2018-2021) Mid-year Review, July 2018

[20] Previously called, Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF)

- to strengthen coordination and leadership through the function of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and the humanitarian cluster system.

On average, the AHF disburses approximately US$ 35-50 million every year. During 2014-2018, donors contributed US$ 231.3 million to the AHF, with the UK, Sweden and Australia contributing the largest amounts every year, followed by Korea. The fund is designed to play an instrumental role in disbursing funds in a timely and flexible manner to the most immediate needs while reinforcing and encouraging coordinated humanitarian action.

1.2.3. Overview of DG ECHO humanitarian actions in Afghanistan

As described in the ToR and the Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIP), DG ECHO's main humanitarian focus in Afghanistan since 2014 has been on:

- Life-saving assistance, through the provision of emergency medical care, nutrition, water, food security, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and protection interventions in response to conflict, gender-based violence and meeting the basic needs of children and vulnerable groups including the disabled and elderly affected by conflict/natural disasters.
- Multi-purpose cash assistance delivered through the Emergency Response Mechanism (ERM) to ensure emergency assistance to displaced people, returning refugees not covered by other programmes – ERM is one of DG-ECHO's programming instruments for delivery of emergency response to the conflict-affected in Afghanistan which has been in existence since 2011. Guided by a common rationale, partners generally implement the same activities in different geographic areas. Its core activities comprise providing unconditional cash transfers (food security), and WASH.
- Education in Emergencies (EiE) for children forced out of school due to conflict or displacement.
- Humanitarian ecosystem – air services, security assessments and analysis for NGOs, in order to provide access to affected populations and ensure timely, coordinated support.

The HIPs set out the main components for DG ECHO's interventions in the country, and grants are made through the annual HIP cycles and could be for a duration of a few months to a year. As DG ECHO does not directly implement activities, funds are disbursed through grants to NGOs, UN agencies and international organisations (Red Cross/Red Crescent movement) which implement project-based activities. DG ECHO maintains an office in Kabul and has regional and global experts involved in the monitoring of projects, with a particular focus on DG ECHO policy areas such as cash, protection, health and education. Table 2 below provides summary information on HIPs during the period of evaluation.

Table 2: Breakdown of DG ECHO funding in Afghanistan, 2014-2018

Year (Contract ref)	Priority sector and activities	Total appeal (€ million)	Afghanistan (€ million)
2014 ECHO/AS/BUD/2014/91000	Covering the Afghan crisis including Afghan population in Iran and Pakistan: Shelter and NFIs, food and nutrition, WASH, healthcare, protection; Coordination, knowledge sharing and information management; Support services (air transport, provision of safety and security support); disaster risk reduction (DRR) and gender mainstreaming;	31.5	30.60
2015 ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91000	Food assistance and nutrition, WASH, emergency health assistance, Shelter and non-food items (NFIs), protection; Coordination and information management; Care and maintenance support (for Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan); Support services (air transport, provision of safety and security support to humanitarian agencies)	66.3 (covering Afghanistan & Pakistan)	40.17[21]
2016 ECHO/WWD/BUD/2016/01000	Multi-sector humanitarian needs: food assistance, NFIs, WASH; Health and nutrition (medicine assistance; Basic health care delivery; Malnutrition, access to safe drinking water; Protection; Coordination and information management	72.5 (covering Afghanistan & Pakistan)	47.0[22]
2017 ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91000	Multi-sector humanitarian needs: food assistance or cash grants, shelter, NFIs, WASH; Health and nutrition (medicine assistance; Basic health care; Malnutrition, access to safe drinking water); Protection; Logistics (humanitarian aid support); Coordination and information management	49.5 (covering Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Central Asia)	29.5[23]
2018 ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91000	Food assistance, shelter, NFIs, WASH (preferably through assessed and monitored multi-purpose cash transfers); Health and nutrition (medicine assistance; Basic health care; malnutrition, access to safe drinking water); Protection; Logistics (humanitarian aid support); Coordination and information management	56.5 (covering Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Central Asia)	46.0[24]

[21] DG ECHO (2016). Technical Annex HIP 2015 Afghanistan, Pakistan Last update: 07/09/2016, Version 7
[22] DG ECHO (2016). Technical Annex HIP 2016: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Financial, Administrative And Operational Information 2016, Last update: 13/12/2016 Version 5, ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91000 1
[23] DG ECHO (2017). Technical Annex 2017 HIP, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia - Financial, Administrative And Operational Information, 27/09/17 Version 3
[24] DG ECHO (2018). Technical Annex 2018 HIP, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Central Asia, Version 3 – 24/06/2018

1.3. Evaluation purpose, objectives, scope and approach

The overall purpose of the Afghanistan evaluation is to provide an external, impartial and independent evidence-based assessment of performance of DG ECHO's portfolio of funded actions in Afghanistan[25], and draw lessons that may be of relevance for DG ECHO's future programming. The evaluation covered the interventions implemented during 2014 to 2018, which have been funded under the five relevant HIPs shown in Table 2 above. This evaluation sought to understand how the support provided by DG ECHO contributed to meeting the needs of the most vulnerable groups, including those who are internally displaced and returning refugees. It covered actions in the areas of protection, basic needs, education, and healthcare, cash transfers, shelter, WASH, as well as coordination, support to operations, logistics and ERM. The primary stakeholders of this evaluation are DG ECHO headquarters, their Afghanistan Country Office (CO) and humanitarian partners in Afghanistan, as well as several secondary stakeholders that include other humanitarian donors.

1.3.1. Evaluation objectives

The evaluation had two objectives:

- Assess the performance of DG ECHO humanitarian actions in Afghanistan, including identifying internal and external enabling factors, and challenges to the delivery of its mandate in relation to assistance and protection to people affected by conflict and disasters;
- Capture lessons, good practices and innovations that are improving humanitarian action and analyse their potential for more general application by DG ECHO.

In specific terms, the evaluation assessed DG ECHO's strategy and priorities in Afghanistan, taking into consideration internal and external enabling factors, using the following evaluation criteria:[26]

a) *Relevance*
b) *Coherence, both internally and with interventions by other donors and by the EC*
c) *EU added-value*
d) *Effectiveness (including in respect to advocacy and visibility),*
e) *Efficiency, and*
f) *Sustainability through contribution to humanitarian-development nexus.*

1.3.2. Evaluation – conceptual framework and methods

The specific indicators and questions addressed in this evaluation, data sources and data collection methods, are set out in the evaluation matrix (Annex 2). In order to develop a detailed methodology and evaluation framework, the ET developed a conceptual understanding of the causal pathway that underpins the HIPs, based on a review of the latter, as well as a desk review of a random sample of project documents in the HOPE database. The ET captured the DG ECHO intervention logic in the following (Figure 1) Theory of Change (ToC). The logic of the ToC helped the evaluation in framing the evaluation sub-questions and corresponding judgement criteria in the evaluation matrix and was particularly useful in assessing overall coherence of DG ECHO's actions in Afghanistan.

[25] The ToR states that the evaluation ought to include actions in favour of Afghans refugees in Iran as well. However, it was agreed during the inception phase to drop this component from the evaluation scope due to complexity and sensitivity involved.

[26] Better Regulation Guidelines: http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/docs/swd_br_guidelines_en.pdf

Figure 1 DG ECHO Afghanistan Theory of Change (focus of DG ECHO grants indicated in dark red font)



Source: Evaluation team, DG ECHO Afghanistan evaluation, 2019)

The evaluation was conducted in four major phases, with clearly defined deliverables for each phase: (a) inception stage during which an inception report with detailed methodology was produced; (b) desk phase – an extensive study of available data in DG ECHO documents and HOPE database was undertaken to produce a desk report with detailed portfolio analysis and tentative findings based on secondary data; (c) a field report submitted at the end of field data collection highlighting the key findings from field visits; and (d) a consolidated evaluation report based on both desk report and field report. Subsequently, the ET received extensive comments on the evaluation report, which were considered to produce a final version of the evaluation report.

As the ToC shows, the DG ECHO Afghanistan portfolio aims to deliver several complex outputs and outcomes, evaluation of which required methodologies that took into account the complexities of dealing with different type of data, quantitative and qualitative, often with little or no counterfactuals to compare against. The ET used mixed methods, with primary and secondary data gathered from a representative sample of projects supported through the HIPs. Evidence from the interventions were analysed to draw findings at the level of ways of working and outputs detailed in the ToC. At the outcome level, the evaluation used the evaluation criteria provided in the ToR, and as elaborated in the evaluation matrix to draw conclusions based on the findings.

The mixed methods approach involved document research, purposively selected key informant interviews (KIIs) with key stakeholders and visits to project sites/ communities and beneficiary interviews. A comprehensive desk review leading to the production of a desk report gave the ET a detailed map of all available data from secondary sources, before progressing to the field work phase. The mapping of key stakeholders during the IR phase provided an initial list of the key informant interviews which was subsequently refined and added to as the data gathering progressed. Detailed sampling methodology for selection of projects and sites for field visit were outlined in the IR. The ET visited Herat, Balkh, Kandahar

and Kabul provinces to concentrate on data collection during the country visit, as well as conducting interviews with partners and Government in Kabul and provinces. The selection was made on the basis of: (i) number of agencies working in an area with DG ECHO grants; (ii) balance of different sectors of work; and (iii) ongoing work through recent grants or continuation of work from previous years. A total of 16 partners (15 with current grants) were interviewed and/or their project sites visited to gain an in-depth understanding of DG ECHO's support to the activities of these organisations. In financial terms, these 16 partners account for a total of €161.3 million (88.67 per cent) of the total €181.9 million grants contracted by DG ECHO during the evaluation period.

A full itinerary of the evaluation team is provided in Annex 3. A total of 86 key informant interviews were conducted by the ET: 42 in Kabul, 40 in provinces and 4 outside Afghanistan (telephone interviews). A full list of all key informants and community interview locations is presented in Annex 4, and a summary breakdown of number of interviews and group discussions conducted is presented in Table 3 below:

Table 3: Breakdown of key informants by category and group discussions

Stakeholder group	No. of interviewees/ Groups		Remarks
	Male	Female	
DG ECHO staff	6	3	DG ECHO Brussels-based staff: 3
DG ECHO partners	48	14	
Government of Afghanistan	7	1	
Donors & others	5	2	
Beneficiary interviews	10	2	
Group discussions with 'affected communities' in Kabul province, Herat, Balkh and Kandahar	10	9	Group size varied from 6 participants to 23, with a total of 218 participants (130 Male, 76 Female in 18 groups, and 1 children's group of 12).

A full list of key documents studied by the ET is provided in Annex 5. In total 54 major documents (published and unpublished), over 150 Fichops and Single Forms (SF), besides a number of web resources were consulted.

1.3.3. Validity of evaluation results

Rigorous data triangulation was undertaken to validate data gathered during the course of the evaluation. This was done mainly through comparing information gathered through multiple sources and methods. Where discrepancies occurred that could not be resolved, the ET did not use such data for drawing conclusions or lessons and recommendations. All data from the desk review, interview notes, group discussions and site observations, including outliers, were examined by two members of the evaluation team independently to check for their: (a) representativeness – do the data/information represent the whole or a sizeable picture? (b) relevance – to the questions in the ToR; and (c) attributability – if the data convey a 'state', is it attributable to the intervention/cause being described? The team mapped (Annex 6) all evidence emerging from the desk review, KIIs, field observations (wherever feasible) and community interviews and assessed the strength of evidence on each evaluation question using the following scoring system:

- 4 - Very strong convergence of data from all sources (desk review, interviews, observations & communities)

- 3 - Strong convergence of data from all sources (desk review, interviews, observations & communities)
- 2 – Reasonable convergence of data from all sources (desk review, interviews, observations & communities)
- 1 – Weak convergence of data from all sources (desk review, interviews, observations & communities) – ET unable to establish any finding.

As can be seen in the evidence map (Annex 6), for nine (9) of the evaluation questions, the evidence supporting results of this evaluation are strong or very strong, in terms of convergence of data from different evaluation methods and sources. In the case of two evaluation questions (EQ) – EQ4 on nexus and EQ6 on EU added value – the strength of evidence was moderate and could be called satisfactory. On nexus, while DG ECHO grants to partners and related reports do not show any significant initiative as DG ECHO's limited funds address short-term needs only, substantial evidence emerged during key informant interviews of DG ECHO's role in ongoing discussions on nexus. Evidence on EU added value came only from a number of donor and DG ECHO staff interviews.

The process and methodology for the Afghanistan part and NRC part of the combined evaluation were kept distinct as both were based on different sets of evaluation questions, criteria and stakeholders' involvement. The ET however ensured that there was a similar approach taken in both the evaluation exercises insofar as methodological rigour and triangulation of findings were concerned. This separation between the two parts of the evaluation proved right, especially for data collection in Afghanistan as conflating the two would have caused confusion among the different set of stakeholders, as well as posing a methodological challenge.

The evaluation methodology based on interviews with key informants, secondary data from documents, discussions with communities and visits to a sample of communities and project locations provided a robust evidence base for the evaluation. The method of triangulation and analysis used by the ET based on collating and comparing evidence from all methods and sources was found to be necessary and sufficient for this evaluation.

1.3.4. Evaluation principles and ethics

The ET was guided by the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid,[27] European Union evaluation guidelines, as well as internationally recognised ethical practices[28] and codes of conduct for evaluators, particularly in humanitarian and conflict situations. The evaluation also used the Sphere Handbook and Standards for Monitoring and Evaluation,[29] and the Ethical Research Involving Children.[30] As a large portion of humanitarian programming in Afghanistan is protection related, the evaluation used a protection lens and scrupulous good practice principles around issues of access and ethics. All data gathering and reporting was governed by the 'do no harm' principle to avoid exposing people to any harm as a result of actions of the ET, ensuring conflict-sensitivity in planning, design and delivery of evaluation tasks. Primary data was only collected through processes that ensured that the victims of conflict, disaster and human rights abuses were not further traumatised, put at risk of retribution, or made to undergo discomfort. The following protocol was adhered to by the ET in all interactions with stakeholders:

- Informed consent - all participants gave their consent to participate in any activity related to the evaluation voluntarily;

[27] http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/media/publications/consensus_en.pdf

[28] OECD-DAC Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies (https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/2667294.pdf); ALNAP's Evaluation of Humanitarian Action Guide (http://www.alnap.org/resource/23592.aspx)

[29] http://www.sphereproject.org/silo/files/sphere-for-monitoring-and-evaluation.pdf

[30] http://childethics.com/

- Confidentiality – all discussions with stakeholders and data provided by individuals and groups are presented and shared on a non-attribution basis;
- Respect of rights – all those involved in any evaluation process or activity were duly informed of the purpose so that they participate freely and equitably;
- Respect dignity - interviews and data-gathering were conducted in a way that respects individuals' dignity;
- Ensure inclusivity – all voices were heard, ensuring respect to privacy and confidentiality.

The team attempted to ensure highest quality standards in terms of comprehensiveness (i.e. evaluation criteria); proportionality (i.e. tailoring the scope of the evaluation to the maturity of the intervention being assessed and data available); independence and objectivity (i.e. robustness and reliability of results); conducting of the evaluation without influence or pressure from any organisation; full autonomy of the team in conducting and reporting their findings; transparency of judgment (i.e. based on data available and previously agreed judgment criteria as per the evaluation matrix); and evidence-based (i.e. collected and triangulated from different sources, with clear limitations addressed).

1.3.5. Limitations

DG ECHO grants are made on an annual basis, though there may be some which are continuation from previous years. As is the case in short-term emergency projects, staff turnover is often very high, resulting in poor institutional memory. Except where good documentation exists, availability or credibility of data related to the response in earlier years was limited as valuable memories from previous grant years faded. So, most of the primary data gathered by the ET through site visits, observations and the bulk of interviews /discussions with partners and communities concentrated on activities that have been ongoing at the time of evaluation or took place during the past 1-2 years. The exceptions were that of work on health programmes (support to hospitals and physical rehabilitation centres) in which the same partners have been supported by DG ECHO in the same locations over a number of years, and ERM activities over the years. To make up for this gap, the evaluation used extensive secondary data available in DG ECHO project database for early years of the evaluation period (2014-2016, in particular), supplemented by KIIs with (former) DG ECHO/partner staff who were involved in DG ECHO-funded actions in early years.

This is an evaluation of DG ECHO's overall response, and not an evaluation of individual partners' responses, and hence all findings have been aggregated in the evaluation report, and direct reference to any particular partner performance has not been made, except in cases where there may be lessons and experiences that are generalisable and only if such data were available in public documents (published evaluation reports, briefing notes, research papers etc).

2. DG ECHO Afghanistan portfolio analysis

Overall, DG ECHO's share in total humanitarian funding through HRPs for Afghanistan during 2014-2018 has been in the order of about 10 per cent, with a peak of 15.5 per cent in 2016, as Table 4 below shows.

Table 4 DG ECHO allocations vs. HRP requirements, 2014-2018

Year	HRP request (US$ mn)	DG ECHO funding (€ mn)	DG ECHO allocation (US$ mn)	DG ECHO share in HRP (%)
2014	406.4	31.50	42.93	10.56
2015	416.7	40.17	44.13	10.59
2016	338.8	47.00	52.36	15.45
2017	409.4	29.50	33.0	8.06
2018	599.0	46.0[31]	53.05	8.86

(Sources: OCHA-FTS for HRP data, DG ECHO HOPE database, and Oanda for exchange rate)

DG ECHO's year-wise sectoral allocations during 2014-2018 is presented in Annex 7. Using the HRP requests for different years, the data shows (Table 5 below) that DG ECHO has consistently covered at least 16-30 per cent of all emergency healthcare needs in the country, and for the years 2017 and 2018, its contribution to multi-purpose cash response has been in the order of 46-51 per cent. Another sector where DG ECHO has been consistent in providing a sizeable response was WASH (9-15 per cent). In some years (2014, 2016 and 2017), DG ECHO has contributed significantly to overall protection needs in the country; however, during 2015 and 2018, the relative contribution was minimal. In shelter, in recent years, DG ECHO's contribution has been fairly small. It was noted in the ET's review of project documents that the way some of the project classifications are made under different sectors may mask the actual focus of the grant – for instance, shelter is sometimes found under protection and food security under multi-purpose cash. It is therefore difficult to draw any definitive conclusions on DG ECHO's share in meeting the overall humanitarian needs in the country by different sectors, except in the health and WASH sector where the data seemed to follow a pattern.

Table 5: DG ECHO contribution vis–a-vis overall HRP, 2014-2018 (US$ million)

Sector	2014		2015		2016		2017		2018	
	HRP request	ECHO spend	HRP needs	ECHO spend	HRP needs	ECHO spend	HRP needs	ECHO spend	HRP needs	ECHO spend
Food security	149	3.7	92	6.0	110.2	10.5	135.5	0	90.6	10.5
		2.5%		6.5%		9.5%				11.6%
Health	43.6	11.3	38.8	11.8	39.6	9.7	52.5	8.5	41.6	11.5
		26%		30.4%		24.5%		16.2%		27.6%

[31] Actual allocations made as of 4 April, 2019 (HOPE database) was €49.6 million which includes an additional funding of €2 mn through ALERT mechanism for the floods in 2018 and an allocation of €1.6 mn from 2019 HIP.

Multi-sector/cash	58.0	NA	NA	NA	36.8	NA	36.8	17.1 46.5%	37.1	19.0 51.3%
WASH	16.5	2.3 13.9%	25.3	3.2 12.6%	20.5	2.4 11.7%	20.5	1.8 8.8%	23.5	3.5 14.8%
Shelter/NFI	28.7	8.2 28.6%	40.0	3.1 7.7%	53.7	2.6 4.8%	38.1	0	53	2.3 4.4%
Protection	30.7	8.8 28.7%	40	1.8 4.5%	42	7.7 18.3%	42	5.8 13.8%	66.5	2.3 3.5%
Coordination & support	NA	6.2	11.5	1.6	NA	1.8	NA	1.1	NA	2.2
Logistics	20.2	NA	17	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Nutrition	47.9	NA	78	NA	63.2	NA	66.5	NA	55.7	NA
Others	NA	NA	62.8	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	29.7 (EiE)	NA
Total (US$)[32]	**406**	**42.9**	**405**	**44.1**	**393**	**52.3**	**550**	**33**	**430**	**53.05**

(Sources: HRP data from HRPs on OCHA website, and DG ECHO data from project list for 2014-2018;[33] Exchange rate from Oanda.com)

The project list (Annex 7) shows 99 contracts (this is also seen in Figure 2 below) with 27 partners during the period 2014-2018,[34] with the number of contracts signed annually varying from 17-23 (Table 6 below). Of the 27 partners, at least 17 have had multiple contracts and 10 had one-off contracts during the five years which this evaluation covers.

Table 6: No of partners, 2014-2018

Year	Partners	Contracts
2018	20	23
2017	19	20
2016	16	21
2015	15	17
2014	15	18
TOTAL	27	99

[32] The column total may not add up as for comparing like for like, only the available relevant sector data for both HRPs and DG ECHO have been shown in this Table. For instance, as DG ECHO does not support nutrition, the DG ECHO spend column does not show figures on nutrition. For detailed sectoral allocation made by DG ECHO, please refer to Annex 7.

[33] DG ECHO data is up-to-date as of 4 April 2019.

[34] As of 04 April 2019.

Figure 2: No. of contracts during 2014-2018

Table 6 above shows the number of partners in different years. Of the 27 partners, 20 were NGOs and 7 UN agencies and international organisations. As shown in Table 7 below, the NGOS received €114mn (63% of grants) and the UN & international organisations receivedf €68mn (37 % of grants)

Table 7: Typology of partners receiving DG ECHO grants (€)

Typology	Number of Partners	Total	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
NGO	20	114,143,780	13,450,000	15,535,000	26,098,779	20,265,191	38,794,810
IO	1	24,779,000	5,000,000	8,000,000	1,700,000	4,000,000	6,079,000
UN	6	42,977,726	12,150,000	14,995,726	6,134,000	4,980,000	4,718,000
	€	181,900,506	30,602,014	38,532,741	33,934,795	29,247,208	49,591,810[35]

Source: DG ECHO Project List 2014-2018, HOPE database

Of the 17 partners receiving multiple contracts, there were four (4) large recipients[36] who received nearly €91mn during the evaluation period, with an average grant size of €3.5-5 million per year for each of these agencies. These outliers apart, the overall frequency distribution of project sizes in the small (less than €300,000), medium (€300,000 to a million) and large (over a million Euros) categories is shown in Table 8 below. In the large category of projects (53 nos., above €1mn), there were five (5) very large allocations in the range of €5mn-€7.75mn, while there were 16 in the range of €3-5mn, and the rest below €3mn. Over the period of evaluation, the proportion of funding to UN agencies compared to NGOs has declined (from nearly 40 per cent of total grants in 2014 to about 9-18 per cent during 2016-2018).

Table 8: Distribution of projects by contracted amount (€)/ financial year

Year	Small (<300,000)	Medium (300,000 – 1,000,000)	Large (> 1,000,000)
2014	0	10	8
2015	0	9	11
2016	0	13	11
2017	3	3	8
2018	0	8	15
Total	3	43	53

(Source: DG ECHO Project list for Afghanistan, HOPE database)

[35] The total exceeds the initial HIP amount of EUR 46 million, as some of the 2018 contracts were topped up with 2019 funds, and HOPE database does not enable disentangling this.

[36] International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), NRC, Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

Figure 3: Distribution of projects by size



DG ECHO puts out assessment rounds for funding under each HIP. Partners submit proposals in response to these calls which are then assessed by DG ECHO staff in the country office (CO), regional office (RO) and the headquarters. During the period of 2014 to 2018, the average number of days between proposal and contracting by DG ECHO to partner projects in Afghanistan was 111. The shortest timeline of the process was 8 days in 2016 (Agreement number ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91033). The longest timeline was 261 days (Agreement number ECHO/CHD/BUD/2015/91009). Figure 4 below illustrates this.

Figure 4: Processing time for grant approval

Table 9 below shows the sector allocation of funds in Afghanistan. Emergency health action (25%) constitutes the largest share of DG ECHO spending, followed by multi-purpose cash (17%), food security (14%) and protection (12%). Combined these 4 sectors comprise two-thirds of all spending over the period of the evaluation.

Table 9: Sectoral allocations made during 2014-2018

Sector	Amount (€)	Per cent of total allocation (%)
Health	45,252,175	24.87
Disaster risk reduction/disaster preparedness	4,275,689	2.36
Coordination	8,076,588	4.43
Food security	26,628,874	14.64
Child protection	500,000	0.28
Education in Emergencies (EIE)	2,531,825	1.39
Mines action	216,709	0.12
Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance (MPCA)	31,705,977	17.42
Nutrition	2,566,923	1.43
Protection	22,215,264	12.21
Shelter & settlements	13,283,684	7.30
Support to Operations	13,205,955	7.27
WASH	11,440,844	6.29
Total	**181,900,506**	**100**

(Source: DG ECHO Project list, HOPE database, as of 4 April 2019)

3. Evaluation findings

3.1. Relevance

EQ1: To what extent did the design and implementation of EU-funded actions take into account the needs of the most vulnerable population in Afghanistan, in particular women, children, elderly and disabled people? To what extent were beneficiaries consulted in the design and implementation of DG ECHO-funded projects?

Key findings:

- DG ECHO and partners use multiple methods and joint needs assessments to identify the vulnerable and gaps; however, the evaluation found weak evidence of beneficiary consultation, participation of women and incorporating age and disability factors in response.
- Data sharing on needs assessment is weak in general in the Afghanistan humanitarian system and OCHA is now working out protocols in this regard.
- As part of accountability to affected population (AAP), the complaints mechanism was weak for most of the evaluation period, though this is now being strengthened by DG ECHO

3.1.1. Needs assessment

Tools and processes

Participation in and use of joint needs assessments coordinated by OCHA were common among partners of ERM which is DG ECHO's key programming instrument for delivery of emergency response for the conflict-affected areas in Afghanistan and has been in existence since 2011.[37] KII with partners in all regions visited by the ET and documents (FichOps) research indicated that needs assessments often involved multiple agencies, including the Directorate of Refugees and Repatriation (DoRR), OCHA and World Food Programme (WFP), and sometimes could be very "crowded" with a large number of

[37] DG ECHO (2017). ERM — Emergency Response Mechanism Common Rationale 7, Afghanistan—2017 (revision 2 October 2017)

participants. During the drought response in 2018, OCHA coordinated needs assessments in Herat and Badghis. Beneficiary selection was based on the Household Emergency Assessment Tool (HEAT)[38] which is now used by all agencies in joint assessments. Though the standard HEAT tool has 100 questions, this was compressed to 20 in order to suit the 2018 emergency context. The duration of household assessment depended on the size and type of caseloads, varying from one day (2018 drought) to several weeks. The HEAT assessment is usually followed by a rapid market analysis to ensure that the cash assistance (by DG ECHO) provided will be usable in a functioning and accessible market.

The joint needs assessment does not follow a standard procedure and is designed by partners each time it is undertaken, partly because the procedure requires negotiation with local authorities, coordinated by OCHA. Key informants (KIs) described that the process normally involved 5 partners, sometimes with one partner taking the lead in collecting data (with others as observers), sometimes one partner would use the HEAT tool while others used their own questionnaire, and on other occasions partners divided up the area and collected data independently which then were shared at the end. This leads to a situation where households are asked multiple times the same or slightly different questions by different NGOs. ERM partners have been very vocal in advocating for a change to the current procedure, recognising that it not only costs time and efficiency but may impinge upon humanitarian space and dignity of beneficiaries.

There is supposed to be at least one female staff member in assessment teams to ensure that information was collected from female-headed households, girls and women. That this rarely happens in practice was observed in DG ECHO monitoring missions, but no actions were taken.[39] It may be that it is not always possible to have female staff on assessment teams, or for female members to access women, without the explicit authorisation by the *Shuras* which are composed of men only. Interviews with female beneficiaries (drought response 2018) in Herat and Mazar showed that there was no inquiry during needs' assessment of specific needs of women as most often needs assessments were carried out with the head of the family (primarily men) and elders. Though needs assessment processes may not have included women, interviews with women beneficiary groups confirmed that non-food items provided by ERM partners did take care of specific needs of women (sanitary napkins, underwear, separate toilets for women, etc). Women also reported that water distribution points were located close to their homes, as otherwise they had to travel some distances to fetch water.

In addition to HEAT assessments, DG ECHO partners utilised data from secondary sources such as Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) and Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP),[40] findings from post-distribution monitoring (PDM) and information from other humanitarian actors, including reports and analysis from OCHA and United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) on IDPs and returnees. Overall, the needs assessments were well structured, and most acute humanitarian needs of the affected population were taken into consideration.[41] The DG ECHO monitoring missions considered the overall needs assessment to be of good quality, demonstrating sound justification for the proposed action, as evidenced in their observations in a number of project follow up documents.

[38] HEAT, originally developed by ERM partners, was adopted by HCT in 2016 for joint needs assessments

[39] As noted in a DG ECHO project follow up document.

[40] DACAAR (2016). HAA--Humanitarian Aid Actions Final Evaluation Report, Afghanistan. (Date of submission: 28/07/2016)

[41] DG ECHO (2018). ERM — Emergency Response Mechanism Interim Report, Afghanistan—2018 (date of final comment 22/12/2018)

Needs assessment during the drought of 2018 proved problematic. First, partners and DG ECHO (and the Government and humanitarian community in general) failed to recognise the early warnings of the impending drought that started to flow from about late 2017. Several FichOps noted the delay in drought response; partner and DG ECHO staff interviews in Herat and Kabul confirmed that initially there was reluctance to respond as ERM was geared more for responding to conflict and rapid onset disasters, such as floods. One partner-NGO in Badghis warned of displacement in February 2018, but this was ignored. By March, there was an influx of drought IDPs in Herat. Over a dozen KIs stated that the Government was initially opposed to any service delivery to the drought IDPs due to the fear of pulling more people into the cities in search of assistance. DG ECHO awaited the OCHA response strategy that was drafted at the end of June and launched its response (blanket cash distribution) in July-August, at the request of OCHA. DG ECHO states that part of the reason for the delay lay in the fact that until it was fully established that the drought crisis had moved into a phase 4 level of International Food Security Phase Classification (IPC),[42] it was difficult to justify use of emergency funds for any response.

> In both Kandahar and Balkh, interviews with partners and communities showed that though the 2018 drought affected these regions as well, the humanitarian response was concentrated mostly in Herat and Qala-e-Naw (Badghis). Site visits and community discussions in IDP settlements in these regions indicated that a very minimalist response was launched by a few organisations (including those supported by DG ECHO) in late summer of 2018, and as IDPs kept moving into towns (Kandahar and Mazar) even as late as December 2018, the humanitarian system failed to respond adequately to the growing needs.

KIs from most of the non-ERM partner agencies, external agencies (not funded by DG ECHO), as well as a few ERM partners complained that **partners do not share their needs assessment data with other agencies or the cluster,** something ERM partners recognise, but justify on the ground that cluster leadership is weak across the board. Data sharing protocols between humanitarian agencies are currently being discussed (led by OCHA). Many of the clusters are co-led by government agencies, which means that sharing beneficiary-specific data with clusters, in a conflict situation, is problematic. As ERM partners are usually the first on the scene, they may be asked to lead the interagency assessment, working with OCHA and DoRR. ERM partners collect the data using KoBo toolbox[43] and use this for analysis. However, the assessment reports that ERM partners bring out only focuses on the ERM caseload, and does not provide any data on the needs/gaps other agencies need to meet.[44]

Targeting

Screening of beneficiaries and ensuring that the most vulnerable are targeted is a recurring problem in all humanitarian actions. In Herat and Qal-e-naw, as soon as needs assessments were conducted during the 2018 drought, more families arrived and the numbers swelled, according to all KIs who were directly involved in the response. It was often impossible to know whether new arrivals were from the drought-affected areas or were arriving for other reasons such as conflict or were simply local people living in conditions of great hardship who considered their own needs on a par with those of outsiders.

ERM partners have raised doubts from time to time about the effectiveness of the ERM criteria in targeting the most vulnerable, as these criteria and method of selection are moderated by negotiations with local authorities which may sometimes lead to high exclusion and inclusion errors, for example: (a) those too poor to come to the capital find it hard to get vetted by the DoRR which is required to assess each

[42] The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is a set of standardised tools that aims at providing a "common currency" for classifying the severity and magnitude of food insecurity. The IPC-Acute scale categorises the severity of acute food insecurity into Five Phases: Phase 1 – minimal; Phase 2 – stress; Phase 3 – crisis; Phase 4 – emergency; and Phase 5 – famine.

[43] KoBo Toolbox is an open source software which has tools for field data collection, on and offline, for use in challenging environments. This software has become popular with humanitarian organisations.

[44] The ERM focus is on verification and beneficiary selection, using the HEAT) – the HEAT data is not systematically analysed or used in order to identify other needs, but this doesn't mean the data is not there.

petition[45] from the affected families; (b) influence of local officials which often result in inclusion of 'undeserving' cases through favouritism or rent-seeking behaviour of officials; (c) existence of the petitions system which can discriminate against claimants by delaying the process of vetting, thereby failing some of the most-vulnerable people in fulfilling ERM eligibility criteria (displaced in the previous 3 months). Several partners state that differentiating between real and fake IDPs and status-based (conflict-affected or flood/drought affected, etc) assistance is not appropriate for the IDP context. This issue also means that **beneficiary selection and registration often takes longer than planned, largely due to delays in the petitions system of the Government**, as ERM partners carry out household assessments after DoRR provides them a vetted list. Several PDMs and DG ECHO monitoring visits raised concerns about the interference of DoRR and local authorities in selection of beneficiaries in the past. The humanitarian community engaged with the government to move away from the petition system. It is understood that now the Government has agreed with HC/OCHA to develop a new SOP recognising a community-based alert system as entry point for the identification of IDPs, alongside the petition system that has a wider function.

Document review and interviews showed patchy evidence of disaggregated data on beneficiaries during needs assessment, as well as in targeting. **Most DG ECHO partners appear to do well on gender-disaggregation, but incorporation of age and disability factors in assessments were not seen**, except in case of a handful of partners who specialise in disability.

3.1.2. Beneficiary consultation

DG ECHO supported humanitarian actions are designed to respond to the humanitarian needs arising from conflict and natural disasters, the location of which cannot be predicted; the target groups cannot therefore be consulted in advance of the action. KIs state that despite this, **there is scope for facilitating greater participation of people during the responses implementation.** ERM actions engaged beneficiaries in implementation to the extent that feedback was collected from beneficiaries of earlier ERM cycles through beneficiary feedback drawn from assessments, PDM and discussions conducted during field visits. The PDM tool includes a section on satisfaction with the service/cash transfers received. Beyond this limited engagement, ERM partner staff consider beneficiary consultation or participation unrealistic as '*beneficiaries tend to lie'*, a common refrain that was heard in several interviews during the evaluation. For this reason, a significant number of actions (just under half) are judged by DG ECHO (as evidenced in project follow-up documents) to have 'not sufficiently' involved 'gender and age groups' in the 'design, implementation and evaluation of the action'. Community interviews by the ET showed a common pattern in that partner staff visit the communities mostly during needs assessment and when aid distributions are made; examples of any follow-up visits or consultations with communities were rare (except two organisations in Herat and Kabul). A third visit may be undertaken (mostly by ERM partners) during PDMs.

The issue of lack of effective complaints mechanism came up in several DG ECHO monitoring missions during the period 2014-mid-2018. Although beneficiaries had issues and complaints regarding the overall delivery of humanitarian assistance (targeting/access to petition system/no assistance/quality of assistance), no complaint was registered, noted one project follow up document. The ET's discussions with communities in different regions indicated that, a few exceptions apart, organisations did not actively

Community interviews and group discussions in Herat, Balkh, Kandahar and Kabul showed different patterns in terms of communities' awareness and use of any complaints mechanisms. In Herat and Kabul, there was awareness about complaints procedure, but that wasn't the case in other 2 regions. However, in all regions, there was reluctance to file complaints for fear of losing future aid and not knowing what their entitlement was and where to lodge a complaint. "*We are in need and whatever assistance we receive, it is welcome".*

[45] In Afghanistan, the first step in identifying recently arrived IDPs is through a petition system. Households submit a petition to the local Directorate of Refugees and Repatriation (DoRR). The DoRR does an initial check of the legitimacy of claims and organises a 'screening meeting' with OCHA and NGOs active in the area.

seek out complaints, nor did beneficiaries attempt to complain. The lack of information and access to the petition resulted in some IDP households not receiving assistance as the DoRR offices were late in assessing their applications in time. A DG ECHO monitoring mission noted in 2018 that the *Awaaz* hotline was being insufficiently promoted to field staff and therefore to beneficiaries. Beneficiaries did not know who to lodge a complaint with.

During 2018, some positive actions were taken in this regard to take complaints mechanism seriously. DG ECHO (with UNHCR, WFP and AHF) supported UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) to set up the *Awaaz* which is a toll-free hotline through which people can approach a 24-hour call centre to lodge any complaint about humanitarian response in general or specific to any particular agency. Launched in May 2018, the hotline has received over 57,000 complaints as of end of April 2019.[46] The complaints are forwarded to either OCHA or to specific agencies, depending on the nature of the complaint, and each complainant then received feedback within a specified period of time. KIs with all NGO partners confirmed that they have some form of hotline which is monitored in their regional and country offices, with systematic record of feedback provided to the complainants. KIs indicate that over three-quarters of complaints relate to exclusion in beneficiary list or non-provision of adequate quantities of assistance. Beneficiaries can communicate their complaints and needs with a trained male or female agent in one of the main local languages. Call handlers are also trained in psychosocial counselling.

The *Awaaz* data is also being used to gain preliminary information on needs in particular areas. As the popularity of the hotline increases, the large volume of data provides a basis for in-depth analysis of the pattern of needs or to identify gaps in humanitarian response. UNOPS has started to produce periodic reports with detailed aggregate analysis which are then shared with the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and OCHA.

EQ 2: To what extent was a clear and context-adapted strategy designed and applied in Afghanistan? To what extent were DG ECHO and its partners successful in adapting and adjusting their approach and in addressing gaps as the needs evolved over time?

Key findings:

- DG ECHO's grant-funded humanitarian actions attempt to address acute vulnerabilities and DG ECHO uses its grant making flexibly to ensure that response adapts to emergency needs as they emerge or change in the on-going humanitarian crises in the country.
- DG ECHO and its partners have focussed their actions in areas where humanitarian needs have been either neglected or inadequately met by other providers (mobile health teams, mental health), though education in emergencies remains a neglected area in the humanitarian response.
- While ERM in the past has concentrated on IDP response in urban areas, in response to the changing context, DG ECHO partners have been gradually increasing their footprint in rural areas to provide assistance in the places of origin of IDPs, especially in AOG areas where

3.1.3. Adapting to the context

All partners interviewed affirmed that DG ECHO's funding is highly flexible, when situations change. DG ECHO allowed partners to use ERM funds which were meant to address needs of conflict/flood-affected IDPs to launch a rapid response for the drought-affected during 2018, once DG ECHO decided (*See* section 3.1.1) that drought merited a significant response. The desk review found good evidence of the use of Modification Requests (MR) to reassign, increase or decrease funds within projects as needs emerged and changed. This allowed for adjusting the scale of response and assistance provided by DG ECHO partners, depending on the response of other humanitarian providers, to ensure that assistance

[46] Awaaz Afghanistan (2019). https://awaazaf.org

is optimally provided. If, for instance a non-DG ECHO agency provided food or NFI, ERM partners reduced the beneficiaries' entitlement through the cash assistance by an equivalent amount, thereby allowing them to cover a larger number of beneficiaries. Given the large number of people to deal with, the needs assessment was conducted using a simplified version of the HEAT methodology, as discussed in section 3.1.1. Where needs were obvious – in particular water and sanitation – no detailed questions were asked and an urgent response could be mounted without them.

DG ECHO staff's willingness to travel to all regions and projects give them a first-hand understanding of the humanitarian context and challenges which DG ECHO is able to bring to bear in conversations with other donors, UN and the government at national level. Nearly two-thirds of the partner staff interviewed during this evaluation opined that DG ECHO's flexibility comes from the fact that all the Technical Assistants (TA) and other field staff come from strong NGO and humanitarian backgrounds and understand operational challenges that encourage frank and honest conversation between partners and the donor. First-hand knowledge and understanding of the context, complemented with knowledge and needs assessments by partners, allows DG ECHO to allow grant amendments to focus on the most pressing and unmet needs, through the pre-positioning of supplies and partners' existing capacity (ERM).

DG ECHO's response is context-specific, depending on the ability of its partners to access communities affected by conflict and disasters. As ERM responds to displacement, it is largely concentrated in urban areas displaced people usually head to. ERM is now improving alerts mechanisms to ensure areas outside provincial capitals (where people have easier access to the petition system) are also sufficiently covered. During the 2018 drought, DG ECHO supported several partners outside the ERM in the north, as well as in Ghor and Nimroz provinces, assisting families in their villages to get back on their feet by providing cash, water and seed distribution activities. Partners keep a low profile and employ local staff who try to access the area through communities, mosques, elders and District Development Committees (DDC). The mobile health teams, in particular, provide a good entry point to gain acceptance in high-risk areas. One partner, for example, offered internships to 20 people from high risk areas in Kandahar Province with the expectation that this would facilitate access to these areas and beyond in the medium term. These approaches are fully in line with DG ECHO's 'access strategy' that aims to increase access to remote and high-risk areas (mostly those contested by AOGs) by promoting humanitarian principles. As mentioned before, with government-controlled areas shrinking, humanitarian organisations need to find ways to increase their access to AOG areas where most of the vulnerable population are located.

3.1.4. Addressing specific needs

There is evidence that DG ECHO and its partners have been able to focus their actions in areas where humanitarian needs have been either neglected or inadequately met by other providers. The largest share of DG ECHO Afghanistan's portfolio is in life-saving health services (trauma care) in some of the most conflict-affected and hard-to-reach areas. During the period of the evaluation, DG ECHO has consistently allocated the largest share of its spending on meeting this critical need. The 'white areas' controlled by Taliban do not generally have access to health services provided by the Government, and DG ECHO partners are able to access these areas through mobile health teams and first-aid treatment posts in conflict-affected areas. During 2018, DG ECHO has established a new partnership with an NGO specialising in trauma care and health services including in the white areas. Another organisation targeted the needs of the undocumented returnees from Iran who otherwise could not access any services within Afghanistan and in 2018 focused on the issues of trafficking in women and children

One entirely new area of humanitarian response in Afghanistan has been the focus on psycho-social support and mental health issues. Interviews with health authorities in Kabul and provinces suggest that DG ECHO and three of its partners have taken the lead in this regard, and in the words of one of the KIs, 'mental health needs affect so many people who have been in Taliban and conflict areas or (have been) just living with tension for years, but we have no capacity to support them'. Beneficiaries, both men and

women, in two settlements in Herat reported that the psychosocial intervention had drastically reduced violence amongst them, including domestic violence. However, they expressed dissatisfaction that in cases of referrals, medical costs have to be borne by them, though transportation expenses are borne by one DG ECHO partner. In a discussion with boys and girls in a school in Herat, children expressed how awareness sessions about land mines and remnants of weapons helped them learn about safety when they go back to their villages; psychosocial support was also provided to children to cope with stress of living in IDP settlement environments.

One area where humanitarian response as a whole, including DG ECHO has failed to respond is: education in emergencies (EiE). In 12 settlements visited in Herat, Kandahar and Balkh, only three IDP settlements reported to have access to basic education for their children, organised within the settlement by the beneficiaries themselves, with small support from a couple of NGOs (DG ECHO partners, though these activities were not funded by DG ECHO). Instructors were literate volunteer men or women from the settlement. In one settlement, where it was possible to have a discussion with children (boys and girls), beneficiaries reported that they had never before attended schools in their place of origin. The NGO supported this 'school' to mainly teach them Dari in preparation for their potential integration in the province of Herat, which is primarily Dari speaking. Furthermore, classes provided them sessions on hygiene (i.e. instructions on usage of soap, toothpaste and hygiene packages for girls) as well as psychosocial support and activities to relieve stress. They were also receiving mine awareness education. The ET also observed a water tank and toilet allocated specifically for students of this class. This example aside, there was no sign of provision of education by either the government or other NGOs. Though EiE is a priority area for DG ECHO globally, during the five year period covered by this evaluation, with a small country budget, DG ECHO could make grants to only 3 NGOs, totalling € 2.53 million.

Most beneficiaries in 14 group discussions in Herat and Balkh expressed concern about the future of their children's education. This was particularly the concern of those beneficiaries whose children used to attend schools in their places of origin. The National IDP Policy recognises IDP's Right to Education (section 7.1.8) based on the country's Constitution (Article 43) and Education for All Initiative (EFA). As per the IDP policy, the Ministry of Education (MoE) is tasked to ensure IDP children have full access to education, with an emphasis on girls' access and those with disabilities. In practice, however, this was nowhere to be found. Overall, it is the observation of the ET that IDP children's education has at no point been a serious consideration by either the government, or the NGO partners and donor communities.

3.2. Coherence

EQ3: To what extent was DG ECHO's response in Afghanistan aligned with: (a) DG ECHO's mandate as per the Humanitarian Aid Regulation; (b) The European Consensus on humanitarian aid; (c) The humanitarian principles; and (d) DG ECHO's relevant thematic/ sector policies?

Key findings:

- Good evidence to show that DG ECHO Afghanistan humanitarian actions are fully aligned with DG ECHO mandate and thematic policies.
- DG ECHO's humanitarian actions operate at two levels – ***funding*** to projects for specific activities, and ***non-funding actions*** in the form of lobbying, advocacy and thought leadership that are not tied to any direct project actions.
- Through its non-funding actions, DG ECHO has been making significant contributions to longer-term issues of disaster risk reduction and resilience.
- DG ECHO is seen as a strong advocate of humanitarian principles, and its contribution to strengthening humanitarian system and operationalising principles in actions is acknowledged by all stakeholders.

3.2.1. Alignment with mandate and thematic sector policies

The HIPs which are issued by DG ECHO on an annual basis define the expected humanitarian

response in the country, and are all based on Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 (HAR) and the Consensus.[47] Desk review of all FichOps for the period 2014-2018 confirms that all humanitarian actions adhere to the principal HAR Regulation, which requires EU humanitarian assistance, relief and protection operations to save and preserve life in humanitarian crises or their immediate aftermath, but also actions aimed at facilitating or obtaining access to people in need and the free flow of assistance. DG ECHO actions have also been addressing psychological suffering of conflict-affected people since 2016, in line with Clause (a) of HAR. All sectoral programming is guided by DG ECHO's thematic policies. Protection is fundamental to all humanitarian response. DG ECHO's protection policy in particular is wide-ranging and includes actions which fall under different thematic areas. The principal objective is to prevent, reduce/mitigate and respond to the risks and consequences of violence, coercion, deliberate deprivation and abuse for persons, groups and communities. Some of the key elements of the policy include actions that are directly about saving and preserving lives and human dignity: documentation, status and protection of individuals; prevention of and response to violence (including gender-based violence, GBV); child protection; housing, land and property rights; mine action; community-based protection and durable solutions (return, local integration and resettlement).

> ECHO is very vocal on protection and conflict issues which it brings in discussions on donor strategies " – *a senior staff of an international humanitarian organisation*

At the inception stage, the ET developed an overarching theory of change (ToC) showing the causal pathway (Figure 1) of DG ECHO interventions, based on desk review of documents, namely: HIPs, DG ECHO Global strategy, HAR and thematic sectoral policies. An interesting finding from the field visits was that DG ECHO's humanitarian actions operate at two levels – ***funding*** to projects for specific activities, and ***non-funding actions*** in the form of lobbying, advocacy and thought leadership that are not tied to any direct project actions. During the past 3-4 years, as conflict has escalated in Afghanistan, DG ECHO's grant-funded actions have tended to focus on short-term response (meeting acute needs, access to basic services and protection outputs as in the ToC) to acute crises. This is only pragmatic, given the increasing humanitarian need on the one hand, and the relatively small size of DG ECHO's country budget, on the other. However**, through its non-funding actions, DG ECHO has been making significant contributions to longer-term issues of recovery, risk reduction and resilience, issues that were not obvious from project documents and DG ECHO database.**

3.2.2. Humanitarian principles

Partners acknowledge DG ECHO's steadfast commitment to ensuring humanitarian principles are adhered to in all actions. The petitions system of the government has been a major contributing factor in delaying humanitarian response, besides often inviting undue political /parochial influence in beneficiary selection process which vitiates the environment for providing response in line with fundamental principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality. Working with OCHA, DG ECHO has been pushing hard on this issue and the government is now more understanding of the limitations of the petitions policy in humanitarian response. It was reported at the time of drafting this report that discussions with the Government have led to the latter agreeing to put in place an alternative system

[47] European Consensus on the Humanitarian Aid (2008). Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 (HAR) requires that EU humanitarian aid is used, amongst others: (a) to save and preserve life during emergencies and their immediate aftermath; (b) to provide the necessary assistance and relief to people affected by longer-lasting crises, especially where their own governments prove unable to help or there is a vacuum of power; (c) to help finance the transport of aid and efforts to ensure that it is accessible to those for whom it is intended, and by protecting humanitarian goods and personnel, but excluding operations with defence implications; (d) to cope with the consequences of population movements (refugees, displaced people and returnees); (e) to ensure preparedness for risks of natural disasters or comparable exceptional circumstances and use a suitable rapid early-warning and intervention system;

which ensures that humanitarian response is not vitiated by procedural delays attributed to the petitions system. Strong evidence emerged during KIIs with donors and UN agencies of DG ECHO's advocacy and lobbying with the Government, UN and donors on principled humanitarian assistance and the need for development aid to focus on chronic poverty and vulnerability.

Promoting humanitarian principles and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is one of the fundamental requirements in all response, and especially so in a conflict-ridden country such as Afghanistan. One partner's protection work in particular has been key to promoting IHL (working with religious scholars, armed forces and police, AOGs) across the country, with both state and non-state actors, in line with EU policies.[48]

At a practical level, **several partners mentioned DG ECHO staff's contribution to operationalising humanitarian principles in relief distribution and interactions with the community**. In the past, some of the partner staff, not being fully conversant with humanitarian principles in action, conducted the majority of distributions at DoRR or government offices; there were instances of government officials pressing organisations to organise distributions in their premises. These instances compromised a principled humanitarian response. Interactions with DG ECHO technical staff who undertake regular visits to the field have brought about a deeper understanding of the humanitarian principles among partner staff and the practice of operating out of government offices during distribution of aid is now discouraged.

As discussed in section 3.1.3, DG ECHO and its partners' ability to access some of the most conflict-affected communities in the country is shrinking, as active conflict intensifies in areas contested by AOGs. This, combined with the fact that funding in the country has been declining steadily, does challenge the principle of *humanity* which enjoins that human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. In light of the current context, which is unlikely to change in near future, where an increasing number of conflict affected communities may be located in contested hard-to-reach areas, DG ECHO and its partners need to explore how they work with local and national NGOs who might have greater access to some areas. In this regard, it may be useful to draw lessons from the experience of AHF, which has progressively increased its funding to national NGOs to about 19% in 2017.[49] This will be coherent with the localisation agenda which is one of the Grand Bargain commitments. **Though localisation in an active conflict context is not an easy agenda to take forward, the desk review and KIIs show the need for a stronger emphasis in this regard.**

At a global level, DG ECHO's contribution to actively influence the global humanitarian system is acknowledged. As the Comprehensive Evaluation[50] noted, the EU pursued its advocacy and policy objectives through several channels, namely: the Transformative Agenda, World Humanitarian Summit and Grand Bargain; leading/supporting role in key policies like Education in Emergencies, cash based assistance and protection. DG ECHO leadership role in the global system has resulted in development of more effective humanitarian aid approaches; for example, DG ECHO's insistence on multi-purpose cash has changed the delivery of humanitarian aid in certain contexts and sectors.[51] In Afghanistan, DG ECHO's multi-purpose cash assistance (MPCA) provided through the ERM is the largest cash programme in humanitarian response for IDPs. In 2017, ERM partners were responsible for 80% of cash distributed in country.[52] In 2018, the value of DG ECHO's MPCA was €16.4 million – almost a third of DG ECHO's overall allocation during the year.

[48] DG ECHO project document

[49] OCHA Afghanistan website

[50] ICF, DG-ECHO (2018). Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016, Final report

[51] ICF, DG-ECHO (2018). Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016 Final report

[52] OCHA (2018). Humanitarian Response Plan 2018, December update.

EQ4: In the context of the nexus and humanitarian-development coordination instruments, what measures were taken by DG ECHO to coordinate the EU's humanitarian and development actions, and how successful were these measures?

Key findings:

- At the country level, though there is informal coordination between senior staff of DG ECHO and DG DEVCO, there is no formal institutional mechanism to promote dialogue or a joined up approach between EU's humanitarian and development arms.
- In Afghanistan, DG ECHO has been playing a pre-eminent role in the current discourse on resilience and nexus, and it has been a vocal advocate on the need to manage the development and humanitarian interface in the country better.

3.2.3. Humanitarian development linkage

While humanitarian aid is crucial in the aftermath of an emergency, it is only development cooperation that can offer long-term solutions to structural problems to improve the living conditions of the most vulnerable people, increase their resilience and thereby shrink humanitarian needs over the long-term.[53] Elements of nexus[54] thinking have been incorporated in DG ECHO programming. The Single Form asks about exit strategy, which can be a proxy indicator for nexus thinking. Some partners utilise ERM data to identify the most vulnerable conflict-affected communities, in particular IDPs, in order to establish longer-term protection and livelihood activities for sustainable support. Some of the health related actions, such as support to Physical Rehabilitation Centres (PRC), early warning for disease outbreak and building local health officials' capacity, are contributing to disaster preparedness and risk reduction. These actions have been supported over a long period of time; however, most of the ERM actions are short-term, one-off and do not leave enough time and space to make any meaningful intervention on DRR.

ECHO supported humanitarian actions have by and large been focused on short-term interventions of a life-saving nature. While this is justified on the grounds that the limited life-saving funds need to go towards addressing acute life-saving needs, it does raise the question as to how DG ECHO and its partners work in tandem with development counterparts (like DG DEVCO) and others to link short-term relief response with needs in a protracted crisis. This was brought to the fore during the drought of 2018. Documents reveal that by and large, the ERM response failed to meet the food consumption score (FCS) indicator, because many beneficiaries did not have acceptable FCS before the shock, and so DG ECHO support, even if it brought them back to their pre-shock consumption levels, did not help them achieve an acceptable FCS. Interviews with partners and communities, including field visits to settlements did not provide strong evidence of specific target groups under DG ECHO assistance being moved on to recovery or longer-term assistance to address continuing vulnerability. A few partners claimed that they have funds from other sources which will be used in the coming months to address this issue. Field visit observations attest that in some settlements, a few development agencies provided long-term support to humanitarian aid beneficiaries. However, these instances were exceptions. As the sectoral allocations for the period 2014-2018 show (Table 9, Section 2), only about 2.36 per cent of total spend has gone into DRR/disaster preparedness. A review of project documents showed that of the 11 actions supported on DRR during the period 2014-2018, just two were judged to have supported long-term strategies to reduce humanitarian needs, underlying vulnerability and risks. DG ECHO's position with regard to making grants on DRR or resilience has been based on a pragmatic and realistic assessment of the fact that DG ECHO's small annual country budget needs to first go into life-saving

[53] Grand Bargain Factsheet https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/grand-bargain_en

[54] The EU attaches great importance to the link between humanitarian aid, as a rapid response measure in crisis situations, and more medium and long-term development action. The humanitarian-development nexus is complex and requires increased coordination – leading to joint humanitarian-development approaches and collaborative implementation, monitoring and progress tracking.

interventions in the country where needs are growing and funds are steadily declining. An additional factor that has influenced DG ECHO to downplay the resilience agenda in its funding activities has been that the absence of an overall pro-poor development and governance strategy in the country runs the risk of negating any investment made in risk reduction and resilience, if experience of the past (nearly) two decades is anything to go by. An argument the ET is sympathetic to – this is one reason why DIPECHO funding was not requested for Afghanistan in the past four years.

KIIs brought into sharp focus a failure of development assistance in the country over the past decades to address chronic vulnerability and basic needs of a large majority of the population which, in times of any shock or stress (drought of 2018 and conflict, for instance), accentuates humanitarian needs. This creates a perpetual cycle where humanitarian assistance has to deal with a continual flow of caseloads in need of protection and life-saving assistance. A classic manifestation of this phenomenon was seen, for instance, in the humanitarian response to the record number of undocumented Afghans (805,877) who returned to the country in 2018. Though they were provided short-term assistance, wherever necessary, six months after their return, 70 per cent of them remain food-insecure and 94 per cent had no secure means of livelihood, with half the returnees expressing desire (in a survey conducted by IOM) to return to the host country, if the opportunity arose.[55] Many of them also joined the queue for the drought affected seeking further assistance during the response. Moving forward, development agencies, including DG DEVCO, need to plan for the protracted crisis to continue, with increasing number of IDPs moving to and settling in urban areas, further stretching the capacity of local authorities to provide basic services

From a DRR perspective, the effectiveness of actions executed under ERM was limited – understandably so, as the purpose of ERM is to respond to immediate emergency needs. Even though data gathered through needs assessment can (and according to DG ECHO, should) be used for planning longer-term interventions, the actions only last as long as the funds allow. The reports show successful completion of targeted activities, but how these activities (DRR in textbooks, school curriculum, mainstreaming DRR) relate to the causal pathway in the theory of change and how these were tracked is not clear. Several project documents state that whenever possible, partners aim to link their humanitarian programming with development projects to provide continuity of assistance and early recovery. Partner interviews included questions about how they promoted linkage between their short-term humanitarian response and longer-term work and nexus, though not necessarily supported with DG ECHO funds. Several partners have funding from other sources and anecdotal evidence suggests that some partners are able to link beneficiaries with other sources of assistance, though evidence is too thin to conclude that this is done systematically and to scale. The ET found strong evidence from community interviews and field visits of the drought-IDPs continuing to live in ‘emergency’ situations for months, even after receiving the limited assistance for a period.

The most challenging concern is water in the IDP camps in drought-affected regions where people are dependent on water tankering. As emergency funds run out while IDPs will still remain in settlements, the issue of durable solutions becomes important. Community interviews show that the chances of return of the drought affected IDPs from Badghis in Herat and Kandahar is remote, owing to recent floods in these areas. People from Badghis have lived with chronic conflict for decades and, now that they have experienced relative peace and alternative, or better, livelihood opportunities in the city, are likely to stay. Of the 12 settlements visited in Herat and Balkh, only one settlement in Herat seemed to have undertaken some exit measures, which was supported by longer-term solutions, such as digging water wells. Some beneficiaries had purchased a small piece of land from a private landlord for AFN 30,000 on which they set up their tent. Small kiosks were set up inside the settlement, with one owner reported to have borrowed AFN 8,000 from a friend to invest. In another settlement in Mazar, the ET visited beneficiaries with various duration of stay (1 month to 18 months). A few who had been there long enough reported to

[55] Briefing note, IOM.

have bought a plot of land, and with the assistance of a few development organisations, built a basic one- or two-bedroom shelter.

Limited funds and an overall lack of development in Afghanistan make durable solution challenging for any humanitarian organisation. Globally, DG ECHO has three current priorities related to nexus: invest in durable solutions for refugees and IDPs; increase social protection systems; and promote multi-hazard risk and vulnerability analysis, and multi-year planning. Related to multi-hazard risk and vulnerability analysis and multi-year planning, the intention is for DG ECHO and DG for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) to explore options for collaboration towards shared objectives. **DG ECHO has been playing a pre-eminent role in the current discourse on resilience and nexus** which has gained traction since the drought of 2018. The multiple overlapping shocks and stresses – conflict, drought, floods and cross-border migration - that affect Afghan communities, brought home the lesson that development and humanitarian actions cannot be delinked from each other and ways must be found to better address acute and chronic vulnerabilities that mediate all disasters. The cluster-led humanitarian response has been largely de-linked from development programmes and resources, in the same way all development programming in the country has been bereft of understanding of disaster/conflict related vulnerability. In collaboration with DFID, DG ECHO commissioned a study to look into the feasibility of a social protection mechanism that was recently finalised. The study has involved UN agencies, World Bank as well as the Government of Afghanistan, and is looking into social assistance that can address chronic, seasonal and acute (in response to shocks and stresses) vulnerabilities. Its findings are to be partially operationalised under a pilot project with WFP in 2019.

DG ECHO and DG DEVCO have also engaged in strategic dialogue with the World Bank on a number of priority nexus initiatives. DG ECHO is developing its work on the triple nexus through a dedicated section at the headquarters level which works closely with DG DEVCO. It has a pilot project looking at linkages in six countries. The global study will look at how to change ways of working so that the root causes of a crisis are considered from the beginning of the crisis and the approach can be consistent with nexus thinking. **At the country level, though there is coordination between DG ECHO and DG DEVCO staff at personal level, there is no formal institutional mechanism to promote dialogue or a joined up approach between EU's humanitarian and development arms**, according to KIs. This is perhaps an institution-wide issue, as the Comprehensive Evaluation had also found that there was "*limited coordination between DG ECHO and DG DEVCO at field and headquarter (HQ) level in the evaluation period. […] The piloting of the humanitarian-development nexus in different contexts should further improve the coherence between DG ECHO and DG DEVCO activities but this still needs to be operationalised*".

When ECHO speaks, agencies listen" – *one external key informant*

EQ5: To what extent was DG ECHO successful in coordinating its response with that of other donors, including EU Member States, and avoiding overlaps and promoting synergies

Key findings:

- Good evidence of DG ECHO's coordination with Member States and its inputs are highly valued by Member State donors present in the country.
- ECHO is a member of various senior level humanitarian forums in the country where its voice has been critical in shaping debates and humanitarian response, far beyond the volume of its funds.

3.2.4. Coordination with other donors

Interviews indicated good evidence of coordination with Member States and showed that DG ECHO's inputs are highly valued by all Member States present in country. As no other humanitarian donor has the kind of access DG ECHO has, others rely on the latter for in-depth understanding of the context that helps them develop their own assistance strategies. As one KI put it, *"we rely on ECHO as a 'coordinator' interacting with all agencies and government to ensure that all actions are rooted in ground realities"*. DG ECHO Head of Office takes the lead in convening regular meetings of humanitarian donors and is considered unofficially the chair of the forum. Besides championing principled humanitarian action, DG ECHO leads donors' advocacy and lobbying with the Government, World Bank, UN and government on humanitarian issues. Having an independent identity, separate from the delegation and firewalled from political and security agenda that most other donors are encumbered by, helps DG ECHO bring an independent voice to policy tables, according to one donor. Most donors funding humanitarian action in Afghanistan (US, Canada, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Germany, Sweden, UK, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and Denmark) directly fund NGOs from their own country or channel funds through the Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund. Many EU member states invest significantly in Afghanistan, the majority of the funding going through the World Bank managed ARTF, and the remainder to NGO and UN supported development programming, and DG ECHO has regular interactions with them to explore areas where there could be greater synergy between development and humanitarian action.

DG ECHO's regular coordination with key humanitarian donors as well as its active support to the humanitarian clusters ensures that its own assistance is harmonised with others and there is no overlap or duplication. DG ECHO is an observer member[56] of the AHF Advisory Group, though it does not channel its funds through the AHF. Several KIs from the UN and donors averred that DG ECHO's funding is not big, but its voice carries a weight which everybody listen to, *'though not everyone may be in full agreement',* as one KI put it.

3.2.5. Advocacy on humanitarian principles and access

DG ECHO is a member of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) where it plays a highly active and vocal role (other humanitarian donors on the HCT are the UK and the USA). In Afghanistan, humanitarian architecture has been problematic for many years. With an integrated mission in the country, the mandate of Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), Resident Coordinator (RC) and United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) overlap and they are often seen in competition with each other, with humanitarian principles often subverted by political pressures emanating from the Mission. Following the failure of the UN-led humanitarian coordination system to mobilise an appropriate and timely response to the severe drought of 2018, DG ECHO and other humanitarian donors (SIDA, DFID and USAID) led a discussion on state of the humanitarian system in Afghanistan, and lobbied the UN to undertake a peer-to-peer review, involving donors and UN system, of the humanitarian architecture in Afghanistan – the review was completed while the evaluation mission was in country and report was pending at the time of the evaluation.

DG ECHO is part of the Humanitarian Access Group (HAG) facilitated by OCHA. The HAG, which has members from the UN and NGOs, monitors and analyses access and security issues in hard-to-reach areas, and provides inputs to the HC, if high-level advocacy is required with parties to the conflict. **KIs who are part of this group affirmed that DG ECHO's inputs grounded on first-hand knowledge and information in this enriches deliberations in the forum.** At a practical level, DG ECHO also lobbies the government authorities on taxes and import duties that affect NGO operations, especially duties on medicines.[57] One of the partners informed the ET that whenever they meet with Ministers of the

[56] OFDA also has a similar status in AHF.

[57] DG ECHO does not allow local procurement of medicines for safety and quality issues.

Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA), they try to do it jointly with the DG ECHO Head of Office as participation of the latter gives weight to the conversations.

3.3. EU added value

EQ6: What was the EU added value in DG ECHO's actions in the country during the evaluation period?

Key finding:

- The EU is recognised by all as the most significant humanitarian actor and DG ECHO's independence from foreign policy, political and security agenda of any government earns it enormous respect which opens doors for dialogue with various parties.

As discussed above, the EU's leadership on humanitarian system in Afghanistan is widely acknowledged by all external stakeholders, for its distinctive contribution on several fronts, namely: ERM, cash-based assistance, principled humanitarian assistance, and most notably, its understanding of the complex situation on the ground. DG ECHO's knowledge and insights about vulnerabilities facing conflict and disaster affected communities across the country gained through its unique ability to travel to most provinces in a country where other donors (and some humanitarian agencies) remain '*bunkerised*' within the precincts of their secured offices are valued by all. DG ECHO's independence from foreign policy, political and security agenda of any government earns it enormous respect which opens doors for dialogue with various parties. The EU is recognised by all as the most significant donor – despite its funds being relatively small in comparison with other large donors - pushing for a principled and needs-based approach. Some of the other European humanitarian donors take inputs from DG ECHO in planning their operations. Partner KIs suggest that as the EU is a collective body and is not beholden to any single government, or its foreign policy, the Afghan government and other stakeholders perceive of it being more 'neutral' than several other governments who, because of a difficult history of conflating development/humanitarian, security and military agenda, are seen in a different light. EU added value also arises from the fact that DG DEVCO is a significant player on the country's development scene which gives DG ECHO's voice on humanitarian and nexus issues greater credence and weight.

3.4. Efficiency

EQ7: To what extent has DG ECHO achieved cost-effectiveness in its response? What factors have affected the cost-effectiveness and to what extent? To what extent have ECHO-funded actions been efficient and cost-effective? What internal and external factors have affected the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of DG ECHO portfolio in the country?

Key findings:

- Across the organisation there was no systematic or standardised consideration of cost-effectiveness, based on quantitative indicators.
- DG ECHO staff do review all actions it supports through a cost lens to assess cost-efficiency.
- MPCA has ensured faster delivery of response.
- The ERM makes administrative savings through common formats, good partner co-ordination and coverage and consistent standards through use of standardised needs assessments, without putting an undue co-ordination burden on partners. It could therefore be described as technically efficient.
- The ERM did not always provide a timely response due to delays endemic in the petition system.
- Although ERM may still enable relatively faster response, compared with many other large agencies, it could not be judged efficient by the cost and timeliness criterion, rigorously applied.
- As needs assessment data is not shared among agencies, there are errors of inclusion/ exclusion and double counting in cash programmes.

3.4.1. Efficiency and cost-effectiveness in DG ECHO actions

In line with the HIP emphasis on integrated approaches, and as set out in the mandatory requirement for Afghanistan proposals introduced in 2017, the ERM intends to *enhance efficiency through joint and co-operative ways of working.* Since 2017, there is an obligation for partners to show in their proposals (Single Forms) the percentage of support costs, which allows for comparison of proposals from different partners. Besides this, the project document format does not require partners or DG ECHO officers to assess projects for efficiency or cost-effectiveness either at the proposal stage, monitoring, or at the final report stage. There is no systematic assessment available from project reporting to answer the question: '*To what extent has DG ECHO achieved cost-effectiveness in its response?*' when this question is asked at the level of the projects. Desk review by the ET showed that **efficiency is referred to in very broad terms in project proposals and reports**, as Box 1 shows.

Box 1: Examples of references to efficiency extracted from project documents

- References made to ERM partners coordinating their geographic coverage under the ERM to make the combined response efficient (8 instances in ERM project documents, out of 21 selected for desktop study).
- References to efficiency gains from joint procurement by ERM partners (2 instances).
- In one specific case, a partner cited use of Emergency Response Teams based in regional hubs to deliver assistance as the most efficient way of operating (2 instances).
- Among the 21 ERM project documents reviewed, there is just one substantive remark about efficiency, made at the proposal stage of a 2015 project which notes that ERM was very expensive, and arguably not very cost-efficient due to high staff costs (over 40%).

The ET reviewed DG ECHO Afghanistan dashboards for 2014-2018 for evidence of considerations of efficiency and cost-effectiveness in DG ECHO fund allocation decisions. The dashboard provides DG ECHO officers with a format in which to assess partner proposals against a set of compliance markers together with a narrative analysis of the partner's proposal that considers the quality of the partner's

needs assessment, appropriateness of the proposed response and the capabilities and comparative advantages of the proposer. Weighing all these factors, the Regional Office, Head Office (HO) and Technical Assistants make judgements as to whether, and to what extent, the proposal should be funded. There is no requirement to assess projects for efficiency or cost-effectiveness. The Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA) Guidelines, after listing the mandatory assessment criteria, state: "*Depending on the characteristics of the crisis, other elements could be taken into account when assessing proposals as follows: … "*. The FPA then lists six considerations of which the last is 'cost-efficiency; or comparative advantage of action or the partners.'[58]

Across the organisation there was no systematic or standardised consideration of cost-effectiveness, based on quantitative indicators, in project documentation.[59] The global study on cost-effectiveness (ADE study)[60] noted that at a corporate level, DG ECHO lacks the capacity to appraise, monitor and evaluate cost-efficiency of its interventions. KIIs with DG ECHO and partners confirm that cost-effectiveness in a protracted conflict and high-insecurity context is a complex construct that is difficult to capture in any rigid measure or parameter. In some responses, partners may be able to take advantage of economies of scale, but in others – for instance, when responding to small number of caseloads in remote, hard-to-reach areas – the logistics and staff costs may be disproportionately high, making comparisons or benchmarking difficult. The high cost of operation in hard-to-reach areas was also found in the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) partnership evaluation which was undertaken by the ET simultaneously with this evaluation. An example of unavoidable high costs of an action comes from the WASH response during 2018 drought in Herat. Conventionally, most of the conflict response during the past has been in the north of the country, and that's where WASH supplies were rightly stockpiled. However, in 2018, these supplies had to be shifted to the west which made it expensive, with high transportation costs (and security/escorted convoy) in the country.

DG ECHO has encouraged and implemented joint procurement facility for NFIs. As an example, in ERM 2017, with 8 ERM partners, DG ECHO tasked one of the main partners with joint procurement facility, with the aim of reducing cost and increasing quality. It also ensured consistency and standardisation. There was a framework agreement with the suppliers (approved by other ERM partners) who were mainly local suppliers, except tents which were imported. The entire process of procurement took 3 months. Although cross-partner cost comparisons are difficult, a detailed analysis of the first round of 2018 dashboard yields more efficiency-related commentary, showing that DG **ECHO staff do review all actions it supports through a cost lens**, as the following examples show:

- A WASH proposal's overheads are said to be too high (Partner I) at 20%.
- Partner J cost per beneficiary is said to be 'reasonable' (no benchmark is referenced);
- Partner K is the most expensive cost per beneficiary of the ERM partners.
- Of the seven ERM partners, five are marked: 'Support costs need to be scrutinised'; the HO opinion of one of them is more emphatic: 'Heavy and expensive structure … beyond the needs of the ERM. These costs have to be significantly reduced.'
- Partner L is a monopoly provider of essential services whose high costs have to be accepted.

As discussed in section 3.1.3, ERM uniquely gives DG ECHO and partners capacity to provide ***flexible and predictable response***, as borne out in all interviews with partners, donors and UN agencies. The NRC partnership evaluation also found that the partners valued DG ECHO flexibility and willingness to experiment as a distinctive feature of the relationship. Pre-designated partners for each region,[61] pre-approved budget and harmonised process and assistance packages ensure a coordinated response. KIs

[58] FPA Guidelines (2014), Section 7.1 Eligibility and Assessment Criteria, pages 39-40.

[59] ICF, DG-ECHO (2018). Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016 Final report

[60] ADE (2016). Evaluation Of The Use Of Different Transfer Modalities In ECHO Humanitarian Aid Actions 2011-2014, January 2016

[61] A handful of areas are covered by more than one ERM partner, partially due to the large caseload, notably in Herat and Badghis.

confirmed that when a decision was taken to launch a response in Herat following the 2018 drought, DG ECHO told partners to start the response immediately utilising ERM's conflict response funds, and DG ECHO would top up later. "*Everything was happening in parallel and quickly*", according to one KI.

Additionally, **provision of cash makes response delivery faster as it saves time on procurement and logistical arrangements**. KIIs with ERM partners indicate that while they can deliver cash within 3-7 days of needs assessment, provision of food/NFI requires procurement, storage and transport which takes anything between 6-8 weeks even for relatively small caseloads. Then the procured materials need to be packed for individual households which take another 5-7 days. ERM 2017 data provided by DG ECHO show that once an emergency is notified (DoRR), assessment is carried out within 8 days and distribution commences by 11th day. Although this is still below the standard set under ERM common rationale, it is faster than the time most other agencies take to launch a response. During the drought, though delayed, DG ECHO partners were the first to provide blanket cash distribution to IDPs[62] in Herat.

> In 9 settlements the ET visited in Herat and Balkh, beneficiaries reported an average of 4 months before they received MPCA or any other assistance. According to field data, the average time between shock and petition submission to DoRR is 2 months, and the average time between petitions and distribution is another 2 months. This means the average time between shock and distribution is 4 months.

The review of ERM in late 2017 noted that ERM partners commit to providing the standard cash response (or other types of response where needed) within five days of the assessment, but this rarely happens. In reality, the average time between a shock and the assessment is 49 days, and the average time between the assessment and distribution of assistance is 14 days.[63] **The petition system and the reliance of the ERM on co-operation with DoRR was an obstacle to timely, principled response**. Substantial errors of both inclusion and exclusion are endemic in the petition system as discussed above under 'Targeting' (Section 3.1.1) and 'Humanitarian Principles' (Section 3.2.2). The average 49-day delay between shock and notification is attributable to the shortcomings in the petition system; the subsequent average 14 days delay in assistance is in part attributable to the need to try to clean up the lists. Several KIs judged the ERM to be 'not very efficient' for these reasons. DG ECHO and partners are working to address this issue in the ERM 2019, especially with new emphasis on working in AOG areas or in the places of origin of the IDPs.

Desk review showed that under the ERM, a budget ratio of 60% (excluding indirect costs) allocated to the direct assistance to beneficiaries was considered acceptable in the Afghanistan context. In some instances, the ratio was slightly lower (57%), but this was still judged to be satisfactory because of the considerable challenges partners faced. Constraints to efficiency include the costs of accurate targeting and dealing with fake beneficiary lists, recruiting staff with suitable level of experience (staff costs can account for 35% of an action), high security costs and procurement.

Partners claimed that their direct assistance to people is about 50 per cent, while the rest goes to implementing cost. During KIIs with partners, one partner had readily available data on its management and operating cost which it monitored regularly. The partner in question provided data showing the following breakdown of its DG ECHO supported operations:

- Direct project staff cost: 31%
- Direct support personnel cost: 3%
- Direct operating cost: 20%
- Direct project assistance to beneficiaries: 46%

Costs per unit of output or per beneficiary are a standard measure of efficiency in many aid operations. As the NRC partnership evaluation noted, this may not be a valid or relevant measure in many situations.

[62] There were agencies, including national NGOs and INGOs, which began responding earlier, but donor funding wasn't forthcoming to any significant scale until June-July.

[63] Review of Rapid/Emergency Response Mechanisms (ERM). INSPIRE Consortium, Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi), Overseas Development Institute (ODI). 2017

The cost incurred in preparedness or developing standby capacity, especially in fragile and insecure context may not be cost-efficient, but a much-needed approach for timely and effective response. Various studies cited in the 2018 DG ECHO Logistics evaluation[64] showed a positive correlation between investment in preparedness and return in terms of humanitarian outcomes. Any notion of efficiency that emphasises cost per beneficiary irrespective of context would risk going against humanitarian principles.

High cash acceptance and overall market functionality are two of the predominant factors in favour of an increased uptake of cash assistance in the country. For cash transfers, *hawalas*[65] are the preferred financial service provider for ERM partners. ERM partners use the *hawala* to transfer money from their main office to the area of distribution; cash is then passed on by the *hawala* operator to the NGO which in turn distributes these to beneficiaries as "cash in hand/envelope". This approach ensures that *hawala* operators do not have access to beneficiary lists. Other NGOs also use *hawalas* but are moving towards alternatives like mobile money and banks, though the challenge with the latter is that few IDPs and rural people use mobile, and bank penetration in Afghanistan does not go beyond district towns.[66] During the distribution, ERM partners reported having at least three people present: the *hawaladar*, the Project Manager, and a representative from the finance department of the partner organisation. The transfer cost itself (cost /commission of *hawala* or remitting agency), not counting the staff time going into planning and delivery of cash, is in the range of 1.5-2 per cent of the total cash delivered.

Going beyond individual organisations or projects, an issue that emerges in Afghanistan context is that of **errors of inclusion/exclusion and double counting in cash and in-kind programmes as data is not shared among agencies**, and beneficiary lists are not reconciled between organisations and between different intervention sites.[67] This allows some beneficiaries to play the system by making repeated claims moving from one site to another, or splitting their families and changing names of heads of household whereby each divided household is treated as independent household for the sake of receiving assistance. Mitigation measures include spot checks of 10% of beneficiaries to ensure the selected beneficiaries were truly eligible for assistance.

In terms of risks arising from cash distribution, KIs noted that misappropriation and embezzlement could occur at the level of agency staff and the FSP which handles physical cash distribution. However, separation of roles within the organisation for the entire cash operation and ensuring oversight of the FSPs during the actual distribution mitigates these risks.

As discussed earlier, **both MPCA and ERM, the two key tools and modalities DG ECHO uses in Afghanistan definitely ensure faster delivery of response**. Despite delays in the 2018 drought, DG ECHO's was one of the fastest responses when compared with other major donors. The petitions system does tend to undermine timeliness and quality of needs assessment, and this is something DG ECHO and partners are working to address in the ERM 2019, especially with new emphasis on working in AOG areas or in the places of origin of the IDPs.

One key aspect of the quality of DG ECHO's response is closely linked to the quality of beneficiary lists and needs assessments. KIs suggest that the quality of response overall would improve significantly with improvements related to these two tools. In terms of technical quality of interventions, there is continuous monitoring by partners, DG ECHO field staff and through PDMs, with active involvement of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) departments of all partners, besides periodic lessons learning workshop organised by DG ECHO on specific programme areas. The quality of some of the interventions seen by the ET during field visits (trauma care, NFIs distributed, WASH provisions) and as confirmed through beneficiary

[64] Landell Mills (2018). The Evaluation of Humanitarian Logistics in the European Union's Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, 2013-2017

[65] *Hawala* is a popular and informal value transfer system based on trust and involves a huge network of money brokers (known as *hawaladars*). Because money never crosses borders, either physically or through electronic transactions, handlers cut out the expensive international bank transfer fees.

[66] Key Aid Consulting (2019). Review of cash transfer modalities in Afghanistan, Final Report

[67] Key Aid Consulting (2019). Review of cash transfer modalities in Afghanistan, Final Report

interviews is good, though from beneficiaries' point of view, the problem is not of quality, but of quantity – DG ECHO response (ERM) is for 2 months only, while needs still exist.

3.4.2. Size of budget and proportionality

EQ 8: Was the size of the budget allocated by DG ECHO to Afghanistan appropriate and proportionate to the outcomes that were meant to be achieved?

Key findings:

- DG-ECHO has been consistently funding an average of 10 per cent of the entire HRP request and is amongst the top three humanitarian donors in the country, though one could argue the need for increased funding as humanitarian needs escalate due to ongoing crisis and development failure.
- At the level of budget allocations to projects, DG ECHO bases the size of its budgets on a costed assessment of the results to be achieved covering emergency needs of the affected population.

The HIP allocation (Table 2, section 1.2.3) is based on country/regional evaluation of needs combined with assessments drawn from the Index for Risk Management (INFORM) and the Forgotten Crisis Assessment (FCA).[68] In the absence of an Afghan state capable of providing basic services and protection to all its people, and continued conflict and climatic shocks, the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan has not improved over the evaluation period. DG ECHO's humanitarian actions constantly struggle to keep up with demand in a constrained funding environment. DG ECHO country staff therefore have to prioritise various actions and allocate budgets to specific humanitarian actions of partners.

The dashboard provides DG ECHO officers with a format in which to assess partner proposals against a set of compliance markers, together with a narrative analysis of partners' proposals. Central to DG ECHO analysis of partner proposals is an analysis of the proposed results areas. Often the funding DG ECHO offers is less than the amount requested by a partner, for which justification is provided in the dashboard. The key point here is that in the SF, all result areas are costed. It is therefore a relatively straightforward calculation to set a funding level that covers only the approved result areas. To a certain extent, this is what DG ECHO officers do when approving funding (though the link is not made explicit in the dashboard), the dashboard confirms that at the level of budget allocations to projects, DG ECHO bases the size of its budgets on a costed assessment of the results to be achieved.

In a country where humanitarian needs continue to escalate due to ongoing conflict as well as development failure, there remain huge unmet needs at any given time – 78.7 per cent and 81.3 per cent of the HRP was funded in 2018 and 2017 respectively. **As shown in Table 4 in section 2, DG-ECHO has been consistently funding about 10 per cent of the entire HRP request on an average and is amongst the top three humanitarian donors in the country.** Taking HRP request as a measure for humanitarian needs in the country in a year, this may be considered reasonable, for both the relative size and consistency over the years. However, the real test of proportionality also lies in being able to scale up in years of acute spikes in emergency caseload, for example, following the drought in 2018 which affected more than two-thirds of Afghanistan. DG ECHO did scale up, though its overall financial contribution remains far less than two other biggest humanitarian donors (Box 2). However, equally importantly, it was DG ECHO's advocacy and passionate articulation of humanitarian needs which all donors and government officials interviewed for the evaluation attested to as the latter's strength.

[68]For example: EC, 3.1.2018, Commission Implementing Decision financing humanitarian aid operational priorities from the 2018 general budget of the EU, plus Annex 1 and FPA Guidelines (2014), Section 5 Financing Decisions, pages 33/34.

Table 10 Humanitarian financing by top three donors in Afghanistan (Millions)

Year	USAID	UK	DG ECHO
2018	[69]€126.67mn	€74.3mn	€46.00mn
2017	€183.57mn	€38.81mn	€29.5mn

Source: USAID data from: www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/hart;www.usaid.gov/sites/default/documents/1866/afghanistan_ce_fs01_12_27_2017.pdf UK data from: www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-aid-to-provide-life-saving-assistance-to-hundreds-of-thousands-of-afghans-at-risk-from-severe-drought

[69] Exch. Rate used: www.oanda.com (as of 31 December of each year)

3.5. Effectiveness

EQ9: To what extent were DG ECHO's objectives (as defined in the HAR, the Consensus and the specific HIPs) achieved in Afghanistan, and the needs of the targeted end-beneficiaries satisfied? What concrete results were achieved during the evaluation period?

Key findings:

- Effectiveness of humanitarian interventions in Afghanistan must be viewed with the fact that most of the conflict/disaster affected are also victims of chronic poverty and vulnerability in mind. DG ECHO's *funded* actions are solely meant to address acute needs. However, DG ECHO's non-funded actions comprising advocacy, lobbying and the work on nexus, in partnership with DG DEVCO, World Bank and other organisations, are all geared towards enhancing the synergy between development and humanitarian actions, and thereby (i) increasing the effectiveness of the latter; and (ii) strengthening resilience of affected communities, the two key objectives in DG ECHO's Theory of Change.
- DG ECHO's evidence-based advocacy work positions it in Afghanistan as a key player, working with others in shaping the overall humanitarian system and its performance, as well as influencing development debates.
- DG ECHO's ERM is recognised by all stakeholders as one of a kind in Afghanistan, capable of delivering relatively fast and need-based response to the conflict IDPs, with nationwide coverage, though it had its limitations when responding to drought and dealing with a large number of IDPs in 2018.
- At the level of affected-communities, DG ECHO's life-saving and protection actions are helping target communities cope with immediate after-effects of conflict and disasters, before they are able to access more longer-term support and move towards recovery.
- There is strong evidence for DG ECHO supporting actions in trauma care, mental health, mobile health/first aid teams, provision of water, sanitation and hygiene education, and cash assistance when the communities are in desperate need are highly appreciated for their quality and coverage.
- WASH response: an adequate quantity of water is provided inside or close to the settlements; communities are aware of and knowledgeable about basics of personal and communal hygiene in settlements, acquired through hygiene promotion work of partners; there are weaknesses in terms of the response exploring innovative approaches and market-based solutions in sustainable provision of water.
- Cash response: while beneficiaries are satisfied with cash which gives them flexibility and dignity, cash is not always the preferred option/need, and in-kind support should not be undervalued in humanitarian response; complicated vulnerability assessments under ERM with differentiated levels of assistance for households caused confusion, anger and resentment among beneficiaries as the process/criteria for judging who was vulnerable or who was not was not always transparent and objective.
- ERM: as the government's petition system is the route to assistance, it often delays the response, and is subject to high exclusion errors; potential exclusion of eligible beneficiaries in non-Government controlled areas is also a challenge.
- Health response: mobile health teams in AOG areas, temporary First Aid Trauma Posts and support to provincial hospitals for communicable disease surveillance meet critical needs which otherwise remained neglected in humanitarian response; given DG ECHO's small budget, it needs a clearer strategy for its health actions, as running some of these services (Hospital, Physical Rehabilitation Centres, for example) involve long-term ongoing support. Exit strategies are now being developed, with one provider having established a time-bound strategy for handover of its PRC services to the Government.
- Coordination: DG ECHO's contribution helped strengthen OCHA's capacity in the regions.
- Protection: the sector has underperformed as the cluster lacks a coherent strategy. DG ECHO partners' performance on this score has also been weak. DG ECHO's limited shelter response was in the form of cash for rent for highly vulnerable families.
- Evidence base: There is a need for standardisation of data collection and training of partner staff in collating and analysing PDM and needs assessment data.

3.5.1. Protection and wellbeing of affected communities

DG ECHO's humanitarian actions in Afghanistan are meant to ensure need-based assistance to conflict and natural disasters affected populations. As discussed earlier in section 3.2.1 on ToC, **DG ECHO's actions need to be assessed in terms of both its direct *funded* actions and it's *enabling* actions, which may not necessarily have involved funding/grant-making.** Project documents and available evaluation reports provide a scattered picture of the effect of assistance provided through DG ECHO-funded humanitarian actions. Food security outcomes, for instance, show improvements for a short time period when beneficiaries are recipients of the assistance, but then may relapse into pre-assistance levels of vulnerability. Water trucking in IDP camps becomes essential but cannot be sustained when IDPs have nowhere else to go for a number of years. Similarly, durable solutions are not always found as the Government may not allow any permanent installations in 'temporary' settlements, while a continuous influx of new IDPs make settlements more or less permanent. **The challenge lies in the fact that most of the conflict/disaster affected are also victims of chronic poverty and vulnerability, while DG ECHO funds are solely meant to address acute needs.** Effectiveness of humanitarian interventions in Afghanistan therefore has to be seen in the context of the multiple crises and vulnerability that affect communities.

> Of the 9 settlements visited in Herat and Balkh, only 1 settlement in Herat seemed to have undertaken some longer-term measures, such as digging water wells; in a more recent settlement in Balkh, beneficiaries, as well as local partners, expressed grave concern over their access to water tanks, which after a certain period will be removed, without providing them with an alternative solution.

DG ECHO's non-funded actions comprising advocacy, lobbying and the work on nexus it has been leading, in partnership with DG DEVCO, World Bank and other organisations have been discussed earlier. These are all geared towards enhancing the synergy between development and humanitarian actions, thereby (i) increasing the effectiveness of the latter; and (ii) strengthening resilience of affected communities, two key objectives in DG ECHO's ToC. In the following paragraphs, some of the major funded actions are presented, with evidence of their contribution (or otherwise) to the wellbeing of conflict and disaster-affected communities in Afghanistan.

Emergency Response Mechanism (ERM)

The ERM standard assistance is intended to cover the needs of a family for two months to allow the immediate needs to be met. The most vulnerable within the affected population may be eligible for further ERM Protection Assistance through referral.[70] **The ERM enables its seven partners to pre-position capacities and supplies, as well as to maintain permanent staff to be able to conduct assessments and respond quickly, as part of preparedness.** Eligible beneficiaries are those directly affected by a shock (conflict or natural disaster) up to three months in the past. Documented returnees are not eligible as they receive a return grant from UNHCR – in exceptional cases, undocumented returnees can be assisted where life-saving assistance is required.

The common rationale requires partners to: (i) coordinate geographical coverage and response; (ii) leverage technical capacity and organise specific capacity building; (iii) manage mutual support, including logistics, access and human resources; and (iv) ensure protection principles are mainstreamed. From time to time, several partners have undertaken studies, lessons learning and evaluative exercises to assess the cash response through ERM in Afghanistan. Some of the key areas where it has contributed to the wellbeing of IDPs that are highlighted in the documents are:

i. One study following cash distribution in Herat[71] found that cash distribution had a clear impact on the establishment/expansion of small markets inside the IDP settlements. Most of the

[70] DG ECHO (2017). ERM — Emergency Response Mechanism Common Rationale 7, Afghanistan—2017 (revision 2 October 2017)
[71] NRC. Injil District (Herat Province) Cash for Food Summary Report

traders inside the settlements had set up their business after the cash distribution and were beneficiaries who had used part of the cash grant to start this business.[72]

ii. One PDM[73] found that the cash modality is nearly unanimously favoured over in-kind aid; almost all beneficiaries expressed their satisfaction with the cash assistance received.

iii. One PDM[74] found that 99% beneficiaries were satisfied with the assistance received and 81% achieved acceptable FCS.

One criticism of the ERM has been that it focuses on very short-term needs, for up to two months and is meant to cover emergency needs immediately after displacement, or a disaster. KIIs, community interviews and documents (PDMs) show that the majority of IDPs have no intention of returning home, nor do they have access to any reliable livelihoods. Hence the need to link emergency relief with longer-term support through non-ERM funding mechanisms, as discussed in section 3.2.4. A review of ERM documents highlighted several issues related to ERM's effectiveness, namely:

- Exclusion of eligible beneficiaries in non-Government controlled areas is 'the main challenge'.[75] This is a *quality* issue for MPCA and humanitarian assistance delivery in general. In this regard, DG ECHO intends to pilot mobile cash transfer to increase access.
- The petition system is the route to assistance, but it is subject to the politics of patronage.[76] This is also a *quality* issue leading potentially to both inclusion and exclusion errors. For people living in remote or unsafe areas, access to the petition system is limited or non-existent.
- The mean overall time from displacement to assistance is 36 days, and this is too long; the largest part of this delay is attributable to the petition system, a process that 'caused *delays*, usually of days to weeks, but, according to the assessment reports, occasionally up to five months.'[77] A smaller part is attributable to partner systems, specifically the time from assessment to distribution, which should be reduced.[78]
- The 3-months rule (must have been displaced in the last 3 months) often excludes a large number of vulnerable people from accessing ERM assistance as people don't always move, when displaced, to the town where assistance is available, and often the time taken to get through the petition system in an area which is new to the displaced IDPs may take them well beyond the three month time-frame.

On the whole, **ERM is recognised by all stakeholders as the only one of its kind in Afghanistan, capable of delivering coordinated and need-based response to the conflict IDPs, with nationwide coverage, though it had limitations when responding to drought and dealing with a large number of IDPs in 2018.** Continuous review of the ERM based on experience ensures that the partners continue to improve their operations and coverage. As discussed before, one of the issues that has undermined ERM's effectiveness has been that it is urban-centric, with a petition system that causes delays. It is understood (at the time of drafting the report) that the Government has reviewed the petition system and, working with the HC, is now considering ways to ensure that humanitarian response is not delayed by the petitions system.

Health

Globally, DG ECHO's health response is geared to limit excess preventable mortality, permanent disability, and disease associated with humanitarian crises.[79] In Afghanistan, support to programmes that

[72] During field visits, the only instance where the ET noted IDPs set up small businesses (shops and kiosks) inside their settlement was established with money borrowed from family and friends, and not with the cash they received as part of the ERM.
[73] DRC (2018). ERM7 PDM FINAL REPORT, July 2018
[74] DRC (2018). ERM7 PDM FINAL REPORT, July 2018
[75] Op cit, pages 50-51.
[76] Op cit, page 14
[77] Op cit, page 13
[78] Op cit, pages 17-19
[79] DG ECHO Thematic Policy Document: Health. General Guidelines, February 2014

restore or reinforce disrupted essential health services and provide additional services on a short-term basis constitute a top priority. DG ECHO's health policy also dictates that emergency health interventions should facilitate transition to development through engagement with various institutions. In Afghanistan, **the predominant emphasis of health response has been on strengthening the capacity of health facilities to provide treatment of conflict-induced trauma**, war wounded, reinforcing and equipping triage and management of mass casualty, as well as supporting training on life-saving medical care and psychosocial first aid. At the next level, DG ECHO supported actions include community level first aid care, mobile health teams in IDP areas and early warning system/preparedness for disease outbreak, in coordination with health partners. An important development in the evolution of the health response has been the focus on psychological first aid, which has been incorporated in a few health programmes undertaken by three partners in particular with specialist expertise in this area. Since 2016, psychosocial first aid has been included in the Health cluster priorities[80] of the HRPs. The focus has been on trauma care (establishment/coverage expansion of Trauma Unit) in the selected provincial hospitals and the temporary First Aid Trauma Posts (FATP) in high-risk areas, and a small component on control of disease outbreak.

Field visits to a number of health-related programmes supported by DG ECHO and interviews with beneficiaries/users in Kandahar and Kabul showed a high quality of work carried out by the partners – a fact appreciated by both beneficiaries and government officials. Partners focus on physical rehabilitation and psychosocial support for survivors of conventional weapons (CW) and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), besides working to create risk awareness among vulnerable people, especially children, exposed to the risks of death and injury from mines, IEDs and explosive remnants of war (ERW). In Kandahar, the Regional Hospital (which is one of the largest hospitals in the country) is managed and supported by one of the partners (partly with DG ECHO funding) and houses the only physical rehabilitation centre (PRC) in the area. In this, besides hospital-based PRCs, mobile teams are also deployed in some areas with high number incidents related to CW, IED and ERW.

> Community groups in Kandahar regarded the following actions as most beneficial for them to deal with future crises: artificial legs, permanent water solutions, toilets, psychosocial and physiotherapy services, and hygiene kits.

In an attempt to mainstream disability and psychosocial support in humanitarian response, one of the partners has been organising, through DG ECHO support, regular training and awareness sessions for NGO staff. The ET visited one such training session, which was well attended by NGOs, both international and national, and there were several who were not part of ERM or any DG ECHO funded programme, indicating that this was meant to benefit the entire humanitarian sector. DG ECHO also provides support for strengthening the health cluster. There is a mental health working group operating under the cluster and this is chaired by one of the DG ECHO-funded NGOs.

With increasingly large areas of territory coming under Armed Opposition Group (AOG) control – currently estimated at over half the geographical area in the country – almost 40 per cent[81] of the population now cannot access government health services (Basic Package in Health Services and Essential Package in Hospital Services). These 'white' areas controlled by Taliban and other AOGs are also the most conflict-affected, with the greatest number of large trauma cases and life-saving healthcare needs. In 2018, DG ECHO established a new partnership with an NGO which specialises in working in trauma care and health services in one of the most conflict affected provinces of the country. This NGO has been providing high quality treatment to war trauma cases in Helmand since 2004 (with funding from other sources), with a

[80] Première Urgence - Aide Médicale Internationale (2016). Advocacy paper on a pilot study of providing psychological First Aid (PFA) for war, conflict and disaster related trauma survivors in Kunar/Afghanistan, July 2016

[81] A report by the agency of the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, or Sigar, stated that the Afghan government controlled territory on which 63.5 per cent of its population lived in October 2018. (https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2019-01-30qr.pdf)

state of the art trauma hospital and seven FATP. Another NGO has also been working in Helmand, providing psychosocial support with DG ECHO funding.

One of the challenges of supporting high-quality healthcare (PRC, hospitals) has been that once established, it is very difficult to discontinue the services, especially when the Government takes it for granted that donors will continue to fund these facilities. DG ECHO has been supporting hospitals and PRC for the past several years and has been exploring the possibility of the health authorities (MoPH) gradually taking over the running of these centres to make them sustainable. However, progress in this regard has been slow, though DG ECHO still hopes that the Kandahar PRC can be handed over by the end of 2021. The handover process is slightly complicated by the fact that qualifications of the technical staff (nurses, physiotherapists) trained by these organisations are not formally recognised by the Government as the latter follows a different accreditation system for technical health staff. While the PRC handover process has made some progress (Box 3), discussions have only recently started with the government on integration of Kandahar hospital, which has been run by an organisation for over 25 years, partly funded by DG ECHO, and is one of the largest hospitals in the country providing high quality services. During 2019, DG ECHO's contribution is much reduced, though the organisation running the hospital will be able to make up the shortfall with its unearmarked funds. While the Government has been happy to let the organisation run the facility, the latter (and hospital staff) is also concerned that if handed over, the Government may not be able to run it to the high standard the organisation has set in health care.

Box 3: Handing over Kandahar PRC to MoPH

A PRC has been run by an NGO in Kandahar since 1996, targeting the war wounded. The PRC offers full range of services in trauma care and physical rehabilitation, involving physiotherapy, orthopaedics and prosthetics. With nearly 50 full time staff, this is the only facility in the region which receives cases from Kandahar, Helmand and Urugzan. The facility was funded by DG DEVCO until the end of 2014, and since March 2015, it has been funded by DG ECHO, as DG DEVCO moved most of its funding through the ARTF which funds the GoIRA's health programme. The PRC also has a 13-bed facility to accommodate people coming from remote areas.

Since March 2017, discussion began with the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) on integrating the PRC in the government health system and budget. A five-year (2017-2021) phased handover plan was agreed with the MoPH. The process has been accompanied by regular engagement between the NGO and MoPH on quality of services and standard of care. Quarterly meetings are held with MoPH Kabul to review the process and progress in integration. A steering committee comprising General Director of MoPH (Preventive Medicine), Director of Kandahar Hospital and the NGO Representatives monitors the progress in integration.

There is an annual workshop involving various stakeholders, including other service providers, is held to discuss lessons and challenges in integration of trauma care facilities in the country. The previous two workshops were convened by the NGO, and the one in 2019 is expected to be led by the MoPH, with support from the ICRC, which is the main expertise provider for disability programming in Afghanistan.

The phased integration process has involved the following so far:

* Since 2018, the MoPH is funding 20 per cent of supplies for the PRC;

* During 2019, the MoPH has allocated budget for 15 technical staff of PRC who will now move into government payroll; another 20 staff are expected to be brought into government payroll next year, with full takeover completed by 2021;

* The NGO has been investing time and resources in helping the MoPH develop standards in trauma care which is new for government health officials;

* As the GoIRA does not recognise the training provided by the NGO to its prosthetics and orthopaedic specialists, the latter is working towards upgrading the staff qualification so that they fulfil the government requirements.

The mobile health teams in AOG areas, temporary FATPs and support to provincial hospitals for communicable disease surveillance meet critical needs which otherwise remained neglected in humanitarian response. However, **given DG ECHO's small budget, it needs a clearer strategy for its health actions, as running some of these services (Hospital, PRC, for example) involve long-term ongoing support. Unless a clear exit strategy is set at the outset, getting into tertiary healthcare can be a never-ending programme which is difficult to exit from.**

MPCA

Increasing cash-transfer response in humanitarian programming is a core commitment of DG ECHO which co-leads with Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) the '*measuring cash*' priority action point of Grand Bargain (GB) cash commitments. Globally in 2017, cash transfers and vouchers made up over 38% of the European Commission's humanitarian aid, for a total of more than €990 million.[82] As was noted in DG ECHO's global study on transfer modalities,[83] cash transfers are generally considered more cost-efficient than either vouchers, in-kind transfers or the use of combined modalities. The EU developed a set of common principles for multi-purpose cash-based assistance[84] to guide donors and humanitarian partners on how best to work with multi-purpose assistance; the key among these were:

- Needs to be met across multiple sectors and provided to meet basic needs
- Multi-purpose assistance should be considered alongside other delivery modalities
- A combination of transfer modalities and delivery mechanisms may be required
- Detailed assessment of the capacity of markets and services to meet humanitarian needs must be carried out at the outset of a crisis
- A clear coordination and governance structure and streamline assessment, beneficiary registration, targeting and monitoring
- Linkages with national social protection systems need to be explored, whenever possible.

In Afghanistan, during 2018 approximately 1.1 million people received cash or vouchers totalling US$ 25.8 million (€22.6 mn)[85] in multipurpose, food, NFI and protection cash grants provided by 26 humanitarian organisations, according to data provided by Afghanistan cash working group.[86] Conflict and drought IDPs accounted for nearly 60 per cent of all cash distributed. Cash-based interventions in response to conflict IDPs and families affected by natural disasters have principally been led by the NGO partners of ERM, funded by DG ECHO.[87] During 2017 and 2018 alone, DG ECHO in Afghanistan provided €31.7 million to multi-purpose cash assistance (MPCA), implemented through ERM. Humanitarian actors in Afghanistan are committed to scaling up cash programming as an effective and flexible way to support people affected by emergencies, and donors such as DG ECHO, Office of Foreign Disasters Assistance (OFDA) and the Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund (AHF) have funded cash/voucher programming for several years.[88]

From the documents and KIs, it is clear that the MPCA programme in Afghanistan is modelled on the common principles mentioned earlier. The size of the cash grant (i.e. the transfer value) varied from one caseload to another (but was the same for all households within the same caseload, regardless of their

[82] https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/cash-transfers-and-vouchers_en (accessed 27 February 2019, 15:47GMT)

[83] Evaluation Of The Use Of Different Transfer Modalities In ECHO Humanitarian Aid Actions 2011-2014

[84] European Union (2015). 10 Common Principles For Multi-Purpose Cash-Based Assistance To Respond To Humanitarian Needs, March 2015

[85] The contribution of DG ECHO alone is €16.39 million for the year ending March 2019. The cash working group data cited however refers to data as of December 2018, while the data presented by ET in Annex 8 is up to the end of March 2019.

[86] Cash & Vouchers Working Group (2019). Overview Of 2018 Humanitarian Cash & Voucher Programmes Analysis Done by The Cash & Voucher Working Group (Cvwg) Based On Report Hub Data 31 January 2019 (https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/cvwg_2018_overview_of_cv_programs_in_afghanistan.pdf)

[87] OCHA. 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan

[88] OCHA. 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan

specific needs and household size, except for ERM 2018). The cash grant size for each caseload was based on a Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB),[89] taking into account the quantum of assistance received by a family from other sources (WFP food ration, other NGO distributions, etc.), as determined during the joint needs assessment (done through household HEAT assessment).[90] The SMEB is meant to ensure coverage of the totality of a household's basic needs for a period of 2 months for an average household size of 7. Currently it is AFN28,000 (€400) for 2 months.[91] According to the data, MPCA reached 285,461 beneficiaries during 2017 (*See* Table 10, presented later), at an average cost of €53.64 per beneficiary,[92] while during 2018, it reached 116,459 people at an average cost of €140.77. Reportedly, it was possible to reach nearly two and half times more beneficiaries through the cash programme in 2017 than in 2018 with similar level of investment, because of large-scale displacement during 2017.

During 2018, the cash component was adjusted for households depending on their combined scoring on the FCS, vulnerability and the support they would have obtained from other sources: some beneficiaries in the same settlement got half of the SMEB or even less, while other received a full package. A breakdown of the package is shown in Box 4, and the exact amount was adjusted for the FCS and other assistance received. For example, if a household was assessed as 'less vulnerable', it received only AFN17,000 or less, if assistance was received from other sources; a household with higher vulnerability received 2 months package (AFN 28,000), if no other assistance was received. Beneficiary interviews and KIs with partners in the field in all regions indicated that this caused confusion, anger and resentment among beneficiaries as **the process/criteria for judging who was vulnerable was complicated and was not seen to be transparent and objective.** It is understood that based on lessons from last year, ERM 2019 will do away with differentiated packages, ensuring that all targeted households receive the same package.

> "For us, water, toilets and tents were the most needed items, better than cash" *women's group, interviewed by ET*

Box 4: ERM 2019 package

Component	1st month (AFN)	2nd month (AFN)
Food	6,000	6,000
NFI /kitchen items	4,000	0
Shelter/WASH	2,000	1,000
Fuel	2,000	2,000
Healthcare support	2,000	2,000
Transportation	1,000	0
Total	**17,000**	**11,000**

A family receiving AFN28,000 was not entitled to any in-kind aid. Most beneficiaries interviewed in Herat received AFN7,500 per family, one tent and a sack of flour from an agency. Some received cash in three instalments: AFN6,000 in two instalments, followed by a third instalment of AFN4600. In one settlement in Balkh, partners had decided to provide only AFN 2000 per family, regardless of the family size, to maximise coverage in the face of an IDP surge.

[89] This includes the minimum food required to meet 2100 Kcal/day, the minimum NFIs, rent in Informal Settlements, minimum water supply required per month, health average expenditure and other essential services covering a period of 2 months.

[90] NRC (2017). Examining Protection Concerns in Emergency Cash Assistance To Internally Displaced People, Balkh Province (Afghanistan), April 2017

[91] DG ECHO (2017). ERM — Emergency Response Mechanism Common Rationale 7, Afghanistan—2017 (revision 2 October 2017)

[92] Beneficiary numbers have been divided by corresponding sectoral allocation for the year, as per Table 9

Partners noted during KIIs that **while cash gives beneficiaries flexibility (and dignity), sometimes in-kind support is also necessary.** A PDM found that the cash modality is nearly unanimously favoured over in-kind aid.[93] Beneficiary interviews, however, do not corroborate this. Of the 14 group discussions held in Herat and Balkh, beneficiaries in 7 groups expressed preference for non-cash items, especially, tents (4) and water (3). An external KI also confirmed these beneficiary views saying that often decisions on cash distribution is not based on the needs on the ground. An evaluation conducted by NRC notes that in a PDM conducted in 2017, it found 35 per cent of MPCA recipients still living in substandard shelters which were at best overcrowded and did not provide sufficient protection against the elements. The evaluation concluded that 22 per cent of its beneficiaries had not been able to recover despite having received cash and emergency shelter/NFI assistance.[94] NRC has now started to pilot shelter outcome-oriented solutions such as cash for rent. DG ECHO is also using this approach to respond to recent floods in different provinces. The dashboard of *Awaaz* Afghanistan website lists reported needs of displaced communities that show only a marginal preference for cash, as following: request for cash assistance (3034), request for shelter (2970), request for food assistance (2863) and request for basic services (3218).[95] Notwithstanding these findings from the field, the ET concurs with documentary evidence that almost all beneficiaries expressed their satisfaction with the cash assistance received.[96] As one beneficiary stated: "*when you are displaced and have lost everything, you appreciate if one gives you even 10AFN*."

Considering access constraints in Afghanistan, cash is deemed the fastest and safest mode of humanitarian delivery. However, as the overall humanitarian response was late during the drought of 2018, most (three-quarters) beneficiaries interviewed mentioned that a large part of the ERM cash assistance was useful for paying off debts to local shopkeepers from whom they had been borrowing for their basic daily needs following their displacement. One concern about cash response in 2018 drought was that it could become a pull factor. There were some drought affected areas which were in such proximity to the urban centres that it was possible for some communities to reach the distribution centres, receive cash (possibly demonstrating fake *tazkira*) and return home. Several KIs (partners) reported instances of this practice, as well as instances of some beneficiaries moving between locations to obtain assistance more than once. However, the evaluation found no evidence to conclude that this happened on a large scale, though reliable data on this is not available. A report earlier this year looking into cash transfers found out that there was no overarching data Management Information System (MIS) in place to help reduce duplication, identify the most vulnerable and enhance data analysis.[97]

Protection

As discussed earlier, DG ECHO's protection policy[98] considers protection as a single sector, encompassing all aspects, such as child protection, Gender-Based Violence (GBV), Housing, Land and Property (HLP) and mine action. In the varied portfolio of actions classified as protection in Afghanistan, all are consistent with the policy objectives and approaches to programming. The evaluation of ERM 2017 found that although actions generally targeted IDPs well, they largely failed to identify the more vulnerable households and support them appropriately. All partners were aware that protection was underperforming, as referral options are limited in Afghanistan.[99] HEAT was found to be an unsuitable tool for protection as it did not cover political exclusion, and partner staff were not sufficiently knowledgeable or trained to recognise child protection needs. This may be because the tool is intended to be fast and the time taken to assess a household was universally short. After the HEAT assessment is finished, the interviewers are often confronted with a relatively high caseload that needs immediate

[93] DRC (2018). ERM7 PDM FINAL REPORT, July 2018
[94] Norwegian Refugee Council (2019). NRC Afghanistan Shelter Evaluation, January 2019
[95] Awaaz Afghanistan (2019). https://awaazaf.org
[96] Key Aid Consulting (January 2019). Review of cash transfer modalities in Afghanistan. Prepared for ECHO and Save the Children.
[97] Key Aid Consulting (January 2019). Review of cash transfer modalities in Afghanistan. Prepared for ECHO and Save the Children.
[98] DG ECHO (2016). Thematic Policy Document no.8: Humanitarian Protection: Improving protection outcomes to reduce risks for people in humanitarian crises. May 2016
[99] Harry Jeene (2017). ECHO Emergency Response Evaluation, Afghanistan

response and can thus not allocate sufficient time to look at protection risks. A brief leaflet is made available on protection, but because of the low literacy rates and lack of time, partner staff are unable to explain to beneficiaries the contents of the leaflet, as was evidenced in several community group discussions in Kandahar, Balkh and Herat.

Several project documents refer to weaknesses in protection assessment. KIs acknowledge that they need to improve focus on addressing specific protection risks either at community level or through referral. As discussed previously (section 3.1.1), the petition system causes delays and waste of time and resources due to the high number of dishonest petitions that come up. The petition is always facilitated by local *Malek* (government registered community representative), who at times were found to attempt to profit from the process through rent-seeking behaviour. Without paying the *Malek*, beneficiaries may not be able to access the system, as the *Malek* needs to verify each petition before their submission. *Maleks* are so influential that, with the payment of these fees, they are able to guarantee to enlist the same beneficiaries in several assessment lists across the year.

KIs suggest that the **protection cluster in Afghanistan has been weak as the cluster has been led by the 'return' agenda in the past few years**, with little attention paid to protection of IDPs and issues of GBV and disability, in particular. DG ECHO and other donors have been raising this issue with HCT from time to time. Limited impact of protection funding in the past is noted in several project documents and now DG ECHO actions focus on tangible activities including: capacity building of all partners on protection mainstreaming; implementation of the common protection approach; and documentation of the approach for dissemination within the humanitarian community.

Several DG ECHO monitoring missions noted in project follow up documents that partners avoid selecting key result indicators for protection, even though there are standard protection indicators under ERM. There was no detailed information on the testing of referral pathways, nor analysis of protection monitoring information in progress reports submitted by partners. Where referrals to other providers were involved, it was unclear how many of the referred cases actually received the assistance as most partners were not able to follow up on referrals. DG ECHO notes that this limits the usefulness of protection activities to the case-specific response rather than contributing to shaping further intervention or improving protection integration into the ERM as a whole. The Afghanistan ERM 2016[100] evaluation noted that **there is a need for standardisation of data collection and analysis on protection.**

The ERM 2016 evaluation noted that the ERM works almost exclusively through the government institutions of DoRR and ANDMA, under the coordinating umbrella of UNOCHA. The fact that many of the most vulnerable people in need of protection are living in areas not controlled by government means that ERM interventions are not addressing important groups. **Providing assistance mainly in government controlled areas, exclusively through government institutions, poses a risk in that the ERM mechanism could easily be perceived as having lost impartiality.** Sometimes organisations' adherence to humanitarian principles have caused difficulties. For example, one partner reported that in order to have line Ministries' sign off on activity reports, they had to deal with the GoIRA's request for sharing beneficiary data. This is a challenge all humanitarian agencies face in Afghanistan, and ECHO has been consistently advocating for a change.

DG ECHO has provided support to a number of organisations to lead advocacy efforts on protection issues and humanitarian access negotiations with governmental, non-governmental, and inter-governmental (UN) stakeholders. One of the partners has a systematic approach to promoting IHL compliance and humanitarian protection among both government institutions and AOGs, besides providing protection, life-saving healthcare and assistance to conflict affected, in accordance with its unique mandate. In its work with parties in conflict, this organisation draws particular attention to the

[100] Harry Jeene (2017). ECHO Emergency Response Evaluation, Afghanistan

necessity of protecting medical services and workers and granting humanitarian access to vulnerable communities. In 2018, another DG ECHO partner extensively documented the humanitarian consequences of trafficking and smuggling and raised an alert about the extremely high number of people involved/victimised.

Coordination and strengthening humanitarian system

Coordination is supported by DG ECHO at two levels – (a) coordination among DG ECHO partners, and (b) coordination of the entire humanitarian system through OCHA/HC and related processes (inter-cluster, cluster coordination). A DG ECHO monitoring mission in 2018 found that coordination among the ERM partners was weak, an observation that was confirmed in at least two-thirds of the key informant interviews during this evaluation, including with ERM partners. Several IDP groups had not received full ERM assistance. In some cases, IDPs received MPCA from one organisation, while they received no assistance on WASH, for example, as the latter was led by another organisation.

DG ECHO partners are involved in providing support to coordination of cash and vouchers group, as cash is a significant component of DG ECHO response. At the national level, as OCHA is mandated to coordinate overall humanitarian response, DG ECHO has consistently provided support to it (average about 10 per cent of OCHA Afghanistan annual budget). In fact, nearly 50 per cent of DG ECHO's allocation for coordination has gone to OCHA. Coordination of the task force on IDPs which used to be undertaken by UNHCR was transferred to OCHA in 2015. OCHA's capacity was severely constrained during 2017-2018 when it had limited human resources in the field. Its staff shortages were felt during the 2018 drought, as OCHA could not deploy adequate human resources to provide guidance to cluster leads and facilitate coordination. DG ECHO stepped in to provide the funding needed, which enabled OCHA to put high quality staff in the regions. This ensured that the humanitarian system did not suffer from lack of coordination and assessment of protection risks at the local level in the regions. KIIs in regions by the ET confirmed that OCHA's continuing presence has strengthened coordination among organisations. The 2019 OCHA country strategy for Afghanistan puts emphasis on strengthening field coordination through placing temporary staff in areas of high concern, as well as setting up/expanding sub-offices in different regions, namely: Herat (for Western Region), Jalalabad (for Eastern Region), Kandahar (for Southern Region), Mazar-i-Sharif (for Northern Region and Kunduz (North-Eastern Region). All these sub-offices are now headed by international staff at P-4 level, with support from donors including DG ECHO.

Amongst the clusters, besides health cluster coordination, one agency has been supported to provide assistance to the WASH cluster, of which it is the co-lead,[101] to standardise WASH response in the country and participate in global WASH cluster meetings. DG ECHO has been funding this organisation for WASH cluster coordination for several years, recognising the added-value of having a competent NGO partner inside the WASH cluster to ensure principled and high-quality WASH response in Afghanistan.[102] Additionally, DG ECHO supports the nutrition cluster co-lead, protection cluster co-lead and Cash and Vouchers Working Group (CVWG) co-lead. DG ECHO also supports an international NGO with specialised expertise on generating and disseminating information and analysis on security and safety of aid workers. All NGO partners use analysis and situation reports provided by this organisation for all their operations and day-to-day security monitoring.

Shelter and settlements

Shelter response for IDPs by humanitarian agencies following the 2018 drought was late as agencies were overwhelmed by the scale of need, compounded by a failure of the humanitarian leadership/cluster to take early action, with the result that in some areas shelter was not provided at all and in others, these were delivered in the middle of severe winter, as late as January 2019. ET visits

[101] DACAAR is significantly involved in the National and Regional WASH clusters in Afghanistan. At national level, DACAAR has been the Co-lead of the WASH cluster since April 2013.
[102] DG ECHO (2015). WASH — Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Interim Report, Afghanistan—2015 (Date of final submission: 28/07/2016)

to IDP communities who arrived in 2018 in Herat, Kandahar and Mazar showed that most of the IDPs did not receive shelter in time and many had to buy their own, borrowing money from relatives and friends, falling into debts. Families spent up to eight months in inadequate makeshift shelters while they waited for assistance.[103] In several community interviews, it was found that a number of families used the cash they received to pay off debt, often leading to negative coping mechanisms like sending children for rag picking on the street to earn small amounts of money to survive on. This was also noted in a 2017 evaluation report of the ERM function in Afghanistan.[104] KIs with partners in the north identified failure to provide shelter response following the floods in early March this year as a serious gap in overall humanitarian response.

As the provider of last resort, UNHCR invests in logistics and warehousing for shelter supplies, tents and NFI kits, but the supply pipeline could not cope with the needs. KIs affirmed that capacity in shelter sector is barely adequate to cover the needs to conflict IDPs which are smaller in number and takes place over a longer period, and was certainly not geared to meeting the needs of a large influx of IDPs in a short period of time, as happened during 2018. The cluster coordination team lacks a strategic focus as the shelter 'strategy' appears to have been more about distributing items (tents and NFI), and not adapted to the context.

DG ECHO did not provide any major shelter response as the bulk of its drought response in 2018 was concentrated in areas of origin where shelter was not an issue; however, for the urban response (IDP), DG ECHO and its partners relied on the cluster to scale up its response, which it failed to do. In small pockets where DG ECHO provided shelter response, this was in the form of cash for rent for highly vulnerable families. DG ECHO has since allocated additional funding through its new ALERT emergency funding mechanism to promote cash for rent and alternative mechanisms for flood-affected families, whereby partners are expected to come with a tailor-made solution per family. On this basis, partners are currently reviewing shelter guidelines.

Within the DG ECHO HOPE database, shelter is conflated with MPCA and protection. In reviewing protection grants during desk review, it was found that shelter may often have been categorised as protection. As protection actions are wide-ranging, it is not obvious when shelter is classified as a sector in its own right. Desk review showed that six of the 16 actions on shelter during 2014-2018 were undertaken through ERM. There were several actions funded in 2015 and 2016 but none in 2017, and only one action on shelter in 2018.

The ET noted in Herat and Mazar that on many occasions IDPs had been settled on privately owned land. Some beneficiaries reported to have paid money for occupying a small piece of land to the owner upon which either they had set up tent or built a basic shelter, the latter often with support from a development NGO. Many beneficiaries expressed concern about being evicted by owners. There was no sign of NGO partners or local authorities' involvement in the negotiations between IDPs (often led by their male representatives or the elderly) and landowners on the land issue.

WASH

According to DG ECHO thematic policies, WASH is considered one of the main sectors of humanitarian operations,[105] focused on preserving life, alleviating human suffering and maintaining human dignity. DG ECHO has provided support and funding to various humanitarian partners active in the area of WASH, led by one main implementing partner (also an ERM partner) which is known for its expertise in this area in Afghanistan. For ERM response, it goes by rapid assessments and vulnerability assessments using standardised HEAT. Besides water and sanitation infrastructure, water trucking is undertaken in many

[103] Norwegian Refugee Council (2019). NRC Afghanistan Shelter Evaluation, January 2019 (https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/afghanistan/2019.04.09-nrc-afghanistan-shelter-evaluation-report-2019.pdf)

[104] Harry Jeene (2017). ECHO Emergency Response Evaluation, Afghanistan

[105] European Commission (May 2014). DG ECHO Thematic Policy Document°2, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene: Meeting the challenge of rapidly increasing humanitarian needs in WASH.

settlements where water infrastructure cannot be installed for a variety of reasons, including government or private landlord's (land over which settlements are created) refusal to allow construction of any permanent structures. Although water trucking is not viable in the long run, in many settlements following the 2018 drought there was no alternative to water trucking. At least 3 partners responded to WASH needs in Herat for IDPs. A DG ECHO monitoring mission noted that WASH facilities (drinking water and toilets) were made available by ERM partners,[106] but on the whole, taking into account the total caseload of IDP, WASH response by the humanitarian system was insufficient and people used open defecation, and had to pay AFN 20 to buy 40 litres of water.[107]

A good amount of data exists in project documents in terms of WASH targets and achievements thereof, which were rated positively in dashboards by DG ECHO staff. Reports also show evidence of water quality tracking for drinking water; however, at the outcome level, reports do not show, for instance, whether or not hygiene promotion activities were changing behaviour of target communities.

Communities interviewed in all the regions visited by the ET attested to water trucking provided by partners (and other NGOs), and site visits to settlements showed that water delivery was done inside or close to the settlements. The ET visited a dozen settlements in Herat, Mazar and Kandahar where water trucking was still ongoing, after nearly 8-9 months of the peak of drought. However, the main concern was water shortage as all the families in a settlement shared water, including those who may have come earlier and were no longer included in the count for provision of humanitarian aid. This seems to have created a cycle wherein those who had received assistance in the past rely of the newly arriving in IDPs' share of water supplies when they are provided. In the north and east, which were also affected by drought, humanitarian response overall was minimal. The ET visited several settlements in Kandahar and Mazar where toilets were being constructed in early April, while there were a few where people still have no access to toilets. DG ECHO partners acknowledge this weakness in response, which is attributed to lack of funding for the north and east.

Hygiene education accompanied all WASH response by partners. Communities interviewed (both men and women) showed a general awareness and knowledge about basics of personal and communal hygiene on settlements, acquired through hygiene promotion work of, mostly, DG ECHO partners.

In emergency WASH projects, DG ECHO field experts have noted that the ERM component of the project can do little to address the long-term needs of the displaced. Under these circumstances, some agencies tried to ensure that by providing high-quality water points, refugees and the host community could continue to access water also in the future. Additionally, they trained the population to conduct regular maintenance of the water point to ensure they could continue to work in the future.[108] It needs however to be noted that there was a lack of experimentation and use of innovative approaches to find alternatives to unsustainable water trucking, which humanitarian agencies have often used in protracted crises in countries like Somalia, South Sudan and Bangladesh,[109] using a mixture of market-based solutions and public private partnerships (see Box 5 for some generic examples of what constitutes market-based WASH approach).

Box 5: Some examples of innovative WASH response in humanitarian context[110]

In one region of Somalia which has a large population of IDPs caught in protracted crisis, a WASH provider worked with local authorities and invested in upgrading the township water supply system on the condition that the authorities would ensure that piped water supply network will be extended up to a point close to the IDP settlements (private or 'illegal') – most of the settlements, like in Herat, were not very far

[106] DG ECHO (2018). ERM — Emergency Response Mechanism Interim Report, Afghanistan—2018 (data of final comment 22/12/2018)

[107] DG ECHO (2018). ERM — Emergency Response Mechanism Interim Report, Afghanistan—2018 (data of final comment 22/12/2018)

[108] DG ECHO (2015). WASH — Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Interim Report, Afghanistan—2015 (Date of final submission: 28/07/2016)

[109] Oxfam (undated). Using Market Analysis to Support Humanitarian Wash Programming

[110] These examples are drawn from an evaluation conducted by one of the team members; however, as the evaluation report was not made public by the organisation, the report is not cited here. The examples are presented here just to show what a market-based approach might look like.

from existing networks. Water tanks and meters are installed at this point from where private providers/water kiosks buy water to sell to households at a pre-agreed price, closely monitored by NGO-trained community leaders/women's groups. Households were paid cash in hand (given to women) for a few months during the peak of the crisis to buy water. The programme found that the cost of operation in the long run was much lower than NGO water trucking and it created a network of entrepreneurs from the IDP communities who set up water kiosks inside the settlements.

In another location, as buying water in normal times from private suppliers was a common practice, during the peak of drought, NGOs simply paid cash to women to buy water, and found that most of the cash in fact went into buying water and water trucking costs in the area had significantly dropped to pre-drought level, with people buying directly from the water tankers, instead of the latter being contracted by NGOs.

3.5.2. Evidence to track outputs and outcomes

Post Distribution Monitoring is carried out for all actions, and this provides a solid basis for tracking beneficiary satisfaction and reach when it is executed in a timely manner. In most cases PDM is done as per requirements, but the desk review found instances where this was not the case, the reason usually related to lack of capacity of sub-partners. The ERM 2017 review[111] observed that more work is required around standardisation of data and training of partner staff in data analysis. DG ECHO staff noted in several project follow up documents that there is little (often no) follow-up to caseloads assisted by the ERM, leaving families in a situation of extreme poverty, food insecurity and high vulnerability.

Some partners collect good data but do not analyse it to improve the response. Desk review shows that partners may be collecting a huge amount of data on their individual interventions and conducting studies. However, KIs indicate that there is no system of aggregating and analysing these to jointly review lessons learnt from various PDMs and M&E carried out by different partners, nor any aggregation of different agencies' PDM data. KIs stated that needs assessment data by ERM partners are sent to DG ECHO, but these are not collated and analysed to draw an aggregate picture.

It is understood that one ERM partner was tasked in 2017 to develop a humanitarian information management system (HIMS) which will collect and centralise all data from rapid assessments, monitoring, IDP tracking, from all DG ECHO and other partners, allowing for a systematic analysis of available data. It was supposed to produce an interactive dashboard, however, progress has been slow. During 2019, fresh efforts are being made with 1 dedicated member of staff working on behalf of the ERM, who will be responsible for: (a) providing technical backstop to the ERM partners on their data collection tools (HEAT, PDM) and data analysis processes; (b) creating a dashboard from the intervention data (activity data for monthly reports); and (c) managing a longitudinal study on ERM over 12 months.

In terms of the number of beneficiaries, data provided in DG ECHO project lists in the HOPE database do not provide a consistent picture as it may be the case that the sectoral classification of various humanitarian actions are made on a subjective basis, depending on individual DG ECHO staff categorising each grant made. With this caveat, the data presented below (as obtained from the Project list for 2014-2018) show that health and WASH responses have consistently reached more beneficiaries than any other sector (Table 11).

Table 11 Number of beneficiaries (people) reported, 2014-2018

Sector	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
FSAL	89,283	151,487	259,136	NA	NA
MPCA	NA	NA	NA	285,461	116,459
Protection	3,424,172	624,794	80,149	734,808	6,258

[111] INSPIRE Consortium, Global Public Policy Institute (2017). Review of Rapid/Emergency Response Mechanisms (ERM). Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 2017

Health	2,767,638	1,165,612	855,805	880,101	533,592
Shelter & settlement	450,919	208,609	77,840	-	1,540
WASH	254,848	250,065	203,017	193,865	152,714

(Source: DG ECHO Projects list, HOPE database)

3.5.3. Accountability to affected populations (AAP)

As discussed in section 3.1.2, basic accountability measures (complaints and feedback mechanisms) are in place in all partner agencies, though these need further strengthening. KIs confirmed that all partners have a hotline through which communities can get in touch to lodge a complaint, and the PDM tool includes a section on satisfaction with the service / transfers received. All DG ECHO NGO partners have some form of feedback and complaints mechanism of their own. In one instance, beneficiaries reported that a complaint tent was set up by a partner organisation where they could go in person to complain. By and large, beneficiaries affirmed they had tried to use the complaints mechanisms, but sometimes it did not work - either there was no response following their call, or if they were able to talk with the respective NGO representative, there was no subsequent action.

EQ10: How successful was DG ECHO through its advocacy and communication measures in Afghanistan in influencing other actors by direct and indirect advocacy on issues like humanitarian access and space, respect for IHL, addressing gaps in response, applying good practices, and carrying out follow-up actions of DG ECHO's interventions? Was there an 'advocacy gap'?

3.5.4. Influencing others and promoting good practice

Key finding:

- DG ECHO's evidence-based advocacy positions it in Afghanistan as a key player, working with others, in influencing the shape of overall humanitarian system and its performance, as well as influencing development debates**.**

DG ECHO's advocacy efforts have been discussed earlier in section 3.2. **DG ECHO's evidence-based advocacy positions it in the Afghanistan aid context as a key player, working with others in shaping the overall humanitarian system and its performance, as well as influencing development debates.** DG ECHO is acknowledged by all stakeholders to have been instrumental in introducing several innovative tools and practices, namely: a rapid response tool (ERM), use of multi-purpose cash in humanitarian response, and HEAT for needs assessments, in particular. Though still at an exploratory phase, DG ECHO's initiative on social protection is another example of its forward thinking and willingness to contribute to the overall humanitarian scene, much beyond the measure of the grants it makes. DG ECHO has also been advocating on issues of cross border deportation, especially from Iran. The Iranian government deports many Afghans (refugees and undocumented migrants), including vulnerable women and children, and there have been many instances of violence against them. DG ECHO has been coordinating with other donors as well as advocating with the Iranian authorities.

3.6. Sustainability

3.6.1. To what extent did DG ECHO make progress in the humanitarian-development nexus? What could be further done (enabling factors, tools, mechanisms, change in strategy, etc.) to promote sustainability and strengthen links to interventions of development actors?

Key findings:

- DG ECHO's short-term assistance to conflict and disaster-affected communities cannot be sustained, unless development interventions are able to provide basic services to people.
- There are no exit strategies for some of the major health facilities supported by DG ECHO, though some initiative in this regard has begun with at least one such service provider.

Nexus has been discussed in section 3.2.2. Humanitarian response is meant to be short-term in response to shocks and stresses. When development and governance failure leads to a precarious situation whereby people are constantly living in the throes of one looming crisis after another, humanitarian assistance can hardly provide any solution. Just as people started to cope with the effects of drought in 2018, after surviving through years of conflict, floods came in early 2019 to wash away anything that the previous round of humanitarian assistance accomplished, only to start all over again. This has been the story of Afghanistan for at least the past 5-7 years, after a brief lull in the previous decade. Development and humanitarian actions in the country have not historically followed the same trajectory as the former focussed on a state building agenda, with little focus on the poor and vulnerable in economic policies, while the latter took it upon itself the task of providing short-term relief with whatever meagre resources it could command, as poverty and vulnerability kept rising steadily in the country.

In the foreseeable future, migration to the cities, whether caused by displacement due to conflict, disasters and climate change, or due to economic factors, will continue. As has been the experience over the past two decades, those who moved to urban areas usually do not return to their villages where development of any hue totally passes them by. Urban authorities and development agencies therefore need to be prepared to deal with this influx on an on-going basis, as well as during episodes of major shocks and crises.

There is a national IDP policy[112] which encourages the development of provisional action plans for each province based on the types of displacement they each experience. Section 7.1.4 of the policy covers the right to livelihood, underlining government's responsibility to ensure IDPs have access to jobs and vocational training opportunities. Authorities in one of the provinces informed the ET of the development of their provisional action plan for protracted IDPs from Ghor and Badghis (mainly from 2002). The government claims to have transformed a big IDP settlement into a township which is now equipped with educational and health facilities, as well as offering employment opportunities. The ET, however, was not able to visit the former settlement/current township. Beyond this example, the implementation of the national IDP policy largely remains unclear as per documentary evidence, field interviews and site visits.

Within DG ECHO's limited mandate and resources, it has begun to take action to seek greater sustainability for some of its humanitarian actions. The process towards integration of Kandahar PRC with MoPH is a good example. Other health facilities DG ECHO supports also need to move in this direction, or alternative funding explored for continuation of these services.

[112] Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2013). The National Policy of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on Internal Displacement, June 2013. Retrieved from: http://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/law-and-policy/files/afghanistan/Afghanistan_national_policy_English_2013.pdf

4. Conclusions, lessons and recommendations

4.1. The evolving context and DG ECHO's role

Afghanistan is a country in protracted conflict and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. Both the scale and nature of displacement have changed, with the latter becoming more protracted, with multiple waves of displacement over time. Increased insecurity in parts of the country will require changes to the way humanitarian and development assistance is delivered. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) report for the period April-June 2016, the Afghanistan government had access to only about 60 per cent of districts, the lowest figure recorded since 2007.[113] This has declined further in the past two years.

Afghanistan is as much a development crisis as it is a protection crisis. Though development efforts immediately after the fall of Taliban made enormous strides in improving village life, increasing access to health, education and livelihoods, this trend was reversed after 2011, when conflict started to escalate. Failure of development aid over the past decade to ensure even the basic survival needs of a large section of population, compounded by protracted conflict, has caused increasing impoverishment, to the extent that the 'normal' borders on emergency threshold. With national poverty rate rising at an annual rate of 3.5 per cent during 2011-12 to 2016-17, it now stands at 55 per cent,[114] not taking into account those pushed into poverty on account of drought and floods during 2018. It comes as no surprise that 6.3 million people are now in need of humanitarian aid in 2019, of which 3.6 million people are experiencing emergency levels of food insecurity, a 24 per cent increase on the same period of 2017. The combined total of internally displaced increased from over 1 million in 2015 to over 3.5 million at the end of 2018. Most of the displaced people and returnees have moved to the cities, where provision of basic services is struggling to cope, given the limited capacity of the government, leading to increased vulnerability and suffering.[115]

It needs to be recognised that the state building and security agenda that has dominated all aid discourse and assistance to the GoIRA will continue to rule the roost in development aid, and any genuine emphasis on pro-poor development strategy has to be predicated on this dominant narrative. DG ECHO has been perspicacious in appreciating that in the scenario unfolding in the country, its humanitarian actions would not add up to much, unless a responsive development framework capable of addressing the minimum basic needs of the ultra-poor and poor are addressed, something beyond the mandate and capacity of DG ECHO. DG ECHO is working with other humanitarian agencies, donors and development agencies, including the World Bank, in shaping a collective response to this, in partnership with the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. **DG ECHO has positioned itself as a key interlocutor, with its credentials as a neutral (non-political), multilateral humanitarian organisation, not influenced by any government agenda, and a leader in the current discourse on resilience and nexus**. As a major humanitarian donor funding on average about 10 per cent of common humanitarian appeals, DG ECHO has been a vocal advocate of the need to manage the development and humanitarian interface in the country better, with a focus on the poor and vulnerable in all development policies.

[113] World Bank Afghanistan. Country Partnership Framework For Islamic Republic Of Afghanistan for the period FY 17 to FY 20, 2016
[114] An OCHA document (OCHA (undated). Key messages on Afghanistan uses a figure of 80 per cent population living below the international poverty line of US$1.25.
[115] DG ECHO (2018). 2018 Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran And Central Asia, Version 3 – 24/06/2018

4.2. Key results/performance of DG ECHO humanitarian actions

4.2.1. Major humanitarian outcomes

DG ECHO's evidence-based advocacy positions it in the Afghanistan aid context as a key player, working with others, towards **enhancing the synergy between development and humanitarian actions**, and thereby (i) increase the effectiveness of the latter; and (ii) strengthen resilience of affected communities.

DG ECHO's support to strengthening and sustaining the humanitarian ecosystem in the country contributes to ensuring that organisations are able to deliver their services effectively. Its critical support to OCHA, cluster coordination and International NGO Safety Organisation, besides strong advocacy with the HCT, is enabling the overall delivery system.

At the level of affected-communities, **DG ECHO's life-saving and protection actions** are helping target communities to *partly* cope with immediate after-effects of conflict and disasters, before they are able to access more longer-term support and move towards recovery. DG ECHO uses its grant making flexibly to ensure that response adapts to needs as they emerge or change.

Cash assistance through DG ECHO's ERM is recognised by all stakeholders as one of its kind in Afghanistan, capable of **delivering need-based response to conflict IDPs**, with nationwide coverage, though it had its limitations when responding to drought and dealing with a large number of IDPs in 2018. It makes administrative savings through common formats, partner co-ordination and coverage and consistent standards through use of standardised needs assessments, without putting an undue co-ordination burden on partners.

DG ECHO supported **actions in trauma care, mental health, mobile health /first aid teams, provision of water, sanitation and hygiene education, and cash assistance are highly appreciated for their quality.** Mobile health teams in AOG areas, temporary First Aid Trauma Posts and support to provincial hospitals for communicable disease surveillance meet critical needs which otherwise remained neglected in humanitarian response. Given DG ECHO's small budget, it needs a clear exit strategy for its health actions, as running some of these services (Hospital, PRC, for example) involve long-term ongoing support, though some initiative in this regard has begun with at least one such service provider.

Water was provided inside or close to the settlements through DG ECHO supported WASH response, **though sanitation facilities were late**; communities are aware of and knowledgeable about basics of personal and communal hygiene in settlements. However, greater effort could have gone into exploring innovative approaches and market-based solutions to the sustainable provision of water.

DG ECHO has been instrumental in pushing for a larger role for cash in humanitarian response in the country, an approach that is steadily gaining momentum. While cash is definitely faster to deliver and gives beneficiaries flexibility and dignity, sometimes in-kind support is also necessary. Complicated vulnerability assessments under ERM with differentiated level of assistance for households caused confusion and anger among beneficiaries as the process/criteria for determining vulnerability was not transparent.

While ERM has concentrated on IDP response in urban areas in the past, **DG ECHO partners have been gradually increasing their footprint in rural areas to provide assistance in the places of origin of IDPs**, especially in AOG areas where some partners have good access.

DG ECHO has been making significant contributions in the country with regard to meeting some of the Grand Bargain commitments, namely: increase use and coordination of cash-based programming (commitment 3); reduce duplication and management costs with periodic functional reviews

(commitment 4); improve joint and impartial needs assessment (commitment 5); and enhance engagement between humanitarian and development actors (commitment 10).

4.2.2. DG ECHO's strengths and distinctive competence

Actions are fully aligned with DG ECHO global mandates and thematic policies, and DG ECHO in Afghanistan is seen as a strong advocate of humanitarian principles; its contribution to strengthening the humanitarian system and operationalising humanitarian principles in actions is acknowledged by all stakeholders.

DG ECHO and its partners have focussed their actions in areas where humanitarian needs have been either neglected or inadequately met by other providers.

DG ECHO is a member of various senior level humanitarian forums in the country where **its voice has been critical in shaping debates and humanitarian response, far beyond the volume of its funds**. DG ECHO's coordination with Member States and its inputs are highly valued by EU Member State donors present in the country.

4.2.3. Challenges and areas for improvement

DG ECHO's short-term assistance to conflict and disaster-affected communities cannot be sustained, unless development interventions are able to provide basic services to people.

As the government's petition system is the route to assistance, it often delays response, and is subject to high exclusion errors[116] due to the 3-months rule (must have been displaced in the last 3 months).[117] Aside from access to the petitions system, exclusion of eligible beneficiaries in non-Government controlled areas is also a challenge.

The ERM did not always provide a timely response (reaching all and only those eligible for need) due to delays endemic in the petition system, although it may still enable relatively faster response compared with many other large agencies.

Partners use multiple methods and joint needs assessments to identify the vulnerable and gaps, though **there is weak evidence of beneficiary consultation, participation of women and incorporating age and disability factors in response.**

As part of accountability to affected populations , the **complaints mechanism was weak for most of the evaluation period, and this is now being strengthened by DG ECHO partners.**

DG ECHO's contribution helped **strengthen OCHA's capacity in the regions**.

The protection cluster has underperformed as the cluster lacks a coherent strategy. DG ECHO partners' performance on this score has also been weak.

Education in emergencies remains a neglected area in humanitarian response.

There is a need for standardisation of data collection and training of partner staff in collating and analysing PDM and needs assessment data. Data sharing on needs assessment is weak, which forces agencies

[116] There may also be possible inclusion error which is mitigated by ERM partners and others going through house to house verification during assessment.
[117] This restriction no longer applies from 2019, giving greater flexibility to ERM.

to undertake multiple assessments. As needs assessment data are not shared among agencies, **there are risks of errors of inclusion/exclusion and double counting in cash programmes**.

At the country level, though there is informal coordination between senior staff of DG ECHO and DG DEVCO, **there is no formal institutional mechanism to promote dialogue or a joined up approach between EU's humanitarian and development arms.**

4.3. Lessons for future programming

The multiple overlapping shocks and stresses – conflict, drought, floods, earthquakes, cross-border migration – that affect Afghan communities, brought home the lesson that development and humanitarian actions cannot be delinked from each other and ways must be found to better address acute and chronic vulnerabilities that mediate all disasters. This has now given an impetus to the nexus thinking in Afghanistan.

Tertiary healthcare requires long-term investment which humanitarian agencies may get into only if there is a clear time-bound exist strategy. An element of redundancy needs to be built into the project design right from the start. Otherwise, humanitarian organisations remain saddled with the burden of running these facilities for an indefinite period of time, creating parallel structures outside the government systems.

4.4. Recommendations

Institutional level:

R1: At the HO and CO levels, explore formal links with DG DEVCO to ensure greater coherence and complementarity between the two organisations in development and humanitarian programmes focused on the ultra-poor, the poor and those vulnerable to shocks and stresses. In the Afghanistan context, using DG DEVCO's off-budget support, joint work on social protection, basic services (water, sanitation, education facilities for IDPs, basic healthcare, vocational training) in urban areas with high concentration of IDPs and trauma care services need to be explored.

R2: DG ECHO Afghanistan needs to continue strengthening its current initiative towards working with other major donors, World Bank and the GoIRA on forging synergy between development and humanitarian actions in the country.

Strategic programming (DG ECHO Afghanistan):

R3: Working with International Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), Famine and Early Warning System Network (FEWSNet), the Department for International Development (DFID), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other key operational humanitarian agencies, conduct a lessons review of 2018 drought response to analyse the reasons as to why good early warnings did not create enough impetus for early action during the drought of 2018. This will contribute to a better understanding of how to respond to slow onset emergencies (drought) in future.

R4: Develop a clear strategy on emergency healthcare, ensuring that any tertiary health action DG ECHO supports is backed by an exit and sustainability strategy. Working with the MoPH, ARTF, DG DEVCO and humanitarian organisations now running hospitals that are partly funded by DG ECHO, develop a time-bound transition plan for the hospitals to be integrated into the healthcare system.

R5: DG ECHO and its partners (as well as other humanitarian organisations) need to expand their footprint in AOG areas through negotiated access, wherever feasible, and through increasing

engagement with local and national NGOs. This will also be in line with the localisation agenda of the Grand Bargain commitments and will place the humanitarian system in a stronger position to influence the development aid system fixated on conflating development, state building and security agenda.

Operational issues:

R6: Using its influence in the HCT, and working with other humanitarian donors, DG ECHO needs to continue pushing for a clearer protection strategy in the country. The strategy needs to focus on GBV, disability, undocumented returnees and IDPs without *tazkira,*[118] besides addressing the issue of (former refugee) returnees from neighbouring countries.

R7: DG ECHO needs to continue supporting OCHA in strengthening joint needs assessment and information sharing on needs among all agencies, including DG ECHO partners. In this regard, a lessons learning workshop focusing on needs assessment during 2018 drought and migration crisis would be a good start, including examining the duplication of needs assessment by various partners and ways to improve this in the future. This should also include examining how ERM's needs assessment can contribute to strengthening the joint needs assessment process and ensure that ERM actions are coordinated with clusters.

R8: DG ECHO partners need to continue the work of strengthening AAP practices and beneficiary participation in all their actions through greater use of *Awaaz* and internal (organisation-specific) complaints and response mechanism.

[118] The electronic Afghan identity card (e-Tazkira) is a national identity document issued to all citizens of Afghanistan. It is proof of identity, residency and citizenship.

Part B: Partnership Evaluation

Executive Summary: Part B - Partnership Evaluation

Introduction

This evaluation is of the partnership between DG ECHO and the NRC. It is a significant partnership for both organisations. During the evaluation period 2014-18, the total value of DG ECHO funding to NRC was approximately €278 million. For NRC, DG ECHO is the second largest donor, providing 18 percent of its funding in 2017.

NRC is a humanitarian organisation dedicated to supporting and advocating for people who are forced to flee. It aims to meet immediate humanitarian needs, prevent further displacement and contribute to durable solutions. It works in 31 countries and in 2017 had a total global income of USD 490 million and employed approximately 14,000 staff, most of whom work at field level.

The purpose of this evaluation is to provide a retrospective assessment of DG ECHO's partnership with NRC globally during the period 2014-2018 with a focus on identifying lessons learned and good practice, for the benefit of this partnership and DG ECHO's overall partnership framework. It has a prospective element of providing up to three strategic recommendations.

The evaluation questions ask about the alignment between DG ECHO and NRC. It asks whether efficiency was maximised and whether the management burden was decreased. It also asks whether the partnership contributed to the Grand Bargain commitments of localisation and the humanitarian-development nexus. The methodology included document analysis, face to face and remote interviews, as well as an online survey. Nine countries formed the sample for conducting interviews and the survey and other countries were included at their request.

Findings

EQI: How well aligned were DG ECHO and the NRC in terms of: priorities, strategies and objectives; advocacy priorities and efforts; needs assessments and multi-hazard risk and vulnerability analyses?

Finding 1: DG ECHO and NRC were and remain strongly aligned in their strategic priorities and objectives through shared commitment to humanitarian principles.

Finding 2: The partners work closely and effectively on advocacy, drawing on shared analysis and using their relative strengths.

Finding 3: NRC follows DG ECHO guidelines for needs assessment and visibility.

EQ2: To what extent did a structured, strategic, timely and functional dialogue take place between the two partners, and by what means?

Finding 4: Dialogue takes place through a range of channels, in structured and unstructured ways, involving all levels of DG ECHO and NRC.

Finding 5: Dialogue at the country level is functional and timely based on a mutual desire to raise the quality of programme performance. Partners attribute this to the quality of DG ECHO Technical Assistance (TA) and the operational expertise of NRC.

Finding 6: DG ECHO and NRC share the view that the quality of dialogue, and therefore the partnership, is very high. Mutual learning is highly valued by both sides.

EQ3: To what extent did the DG ECHO-NRC partnership succeed in maximising efficiencies and decreasing management and related costs, including administrative burden; improving cost-effectiveness in their response; improving the use of cash-based response?

Finding 7: The DG ECHO partnership framework aspires to simplified procedures but does not provide explicit guidance as to how this may be achieved. The result is that work-arounds and informal dialogues become the primary means of improving the efficiency of partnership transactions.

Finding 8: Proposal and modification processes are lengthy, requiring a level of detail and scrutiny that is time consuming. This is compounded by both parties lack of clarity with regard to how efficiency requirements should be interpreted.

Finding 9: Rigorous audits as per the Financial Regulation, exhibit the same combination of detailed analysis, conducted in an open and collaborative spirit, but at considerable management cost to both DG ECHO and NRC. The positive consequence is that they have led to NRC strengthening its financial systems.

Finding 10: The *de facto* technical authority of DG ECHO field TA is recognised as a vital input to flexible management. However, as TA do not have *de jure* financial authority, there are some inefficiencies in cases where their guidance has been subsequently over-turned.

Finding 11: NRC is viewed by many in DG ECHO as a very expensive partner, which is not necessarily justified by the high costs and high risks of meeting finance, anti-corruption and anti-terrorism compliance requirements.

Finding 12: Annual funding without any future year commitment is a cost-effectiveness issue as it affects operating costs and long-term, in-country trust and knowledge building.

Finding 13: DG ECHO policy guidance on cash, and its highly valued technical expertise at field level have systematically improved NRC responses.

EQ4: To what extent did the DG ECHO-NRC partnership contribute to increasing local partners' meaningful participation in humanitarian response; enhancing the engagement between humanitarian and development actors?

Finding 14: The partners differ in their adoption of the localisation agenda. Whereas DG ECHO is actively committed to localisation, NRC's identity is bound in direct implementation.

Finding 15: The meeting point on the humanitarian development nexus is partners' shared commitment on increasing resilience in protracted crises and the pursuit of durable solutions. This and funding limitations within DG ECHO are leading to increasing tripartite collaboration with DG DEVCO.

Conclusions

There is a high quality partnership between DG ECHO and NRC. The foundation is the stable and long-term Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA) which specifies the rights and obligations of partners. There is strong evidence of regular, comprehensive and transparent exchange of information at all levels, which promotes institutional learning and development of best practice.

The weakness is that the simplified and efficient procedures, which are an assumption of the FPA, are not realised in practice. Some processes are inefficient, there are some lapses in internal communications, and audit requirements are perceived by NRC to be over-stringent in the context of humanitarian crisis. There is an unresolved tension between principled risk-taking and compliance. These inefficiencies act as a barrier to achieving the impact level ambition of increased aid effectiveness.

For the most part, DG ECHO is highly satisfied with the performance of NRC and especially values its strength in and commitment to advocacy. NRC is also satisfied, especially with the quality of DG ECHO's TA, which strengthens the contextual analysis, ensures an informed dialogue at country level, and improves the response. The key factor influencing perceptions of quality is trust between partners. This is strong at policy level and very strong at country level. Overall, there is very good communication between DG ECHO and NRC at each level although, in a minority of cases, there are miscommunications resulting from the difference between decentralised decision-making authority in NRC and the centralisation of DG ECHO.

In terms of efficiency, the partnership is characterised by skilled and principled professionals working conscientiously through highly detailed and lengthy processes that, in a humanitarian context, can only be described as inefficient. Although the accountability justification for the current processes, including stringent financial audits, is clear, the costs in terms of time and effort are disproportionate. The result is that attention has shifted backwards to activities, outputs and documentation. The risk is that it undermines the more forward-looking attention to achievement of outcomes and impact. It also sets up a dissonance that has the potential to undermine the relationship of trust that appears so critical to effectiveness.

Lessons

Lesson 1: The importance of trust: When funding and delivery organisations jointly invest resources in developing a high-quality humanitarian response, a relationship of trust develops, which creates an enabling environment for a genuine partnership based on integrity, reliability and performance.

Lesson 2: Effective policy dialogue: Policy dialogue is most effective if it happens at all levels and utilises structured as well as unstructured means. Opportunities for unstructured dialogue are greater but balancing it with more structured dialogue is likely to increase learning and aid effectiveness.

Lesson 3: The ambition of the FPA, its interpretation and its internal conflicts: In attempting to cover all possible angles and risks, the FPA creates an ideal of humanitarian partnership and high-quality response that cannot be fully realised in practice. Internal inconsistences and detailed requirements do not translate into an efficient and cost-effective response, which depends on flexible interpretation of the requirements, recognition of trade-offs, and agreement on risk sharing.

Strategic recommendations

Recommendation 1: Move towards multiyear planning and funding for trusted partners

Recommendation 2: Develop more opportunities for structured dialogue to increase institutional learning and promote aid effectiveness

Recommendation 3: Simplify project cycle processes; vest authority on operational matters in the field; define risk-sharing agreements that facilitate principled, cost-effective responses

5. Introduction

5.1. Background to the partnership

Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)

Established in 1946 to assist refugees in Europe after World War II, the Norwegian Refugee Committee (NRC) is an independent, humanitarian, rights-based organisation committed to the principles of humanity, neutrality, independence and impartiality. It currently works in new and protracted crises in 31 countries with a mission to protect the rights of displaced and vulnerable persons. Its programmes aim to provide assistance to meet immediate humanitarian needs, prevent further displacement and contribute to durable solutions. Programme focus is in the core competency areas of camp management, food assistance, clean water, shelter, legal aid, and education. NRC is known for its attention to advocacy for displaced people, through which it aims to alert the world to injustices and to promote and defend displaced people's rights and dignity in local communities, with national governments and in the international arena.[119]

In addition to the country programme focus, NRC established the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre in Geneva to be a global leader in monitoring, reporting on and advocating for people displaced within their own country.[120] It also has a facility (NORCAP) which can rapidly deploy experts from all over the world to support the United Nations (UN) agencies and local authorities in humanitarian crises.

In 2017, NRC's total income reached USD 490 million and the organisation employed around 14,000 staff, mostly hired locally to work in the field.[121] NRC is a decentralised organisation with authority vested at field level in the country offices. It maintains a headquarters in Oslo as well as several regional offices. Due to the importance of the partnership with DG ECHO, NRC maintains an office in Brussels to develop and maintain a close working relationship. It has Partnership and Advocacy Advisers who provide support to NRC country offices to ensure quality and compliance.

Framework Partnership

The Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) has a Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA) with NRC, as well as with more than 200 diverse partner organisations providing humanitarian assistance throughout the world. FPAs for NGOs are in recognition of their vital role and added value in providing humanitarian assistance because of their field presence, flexibility, specialisation, and because they are a direct expression of active citizenship at the service of humanitarian actions. These FPAs enable DG ECHO to have comprehensive coverage of ever-expanding needs across the world in increasingly complex situations. The DG ECHO Partnership guidelines (2014)[122] require partnership to be based on:

- Transparency and accountability towards all stakeholders, including beneficiaries of aid;
- Strategies and initiatives to increase the effectiveness of humanitarian aid though coordinated humanitarian response;
- Duty of care toward humanitarian workers and volunteers, with special attention to their safety in the field and, to the extent possible, to their professional development;
- Coherence with regard to sectorial and thematic issues;
- Evidence-based learning culture; and

[119] https://www.nrc.no/who-we-are/about-us/

[120] http://www.internal-displacement.org/about-us

[121] NRC Annual Report 2017 (latest available)

[122] DG ECHO (2015). Framework Partnership Agreement 2014 Guidelines, version September 2015

- Promotion of awareness and understanding of humanitarian issues and values among decision-makers and the general public in order to foster the legitimacy and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance.

The current FPA commenced on 1 January 2014 and followed from the previous 2008 agreement. It is based on shared common objectives and the intention to establish a relationship of lasting cooperation based on commitment to quality; efficiency; effectiveness; mutual trust; complementarity of roles; and simplified procedures to ensure effective, efficient and rapid delivery of aid.

The purpose of the FPA is to define the rights and obligations of the Parties when they enter into a Specific Grant Agreement (SGA) and to lay down the rules governing European Union-funded humanitarian aid actions. The relevant rules are the Humanitarian Aid Regulation and Regulation No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2012.

The FPA specifies that Union-funded actions should be based solely on the affected people's needs and capacities of women and men of all ages, be results-oriented, and delivered in the most effective, efficient and rapid manner. They should be implemented with due regard to quality standards and guidelines for sectoral and thematic issues. The parties commit to raise awareness of humanitarian issues among decision makers and the general public in order to foster the overall effectiveness of, and support to, humanitarian assistance. NRC is expected to publicise the relevance and impact of Union-funded aid.

Key elements of the objectives and principles of the FPA are examined and included in the intervention logic section of this report.

DG ECHO – NRC portfolio

The partnership between DG ECHO and NRC is significant, with DG ECHO being the second largest donor to NRC, providing 18 percent of its total funding globally in 2017.[123] At individual country level the proportion of funding provided by DG ECHO varies considerably.

During the evaluation period 2014-18, the total value of DG ECHO funding provided to NRC globally was around 278 M€ million.[124] Figure 1 shows the variation by year, rising from 43 M€ in 2014 to a high of more than 69 M€ in 2016.[125] Figure 2 shows the distribution of total DG ECHO funding to NRC by country across all years.

Figure 5: Total DG ECHO funding to NRC by year



[123] https://www.nrc.no/who-we-are/our-donors/

[124] Cited in the ToR for this evaluation

[125] In 2018, the total cited by NRC was just over 72 M€, which includes consortium contracts where NRC leads.

Figure 6: Total funding to NRC, 2014-2018



The highest funding was for Lebanon at more than 39 M€, mainly from 2016, followed by the Democratic Republic of Congo (M€ 33), Palestine, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq, each between 22 and 25 M€ over the period of 2014-2018. Greece received more than 16 M€, almost all in 2016 at the height of the migration crisis in Europe. Yemen, Syria and Ethiopia were in the 10-14 M€ range, followed by South Sudan, Ethiopia, Iran, Jordan and Mali at more than 5 M€. 14 other countries received less than 5 M€.

The three main sectors covered by DG ECHO funding were food security and livelihoods; shelter and settlements; and protection (including child protection). Education in Emergencies (EiE) and Water and Sanitation for Health (WASH) were also significant sectors. Health is a core sector for DG ECHO but largely outside NRC's expertise and focus. The Figure 3 below shows the allocation of these funds by different sectors.

Figure 7: Use of DG ECHO funds by NRC by sector



5.2. Context of the evaluation

Purpose and scope

The purpose of the evaluation is to provide a retrospective assessment of DG ECHO's partnership with NRC globally with a focus on identifying lessons learned, for the benefit of this partnership and DG ECHO's overall partnership framework.

The prospective dimension is the provision of up to three strategic recommendations to support the future partnership with NRC as well as DG ECHO's overall partnership framework.

The scope of the evaluation is the entire partnership between DG ECHO and NRC at global level and all NRC actions funded by DG ECHO during the period 2014-2018.

Evaluation questions

The combined Terms of Reference[126] outline five questions specific to the partnership (Part B, questions 12-16). These cover alignment between DG ECHO and NRC, cost-efficiency and effectiveness, effectiveness in terms of localisation and humanitarian-development engagement, flexibility of response, and visibility.

Specific questions focusing on DG ECHO's partnership with the Norwegian Refugee Council

1. How well aligned were DG ECHO and the NRC in terms of
    a. needs assessments and multi-hazard risk and vulnerability analyses?
    b. priorities, strategies and objectives?
    c. advocacy priorities and efforts?

    To what extent did a structured, strategic, timely and functional dialogue take place between the two partners, and by what means?

2. To what extent did the DG ECHO-NRC partnership succeed in
    a. maximising efficiencies and decreasing management and related costs, including administrative burden?
    b. improving cost-effectiveness in their response?
    c. improving the use of cash-based response?

3. To what extent did the DG ECHO-NRC partnership contribute to
    a. increasing local partners' meaningful participation in humanitarian response?
    b. enhancing the engagement between humanitarian and development actors?

4. To what extent did the DG ECHO-NRC partnership ensure flexibility of response?

5. To what extent did the NRC follow DG ECHO's visibility guidelines?

5.3. Methodology

The evaluation matrix is presented in Annex 8. This shows the EQs and sub-questions along with judgement criteria, methods and data sources.

Three methods were used: document analysis, interviews and survey. Elaborated detail of document analysis and interviews is contained in the Afghanistan evaluation report (Part A of the combined evaluation).

[126] DG ECHO commissioned a combined evaluation consisting of two main aspects: a geographical aspect, focusing on DG ECHO's interventions in Afghanistan; and a partnership aspect, focusing on DG ECHO's Partnership with the Norwegian Refugee Council.

Interviews were conducted in person in Oslo, Brussels and Kabul along with a smaller number of remote interviews with specialists at country level.

A simple internet survey, designed to take only 10-15 minutes, was undertaken to hear the views of NRC and DG ECHO staff in country offices. Some DG ECHO DO's and NRC regional staff were also included. The number of surveys sent depended on the agreement of staff to participate. For DG ECHO, 48 survey invitations were sent, and 25 responses received (response rate almost 50 percent). For NRC, 62 were sent and 21 received (response rate 33 percent). NRC staff ability to respond may have been affected by some technical challenges receiving and responding to the email survey. Interview and survey questions are attached as Annex 9.

The sample

Nine countries were selected as the sample for face to face and/or remote interviews

- Countries were/are high priority for NRC and DG ECHO
- DG ECHO funding comprised more than 20 percent of the total NRC funding in 2017 and/or 2016 (based on available data in NRC Annual Reports)[127]
- Spread across regions
- Potential to explore the humanitarian-development nexus if pilot country
- Inclusion of two additional countries at the request of DG ECHO Desk Officers (Ukraine, Yemen) and replacing original selections of Ethiopia and Colombia where there was no response.

Country	Specific Criteria	Detail	Total DG ECHO aid in 2017[128]	% NRC budget funded by DG ECHO in 2017
Afghanistan	Subject of DG ECHO country evaluation	Major and deteriorating displacement crisis	€29.5m	36%
Somalia	*H-D nexus pilot country*	10.7 million in need of food assistance	€212.25m for Horn of Africa crisis	23%
DR Congo	Complex humanitarian crisis	4.5m IDPs 540,000 refugees	€57 for Great Lakes crisis	30%
Lebanon Syria	Syria recognised as the worst humanitarian crisis of our time	11 million IDPs, 19 million Syrians in need of assistance	€80.5m in Lebanon €142.5m in Syria	20% 21%
Palestine	Protracted crisis	80% Gazans dependent on aid	€20m	30%
Greece	Unprecedented migration crisis in Europe	Massive influx refugees 2015/16, 60,000 still stranded	€643.3m since 2016	99%
Iran	Large refugee hosting country	951,142 documented and 2 million undocumented Afghan refugees	€9.75	51%
Ukraine	Request to participate	Unresolved conflict, 800,000 permanently displaced	€20m	11%

[127] This criterion initially did not include Yemen and Ukraine as DG ECHO funding to NRC is only around 10% of the country budget

[128] Annual Report 2017 including technical annexes

Yemen	Request to participate	2m displaced, 18m in need of humanitarian aid	€76.7m	9%

Intervention logic

The theory of change developed for the partnership evaluation and revisited in the conclusion is:

If there is a stable and long-term **partnership agreement** which specifies rights and obligations

and there are **simplified and efficient procedures** for DG ECHO and NRC to respond to humanitarian needs

and there is regular, comprehensive and transparent exchange of information for the purpose of **institutional learning** and development of best practice

Then there will be a **quality partnership** which will help to increase aid effectiveness



6. Findings on alignment

Finding 1: DG ECHO and NRC are strongly aligned in their strategic priorities and objectives through shared commitment to humanitarian principles.

Finding 2: The partners work closely and effectively on advocacy, drawing on shared analysis and using their relative strengths.

Finding 3: NRC follows DG ECHO guidelines for needs assessment and visibility.

6.1. Alignment of priorities, strategies and objectives

At the highest level, the mandate of DG ECHO and the mission statement of NRC are aligned. DG ECHO's mandate, guided by the 2008 European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, is to save and preserve life, to reduce or prevent suffering and to safeguard the integrity and dignity of people affected by humanitarian crises by providing need-based relief and protection, wherever the need arises if governments and local actors are overwhelmed, unable or unwilling to act. NRC's mission is to work to protect the rights of displaced and vulnerable people during crisis by providing assistance to meet immediate humanitarian needs, prevent further displacement and contribute to durable solutions.[129]

The way in which DG ECHO and NRC express their priorities differs, but there is general agreement that they are strongly aligned and stakeholders attribute this to the value each partner places on the principled approach to humanitarian assistance. DG ECHO's overall priority is to ensure that the aid is managed in the most effective and efficient way possible so that it has the maximum effect, whilst respecting the international law and fundamental humanitarian principles.[130] NRC's overall priority is to protect, assist and promote the rights of people affected by displacement in situations of armed conflict and in accordance with the humanitarian principles.[131]

DG ECHO sets and reports on priorities annually. Core priorities such as improving coherence between humanitarian and development aid and building capacities and resilience to disaster run across all actions. In particular, forgotten crises are prioritised through the allocation of at least 15 percent of the EU's annual humanitarian aid budget.[132] During the evaluation period, new priorities emerged and the balance between ongoing and new priorities varied depending on context. Examples included innovations in allocation of humanitarian aid on the basis of assessed needs (2014); Education in Emergencies (EiE) (2015);[133] responding more rapidly and effectively to natural disasters in the wake of El Nino (2016); use of cash (2016). In 2017 priorities were responding to gender-based violence; meeting Grand Bargain commitments in efficiency and value for money, as well as accelerating progress in the nexus; and maximising the impact of humanitarian aid through support for innovation and digitalisation.[134]

For NRC, priorities were expressed in terms of reaching more people in hard-to-reach areas; contributing to finding durable solutions for people in protracted crises; and reaching more people in neglected

[129] NRC GLOBAL STRATEGY 2018 – 2020

[130] http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/164/humanitarian-aid and in various documents

[131] NRC Strategy op cit

[132] https://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/addressing-forgotten-crises-todays-global-context_en

[133] In July 2015 Commissioner Christos Stylianides announced his intention to scale-up related EC's support, dedicating to education 4% of the 2016 humanitarian aid budget during the Oslo Summit on Education for Development.

[134] DG ECHO Annual Reports on the European Union's humanitarian aid policies and their implementation 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017

crises.[135] This is to be achieved through improvements in protection, holding the humanitarian system accountable and promoting rights in education, housing, land and property.

In terms of country priorities, there is alignment between DG ECHO and NRC. DG ECHO draws on a range of sources to inform its response including UN categorisation of crisis, Global Vulnerability Crisis Assessment (GVCA), assessment of forgotten crises, and use of the Index for Risk Management (INFORM) methodology to inform choices. NRC's response is informed by DG ECHO-mandated needs assessment methodology, such as HEAT, and its own core competency (sector) requirements. Of the more than 50 countries covered by DG ECHO, NRC is present in 31.

DG ECHO and NRC share the priority of addressing hard-to-reach areas. However, there are two sources of tension, both of which are related to efficiency. One is that the cost of reaching beneficiaries is much higher, especially if the numbers are smaller, than in easily accessible areas. The other, which is a major concern for NRC, is that the context of insecure countries is one in which there are huge corruption and other operational risks including diversion of aid. This links to the ongoing debate about risk sharing that is covered in the analysis of efficiency.

Cross cutting priorities are also broadly aligned. DG ECHO and NRC mainstream protection and compliance with International Humanitarian Law, as well as paying attention to gender, age and disability in assessment of vulnerability and promoting resilience. There is also agreement that innovation, technology and big data are important in improving response as well as engagement with the private sector, although funds are not allocated specifically for this.

Survey data confirms a high degree of alignment on overall priorities with 87 percent of DG ECHO respondents and 95 percent of NRC respondents stating they were totally or mainly aligned.

Figure 8 Alignment of SG DG ECHO and NRC overall priorities



From DG ECHO's perspective, reasons for a rating of mainly aligned were that NRC is not present in all the countries DG ECHO operates in, their activities sometimes go beyond strict humanitarian needs, and priorities between countries in the same region are not as joined up as they might be. From NRC's perspective, some of its programmes on durable solutions and resilience, as well as some activities related to provision of sustainable integrated shelter, fall outside DG ECHO stated priorities. In some countries DG ECHO prioritises health and nutrition, which is not a focus sector for NRC. There are also differences between countries as one respondent said that DG ECHO did not consider EiE funding whilst another said that it was a shared priority.

[135] NRC (2015). Strategy for global advocacy 2015-17

6.2. Alignment of advocacy priorities and efforts

DG ECHO and NRC advocacy priorities are also closely aligned. NRC's advocacy strategy during the evaluation period aimed to strengthen its ability to be a courageous and effective advocate for people affected by and at risk of displacement, especially at country level. In particular, the strategy aimed to increase access to protection, assistance and durable solutions in situations of protracted displacement by targeting stakeholders who are able to positively influence policies and practice. As both partners place a high emphasis on protection, development of joint advocacy messages is straightforward, and NRC has dedicated advocacy advisers at regional level and for countries such as Palestine as well as in most country offices. Examples of joint advocacy are development of humanitarian financing and structural change in Palestine.

Staff of NRC's representation office in Brussels regularly meet with representatives from DG ECHO and other European Commission policy makers to discuss advocacy concerns and responses arising from country level.[136] Much relates to particular countries or regions, such as Syria, and some is on technical challenges such as how to address low participation in the Afghanistan Cash and Voucher Working Group and trainings, which resulted in a strategy to expand awareness of cash as a viable option.[137]

The most challenging advocacy partnership, which led to a degree of strain, was in Greece. As NRC felt that the humanitarian response was simultaneously politicised and polarised, EU powerholders were seen as the most effective target for advocacy. However, during implementation of the advocacy strategy there was pushback from DG ECHO for use of funding to criticise the EU. For DG ECHO, there were significant concerns about NRC's performance in delivery overall and these were not easily separated from those of advocacy. NRC was criticised because it had no senior Greek staff which, from DG ECHO's perspective, meant that they had less understanding of and access to the Greek authorities and were less effective in the advocacy arena. In Syria there was a view that NRC's outreach to donors was somewhat disconnected from its actual operational delivery and capacity. More broadly, advocacy has become challenging for both partners since the 2016 European migration crisis, which deeply affected the Syria response.

One of the strongest advocacy partnerships is in the West Bank Protection Consortium.[138] NRC is highly appreciative of DG ECHO's willingness to speak about issues other donors find too political and to open doors to advocacy by informing them of relevant debates and issues. DG ECHO appreciates NRC's willingness and ability to communicate certain advocacy messages that it cannot. There is acknowledgement on both sides that one of the reasons DG ECHO funds NRC is the latter's strong emphasis on ensuring principled humanitarian response. Other examples of joint advocacy mentioned in interviews include developing an in-depth understanding of what it means to close a longstanding refugee camp in Kenya; a tour in Afghanistan to look at the issues of secondary displacement; a campaign to persuade development actors to adopt a humanitarian approach in response to the crisis in Northern Nigeria; and a joint response to the drought in Afghanistan.

Several DG ECHO staff commented in interviews that one of the main reasons for selecting NRC as a partner was its advocacy capacity, which was unparalleled in some countries and often superior to that of other partners. In Yemen, despite an unquestionably politically loaded crisis, NRC and DG ECHO advocacy was well aligned and collaborative, with partners sharing the same analysis and many policy objectives. NRC believes this is because their advocacy staff are professionals with solid field experience rather than lobbyists. Some DG ECHO staff mentioned appreciation of NRC's good data and analysis which is of good quality and very helpful at key times. One appreciated the analysis but said that there

[136] NRC Annual Report 2017

[137] Daniels, M (2015). Consultancy Report: Annex 1 Advocacy Strategy. Mike Daniels October 2015

[138] The Consortium is a strategic partnership between DG ECHO, nine EU member states, and five NGOs aimed at providing protection and assistance to Palestinians at risk of forcible transfer due to recurrent violations of international law.

was insufficient consultation about the terms of reference and process. NRC acknowledged that, where an issue is or is likely to become political, the level of consultation may be lower but believes that the value of NRC advocacy comes from its independence.

In the survey, 92 percent of DG ECHO respondents and 90 percent of NRC respondents stated that advocacy priorities were totally or mainly aligned.

Figure 9 Alignment of advocacy priorities



Differences between the partners on advocacy seem to be a question of degree. Where DG ECHO is concerned with all populations in need of humanitarian assistance regardless of their status, NRC advocates most strongly for displacement-affected populations, in line with its mandate. There is also a difference between what each partner can advocate on, with three DG ECHO respondents acknowledging that NRC can be more outspoken on some issues and can exert pressure where DG ECHO cannot for political reasons. In Europe, NRC's criticism of EU asylum policy was simultaneously considered necessary but uncomfortable.

Two NRC respondents stated that although DG ECHO is clear that advocacy in general is a priority, they are not always clear or 'straightforward' about what the actual advocacy priority is at country level. NRC's advocacy priorities of linking the addressing of humanitarian access and policy blockages to practical and achievable targets for programme delivery is endorsed by DG ECHO. In some cases DG ECHO's advocacy priority is broad, encompassing anything related to principled humanitarian response. In Afghanistan, DG ECHO and NRC agreed, with the benefit of hindsight, that more advocacy on the nexus would have been relevant because most actions relate to a context of protracted crisis.

6.3. Alignment of needs assessment

A specific question of the evaluation was alignment of needs assessments and multi-hazard risk and vulnerability analyses. To the extent that all actions funded by DG ECHO require compliance with standards for needs assessment, it can be assumed that there is alignment.

DG ECHO uses a two-phase framework to assess and analyse needs across countries and crises and to provide the evidence to allocate funding and develop the humanitarian implementations plans (HIPs).[139] The first phase is a global evaluation using INFORM and the Forgotten Crisis Assessment, which identifies serious humanitarian crises where the affected populations receive insufficient or no

[139] DG ECHO Needs Assessment Factsheet 15 February 2019.

international aid. The second phase of the framework is a crisis- specific response analysis using the Integrated Analysis Framework (IAF).

NRC uses a combination of its own needs assessment methodology and the assessment agreed jointly by the various humanitarian actors. Sometimes there is disagreement about assessment of vulnerability, especially in hard-to-reach areas where the cost of reaching beneficiaries may be very high relative to the numbers. NRC also uses its own assessment and indicators for thematic purposes.

DG ECHO encourages joint needs assessments as part of the ERM. NRC finds this challenging because it has specific areas of expertise and does not aim to assess all beneficiary needs. One DG ECHO interviewee noted the excellent quality of the community-based approach to needs assessment and another noted the sensitivity with which it was conducted in Iran. On NRC's side there was recognition of DG ECHO's flexibility when context and needs change. Within NRC there is a recognition that the tools for needs assessment can be improved to ensure that there is a conversation about need with beneficiaries rather than just an assessment of them. Both partners see the usefulness of needs assessment in defining advocacy messages.

In Afghanistan, the ERM requires the use of the Household Emergency Assessment Tool (HEAT) assessment by all partners and these are undertaken in as rigorous a manner as the situation allows. However, the petition system, in which beneficiaries make their applications through official government channels, has been a source of concern to both partners as it affects control over beneficiary selection and induces delays when beneficiary eligibility has to be rechecked.[140] During the drought response, when it was essential to conduct the assessment in one day to prevent what would likely be a significant pull factor, the HEAT mechanism was adapted to reduce the number of questions and focus only on those immediately critical to the response. Where the response was obvious, notably in water and sanitation, action was taken, and detailed needs assessment done subsequently. Overall, although there are criticisms of HEAT, the revisions to ERM take account of partner feedback and all partners in Afghanistan, including NRC, were generally satisfied with its usefulness and adaptability.

No evidence was found in any of the documents to multi-hazard risk and vulnerability analysis, other than a passing reference in documents on the humanitarian development nexus. Section 9.2 places this in context.

6.4. Following visibility guidelines

NRC appears to be broadly compliant with DG ECHO visibility requirements. In Afghanistan this comprised appropriate recognition of DG ECHO funding to stakeholders with banners at distribution points;[141] logos on relief items and tents; in workshops and training sessions;[142] on printed materials such as tools for project assessment and data collection templates; in social media announcements; and in NRC's newsletter, which is widely disseminated.[143] In some cases, audit reports show NRC invested more in visibility than is allowed under the 0.5 percent limit.

There are many situations in which visibility needs to be underplayed or avoided for security or sensitivity reasons. This is considered when the level of visibility is designed and mentioned in documents. There are also questions about the value of visibility. The evaluation of the Humanitarian Access

[140] This issue is covered in most DG ECHO Single Forms and FicheOps related to Afghanistan

[141] Emergency Response Mechanism (ERM) Afghanistan (2017). eSingle Form For Humanitarian Aid Actions 2017/00380/FR/01/01

[142] Education in Emergencies and Accelerated Learning Program (EiE-ALP). Support for Displaced and Vulnerable Children in Khost, Nangarhar, and Kunar Provinces eSingle Form 2016/00854/FR/01/01

[143] Aggregate, appropriate and effective humanitarian response in Afghanistan eSingleForm2016.09.27 RM5 Final Report

Communication project[144] showed that, even where visibility is demonstrated, beneficiaries and communities are unable to differentiate between the different entities involved in aid or understand the difference between NGOs, UN agencies, donors or government programmes.

Interview respondents indicated that NRC are largely following the visibility guidelines. However, NRC hopes to have a full dialogue about what DG ECHO wants to achieve with visibility and whether they are getting it. The focus is currently on the medium of visibility, for example, logos and media releases. NRC works hard to meet all the requirements but is concerned that there is no impact because the messaging is not strategic. At a time when it is hard to get support from the public and there are critical voices about aid, the quality of visibility needs to be addressed so that the messaging is more effective.

[144] JS Consultancy Services (2014). Humanitarian Access Communication Project. External Evaluation Report.. February 2014

7. Findings on policy level dialogue

Finding 4: Dialogue takes place through a range of channels, in structured and unstructured ways, involving all levels of DG ECHO and NRC.

Finding 5: Dialogue at the country level is functional and timely, based on a mutual desire to raise the quality of programme performance. Partners attribute this to the quality of DG ECHO Technical Assistance (TA) and the operational expertise of NRC.

Finding 6: DG ECHO and NRC share the view that the quality of dialogue, and therefore the effectiveness and influence of the partnership, is very high. Mutual learning is highly valued by both sides.

7.1. Structure and function of dialogue

Dialogue takes place between DG ECHO and NRC at several levels. At the highest level, the mechanism for strategic dialogue is very strong. As well as mutual interest, this is dependent on an established and close relationship between the Secretary General of NRC and the Director General of DG ECHO. High level technical dialogue is at least weekly and can be daily because of the strategic implications arising from work at country level in contexts that can be changing rapidly.

At policy level, senior NRC staff in Oslo and the representation offices in Brussels and Geneva maintain an ongoing dialogue with their DG ECHO counterparts and describe it as organisationally mature. In Brussels, NRC has a dedicated Partnership Adviser who engages at operational level with DG ECHO DO's to facilitate dialogue and resolution of any issues. However, this dialogue is mainly unstructured and takes place on an as-needed basis rather than according to a schedule. NRC would like to develop the partnership strategically but, in the absence of a more structured dialogue, are unclear how to reach out at the senior level of DG ECHO between the very top and the country desk.

Some interviewees say that the mechanism for dialogue works well because both organisations are relatively flat in structure and each party can simply pick up the phone to talk. Others in DG ECHO say that NRC's regional structure sometimes adds an unhelpful layer because the context of each country is so different, and the region is not always a meaningful entity. For this reason, policy dialogue at regional level is not structured.

At field level, dialogue is frequent but with greater dependence on individuals and a need to re-establish the relationship when there is a change in personnel, which is sometimes frequent. NRC notes that partner performance at local level depends on the relationship between DG ECHO in Brussels and the field and that sometimes different messages are being conveyed and the formal response can be different from informal agreements. This issue is covered in the efficiency section.

On both sides, at policy and operational levels, there is a desire to improve formal strategic dialogue. The formal mechanisms of the Annual Partner Meetings (see below) and the HIP process serve a useful purpose but often involve large numbers of people, and multiple technical and general agendas. Smaller forums work better in terms of establishing trust and having focused dialogue. Although NRC shares its strategies with DG ECHO, DG ECHO is unable to share strategies such as the Joint Humanitarian Development Framework (JHDF), which is an important tool in relation to the nexus, but is confidential.

NRC has various ways of pursuing ad hoc strategic dialogue such as bringing staff from the field or Oslo to Brussels to talk about key issues with DG ECHO. Continuous round table dialogue about Ukraine and a forum on Afghanistan, for example, were very useful and DG ECHO was able to provide NRC good access to the political wing of the EU. At other times, visits by NRC's Oslo staff were not always perceived

as well structured, especially when staff from NRC HQ were not well versed in programme details on the ground, whereas DG ECHO interlocutors in Brussels generally were.

When asked about how the mechanism for partnership with DG ECHO compare with other donors, NRC cites its programme-based approach with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA) and the Swedish Government. Under these agreements, project level decision making is devolved to the field and all dialogue at central level relates to strategic priority setting. It has formal elements of process to agree the framework, but the day-to-day dialogue is informal and responsive. With DG ECHO there are some gaps at this level of priority setting, as DG ECHO is project-based and is less engaged in thematic issues.

Two other mechanisms for dialogue, which are related. One is the Annual Partnership Meetings held by DG ECHO which are open to all partners (around 200) and provide a structured forum to engage in dialogue about the FPAs and issues arising from partners' work in country. The agenda includes a keynote address, panel discussions and a selection of thematic groups and workshops on a range of topical issues.[145] DG ECHO systematically seeks and documents feedback from partners after each meeting. In general, partners are satisfied with the conference, appreciating the interactivity and dialogue with the panellists and the Director-General, which they take as a token of the importance given by DG ECHO to partnership.[146]

Another useful mechanism that serves all FPA partners is the Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies (VOICE). NRC is one of the largest members and, due to the presence of the Partnership Adviser in Brussels, is an active and appreciated contributor. VOICE significantly increases the efficiency of the very detailed dialogue on new FPA agreements. VOICE exists to ensure the policies, practices and funding of EU and member state institutions relevant to humanitarian aid increasingly follow core humanitarian principles and good practice[147] and represents the views of 37 DG ECHO NGO partners from 17 countries in the monitoring, review and consultation of all matters relating to the FPA.[148] An evaluation in 2018 stated that VOICE were highly appreciative of DG ECHO for its commitment to work with a diversity of humanitarian partners and for undertaking structured dialogue with NGOs through the Watch Group.[149]

7.2. Purpose and quality of dialogue

Interviews on the subject of policy dialogue (along with efficiency) elicited the most interest and information of any of the EQs. This is an indicator of the value both partners attach to the partnership.

Dialogue at the country level is considered the most important by both partners. There are two main purposes of dialogue at country level: one to make the actions effective by discussing implementation challenges and changes in the operating environment and agreeing adaptations to the project's inputs, activities and outputs; and the other is to develop targeted advocacy messages. NRC has more dialogue with DG ECHO than any other donor in country and attributes the high-quality dialogue to DG ECHO TA, who they generally find accessible, easy to talk to and responsive, with good experience and knowledge of the country. The ability of TAs to get out to project locations gives them much deeper insights than other donors, which results in greater mutual respect and improved operational performance. DG ECHO

[145] Agendas of Annual Partner Conferences. Examples of focus are Education in Emergencies (2015), the European 'migration crisis' (2016), follow up to the Grand Bargain commitments of the World Humanitarian Summit (2017). the implication of Counter Terrorism requirements (2018) there was continuing discussion about how to make the FPA more strategic and result-oriented, as well as and consideration of migration and refugee compacts

[146] REPORT ON SURVEY ON DG ECHO PARTNERS CONFERENCE 2016

[147] VOICE website https://ngovoice.org/activities#whatwedo

[148] TERMS OF REFERENCE FPA WATCH GROUP, Feb 2016

[149] ICF (2018). Comprehensive Evaluation Of The European Union's Humanitarian Aid 2012-2016, Open Public Consultation Background elements to VOICE answers

Brussels-based staff confirmed that the field partnership was very strong and that a lot of insights were shared during dialogue that could feed into policy.

At the strategic level, dialogue is strengthened by the experience and networks of NRC's Secretary General, which support high level dialogue about issues such as the Syria and Yemen crises and key themes such as humanitarian space or counter terrorism. For NRC to be effective at policy level, the messaging is developed on field experience and rigorous analysis of trends before being put on the agenda of DG ECHO. In this, NRC draws on its strong commitment to coordination at all levels, including global, where it can see and discuss what other partners and donors are thinking and doing.

At policy level, NRC's strategic investment and the quality of NRC's policy advisers, who have years of field experience, result in messages that DG ECHO respects and can trust. A principal function of NRC in Oslo is to influence global policy using evidence. This feeds into annual strategy setting and co-chairing of working groups on issues such as protection, humanitarian access and use of cash. In addition to the Afghanistan and Ukraine examples in the previous section, the partners had high quality dialogue about how to view South Sudan as a whole country, rather than thinking about it in terms of the separate regions where assistance was being provided. Feedback from DG ECHO is that NRC's policy level dialogue is appreciated by member states. Feedback from NRC is that DG ECHO's investment in the principled humanitarian response is influential with other donors.

The principled approach and commitment to upholding high standards in humanitarian action is the basis of quality dialogue at all levels. NRC sees this as a salient feature of the relationship and considers DG ECHO to be one of few global donors that has managed to preserve a level of independence from the more political parts of the EU. Other donors have become increasingly concerned about the reaction of the media to aid decisions. Because of this, NRC invests more resources in its partnership with DG ECHO than with any other of its other 44 donors.

In some countries the quality of dialogue is affected by politics, especially the politics of migration since 2016. The NRC operation in Greece was 99 per cent funded by DG ECHO. Combined with a perceived higher degree of scrutiny of performance because it took place in a Member State, NRC felt less able to pursue its own advocacy priorities compared with other countries where it has mixed resourcing and is able to balance advocacy messages that may be politicised for one donor but less so for another. An example of the advocacy challenge was 'tough' dialogue on unaccompanied minors. Dialogue on Yemen also had political elements relating to access.

The quality of dialogue is sometimes affected by challenges of communication that arise between a partner that has a decentralised structure and one that is centralised. Meaningful discussion takes place around various high-level issues but the messages are not always easily conveyed between different layers of management within DG ECHO. In the case of Iran, for example, one conversation happens at three different levels: with Brussels and Oslo; with TA based in Islamabad; and with NRC regional office.

During interviews, many examples were provided about the partnership and most of them were positive. These are not included here because they often concern operational effectiveness, which is interconnected with but separate from the evaluation question on policy dialogue.

Many stakeholders in DG ECHO and NRC mentioned that both the organisations learn from each other. NRC believes that DG ECHO invests in it for the quality of technical dialogue and appreciates being challenged by a knowledgeable donor with shared interest in the principles, which helps them 'up the game'. They see DG ECHO trying to develop the humanitarian sector and bring partners along with it. One example was DG ECHO's positive influence on M&E from the outset of the partnership.

Organisational learning is important for both the partners to have policies grounded in evidence. DG ECHO DO's acknowledge that they learn a lot from NRC, directly from the field communicated by DG ECHO TA and from the various interactions with NRC in Brussels. Some learning is about what is working well and some the result of hard experience. DG ECHO's evaluation of the technical quality of WASH in

Somalia was a wakeup call for NRC, showing that the quality had fallen short. But it is testimony to the strength of the partnership that dialogue was open and transparent, which served to improve performance.

NRC's decision to recruit a Rapid Response Adviser at regional level was significantly influenced by the desire to coordinate with and learn from DG ECHO ERM coordinators. Both partners are concerned with questions about how needs are understood and assessed, and how to improve the response. For this reason NRC has responded to DG ECHO's positive influence in terms of professionalisation by creating a new position of Rapid Response Adviser.

Some interviewees pointed out that learning is more important than ever because, although dialogue is good, the issues the partners are dealing with are more complex than in the past. At the same time, funding is reducing and this affects learning. Learning also implies some risk. NRC appreciated DG ECHO's flexibility to experiment with innovation and this has been important in learning related to the use of cash. Learning from the use of cash in Lebanon have informed other programmes, including ongoing dialogue on the feasibility of use of cash in South Sudan. The partnership with DG ECHO has been timely as it has prompted NRC to ask the question "if not now, when?" in relation to use of cash.

Other attempts to innovate have been less successful. NRC's attempt to use digital innovation in Nigeria was a bold idea to do predictive modelling of movement in Boko Haram areas, combine it with programme information and use it to gather behavioural data. It was not successful in part because it didn't work in the context, and also because NRC staff on the ground could not understand its purpose. The after action review was an opportunity to learn, but DG ECHO decided not to provide further digital innovation funds. For NRC this was disappointing because they see the digital journey as only just beginning and a key step into policy that necessarily involved risk of failure. They observe that, under their programme-based approach with NMFA, the tolerance of such risk is absorbed through flexibility of thematic funding.

Learning related to protection is by far the hardest for NRC. It is definitionally complex and, at its widest, incorporates almost everything. But the approach has been the same thing for 10 years and both partners feel the need to review it.

7.3. Influence and effectiveness of dialogue

The survey provided good information on the influence and effectiveness of dialogue.

Influence of dialogue

Partners were asked whether policy dialogue had an influence on programme priorities. More than half (54/55 percent for DG ECHO/NRC respectively) stated that it had a moderate amount of influence. 20 percent of NRC respondents said that DG ECHO had a lot of influence compared with 8 percent of DG ECHO respondents saying that NRC had a lot of influence. At the other end, more DG ECHO respondents said that NRC had a little or no influence (34 percent) compared with vice versa (21 percent).

Figure 10: Influence of policy dialogue on programme priorities



In comments to the question, several DG ECHO respondents praised the input and 'fresh thinking' of NRC, which led to very good dialogue and an important exchange on strategic issues. One person said that NRC had highlighted situations that required a specific response, and which could be incorporated in DG ECHO's programme priorities without requiring a major shift. Another said that NRC had encouraged DG ECHO to keep a focus on education in refugee camps.

Two DG ECHO staff mentioned the importance of field visits in influencing priorities, pointing out that it was dialogue with all partners, in the context of the operational reality, that had influence rather than NRC alone. One pointed out that most dialogue was practical and operational, oriented to the ongoing action and overcoming the challenges faced, rather than strategic. Another acknowledged the value of NRC but noted that they are one among many partners and not necessarily the most influential. In general, the operating context and reality is the main influence on all partners, whether it's DG ECHO, NRC or another partner. One respondent noted that NRC's insight and analysis is not necessarily deeper than that of other partners but that they are often more skilled at articulating it and are seen as a good ally for partners who have less capacity.

In one country, where NRC was not a major player, DG ECHO considered the local team to be weak on advocacy, including towards DG ECHO.

For NRC, dialogue with DG ECHO, especially related to context analysis, had a strong influence on the activities proposed to DG ECHO. There was recognition that DG ECHO's prioritisation of needs and target beneficiaries can be different and, where DG ECHO had a clear idea of the kind of response they expected from partners, the choice was either to comply with DG ECHO requirements even if it does not fully match NRC's assessment of needs or to seek alternative funding sources. Two respondents said that there was open and frank discussion about strategy and programming, with one noting that DG ECHO's participation in the formal process has the potential to influence strategic priorities in country. When NRC's strategy is finalised, it provides the framework for programmes. Another noted that DG ECHO was an important stakeholder but that the process for setting priorities was independent.

One NRC respondent observed that dialogue has most influence on programme activities where the DG ECHO input is based on contextual analysis of needs in relation to the reality and where the same issues are jointly identified through coordination with other humanitarian actors. Another mentioned that dialogue with DG ECHO on each partners' top priorities influences the way NRC divides its activities or geographical choices between its various donors. A different respondent felt that DG ECHO officials sometimes have disproportionate influence, leaning heavily on partners to change their strategies.

Effectiveness of dialogue

Almost all respondents, on both sides, agreed that dialogue was effective, very effective or highly effective. At the higher end, 70 percent of DG ECHO and 51 percent of NRC respondents were in regular contact and either resolved issues in good time or were able to discuss and get a result whenever it was needed.

Figure 11: Perceptions of the effectiveness of dialogue



Where dialogue was classified as effective, almost half of DG ECHO respondents (46 percent) said they got a better result on some issues with others compared with a quarter of NRC (25 percent). This may reflect DG ECHO's accountability requirements as a donor.

Comments from DG ECHO reflected these differences with some saying that discussions in Brussels and in country were always fruitful and that there were direct lines of communication with the NRC country director if needed urgently or frequent informal meetings with relevant staff to update on the context or actions. One mentioned that NRC was highly proactive and transparent. Several comments demonstrated differences according to the topic of dialogue with greater satisfaction on programme level dialogue and requests for contextual information compared with administrative issues. One DG ECHO official was highly satisfied with general dialogue but highly dissatisfied with contractual documentation, which was slow, less regular, and consistently delayed. Two respondents stated that they received answers to requests only after sending reminders. One observed that effectiveness was dependent on NRC management at a particular time and another that NRC failed to address low quality implementation and dedicate the necessary human resources early enough to prevent a poor outcome. Another noted that NRC could be a stand-alone entity that may suddenly choose to engage differently or set itself outside a group of NGOs in advocacy.

Comments from NRC confirmed the effectiveness of dialogue and the easy availability of DG ECHO staff willing to discuss any issue. One claimed that this was a result of NRC's track record of being a reliable and dependable partner. Another said that DG ECHO TA and representatives were allies of NRC, enabling joint advocacy in humanitarian fora. In two cases, where there was no DG ECHO presence in country, dialogue was irregular but still considered effective. In another, issues were taken up by NRC's Brussels office, with good effect. One example of effective dialogue was a protection programme that DG ECHO co-funded with another donor in which three-way communication to align proposals worked well. Where there was dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of dialogue it was attributed to the individual involved.

8. Findings on efficiency

Finding 7: The DG ECHO partnership framework aspires to simplified procedures but does not provide any guidance as to how this may be achieved. The result is that work-arounds and informal dialogues become the primary means of improving the efficiency of partnership transactions.

Finding 8: Proposal and modification processes are lengthy, requiring a level of detail and scrutiny that is time consuming. This is compounded by uncertainty in both partners about how efficiency requirements should be interpreted.

Finding 9: Rigorous audits applying the Financial Regulation exhibit the same combination of detailed analysis, conducted in an open and collaborative spirit, but at considerable management cost to both DG ECHO and NRC. The positive consequence is that they have led to NRC strengthening its systems.

Finding 10: The *de facto* technical authority of DG ECHO field TA, recognised as a vital input to flexible management, is mismatched with their *de jure* lack of financial authority; this has been a source of inefficiency in cases where their guidance has been subsequently over-turned.

Finding 11: NRC is viewed by many in DG ECHO as a very expensive partner, which is not necessarily justified by the high costs and high risks of meeting finance, anti-corruption and anti-terrorism compliance requirements.

Finding 12: Annual funding without any future year commitment is a cost-effectiveness issue as it affects operating costs and long-term, in-country trust and knowledge building.

Finding 13: DG ECHO policy guidance on cash, and its highly valued technical expertise at field level have systematically improved NRC responses.

8.1. Management costs and administrative burden

Terms of engagement of the partnership

The FPA sets the terms of engagement between DG ECHO and NGO recipients of DG ECHO grant funding. These are constrained by EU policies and regulations including the humanitarian aid regulation, the financial regulation, sectoral policies, and relevant legislation such as that on counter terrorism. The FPA requires that partners provide assistance in accordance with the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence – which together define what is meant by a 'principled' approach. Further, DG ECHO agrees to provide aid in accordance with the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) which include reference to principled humanitarian action, respect for and promotion of international law, the importance of needs-based assistance, accountability to affected populations, predictable humanitarian funding, coherence of donor action, primacy of civilian response and support to multilateral co-ordinated humanitarian action.

Country or regional HIPs communicate to potential partners the needs as assessed by DG ECHO and the parameters partners are expected to observe in preparing proposals. The HIP comes with thematic and technical annexes that elaborate on policies, principles and guidelines referred to in the FPA, to which have been added DG ECHO's Grand Bargain commitments. This requires partners to explore and propose concrete ways of implementing commitments such as multi-annual planning and reduced duplication and management costs.

Grants are provided for specific projects (actions) on an annual basis. The total available for a country or region is constrained within a budget envelope determined by an EU Commission implementing decision. DG ECHO assesses proposals against a set of compliance markers, together with a narrative analysis

of the partner's proposal that considers the quality of the partner's needs assessment, the appropriateness of the proposed response and the capabilities and comparative advantage of the proposer. In line with the FPA's results-oriented approach, DG ECHO focuses on the relevance, feasibility and cost of proposed results areas. DG ECHO does not fund all proposals, and where it does provide funding it is often less than the amount requested by a partner.

Partner proposals are submitted, revised, agreed, reported on and modified through the Single Form . During implementation, partners are monitored for performance and compliance with policies and guidelines. At the end of the project, liquidation takes place in accordance with the EU Financial Regulation. A substantial proportion of projects are subsequently audited, again with reference to the requirements of the Financial Regulation, at which stage expenses may be disallowed and, after due process of discussion, recovered from partners.

The FPA Guidelines aim to establish a stable and long-term co-operation mechanism between the Parties that allows recourse to be made to simplified procedures. They also aim to promote the efficiency of aid. However, in 147 pages, there is no clear explanation of how procedures can be simplified or how management costs can be decreased. This means that although there is aspiration, the FPA itself cannot do either in itself.

Project proposal process

The rhetoric of partnership does not express the relationship between DG ECHO and its NGO framework partners for the duration of the proposal stage; rather, this is a negotiation between potential operational (as distinct from framework) partners with overlapping but not identical objectives for the contract under negotiation. NRC, in common with all other NGOs, is a business which must cover its core costs in order to survive. Its proposal to DG ECHO will therefore be a programmatic offer in line with DG ECHO's objectives as set out in the HIP and it will also be an offer which also supports NRC's business objectives. Among these will be (a) a business requirement to maintain a high project spend, since core costs are partially funded from project budget overhead contributions, and (b) business (as well as programme) incentives for continuity and stability of country presence, since setting up, expanding and closing down offices are all costly processes. These, and a related drive for visibility, were understood by some DG ECHO respondents to be among the reasons why NRC has made some very large, comprehensive proposals - such as the 2017 Afghanistan proposal - which DG ECHO declined to fund fully, decisions based on explicit programmatic criteria.

It is not DG ECHO's responsibility to ensure the business viability of its framework partners. However, there are two reasons why DG ECHO should consider the issue. First, NGO partners such as NRC comprise a reservoir of capacity that DG ECHO needs to meet its programmatic objectives and DG ECHO therefore has an interest in the survival of a financially healthy NGO sector. Second, a large and increasing part of NRC's core costs are spent on capacity to meet what they experience as increasing compliance requirements from donors, including DG ECHO. The compliance issue is discussed further in the section on project cost-effectiveness.

During interviews, respondents spoke on two topics with implications for transaction costs and for good working relationships. One concerned the high-level engagement with DG ECHO on policy and advocacy initiatives that NRC enjoys. At DG ECHO desk level, in their negotiation with NRC as a potential operational partner, the high-level access and influence can sometimes be felt as pressure to look favourably on NRC's proposal. This can seem unreasonable as well as unfair to other potential partners who don't enjoy the same access in DG ECHO. In turn it may increase the workload and put stress on the relationship.

The other is the abundant evidence NRC presents for the programmatic and cost benefits of donor multi-year funding commitments, currently being piloted by DG ECHO, and to DG ECHO's Grand Bargain commitments in this regard. As an interim measure, it also asks whether DG ECHO cannot provide more

predictability in funding in line with DG ECHO's commitment to Good Humanitarian Donorship. NRC has experienced DG ECHO funding dropping from many millions of euros to zero from one year to the next and, although changes in DG ECHO priorities or funding may necessitate this, changes at short notice can have very significant cost implications for NRC's country operation. The presentation of evidence, combined with high level engagement, have the potential to reduce the proposal process overall transaction costs, and both are explicit in the FPA.

This is one of several instances where the various guidelines and commitments set out in the FPA are mutually antagonistic: DG ECHO respondents point out that Desk Officers assess proposals in the light of the partner's current programme performance and with consideration of competing partner offers, both of which limit the scope for making binding funding commitments. Other aspects of Multi-year funding and programming are discussed below in the Project Cost-Effectiveness section.

Project management

In all interviews with DG ECHO and NRC, there was acknowledgement that humanitarian response in fluid and insecure environments requires flexible and responsive management, often calling for changes to operational modalities, inputs and outputs. These changes are routinely discussed and agreed with DG ECHO field TA, who NRC frequently describe as highly competent and having good knowledge of the context. However, respondents also report that changes may not be communicated and agreed across the relevant DG ECHO departments in Brussels, leading to subsequent re-runs of the same discussions with desks and heads of unit, and, potentially, audit disallowances. DG ECHO is a centralised organisation and the FPA clearly states that only DG ECHO headquarters can take decisions having legal or financial implication and they cannot be taken at field level. In contrast, NRC is a decentralised organisation and their respondents argue that the field perspective and expert judgement on field level issues (inputs, modalities, outputs) should be primary.

The processes for project approval and, to a lesser extent, modification approval, are lengthy. For example, the average length of time between proposal and grant approval in Afghanistan over the period 2014 – 2018 was 111 days (nearly 4 months). Proposals are necessarily substantial and may go through several drafts, sometimes driven by unresolved differences of opinion between DG ECHO TA in the field and the Desk Officer. The Single Form was welcomed but there was also a widespread view in NRC that it is repetitive and is cumbersome and time-consuming to use. Concerns were that it has a poor interface, asks for unnecessary data in numerous activity tabs and, as it expands, becomes increasingly confusing, which tends to obscure the core messages.

The effect of time-consuming processes is that partners and DG ECHO staff have to find ways to reduce the burden. One DG ECHO respondent reported that a new project approval might take four months. However, if the changes from one project to the next are broadly similar, it is sometimes possible to use the procedure of Modification Request to an already approved project, which can reduce the time to perhaps three weeks. Correspondingly, the workload to open a new FichOp (the requirement for a new project) would be half a day compared with half an hour for modification of an existing project. These indicative numbers indicate why a preferred work-around for at least some DOs is to extend a project with a modification rather than, as is strictly required, initiate a new project approval process.

Other respondents emphasised how informal, frequent, pro-active dialogue, and using the phone rather than email, speeded up processes. Sharing rough drafts before submission, for example, enabled disagreements to be ironed out at an early stage and could avoid unnecessary detailed work.

The fact that many of the programmes are chronic crises, and there is trust between the partners, facilitates use of most efficient processes and respondents emphasised that the generally excellent relations between NRC and DG ECHO at both HO and field level were preconditions to ensure the success of this way of working. However, where speed of response is a critical factor, the extent to which

creative methods are used and valued by respondents is a proxy for a system that is not as efficient as it could be.

Audit and the management cost of compliance

DG ECHO conducts periodic 'HQ audits' of partners, in each case commissioning an external auditor to audit a batch of projects implemented by the partner. In the period 2014 – 2018, NRC has experienced two HQ audits: a 2015 audit of 12 grant agreements and a 2017 audit of seven grant agreements, covering the period 2013 – 2015. For each grant agreement, the audit tests 35 – 80 percent of expenditure for eligibility with very detailed documentation criteria and marks inadequately documented expenditure as 'potentially ineligible'.

An example is illuminating. In 2017, initial audit testing resulted in a potential disallowance of several million Euro because NRC could not supply the supporting documents during the audit, as required under the FPA. This was because NRC had lost access to its offices in Turkey, from where it managed aspects of the Syria programme, due to the conflict and an important point of learning was that it should have repatriated key documents, such as beneficiary lists, to Oslo on a regular basis. The result was that NRC had to put a dedicated team of three people on the case in order to undertake two lengthy processes of document discovery, submission and analysis to reduce the disallowances. This took 16 months of intensive work and created a substantial administrative burden for NRC and DG ECHO Desk Officers and external audit department to piece together and scrutinise the audit trails.

Interviews elicited various perspectives on the efficiency of the audit process. From DG ECHO's perspective, audit is fair and reasonable, using a process that follows the spirit of the Financial Regulation and FPA. From NRC's perspective, the audit requirements are seen as too stringent and rigidly applied for the context. Where DG ECHO requires details of spending on deliverables to the final beneficiary and full documentation of procurement processes, NRC sees a system in which even one missing document, in the context of loss of an office, risks disallowing the entire transaction amount. In 2017, more than half the documentation requested by auditors from countries and regions was not readily available and/or in line with either DG ECHO or NRC requirements. Reconstructing evidence several years after the event (projects dated from 2013 to 2015 for an audit in 2017) is very challenging as staff with memory of the time have moved on.

On the positive side, both partners reported that the effect of this and of previous audits has been an improvement in NRC systems such as supply chain management and electronic scanning of receipts to ensure compliance. The process was also generous in terms of allowing repeated document submission over time; it was also collaborative. Overall NRC felt that DG ECHO achieved a fair balance between being sympathetic to the challenges and tough-minded in the application of the rules. On DG ECHO's side, while the investment in external audit costs was small in comparison with the amount recovered, the investment in staff time, particularly in relation to Syria, was considerable. There was also a sense that, as happened in relation to contentious project proposals (noted above), high level contacts between NRC and DG ECHO were perceived by some in DG ECHO as pressure to go beyond what was required by the process in terms of the depth of exploration to reduce the disallowance.

Beyond the partnership, several respondents framed the audit issue within the bigger picture of increasing demands from donors for strict compliance with a range of policies on, among others, corruption, anti-terrorism and sexual abuse. A concern was the cost of compliance, with NRC reporting that it had made very significant investments in capacity to develop policies and procedures and train staff to ensure compliance. This is discussed further in the section on Project Cost-Effectiveness.

Relationships

With a few exceptions, respondents in DG ECHO and the NRC represented the relationships between DG ECHO and NRC at field and head office level as excellent. Many linked this to smoother implementation of partnership processes and hence a significant driver of reduced management costs.

As discussed in earlier sections on policy dialogue, interviewees cited mutual trust, agreement on strategy and principles, pro-active information sharing, meaningful conversations on priorities, informal and swift communications to sort out problems, access to decision-makers, and openness. The relationship was stronger because DG ECHO, especially TA, were able to 'get out of the bunker' in insecure contexts and, as a result, had a better understanding of the operational reality. Several respondents mentioned instances where DG ECHO advice had helped improve NRC contextual understanding and approach. This differentiated the partnership from that with some other donors who see NRC solely as an implementer delivering logframe results.

Administrative burden

Responses to the survey questions related to efficiency are informative in terms of the amount of time spent on administrative aspects of the partnership and respondents provided many examples of ways in which the burden could be reduced.

In terms of the amount of time spent on administrative aspects of partnership, the table below shows responses to a list of statements in which respondents were asked to check all that applied to them.

Figure 12: Perceptions of the amount of time spent on administrative aspects of partnership



For DG ECHO, the largest number of responses (11) were that the time spent on administration related to NRC was normal. However, 8 said they spent more time on NRC administration than for other partners. For NRC, a smaller number (5) said that the time spent was normal and the same number (8) said they spent more time on DG ECHO administration than for other donors. A smaller number said either they spent too much time and found it unreasonable (4 each) or spent a lot of time which they accepted was necessary. For NRC, the same number (4) found DG ECHO formats difficult/time-consuming and easy/quick to use. In comments, three DG ECHO staff said they spent more time on NRC but in two cases it related to the complexity of the project, especially modification requests and project negotiation, rather than the quality of dialogue and documentation. One, who spent a disproportionate amount of time on NRC compared with other partners, commented that NRC continued to receive funds because it did important work done on ground but that programmatic documents were not coherent or clear and had a lot of inconsistencies. In that case the dysfunction was attributed to NRC's structure at country level and the reliance on a grants officer with limited project knowledge to produce documentation. Three DG ECHO staff said they needed to follow up NRC closely but pointed out that addressing administrative and contractual issues is an important part of the role of TA. One agreed that DG ECHO systems were difficult to use but that NRC had not yet customised DG ECHO requirements to align with their own system.

For NRC, three staff mentioned that the Single Form 2018 had brought improvements but was still not efficient due to frequent technical issues, in particular related to patchy internet access and difficulties working offline or with multiple users wanting to work simultaneously. Some of the issues were very basic – such as compatibility with Word - but took a lot of time to overcome so that the form could be completed properly. One respondent noted that the amount of time spent on administration varies according to the TA with some dedicated to supporting NRC to minimise the workload and others seemingly making excessive demands. Another observed that the process of project preparation with DG ECHO is more than for other donor grants but the time is not excessive. More time is spent on consultation, especially on advocacy issues and activities but, if these are agreed in advance of the actual proposal, the process is generally smooth. One respondent noted that NRC has to be especially vigilant on visibility.

The survey also asked respondents to identify up to three ways in which the administrative burden could be reduced. This question clearly engaged respondents as a total of 80 suggestions were received, 40 from each partner. The responses are summarised below and the survey questions are presented in Annex 9.

Figure 13: Respondents suggestions for reducing the administrative burden



Suggestions from DG ECHO about how NRC can be more efficient can be clustered under four headings:

- **Simplified proposals:** focus on a few areas of strength in specific sectors and geographical areas rather than complex and vast actions, with clearly defined parameters from the onset. Ensure staff are trained in clear and concise writing for FPA and eSingleForm
- **Better quality reporting**: providing all the information requested by DG ECHO clearly and consistently in a way that can be easily understood and with greater attention to quality before submission so that repeated revisions are unnecessary
- **Timely communication:** earlier identification of challenges, bottlenecks and likely underachievement to avoid multiple adjustments in the implementation plan and budget
- **Reduced cost:** reduce support costs so they are comparable to similar partners/programmes and be more transparent in financial reporting

Suggestions from NRC about how DG ECHO can improve can be similarly clustered:

- **Simplified procedures:** making the online project management system, Single Form and Appel shorter and less complex, more user friendly, usable offline so multiple users can contribute and review, and compatible with typical software such as Word.

- **Better communication:** greater consistency in messaging and expectations from DG ECHO TAs and DG ECHO in Brussels; fewer lines of communication to avoid confusion; reduced ad hoc requests for written reports and information beyond that agreed in the SGA; greater use of the flexibility provided for in the HIP submission schedule to reduce time pressure
- **Accountability for costs:** agree allocation of support costs at overall levels instead of the time-consuming line by line; acceptance of copies of cheques and bank transfers as proof of payment instead of insisting on a bank statement for each payment; application of the Fair Share allocation model; use of a global audit firm that understands the humanitarian world and can make sensible recommendations that add value.

Some of the suggestions apply specifically to each of the partners and require actions that only they can take. Others demonstrate room for improvement in efficiency that will benefit from ongoing dialogue between partners at institutional level. Examples are:

- Negotiation on the definition of programme and support costs and standardisation of a ratio to apply across all NRC contracts in the country
- Discussion about fair share financial reporting because there are opposing views within DG ECHO about its appropriateness in all contexts
- Discussion about the regularity and formality of communication and reporting in the light of after the fact audit and the difficulty of justifying historic decisions or agreements
- Developing means of consultation in the period before development of project proposals to define parameters of scope that work for both partners and reduce the burden of the process of submission and approval
- Continuing negotiation about a program-based approach
- Discussion about the extent to which DG ECHO should involve itself in implementation. Whilst NRC staff generally have huge respect for DG ECHO TA there are some areas of tension in the grey area between partner and donor

8.2. Cost-effectiveness of the response

Project efficiency

The FPA requires actions to uphold efficiency but does not have a clear definition of what is meant by efficiency.[150] Similar general formulations occur in the FPA Guidelines, requiring the partner to implement the action with 'the requisite degree' of efficiency 'as required by best practice'.[151] At the project appraisal stage, after listing the mandatory assessment criteria, which do not include efficiency, the Guidelines state that other elements *could be* taken into account, the last of which is cost-efficiency or comparative advantage of the action or the partners.[152] There is no requirement for Desk Officers to take measures to assess, improve or maximise project efficiency and cost-effectiveness during the project cycle.[153] Neither do the principal project management tools - the FichOps and the Single Form - require partners or DG ECHO desk officers to assess projects for efficiency or cost-effectiveness at any stage.

The only substantive reference to efficiency in the FPA arises from the EU financial regulations. Under Section 9.3, Eligibility Criteria of Costs, the Guidelines stipulate that the budget of an action must be used in accordance with the principles of economy and efficiency. The principle of economy requires that the resources used in the pursuit of an activity be made available in due time, in appropriate quantity and

[150] FPA, page 4.

[151] FPA Guidelines Sections 1.1, 2.2.3, 4.1.1, 9.0, 9.4.9, 10.4,

[152] FPA Guidelines (2014), Section 7.1 Eligibility and Assessment Criteria, pages 39-40, (emphasis added).

[153] FPA Annex II: General Conditions, page 4.

quality and at the best price. The principle of efficiency refers to the best relationship between resources employed and results achieved. If the principles cannot be respected, the partner is expected to justify the reasons and the impact and, if they cannot, the costs can be declared ineligible.[154] DG ECHO's obligation to ensure quality in terms of efficiency and accountability targets is mentioned under audit.[155]

In the Glossary, there is mention that efficiency generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving an output, to see whether the most efficient approach has been used.[156] Here there is internal inconsistency. Although partners are required to analyse distribution modalities – such as cash, vouchers and in-kind assistance - for their relative efficiency, there is no general requirement at the project design and proposal stage to compare alternative approaches and demonstrate that the most efficient approach has been used. On the other hand, a subsequent audit is empowered to recommend disallowance of costs if it determines that this hasn't been done. While none of the DG ECHO or NRC interviewees who were asked about this cited an occasion on which project costs were clawed back on the general grounds of inefficiency, this represents a risk to partners that is difficult to manage.

Ex post focus on outputs at liquidation

Although project liquidation was described by one respondent as usually smooth, NRC has experienced two recent instances of disallowances claimed at liquidation by DG ECHO based on non-delivery of outputs: in Yemen and in Greece. Both represent efficiency judgements.

The VOICE submission to the current FPA review framed this and similar instances as a mismatch between the focus on results at proposal stage as against the focus on outputs at liquidation. It notes that, with the regular reminders from DG ECHO about demonstrating value for money, the discussion has shifted from one on the quality of aid to one of cost-effectiveness. During the proposal stage the focus is on results and indicators but at liquidation it shifts to a focus on inputs and outputs. For partners the concern is that there is lack of clarity about how the Financial Regulation is being used and, consequently, what the rationale is for why or how a penalty is being applied. This makes it hard for its partners to manage the risk.[157]

Operational efficiency

For NRC, the idea of comparing alternative approaches to achieving an output, to see whether the most efficient approach has been used, was felt to be of limited utility in a fluid and insecure environment where opportunities to provide aid can arise without warning and must be seized quickly. One interviewee suggested that a working definition of efficiency might be 'readiness to act swiftly with very good control'. The readiness might, for example, involve leasing vehicles. From a readiness perspective this would seem necessary but, judged with hindsight using a conventional audit perspective, could look inefficient.

Unit costs – costs per output or per beneficiary – are a standard measure of efficiency that was also questioned by NRC. The example of having vehicles on stand-by shows how costs can be incurred to ensure readiness, undermining the utility of comparisons with projects operating in more secure environments. Another example is the cost of assisting hard-to-reach populations. Here, a standard measure of efficiency conflicts with the requirements of a principled response – it will generally be more costly to assist a hard-to-reach caseload. As humanitarian principles are central to the FPA, any definition of efficiency that emphasises reducing cost per beneficiary irrespective of context would introduce an internal inconsistency into the FPA. Several NRC respondents raised this inconsistency as an unresolved issue in the partnership with the simple question: what do you want us to achieve: low costs or principled assistance?

[154] FPA 2014 Guidelines, Section 9.3, page 57.
[155] As above, Section 12.2.1, page 126.
[156] FPA Guidelines (2014), Glossary, page 139
[157] As above, page 16.

This means that the FPA and Financial Regulation definition of efficiency is not appropriate to fluid and insecure operating environments of the kind that characterise several major NRC operations.

Economy: DG ECHO ex ante scrutiny of project costs

The FPA requires partners to be economical, using the cost-quality-timeliness (CQT) criterion[158]. Several respondents confirmed that at project appraisal stage DG ECHO DOs scrutinise project costs, often line by line, and may ask partners to remove individual lines or reduce certain costs. Results areas are costed by default in the Single Form, and DOs may question costs in relation to their expected outcomes - a results-based approach. Significantly, these respondents had extensive relevant humanitarian experience on which to base their judgements whereas not all DOs will have that. In addition, support costs may be assessed as a proportion of total costs. The FPA provides no criteria for assessing support costs, so DOs make context-specific judgements by reference to the desired results; for example, on the basis that co-ordination in a certain environment will be costly. A number of respondents in both DG ECHO and NRC described NRC as expensive. NRC's cost justification emphasises its deployment of high quality, senior staff to the field; essentially, using CQT reasoning, the justification gave priority to Q and T, with C a tertiary consideration.

This means that the utility of the *ex ante* cost scrutiny undertaken by at least some DG ECHO DOs is heavily dependent on the individual's expert contextual knowledge and good judgement as there are no explicit criteria by which to assess whether a partner's costs, in particular its support costs, are reasonable.

Project cost-effectiveness

For the purpose of this analysis, project effectiveness is defined as the capacity to deliver a principled response within the framework of the partnership. Project cost-effectiveness is defined as the capacity to do that without incurring undue management costs. The purely cost aspects of both these have been discussed above and this section examines larger cost-effectiveness implications.

A donor commitment to multi-year funding (MYF) will tend to reduce costs as discussed above. NRC respondents share the view that it also leads to agency continuity, hence deeper local knowledge and increased trust between NRC staff and local populations. NRC believes this is a determinant of effective programming, especially in the context of Afghanistan. Conversely, a DG ECHO requirement to move into a new area will entail trust building from scratch. Multi-year funding and programming therefore enables continuity of presence and response, which is a determinant of cost-effective programming.

The requirements of the FPA are, if strictly enforced, mutually conflicting and, for NRC, this conflict has not been resolved satisfactorily at country level. A perceived zero-tolerance compliance regime in conjunction with *ex post* judgements uninformed by country context and needs analysis risks stifling principled assistance, and hence reducing effectiveness while increasing costs.

Risk sharing and compliance emerged as a major effectiveness issue in discussions with NRC, the cost of which has been discussed above. Several NRC respondents made a link between compliance, risk, principled delivery and country level decision-making in terms of a zero-tolerance agenda stifling risk-taking. Principled assistance entails assistance in hard to reach areas, which may be controlled by non-government actors, which carries the risk of falling foul of anti-corruption and anti-terrorism rules, in addition to the risk of disallowed costs due to inadequate documentation as discussed above. Decision-making needs to be made at country level without fear of it being rescinded subsequently by auditors working inflexibly far from the context and later in time.

[158] The principle of economy requires that the resources used in the pursuit of an activity be made available in due time, in appropriate quantity and quality and at the best price.

The same concerns affect all partners, as expressed by VOICE. Its policy resolution called for systematic and meaningful consultations with NGOs to ensure that policy development would be rooted in field reality and form the basis for quality operations.[159] This was a follow up to a 2016 agreement that DG ECHO will consult more closely with Field Offices for the HIPs.[160]

Several of those interviewed in DG ECHO commented that NRC is a very expensive partner compared with others and that the quality of the programme does not necessarily justify the cost. NRC openly acknowledges that it is higher cost but justifies this on the grounds that its staff are more highly qualified and that it is committed to working in hard to reach areas. It was beyond the scope of the evaluation to undertake a cost-benefit analysis and therefore the evaluation team cannot comment on whether NRC's higher cost brings value for money. But it is important to register that the issue is live in DG ECHO and that audits are considered important as a means of assessing cost compliance.

8.3. Use of cash-based response

This question could not be covered in detail within the time and resources available for the evaluation. However, NRC respondents agreed that DG ECHO's endorsement of cash assistance has led to NRC questioning its own policy, increasing the use of cash assistance in its programmes, and promoting more extensive use of cash with other donors. Respondents cited examples of dialogue with DG ECHO on the feasibility of cash in certain borderline circumstances, such as South Sudan. NRC has engaged with the CaLP to build its capacity.

[159] VOICE (2017). General Assembly Resolution On Partnership Between NGOs, Eu Institutions And Member States

[160] DG ECHO (2016). HIP process meeting 2 FPA Task Force Exchange with DG ECHO. 20 July 2016

9. Findings on localisation and nexus

Finding 14: The partners differ in their adoption of the localisation agenda. Whereas DG ECHO is actively committed to localisation, NRC's identity is bound in direct implementation.

Finding 15: The meeting point on the humanitarian development nexus is partners' shared commitment to increasing resilience in protracted crises and the pursuit of durable solutions. This and funding limitations within DG ECHO are leading to increasing tripartite collaboration with DG DEVCO.

9.1. Local partner participation

The evaluation question asks about the extent to which the DG ECHO-NRC partnership contributes to increasing local partners' meaningful participation in humanitarian response.

Under the localisation workstream of the Grand Bargain, DG ECHO is looking at how to make its own internal processes more effective and efficient by stepping up cooperation with local partners. Increasing financial support to local partners and developing their competencies for better preparedness, faster response and resilience-building is seen as a way to improve delivery of humanitarian aid.[161]

In its self-report to the Interagency Standing Committee, DG ECHO noted a baseline of various actions prior to the signing of the Grand Bargain. These included local capacity-building implemented through DG ECHO Disaster Preparedness (DIPECHO) and EU Aid Volunteers; and Enhanced Response Capacity (ERC) funding to build the Network for Empowered Aid Response (NEAR) network of southern/local NGOs.[162] DG ECHO has also designed a localisation marker to measure progress towards the global target.

DG ECHO is currently working out the policy and legal implications of trying to achieve a system of humanitarian assistance that is locally led. The Humanitarian Aid Regulation limits DG ECHO to funding UN/NGOs with headquarters in EU Member States, which acts as a barrier to direct funding of national or local partners. An internal process has been initiated to assess what change is needed and DG ECHO has been actively involved in discussions with various FPA partners to move towards a common vision and integrated approach to localisation. Interviews indicated that change is already happening at country level where several governments are revising their requirements for localisation and, for DG ECHO, this means a complete rethinking of its role if the power balance is to be shifted to local level. To this end, DG ECHO is supporting four projects looking at the challenges of supporting global coordination and enabling local organisations to bring their own perspective.

DG ECHO is not alone in the challenge. An independent review of the Grand Bargain highlights the definitional issues around localisation and the difficulty of identifying the desired end goal. Aid delivery organisations are starting from different baselines and, for donors including the EU, there are legislative and political constraints on their ability to provide funding more directly to local and national actors. DG ECHO is mentioned in its endeavour to address the strategic challenge through investments in 'system-transforming initiatives.[163]

NRC has signed all the commitments under the Grand Bargain although it gives lower priority to localisation compared with engagement in other workstreams. It advances the localisation agenda through its work on Country Based Pooled Funds, internal policy on partners and capacity building initiatives implemented by NORCAP.

[161] DG ECHO Grand Bargain Factsheet https://ec.europa.eu/DG ECHO/what/humanitarian-aid/grand-bargain_en

[162] DG ECHO (Undated). DG ECHO Grand Bargain annual self-reporting exercise (presumed 2017/18)

[163] Overseas Development Institute (2018) Grand Bargain annual independent report 2018. HPG

The organisation practices a model of direct implementation, which it believes is essential for working in conflict-affected and complex crises where principled humanitarian action plays a crucial role.[164] Interviewees were clear that localisation is inconsistent with the strongly held view that the 'soul' of the organisation is its presence on the front line with the people who are displaced. Under its current strategy, NRC commits to strengthen the impact of its programmes by partnering more with actors – local and global - that have complementary expertise. In the case of Iran, for example, it is a government requirement to work through local partners and DG ECHO has been pleased with NRC's capacity development activities.

For some stakeholders in DG ECHO, localisation is a weak point of NRC. In Greece, the lack of senior Greek staff reduced their understanding of the context. In Jordan, NRC uses Jordanian lawyers but in a sub-contracting rather than partnership relationship. In Serbia, there was disappointment that NRC left rather suddenly, without developing capacity, although the reason appeared to be related to lack of funds to continue.

Survey evidence shows that, in the majority of cases, DG ECHO staff have either not talked to NRC about localisation or have found it not relevant in the context (71 percent). The figure is slightly higher for NRC (80 percent) although the respondents are not necessarily talking about the same countries.

Figure 14: Partner discussion about localisation



Comments from DG ECHO suggest that the main reason for raising the subject is the strong interest to move this Grand Bargain commitment forward. Reasons for not raising it, or for considering it not appropriate in the context, were NRC's stated preference to implement their action directly. In one country the contribution of local partners was only between one and three percent of NRC's DG ECHO-funded budget and DG ECHO encouraged an increase. In another country, DG ECHO said that NRC's stated reason for not involving local partners was to maintain quality but the quality of the action had been questionable, with one of the reasons being the lack of engagement of local partners. The quality of other partner programmes, who had engaged local partners, was considered superior to NRC's. In the Syria response, remote management and localisation were a necessary part of the modus operandi in some operations and NRC had initially been proactive in leading a remote management study. This decreased when there was turnover in staff.

Comments from NRC confirmed the preference for direct implementation whilst mentioning engagement with DG ECHO about the eventual handover of some activities to national entities.

[164] NRC GLOBAL STRATEGY 2018 – 2020

9.2. Humanitarian development nexus

The evaluation question asks about the extent to which the partnership enhanced engagement between humanitarian and development actors.

As with localisation, DG ECHO has been working on its humanitarian-development nexus commitment under the Grand Bargain to enhance engagement with development actors. It has long understood that, while humanitarian aid is crucial in the aftermath of an emergency, development cooperation offers long-term solutions to structural problems and that working together can improve the living conditions of the world's most vulnerable people, increase their resilience and thereby shrink humanitarian needs over the long-term.[165] Nexus approaches to promote humanitarian-development synergies are encapsulated in the EC's 2013 Resilience Action Plan and in earlier commitments to Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD).[166] Since the 2017 Joint Communication,[167] the approach has moved beyond strengthening resilience at community and individual levels to emphasise enhancing state and societal resilience. This recognises the need for a political and security approach in which governments take primary responsibility for catering for the needs of their populations.

In line with growing recognition that the humanitarian-development nexus needs to expand to a Triple Nexus, which adds peace to the mix of efforts to respond to volatile situations around the world, DG ECHO is developing its ways of working. It has a dedicated section which works closely with DG DEVCO and has a pilot project looking at linkages in six countries[168] (originally 14). Among other things, the study will look at how to change ways of working so that the root causes of a crisis are considered from the beginning of the crisis and the approach can be consistent with current nexus thinking. The three current priorities related to nexus are to invest in durable solutions for refugees and IDPs; increase social protection systems; and promote multi-hazard risk and vulnerability analysis, and multi-year planning.

Related to multi-hazard risk and vulnerability analysis and multi-year planning, the intention is for DG ECHO and DG DEVCO to consider options for collaboration towards shared objectives as early as possible. DG ECHO and DG DEVCO have also engaged in strategic dialogue with the World Bank on a number of priority nexus initiatives. At a practical level, DG DEVCO and DG ECHO are applying a resilience approach in certain Humanitarian-Development Nexus pilot countries. These aim to trial collaborative activities such as joint analysis and programme activities; introduction and use of social safety nets to avert crises and allow for early pre-emptive action; developing insurance mechanisms to enable a local response and humanitarian financing; multi-year programming.

At the operational level, elements of nexus thinking have long been incorporated in DG ECHO programming. For example, the Single Form asks about exit strategy, which is a proxy indicator of nexus thinking, and DG ECHO do not provide funding for structures that parallel those of the host government.

NRC's Global Strategy 2018-20 has four main ambitions, one of which is to be a champion for durable solutions, and this is the starting point for engagement in nexus. Similar to the concern with localisation, interviews revealed concern that working on nexus will take NRC away from its core. Specifically, there is concern that use of humanitarian funds for development purposes would mean less for emergency response at a time when needs are increasing. At the same time, due to the number of protracted crises countries, NRC is prompted to think more deeply about nexus because short-term humanitarian response is hard to disentangle from long-term vulnerability. Adoption of the Triple Nexus by DG ECHO adds another dimension and has led to ongoing discussions in NRC about what the Peace element means for

[165] Grand Bargain Factsheet https://ec.europa.eu/DG ECHO/what/humanitarian-aid/grand-bargain_en

[166] Grand Bargain annual self-reporting exercise: DG ECHO. Undated (presumed 2018)

[167] Joint Communication Full reference??): "A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's External Action" 7 June 2017

[168] None of these are the same as the countries selected for the evaluation sample.

an organisation that defines itself as purely humanitarian. At issue is whether NRC can develop a position that allows it to work on nexus without compromising humanitarian principles.

Separate from the main effort in humanitarian delivery, NRC contributes to stronger linkages between humanitarian and development efforts through NORCAP.[169] This facility places individual experts in governments and other organisations with the aim of strengthening capacity of partners to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from crises.

Conceptually DG ECHO and NRC agree that the key consideration in nexus is resilience and the partners work together in a number of ways including on the Resilience Committee. As with localisation, there are definitional challenges. The idea of a continuum between relief and development, and the desire to respond to it, dates back decades and has been continually debated under different names. For some countries, such as South Sudan or Yemen, the partners agree that there is currently no continuum to development and there are particular challenges in the grey zone of the Syrian crisis and in Palestine, where there is no authority to hand over to. Therefore, while both partners recognise the need to have a more structured response, there is no similar experience to draw on.

As a consequence of engagement on nexus, as well as declining funds in DG ECHO, NRC now has 30 projects which have shifted to funding through DG DEVCO, NEAR and the Emergency Trust Fund. Its flagship Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA) programme is no longer classified as humanitarian but, as the issues it addresses are long-term, it is considered suitable for multiyear funding. In these cases, there is no difference in intervention, only in the funding modality. This highlights the challenge that, aside from the push factor of reduced humanitarian funding, neither DG ECHO nor NRC are conceptually clear about the point at which development funding is more appropriate than humanitarian in protracted displacement. An example is NRC's shelter response where a precondition is that people supported with shelter interventions should not be evicted within ten years. For DG ECHO this period is too long.

At country level there are various ad hoc examples of how DG ECHO and NRC work together on issues that can be considered nexus. In Iran, NRC works directly with the Iranian education authorities in rehabilitation and construction of classrooms to help meet their commitment to inclusion of registered and unregistered Afghan children. In Iraq, Central African Republic and Central America, there have been initiatives on conflict sensitivity which aim to define the conditions under which nexus is feasible and likely to be effective. In Afghanistan the Triple Nexus has been adopted by the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), in which DG ECHO has observer status, so there are ongoing discussions about how this can work for all humanitarian actors, especially on the Peace element.

On behalf of partners, VOICE emphasises that operationalising the nexus requires different funding instruments to ensure that closer cooperation and coordination between humanitarian and development policies does not undermine timely humanitarian response.[170] From the FPA partner perspective, successful implementation of the nexus implies more multi-year planning and funding in humanitarian activities and the systematic introduction of crisis modifiers in development activities so that opportunities are not lost due to lack of an appropriate instrument.[171]

In the survey, responses about working together on the nexus showed the largest difference of all questions. Whereas less than half (42 percent) of DG ECHO staff said they were working on the nexus

[169] NORCAP is a global provider of expertise to the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding sectors managed by NRC

[170] ICF (2018). Comprehensive Evaluation Of The European Union's Humanitarian Aid 2012-2016 Open Public Consultation Background elements to VOICE answers

[171] Ensuring people's needs are at the heart of the nexus approach: a humanitarian NGO perspective. VOICE Policy Resolution 2018

with the partner, more than three quarters of NRC staff (80 percent) said they were actively working with DG ECHO on it. In part this may reflect issues of interpretation about what constitutes nexus.

Figure 15: Partners working together on the nexus



In five cases where there were attempts to work on the nexus, one said that NRC was one of the leading NGOs (Ukraine) and another that some projects had been handed over to DG DEVCO as development rather than humanitarian initiatives. Two said that their attempts to work on nexus were unsuccessful but that the challenge was getting development donor interest, not NRC interest. In the drought response in Afghanistan, DG ECHO contracted NRC and other partners not only to respond to needs but also to encourage increased productive dialogue with development partners based on evidence from the action. This advocacy on nexus, for which NRC is an ally, is the limit as DG ECHO Afghanistan does not have available funds for nexus activities. In Iran, DG ECHO works on education with NRC in a way that is clearly nexus, prompted by government policy.

Where DG ECHO does not work with NRC on nexus, one reason was that activities in the country are limited to meeting core humanitarian needs, in which NRC adds the most value. Another was that NRC had no medium term strategy with which to engage on nexus.

NRC comments indicated similarities in terms of general support for nexus and the challenges of engaging development partners. Two respondents said that DG DEVCO was present as well as DG ECHO but that it was either not clear how they wished to complement each other or that DG ECHO did not do enough to facilitate dialogue with DG DEVCO and NEAR. Another said that DG ECHO had not yet found its voice on nexus. Four responses indicated that they were working on nexus, but because it was within the overall mandate of NRC to pursue durable solutions, not because of DG ECHO influence.

10. Conclusions, lessons and recommendations

10.1. Conclusions

The evaluation sought to test the intervention logic that, if there is a stable and long-term partnership agreement, and there are simplified and efficient procedures to respond to humanitarian needs, and there is regular, comprehensive and transparent exchange of information, then there will be a relationship of trust and a quality partnership which will help to increase aid effectiveness.

The conclusion of the evaluation is that the partnership between DG ECHO and NRC is of high quality. It is characterised by skilled and principled professionals who work sincerely to exchange information through a range of policy dialogue processes that are oriented to delivering results for people in humanitarian crisis. These exchanges between partners have a positive effect in promoting institutional learning and development of best practice in both organisations. This results in a high degree of trust at all levels, especially at country level where it matters most.

The weak point of the intervention logic is the assumption of the FPA that it will result in procedures that are simplified and efficient. This aspiration has not yet been realised and, although staff on both sides work conscientiously through highly detailed and lengthy processes, these can only be described as inefficient in a humanitarian context. At this stage in the partnership, further improvements in procedures are necessary for the impact level ambition of improved aid effectiveness to be achieved. This will require resolution of the tension between principled risk-taking and compliance.

The FPA covers some 200 NGOs of varying size, experience and capacity. At country level the FPA is a prerequisite for grant funding but it does not guarantee it and NRC has to demonstrate its capacity on the ground and in relation to other partners. For the most part, DG ECHO is highly satisfied with the performance of NRC and especially values its strength in and commitment to advocacy. But there are areas where NRC has not met DG ECHO's performance expectation. This is relevant as NRC justifies its high cost relative to other partners on the basis of superior expertise.

The accountability justification for the current processes, including stringent financial audits, is clear and DG ECHO managers fear loss of control if they are relaxed. However, the costs are disproportionate, both in the timeliness of approvals and in the poor use of time. The focus of skilled DG ECHO DOs and NRC managers should be on accountability for programme results and not on the detail of implementation in budget lines and distribution lists. In terms of locus of decision making, the fact that NRC decentralises control over inputs, activities and outputs to field level managers, whereas DG ECHO retains control at central level, has the potential to create delay and misunderstanding.

Globally, where insecurity and protracted crises are becoming the norm, the increase in compliance regimes have a high cost. This results in the dilemma that attempts to deliver principled assistance appear to be increasingly at risk of falling foul of compliance requirements or, at a minimum, having very onerous consequences for the partners. The unintended consequence is a retrospective shift of attention and effort to activities, outputs and documentation that risks compromising principled action and undermining achievement of outcomes and impact.

These factors set up a dissonance that has the potential to undermine the critical relationship of trust that is at the heart of a quality partnership. Trust between DG ECHO and NRC is about reliance on and confident expectation of integrity, strength, ability, and reliability. With a small number of exceptions, all

the evidence points to levels of institutional strength in DG ECHO and NRC that can guarantee at least satisfactory performance even when the context is particularly challenging. Whilst DG ECHO is required to ensure compliance and good performance across the board, it is important that this is balanced by consideration of what is appropriate in the most challenging of contexts.

10.2. Lessons

The evaluation is of the partnership between DG ECHO and NRC. Some of the findings, especially those related to quality of dialogue, are unique to these partners. Others, notably findings and conclusions on efficiency, are applicable to DG ECHO's relationship with all framework partners. The following lessons are applicable to all partnerships at the higher level.

Lesson 1: The importance of trust

When funding and delivery organisations jointly invest resources in developing and maintaining a high quality humanitarian response, a relationship of trust develops. This creates an enabling environment for a genuine partnership – as distinct from a donor / implementing agency relationship – which is based on integrity, reliability and performance. A partnership based on trust cannot be taken for granted and requires continual investment at all levels. But the dividend is that, when things are not going as well as envisaged, there is goodwill on both sides to find a solution or compromise.

Lesson 2: Effective policy dialogue

Policy dialogue is most effective if it happens at all levels and utilises structured (planned) as well as unstructured (ad hoc, as needed) means. Although the partnership utilises both means productively, the opportunities for unstructured dialogue are greater and this works well for urgent or specific issues. Where structured dialogue takes place, it allows in-depth exploration of issues that may be important but not urgent, such as how to respond to Grand Bargain commitments or how to refine technical approaches such as cash. Balancing structured and unstructured dialogue is likely to increase the institutional learning that is an important element of the theory of change in the move to greater aid effectiveness.

Lesson 3: The ambition of the FPA, its interpretation and its internal conflicts

The FPA is an instrument whose internal inconsistences and detailed requirements do not translate into an efficient and cost-effective response. Achieving the latter depends on flexible interpretation of the requirements, recognition of trade-offs, and agreement on risk sharing.

The FPA attempts to cover all possible angles and all possible risks. Projects are specified, assessed, liquidated and audited in great detail. Implementation is guided and constrained by a wide range of policies, guidelines and regulations, increasing in number over the past five years, some of them enforceable through financial sanctions on partners. The result is an ideal of humanitarian partnership and high-quality response which cannot be fully realised in practice with requirements that cannot all be simultaneously satisfied.

There are basic structural conflicts: for example, although DG ECHO has committed to the Grand Bargain and the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative[172], these are works in progress rather than commitments achieved. There are also structural inconsistencies in that operational knowledge to guide project implementation is peripheral and contextual, but decision-making is centralised and does not recognise the technical authority of field-based judgements. Some requirements conflict with others in that partners are required to make a principled response but also to accord with tough compliance requirements, both of which may not be possible at the same time. Some regulations need flexible, context-specific

[172] The Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative is an informal donor forum and network which facilitates collective advancement of GHD principles and good practices. It recognises that, by working together, donors can more effectively encourage and stimulate principled donor behaviour and, by extension, improved humanitarian action.

interpretation: the standard definition of efficiency offered by the Financial Regulation needs to be interpreted for insecure contexts; audits could make more flexible use of the concept of materiality.

Other FPA conflicts are emergent and might be described as paradoxical: while efficiency is a basic principle, onerous procedures and formats, partly intended to ensure efficiency, generate a considerable workload and delay approvals, which is inefficient. Although cost-effectiveness is a principle, the dominant focus on cost-efficiency (costs and outputs), combined with fear of penalties, serves to distract the attention of DG ECHO and partners from the strategic importance of the cost of results focus.

Relevant to any partnership, therefore, is an articulation and negotiation of how the rules of the partnership are to be applied, recognising that not all the rules can be strictly applied all the time.

10.3. Strategic recommendations

The strategic recommendations follow from the evidence-based conclusions and the lessons that can be identified from them.

Recommendation 1: DG ECHO should move towards multiyear planning and funding for trusted partners

For those partners who operate at scale and have a proven track record of quality delivery using DG ECHO funds, multiyear planning and funding has the potential to reduce operating costs and improve effectiveness. It is also a Grand Bargain commitment to introduce predictability into funding through some form of multi-year planning which DG ECHO, as a signatory, should strive for as a matter of priority.

Recommendation 2: DG ECHO should develop more opportunities for structured dialogue to increase institutional learning

DG ECHO has successful Annual Partner Meetings that are much appreciated by partners. They enable partners to prepare their agenda items carefully and provide a forum for sharing that is especially beneficial for smaller partners who do not have the access enjoyed by organisations such as NRC. But the larger partners have considerable capacity, gained through years of experience, which they could share more strategically if there were increased opportunities for structured dialogue.

Recommendation 3: DG ECHO should simplify project cycle processes; vest authority on operational matters in the field; define risk-sharing agreements that facilitate principled, cost-effective responses

DG ECHO can improve the efficiency of partnerships by reducing very considerably the level of detailed information and scrutiny inherent in the current process. There are already efforts to make the audit process more efficient and less resource intensive and these should be prioritised along with improvement in all processes from proposal through to liquidation, as well as speeding up the timeframe. Moving towards a situation where approval authority for changes to inputs, activities and outputs, and judgements of efficiency, is vested at field level, should facilitate efficient, flexible and responsive project management. Desk officers should focus on results. DG ECHO's partnerships will also benefit from negotiation of risk-sharing agreements that permit principled work within agreed parameters and shield partners from the political pressure of the 'zero tolerance agenda'.

Annex 1: Terms of Reference

EUROPEAN COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR CIVIL PROTECTION AND HUMANITARIAN AID OPERATIONS – DG ECHO

ANNEX I

Terms of Reference

for the combined evaluation of the European Union's humanitarian interventions in Afghanistan, 2014-2018, and DG ECHO's partnership with the Norwegian Refugee Council

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1. EU HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

1.1 FRAMEWORK

1 The **legal base** for Humanitarian Aid is provided by Article 214 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and the Humanitarian Aid Regulation (HAR). The objectives of European Union (EU) humanitarian assistance are outlined there and could – for evaluation purposes – be summarized as follows: *From a donor perspective and in coordination with other main humanitarian actors, to provide the right amount and type of aid, at the right time, and in an appropriate way, to the populations most affected by natural and/or manmade disasters, in order to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity*.

2 The **European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid** (the Consensus) – which has been jointly developed by the Council, the EU Member States, the European Parliament and the Commission – provides a reference for EU humanitarian aid, and outlines the common objectives, fundamental humanitarian principles and good practices that the European Union as a whole pursues in this domain. The aim is to ensure an effective, high-quality, needs-driven and principled EU response to humanitarian crises. It concerns the whole spectrum of humanitarian action: from preparedness and disaster risk reduction, to immediate emergency response and life-saving aid for vulnerable people in protracted crises, through to situations of transition to recovery and longer-term development. The Consensus has thus played an important role in creating a vision of best practice for principled humanitarian aid by providing an internationally unique, forward-looking and common framework for EU actors. It has set out high-standard commitments and has shaped policy development and humanitarian aid approaches both at the European and Member State level. Furthermore, with reference to its overall aim, the Consensus has triggered the development of a number of humanitarian **sectoral policies**.

3 The humanitarian aid budget is implemented through annual funding decisions adopted by the Commission, which are directly based on Article 15 of the HAR. In general, there are two types of financial decisions: decisions adopted in the context of non-emergency situations (currently entitled **World Wide Decisions** (WWD)), and decisions which are adopted in emergency situations. The WWD defines inter alia the total budget, and budget available for specific objectives, mechanisms of flexibility. It is taken for humanitarian operations in each country/region at the time of establishing the budget. The funding decision also specifies potential partners, and possible areas of intervention. The operational information about crises and countries for which humanitarian aid should be granted is provided through 'Humanitarian Implementation Plans' (HIPs). They are a reference for humanitarian actions covered by the WWD and contain an overview of humanitarian needs in a specific country at a specific moment of time.

4 DG ECHO has more than 200 partner organisations for providing humanitarian assistance throughout the world. **Humanitarian partners** include non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international organisations and United Nations agencies. Having a diverse range of partners is important for ECHO because it allows for comprehensive coverage of the ever-

expanding needs across the world – and in increasingly complex situations. ECHO has developed increasingly close working relationships with its partners at the level of both policy issues and management of humanitarian operations.

5 DG ECHO has a worldwide network of field offices that ensure adequate monitoring of projects funded, provide up-to-date analyses of existing and forecasted needs in a given country or region, contribute to the development of intervention strategies and policy development, provide technical support to EU-funded humanitarian operations, and facilitate donor coordination at field level.

6 DG ECHO has developed a two-phase framework for assessing and **analysing needs** in specific countries and crises. The first phase of the framework provides the evidence base for prioritisation of needs, funding allocation, and development of the HIPs.

The first phase is a global evaluation with two dimensions:

- Index for Risk Management (INFORM) is a tool based on national indicators and data which allows for a comparative analysis of countries to identify their level of risk to humanitarian crisis and disaster. It includes three dimensions of risk: natural and man-made hazards exposure, population vulnerability and national coping capacity. The INFORM data are also used for calculating a Crisis Index that identifies countries suffering from a natural disaster and/or conflict and/or hosting a large number of uprooted people.
- The Forgotten Crisis Assessment (FCA) identifies serious humanitarian crisis situations where the affected populations do not receive enough international aid or even none at all. These crises are characterised by low media coverage, a lack of donor interest (as measured through aid per capita) and a weak political commitment to solve the crisis, resulting in an insufficient presence of humanitarian actors.

The second phase of the framework focuses on context and response analysis:

- Integrated Analysis Framework (IAF) is an in-depth assessment carried out by European Commission's humanitarian experts. It consists of a qualitative assessment of humanitarian needs per single crisis, also taking into account the population affected and foreseeable trends.

1.2 SCOPE & RATIONALE

7 The European Union aims at being a **reference humanitarian donor**[173], by ensuring that its interventions are coherent with the **humanitarian principles**[174], are relevant in targeting the most vulnerable beneficiaries, are duly informed by needs assessments, and promote resilience building to the extent possible. The Commission also takes the role of – when necessary – leading, shaping, and coordinating the response to crises, while respecting the overall coordination role of the UN OCHA.

[173] I.e. a principled donor, providing leadership and shaping humanitarian response.

[174] Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality and Independence

8 Interventions have a focus on **funding critical sectors and addressing gaps** in the global response, mobilising partners and supporting the overall capacity of the humanitarian system. As a consequence of the principled approach and addressing gaps in overall response, the EU intervenes in **forgotten crises**[175], i.e. severe, protracted humanitarian crisis situations where affected populations are receiving no or insufficient international aid and where there is little possibility or no political commitment to solve the crisis, accompanied by a lack of media interest. This refers primarily to protracted conflict situations, but can also refer to crises resulting from the cumulative effect of recurring natural disasters, or, a combination of different factors. Although the bulk of EU funding goes to major, recognised crisis like the Syrian, it allocated in 2017 almost 16% of its initial humanitarian aid budget to forgotten crises, including the Sahrawi refugees in Algeria, the Rohingya people in Myanmar/Burma and Bangladesh, and the Colombian refugees in Ecuador and Venezuela.

9 Actions funded comprise **assistance, relief and protection** operations on a non-discriminatory basis to help people in third countries, particularly the most vulnerable among them, and as a priority those in developing countries, victims of natural disasters, man-made crises, such as wars and outbreaks of fighting, or exceptional situations or circumstances comparable to natural or man-made disasters. The actions should extend the time needed to meet the humanitarian requirements resulting from these different situations.

10 **Health** is both a core sector of humanitarian aid interventions and the main reference for measuring overall humanitarian response. With the global trends of climate change and a growing and ageing population, together with the increasing frequency and scale of natural disasters and the persistency of conflicts, humanitarian health needs are continuing to increase. Given the significance of Commission humanitarian health assistance for the health sector in emergencies, and of the sector for Commission humanitarian health assistance, the Commission developed a set of Guidelines (operational in 2014) to support an improved delivery of affordable health services, based on humanitarian health needs.

11 The poorest people carry the greatest exposure to the consequences of disasters such as **food insecurity and under-nutrition**. Insufficient food production or an inability of vulnerable people to purchase enough nutritious food leads to malnutrition and under-nutrition. Moreover, dramatic interruptions in food consumption heighten risks of morbidity and mortality. Addressing under-nutrition requires a multi-sector approach and a joint humanitarian and development framework. Humanitarian food assistance aims to ensure the consumption of sufficient, safe and nutritious food in anticipation of, during, and in the aftermath of a humanitarian crisis. Each year, the European Commission allocates well over EUR 100 million to humanitarian assistance actions that are explicitly associated with specific nutrition objectives.

12 **Protection** is embedded in DG ECHO's mandate as defined by the HAR and confirmed by the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. Its objective is to reduce physical and psychological insecurity for persons and groups under threat. When providing general assistance, humanitarian actors must ensure that their actions do not undermine protection, nor

[175] See also http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/needs-assessments_en

increase existing inequalities (do-no-harm principle). The 2009 funding guidelines for humanitarian protection activities define the framework in which DG ECHO may support protection activities, including the type of partners and the kind of activities it may finance. DG ECHO supports non-structural activities aimed at reducing the risk, and mitigating the impact of human-generated violence, coercion, deprivation and abuse of vulnerable individuals or groups in the context of humanitarian crises.

13 **Urban areas** are complex settings to implement humanitarian assistance and are different from rural areas in terms of needs and vulnerabilities of the affected people. Furthermore, capacities, methods, and preparedness of local actors, institutions, and partners vary considerably between cities. Humanitarian actors, including DG ECHO, have developed an extensive range of policies, practices, standards and tools for humanitarian work that are often adapted to rural areas, but far less to urban areas. In the past few years a number of studies have been conducted to explore the drivers of urbanization and its consequences and implications to humanitarian aid. Some of these studies have formulated suggestions on how international humanitarian aid can best engage with the changing settlement patterns.

14 Humanitarian air services (including ECHO Flights) provide a lifeline for millions of people who are caught up in humanitarian emergencies. When a crisis hits, guaranteeing fast and safe access to the field is vital to save lives. In contexts where there are no reliable roads, ports or other infrastructure, access to crises by land or water becomes difficult, if not impossible. Humanitarian air services are often the only way to get access to remote places and reach people in need. In addition to transporting humanitarian supplies and workers, humanitarian air services also carry out medical and security evacuations.

15 Education in emergencies is crucial for both the protection and healthy development of girls and boys affected by crises. It can rebuild their lives; restore their sense of normality and safety, and provide them with important life skills. It helps children to be self-sufficient and to have more influence on issues that affect them. It is also one of the best tools to invest in their long-term future, and in the peace, stability and economic growth of their countries. Yet it has traditionally been one of the least funded humanitarian sectors. With the level of funding at 1% of its annual humanitarian budget still in 2015, the European Commission increased this share to 8% in 2018 and aims to reach 10% by 2019. Globally, less than 3% of global humanitarian funding is allocated to education.

16 Strengthening the gender approach within the EU humanitarian aid is a commitment made in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, which highlights the need to integrate gender considerations, to promote the active participation of women in humanitarian aid and to incorporate protection strategies against sexual and gender-based violence. A Commission Staff Working document has been established to address this issue.

17 DG ECHO has been instrumental in establishing and funding Emergency Response Mechanisms (ERMs) in several contexts, enabling early, localised response in conflict and natural disaster situations. ERMs are contractual arrangements with one or multiple partners in a given country to ensure that humanitarian organisations can access sufficient personnel, financial and material resources to respond to recurring localised, small-scale emergencies as

soon as possible after they occur. They allow a network of humanitarian organizations to rapidly assess and respond to recurring localized emergencies thanks to pre-positioned relief goods, agreed-upon processes, and staff capacity. Donors and humanitarian organizations have long recognised that timely humanitarian action prevents unnecessary suffering and can keep localized or escalating emergencies from deteriorating. Yet, institutional constraints, among them long and cumbersome contracting procedures, make it difficult to turn commitments to rapid response into reality. To inform an overall reflection on ERMs, DG ECHO has commissioned a study176 on five ERMs currently in operation in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia and Iraq.

18 The cash-based assistance approach (See DG ECHO Thematic Policy document no 3) ensures humanitarian aid reaches directly those with the greatest need in a timely manner. DG ECHO uses cash and vouchers and other alternative forms of humanitarian assistance only after thoroughly evaluating all options. It recognises that cash and voucher programmes have to be cautiously planned in order to prevent unintended inflation, depression or social imbalances in local markets while reaching the most vulnerable groups (women, children and the elderly).

19 Each year millions of people are forced to leave their homes and seek refuge from conflicts, violence, human rights violations, persecution or natural disasters. The number of forcibly displaced persons (refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced persons) has continued to rise in 2017, calling for increased humanitarian assistance worldwide. The majority of today's refugees live in the developing world, which means that they flee to countries already struggling with poverty and hardship. In April 2016, the European Commission adopted a new development-led approach to forced displacement, aimed at harnessing and strengthening the resilience and self-reliance of both the forcibly displaced and their host communities. The new approach stipulates that political, economic, development and humanitarian actors should engage from the outset of a displacement crisis, and work with third countries towards the gradual socio-economic inclusion of the forcibly displaced. The objective is to make people's lives more dignified during displacement; and ultimately, to end forced displacement.

20 The EU attaches great importance to the link between humanitarian aid, as a rapid response measure in crisis situations, and more medium and long-term development action. The humanitarian-development nexus is complex and requires increased coordination – leading to joint humanitarian-development approaches and collaborative implementation, monitoring and progress tracking. In order to address crisis situations, humanitarian and development actors need to work from the early stage of a crisis – or, in case of slow onset events, before a crisis occurs. The common humanitarian-development agenda has long been referred to as Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). The need to further invest in this approach was reaffirmed in the Agenda for Change in 2011 and reinforced by the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. The Council Conclusions on Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development Nexus of 19 May 2017 welcomed cooperation between EU humanitarian and development actors, including in the framework of the EU approach to forced displacement and development. The Council encourages the Commission and the Member States to take forward humanitarian and development work in a number of pilot countries, starting with joint analysis and leading, where possible, to joint planning and programming of humanitarian and

[176] Available on request

development partners. The response should address not only the humanitarian needs in a country (deriving from an environmental crisis (prolonged drought), a natural disaster or a conflict) but also the improvement of resilience with a view to better managing different types of risks. In a number of countries Joint Humanitarian and Development Frameworks (JHDF) have been developed as a basis for humanitarian and development planning and programming.

2 CONTEXT OF THE EVALUATION

This is a combined evaluation, consisting of the following two main aspects:

- A geographical aspect, focusing on DG ECHO's interventions in **Afghanistan**;
- A partnership aspect, focusing on DG ECHO's **Partnership with the Norwegian Refugee Council**.

2.1 HUMANITARIAN NEEDS IN AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan faces a complex multi-dimensional crisis. Almost 40 years of conflict, widespread chronic poverty compounded by recurrent natural disasters has resulted in displacement, depleted coping mechanisms and low resilience.

The ongoing conflict between Government forces and non-state armed opposition groups, as well as intra-fighting amongst armed groups, has caused the displacement of many Afghans over the years. Natural disasters like floods, landslides and earthquakes have added to the problem. Approximately 1,7 million people are currently displaced, 58% of whom are below 18 years of age. Most of the displaced have moved to the cities, where housing and livelihoods are scarce, and social services can hardly cope. Many have been in need of shelter and non-food items. In addition, there are some 45,000 Pakistani refugees in Afghanistan.

DG ECHO's Integrated Analysis Framework (IAF) for 2017 identified extreme humanitarian needs in Afghanistan. The vulnerability of the population affected by the crisis is assessed to be very high.

In Pakistan, there are around 1,4 million Afghan refugees who are registered and protected by the UN, an additional 800,000 registered by the Government of Pakistan, and an estimated 300,000 who are undocumented. Iran hosts around 950,000 registered and an estimated 1,5 million unregistered Afghan refugees. Both countries have been deporting hundreds of thousands of these refugees in recent years, and returnees are highly vulnerable and increase Afghanistan’s difficulties to provide basic services to their citizens.

According to estimates, over 9 million people have no or limited access to basic health services country-wide. Trauma care and conflict-related surgery are also necessary in parts of the country affected by the armed conflict.

Severe food insecurity is producing malnutrition in the case of around 1,6 million people, and lack of access to safe drinking water is an additional problem. The needs are particularly serious among women and children.

Multiple forms of gender-based violence are reported, such as early and forced marriage and domestic and sexual violence. Children are suffering from the destruction of schools, and over 100,000 children have no access to education. Furthermore, Afghanistan has the highest level of gender disparity in primary school in the world, with only 71 girls for every 100 boys. Only 35% of IDP children attend school.

2.2 ECHO RESPONSE

DG ECHO has funded humanitarian operations in Afghanistan since 1994. Given the intensity of the conflict and the level of humanitarian needs, it has prioritised life-saving interventions.

The main focus of the response from 2014 to 2018 has been on emergency medical care, nutrition, and protection interventions. Life-saving health care has been provided to war-wounded civilians, and basic health services have been supported in areas disrupted by the conflict. Nutritional rehabilitation treatment has been provided to women and children in areas where the acute malnutrition rate is above the emergency threshold. Protection actions have included measures to counter gender-based violence and the needs of children in conflict and natural disaster settings.

Relief assistance has recently been provided through the Emergency Response Mechanism (ERM). This has been put in place to ensure timely emergency assistance to people who have been recently displaced, vulnerable returning refugees not covered by other programmes and Pakistani refugees in situations of emergency. A small proportion of these beneficiaries have been people affected by natural disasters. The response has consisted of multi-purpose cash assistance to cover the survival minimum expenditure basket for the initial period of displacement.

DG ECHO has supported education in emergencies for children who were forced out of school due to conflict or displacement. In order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid in hard-to-reach or insecure areas, it has also funded humanitarian flights, the provision of security assessments and analyses to NGOs and the coordination of humanitarian action by UN OCHA.

DG ECHO has allocated resources to the country under the following Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs):

- ECHO/-AS/BUD/**2014**/91000, EUR **31,500,000** (Afghanistan)
- ECHO/-AS/BUD/**2015**/91000, EUR **66,307,000** (Afghanistan and Pakistan)
- ECHO/WWD/BUD/**2016**/01000, EUR **72,500,000** (Afghanistan and Pakistan)
- ECHO/-AS/BUD/**2017**/91000, EUR **49,450,000** (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Central Asia)

- ECHO/-AS/BUD/**2018**/91000, EUR **56,500,000** (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Central Asia)

Afghanistan is also beneficiary of development assistance (not the subject of this evaluation). The EU, together with its Member States, contributes more than €1 billion in development assistance per year. Development aid focuses on agriculture and rural development, which are vital for employment and growth, health, security for citizens through the professionalisation of civilian policing and application of the rule of law, and State accountability through democratisation. Also the World Bank funds a development programme in the country, which focuses on building strong and accountable institutions, supporting inclusive growth and deepening social inclusion.

2.3 DG ECHO-NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL PARTNERSHIP

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) is an independent humanitarian organisation specialised in helping displaced people. It is based in Oslo and present in more than 25 countries. Based on an initial analysis of DG ECHO's humanitarian project database, the NCR carried out actions for a total value or around 278 M€ globally, and about 24 M€ in Afghanistan, during the evaluation period – figures to be confirmed in the course of the evaluation. The NRC is one of DG ECHO's major humanitarian partners in Afghanistan. The sectors in which it operated in the country during the evaluation period were mainly multi-purpose cash transfers (EUR ~7,600,000), food security (EUR ~6,500,000), shelter (EUR ~3,500,000), support to operations (EUR ~1,400,000), and protection (EUR ~1,350,000).

3 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

3.1 PURPOSE AND GENERAL SCOPE

Based on Art. 30(4) of the Financial Regulation and Regulation (EC) 1257/96, the purpose of this Request for Services is to have a combined, independent evaluation, covering the period of **2014 – 2018,** of

- the EU's humanitarian interventions in **Afghanistan**; and
- DG ECHO's **partnership** with the **Norwegian Refugee Council**.

The evaluation should provide:

- A retrospective assessment of DG ECHO's interventions in Afghanistan, covering the evaluation issues of **relevance**, **coherence, (EU) added value**, **effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability**. This analysis should help to shape the EU's future approach in the country.

- A retrospective assessment of DG ECHO's partnership with the NRC globally (not restricted to actions in Afghanistan), with a focus on identifying lessons learned and good practice, for the benefit of this particular partnership and DG ECHO's overall partnership framework.

A maximum of **5 prospective, strategic recommendations** to support ECHO's future actions in Afghanistan and a maximum of **3 prospective, strategic recommendations** to support its future partnership with the NRC and DG ECHO's overall partnership framework. These strategic recommendations could possibly be supported by further, related, operational recommendations.

The main users of the evaluation report include inter alia ECHO staff at HQ, regional and country level, national and regional stakeholders, the NRC and other participating implementing partners, and other humanitarian and development donors and agencies.

3.2 EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The conclusions of the evaluation will be presented in the report in the form of evidence-based, reasoned answers to the evaluation questions presented below. These questions should be further tailored by the Evaluator, and finally agreed with the Steering Group in the inception phase.

A) General questions

Relevance

1. To what extent did the design and implementation of EU-funded actions take into account the needs of the most vulnerable population in Afghanistan, in particular women, children, elderly and disabled people, as well as the needs of Afghan refugees in Iran[177]? To what extent were beneficiaries consulted in the design and implementation of DG ECHO-funded projects?
2. To what extent was a clear and context-adapted strategy designed and applied in Afghanistan? To what extent were DG ECHO and its partners successful in adapting and adjusting their approach and in addressing gaps as the needs evolved over time?

Coherence

3. To what extent was DG ECHO's response in Afghanistan aligned with:
    a. DG ECHO's mandate as provided by the Humanitarian Aid Regulation,
    b. The European Consensus on humanitarian aid,
    c. The humanitarian principles, and
    d. DG ECHO's relevant thematic/sector policies?
4. In the context of the Nexus and humanitarian-development coordination instruments, what measures were taken by DG ECHO to coordinate the EU's humanitarian and development actions, and how successful were these measures?

[177] The evaluation should include actions in favour of Afghan refugees in Iran. However, it should not include actions in favour of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, as these were already assessed in the 2016 evaluation of DG ECHO's interventions in Pakistan.

5. To what extent was DG ECHO successful in coordinating its response with the response of other donors, including EU Member States, and by that avoiding overlaps and promoting synergies?

EU Added Value

6. What was the EU added value of DG ECHO's actions in the country during the evaluation period?

Effectiveness

7. To what extent were DG ECHO's objectives (as defined in the HAR, the Consensus and the specific HIPs) achieved in Afghanistan, and the needs of the targeted end-beneficiaries satisfied? What concrete results were achieved during the evaluation period?
8. How successful was DG ECHO through its advocacy and communication measures in Afghanistan in influencing other actors by direct and indirect advocacy on issues like humanitarian access and space, respect for IHL, addressing gaps in response, applying good practice, and carrying out follow-up actions of DG ECHO's interventions? Was there an 'advocacy gap'?

Efficiency

9. To what extent did DG ECHO achieve cost-effectiveness in its response? What factors affected the cost-effectiveness of the response and to what extent? (*The methodology applied for responding to this question must be based on the Cost-effectiveness guidance for DG ECHO evaluations, which is to be adapted to and applied proportionally to the current exercise.)*
10. Was the size of the budget allocated by DG ECHO to Afghanistan appropriate and proportionate to what the actions were meant to achieve?

Sustainability/Connectedness

11. To what extent did DG ECHO progress in the humanitarian-development nexus? What could be further done (enabling factors, tools, mechanisms, change in strategy, etc.) to promote sustainability and strengthen links to interventions of development actors?

B) Specific questions focusing on DG ECHO's partnership with the Norwegian Refugee Council

12. How well aligned were DG ECHO and the NRC in terms of
    a. needs assessments and multi-hazard risk and vulnerability analyses?
    b. priorities, strategies and objectives?
    c. advocacy priorities and efforts?

1. To what extent did a structured, strategic, timely and functional dialogue take place between the two partners, and by what means?

13. To what extent did the DG ECHO-NRC partnership succeed in
    a. maximising efficiencies and decreasing management and related costs, including administrative burden?

b. improving cost-effectiveness in their response?

c. improving the use of cash-based response?

14. To what extent did the DG ECHO-NRC partnership contribute to

a. increasing local partners' meaningful participation in humanitarian response?

b. enhancing the engagement between humanitarian and development actors?

15. To what extent did the DG ECHO-NRC partnership ensure flexibility of response?
16. To what extent did the NRC follow DG ECHO's visibility guidelines?

3.3 OTHER TASKS UNDER THE ASSIGNMENT

The Contractor should:

1. Draw up an **intervention logic** for DG ECHO's interventions in Afghanistan during the evaluation period
2. Define and analyse **DG ECHO's portfolio** of actions, during the evaluation period,
   a. in Afghanistan (including projects funded and other actions), and
   b. implemented **by the NRC** in the country and globally
3. Identify the **main lessons learnt**
   a. from DG ECHO's intervention in Afghanistan in the different sectors covered (ERM, Health, Food Assistance, Multi-sectoral assistance and coordination, Protection, Shelter/NFIs, Water and Sanitation, EiE, …),
   b. for the DG ECHO-NRC partnership, and
   c. for DG ECHO's overall partnership framework

   What worked and what did not?
4. On the basis of the research carried out for responding to the evaluation questions, and at a general level, identify the main factors **limiting the success of the projects** funded in the country over the period covered by the evaluation. *COMMENT: This relates to an audit recommendation; success-limiting factors should be identified in order to develop indicators for focused monitoring, with the overall purpose of strengthening the monitoring system*
5. Provide a statement about the **validity of the evaluation results**, i.e. to what extent it has been possible to provide reliable statements on all essential aspects of the intervention examined. Issues to be referred to may include scoping of the evaluation exercise, availability of data, unexpected problems encountered in the evaluation process, proportionality between budget and objectives of the assignment, etc.
6. Make a proposal for the **dissemination** of the evaluation results
7. Provide a French **translation** (in addition to the English version) of the executive summary of the Final Report
8. Provide an **abstract** of the evaluation of no more than 200 words

4 MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF THE EVALUATION

The Evaluation Sector of DG ECHO is responsible for the management and the monitoring of the evaluation, together with the DG ECHO Unit responsible for the evaluation subject, i.e. C4. The DG ECHO Evaluation manager is the contact person for the evaluator and shall assist the team during their mission in tasks such as providing documents and facilitating contacts. The Evaluation manager assigned to the evaluation should always be kept informed and consulted by the evaluator and copied on all correspondence with other DG ECHO staff.

A Steering Committee, made up of Commission staff involved in the activity evaluated, will provide general assistance to and feedback on the evaluation exercise, and discuss the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation.

5 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

5.1 METHODOLOGY

In their offer, the bidders will describe in detail the methodological approach they propose in order to address the evaluation questions listed above, as well as the tasks requested.

This will include a proposal for indicative **judgment criteria**[178] that they may consider useful for addressing each evaluation question. The judgement criteria, as well as the information sources to be used in addressing these criteria, will be discussed and validated by the Commission during the Inception phase.

To the extent possible the methodology should promote the participation in the evaluation exercise of all actors concerned, including beneficiaries and local communities when relevant and feasible.

The conclusions of the evaluation must be presented in a transparent way, with clear references to the sources on which they are based.

The evaluator must undertake a number of **field visits**, to be proposed in the tenderer's offer and agreed in the inception phase. One of the visits should focus on the Afghan refugees in Iran. The set of field visits will have to take into account the security situation in Afghanistan, particularly in view of the increased risk of terrorist attacks linked to the 2019 presidential elections. Thus, the evaluation team will have to show a high degree of flexibility regarding the dates of the field visits,

[178] A judgement criterion specifies an aspect of the evaluated intervention that will allow its merits or success to be assessed. E.g., if the question is "To what extent has DG ECHO assistance, both overall and by sector been appropriate and impacted positively the targeted population?", a general judgement criterion might be "Assistance goes to the people most in need of assistance". In developing judgment criteria, the tenderers may make use of existing methodological, technical or political guidance provided by actors in the field of Humanitarian Assistance such as HAP, the Sphere Project, GHD, etc.

and a back-up plan should be provided in the tenderer's offer, addressing the risk of not being able to carry out field visits at all due to access and security problems.

DG ECHO has a field office in Kabul, which will provide a certain level of support to the evaluation team, mainly in the form of information and advice on practical issues like accommodation, transport and the like. It will not be able to provide direct support like organizing their transport. As a contractor to the European Commission, the evaluation team should be entitled to use the services of PACTEC-operated flights within Afghanistan, as well as those operated by UNHAS (both against a fare). There are also commercial flights available to move around the country. The evaluation team will be responsible of catering for their own protection and security.

5.2 EVALUATION TEAM

In addition to the general requirements of the Framework Contract, as referred to in section 10.1 below, the team should include experts knowledgeable of the Afghan crisis. Additionally, it is recommended that the team should have experience in refugees, humanitarian health, food assistance, nutrition, protection, other relevant ECHO policies and assessment of donor-implementing agency partnerships. If necessary, the experts must agree to work in high-risk areas; it is therefore recommended that the team should have experience working in similar unsafe environments and include national experts whenever possible.

6 CONTENT OF THE OFFER

A. The administrative part of the bidder's offer must include:

1. The tender submission form (annex C to the model specific contract);
2. A signed Experts' declaration of availability, absence of conflict of interest and not being in a situation of exclusion (annex D to the model specific contract – please use corrected version sent by e-mail on 12 April 2018).

B. The technical part of the bidder's offer should be presented in a maximum of **30 pages** (excluding CVs and annexes), and must include:

1. A description of the understanding of the Terms of Reference, their scope and the tasks covered by the contract. This will include a graphic reconstruction of the intervention logic of the Commission's humanitarian activities concerned. It will also explain the bidder's understanding of the evaluation questions, including a first proposal of judgement criteria to be used for answering the evaluation questions and the information sources to be used for answering the questions. The final definition of judgement criteria and information sources will be validated by the Commission during the inception phase;
2. The methodology the bidder intends to apply for this evaluation for each of the phases involved, including a draft proposal for the number of case studies to be carried out during the field visit, the regions to be visited, and the reasons for such a choice. The methodology will be refined and validated by the Commission during the desk phase;

3. A description of the distribution of tasks in the team, including an indicative quantification of the work for each expert in terms of person/days;
4. A detailed proposed timetable for its implementation with the total number of days needed for each of the phases (Desk, Field and Synthesis).

C. The CVs of each of the experts proposed.

D. The financial part of the offer (annex E to the model specific contract) must include the proposed total budget in Euros, taking due account of the maximum amount for this evaluation. The price must be expressed as a lump sum for the whole of the services provided. The expert fees as provided in the Financial Offer for the Framework Contract must be respected.

7 AMOUNT OF THE CONTRACT

The maximum budget allocated to this study is EUR 280 000.

8 TIMETABLE

The indicative duration of the evaluation is **8 months**. The duration of the contract shall be no more than **9 months)**.

The evaluation starts after the contract has been signed by both parties, and no expenses may be incurred before that. The main part of the existing relevant documents will be provided after the signature of the contract.

In their offer, the bidders shall provide a schedule based on the indicative table below (T = contract signature date):

Timing	**Event**
T+1 week	Kick-off
T+5 weeks	Draft Inception Report
T+6 weeks	Inception meeting
T+11 weeks	Draft Desk Report
T+12 weeks	Desk Report meeting
T+14 – 17 weeks	Field visits
T+18	Draft Field Report

T+19	Field Report Meeting
T+27 weeks	Draft Final Report
T+29 weeks	Draft Final Report meeting
T+37 weeks	Final Report

9 PROVISIONS OF THE FRAMEWORK TENDER SPECIFICATIONS

1) **Team composition**: The Team proposed by the Tenderer for assignments to be contracted under the Framework Contract must comply with Criterion B4 (see Section 5.2.4 of the Tender Specifications for the Framework Contract).
2) **Procedures and instructions**: The procedures and instructions to the Tenderer for Specific Contracts under the Framework Contract are provided under Section 6 of the Tender Specifications for the Framework Contract.
    - Sections 6 – 6.4 are fixed and must be fully taken into account for offers submitted in response to Requests for Services. E.g. the **Award Criteria** are presented under Section 6.2.2;
    - Section 6.5 is indicative and could be modified in a Request for Services or discussed and agreed during the Inception Phase under a Specific Contract.
3) **EU Bookshop Format**: The template provided in Annex M of the Tender Specifications for the Framework Contract must be followed for the Final Report. Any changes to this format, as introduced by the Publications Office of the European Union, will be communicated to the Framework Contractors by the Commission.

10 RAW DATA AND DATASETS

Any final datasets should be provided as structured data in a machine readable format (e.g. in the form of a spreadsheet and/or an RDF file) for Commission internal usage and for publishing on the Open Data Portal, in compliance with Commission Decision (2011/833/EU)[179].

The data delivered should include the appropriate metadata (e.g. description of the dataset, definition of the indicators, label and sources for the variables, notes) to facilitate reuse and publication.

[179] If third parties' rights do not allow their publication as open data, the tenderers should describe in the offer the subpart that will be provided to the Commission free of rights for publication and the part that will remain for internal use.

The data delivered should be linked to data resources external to the scope of the evaluation, preferably data and semantic resources from the Commission's own data portal or from the Open Data Portal[180]. The contractor should describe in the offer the approach they will adopt to facilitate data linking.

[180] For a list of shared data interoperability assets see the ISA program joinup catalogue (https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/catalogue/repository/eu-semantic-interoperability-catalogue) and the Open Data Portal resources.

Annex 2: Evaluation Matrix – the Afghanistan Country Evaluation

Criteria	Question	Sub-questions	Judgement Criteria	Methods & sources	Analytical methods
Relevance	1. To what extent did the design and implementation of EU-funded actions take into account the needs of the most vulnerable population in Afghanistan, in particular women, children, elderly and disabled people, as well as the needs of Afghan refugees in Iran? To what extent were beneficiaries consulted in the design and implementation of DG ECHO-funded projects?	1.1 What evidence exists to show that ECHO-funded agencies collaborated in joint needs assessments and identified pockets of unmet needs in different areas and devised strategies to prioritise needs in hard-to-reach areas? 1.2 Were affected communities consulted in assessing needs and identifying vulnerability, and is there evidence that community feedback has been taken into account in designing response? 1.3 Were the needs identified disaggregated by sex, age and disability, as well as the types of refugees consulted such as origin, status, gender, age, rural/urban, in-camp/outside-camps, etc. in Afghanistan and Iran? 1.4 What evidence and methodological elements support the extent to which DG ECHO interventions targeted the specific needs of the most vulnerable communities?	Use of joint and coordinated needs assessments in planning & delivery of humanitarian response by funded agencies. Evidence of consultation and involvement of communities in needs assessments and planning of response SADD data on targeted beneficiaries form basis of response plans through ECHO-funded interventions. Most vulnerable groups of communities /refugees/ IDPs targeted based on needs assessment data.		

Relevance	2. To what extent was a clear and context-adapted strategy designed and applied in Afghanistan? To what extent were DG ECHO and its partners successful in adapting and adjusting their approach and in addressing gaps as the needs evolved over time?	2.1 What major contextual changes affected humanitarian response in geographical areas prioritised by ECHO-funded actions during 2014-2018, and did individual agencies take into account these changes in their plans and actions? 2.2 Did ECHO-funded interventions address both chronic and acute vulnerabilities arising from protracted and immediate crises, including new human suffering due to ongoing conflict and natural disasters? 2.3 What evidence exists to show that ECHO-funded interventions remained flexible and agile in adapting to evolving context, including approaches to gaining access in insecure areas?	DG ECHO and its partners have adapted their approaches and programming to the gaps and evolving needs. Relief responses of short-term nature are provided in a way that address causes of chronic vulnerability as well. ECHO-funded interventions used a range of tools and strategies like partnership with local CSOs, TPM, negotiated access, etc. in response to evolving contexts of insecurity.		

Coherence	3.To what extent was DG ECHO's response in Afghanistan aligned with: (a) DG ECHO's mandate as per the Humanitarian Aid Regulation; (b) The European Consensus on humanitarian aid; (c) The humanitarian principles; and (d) DG ECHO's relevant thematic/ sector policies?	3.1 What partnership strategies have been adopted to deliver assistance in complex humanitarian situations, and to what extent have these strengthened communities' and local authorities' involvement and ownership in humanitarian action?	Strategic partnerships with local organisations, /authorities and government.		
		3.2 How does DG ECHO balance coverage against quality, adhering to humanitarian principles, against a high threat environment that may demand trade-offs between the principles and action?	All ECHO-funded agencies clearly demonstrating adherence to the principles of impartiality, independence, neutrality and humanity in their actions, and any trade-offs are justified only by primacy of needs and 'Do No Harm'. Evidence exists to show that humanitarian principles are routinely used as an operational tool to guide decision-making.		
		3.3 Do ECHO funded interventions adhere to best practices in Humanitarian civil-military relations to manage potential impact on humanitarian principles?	All ECHO interventions follow OSLO Guidelines - Guidelines on the use of Foreign Military And Civil Defence ASSETS in Disaster Relief, and IASC Non Binding Guidelines on Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys.		
		3.4 How does ECHO balance the challenges of respecting the principle of humanity in the context of declining funding and access, and increasing needs?	Criteria for choice of interventions funded pass the humanity principles test.		
		3.5 Is there evidence of advocacy with state and relevant non-state actors regarding humanitarian principles, while delivering sectoral activities by partners and ECHO?	Evidence of advocacy by ECHO and partners on humanitarian access.		
		3.6 Are the sectoral work aligned with ECHO thematic policies? What could explain any possible discrepancy between DG ECHO's operations and DG ECHO's thematic/ sector policies?	Key elements of all relevant thematic policies reflected in the funded interventions.		

Coherence	4. In the context of the Nexus and humanitarian-development coordination instruments, what measures were taken by DG ECHO to coordinate the EU's humanitarian and development actions, and how successful were these measures?	4.1 To what extent the EU development and humanitarian portfolios in Afghanistan use joined-up approach and partnership strategies? How well did DG ECHO manage to collaborate with other EU instruments? 4.2 Do the ECHO-funded interventions demonstrate use of a coordinated joined up approach to addressing humanitarian needs and protection, and are contributing to resilience, including strengthening local capacity, participation and involvement of women in particular? 4.3 Is there evidence that gender mainstreaming is being systematised in all interventions?	Evidence of joined-up approach between development and humanitarian interventions leading to local capacity, participation and increased resilience at community level. Gendered analysis of vulnerability to conflict and disasters inform all humanitarian actions.		
Coherence	5. To what extent was DG ECHO successful in coordinating its response with the response of other donors, including EU Member States, and avoiding overlaps and promoting synergies?	5.1 How well, and through which mechanisms, has DG ECHO informed its response based on the actions of other donors, including EU MS? 5.2 To what extent do the response / operations of DG ECHO and other donors complement each other? (per sector) 5.3 Is there a concerted effort by all donors to advocate for principled humanitarian response and humanitarian space, and if so, what role has been played by ECHO?	Evidence of coordination and collaboration among key humanitarian donors, and effective coordination with UNHCT. Collective voice of all donors brought to bear on all actors to ensure humanitarian space.		

Added value	6. What was the EU added value of DG ECHO's actions in the country during the evaluation period?	6.1 To what extent ECHO's ERM provide an opportunity to ensure coordinated and rapid response by NGOs? 6.2 Is there evidence that besides funding, ECHO was able to bring in high-quality expertise and new ways of working in developing and delivering quality response?	Timeliness of response Distinctive contribution - the EU intervention leveraged its comparative advantage and provided a value added that could not have been provided by Member States individually.		

Effectiveness	7. To what extent were DG ECHO's objectives (as defined in the HAR, the Consensus and the specific HIPs) achieved in Afghanistan, and the needs of the targeted end-beneficiaries satisfied? What concrete results were achieved during the evaluation period?	7.1 To what extent ECHO funding enabled/contributed to vulnerable communities in general, and refugees and IDPs in particular, to improve their wellbeing basic needs, health, nutrition, education, protection, MPCT, either directly from the interventions, or indirectly through increasing access to government and non-government services?	Data shows improvement in wellbeing of communities through improved nutrition, healthcare, provision of basic needs, cash transfers, education and protection for the conflict and disaster-affected.		
		7.2 Are ECHO and its funded agencies able to generate systematic evidence to track outputs and outcomes the interventions are producing?	Agencies able to track evidence of: (i) stronger capacity of ECHO and partners to meet acute spikes in humanitarian need in a timely manner; (ii) assisted population have mechanisms and practices which enable them to cope and adapt to effects of disasters and conflict; (iii) sectoral interventions (e.g. protection, education, nutrition, livelihoods, cash, durable solutions, WASH, etc.) are addressing vulnerability and building resilience; and (iv) effective partnership and coordination among humanitarian agencies.		
		7.3 To what extent ERM has enabled fast and flexible response to meet needs of a rapid response?	ERM meets the humanitarian triad of speed, quality and timeliness (SQT).		
		7.4 Have ECHO-funded interventions enhanced beneficiary participation, communication and accountability to communities?	Active community participation in planning and implementation, and system for accountability to affected people in place.		

Effectiveness	8. How successful was DG ECHO through its advocacy and communication measures in Afghanistan in influencing other actors by direct and indirect advocacy on issues like humanitarian access and space, respect for IHL, addressing gaps in response, applying good practices, and carrying out follow-up actions of DG ECHO's interventions? Was there an 'advocacy gap'?	8.1 EQ 3.2 - 3.4, 5.1-5.3 8.2 To what extent ECHO has facilitated a coordinated strategy and overall approach by donors, Government and key humanitarian institutions in addressing gaps, humanitarian access and promoting international good practices (Grand Bargain)?	As per EQ 3.2 - 3.4, 5.1-5.3 Evidence of ECHO playing a catalytic role, instead of being solely focused on ensuring implementation of ECHO-funded response. Demonstrating material progress on Grand Bargain commitments.		
Efficiency	9. To what extent has DG ECHO achieved cost-effectiveness in its response? What factors have affected the cost-effectiveness of the response and to what extent?	9.1 To what extent have ECHO-funded actions been efficient and cost-effective? 9.2 What internal and external factors have affected the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of DG ECHO portfolio in the country?	Humanitarian actions funded by ECHO in each sector were efficient and cost-effective (on a case study basis) Factors affecting efficiency and cost-effectiveness at both the project and portfolio levels were understood and informed project planning and implementation.		
Efficiency	10. Was the size of the budget allocated by DG ECHO to Afghanistan appropriate and proportionate to what the outcomes were meant to achieve?	10.1 To what extent was the size of the budget based on a costed assessment of the results to be achieved (i.e. the cost to respond to these needs, per sector)? 10.2 What proportion of those in need in Afghanistan has DG ECHO portfolio targeted and how many has it reached? How does the size of the budget allocated and achievements by DG ECHO compare with other donors? 10.3 Could DG ECHO have achieved better results with the same or less resources?	The size of budget allocated by DG ECHO is appropriate/costed realistically and proportionate in relation to outcome sought. Relative share and contribution of DG ECHO in the overall humanitarian allocation for the country compare well with other major donors – good relative coverage Evidence of different alternative programming options considered.		

Sustainability	11. To what extent did DG ECHO progress in the humanitarian-development nexus? What could be further done (enabling factors, tools, mechanisms, change in strategy, etc.) to promote sustainability and strengthen links to interventions of development actors?	Linked to EQ4	Evidence of joined-up approach between development and humanitarian interventions leading to local capacity, participation and increased resilience at community level. Evidence of integrated sector programming		

Annex 3: Field visit schedule

Date	Meeting
30/03/2019	Team arrival
31/02/2019	Meeting with ECHO staff Meeting with ECHO partners and ECHO staff
01/04/2019	Key informant interviews in Kabul (WHO, DRC, SIDA, ACTED, WASH cluster representative)
02/04/2019	Team one travel to Herat, Team two continues Key informant interviews in Kabul (DACARR, HI)
03/04/2019	Herat: visit IDP camps, Wash facilities, interview partners. Kabul: Key informant interviews with WHO, OCHA, UNHCR
04/04/2019	Herat: meeting with the provincial health authority and head of cluster. Focus group interviews with IDPs, meetings with partners (Return to Kabul) Kabul: Key informant interviews with action against hunger, DG DEVCO, ICRC, INSO Afghanistan
06/04/2019	Team two travels to Kandahar, visits a settlement, meeting with Handicapp International
07/08/2019	Kandahar: visit to Mirwais hospital, meeting with regional director of public health, meet with NRC Kandahar and OCHA Kandahar. Kabul: debriefing with local consultants following visit to Herat
08/04/19	Team return from Kandahar, KII in Kabul: NRC and Action against hunger
09/04/19	Key informant interviews in Kabul: Handicapp International
10/04/19	Key informant interviews in Kabul: DFID, UN OCHA, Call with ECHO Brussels for up-date.
11/04/19	Key informant interviews in Kabul: PIN, IOM, NRC. Debriefing with ECHO
13/04/19	Team travels to Balkh, Briefing with partners, visit Faryabi IDP settlement, meeting with partners,
14/04/19	Interviews with partners (Acted, NRC), visit IDP settlement, Interview with OCHA. FG interviews with IDPs
15/04/19	Return from Balkh. Meetings with MoPH, ECHO TA, Team debriefing with AREU (local partner)
16/04/19	The end of the field visit and all consultants return home

Annex 4: List of interviewees

Number	Destination	Organisation	Job title	Date
1	Brussels	ECHO	Desk Officer for Afghanistan	22-Mar
2	Brussels	ECHO	Former Technical Assistant	27-Mar
3	Brussels	ECHO	Former Desk Officer, Afghanistan	27-Mar
4	Prague	People in Need	Desk Officer for Afghanistan	28-Mar
5	Kabul	ECHO	Head of Office	31-Mar
6	Kabul	ECHO	Programme Officer	31-Mar
7	Kabul	ECHO	Programme Officer	31-Mar
8	Kabul	ECHO	Programme Officer (gender and protection)	31-Mar
9	Kabul	DRC	Emergency Coordinator	1-Apr
10	Kabul	ACTED	Project Development Manager	1-Apr
11	Kabul	ACTED	Emergency Project Manager	1-Apr
12	Kabul	WHO	Team Leader, Emergency	1-Apr
13	Kabul	SIDA	Counsellor	1-Apr
14	Kabul	MRRD	National WASH Cluster Coordinator	1-Apr
15	Herat	INSO	Safety Adviser	2-Apr
16	Herat	INSO	Deputy Safety Adviser	2-Apr
17	Kabul	DACAAR	Emergency WASH Manager	2-Apr
18	Kabul	DACAAR	Emergency WASH Adviser	2-Apr
19	Kabul	DACAAR	Head of Programme	2-Apr
20	Kabul	DACAAR	Head of Fundraising	2-Apr
21	Kabul	OCHA	Head of Office	3-Apr

22	Herat	DRC	Area Manager	3-Apr
23	Herat	NRC	Area Manager	3-Apr
24	Herat	NRC	Project Manager	3-Apr
25	Herat	NRC	WASH/Shelter Project Manager;	3-Apr
26	Herat	NRC	Emergency Coordinator	3-Apr
27	Herat	HI	Base Coordinator	3-Apr
28	Kabul	UNHCR	Senior Reporting Manager	03-Apr
29	Kabul	UNHCR	Associate Reporting Officer	03-Apr
30	Herat	UNHCR	ES/NFI WR	4-Apr
31	Herat	UNHCR	Asst Programme Officer	4-Apr
32	Herat	UNHCR	Head of Office	4-Apr
33	Herat	DACAAR	Regional Manager	4-Apr
34	Herat	DACAAR	Field Coordinator	4-Apr
35	Herat	DACAAR	ERM Team Leader	4-Apr
36	Herat	DACAAR	Dpty Operation Manager	4-Apr
37	Herat	DACAAR	Hygiene/Sanitation Supervisor	4-Apr
38	Herat	DACAAR	Hygiene/Sanitation Supervisor	4-Apr
39	Herat	PPHD	Dpty Director of Public Health	4-Apr
40	Herat	DRC	Area Manager	4-Apr
41	Herat	DRC	Protection Project Manager	4-Apr
42	Herat	DRC	Protection Team Leader	4-Apr
43	Herat	DoRR	Director	4-Apr
44	Herat	DoRR	IDP Project Manager	4-Apr

45	Kabul	EU	Team Leader, Social Development	4-Apr
46	Kabul	EU	Health Programme Adviser	4-Apr
47	Kabul	ICRC	Health Coordinator	4-Apr
48	Kabul	ICRC	Dpty Head of Delegation	4-Apr
49	Kabul	INSO	Country Director	4-Apr
50	Kabul	ECHO	Technical Assistant	5-Apr
51	Kandahar	DACAAR	ERM Team Leader	6-Apr
52	Kandahar	DACAAR	Hygiene Promoter	6-Apr
53	Kandahar	DACAAR	ERM Store Keeper	6-Apr
54	Kabul	IRC	Deputy Director – Emergencies	7-Apr
55	Kandahar	HI	Project Manager	7-Apr
56	Kandahar	ICRC	Hospital Programme Manager	7-Apr
57	Kandahar	ICRC	Health Delegate	7-Apr
58	Kandahar	NRC	Emergency Coordinator	7-Apr
59	Kandahar	OCHA	Humanitarian Affairs Adviser	7-Apr
60	Kabul	ACF	Emergency Response, Head of Department	8-Apr
61	Kabul	NRC	Cash Advisor/Livelihood and Food Security Specialist	8-Apr
62	Kabul	WHO	Health Cluster Coordinator	9-Apr
63	Kabul	HI	Emergency Coordinator	9-Apr
64	Kabul	HI	Country Director	9-Apr
65	Kabul	HI	Project Manager	9-Apr
66	Kabul	Independent	ECHO Social protection Consultant	9-Apr
67	Kabul	Independent	ECHO Social Protection Consultant	9-Apr
68	Kabul	DFID	Humanitarian Adviser	10-Apr

69	Kabul	UNOPS	Head of Programme	10-Apr
70	Kabul	UNOPS	Acting Project Manager, AWAAZ	10-Apr
71	Kabul	EMERGENCY	Country Director	10-Apr
72	Kabul	NRC	Country Director	11-Apr
73	Kabul	IOM	Head of Programme	11-Apr
74	Kabul	IOM	Programme Manager	11-Apr
75	Kabul	PIN	Finance Manager	11-Apr
76	Mazar	DoRR	Acting Director	13-Apr
77	Mazar	DoRR	Emergencies Director	13-Apr
78	Mazar	ACTED	Acting Coordinator (North)	13-Apr
79	Mazar	DACAAR	ERM Team Leader	13-Apr
80	Mazar	ANDMA	Director, Mazar Province	14-Apr
81	Mazar	OCHA	Humanitarian Affairs Officer	14-Apr
82	Mazar	OCHA	Head of Sub-Office	14-Apri
83	Mazar	NRC	Head of Sub-Office	14-Apr
84	Mazar	NRC	Former ERM Coordinator	14-Apr
85	Kabul	MoPH	National Disability & Rehab Programme Manager	15-Apr
86	Kabull	ECHO	Technical Assistant	15-Apr

List of community interviewees

Number	Province	Location	Type of interview	No of Participants
1	Kabul	Takhnikum	Interview	2
2		Qarya Kochi ha	Interview	1
3		Gosfand Dara	FGD	10
4		Kochi Abaad	FGD	23
5	Kandahar	Shikarpoor Darwaza	FGD	15
6		Loya Wala (HI facilities)	FGD	20
7		Shikarpoor Darwaza 2nd site	FGD	18
8		HI (PRC)	Interview	3
9		District 9 and 12	Interview	3
10		MRH (Mirwais Regional Hospital)	Interview	3
11		Shydayee	FGD	16
12			FGD	14
13		Kahdistan	FGD	7
14			FGD	10
15		Pol Rangina	FGD	6
16		Urdu Bagh	FGD	8
17			FGD	10
18		Faiz Abaad	FGD	12 (boys and girls)
19			FGD	6
20	Balkh	Faryaabi	FGD	7
21		Zabeh-ullah Shaheed	FGD	6
22			FGD	10
23		Hassan Abaad	FGD	9
24		Nasim Mahdi	FGD	11

Annex 5: List of key documents reviewed

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2. CaLP/USAID (2015). AFGHANISTAN EMERGENCY RESPONSE MECHANISM (ERM)
3. Cash & Vouchers Working Group (2019). OVERVIEW OF 2018 HUMANITARIAN CASH & VOUCHER PROGRAMMES ANALYSIS DONE BY THE CASH & VOUCHER WORKING GROUP (CVWG) BASED ON REPORT HUB DATA 31 JANUARY 2019
4. DACAAR (2016). HAA--Humanitarian Aid Actions Final Evaluation Report, Afghanistan. (Date of submission: 28/07/2016)
5. DRC-DK (2018). ERM--Emergency Response Mechanism Interim Report, Afghanistan— (date of submission 31/10/2018)
6. ECHO (2014). Technical Annex 2014 Afghanistan HIP: Financial, Administrative And Operational Information - The Afghan Crisis, Last update: 30/07/2014 Version 2
7. ECHO (2014). WASH — Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Interim Report, Afghanistan—2015 (date of final comment 29/07/2015)
8. ECHO (2015). Framework Partnership Agreement 2014 Guidelines, version September 2015
9. ECHO (2015). Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Afghanistan, Pakistan 2015, update: 30/11/2015
10. ECHO (2015). WASH — Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Interim Report, Afghanistan—2015 (Date of final submission: 28/07/2016)
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13. ECHO (2016). WASH — Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Final Report, Afghanistan—2016 (Date of final submission: 20/12/2016)
14. ECHO (2017). Education in Emergencies Strategy Iran
15. ECHO (2017). ERM — Emergency Response Mechanism Common Rationale 7, Afghanistan—2017 (revision 2 October 2017)
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17. ECHO (2017). Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) 2017, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Iran And Pakistan, Last update: 27/09/17 Version 3
18. ECHO (2017). Technical Annex 2017 HIP, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia - Financial, Administrative And Operational Information, 27/09/17 Version 3
19. ECHO (2018) Mission Report December 2018
20. ECHO (2018). 2018 Humanitarian Implementation Plan (Hip) Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran And Central Asia, Version 3 – 24/06/2018

21. ECHO (2018). ERM — Emergency Response Mechanism Interim Report, Afghanistan—2018 (data of final comment 22/12/2018)

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23. ECHO Thematic Policy Document: Health (2016). General Guidelines, February 2014

24. ECHO (2016). Thematic Policy Document no.8: Humanitarian Protection: Improving protection outcomes to reduce risks for people in humanitarian crises. May 2016

25. ECHO (2016). Thematic Policy Document No1 Humanitarian Food Assistance

26. ECHO (2016). Thematic Policy Document No5. Disaster Risk Reduction

27. European Commission (2015). Strategic Plan 2016-2020, Directorate-General Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection – ECHO.

28. European Commission (May 2014). DG ECHO Thematic Policy Document°2, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene: Meeting the challenge of rapidly increasing humanitarian needs in WASH.

29. European Commission Annual Reports 2014, 2015, 2016 & 2017

30. Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2013). The National Policy of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on Internal Displacement, June 2013.

31. Handicap International (2016). Case study country in Challenges to Principled Humanitarian Action.

32. Harry Jeene (2017). ECHO Emergency Response Evaluation, Afghanistan

33. ICF (2017). Evaluation of the European Commission's interventions in the Humanitarian Health sector, 2014-2016, September 2017

34. ICF, DG-ECHO (2018). Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016 Final report

35. IDMC (2018). Mid-year figures Internal displacement in 2018, 12 September 2018

36. INSPIRE Consortium /Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) (2017). Review of Rapid/Emergency Response Mechanisms (ERM), Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 2017

37. International Organisation for Migration (2019). Return Of Undocumented Afghans, Weekly Situation Report JAN— DEC 2018 / 01– 05 JAN 2019

38. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2017). Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF), 2017 to 2021

39. Key Aid Consulting (2019). Review of cash transfer modalities in Afghanistan, Final Report

40. Landell Mills (2018). The Evaluation of Humanitarian Logistics in the European Commission's civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, 2013-2017 – Desk and Field Report, Draft August 2018

41. Norwegian Refugee Council (2019). NRC Afghanistan Shelter Evaluation, January 2019

42. NRC – Handicap International Study. 2016. Led to inter-agency workshops in DRC, Nigeria and Greece

43. NRC (2017). Examining Protection Concerns in Emergency Cash Assistance To Internally Displaced People, Balkh Province (Afghanistan), April 2017

44. NRC. Injil District (Herat Province) Cash for Food Summary Report

45. OCHA Afghanistan (2018). The Common Humanitarian Fund Afghanistan – Annual Report 2017

46. OCHA (2018). 2018-2021 Humanitarian Response Plan, December 2018 update

47. OCHA (2016). Humanitarian Respond Plan 2017, November 2016.

48. OCHA (2015). Humanitarian Respond Plan 2016, November 2015.

49. OCHA (2014). Afghanistan Strategic Response Plan 2015, November 2014

50. Première Urgence - Aide Médicale Internationale (2016). Advocacy paper on a pilot study of providing psychological First Aid (PFA) for war, conflict and disaster related trauma survivors in Kunar/Afghanistan, July 2016

51. SIDA (2017). Afghanistan Humanitarian Crises Analysis 2018, December 2017

52. UNHCR (2018). Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees Enhancing Resilience and Co-Existence through Greater Responsibility-Sharing 2018-19

53. UNHCR (2018). Returnee and Internally Displaced Persons Monitoring Report. UNHCR May 2018

54. United Nations (2017). Special report on the strategic review of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan Report of the Secretary-General A/72/312–S/2017/696, 2017

55. USAID (2015). The USAID Afghanistan Plan for Transition 2015-2018

56. World Bank Group (2016). Country Partnership Framework For Islamic Republic Of Afghanistan For The Period FY 17 to FY 20, 2 October, 2016

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3. DRC-DK ERM 4 PDM Report - Cash Southern Region 120415
4. DRC-DK ERM 4 PDM Report - NFI Eastern Region 130415
5. PIN_ERM5_-_Evaluation_report_20160531
6. 2016-ERM-JLB#23-Joint_need_assessment_report
7. Mike Daniels NRC Consultancy Report Oct 2015
8. CARITAS-DE P.307.001-2014_-_Endline_Report
9. CARITAS-DE P.307.001-2014_-_Baseline_Report
10. WV-NL Multi-Sector_Rapid_Needs_Assessment_2018_(Badghis)
11. PIN-CZ 3_ERM6_PIN_PDM_FINAL
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13. Cash-based-assistance-programmes-for-idps-in-the-kabul-informal-settlements
14. NRC-NO Annex_8_-_AEPO_Final_Narrative_Report_to_NRC
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https://displacement.iom.int/afghanistan Data Visualisation

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Annex 6: Evidence assessment

Evaluation Questions	Findings from Desk review	Findings from KII and field observations	Findings from communities	Conclusive findings	Strength of evidence
1. To what extent did the design and implementation of EU-funded actions take into account the needs of the most vulnerable population in Afghanistan, in particular women, children, elderly and disabled people? To what extent were beneficiaries consulted in the design and implementation of DG ECHO-funded projects?	ECHO and partners use multiple methods and joint needs assessments to identify the vulnerable and gaps.	Joint assessment emphasized, but weak in data sharing; hence multiple assessments are common; focus mostly on vulnerable, but selection/targeting process high in exclusion errors due to petitions system in government areas; no standard procedure for joint assessments.	NGOs come and ask questions a number of times and find out their needs; assistance in cash, WASH and mental health support received repeated mention as highly relevant; hygiene items and education was frequently mentioned by women groups; people have no say in what they needed, but they accepted everything as welcome.	Joint assessment is still weak and the quality of needs assessment and targeting heavily affected by the petitions system for ERM, though the response by partners is considered relevant and appropriate by communities.	4
	Weak evidence with regard to participation of women and incorporating age and disability factors.	Women's participation or consultation during needs assessment not done; weak focus on disability.	Though women were not consulted during needs assessment, most organisations address their specific needs of NFI, water, etc.; disability only focused by 2-3 organisations	ECHO partners weak on participation of women and incorporating age and disability factors in their actions	4

	Beneficiary consultation, participation and AAP – though emphasized, performance not consistent across partners.	Beneficiary consultation predominantly with men; AAP was weak, but now being strengthened in most organisations through Awaaz and CRM	Only few (quarter) group discussions showed reasonable awareness about complaints mechanism; generally weak awareness and understanding of process and entitlement.	AAP and complaints response mechanism still weak among most of ECHO partners, and this is now being strengthened.	4
2. To what extent was a clear and context-adapted strategy designed and applied in Afghanistan? To what extent were DG ECHO and its partners successful in adapting and adjusting their approach and in addressing gaps as the needs evolved over time? Did ECHO-funded interventions address both chronic and acute vulnerabilities arising from protracted and immediate crises, including new humanitarian suffering due to ongoing conflict and natural disasters?	Weak evidence with regard to adaptive management of response and how ECHO responds to needs in protracted crises and links its short-term emergency assistance with recovery activities.	ECHO uses grant making flexibly to ensure that response adapts to needs; ECHO staff travel to all regions and projects; address short-term needs only; actions in areas where humanitarian needs have been either neglected or inadequately met by other providers (mental health, trauma care); slowly expanding footprint in rural and AOG areas, depending on access.	Very short term assistance, not enough quantity; recovery or long-term needs not addressed; children education for IDPs not addressed; IDP who kept arriving after the peak of drought got almost no assistance; mental health support highly appreciated, with prosthetics.	Afghanistan humanitarian context is highly fluid, with one crisis after another. Though ECHO tries to be flexible, with its limited resources, partner actions are often unable to cope with the unfolding crises and expanding needs. ECHO grants generally do not address chronic needs, though the borderline between chronic and acute is blurred in the country context.	3

3. To what extent was DG ECHO's response in Afghanistan aligned with: (a) DG ECHO's mandate as per the Humanitarian Aid Regulation; (b) The European Consensus on humanitarian aid; (c) The humanitarian principles; and (d) DG ECHO's relevant thematic/ sector policies? What were the challenges of alignment with the humanitarian principles? How does ECHO balance the challenges of respecting the principle of humanity in the context of declining funding and access, and increasing needs?	Good evidence to show that ECHO Afghanistan humanitarian actions are fully aligned with ECHO mandates and thematic policies.	ECHO's humanitarian actions operate at two levels – funding to projects for specific activities, and non-funding actions (lobbying, advocacy and thought leadership) that are not tied to any direct project actions; ECHO making significant contributions in promoting humanitarian principles and longer-term issues of risk reduction & resilience, that are not obvious from project documents; strong advocacy on humanitarian principles; with access shrinking, localization agenda will become important - so far not very proactive.	NA	Strong alignment with HAR, Consensus and thematic policies. Through its non-funding actions, ECHO making significant contribution to longer team issues of DRR, resilience etc., and its strong advocacy on humanitarian principles is valued by all humanitarian organisations.	4
	Weak evidence of advocacy on humanitarian principles and access.	Strong advocacy with HCT and all donors on humanitarian principle; jointly with OCHA advocacy on petitions system	NA	As above. (Written documents do not reflect all that ECHO does on the ground).	3

4. In the context of the Nexus and humanitarian-development coordination instruments, what measures were taken by DG ECHO to coordinate the EU's humanitarian and development actions, and how successful were these measures	No significant efforts towards localization and nexus.	Leading on resilience debates, working with other donors and World Bank; informal links with DEVCO, no institutional link; vocal advocate on nexus; convergence of views about ECHO's critical role among all Kis; localization not yet picked up; short-term actions not linked to long-term recovery.	After the short term assistance stops, communities remain in critical/emergency situation in terms of their vulnerability.	ECHO plays a significant leadership role on discourse on nexus, social protection, and works closely with DEVCO, though there is no institutional link between the two organisations.	2
5. To what extent was DG ECHO successful in coordinating its response with that of other donors, including EU Member States, and avoiding overlaps and promoting synergies? How well, and through which mechanisms, has DG ECHO coordinated its response with EU Member States and the UN? Did ECHO facilitate a concerted effort by all donors to advocate for principled humanitarian response and humanitarian space?	No evidence of coordination with EU Member States by ECHO in Afghanistan.	Closely works with other donors including European agencies; the latter highly value and rely on ECHO's unique knowledge and understanding of the country situation and its in-depth analysis; ECHO active in coordination with OCHA and HCT and all relevant humanitarian forums; respected for its distinctive contribution and understanding of humanitarian issues.	NA	ECHO coordinates closely with other donors, including European agencies. It is also an active member of various humanitarian forums.	3
6. What was the EU added value in DG ECHO's actions in the country during the evaluation period?	No evidence found	Neutral' actor, not led by any foreign policy or political agenda.	NA	Multi-lateral donor, perceived a 'relatively neutral'.	2

7. To what extent has DG ECHO achieved cost-effectiveness in its response? What factors have affected the cost-effectiveness of the response and to what extent? To what extent have ECHO-funded actions been efficient and cost-effective? What internal and external factors have affected the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of DG ECHO portfolio in the country?	Across the organisation there is no systematic or standardized consideration of Value for Money, with a low prominence of cost-effectiveness in project documentation.	ECHO staff always compare costs in proposals; cost-comparisons need to be made based on contexts, no set measure possible; cost rises in AOG/hard-to-reach areas or when a small caseload.	NA	Though there is no systematic parameter across the organization to assess cost-effectiveness, staff assess cost-efficiency based on differences in contexts and scale of operation.	3
	Comparative cost effectiveness of different alternative actions is largely unavailable. Project results are either measured in incomparable ways or reported at the output, rather than outcome, level.	Financial cost apart, time-saving is critical in humanitarian ops, and ERM/cash meant to do just that; ERM streamlines needs assessment and has pre-approved budget; Reporting not very systematic; ECHO does not collate and analyse or project level data, so difficult to track outcome easily; but ECHO staff regular monitoring ensures full knowledge of progress.	NA	Cash makes response faster and ERM saves time through common rationale, pre-approved budget, etc.	

	The cost, quality and timeliness of ERM is undermined by various extraneous factors.	Petitions system causes delays; ERM used to small caseloads and challenged in large caseloads; coordination weak means there can be overlap (Herat 2018); inclusion/ exclusion in needs assessment; data not shared; some may play the system to get repeated benefits.	Response by all agencies late, sometimes 3-4 months and quantity inadequate; petitions system difficult to access; NGOs do many survey, but little given.	ERM efficiency undermined by cost, quality and timeliness. Sometimes challenged to provide principled humanitarian response due to petitions system.	4
	No evidence seen to suggest that ECHO/partners are monitoring major cost drivers and streamlining procurement and delivery modality to optimize costs.	At times, there were joint procurement to reduce cost; partners coordinate cash delivery mode; ECHO monitors procurement of big ticket items (cars, medicines, etc.); individual partners claim to monitor cost drivers; pone partner showed analysis data on costs drivers.	NA	Difficult to assess how cost drivers are monitored as except for one agency, all Kis were very general and non-specific in their response.	2
8. Was the size of the budget allocated by DG ECHO to Afghanistan appropriate and proportionate to the outcomes that were meant to be achieved?	Not enough evidence to show how ECHO actions were able to respond to the overall scale of humanitarian needs in different sectors across the country.	ECHO's response is based on its budget allocated; within that, it focuses on needs where it can; needs huge in country; ECHO still is one of the top 3 donors.	NA	Though third-largest humanitarian donor, relative to the humanitarian outcomes that need to be delivered for communities, ECHO's budget is small and can only assist for limited duration.	2

9. To what extent were DG ECHO's objectives (as defined in the HAR, the Consensus and the specific HIPs) achieved in Afghanistan, and the needs of the targeted end-beneficiaries satisfied? What concrete results were achieved during the evaluation period?	Data show uneven results of ECHO actions in food security and WASH, particularly as short-term relief response may not be linked to interventions aimed at addressing ongoing vulnerability in a protracted crisis.	ERM still faster than many agencies response; provides predictable, though minimal, response; ECHO funding not meant to address recovery needs; protection issues not fully addressed (GBV, disability); very late and little drought response by ECHO (and other agenices) in the north.	Trauma care, mental health, water trucking, cash, all highly valued; good effect of hygiene education among most communities in FGDs; too little for too little time, so needs remain unmet; communities go into debts; no shelter for months, most bought their own tents to survive winter; beneficiaries confused and angered by differential treatment in provision of assistance;	Good results on health response; uneven results of ECHO actions in food security, cash and WASH, particularly as short-term relief response may not be linked to interventions aimed at addressing ongoing vulnerability in a protracted crisis; weak on protection and shelter.	4
	Available data on number of beneficiaries at portfolio level does not lend itself to analysis of overall results.	Data on coverage for cash or NFI easy to get, but protection, WASH, etc. difficult; usually go by population in the settlement; different agencies have different approach to data collection and analysis	NA	Data collection, analysis not systematic among partners.	4
	Reports indicate existence of complaints and feedback mechanism and use of Common Humanitarian Standard involving communities, but not clear how effective these are, how they promote participation and/or quality assurance.	All partners have some form of CRM; Awaaz set up and getting traction; strong push from ECHO on this; partners strengthening the system now; participation not strong emphasis; a few Kis argue that people lie.	Between awareness of complaints mechanism in Herat than in Kandahar and Balkh; Small number or people have used it (less that a fifth of FGDs) have used it, but most said no follow up; leaflet not explained	As under EQ1	4

10. How successful was DG ECHO through its advocacy and communication measures in Afghanistan in influencing other actors by direct and indirect advocacy on issues like humanitarian access and space, respect for IHL, addressing gaps in response, applying good practices, and carrying out follow-up actions of DG ECHO's interventions? Was there an 'advocacy gap'?	Weak evidence	As in RQ3	As in EQ3	As inEQ3	4
11. To what extent did DG ECHO make progress in the humanitarian-development nexus? What could be further done (enabling factors, tools, mechanisms, change in strategy, etc.) to promote sustainability and strengthen links to interventions of development actors?	No evidence found	As in EQ4. Strategy for support to long term health facilities unclear.	NA	No exit strategies for some of the health facilities, and ECHOs short-term actions can not produce sustainable results, without effective development actions.	3

Annex 7: ECHO project List

Afghanistan Project List

Number	Action ID	Contract ID	Unit	Contract	Financial Year	Partner	Partner Category	Partner HQ Country	Benef Country	Operational Status	Result Number	Sector	Subsectors	Beneficiaries Typ	Contracted amount signed by partner	Contracted amount latest version	Result Beneficiaries
1	2013/01086	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91001	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	MAF-UK	NGO	UNITED KINGDOM	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Support to operations	Logistics	Others	1,832,938	1,832,938	0
	2013/01086	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91001	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	MAF-UK	NGO	UNITED KINGDOM	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Support to operations	Logistics	Others	17,062	17,062	0
2	2013/01290	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91004	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	OCHA-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	375,000	375,000	0
	2013/01290	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91004	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	OCHA-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	375,000	375,000	428
	2013/01290	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91004	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	OCHA-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	375,000	375,000	428
	2013/01290	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91004	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	OCHA-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	375,000	375,000	428
3	2013/01292	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91002	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	CICR-CH	IO	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Health	Medical supplies; Other (Heal	IDP; Local populatio	3,191,638	3,191,638	432,957
	2013/01292	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91002	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	CICR-CH	IO	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Protection	Detention programmes	Others	1,163,430	1,163,430	1,896
	2013/01292	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91002	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	CICR-CH	IO	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Protection advocacy	IDP; Local populatio	644,932	644,932	0
4	2013/01293	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91003	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Support to operations	Security	Others	1,039,986	1,039,986	0
	2013/01293	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91003	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Support to operations	Security	Others	210,014	210,014	0
5	2013/01297	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91006	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	UNHCR-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Protection	Prevention of and response t	IDP	841,542	841,542	13,707
	2013/01297	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91006	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	UNHCR-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Shelter and settlements	Provision of non-food items	IDP	1,840,768	1,840,768	222,079
	2013/01297	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91006	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	UNHCR-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	3	Protection	Other (Protection); Refugee/	IDP; Returnees	606,391	606,391	181,133
	2013/01297	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91006	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	UNHCR-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	4	Protection	Refugee/IDP protection	Refugees	774,224	774,224	1,719,998
	2013/01297	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91006	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	UNHCR-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	5	Protection	Refugee/IDP protection	Refugees	1,913,322	1,913,322	1,500,460
	2013/01297	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91006	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	UNHCR-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	6	Protection	Refugee/IDP protection	Refugees	207,946	207,946	4,456
	2013/01297	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91006	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	UNHCR-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	7	Health	Other (Health)	Refugees	1,565,808	1,565,808	220,200
6	2014/00154	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	WHO	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Health	Medical supplies; Other (Heal	IDP; Local populatio	1,118,515	1,118,515	406,965
	2014/00154	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	WHO	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Health	Community outreach (Health	IDP; Local populatio	1,181,485	1,181,485	1,647,601
7	2014/00158	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91014	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	DRC-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Support to operations	Capacity building (Not sector	IDP; Local populatio	149,411	149,411	69,300
	2014/00158	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91014	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	DRC-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Food security and livelihoc	Conditional or unconditional c	IDP; Local populatio	748,751	748,751	22,279
	2014/00158	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91014	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	DRC-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Other (Protection); Preventic	IDP; Local populatio	287,980	287,980	2,409
	2014/00158	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91014	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	DRC-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	3,200	3,200	0
	2014/00158	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91014	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	DRC-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	5	Shelter and settlements	Conditional or unconditional c	IDP; Local populatio	191,987	191,987	316
	2014/00158	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91014	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	DRC-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	6	Shelter and settlements	Provision of non-food items	IDP; Local populatio	590,681	590,681	17,428
	2014/00158	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91014	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	DRC-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	7	WASH	Water supply	IDP; Local populatio	127,991	127,991	4,998
8	2014/00161	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91015	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	DACAAR-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	WASH	Water supply	IDP; Local populatio	408,050	408,050	41,061
	2014/00161	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91015	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	DACAAR-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Excreta disposal	IDP; Local populatio	46,848	46,848	3,045
	2014/00161	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91015	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	DACAAR-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	WASH	Hygiene promotion	IDP; Local populatio	103,132	103,132	40,809
	2014/00161	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91015	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	DACAAR-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene pr	IDP; Local populatio	86,436	86,436	5,971
	2014/00161	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91015	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	DACAAR-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	5	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	18,645	18,645	0
	2014/00161	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91015	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	DACAAR-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	6	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene pr	Local population; Re	336,889	336,889	23,889
9	2014/00162	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Food security and livelihoc	Conditional or unconditional c	IDP; Local populatio	1,200,066	1,200,066	38,953
	2014/00162	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Shelter and settlements	Conditional or unconditional c	IDP; Local populatio	375,370	375,370	1,486
	2014/00162	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Shelter and settlements	Provision of non-food items	IDP; Local populatio	780,315	780,315	28,026
	2014/00162	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Coordination	Public awareness and advoca	Local population; Ot	345,461	345,461	381
	2014/00162	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	5	Protection	Protection advocacy	Others	57,095	57,095	113
	2014/00162	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	6	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	52,072	52,072	0
	2014/00162	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	7	Food security and livelihoc	Conditional or unconditional c	Others	92,622	92,622	180
10	2014/00165	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91011	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	CARITAS-DE	NGO	GERMANY	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Food security and livelihoc	Conditional or unconditional c	Local population	426,162	426,162	13,600
	2014/00165	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91011	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	CARITAS-DE	NGO	GERMANY	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Local population; Ot	19,385	19,385	31,360
	2014/00165	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91011	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	CARITAS-DE	NGO	GERMANY	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	3	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	4,453	4,453	0
11	2014/00172	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91013	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	STC-NL	NGO	NETHERLANDS	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Health	Community outreach (Health	IDP; Local populatio	512,203	512,203	51,709
	2014/00172	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91013	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	STC-NL	NGO	NETHERLANDS	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Nutrition	Nutrition surveys and surveill	IDP; Local populatio	146,923	146,923	11,130
	2014/00172	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91013	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	STC-NL	NGO	NETHERLANDS	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	IDP; Local populatio	40,875	40,875	48
12	2014/00175	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91007	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	PUI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Health	Health infrastructure rehabili	IDP; Local populatio	364,458	364,458	7,586
	2014/00175	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91007	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	PUI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Health	Community outreach (Health	IDP; Local populatio	196,079	196,079	620
	2014/00175	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91007	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	PUI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Health	Epidemics; Primary health	IDP; Local populatio	139,463	139,463	0
13	2014/00176	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91012	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	ACF-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Food security and livelihoc	Conditional or unconditional c	IDP; Local populatio	210,531	210,531	14,271
	2014/00176	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91012	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	ACF-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Shelter and settlements	Provision of non-food items	IDP; Local populatio	77,697	77,697	4,556
	2014/00176	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91012	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	ACF-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	3	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene pr	IDP; Local populatio	111,546	111,546	14,271
	2014/00176	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91012	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	ACF-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	4	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	226	226	0
14	2014/00742	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91016	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	PIN-CZ	NGO	CZECH REPUBLIC	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Shelter and settlements	Conditional or unconditional c	Local population	350,000	350,000	3,063

Number	Action ID	Contract ID	Unit	Contract	Financial Year	Partner	Partner Category	Partner HQ Country	Benef Country	Operational Status	Result Number	Sector	Subsectors	Beneficiaries Typ	Contracted amount signed by partner	Contracted amount latest version	Result Beneficiaries
15	2014/00743	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91019	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Shelter and settlements	Individual household shelter	IDP	752,000	752,000	5,376
	2014/00743	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91019	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Shelter and settlements	Provision of non-food items	IDP	48,000	48,000	5,376
16	2014/00773	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91021	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	UNHCR-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Shelter and settlements	Individual household shelter	Refugees	322,902	322,902	38,785
	2014/00773	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91021	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	UNHCR-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Shelter and settlements	Provision of non-food items	Refugees	277,098	277,098	120,749
17	2014/00784	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91017	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	CONCERN WORL	NGO	IRELAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Shelter and settlements	Camps and collective centers	IDP	437,000	437,000	3,679
18	2014/00785	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91018	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	SI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	WASH	Water supply	Refugees	127,348	127,348	54,701
	2014/00785	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91018	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	SI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	WASH	Excreta disposal; Other (WAS	Refugees	225,865	225,865	59,720
	2014/00785	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91018	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	SI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	3	WASH	Hygiene promotion	Refugees	156,787	156,787	6,383
19	2015/00016	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91003	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	MAF-UK	NGO	UNITED KINGDOM	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Support to operations	Logistics	Others	863,153	863,153	1,193
	2015/00016	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91003	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	MAF-UK	NGO	UNITED KINGDOM	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Support to operations	Logistics	Others	5,362	5,362	1,193
	2015/00016	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91003	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	MAF-UK	NGO	UNITED KINGDOM	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	3	Support to operations	Logistics	Others	9,485	9,485	1,193
20	2015/00142	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91025	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	WHO	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Health	Medical supplies; Primary hea	IDP; Local populatio	922,750	922,750	148,611
	2015/00142	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91025	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	WHO	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Health	Community outreach (Health	IDP; Local populatio	820,777	820,777	139,278
	2015/00142	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91025	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	WHO	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Health	Primary health; Secondary he	Local population	1,306,474	1,306,474	36,265
21	2015/00146	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	DACAAR-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene pro	IDP; Local populatio	358,564	358,564	31,176
	2015/00146	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	DACAAR-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Coordination	Country level (sector/intersec	Others	39,488	39,488	0
	2015/00146	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	DACAAR-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene pro	Local population; Re	640,523	640,523	34,902
	2015/00146	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	DACAAR-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	WASH	Other (WASH)	IDP; Local populatio	66,425	66,425	0
22	2015/00179	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91007	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	SI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	WASH	Water supply	Refugees	592,129	592,129	71,494
	2015/00179	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91007	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	SI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Excreta disposal; Solid waste	Refugees	857,768	857,768	79,560
	2015/00179	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91007	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	SI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	WASH	Hygiene promotion	Refugees	350,103	350,103	32,933
23	2015/00194	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91004	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	ACF-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Food security and livelihoc	Conditional or unconditional c	IDP; Local populatio	804,628	804,628	15,322
	2015/00194	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91004	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	ACF-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Coordination	Global (sector/intersector) co	Others	83,745	83,745	0
	2015/00194	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91004	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	ACF-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Shelter and settlements	Provision of non-food items	IDP; Local populatio	1,628	1,628	0
24	2015/00207	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91019	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	CICR-CH	IO	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Health	Medical supplies; Primary hea	IDP; Local populatio	4,000,000	4,000,000	497,367
25	2015/00209	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91005	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	FEDERATION HA	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Health	Other (Health)	IDP; Local populatio	450,000	450,000	7,435
26	2015/00230	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91011	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	STC-NL	NGO	NETHERLANDS	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Health	Medical supplies; Other (Heal	IDP; Local populatio	378,327	378,327	36,652
	2015/00230	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91011	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	STC-NL	NGO	NETHERLANDS	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Health	Community outreach (Health	IDP; Refugees; Ret	141,673	141,673	27,535
27	2015/00244	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91002	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Food security and livelihoc	Conditional or unconditional c	IDP; Local populatio	2,040,457	2,040,457	75,851
	2015/00244	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91002	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Shelter and settlements	Conditional or unconditional c	IDP; Local populatio	374,236	374,236	971
	2015/00244	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91002	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Coordination	Public awareness and advoca	Others	422,642	422,642	82
	2015/00244	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91002	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Protection	Protection advocacy	Others	258,975	258,975	140
	2015/00244	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91002	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	5	Coordination	Country level (sector/intersec	Others	39,430	39,430	137
	2015/00244	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91002	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	6	Shelter and settlements	Provision of non-food items	IDP; Local populatio	486,260	486,260	0
28	2015/00251	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91023	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	UNHCR-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Shelter and settlements	Individual household shelter;	Refugees	1,867,992	1,867,992	207,638
	2015/00251	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91023	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	UNHCR-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Protection	Refugee/IDP protection	Refugees	735,331	735,331	174,698
	2015/00251	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91023	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	UNHCR-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Refugee/IDP protection	IDP; Returnees	431,975	431,975	436,990
	2015/00251	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91023	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	UNHCR-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Protection	Other (Protection)	Returnees	74,695	74,695	12,035
	2015/00251	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91023	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	UNHCR-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	5	Health	Other (Health); Primary healt	Refugees	1,990,007	1,990,007	240,851
29	2015/00255	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	DRC-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Support to operations	Capacity building (Not sector	IDP; Local populatio	135,054	135,054	60,900
	2015/00255	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	DRC-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Food security and livelihoc	Conditional or unconditional c	IDP; Local populatio	2,607,106	2,607,106	60,314
	2015/00255	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	DRC-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Other (Protection); Preventic	IDP; Local populatio	99,175	99,175	931
	2015/00255	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	DRC-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Shelter and settlements	Provision of non-food items	IDP; Returnees	93,665	93,665	0
30	2015/00261	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91031	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	OCHA-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Coordination	Country level (sector/intersec	Others	400,000	400,000	0
	2015/00261	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91031	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	OCHA-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Coordination	Country level (sector/intersec	Others	300,000	300,000	0
	2015/00261	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91031	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	OCHA-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	3	Coordination	Country level (sector/intersec	Others	100,000	100,000	0
	2015/00261	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91031	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	OCHA-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	4	Coordination	Country level (sector/intersec	Others	200,000	200,000	0
31	2015/00270	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91029	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	PUI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Health	Health infrastructure rehabilit	IDP; Local populatio	650,369	650,369	26,811
	2015/00270	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91029	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	PUI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Health	Community outreach (Health	IDP; Local populatio	36,988	36,988	3,929
	2015/00270	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91029	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	PUI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Health	Epidemics; Primary health	Others	0	0	21
	2015/00270	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91029	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	PUI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Health	Epidemics; Mental and psych	IDP; Local populatio	12,643	12,643	857

Number	Action ID	Contract ID	Unit	Contract	Financial Year	Partner	Partner Category	Partner HQ Country	Benef Country	Operational Status	Result Number	Sector	Subsectors	Beneficiaries Typ	Contracted amount signed by partner	Contracted amount latest version	Result Beneficiaries
32	2015/00288	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91012	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	STC-NL	NGO	NETHERLANDS	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Disaster Risk Reduction / [	Information, communication a	Others	162,584	162,584	338
	2015/00288	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91012	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	STC-NL	NGO	NETHERLANDS	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Disaster Risk Reduction / [	Community and local level act	Others	104,445	104,445	9,021
	2015/00288	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91012	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	STC-NL	NGO	NETHERLANDS	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	3	Disaster Risk Reduction / [	Information, communication a	Others	117,971	117,971	20,280
33	2015/00291	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91020	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	AFGHANAID-UK	NGO	UNITED KINGDOM	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Disaster Risk Reduction / [	Community and local level act	Local population; Ot	500,000	500,000	184,884
34	2015/00690	ECHO/CHD/BUD/2015/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Child protection	Education, training and educ	IDP; Local populatio	235,285	235,285	1,400
	2015/00690	ECHO/CHD/BUD/2015/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Child protection	Education, training and educ	Local population; Ot	261,448	261,448	21,488
	2015/00690	ECHO/CHD/BUD/2015/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Child protection	Education, training and educ	Local population; Ot	3,267	3,267	50
35	2015/00748	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91006	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	INSO-UK	NGO	UNITED KINGDOM	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Support to operations	Security	Others	1,036,876	1,036,876	0
	2015/00748	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91006	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	INSO-UK	NGO	UNITED KINGDOM	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Support to operations	Security	Others	213,124	213,124	0
36	2015/01115	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91002	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	ACF-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Health	Community outreach (Health	Local population	119,805	119,805	2,073
	2015/01115	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91002	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	ACF-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Water supply	Local population	122,295	122,295	9,937
	2015/01115	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91002	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	ACF-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	WASH	Hygiene promotion	Local population	82,899	82,899	5,397
37	2015/01123	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91003	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	INSO-UK	NGO	UNITED KINGDOM	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Support to operations	Security	Others	1,593,492	1,593,492	0
	2015/01123	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91003	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	INSO-UK	NGO	UNITED KINGDOM	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Support to operations	Security	Others	306,508	306,508	0
38	2015/01179	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91034	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2015	OCHA-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	345,242	345,242	0
	2015/01179	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91034	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2015	OCHA-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	345,242	345,242	0
	2015/01179	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91034	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2015	OCHA-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	345,242	345,242	0
	2015/01179	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91034	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2015	OCHA-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	345,242	345,242	0
39	2015/01219	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91035	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2015	CICR-CH	IO	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Health	Medical supplies; Secondary l	IDP; Local populatio	4,000,000	4,000,000	505,553
40	2015/01233	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91036	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2015	UNHCR-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Shelter and settlements	Provision of non-food items	Refugees	876,086	876,086	74,991
	2015/01233	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91036	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2015	UNHCR-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Protection	Other (Protection)	Refugees	363,608	363,608	60,000
	2015/01233	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91036	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2015	UNHCR-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Other (Protection)	IDP; Returnees	3,225,064	3,225,064	4,846
41	2016/00402	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	ACF-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Food security and livelihoc	Conditional or unconditional c	IDP; Local populatio	1,328,549	1,328,549	33,526
	2016/00402	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	ACF-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Disaster Risk Reduction / [	Contingency planning and pr	Others	191,047	191,047	0
	2016/00402	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	ACF-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Documentation, status and p	IDP; Local populatio	146,912	146,912	145
	2016/00402	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	ACF-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene pr	IDP; Local populatio	53,491	53,491	2,365
42	2016/00405	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91016	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	WHO	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Health	Capacity building (Health); M	Local population	1,088,080	1,088,080	66,712
	2016/00405	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91016	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	WHO	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Health	Capacity building (Health); C	Local population	341,870	341,870	134,641
	2016/00405	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91016	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	WHO	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	3	Health	Primary health; Secondary he	Local population	1,070,050	1,070,050	38,762
43	2016/00406	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91011	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	DACAAR-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Disaster Risk Reduction / [	Contingency planning and pr	IDP; Local populatio	449,571	449,571	61,170
	2016/00406	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91011	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	DACAAR-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene pr	IDP; Local populatio	630,843	630,843	61,170
	2016/00406	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91011	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	DACAAR-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	55,585	55,585	0
44	2016/00478	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91007	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	DRC-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Food security and livelihoc	Conditional or unconditional c	IDP	2,711,890	2,711,890	79,275
	2016/00478	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91007	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	DRC-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Disaster Risk Reduction / [	Contingency planning and pr	IDP; Others	404,284	404,284	1,400
	2016/00478	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91007	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	DRC-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Documentation, status and p	IDP; Local populatio	33,955	33,955	462
	2016/00478	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91007	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	DRC-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	100,811	100,811	0
	2016/00478	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91007	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	DRC-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	5	Food security and livelihoc	Conditional or unconditional c	Returnees	499,060	499,060	10,437
45	2016/00489	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	PIN-CZ	NGO	CZECH REPUBLIC	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Food security and livelihoc	Conditional or unconditional c	IDP; Local populatio	1,781,486	1,781,486	44,982
	2016/00489	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	PIN-CZ	NGO	CZECH REPUBLIC	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Disaster Risk Reduction / [	Contingency planning and pr	Others	322,665	322,665	0
	2016/00489	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	PIN-CZ	NGO	CZECH REPUBLIC	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Documentation, status and p	IDP; Local populatio	287,493	287,493	258
	2016/00489	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	PIN-CZ	NGO	CZECH REPUBLIC	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Support to operations	Capacity building (Not sector	Others	8,357	8,357	0
46	2016/00502	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91004	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	IOM-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Protection	Support to seperated/unacco	Returnees	117,419	117,419	4,773
	2016/00502	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91004	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	IOM-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Protection	Gender based violence (Prev	Returnees	204,407	204,407	2,806
	2016/00502	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91004	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	IOM-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Gender based violence (Prev	Returnees	372,174	372,174	5,024
47	2016/00507	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91012	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	SI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	WASH	Water supply	Local population; Re	851,418	851,418	49,117
	2016/00507	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91012	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	SI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Excreta disposal; Solid waste	Local population; Re	176,788	176,788	41,927
	2016/00507	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91012	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	SI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	WASH	Hygiene promotion	Local population; Re	263,964	263,964	27,931
	2016/00507	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91012	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	SI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	WASH	Hygiene promotion; Water su	Refugees	52,830	52,830	5,173

Number	Action ID	Contract ID	Unit	Contract	Financial Year	Partner	Partner Category	Partner HQ Country	Benef Country	Operational Status	Result Number	Sector	Subsectors	Beneficiaries Typ	Contracted amount signed by partner	Contracted amount latest version	Result Beneficiaries
48	2016/00517	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Food security and livelihoc	Other (Food)	IDP; Local populatio	2,639,385	2,639,385	76,916
	2016/00517	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Disaster Risk Reduction / I	Contingency planning and pr	Others	587,970	587,970	0
	2016/00517	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Documentation, status and p	IDP; Local populatio	320,694	320,694	1,722
	2016/00517	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Support to operations	Advocacy for humanitarian a	Others	111,684	111,684	0
	2016/00517	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	5	Protection	Capacity building (Protection)	Others	106,932	106,932	113
	2016/00517	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	6	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	35,234	35,234	60
	2016/00517	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	7	Food security and livelihoc	Other (Food)	Returnees	538,182	538,182	14,000
49	2016/00520	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91006	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	PUI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Health	Capacity building (Health); H	Local population	948,448	948,448	56,120
	2016/00520	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91006	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	PUI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Health	Capacity building (Health); C	Local population	217,091	217,091	6,301
	2016/00520	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91006	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	PUI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Health	Capacity building (Health); E	Local population	59,380	59,380	0
	2016/00520	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91006	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	PUI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Health	Mental and psycho-social sup	IDP; Local populatio	225,081	225,081	33,397
50	2016/00526	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91005	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	FEDERATION HA	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Health	Other (Health)	IDP; Local populatio	424,211	424,211	7,546
	2016/00526	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91005	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	FEDERATION HA	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Health	Other (Health)	Others	50,209	50,209	0
	2016/00526	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91005	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	FEDERATION HA	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Health	Other (Health)	Others	14,624	14,624	0
	2016/00526	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91005	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	FEDERATION HA	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Health	Health infrastructure rehabili	IDP; Local populatio	205,956	205,956	4,700
51	2016/00612	ECHO/ERC/BUD/2016/91001	ECHO DDG C 1	2016	2016	CICR-CH	IO	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Protection	Capacity building (Protection)	N/A	1,157,269	1,157,269	0
	2016/00612	ECHO/ERC/BUD/2016/91001	ECHO DDG C 1	2016	2016	CICR-CH	IO	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Protection	Other (Protection); Preventic	N/A	542,731	542,731	0
52	2016/00655	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91025	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	ACTED-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Education in emergencies	Non-formal education; Safe a	IDP	108,304	108,304	4,709
	2016/00655	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91025	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	ACTED-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Education in emergencies	Non-formal education; Safe a	IDP	376,275	376,275	1,845
	2016/00655	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91025	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	ACTED-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	3	Education in emergencies	Formal education; Non-forma	IDP	300,420	300,420	4,709
53	2016/00854	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91021	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Education in emergencies	Capacity Building (Education)	Local population; Re	609,788	609,788	3,513
	2016/00854	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91021	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Education in emergencies	Capacity Building (Education)	IDP; Local populatio	387,037	387,037	2,032
54	2016/01106	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91032	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	DRC-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Shelter and settlements	Conditional or unconditional c	IDP; Local populatio	700,000	700,000	1,309
55	2016/01109	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91029	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Shelter and settlements	Capacity building (Shelter); C	Local population	840,000	840,000	1,540
56	2016/01192	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91033	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	MAF-UK	NGO	UNITED KINGDOM	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Support to operations	Logistics	Others	862,189	862,189	939
	2016/01192	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91033	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	MAF-UK	NGO	UNITED KINGDOM	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Support to operations	Logistics	Others	986	986	901
57	2016/01561	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91050	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2016	INSO-UK	NGO	UNITED KINGDOM	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Support to operations	Security	Others	686,496	686,496	0
	2016/01561	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91050	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2016	INSO-UK	NGO	UNITED KINGDOM	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Support to operations	Security	Others	153,504	153,504	0
58	2017/00133	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91018	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	MAF-UK	NGO	UNITED KINGDOM	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Support to operations	Logistics	Others	730,000	730,000	1,596
59	2017/00321	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91013	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	ACF-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Multi-purpose cash transfe	Availability of, access to and	IDP; Local populatio	2,085,480	2,085,480	34,062
	2017/00321	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91013	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	ACF-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Disaster Risk Reduction / I	Contingency planning and pr	Others	162,509	162,509	0
	2017/00321	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91013	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	ACF-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Documentation, status and p	IDP; Local populatio	149,085	149,085	595
	2017/00321	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91013	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	ACF-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene pr	IDP; Local populatio	72,651	72,651	5,509
	2017/00321	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91013	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	ACF-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	5	Support to operations	Advocacy for humanitarian a	Others	80,275	80,275	0
60	2017/00322	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91012	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	CICR-CH	IO	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Health	Medical supplies; Secondary I	IDP; Local populatio	3,292,128	3,292,128	562,945
	2017/00322	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91012	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	CICR-CH	IO	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Protection	Capacity building (Protection)	IDP; Local populatio	707,872	707,872	4,486
61	2017/00327	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	DACAAR-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Disaster Risk Reduction / I	Contingency planning and pr	IDP; Refugees; Ret	860,523	860,523	0
	2017/00327	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	DACAAR-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene pr	IDP; Returnees	1,051,642	1,051,642	139,152
	2017/00327	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	DACAAR-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	63,026	63,026	0
62	2017/00329	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91048	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2016	OCHA-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Coordination	Other (Coordination)	Others	125,000	125,000	0
	2017/00329	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91048	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2016	OCHA-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Coordination	Other (Coordination)	Others	125,000	125,000	150
	2017/00329	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91048	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2016	OCHA-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	3	Coordination	Other (Coordination)	Others	125,000	125,000	150
	2017/00329	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91048	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2016	OCHA-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	4	Coordination	Other (Coordination)	Others	125,000	125,000	150
63	2017/00333	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91034	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	WFP-IT	UN	ITALY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Support to operations	Capacity building (Not sector	Others	783,667	783,667	0
	2017/00333	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91034	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	WFP-IT	UN	ITALY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Support to operations	Capacity building (Not sector	Others	146,333	146,333	0
64	2017/00337	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91045	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2016	FEDERATION HA	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Health	Other (Health)	IDP; Local populatio	551,369	551,369	10,800
	2017/00337	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91045	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2016	FEDERATION HA	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Health	Other (Health)	IDP; Local populatio	81,331	81,331	14
65	2017/00340	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91046	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2016	SI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	WASH	Water supply	Refugees	217,084	217,084	16,440
	2017/00340	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91046	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2016	SI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Excreta disposal	Local population; Re	87,254	87,254	2,800
	2017/00340	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91046	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2016	SI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	WASH	Hygiene promotion	Refugees	95,662	95,662	16,440

Number	Action ID	Contract ID	Unit	Contract	Financial Year	Partner	Partner Category	Partner HQ Country	Benef Country	Operational Status	Result Number	Sector	Subsectors	Beneficiaries Typ	Contracted amount signed by partner	Contracted amount latest version	Result Beneficiaries
66	2017/00344	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91011	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	ACTED-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Multi-purpose cash transfe	N/A	IDP; Local populatio	3,541,790	3,541,790	70,626
	2017/00344	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91011	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	ACTED-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Disaster Risk Reduction / I	Other (DRR / DP)	Others	0	0	0
	2017/00344	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91011	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	ACTED-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Documentation, status and p	IDP; Local populatio	11,147	11,147	88
	2017/00344	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91011	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	ACTED-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene pr	IDP; Local populatio	0	0	0
	2017/00344	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91011	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	ACTED-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	5	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	147,063	147,063	0
67	2017/00346	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	PIN-CZ	NGO	CZECH REPUBLIC	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Multi-purpose cash transfe	N/A	IDP; Local populatio	2,225,515	2,225,515	34,179
	2017/00346	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	PIN-CZ	NGO	CZECH REPUBLIC	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Disaster Risk Reduction / I	Contingency planning and pr	IDP; Others	259,920	259,920	0
	2017/00346	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	PIN-CZ	NGO	CZECH REPUBLIC	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Documentation, status and p	IDP; Local populatio	28,948	28,948	186
	2017/00346	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	PIN-CZ	NGO	CZECH REPUBLIC	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene pr	IDP; Local populatio	85,617	85,617	13,524
68	2017/00353	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91005	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	STC-NL	NGO	NETHERLANDS	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Education in emergencies	Formal education; Non-forma	IDP; Local populatio	233,409	233,409	2,053
	2017/00353	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91005	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	STC-NL	NGO	NETHERLANDS	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Education in emergencies	Other (Education)	IDP; Local populatio	16,591	16,591	500
69	**2017/00355**	**ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91047**	**ECHO DDG C 4**	**2017**	**2016**	**PUI-FR**	**NGO**	**FRANCE**	**AFGHANISTAN**	**VA Signed by partner**	**1**	**Health**	**Capacity building (Health); M**	**IDP; Local populatio**	**590,279**	**590,279**	**6,654**
	2017/00355	**ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91047**	**ECHO DDG C 4**	**2017**	**2016**	**PUI-FR**	**NGO**	**FRANCE**	**AFGHANISTAN**	**VA Signed by partner**	**2**	**Health**	**Capacity building (Health); Ep**	**IDP; Local populatio**	**257,763**	**257,763**	**33,540**
	2017/00355	**ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91047**	**ECHO DDG C 4**	**2017**	**2016**	**PUI-FR**	**NGO**	**FRANCE**	**AFGHANISTAN**	**VA Signed by partner**	**3**	**Health**	**Other (Health)**	**IDP; Local populatio**	**131,958**	**131,958**	**50,000**
70	2017/00357	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91007	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	DRC-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Multi-purpose cash transfe	N/A	IDP; Local populatio	3,190,051	3,190,051	48,153
	2017/00357	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91007	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	DRC-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Disaster Risk Reduction / I	Contingency planning and pr	Others	0	0	0
	2017/00357	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91007	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	DRC-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Documentation, status and p	IDP; Local populatio	9,949	9,949	371
71	2017/00360	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91019	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	IOM-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Protection	Other (Protection); Protectio	Returnees	151,453	151,453	4,505
	2017/00360	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91019	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	IOM-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Protection	Gender based violence (Prev	Returnees	598,547	598,547	4,545
72	2017/00380	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Multi-purpose cash transfe	Other (Food)	IDP; Local populatio	4,268,925	4,268,925	98,441
	2017/00380	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Disaster Risk Reduction / I	Contingency planning and pr	IDP	152,200	152,200	0
	2017/00380	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Documentation, status and p	IDP	282,592	282,592	500
	2017/00380	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	246,283	246,283	0
73	2017/00600	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91017	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	UNHCR-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Protection	Documentation, status and p	Refugees	151,764	151,764	29,161
	2017/00600	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91017	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	UNHCR-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Protection	Capacity building (Protection)	IDP; Local populatio	1,135,352	1,135,352	198,548
	2017/00600	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91017	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	UNHCR-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	3	Protection	Other (Protection)	IDP; Refugees; Ret	2,012,884	2,012,884	491,823
74	2017/00606	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91049	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2016	WHO	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Health	Capacity building (Health); M	IDP; Local populatio	1,148,514	1,148,514	55,100
	2017/00606	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91049	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2016	WHO	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Health	Capacity building (Health); Co	IDP; Local populatio	559,207	559,207	120,000
	2017/00606	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91049	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2016	WHO	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	3	Health	Primary health; Secondary he	Local population	732,279	732,279	35,800
75	2017/00937	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91031	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	FEDERATION HA	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Health	Capacity building (Health); M	IDP; Local populatio	250,000	250,000	5,248
76	**2017/00938**	**ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91032**	**ECHO DDG C 4**	**2017**	**2017**	**OXFAM-NL (NOV**	**NGO**	**NETHERLANDS**	**AFGHANISTAN**	**VA Signed by partner**	**1**	**Coordination**	**Other (Coordination)**	**Others**	**60,000**	**60,000**	**0**
77	2018/00156	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91012	ECHO DDG C 4	N/A	2018	DACAAR-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by ECHO	1	Disaster Risk Reduction / I	Contingency planning and pr	Others	0	1,197,023	0
	2018/00156	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91012	ECHO DDG C 4	N/A	2018	DACAAR-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by ECHO	2	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene pr	IDP; Local populatio	0	1,206,956	151,200
	2018/00156	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91012	ECHO DDG C 4	N/A	2018	DACAAR-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by ECHO	3	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	0	96,020	0
78	2018/00157	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	CICR-CH	IO	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Health	Medical supplies; Secondary h	IDP; Local populatio	3,491,566	3,491,566	377,450
	2018/00157	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	CICR-CH	IO	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Protection	Capacity building (Protection)	IDP; Local populatio	508,434	508,434	4,332
79	2018/00244	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91011	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	DRC-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Multi-purpose cash transfe	N/A	IDP; Local populatio	3,331,120	3,331,120	41,762
	2018/00244	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91011	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	DRC-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Disaster Risk Reduction / I	Contingency planning and pr	Others	50,821	50,821	5,250
	2018/00244	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91011	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	DRC-DK	NGO	DENMARK	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	3	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene pr	IDP; Local populatio	18,059	18,059	714
80	2018/00247	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91017	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	OCHA-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	125,000	125,000	0
	2018/00247	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91017	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	OCHA-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	125,000	125,000	0
	2018/00247	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91017	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	OCHA-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	3	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	125,000	125,000	0
	2018/00247	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91017	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	OCHA-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	4	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	Others	125,000	125,000	0
81	2018/00249	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91004	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	MAF-UK	NGO	UNITED KINGDOM	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Support to operations	Logistics	Others	750,000	750,000	1,746
82	2018/00253	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91016	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	FEDERATION HA	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Health	Other (Health)	IDP; Local populatio	222,418	222,418	4,500
	2018/00253	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91016	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	FEDERATION HA	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Health	Other (Health)	Others	56,904	56,904	0
	2018/00253	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91016	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	FEDERATION HA	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Health	Mental and psycho-social sup	IDP; Local populatio	328,383	328,383	7,875
	2018/00253	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91016	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	FEDERATION HA	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Mine actions	Mine education and mine risk	IDP; Local populatio	216,709	216,709	26,460
	2018/00253	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91016	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	FEDERATION HA	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	5	Health	Other (Health)	IDP; Others; Refug	220,395	220,395	1,098

Number	Action ID	Contract ID	Unit	Contract	Financial Year	Partner	Partner Category	Partner HQ Country	Benef Country	Operational Status	Result Number	Sector	Subsectors	Beneficiaries Typ	Contracted amount signed by partner	Contracted amount latest version	Result Beneficiaries
83	2018/00255	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	ACTED-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Multi-purpose cash transfe	N/A	IDP; Local populatio	3,000,000	3,000,000	36,407
84	2018/00261	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91001	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	INSO-UK	NGO	UNITED KINGDOM	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Support to operations	Security	Others	960,493	960,493	0
	2018/00261	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91001	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	INSO-UK	NGO	UNITED KINGDOM	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Support to operations	Security	Others	219,507	219,507	0
85	2018/00265	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91018	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	STC-NL	NGO	NETHERLANDS	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Education in emergencies	Formal education; Safe and a	IDP; Local populatio	262,835	262,835	7,125
	2018/00265	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91018	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	STC-NL	NGO	NETHERLANDS	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Education in emergencies	Safe and accessible learning	IDP; Local populatio	180,585	180,585	3,525
	2018/00265	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91018	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	STC-NL	NGO	NETHERLANDS	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	3	Education in emergencies	Capacity Building (Education)	IDP; Local populatio	56,580	56,580	369
86	2018/00266	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91019	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	WHO	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Health	Capacity building (Health); M	IDP; Local populatio	689,313	689,313	16,279
	2018/00266	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91019	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	WHO	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Health	Capacity building (Health); C	IDP; Local populatio	46,477	46,477	0
	2018/00266	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91019	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	WHO	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	3	Health	Primary health; Secondary he	Local population	64,210	64,210	40,000
87	2018/00267	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91020	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	IOM-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Protection	Capacity building (Protection)	Others	226,878	226,878	0
	2018/00267	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91020	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	IOM-CH	UN	SWITZERLAND	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Protection	Documentation, status and p	Others; Returnees	773,122	773,122	1,926
88	2018/00268	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91022	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	UNOPS-US	UN	UNITED STATES OF AMER	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	IDP; Local populatio	200,000	200,000	12,800
	2018/00268	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91022	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	UNOPS-US	UN	UNITED STATES OF AMER	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Coordination	Country level (sector/interse	IDP; Local populatio	200,000	200,000	12,800
89	2018/00271	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91013	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	STC-NL	NGO	NETHERLANDS	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Nutrition	Nutrition surveys and surveill	IDP; Local populatio	538,993	538,993	33,102
	2018/00271	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91013	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	STC-NL	NGO	NETHERLANDS	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Nutrition	Prevention of undernutrition	IDP; Local populatio	117,010	117,010	21,282
	2018/00271	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91013	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	STC-NL	NGO	NETHERLANDS	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	3	Health	Community outreach (Health	IDP; Local populatio	303,749	303,749	18,330
	2018/00271	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91013	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	STC-NL	NGO	NETHERLANDS	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	4	Nutrition	Capacity building (Nutrition)	Others	46,607	46,607	72
	2018/00271	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91013	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	STC-NL	NGO	NETHERLANDS	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	5	Nutrition	Other (Nutrition)	Others	113,639	113,639	0
90	2018/00273	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91014	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	PUI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Health	Capacity building (Health); He	IDP; Local populatio	220,075	220,075	4,666
	2018/00273	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91014	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	PUI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Health	Capacity building (Health); M	IDP; Local populatio	235,711	235,711	21,264
	2018/00273	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91014	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	PUI-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	3	Multi-purpose cash transfe	Medical supplies; Other (Heal	IDP; Local populatio	344,215	344,215	3,045
91	2018/00274	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Multi-purpose cash transfe	N/A	IDP; Refugees; Ret	3,420,983	3,420,983	35,245
	2018/00274	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Coordination	Other (Coordination)	Others	259,282	259,282	0
	2018/00274	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Disaster Risk Reduction / I	Contingency planning and pr	IDP; Refugees; Ret	75,718	75,718	0
	2018/00274	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene pr	IDP; Refugees; Ret	94,018	94,018	700
92	2018/00344	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91006	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	EMERGENCY	NGO	ITALY	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Health	Other (Health)	Others	245,785	245,785	25,630
	2018/00344	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91006	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	EMERGENCY	NGO	ITALY	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Health	Secondary health	Others	1,104,215	1,104,215	16,500
93	2015/00493	ECHO/ERC/BUD/2015/91012	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	TI-DE	NGO	GERMANY	COUNTRY NOT SPECIFIED, KENYA, SOMALIA, SENEGAL, GUINE			Support to operations					
94	2018/00946	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91025	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	CARITAS-DE	NGO	GERMANY	AFGHANISTAN	Agreement transmitted on 30/10/2018		Food security and livelihoods, WASH			1.000.000,00	1.240.000,00	
95	2018/00947	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91028	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	ACTED-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	Agreement transmitted on 07/11/2018		Food security and livelihoods, WASH, Disaster Risk Reduction / Disaster Prep			3.000.000,00	3.000.000,00	
96	2018/00950	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91030	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	ACF-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	Agreement transmitted on 09/11/2018		Nutrition			1.000.000,00	1.000.000,00	
97	2018/00951	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91026	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	IRC-UK	NGO	UNITED KINGDOM	AFGHANISTAN	Agreement transmitted on 07/11/2018		Food security and livelihoods, WASH, protection			2.154.926,00	2.154.926,00	
98	2018/00952	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91024	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	WV-NL	NGO	NETHERLANDS	AFGHANISTAN	Agreement transmitted on 24/10/2018		Food security and livelihoods, WASH, Nutrition			2.222.222,00	2.222.222,00	
99	2018/00954	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91027	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	Agreement transmitted on 07/11/2018		Shelter and settlements, Protection, Education in Emergencies			2.230.000,00	2.230.000,00	
100	2018/00998	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91029	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	MRCA-FR	NGO	FRANCE	AFGHANISTAN	Agreement transmitted on 15/11/2018		Food security and livelihoods, WASH			1.000.000,00	1.000.000,00	

NRC Partnership Project List

Number	Action ID	Contract ID	Unit	Contract Year	Financial Year	Partner	Partner Category	Partner HQ Country	Benef Country	Operational Status	Result Number	Sector	Subsectors	Beneficiaries Type	Contracted amount signed by partner	Contracted amount latest version	Result Beneficiaries
1	2013/00943	ECHO/COD/BUD/2014/91004	ECHO DDG C 3	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	VA Signed by partner	1	Support to c	Security	Others	599,929	599,929	0
2	2013/00943	ECHO/COD/BUD/2014/91004	ECHO DDG C 3	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	VA Signed by partner	2	Support to c	Security	Others	62,070	62,070	0
3	2013/00943	ECHO/COD/BUD/2014/91004	ECHO DDG C 3	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	VA Signed by partner	3	Support to c	Security	Others	25,248	25,248	0
4	2013/00961	ECHO/COD/BUD/2014/91023	ECHO DDG C 3	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	VA Signed by partner	1	Food securit	Conditional or unconditional cash/voucher food assistance	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	2,023,999	2,023,999	87,845
5	2013/00961	ECHO/COD/BUD/2014/91023	ECHO DDG C 3	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	VA Signed by partner	2	Food securit	Conditional or unconditional cash/voucher food assistance	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	138,000	138,000	2,959
6	2013/00961	ECHO/COD/BUD/2014/91023	ECHO DDG C 3	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Protection advocacy	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	138,000	138,000	87,845
7	2013/01177	ECHO/YEM/BUD/2014/91008	ECHO DDG B 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	YEMEN	VA Signed by partner	1	Protection	Gender based violence (Prevention, response, other); Other (Protection); Prevention of and respo	IDP; Local population; Refugees	332,371	332,371	10,682
8	2013/01177	ECHO/YEM/BUD/2014/91008	ECHO DDG B 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	YEMEN	VA Signed by partner	2	Shelter and	Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers; Individual household shelter	IDP; Local population; Refugees	882,704	882,704	4,080
9	2013/01177	ECHO/YEM/BUD/2014/91008	ECHO DDG B 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	YEMEN	VA Signed by partner	3	Food securit	Conditional or unconditional cash/voucher food assistance; Short-term livelihood support	IDP; Local population; Returnees	963,445	963,445	15,148
10	2013/01177	ECHO/YEM/BUD/2014/91008	ECHO DDG B 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	YEMEN	VA Signed by partner	4	WASH	Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers; Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Other (WASH); V	IDP; Local population; Returnees	479,221	479,221	17,574
11	2013/01177	ECHO/YEM/BUD/2014/91008	ECHO DDG B 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	YEMEN	VA Signed by partner	5	Support to c	Security	Others	342,259	342,259	0
12	2013/01227	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2014/91002	ECHO DDG C 3	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOMALIA	VA Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Individual household shelter; Provision of non-food items	IDP; Local population; Returnees	1,485,241	1,485,241	45,970
13	2013/01227	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2014/91002	ECHO DDG C 3	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOMALIA	VA Signed by partner	2	Food securit	Conditional or unconditional cash/voucher food assistance; Short-term livelihood support	IDP; Local population; Returnees	1,314,211	1,314,211	29,380
14	2013/01227	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2014/91002	ECHO DDG C 3	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOMALIA	VA Signed by partner	3	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Solid waste management; Water supply	IDP; Local population; Returnees	1,017,386	1,017,386	86,967
15	2013/01227	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2014/91002	ECHO DDG C 3	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOMALIA	VA Signed by partner	4	Protection	Other (Protection); Prevention of and response to violence; Protection advocacy; Refugee/IDP pro	IDP; Local population; Others; Returnees	183,163	183,163	26,933
16	2013/01293	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91003	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Support to c	Security	Others	1,039,986	1,039,986	0
17	2013/01293	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91003	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Support to c	Security	Others	210,014	210,014	0
18	2014/00022	ECHO/PAK/BUD/2014/91005	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Protection	Refugee/IDP protection	IDP; Returnees	172,996	172,996	3,085
19	2014/00022	ECHO/PAK/BUD/2014/91005	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Shelter and	Provision of non-food items	IDP; Returnees	1,227,004	1,227,004	138,162
20	2014/00026	ECHO/PAK/BUD/2014/91006	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Coordinatior	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination	Others	127,336	127,336	0
21	2014/00026	ECHO/PAK/BUD/2014/91006	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Coordinatior	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination	Others	112,066	112,066	0
22	2014/00026	ECHO/PAK/BUD/2014/91006	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Coordinatior	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination	Others	177,286	177,286	0
23	2014/00026	ECHO/PAK/BUD/2014/91006	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PAKISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Coordinatior	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination	Others	183,311	183,311	0
24	2014/00054	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2014/91003	ECHO DDG B 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	1	Protection	Other (Protection); Prevention of and response to violence; Refugee/IDP protection	IDP; Local population; Refugees	678,897	678,897	9,354
25	2014/00054	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2014/91003	ECHO DDG B 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	2	Protection	Prevention of and response to violence; Protection advocacy; Refugee/IDP protection	IDP; Local population; Others; Refugees	306,976	306,976	7,476
26	2014/00054	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2014/91003	ECHO DDG B 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Prevention of and response to violence; Protection advocacy; Refugee/IDP protection	IDP; Local population; Others; Refugees	445,676	445,676	0
27	2014/00054	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2014/91003	ECHO DDG B 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	4	Shelter and	Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers; Individual household shelter; Provision of non-food iter	IDP; Refugees	588,491	588,491	7,986
28	2014/00054	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2014/91003	ECHO DDG B 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	5	Coordinatior	Other (Coordination)	IDP	79,960	79,960	22,230
29	2014/00152	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Food securit	Conditional or unconditional cash/voucher food assistance; Food security information and analysis;	Refugees	181,883	181,883	3,020
30	2014/00152	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion	Refugees	82,621	82,621	14,695
31	2014/00152	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Shelter and	Individual household shelter; Provision of non-food items	Refugees	181,231	181,231	5,691
32	2014/00152	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Child proted	Advocacy, awareness raising; Education, training and educational activities	Refugees	129,827	129,827	3,366
33	2014/00152	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	VA Signed by partner	5	Coordinatior	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination; Public awareness and advocacy	Others	24,437	24,437	129
34	2014/00162	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Food securit	Conditional or unconditional cash/voucher food assistance; Short-term livelihood support	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	1,200,066	1,200,066	38,953
35	2014/00162	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Shelter and	Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers; Individual household shelter	IDP; Local population; Returnees	375,370	375,370	1,486
36	2014/00162	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Shelter and	Provision of non-food items	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	780,315	780,315	28,026
37	2014/00162	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Coordinatior	Public awareness and advocacy	Local population; Others	345,461	345,461	381
38	2014/00162	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	5	Protection	Protection advocacy	Others	57,095	57,095	113
39	2014/00162	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	6	Coordinatior	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination; Public awareness and advocacy	Others	52,072	52,072	0
40	2014/00162	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	7	Food securit	Conditional or unconditional cash/voucher food assistance	Others	92,622	92,622	180
41	2014/00293	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91012	ECHO DDG B 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Individual household shelter	Refugees	1,377,082	1,377,082	3,721
42	2014/00293	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91012	ECHO DDG B 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	2	Protection	Protection advocacy; Refugee/IDP protection	Refugees	670,824	670,824	48,351
43	2014/00293	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91012	ECHO DDG B 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	3	Shelter and	Individual household shelter; Provision of non-food items	IDP; Local population; Refugees	954,202	954,202	7,781
44	2014/00293	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91012	ECHO DDG B 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	4	Shelter and	Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers; Provision of non-food items	Refugees	997,892	997,892	96,556
45	2014/00436	ECHO/COL/BUD/2014/91014	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	VA Signed by partner	1	Child proted	Education, training and educational activities	IDP; Local population; Others	556,943	556,943	9,556
46	2014/00436	ECHO/COL/BUD/2014/91014	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	VA Signed by partner	2	Protection	Refugee/IDP protection	Refugees	54,253	54,253	2,030
47	2014/00436	ECHO/COL/BUD/2014/91014	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	VA Signed by partner	3	Food securit	Short-term livelihood support	IDP	68,804	68,804	3,077
48	2014/00552	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2014/91026	ECHO DDG C 3	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	ETHIOPIA	VA Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Individual household shelter	Local population; Refugees	1,313,410	1,313,410	48,030
49	2014/00552	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2014/91026	ECHO DDG C 3	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	ETHIOPIA	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion	Refugees	586,590	586,590	50,687
50	2014/00633	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2014/91030	ECHO DDG C 3	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	VA Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Individual household shelter	IDP	421,891	421,891	19,534
51	2014/00633	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2014/91030	ECHO DDG C 3	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Solid waste management	IDP	770,767	770,767	15,757
52	2014/00633	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2014/91030	ECHO DDG C 3	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	VA Signed by partner	3	Shelter and	Individual household shelter; Provision of non-food items	IDP; Local population; Returnees	807,342	807,342	81,312
53	2014/00684	ECHO/CIV/BUD/2014/91006	ECHO DDG C 2	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COTE D'IVOIRE	VA Signed by partner	1	Protection	Prevention of and response to violence; Protection advocacy	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	366,936	366,936	5,256
54	2014/00684	ECHO/CIV/BUD/2014/91006	ECHO DDG C 2	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COTE D'IVOIRE	VA Signed by partner	2	Protection	Prevention of and response to violence; Protection advocacy	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	198,399	198,399	512
55	2014/00684	ECHO/CIV/BUD/2014/91006	ECHO DDG C 2	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COTE D'IVOIRE	VA Signed by partner	3	Food securit	Short-term livelihood support	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	234,665	234,665	692
56	2014/00712	ECHO/CHD/BUD/2014/91002	ECHO DDG C 3	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	V1 Signed by partner	1	Child proted	Education, training and educational activities	IDP; Local population; Returnees	300,000	300,000	11,283
57	2014/00712	ECHO/CHD/BUD/2014/91002	ECHO DDG C 3	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	V1 Signed by partner	2	Child proted	Education, training and educational activities	IDP; Local population; Returnees	100,000	100,000	5,419
58	2014/00743	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91019	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Individual household shelter	IDP	752,000	752,000	5,376
59	2014/00743	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2014/91019	ECHO DDG C 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Shelter and	Provision of non-food items	IDP	48,000	48,000	5,376
60	2014/00744	ECHO/-ME/BUD/2014/91007	ECHO DDG B 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers; Individual household shelter; Provision of non-food iter	IDP; Local population	989,196	989,196	13,965

Number	Action ID	Contract ID	Unit	Contract Year	Financial Year	Partner	Partner Category	Partner HQ Country	Benef Country	Operational Status	Result Number	Sector	Subsectors	Beneficiaries Type	Contracted amount signed by partner	Contracted amount latest version	Result Beneficiaries
61	2014/00744	ECHO/-ME/BUD/2014/91007	ECHO DDG B 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	2	Shelter and	Provision of non-food items	IDP	389,605	389,605	10,194
62	2014/00744	ECHO/-ME/BUD/2014/91007	ECHO DDG B 4	2014	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	3	Coordinatior	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination	Local population	31,199	31,199	0
63	2014/00992	ECHO/YEM/BUD/2015/91001	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	YEMEN	VA Signed by partner	1	Protection	Gender based violence (Prevention, response, other); Other (Protection); Prevention of and respo	IDP; Local population; Returnees	231,983	231,983	1,907
64	2014/00992	ECHO/YEM/BUD/2015/91001	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	YEMEN	VA Signed by partner	2	Shelter and	Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers; Individual household shelter; Other (Shelter)	IDP; Local population; Returnees	507,125	507,125	4,900
65	2014/00992	ECHO/YEM/BUD/2015/91001	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	YEMEN	VA Signed by partner	3	Food securit	Conditional or unconditional cash/voucher food assistance; Short-term livelihood support	IDP; Local population; Returnees	812,916	812,916	8,260
66	2014/00992	ECHO/YEM/BUD/2015/91001	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	YEMEN	VA Signed by partner	4	WASH	Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers; Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Other (WASH); V	IDP; Local population; Returnees	427,626	427,626	13,104
67	2014/00992	ECHO/YEM/BUD/2015/91001	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	YEMEN	VA Signed by partner	5	Support to c	Security	Others	420,349	420,349	0
68	2014/00994	ECHO/-SM/BUD/2015/91029	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	V1 Signed by partner	1	Child protec	Education, training and educational activities	IDP; Local population	373,365	373,365	5,822
69	2014/00994	ECHO/-SM/BUD/2015/91029	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	V1 Signed by partner	2	Protection	Refugee/IDP protection	IDP; Others	50,388	50,388	1,009
70	2014/00994	ECHO/-SM/BUD/2015/91029	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	V1 Signed by partner	3	Protection	Refugee/IDP protection	Others; Refugees	76,247	76,247	1,129
71	2014/01029	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2015/91006	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers; Individual household shelter	IDP; Local population	597,442	597,442	6,790
72	2014/01029	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2015/91006	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	2	Disaster Ris	Community and local level action; Institutional linkages and advocacy; Other (DRR / DP)	IDP; Local population; Others; Refugees	106,309	106,309	150
73	2014/01029	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2015/91006	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Other (Protection); Prevention of and response to violence; Protection advocacy; Refugee/IDP pro	IDP; Local population; Others; Refugees	73,125	73,125	0
74	2014/01029	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2015/91006	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	4	Shelter and	Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers; Provision of non-food items	IDP; Local population	273,124	273,124	17,623
75	2014/01031	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2015/91005	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	1	Protection	Other (Protection); Prevention of and response to violence	IDP; Others; Refugees	1,967,345	1,967,345	16,679
76	2014/01031	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2015/91005	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	2	Protection	Prevention of and response to violence; Protection advocacy	IDP; Local population	573,679	573,679	342
77	2014/01031	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2015/91005	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Other (Protection); Prevention of and response to violence; Refugee/IDP protection	IDP; Others; Refugees	1,271,326	1,271,326	6,370
78	2014/01031	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2015/91005	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	4	Protection	Other (Protection); Protection advocacy; Refugee/IDP protection	IDP; Local population; Others; Refugees	168,904	168,904	375
79	2014/01031	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2015/91005	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	5	Shelter and	Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers; Individual household shelter	IDP; Others; Refugees	1,268,747	1,268,747	4,522
80	2015/00048	ECHO/COD/BUD/2015/91002	ECHO DDG C 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	V1 Signed by partner	1	Food securit	Food security information and analysis; Other (Food); Short-term livelihood support	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	392,000	392,000	10,310
81	2015/00048	ECHO/COD/BUD/2015/91002	ECHO DDG C 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	V1 Signed by partner	2	Food securit	Conditional or unconditional cash/voucher food assistance	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	144,000	144,000	14,865
82	2015/00048	ECHO/COD/BUD/2015/91002	ECHO DDG C 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	V1 Signed by partner	3	Food securit	Other (Food)	IDP; Local population; Others; Refugees; Returnees	264,000	264,000	13,125
83	2015/00052	ECHO/COD/BUD/2015/91026	ECHO DDG C 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	VA Signed by partner	1	Food securit	Conditional or unconditional cash/voucher food assistance	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	3,087,500	3,087,500	156,882
84	2015/00052	ECHO/COD/BUD/2015/91026	ECHO DDG C 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	VA Signed by partner	2	Food securit	Conditional or unconditional cash/voucher food assistance	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	162,500	162,500	156,882
85	2015/00064	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2015/91021	ECHO DDG C 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	V1 Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Individual household shelter; Provision of non-food items	IDP; Local population; Returnees	589,561	589,561	70,440
86	2015/00064	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2015/91021	ECHO DDG C 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	V1 Signed by partner	2	Protection	Prevention of and response to violence; Protection advocacy; Refugee/IDP protection	IDP; Local population	110,439	110,439	500
87	2015/00145	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2014/91053	ECHO DDG C 3	2015	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	DJIBOUTI	V1 Signed by partner	1	Food securit	Short-term livelihood support	Local population; Refugees	200,000	200,000	1,000
88	2015/00206	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91027	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Food securit	Conditional or unconditional cash/voucher food assistance; Short-term livelihood support	Refugees	110,167	110,167	2,025
89	2015/00206	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91027	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Drainage; Hygiene promotion; Solid waste management; Water supply	Others; Refugees	125,185	125,185	11,851
90	2015/00206	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91027	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Shelter and	Other (Shelter); Provision of non-food items	Refugees	59,981	59,981	8,754
91	2015/00206	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91027	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Protection	Refugee/IDP protection	Refugees	183,156	183,156	2,671
92	2015/00206	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91027	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	VA Signed by partner	5	Coordinatior	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination; Other (Coordination); Public awareness and advoca	Others	21,511	21,511	30
93	2015/00231	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2015/91012	ECHO DDG C 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	UGANDA	VA Signed by partner	1	Food securit	Other (Food); Short-term livelihood support	Local population; Refugees	556,525	556,525	1,309
94	2015/00231	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2015/91012	ECHO DDG C 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	UGANDA	VA Signed by partner	2	Protection	Gender based violence (Prevention, response, other); Prevention of and response to violence; Pro	Local population; Refugees	129,552	129,552	2,097
95	2015/00231	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2015/91012	ECHO DDG C 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	UGANDA	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Other (Protection); Protection advocacy; Refugee/IDP protection	Local population; Others; Refugees	3,923	3,923	0
96	2015/00238	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2015/91045	ECHO DDG C 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	ETHIOPIA	V1 Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Individual household shelter; Other (Shelter); Provision of non-food items	Refugees	750,000	750,000	4,372
97	2015/00244	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91002	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Food securit	Conditional or unconditional cash/voucher food assistance; Conditional or unconditional in-kind food	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	2,040,457	2,040,457	75,851
98	2015/00244	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91002	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Shelter and	Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers; Individual household shelter	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	374,236	374,236	971
99	2015/00244	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91002	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Coordinatior	Public awareness and advocacy	Others	422,642	422,642	82
100	2015/00244	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91002	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Protection	Protection advocacy	Others	258,975	258,975	140
101	2015/00244	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91002	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	5	Coordinatior	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination	Others	39,430	39,430	137
102	2015/00244	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2015/91002	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	6	Shelter and	Provision of non-food items	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	486,260	486,260	0
103	2015/00293	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2015/91019	ECHO DDG C 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOMALIA	VA Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers; Individual household shelter; Provision of non-food iter	IDP; Local population; Returnees	592,292	592,292	14,322
104	2015/00293	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2015/91019	ECHO DDG C 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOMALIA	VA Signed by partner	2	Food securit	Conditional or unconditional cash/voucher food assistance; Short-term livelihood support	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	796,462	796,462	14,706
105	2015/00293	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2015/91019	ECHO DDG C 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOMALIA	VA Signed by partner	3	WASH	Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers; Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Water supply	IDP; Local population; Returnees	685,264	685,264	56,284
106	2015/00293	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2015/91019	ECHO DDG C 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOMALIA	VA Signed by partner	4	Protection	Refugee/IDP protection	IDP; Local population; Returnees	725,983	725,983	13,547
107	2015/00439	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2015/92029	ECHO DDG C 2	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	VA Signed by partner	1	Protection	Other (Protection); Prevention of and response to violence; Protection advocacy; Refugee/IDP pro	IDP; Local population; Returnees	250,000	250,000	10,764
108	2015/00439	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2015/92029	ECHO DDG C 2	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	VA Signed by partner	2	Shelter and	Individual household shelter; Other (Shelter); Provision of non-food items	IDP; Local population; Returnees	400,000	400,000	2,268
109	2015/00439	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2015/92029	ECHO DDG C 2	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	VA Signed by partner	3	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Water supply	IDP; Local population; Returnees	350,000	350,000	14,069
110	2015/00536	ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2015/91001	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers	IDP; Returnees	1,357,408	1,357,408	14,502
111	2015/00536	ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2015/91001	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	2	Shelter and	Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers	IDP; Local population; Returnees	625,510	625,510	5,160
112	2015/00536	ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2015/91001	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	3	Shelter and	Individual household shelter; Provision of non-food items	IDP; Local population	2,623,121	2,623,121	10,806
113	2015/00536	ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2015/91001	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	4	Protection	Protection advocacy; Refugee/IDP protection	IDP; Refugees	757,428	757,428	7,812
114	2015/00536	ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2015/91001	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	5	Shelter and	Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers	IDP; Local population; Returnees	1,024,369	1,024,369	5,406
115	2015/00536	ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2015/91001	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	6	WASH	Hygiene promotion; Other (WASH); Water supply	IDP	458,359	458,359	33,798
116	2015/00536	ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2015/91001	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	7	Shelter and	Provision of non-food items	IDP; Local population	31,667	31,667	2,976
117	2015/00536	ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2015/91001	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	8	Shelter and	Provision of non-food items	IDP	147,137	147,137	13,200
118	2015/00540	ECHO/ERC/BUD/2015/91010	ECHO DDG C 1	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COUNTRY NOT SPECIFIED	VA Signed by partner	1	Support to c	Capacity building (Not sector specific)	Others	137,134	137,134	0
119	2015/00540	ECHO/ERC/BUD/2015/91010	ECHO DDG C 1	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COUNTRY NOT SPECIFIED	VA Signed by partner	2	Support to c	Capacity building (Not sector specific)	Others	501,125	501,125	0
120	2015/00540	ECHO/ERC/BUD/2015/91010	ECHO DDG C 1	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COUNTRY NOT SPECIFIED	VA Signed by partner	3	Support to c	Capacity building (Not sector specific); Feasibility studies, needs assessment and other studies	Others	84,468	84,468	0

Number	Action ID	Contract ID	Unit	Contract Year	Financial Year	Partner	Partner Category	Partner HQ Country	Benef Country	Operational Status	Result Number	Sector	Subsectors	Beneficiaries Type	Contracted amount signed by partner	Contracted amount latest version	Result Beneficiaries
121	2015/00540	ECHO/ERC/BUD/2015/91010	ECHO DDG C 1	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COUNTRY NOT SPECIFIED	VA Signed by partner	4	Support to c	Capacity building (Not sector specific); Feasibility studies, needs assessment and other studies	Others	73,095	73,095	0
122	2015/00540	ECHO/ERC/BUD/2015/91010	ECHO DDG C 1	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COUNTRY NOT SPECIFIED	VA Signed by partner	5	Support to c	Capacity building (Not sector specific)	Others	154,177	154,177	0
123	2015/00562	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91044	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	VA Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Individual household shelter; Provision of non-food items	Refugees	2,024,733	2,024,733	7,181
124	2015/00562	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91044	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Drainage; Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Solid waste management; Water supply	Refugees	992,872	992,872	15,615
125	2015/00562	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91044	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Protection advocacy; Refugee/IDP protection	Refugees	465,870	465,870	11,832
126	2015/00562	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91044	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	VA Signed by partner	4	Protection	Protection advocacy; Refugee/IDP protection	Local population; Refugees	2,016,524	2,016,524	103,039
127	2015/00566	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91012	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	VA Signed by partner	1	Food securit	Conditional or unconditional in-kind food assistance; Short-term livelihood support	IDP; Local population	1,459,811	1,459,811	18,080
128	2015/00566	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91012	ECHO DDG B 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	VA Signed by partner	2	Food securit	Conditional or unconditional in-kind food assistance; Other (Food); Short-term livelihood support	IDP; Local population	790,189	790,189	48,193
129	2015/00615	ECHO/UKR/BUD/2015/91010	ECHO DDG B 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	UKRAINE	VA Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Individual household shelter; Provision of non-food items	IDP; Local population; Returnees	320,000	320,000	9,209
130	2015/00615	ECHO/UKR/BUD/2015/91010	ECHO DDG B 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	UKRAINE	VA Signed by partner	2	Support to c	Other (Support to operations)	IDP; Local population; Returnees	80,000	80,000	820
131	2015/00690	ECHO/CHD/BUD/2015/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Child protec	Education, training and educational activities; Psychosocial support	IDP; Local population; Returnees	235,285	235,285	1,400
132	2015/00690	ECHO/CHD/BUD/2015/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Child protec	Education, training and educational activities	Local population; Others	261,448	261,448	21,488
133	2015/00690	ECHO/CHD/BUD/2015/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Child protec	Education, training and educational activities	Local population; Others	3,267	3,267	50
134	2015/00691	ECHO/CHD/BUD/2015/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	VA Signed by partner	1	Child protec	Advocacy, awareness raising; Child soldiers / Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Gr	Local population	319,205	319,205	8,908
135	2015/00691	ECHO/CHD/BUD/2015/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	VA Signed by partner	2	Child protec	Child soldiers / Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups (CAAC); Education, traini	IDP; Local population; Others	17,963	17,963	1,714
136	2015/00691	ECHO/CHD/BUD/2015/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	VA Signed by partner	3	Child protec	Child soldiers / Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups (CAAC); Education, traini	IDP; Local population; Others	462,832	462,832	6,742
137	2015/00856	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2014/92018	ECHO DDG C 2	2015	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	GUINEA	VA Signed by partner	1	Support to c	Feasibility studies, needs assessment and other studies	Others	88,804	88,804	0
138	2015/00856	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2014/92018	ECHO DDG C 2	2015	2014	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	GUINEA	VA Signed by partner	2	Support to c	Feasibility studies, needs assessment and other studies	Others	60,196	60,196	0
139	2015/00987	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2015/91065	ECHO DDG C 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	DJIBOUTI	VA Signed by partner	1	WASH	Water supply	Local population; Refugees	133,181	133,181	2,405
140	2015/00987	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2015/91065	ECHO DDG C 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	DJIBOUTI	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Excreta disposal	Local population; Refugees	32,214	32,214	2,405
141	2015/00987	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2015/91065	ECHO DDG C 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	DJIBOUTI	VA Signed by partner	3	WASH	Hygiene promotion	Local population; Refugees	84,606	84,606	2,405
142	2015/01027	ECHO/-AF/EDF/2015/01013	ECHO DDG C 2	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	NIGERIA	VA Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Individual household shelter	IDP; Local population	542,756	542,756	3,500
143	2015/01027	ECHO/-AF/EDF/2015/01013	ECHO DDG C 2	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	NIGERIA	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Water supply	IDP; Local population	171,123	171,123	14,448
144	2015/01027	ECHO/-AF/EDF/2015/01013	ECHO DDG C 2	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	NIGERIA	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Protection advocacy	Others	136,121	136,121	127
145	2015/01069	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91070	ECHO DDG B 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SERBIE	VA Signed by partner	1	Protection	Refugee/IDP protection	Others; Refugees	371,019	371,019	25,266
146	2015/01069	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91070	ECHO DDG B 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SERBIE	VA Signed by partner	2	Food securit	Conditional or unconditional in-kind food assistance	Others; Refugees	39,046	39,046	9,071
147	2015/01069	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91070	ECHO DDG B 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SERBIE	VA Signed by partner	3	Shelter and	Other (Shelter); Provision of non-food items	Others; Refugees	339,428	339,428	15,923
148	2015/01069	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91070	ECHO DDG B 3	2015	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SERBIE	VA Signed by partner	4	Shelter and	Provision of non-food items	Others; Refugees	110,768	110,768	7,500
149	2015/01168	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2016/91014	ECHO DDG C 2	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	MALI	VA Signed by partner	1	Disaster Ris	Community and local level action; Information, communication and public awareness; Institutional li	Local population	288,062	288,062	102
150	2015/01168	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2016/91014	ECHO DDG C 2	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	MALI	VA Signed by partner	2	Disaster Ris	Community and local level action; Contingency planning and preparedness for response	IDP; Local population	1,004,108	1,004,108	48,112
151	2015/01235	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2016/91048	ECHO DDG C 2	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	NIGERIA	VA Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Individual household shelter	IDP; Local population; Returnees	553,265	553,265	6,330
152	2015/01235	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2016/91048	ECHO DDG C 2	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	NIGERIA	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Water supply	IDP; Local population; Returnees	315,221	315,221	10,656
153	2015/01235	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2016/91048	ECHO DDG C 2	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	NIGERIA	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Protection advocacy	Others	157,886	157,886	4,632
154	2015/01235	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2016/91048	ECHO DDG C 2	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	NIGERIA	VA Signed by partner	4	Protection	Other (Protection)	Others	242,629	242,629	0
155	2015/01276	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2016/91001	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	1	Protection	Other (Protection); Prevention of and response to violence; Protection advocacy; Refugee/IDP pro	IDP; Local population; Others; Refugees	730,780	730,780	5,243
156	2015/01276	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2016/91001	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	2	Protection	Other (Protection); Prevention of and response to violence; Protection advocacy	IDP; Local population; Others; Refugees	3,652,372	3,652,372	40,800
157	2015/01276	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2016/91001	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Other (Protection); Prevention of and response to violence; Protection advocacy; Refugee/IDP pro	IDP; Local population; Others; Refugees	266,848	266,848	650
158	2015/01294	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2016/91004	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	1	Coordinatior	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination; Public awareness and advocacy	Others	206,640	206,640	0
159	2015/01294	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2016/91004	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	2	Shelter and	Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers	IDP; Local population; Others; Refugees	1,153,391	1,153,391	19,049
160	2015/01294	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2016/91004	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	3	Disaster Ris	Community and local level action; Institutional linkages and advocacy	IDP; Local population	339,969	339,969	4,654
161	2015/01335	ECHO/YEM/BUD/2016/91002	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	YEMEN	VA Signed by partner	1	Protection	Capacity building (Protection); Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Gender based v	IDP; Local population; Returnees	612,503	612,503	42,077
162	2015/01335	ECHO/YEM/BUD/2016/91002	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	YEMEN	VA Signed by partner	2	Shelter and	Individual household shelter	IDP	338,918	338,918	12,642
163	2015/01335	ECHO/YEM/BUD/2016/91002	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	YEMEN	VA Signed by partner	3	Food securit	Availability of, access to and consumption of food	IDP; Local population	2,108,498	2,108,498	28,112
164	2015/01335	ECHO/YEM/BUD/2016/91002	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	YEMEN	VA Signed by partner	4	WASH	Hygiene promotion; Water supply	IDP; Local population	907,895	907,895	48,041
165	2015/01335	ECHO/YEM/BUD/2016/91002	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	YEMEN	VA Signed by partner	5	Coordinatior	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination	Others	282,186	282,186	0
166	2016/00002	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2016/91026	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	VA Signed by partner	1	WASH	Hygiene promotion; Water supply	IDP; Local population; Returnees	316,809	316,809	228,072
167	2016/00002	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2016/91026	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	VA Signed by partner	2	Shelter and	Capacity building (Shelter); Individual household shelter; Other (Shelter)	IDP; Local population; Returnees	522,679	522,679	209,268
168	2016/00002	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2016/91026	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Capacity building (Protection); Housing, land and property rights; Protection advocacy	IDP; Local population; Returnees	110,512	110,512	1,127
169	2016/00090	ECHO/-HF/EDF/2015/01014	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	DJIBOUTI	V1 Signed by partner	1	WASH	Capacity building (WASH); Drainage; Water supply	IDP; Local population; Refugees	168,318	168,318	13,375
170	2016/00090	ECHO/-HF/EDF/2015/01014	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2015	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	DJIBOUTI	V1 Signed by partner	2	WASH	Drainage; Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Other (WASH); Solid waste management	IDP; Local population; Refugees	231,682	231,682	12,275
171	2016/00127	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2016/91033	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOMALIA	V1 Signed by partner	1	Food securit	Other (Food); Short-term livelihood support	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	1,494,801	1,494,801	19,488
172	2016/00127	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2016/91033	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOMALIA	V1 Signed by partner	2	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Other (WASH); Water supply	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	439,883	439,883	34,293
173	2016/00127	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2016/91033	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOMALIA	V1 Signed by partner	3	Protection	Capacity building (Protection); Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Housing, land a	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	565,316	565,316	7,179
174	2016/00164	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2016/91016	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	KENYA	V1 Signed by partner	1	WASH	Water supply	Local population; Refugees	790,615	790,615	168,224
175	2016/00164	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2016/91016	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	KENYA	V1 Signed by partner	2	WASH	Excreta disposal; Solid waste management	Local population; Refugees	148,322	148,322	168,224
176	2016/00164	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2016/91016	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	KENYA	V1 Signed by partner	3	WASH	Hygiene promotion	Refugees	33,458	33,458	168,224
177	2016/00164	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2016/91016	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	KENYA	V1 Signed by partner	4	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Other (WASH); Solid waste management; Vector control; Wat	Local population; Others; Refugees	27,605	27,605	1,119
178	2016/00178	ECHO/COD/BUD/2016/91014	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	V1 Signed by partner	1	Food securit	Conditional or unconditional cash/voucher food assistance; Constitution of emergency food stocks	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	3,515,000	3,515,000	160,635
179	2016/00178	ECHO/COD/BUD/2016/91014	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	V1 Signed by partner	2	Food securit	Conditional or unconditional cash/voucher food assistance; Constitution of emergency food stocks	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	185,000	185,000	160,635
180	2016/00183	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2016/91027	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	ETHIOPIA	V1 Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Capacity building (Shelter); Individual household shelter	Refugees	800,000	800,000	5,089

Number	Action ID	Contract ID	Unit	Contract Year	Financial Year	Partner	Partner Category	Partner HQ Country	Benef Country	Operational Status	Result Number	Sector	Subsectors	Beneficiaries Type	Contracted amount signed by partner	Contracted amount latest version	Result Beneficiaries
181	2016/00302	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2016/91029	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	UGANDA	V1 Signed by partner	1	Food securit	Short-term livelihood support	Local population; Refugees	221,646	221,646	611
182	2016/00302	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2016/91029	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	UGANDA	V1 Signed by partner	2	Child protec	Education, training and educational activities	Local population; Refugees	150,287	150,287	1,116
183	2016/00302	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2016/91029	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	UGANDA	V1 Signed by partner	3	Food securit	Other (Food)	Local population; Refugees	100,525	100,525	1,011
184	2016/00302	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2016/91029	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	UGANDA	V1 Signed by partner	4	Protection	Gender based violence (Prevention, response, other); Prevention of and response to violence; Prot	Local population; Refugees	27,542	27,542	2,642
185	2016/00311	ECHO/COD/BUD/2016/91008	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	VA Signed by partner	1	Food securit	Availability of, access to and consumption of food; Capacity building (Food); Conditional or uncondi	IDP; Local population; Others; Returnees	538,422	538,422	33,086
186	2016/00311	ECHO/COD/BUD/2016/91008	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	VA Signed by partner	2	Protection	Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Housing, land and property rights; Prevention	IDP; Local population; Returnees	113,850	113,850	14,108
187	2016/00311	ECHO/COD/BUD/2016/91008	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	VA Signed by partner	3	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Formal education; Non-formal education; Safe and accessible learnin	IDP; Local population; Returnees	481,129	481,129	14,155
188	2016/00311	ECHO/COD/BUD/2016/91008	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	VA Signed by partner	4	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Non-formal education; Other (Education); Safe and accessible learnir	IDP; Local population; Returnees	316,599	316,599	9,264
189	2016/00312	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2016/91003	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	KENYA	VA Signed by partner	1	WASH	Capacity building (WASH); Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Solid waste management; Water s	IDP; Local population	944,184	944,184	30,375
190	2016/00312	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2016/91003	ECHO DDG C 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	KENYA	VA Signed by partner	2	Protection	Capacity building (Protection); Housing, land and property rights; Protection information disseminat	IDP; Local population	255,816	255,816	3,824
191	2016/00434	ECHO/-SM/BUD/2016/91026	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	VA Signed by partner	1	Protection	Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Gender based violence (Prevention, response,	IDP; Local population	446,722	446,722	8,749
192	2016/00434	ECHO/-SM/BUD/2016/91026	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	VA Signed by partner	2	Protection	Gender based violence (Prevention, response, other); Prevention of and response to violence	IDP; Local population	12,998	12,998	6,516
193	2016/00434	ECHO/-SM/BUD/2016/91026	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Capacity building (Protection); Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Housing, land a	Others; Refugees	84,654	84,654	1,325
194	2016/00517	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Food securit	Other (Food)	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	2,639,385	2,639,385	76,916
195	2016/00517	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Disaster Ris	Contingency planning and preparedness for response	Others	587,970	587,970	0
196	2016/00517	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Housing, land and property rights; Other (Prot	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	320,694	320,694	1,722
197	2016/00517	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Support to c	Advocacy for humanitarian access; Capacity building (Not sector specific)	Others	111,684	111,684	0
198	2016/00517	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	5	Protection	Capacity building (Protection)	Others	106,932	106,932	113
199	2016/00517	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	6	Coordinatior	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination	Others	35,234	35,234	60
200	2016/00517	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91008	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	7	Food securit	Other (Food)	Returnees	538,182	538,182	14,000
201	2016/00675	ECHO/CHD/BUD/2016/91010	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	V1 Signed by partner	1	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Formal education; Safe and accessible learning environements	IDP; Local population; Refugees	419,723	419,723	19,980
202	2016/00675	ECHO/CHD/BUD/2016/91010	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	V1 Signed by partner	2	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Formal education	IDP; Local population; Refugees	207,785	207,785	17,808
203	2016/00675	ECHO/CHD/BUD/2016/91010	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	V1 Signed by partner	3	Protection	Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Other (Protection); Prevention of and respons	IDP; Local population; Refugees	172,492	172,492	2,863
204	2016/00723	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91061	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	VA Signed by partner	1	Food securit	Conditional or unconditional cash/voucher food assistance; Conditional or unconditional in-kind food	IDP; Local population; Returnees	1,887,760	1,887,760	103,034
205	2016/00723	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91061	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	VA Signed by partner	2	Shelter and	Camps and collective centers; Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers; Individual household she	IDP; Local population; Returnees	3,361,156	3,361,156	74,017
206	2016/00723	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91061	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	VA Signed by partner	3	WASH	Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers; Hygiene promotion; Other (WASH); Water supply	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	948,277	948,277	60,675
207	2016/00723	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91061	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	VA Signed by partner	4	Protection	Other (Protection); Protection advocacy; Refugee/IDP protection	IDP; Local population; Others; Returnees	302,807	302,807	1,134
208	2016/00753	ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2016/91008	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Camps and collective centers; Capacity building (Shelter); Settlements (Site selection, planning and	IDP; Local population; Others	1,336,561	1,336,561	2,965
209	2016/00753	ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2016/91008	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	2	Shelter and	Camps and collective centers; Capacity building (Shelter); Individual household shelter; Other (Shel	IDP; Local population; Returnees	2,317,960	2,317,960	27,595
210	2016/00753	ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2016/91008	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Housing, land and property rights	IDP; Local population	837,530	837,530	11,661
211	2016/00753	ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2016/91008	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	4	Protection	Capacity building (Protection); Protection information management and monitoring	IDP; Local population; Others	78,253	78,253	82
212	2016/00753	ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2016/91008	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	5	Support to c	Advocacy for humanitarian access; Capacity building (Not sector specific); Feasibility studies, needs	Others	229,697	229,697	0
213	2016/00825	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91022	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	V1 Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Camps and collective centers; Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers; Individual household she	Refugees	3,157,947	3,157,947	25,312
214	2016/00825	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91022	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	V1 Signed by partner	2	WASH	Drainage; Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Solid waste management; Vector control; Water su	Refugees	1,141,118	1,141,118	9,411
215	2016/00825	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91022	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	V1 Signed by partner	3	Protection	Other (Protection); Protection advocacy; Refugee/IDP protection	Refugees	331,440	331,440	15,291
216	2016/00825	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91022	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	V1 Signed by partner	4	Protection	Other (Protection); Protection advocacy; Refugee/IDP protection	Local population; Refugees	2,369,495	2,369,495	172,811
217	2016/00850	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91047	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	JORDAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Protection	Refugee/IDP protection	Local population; Refugees	212,113	212,113	7,789
218	2016/00850	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91047	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	JORDAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Protection	Gender based violence (Prevention, response, other); Prevention of and response to violence; Ref	Local population; Refugees	345,441	345,441	4,574
219	2016/00850	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91047	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	JORDAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Protection advocacy; Refugee/IDP protection	Local population; Others; Refugees	48,483	48,483	318
220	2016/00850	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91047	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	JORDAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Protection	Refugee/IDP protection	Refugees	1,608,487	1,608,487	21,911
221	2016/00850	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91047	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	JORDAN	VA Signed by partner	5	Coordinatior	Other (Coordination); Public awareness and advocacy	Others	85,476	85,476	0
222	2016/00854	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91021	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Non-formal education; Safe and accessible learning environements	Local population; Refugees; Returnees	609,788	609,788	3,513
223	2016/00854	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91021	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Non-formal education; Safe and accessible learning environements	IDP; Local population; Returnees	387,037	387,037	2,032
224	2016/00860	ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2016/91017	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	1	Education in	Formal education; Non-formal education; Safe and accessible learning environements	IDP	562,809	562,809	5,593
225	2016/00860	ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2016/91017	ECHO DDG B 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	2	Education in	Capacity Building (Education)	IDP	137,191	137,191	5,700
226	2016/00870	ECHO/CHD/BUD/2016/91013	ECHO DDG C 2	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	MALI	VA Signed by partner	1	Education in	Formal education; Non-formal education; Safe and accessible learning environements	Local population; Others; Returnees	328,049	328,049	1,461
227	2016/00870	ECHO/CHD/BUD/2016/91013	ECHO DDG C 2	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	MALI	VA Signed by partner	2	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Formal education; Non-formal education	Local population; Others	85,001	85,001	164
228	2016/00870	ECHO/CHD/BUD/2016/91013	ECHO DDG C 2	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	MALI	VA Signed by partner	3	Education in	Formal education; Non-formal education; Safe and accessible learning environements	Local population; Others; Returnees	306,950	306,950	7,132
229	2016/00888	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91030	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Education in	Formal education; Non-formal education; Other (Education); Safe and accessible learning environer	Local population; Others; Refugees	1,275,000	1,275,000	11,995
230	2016/00888	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91030	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Protection	Capacity building (Protection); Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Prevention of a	Others; Refugees	165,000	165,000	2,500
231	2016/00888	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91030	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Coordinatior	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination; Other (Coordination)	Others	60,000	60,000	0
232	2016/00902	ECHO/UKR/BUD/2016/91006	ECHO DDG B 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	UKRAINE	VA Signed by partner	1	Protection	Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Housing, land and property rights; Protection i	IDP; Local population; Returnees	600,000	600,000	16,588
233	2016/00902	ECHO/UKR/BUD/2016/91006	ECHO DDG B 3	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	UKRAINE	VA Signed by partner	2	Protection	Capacity building (Protection); Protection advocacy	IDP; Local population; Others; Returnees	400,000	400,000	260
234	2016/00930	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91037	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Food securit	Conditional or unconditional cash/voucher food assistance; Food security information and analysis;	Others; Refugees	803,990	803,990	9,660
235	2016/00930	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91037	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers; Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Other (WASH); V	Others; Refugees	310,189	310,189	12,367
236	2016/00930	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91037	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Shelter and	Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers; Individual household shelter; Other (Shelter); Provision	Others; Refugees	496,833	496,833	724
237	2016/00930	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91037	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Protection	Other (Protection); Protection advocacy; Refugee/IDP protection	Others; Refugees	845,701	845,701	7,543
238	2016/00930	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91037	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	VA Signed by partner	5	Coordinatior	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination; Other (Coordination); Public awareness and advoca	Others; Refugees	193,287	193,287	109
239	2016/01109	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2016/91029	ECHO DDG C 4	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Capacity building (Shelter); Conditional or unconditional cash/vouchers; Individual household shelte	Local population	840,000	840,000	1,540
240	2016/01175	ECHO/-EU/BUD/2016/01009	ECHO DDG B 2	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	GREECE	VA Signed by partner	1	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Non-formal education; Safe and accessible learning environements	Others; Refugees	2,000,693	2,000,693	1,600

Number	Action ID	Contract ID	Unit	Contract Year	Financial Year	Partner	Partner Category	Partner HQ Country	Benef Country	Operational Status	Result Number	Sector	Subsectors	Beneficiaries Type	Contracted amount signed by partner	Contracted amount latest version	Result Beneficiaries
241	2016/01175	ECHO/-EU/BUD/2016/01009	ECHO DDG B 2	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	GREECE	VA Signed by partner	2	Food securit	Availability of, access to and consumption of food	Others; Refugees	3,621,584	3,621,584	7,000
242	2016/01175	ECHO/-EU/BUD/2016/01009	ECHO DDG B 2	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	GREECE	VA Signed by partner	3	Shelter and	Individual household shelter; Other (Shelter); Support to host communities' shelters and settlemen	Others; Refugees	7,284,801	7,284,801	3,260
243	2016/01175	ECHO/-EU/BUD/2016/01009	ECHO DDG B 2	2016	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	GREECE	VA Signed by partner	4	Shelter and	Camps and collective centers; Individual household shelter	Others; Refugees	3,492,922	3,492,922	8,750
244	2016/01234	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2016/92046	ECHO DDG C 2	2017	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	VA Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Capacity building (Shelter); Individual household shelter; Other (Shelter); Support to host communit	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	459,978	459,978	1,810
245	2016/01234	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2016/92046	ECHO DDG C 2	2017	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Capacity building (WASH); Hygiene promotion; Other (WASH); Water supply	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	289,983	289,983	5,425
246	2016/01234	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2016/92046	ECHO DDG C 2	2017	2016	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Capacity building (Protection); Prevention of and response to violence	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	250,039	250,039	8,875
247	2016/01323	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2017/91081	ECHO DDG C 2	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	MALI	V1 Signed by partner	1	Education in	Non-formal education; Other (Education); Safe and accessible learning environements	Local population; Returnees	252,826	252,826	2,750
248	2016/01323	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2017/91081	ECHO DDG C 2	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	MALI	V1 Signed by partner	2	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Other (Education)	Local population; Returnees	145,074	145,074	73
249	2016/01323	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2017/91081	ECHO DDG C 2	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	MALI	V1 Signed by partner	3	Education in	Non-formal education; Other (Education)	IDP; Local population; Others; Returnees	337,101	337,101	6,000
250	2016/01325	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2017/91044	ECHO DDG C 2	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	MALI	VA Signed by partner	1	Coordinatior	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination	Local population	195,381	195,381	111
251	2016/01325	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2017/91044	ECHO DDG C 2	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	MALI	VA Signed by partner	2	Disaster Ris	Other (DRR / DP)	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	937,828	937,828	36,376
252	2016/01325	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2017/91044	ECHO DDG C 2	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	MALI	VA Signed by partner	3	Coordinatior	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination; Other (Coordination)	Others	130,254	130,254	0
253	2016/01325	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2017/91044	ECHO DDG C 2	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	MALI	VA Signed by partner	4	Protection	Prevention of and response to violence	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	39,077	39,077	0
254	2016/01330	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2017/91075	ECHO DDG C 2	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	NIGERIA	VA Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Individual household shelter; Support to host communities' shelters and settlemen	IDP; Local population	523,663	523,663	16,800
255	2016/01330	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2017/91075	ECHO DDG C 2	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	NIGERIA	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Capacity building (WASH); Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Water supply	IDP; Local population	703,386	703,386	21,548
256	2016/01330	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2017/91075	ECHO DDG C 2	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	NIGERIA	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Housing, land and property rights	IDP; Others	162,029	162,029	6,360
257	2016/01330	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2017/91075	ECHO DDG C 2	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	NIGERIA	VA Signed by partner	4	Support to c	Feasibility studies, needs assessment and other studies	IDP; Local population; Returnees	110,922	110,922	10,800
258	2016/01448	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2017/91011	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	V1 Signed by partner	1	Education in	Other (Education)	IDP; Local population; Refugees	240,335	240,335	11,113
259	2016/01448	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2017/91011	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	V1 Signed by partner	2	Education in	Formal education	IDP; Local population; Refugees	261,433	261,433	6,800
260	2016/01448	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2017/91011	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	V1 Signed by partner	3	Protection	Other (Protection)	IDP; Local population; Refugees	226,501	226,501	1,080
261	2016/01448	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2017/91011	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	V1 Signed by partner	4	Education in	Other (Education)	IDP; Local population; Refugees	71,731	71,731	11,838
262	2016/01449	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2017/91005	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	1	Protection	Protection advocacy	Others	180,737	180,737	0
263	2016/01449	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2017/91005	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	2	Shelter and	Other (Shelter)	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	718,480	718,480	17,348
264	2016/01449	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2017/91005	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	3	Disaster Ris	Other (DRR / DP)	IDP; Local population; Others	200,783	200,783	852
265	2016/01457	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2017/91001	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	1	Protection	Capacity building (Protection); Housing, land and property rights; Prevention of and response to vic	IDP; Local population; Others; Refugees	439,269	439,269	10,698
266	2016/01457	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2017/91001	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	2	Protection	Housing, land and property rights; Prevention of and response to violence	IDP; Local population; Others; Refugees	3,306,020	3,306,020	27,285
267	2016/01457	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2017/91001	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Capacity building (Protection); Prevention of and response to violence; Protection advocacy; Prote	Others	154,712	154,712	1,070
268	2016/01500	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2017/91007	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	V1 Signed by partner	1	WASH	Capacity building (WASH); Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Other (WASH); Solid waste manag	IDP; Local population; Returnees	321,778	321,778	79,194
269	2016/01500	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2017/91007	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	V1 Signed by partner	2	Shelter and	Capacity building (Shelter); Individual household shelter; Other (Shelter)	IDP; Local population; Returnees	342,115	342,115	107,526
270	2016/01500	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2017/91007	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	V1 Signed by partner	3	Food securit	Availability of, access to and consumption of food; Short-term livelihood support	IDP; Local population; Returnees	313,652	313,652	44,844
271	2016/01500	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2017/91007	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	V1 Signed by partner	4	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Safe and accessible learning environements	IDP; Local population; Returnees	603,687	603,687	3,992
272	2016/01500	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2017/91007	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	V1 Signed by partner	5	Disaster Ris	Other (DRR / DP)	IDP; Local population; Returnees	118,767	118,767	11,862
273	2017/00014	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91001	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Education in	Formal education; Non-formal education; Other (Education); Safe and accessible learning environer	Local population; Others; Refugees	1,198,529	1,198,529	14,300
274	2017/00014	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91001	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Protection	Capacity building (Protection); Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Prevention of a	Others; Refugees	257,105	257,105	2,100
275	2017/00014	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91001	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Coordinatior	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination; Other (Coordination)	Local population; Others; Refugees	44,366	44,366	80
276	2017/00118	ECHO/YEM/BUD/2017/91005	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	YEMEN	VA Signed by partner	1	Food securit	Availability of, access to and consumption of food	IDP; Local population; Returnees	1,163,844	1,163,844	18,690
277	2017/00118	ECHO/YEM/BUD/2017/91005	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	YEMEN	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Hygiene promotion; Solid waste management; Vector control; Water supply	IDP; Local population; Returnees	380,886	380,886	13,468
278	2017/00118	ECHO/YEM/BUD/2017/91005	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	YEMEN	VA Signed by partner	3	Shelter and	Individual household shelter; Support to host communities' shelters and settlemen	IDP; Local population	455,270	455,270	8,533
279	2017/00201	ECHO/COD/BUD/2017/91004	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	VA Signed by partner	1	Food securit	Availability of, access to and consumption of food; Capacity building (Food); Food security informat	IDP; Local population; Returnees	2,999,195	2,999,195	106,090
280	2017/00201	ECHO/COD/BUD/2017/91004	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	VA Signed by partner	2	Food securit	Food security information and analysis; Other (Food)	IDP; Local population; Returnees	227,606	227,606	106,090
281	2017/00201	ECHO/COD/BUD/2017/91004	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	VA Signed by partner	3	Food securit	Other (Food)	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	4,737,219	4,737,219	119,600
282	2017/00201	ECHO/COD/BUD/2017/91004	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	VA Signed by partner	4	Food securit	Short-term livelihood support	IDP; Local population; Others; Refugees; Returnees	835,980	835,980	90,842
283	2017/00235	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91020	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	KENYA	VA Signed by partner	1	WASH	Water supply	Local population; Refugees	355,985	355,985	147,744
284	2017/00235	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91020	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	KENYA	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Excreta disposal; Solid waste management	Refugees	406,671	406,671	147,744
285	2017/00235	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91020	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	KENYA	VA Signed by partner	3	WASH	Hygiene promotion	Refugees	22,474	22,474	147,744
286	2017/00235	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91020	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	KENYA	VA Signed by partner	4	WASH	Capacity building (WASH)	Others; Refugees	14,870	14,870	188
287	2017/00240	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91015	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	DJIBOUTI	V1 Signed by partner	1	WASH	Capacity building (WASH); Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Solid waste management; Water s	Refugees	200,000	200,000	23,500
288	2017/00248	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91040	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	ETHIOPIA	VA Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Capacity building (Shelter); Individual household shelter; Other (Shelter)	Refugees	1,502,518	1,502,518	13,540
289	2017/00248	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91040	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	ETHIOPIA	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Excreta disposal; Other (WASH)	Refugees	397,169	397,169	2,850
290	2017/00248	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91040	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	ETHIOPIA	VA Signed by partner	3	Education in	Non-formal education	Refugees	423,507	423,507	3,800
291	2017/00248	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91040	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	ETHIOPIA	VA Signed by partner	4	Education in	Safe and accessible learning environements	Refugees	462,302	462,302	3,800
292	2017/00248	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91040	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	ETHIOPIA	VA Signed by partner	5	Education in	Capacity Building (Education)	Refugees	126,964	126,964	217
293	2017/00248	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91040	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	ETHIOPIA	VA Signed by partner	6	Education in	Non-formal education	Refugees	87,541	87,541	1,100
294	2017/00255	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91023	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOMALIA	VA Signed by partner	1	Food securit	Availability of, access to and consumption of food; Short-term livelihood support	IDP; Local population; Returnees	10,789,826	10,789,826	163,458
295	2017/00255	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91023	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOMALIA	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Capacity building (WASH); Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Water supply	IDP; Local population; Returnees	207,040	207,040	20,580
296	2017/00255	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91023	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOMALIA	VA Signed by partner	3	Shelter and	Individual household shelter; Other (Shelter); Support to host communities' shelters and settlemen	IDP; Local population; Returnees	259,717	259,717	15,173
297	2017/00255	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91023	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOMALIA	VA Signed by partner	4	Protection	Capacity building (Protection); Housing, land and property rights	IDP; Local population	473,417	473,417	39,939
298	2017/00283	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91012	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	UGANDA	VA Signed by partner	1	WASH	Capacity building (WASH); Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Water supply	Local population; Refugees	1,369,151	1,369,151	55,000
299	2017/00283	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91012	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	UGANDA	VA Signed by partner	2	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Non-formal education	Local population; Refugees	1,203,893	1,203,893	3,200
300	2017/00283	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91012	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	UGANDA	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Gender based violence (Prevention, response, other); Prevention of and response to violence; Pro	Local population; Others; Refugees	426,956	426,956	4,180

Number	Action ID	Contract ID	Unit	Contract Year	Financial Year	Partner	Partner Category	Partner HQ Country	Benef Country	Operational Status	Result Number	Sector	Subsectors	Beneficiaries Type	Contracted amount signed by partner	Contracted amount latest version	Result Beneficiaries
301	2017/00380	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Multi-purpos	Other (Food)	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	4,268,925	4,268,925	98,441
302	2017/00380	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Disaster Risl	Contingency planning and preparedness for response	IDP	152,200	152,200	0
303	2017/00380	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Housing, land and property rights; Other (Prot	IDP	282,592	282,592	500
304	2017/00380	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2017/91009	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	Coordinatior	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination; Other (Coordination)	Others	246,283	246,283	0
305	2017/00410	ECHO/-AM/BUD/2017/91018	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	VA Signed by partner	1	Protection	Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Prevention of and response to violence; Prote	IDP; Local population	126,082	126,082	4,500
306	2017/00410	ECHO/-AM/BUD/2017/91018	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	VA Signed by partner	2	Education in	Other (Education)	IDP; Local population	229,186	229,186	2,650
307	2017/00410	ECHO/-AM/BUD/2017/91018	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	VA Signed by partner	3	Shelter and	Individual household shelter; Other (Shelter)	IDP; Local population	31,124	31,124	1,280
308	2017/00410	ECHO/-AM/BUD/2017/91018	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	VA Signed by partner	4	WASH	Hygiene promotion; Water supply	IDP; Local population	169,138	169,138	6,900
309	2017/00410	ECHO/-AM/BUD/2017/91018	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	VA Signed by partner	5	Food securit	Availability of, access to and consumption of food	IDP; Local population	87,658	87,658	6,900
310	2017/00410	ECHO/-AM/BUD/2017/91018	ECHO DDG C 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	VA Signed by partner	6	Health	Capacity building (Health); Mental and psycho-social support; Other (Health)	IDP; Local population	6,812	6,812	3,260
311	2017/00468	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2017/91008	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	VA Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Individual household shelter; Other (Shelter); Support to host communities' shelters and settlemen	Refugees	1,952,370	1,952,370	3,644
312	2017/00468	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2017/91008	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	VA Signed by partner	2	Shelter and	Camps and collective centers; Individual household shelter	Refugees	896,250	896,250	5,705
313	2017/00468	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2017/91008	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Housing, land and property rights; Other (Prot	Local population; Refugees	2,605,832	2,605,832	133,010
314	2017/00468	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2017/91008	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	VA Signed by partner	4	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Non-formal education; Other (Education)	Local population; Refugees	4,659,761	4,659,761	18,885
315	2017/00468	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2017/91008	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	VA Signed by partner	5	Coordinatior	Other (Coordination)	Others	386,147	386,147	0
316	2017/00468	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2017/91008	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	VA Signed by partner	6	Protection	Capacity building (Protection); Other (Protection); Protection advocacy; Protection information diss	Refugees	649,640	649,640	20,171
317	2017/00686	ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2017/91004	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Other (Shelter)	IDP; Local population; Returnees	430,020	430,020	15,120
318	2017/00686	ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2017/91004	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Capacity building (WASH); Hygiene promotion; Solid waste management; Water supply	IDP; Local population; Returnees	1,474,163	1,474,163	103,500
319	2017/00686	ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2017/91004	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	3	Shelter and	Camps and collective centers; Capacity building (Shelter)	IDP	873,075	873,075	69,996
320	2017/00686	ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2017/91004	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	4	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Non-formal education; Safe and accessible learning environements	IDP	783,309	783,309	7,105
321	2017/00686	ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2017/91004	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	VA Signed by partner	5	Protection	Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Housing, land and property rights	IDP; Local population; Returnees	439,434	439,434	6,250
322	2017/00736	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2017/91017	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	JORDAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Protection	Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Housing, land and property rights; Protection i	Local population; Refugees	853,458	853,458	10,000
323	2017/00736	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2017/91017	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	JORDAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Protection	Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Housing, land and property rights; Protection i	Local population; Refugees	1,389,917	1,389,917	12,000
324	2017/00736	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2017/91017	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	JORDAN	V1 Signed by partner	3	Protection	Capacity building (Protection); Protection advocacy; Protection information dissemination	Local population; Others; Refugees	195,076	195,076	300
325	2017/00736	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2017/91017	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	JORDAN	V1 Signed by partner	4	Protection	Protection advocacy; Protection information dissemination	Others	78,330	78,330	10
326	2017/00736	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2017/91017	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	JORDAN	V1 Signed by partner	5	Coordinatior	Other (Coordination)	Others	183,219	183,219	0
327	2017/00783	ECHO/-AF/EDF/2017/01022	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	ETHIOPIA	VA Signed by partner	1	Food securit	Short-term livelihood support	Local population; Refugees	631,740	631,740	1,011
328	2017/00783	ECHO/-AF/EDF/2017/01022	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	ETHIOPIA	VA Signed by partner	2	Nutrition	Capacity building (Nutrition); Prevention of undernutrition; Treatment of undernutrition	Local population; Refugees	634,759	634,759	11,469
329	2017/00783	ECHO/-AF/EDF/2017/01022	ECHO DDG C 3	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	ETHIOPIA	VA Signed by partner	3	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Formal education; Safe and accessible learning environements	Refugees	733,501	733,501	1,008
330	2017/00835	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2017/92042	ECHO DDG C 2	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CAMEROON	VA Signed by partner	1	Shelter and	Individual household shelter; Support to host communities' shelters and settlemen	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	446,572	446,572	10,535
331	2017/00835	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2017/92042	ECHO DDG C 2	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CAMEROON	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Hygiene promotion; Water supply	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	226,943	226,943	34,641
332	2017/00835	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2017/92042	ECHO DDG C 2	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CAMEROON	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Capacity building (Protection); Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Housing, land a	IDP; Local population; Returnees	176,485	176,485	1,742
333	2017/01044	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2018/91016	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	V1 Signed by partner	1	Protection	Capacity building (Protection); Gender based violence (Prevention, response, other); Other (Protec	IDP; Local population; Refugees	414,581	414,581	18,300
334	2017/01044	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2018/91016	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	V1 Signed by partner	2	Food securit	Short-term livelihood support	IDP; Local population; Returnees	169,849	169,849	36,600
335	2017/01044	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2018/91016	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	V1 Signed by partner	3	WASH	Capacity building (WASH); Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Other (WASH); Water supply	IDP; Local population; Returnees	313,239	313,239	60,000
336	2017/01044	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2018/91016	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	V1 Signed by partner	4	Shelter and	Capacity building (Shelter); Individual household shelter; Other (Shelter)	IDP; Local population; Returnees	428,681	428,681	87,600
337	2017/01044	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2018/91016	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	V1 Signed by partner	5	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Formal education; Safe and accessible learning environements	IDP; Local population; Returnees	411,087	411,087	7,280
338	2017/01044	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2018/91016	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	V1 Signed by partner	6	Disaster Risl	Contingency planning and preparedness for response; Other (DRR / DP)	IDP; Local population; Returnees	62,563	62,563	7,200
339	2017/01064	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91025	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	DJIBOUTI	V1 Signed by partner	1	WASH	Capacity building (WASH); Hygiene promotion; Solid waste management; Water supply	IDP; Local population; Refugees	275,000	275,000	23,000
340	2017/01076	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91029	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	KENYA	V1 Signed by partner	1	Coordinatior	Camp coordination; Country level (sector/intersector) coordination	Others; Refugees	199,116	199,116	500
341	2017/01076	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91029	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	KENYA	V1 Signed by partner	2	WASH	Water supply	Local population; Refugees	299,008	299,008	147,371
342	2017/01076	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91029	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	KENYA	V1 Signed by partner	3	WASH	Capacity building (WASH); Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Solid waste management	Local population; Refugees	301,875	301,875	147,371
343	2017/01088	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91034	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOMALIA	VA Signed by partner	1	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Water supply	IDP; Local population; Returnees	1,506,468	1,506,468	69,302
344	2017/01088	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91034	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOMALIA	VA Signed by partner	2	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Formal education; Non-formal education; Safe and accessible learnin	IDP; Local population	814,220	814,220	14,642
345	2017/01088	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91034	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOMALIA	VA Signed by partner	3	Protection	Capacity building (Protection); Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Housing, land a	IDP; Local population; Returnees	525,620	525,620	17,536
346	2017/01088	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91034	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOMALIA	VA Signed by partner	4	Health	Capacity building (Health); Medical supplies; Primary health	IDP; Local population	367,176	367,176	29,226
347	2017/01088	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91034	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SOMALIA	VA Signed by partner	5	Disaster Risl	Contingency planning and preparedness for response	IDP; Local population; Returnees	486,515	486,515	55,800
348	2017/01118	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2017/91048	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	V1 Signed by partner	1	Coordinatior	Other (Coordination)	Others	72,442	72,442	0
349	2017/01118	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2017/91048	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	V1 Signed by partner	2	Coordinatior	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination	Refugees	224,385	224,385	115,000
350	2017/01118	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2017/91048	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	V1 Signed by partner	3	Coordinatior	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination	Others	53,259	53,259	0
351	2017/01118	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2017/91048	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	V1 Signed by partner	4	Coordinatior	Other (Coordination)	Others	99,167	99,167	0
352	2017/01118	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2017/91048	ECHO DDG B 4	2017	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	V1 Signed by partner	5	Coordinatior	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination	Others	50,748	50,748	0
353	2017/01124	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2018/91005	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	V1 Signed by partner	1	Protection	Other (Protection); Protection advocacy; Protection information dissemination	IDP; Local population; Refugees	416,742	416,742	8,236
354	2017/01124	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2018/91005	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	V1 Signed by partner	2	Protection	Housing, land and property rights; Other (Protection)	IDP; Local population; Refugees	3,136,480	3,136,480	30,433
355	2017/01124	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2018/91005	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	V1 Signed by partner	3	Protection	Protection advocacy	Others	146,777	146,777	530
356	2017/01126	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2018/91008	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	V1 Signed by partner	1	Education in	Other (Education)	IDP; Refugees	282,522	282,522	4,350
357	2017/01126	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2018/91008	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	V1 Signed by partner	2	Education in	Other (Education)	IDP; Refugees	259,143	259,143	16,222
358	2017/01126	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2018/91008	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	V1 Signed by partner	3	Protection	Other (Protection)	IDP; Refugees	216,721	216,721	1,220
359	2017/01126	ECHO/PSE/BUD/2018/91008	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	V1 Signed by partner	4	Education in	Other (Education)	IDP; Refugees	41,613	41,613	18,171
360	2017/01209	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2018/91062	ECHO DDG C 2	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	MALI	V1 Signed by partner	1	Coordinatior	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination; Global (sector/intersector) coordination including gl	Local population; Others	187,500	187,500	130

Number	Action ID	Contract ID	Unit	Contract Year	Financial Year	Partner	Partner Category	Partner HQ Country	Benef Country	Operational Status	Result Number	Sector	Subsectors	Beneficiaries Type	Contracted amount signed by partner	Contracted amount latest version	Result Beneficiaries
361	2017/01209	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2018/91062	ECHO DDG C 2	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	MALI	V1 Signed by partner	2	Disaster Ris	Other (DRR / DP)	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	812,500	812,500	19,000
362	2017/01209	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2018/91062	ECHO DDG C 2	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	MALI	V1 Signed by partner	3	Protection	Other (Protection)	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	125,000	125,000	4,000
363	2017/01209	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2018/91062	ECHO DDG C 2	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	MALI	V1 Signed by partner	4	Coordinatio	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination	Others	125,000	125,000	0
364	2017/01211	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2018/91074	ECHO DDG C 2	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	MALI	V1 Signed by partner	1	Education in	Non-formal education; Safe and accessible learning environements	IDP; Local population; Returnees	500,000	500,000	1,240
365	2017/01211	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2018/91074	ECHO DDG C 2	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	MALI	V1 Signed by partner	2	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Formal education; Other (Education)	Local population; Returnees	350,000	350,000	8,200
366	2017/01211	ECHO/-WF/BUD/2018/91074	ECHO DDG C 2	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	MALI	V1 Signed by partner	3	Education in	Other (Education)	Local population; Returnees	150,000	150,000	680
367	2018/00184	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2017/92054	ECHO DDG C 2	2018	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	VA Signed by partner	1	Protection	Capacity building (Protection); Prevention of and response to violence	IDP; Local population; Returnees	171,752	171,752	3,500
368	2018/00184	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2017/92054	ECHO DDG C 2	2018	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Water supply	IDP; Local population; Returnees	236,764	236,764	4,500
369	2018/00184	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2017/92054	ECHO DDG C 2	2018	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	VA Signed by partner	3	Shelter and	Other (Shelter)	IDP; Local population; Returnees	291,484	291,484	5,250
370	2018/00233	ECHO/-AF/BUD/2018/92018	ECHO DDG C 2	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CAMEROON	VA Draft terminated	1	Protection	Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Housing, land and property rights	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	500,000	800,000	8,575
371	2018/00274	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	1	Multi-purpos	N/A	IDP; Refugees; Returnees	3,420,983	3,420,983	35,245
372	2018/00274	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	2	Coordinatio	Other (Coordination)	Others	259,282	259,282	0
373	2018/00274	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	3	Disaster Ris	Contingency planning and preparedness for response	IDP; Refugees; Returnees	75,718	75,718	0
374	2018/00274	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91010	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	AFGHANISTAN	VA Signed by partner	4	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Vector control; Water supply	IDP; Refugees; Returnees	94,018	94,018	700
375	2018/00289	ECHO/COD/BUD/2018/91014	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	V1 Signed by partner	1	Education in	Formal education; Non-formal education; Other (Education)	IDP; Local population; Returnees	742,436	742,436	28,252
376	2018/00289	ECHO/COD/BUD/2018/91014	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	V1 Signed by partner	2	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Other (Education); Safe and accessible learning environements	IDP; Local population; Returnees	465,544	465,544	27,440
377	2018/00289	ECHO/COD/BUD/2018/91014	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	V1 Signed by partner	3	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Other (Education)	IDP; Local population; Returnees	92,020	92,020	27,632
378	2018/00308	ECHO/COD/BUD/2018/91010	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	VA Signed by partner	1	Disaster Ris	Contingency planning and preparedness for response	IDP; Local population; Others; Refugees; Returnees	206,637	206,637	0
379	2018/00308	ECHO/COD/BUD/2018/91010	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	VA Signed by partner	2	Food securit	Availability of, access to and consumption of food; Short-term livelihood support	IDP; Local population; Others; Refugees; Returnees	10,441,754	10,441,754	323,547
380	2018/00308	ECHO/COD/BUD/2018/91010	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	VA Signed by partner	3	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Water supply	IDP; Local population; Refugees; Returnees	351,609	351,609	51,540
381	2018/00371	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91036	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	ETHIOPIA	VA Draft terminated	1	Food securit	Availability of, access to and consumption of food	IDP	499,451	998,902	16,000
382	2018/00371	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91036	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	ETHIOPIA	VA Draft terminated	2	Shelter and	Individual household shelter; Other (Shelter)	IDP	380,077	760,154	8,400
383	2018/00371	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91036	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	ETHIOPIA	VA Draft terminated	3	Shelter and	Capacity building (Shelter); Individual household shelter; Other (Shelter)	Local population; Refugees	457,567	915,133	800
384	2018/00371	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91036	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	ETHIOPIA	VA Draft terminated	4	Protection	Capacity building (Protection); Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Other (Protecti	IDP; Refugees	162,906	325,811	3,405
385	2018/00388	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91040	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	UGANDA	V1 Signed by partner	1	Coordinatio	Camp coordination; Country level (sector/intersector) coordination; Global (sector/intersector) coor	Others	376,883	376,883	0
386	2018/00388	ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91040	ECHO DDG C 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	UGANDA	V1 Signed by partner	2	Protection	Capacity building (Protection); Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Housing, land a	Local population; Refugees	323,117	323,117	12,000
387	2018/00441	ECHO/YEM/BUD/2018/91004	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	YEMEN	VA Signed by partner	1	Food securit	Availability of, access to and consumption of food	IDP; Local population; Returnees	1,147,812	1,147,812	32,620
388	2018/00441	ECHO/YEM/BUD/2018/91004	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	YEMEN	VA Signed by partner	2	WASH	Excreta disposal; Hygiene promotion; Water supply	IDP; Local population; Returnees	275,528	275,528	8,750
389	2018/00441	ECHO/YEM/BUD/2018/91004	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	YEMEN	VA Signed by partner	3	Shelter and	Individual household shelter	IDP; Returnees	182,668	182,668	4,900
390	2018/00441	ECHO/YEM/BUD/2018/91004	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	YEMEN	VA Signed by partner	4	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Formal education; Safe and accessible learning environements	IDP; Local population; Returnees	793,992	793,992	7,000
391	2018/00530	ECHO/-AM/BUD/2017/91025	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	VENEZUELA	V1 Signed by partner	1	Protection	Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Protection information dissemination	Local population; Others; Refugees; Returnees	38,765	38,765	1,400
392	2018/00530	ECHO/-AM/BUD/2017/91025	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	VENEZUELA	V1 Signed by partner	2	Multi-purpos	N/A	Local population; Others; Refugees; Returnees	150,162	150,162	6,000
393	2018/00530	ECHO/-AM/BUD/2017/91025	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2017	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	VENEZUELA	V1 Signed by partner	3	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Formal education; Other (Education); Safe and accessible learning en	Local population; Others; Refugees	311,073	311,073	2,600
394	2018/00531	ECHO/-AM/BUD/2018/91019	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	V1 Signed by partner	1	Protection	Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Gender based violence (Prevention, response,	IDP; Local population	39,495	39,495	6,000
395	2018/00531	ECHO/-AM/BUD/2018/91019	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	V1 Signed by partner	2	Education in	Other (Education)	IDP; Local population	201,204	201,204	2,350
396	2018/00531	ECHO/-AM/BUD/2018/91019	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	V1 Signed by partner	3	Shelter and	Individual household shelter	IDP; Local population	132,584	132,584	3,000
397	2018/00531	ECHO/-AM/BUD/2018/91019	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	V1 Signed by partner	4	WASH	Hygiene promotion; Water supply	IDP; Local population	156,489	156,489	6,000
398	2018/00531	ECHO/-AM/BUD/2018/91019	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	V1 Signed by partner	5	Food securit	Availability of, access to and consumption of food	IDP; Local population	94,709	94,709	6,000
399	2018/00531	ECHO/-AM/BUD/2018/91019	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	V1 Signed by partner	6	Health	Capacity building (Health); Mental and psycho-social support; Other (Health)	IDP; Local population	4,010	4,010	1,500
400	2018/00531	ECHO/-AM/BUD/2018/91019	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	COLOMBIA	V1 Signed by partner	7	Coordinatio	Other (Coordination)	Others	21,509	21,509	0
401	2018/00546	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2018/91040	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	V1 Signed by partner	1	Disaster Ris	Other (DRR / DP)	IDP; Returnees	2,543,737	2,543,737	37,640
402	2018/00546	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2018/91040	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	V1 Signed by partner	2	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Non-formal education; Safe and accessible learning environements	IDP; Local population; Returnees	1,009,935	1,009,935	21,335
403	2018/00546	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2018/91040	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	V1 Signed by partner	3	Food securit	Capacity building (Food); Short-term livelihood support	IDP; Local population; Returnees	214,684	214,684	4,750
404	2018/00546	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2018/91040	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	V1 Signed by partner	4	Protection	Capacity building (Protection); Other (Protection)	Others	231,643	231,643	480
405	2018/00561	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2018/91015	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	V1 Signed by partner	1	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Non-formal education; Other (Education)	Local population; Refugees	1,898,530	1,898,530	13,065
406	2018/00561	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2018/91015	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	V1 Signed by partner	2	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Non-formal education; Other (Education)	Local population; Refugees	893,780	893,780	2,295
407	2018/00561	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2018/91015	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	V1 Signed by partner	3	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Non-formal education; Other (Education)	Local population; Refugees	207,690	207,690	1,225
408	2018/00588	ECHO/-AM/BUD/2018/91018	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	HONDURAS	V1 Signed by partner	1	Protection	Capacity building (Protection); Other (Protection); Protection information dissemination	IDP; Others	147,210	147,210	1,255
409	2018/00588	ECHO/-AM/BUD/2018/91018	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	HONDURAS	V1 Signed by partner	2	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Non-formal education; Safe and accessible learning environements	IDP; Others	360,579	360,579	4,635
410	2018/00588	ECHO/-AM/BUD/2018/91018	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	HONDURAS	V1 Signed by partner	3	Health	Capacity building (Health); Mental and psycho-social support; Primary health	IDP; Others	92,211	92,211	3,170
411	2018/00597	ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2018/91017	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAQ	V1 Signed by partner	1	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Formal education; Non-formal education	IDP; Returnees	500,000	500,000	7,169
412	2018/00673	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91023	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Education in	Capacity Building (Education); Formal education; Non-formal education; Safe and accessible learnin	Local population; Refugees	1,155,387	1,155,387	11,050
413	2018/00673	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91023	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Protection	Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Protection advocacy; Protection information di	Refugees	231,169	231,169	1,000
414	2018/00673	ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91023	ECHO DDG C 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	IRAN	V1 Signed by partner	3	Coordinatio	Country level (sector/intersector) coordination; Other (Coordination)	Local population; Others; Refugees	38,443	38,443	100
415	2018/00700	ECHO/UKR/BUD/2018/91005	ECHO DDG B 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	UKRAINE	V1 Signed by partner	1	Protection	Documentation, status and protection of individuals; Housing, land and property rights; Protection a	IDP; Local population; Returnees	414,000	414,000	7,100
416	2018/00700	ECHO/UKR/BUD/2018/91005	ECHO DDG B 3	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	UKRAINE	V1 Signed by partner	2	Shelter and	Individual household shelter; Other (Shelter)	IDP; Local population; Refugees	486,000	486,000	1,987
417	2018/00771	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2018/91032	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	JORDAN	V1 Signed by partner	1	Education in	Other (Education)	Refugees	1,287,000	1,287,000	3,500
418	2018/00771	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2018/91032	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	JORDAN	V1 Signed by partner	2	Education in	Capacity Building (Education)	Local population; Refugees	663,000	663,000	2,250
419	2018/00801	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2018/91018	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	V1 Signed by partner	1	Protection	Other (Protection); Protection information dissemination; Protection information management and n	Refugees	1,550,404	1,550,404	2,955
420	2018/00801	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2018/91018	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	V1 Signed by partner	2	Protection	Other (Protection)	Local population; Refugees	9,714,694	9,714,694	200,016
421	2018/00801	ECHO/SYR/BUD/2018/91018	ECHO DDG B 4	2018	2018	NRC-NO	NGO	NORWAY	LEBANON	V1 Signed by partner	3	Protection	Other (Protection)	Refugees	734,901	734,901	500,000

Annex 8: Evaluation matrix - Partnership Evaluation

Criteria	Question	Sub-questions	Judgement Criteria	Methods	Data Sources
Coherence	**EQ1** How well aligned were DG ECHO and the NRC?	1.1 How aligned were priorities, strategies and objectives? 1.2 How aligned were needs assessments and multi-hazard risk and vulnerability analyses aligned? 1.3 How aligned were advocacy priorities and efforts? 1.4 Did NRC follow DG ECHO's visibility guidelines?	Priorities, strategies and objectives were similar NRC assessment and vulnerability analyses met DG ECHO standard NRC advocacy priorities aligned with DG ECHO i) at global level ii) at country level NRC met visibility standard	Document analysis Interviews	NRC Global Policy and Programme Policy Papers; Annual Reports; DG ECHO Annual Priority statements; INFORM, FCA; Annual Reports; Country Factsheets Final reports
	EQ2 How coherent was the policy level dialogue between the two partners?	2.1 How strategic, structured, functional and timely was the dialogue between NRC and DG ECHO? 2.2 By what means did dialogue take place	Evidence of strategic dialogue on policies and priorities Evidence of structural regularity Evidence of clear purpose Evidence dialogue was time-responsive	Document analysis	Strategic communications Minutes of meetings Meeting Schedule

Efficiency	**EQ3** To what extent did the partnership succeed in maximising efficiencies and decreasing management and related costs, including administrative burden?	3.1 Did the FPA decrease management and related costs, including administrative burden?	Evidence that funding was: • predictable • timely • flexible in response to changing needs Reduced transaction costs for project proposals, negotiation of the grant agreement, fund transfers, proposal modification, reporting, liquidation Simplified procedures reduced administrative and compliance costs of working through DG ECHO's systems Evidence that intended efficiencies and/or cost savings have been realised	Document analysis Interviews Comparison with other reference donors or plausible counter-factual scenarios NRC project cost-effectiveness case study Afghanistan	Final reports Interviews
		3.2 Did the partnership succeed in improving cost-effectiveness in their response?	Evidence that the partnership contributed to improvements in operational cost-effectiveness across the portfolio of DG ECHO-funded projects Evidence of DG ECHO staff influencing cost-effectiveness of: • project design • implementation	Case studies Case studies	
		3.3 Did the partnership improve the use of cash-based response?	Evidence of increased / more timely use of cash-based response as a result of DG ECHO influence		

Effectiveness	**EQ4** How effective was the contribution of the partnership in terms of localisation and humanitarian / development engagement?	4.1 Did the partnership promote increasing local partners' meaningful participation in humanitarian response? 4.2 Did the partnership enhance engagement between humanitarian and development actors?	Evidence of strategic intent to increase participation of local partners Evidence of increase in number of local partners and/or funds channelled through them Evidence of systematic engagement with development actors at country level	Document analysis Interviews at HQ and country level Survey	Global Strategy Paper Record of Annual Partner Conference Final Reports

Annex 9: Interview and Survey Questions Partnership Report

Topic	Interview questions (as relevant to the stakeholder)
Policy dialogue	• In your experience, what has been the most important dialogue about policy (HQ) and advocacy (country) between the partners? • How similar or different have the viewpoints been? • Do you have an example of where you have influenced the partner and/or the partner has influenced you?
Localisation	• How important is the localisation agenda to you? • Are there differences between your approach and the partner's? • Has your position been influenced by the approach of the partner? In what ways? • What progress has the *partnership* made on localisation? • What are the challenges in moving forward? • Are there advantages of addressing localisation in partnership compared with by each partner individually?
Humanitarian – development nexus	• How important is addressing the nexus to you? • Are there differences with the approach of the partner? • Has your position been influenced by the approach of the partner? In what ways? • What progress has the *partnership* made on the nexus? • What are the challenges in moving forward? • Are there advantages of addressing the nexus in partnership compared with by each partner individually?
Efficiency – management costs and administrative burden	• Is DG ECHO a prompt and reliable provider of funds? • For each SGA, does DG ECHO reliably adhere to an agreed funding schedule? • When an SGA is modified, is DG ECHO prompt in providing additional funding? • The FPA anticipates that cooperation will lead to '*simplified procedures*.' Has it? What are they? Have there been significant cost and time savings? • *Only NRC:* How do the *transaction* costs of DG ECHO funding compare with NMFA, DFID and SIDA[181]? What stages of the project cycle are onerous? • Are DG ECHO *compliance* costs (for example, with procurement procedures) more or less onerous than those of NMFA, DFID and SIDA? • To what extent is any of the above documented? • *Only DG ECHO:* Does DG ECHO have any analysis of the efficiency of its grant-making process compared with other reference donors? • In what respects might the DG ECHO relationship be streamlined without significant compromise in quality and accountability?
Efficiency – cost-effectiveness of DG ECHO-supported NRC responses	• To what extent has the DG ECHO partnership led to *operational* efficiency and cost-effectiveness improvements? Are there examples? • Do DG ECHO staff (for example, regional experts and country TA) make a significant contribution to NRC project design or implementation modality? • What further input from DG ECHO might enhance NRC's operational efficiency and cost-effectiveness, and in what ways?
Efficiency – cash-based response	• Are NRC and DG ECHO aligned in their cash policies and analysis? • Has input/pressure from DG ECHO changed NRC's policy on the use of cash? • Has input/pressure from DG ECHO increased NRC's use of cash over the period of the evaluation? • Is this documented?

[181] NRC's top four institutional donors globally are NMFA, DG ECHO, DFID and SIDA

Online survey questions

Questions sent to NRC:

1. How well aligned are your program priorities with those of DG ECHO?

- ○ Totally
- ○ Mainly
- ○ Partially
- ○ Not at all

Please mention any differences

2. How aligned are your advocacy priorities?

- ○ Totally
- ○ Mainly
- ○ Partially
- ○ Not at all

Please mention any differences

3. Does dialogue with DG ECHO influence your program priorities?

- ○ A lot
- ○ A moderate amount
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

Please explain your choice

4. How do you feel about the amount of time you spend dealing with DG ECHO's administrative requirements? Check all that apply

- ☐ I spend too much time and find it unreasonable
- ☐ I spend a lot of time but accept that it is necessary
- ☐ I spend a lot of time and it feels disproportionate to the benefit
- ☐ I spend a lot more time on DG ECHO requirements than other donors
- ☐ The time I spend is normal
- ☐ DG ECHO's formats are difficult and time consuming
- ☐ DG ECHO's formats are easy and quick to use

5. Can you identify up to three ways in which the administrative burden could be reduced?

1. _____ 2. _____ 3. _____

6. How effective is your dialogue with DG ECHO?

- ○ Highly effective - I can discuss anything whenever I need to and get a result
- ○ Very effective - we are in regular contact and issues are resolved in good time
- ○ Effective - but I get a better result on some issues compared with others
- ○ Not very effective - I don't get the support I need
- ○ Not at all effective - we have poor relations

Please give an example to explain your answer

7. Has DG ECHO talked to you about localisation?

- ○ Yes

- No
- Not applicable

If yes, what was your response?

8. Are you actively working on the humanitarian-development nexus?

- Yes
- No
- Not applicable

If yes, is this due to DG ECHO influence? If no, what is the reason?

9. Overall, how do you rate the partnership with DG ECHO?

- Very high quality
- High quality
- Neither high nor low quality
- Low quality
- Very low quality

10. If you could change one thing about the partnership what would it be?

Question variant sent to DG ECHO

1. How well aligned is NRC with your program priorities?
2. How aligned are your advocacy priorities?
3. Does dialogue with NRC influence your program priorities?
4. How do you feel about the amount of time you spend dealing with administrative aspects of the partnership with NRC? Check all that apply
5. Can you identify up to three ways in which the administrative burden could be reduced?
6. How effective is your dialogue with NRC?
7. Have you talked to NRC about localisation?
8. Are you actively working on the humanitarian-development nexus with NRC?
9. Overall, how do you rate the partnership with NRC?
10. If you could change one thing

Annex 10: Detailed suggestions for improving efficiency

Area of efficiency	Suggestions from DG ECHO about how NRC can be more efficient *Suggestions from DG ECHO about improving its own efficiency*	Suggestions from NRC about how DG ECHO can be more efficient
Communication	• communication of challenges and bottlenecks which will necessitate adjustments in the implementation plan, activities and budget • better and more transparent anticipation of problems in implementation • more communication when there is any doubt about the implications of a decision or consequences of an event • train staff in clear and concise writing for FPA and eSingleForm so that information can be read more easily • position more experienced senior staff at all levels • improve document archiving system so that earlier decisions and agreements can be traced easily • be more flexible in terms of geographical scope, timeline, indicator/target changes and don't insist that the Grant agreement is followed literally	• greater consistency in messaging and expectations of partners, particularly from different levels within DG ECHO • eliminate the informal requirement for monthly or ad hoc written reports and additional information beyond what is agreed in the SGA • better alignment between DG ECHO TAs and DG ECHO in Brussels to prevent having to elevate requests for clarifications at Brussels level for issues that have been already discussed at the field level • recognition of the time demand that completion of RQ, MR, IR and FR places on partners • agree submission schedules which work within the flexibility provided for by the indicative dates of submission for HIP applications, rather than treating the indicative date as prescriptive/final • reduce the numbers of lines of communication
Reporting	• provide all the information that is requested in a way that can be clearly understood and is consistent through the report • include more quantitative information against the indicators • pay more attention to quality before submission to avoid wasting time on mistakes that can be avoided • better analysis of factors leading to underachievement • make context analysis specific rather than general	• standardise proposal and reporting formats with other donors • reduce the amount of information required to prepare a donor visit as requirements for financial report, updated logframe, security/risks analysis are almost as burdensome as a full report

Procedures	• focus on a few areas of strength in specific sectors and geographical areas rather than complex actions covering vast geographical areas • define very clear parameters of the project from the onset • demonstrate how the components of a proposal fit with DG ECHO's overall strategy • Simplify procedures and speed up the contracting process	• make online project management system, single form and Appel more user friendly and more intuitive • reduce the number, length and complexity of guidance documents on using Appel • reduce size, eliminate the byte size limit and change to characters • enable formats to be used offline to facilitate use and review by multiple contributors before uploading to Appel • improve the online submission process • reduce complexity of the logframe • improve compatibility with typical software such as Word • simplify financial reporting requirements
Costs and accountability	• reduce support costs so NRC is comparable to similar partners/programs • be more transparent in financial reporting • Revise the fair share approach	• accept copy of cheques, bank transfers etc as proof of payment instead of insisting a bank statement for each payment • apply the Fair Share allocation model • reduce excessive time required by allocating support costs at overall levels instead of line by line • use a global audit firm. The current audit firm that DG ECHO uses has very narrow understanding of the humanitarian world and comes up with 40-60 recommendations for each audit that make no sense in most of the cases