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Modelling Global Diffusion

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Modelling Global Diffusion

Abstract

This paper presents a general model of global diffusion processes. The approach recognizes "breadth" and "depth" of adoption by first considering the sequential introduction of the innovation across countries (breadth). Given the time of introduction into a specific country, within-country diffusion (depth) is subsequently modelled. We illustrate the approach using data from the cellular telephone industry for 184 countries. The proposed approach provides empirical insights which could not have been obtained using traditional techniques. In particular, we show that breadth and depth processes are not necessarily affected by the same socioeconomic factors. We also are able to evaluate the importance of the *linkage* between the two processes.

"When it comes to product strategy, managing in a borderless world doesn't mean managing by averages." (*The Borderless World*, Kenichi Ohmae, McKinsey & Company, 1990, p. 24).

1. INTRODUCTION

The marketing of globalized products produces a number of challenges to firms hoping to serve international markets. Believing that there is an "average" country or assuming that the home market's behavior will be replicated elsewhere may ignore important variances likely to be faced by products going global. In this paper, we propose a formal approach designed to investigate and explain variances in globalization patterns. In particular, we are interested in understanding forces which affect the global acceptance of a given product or service, and provide a vehicle to test theories as to why this acceptance may vary from one country to another. In doing so, we hope to extend the literature on innovation diffusion (e.g. Robertson 1967, 1971; Rogers 1983) to the study of product acceptance across the entire community of nations. Since the 1960s, several new-product diffusion models have been developed and documented in the marketing literature which are specifically designed to evaluate new-product acceptance over time, and a number of reviews have considered in great detail their descriptive, predictive and normative use (e.g. Bridges, Coughlan and Kalish 1991; Hanssens, Parsons and Schultz 1990; Lilien, Kotler and Moorthy 1992; Mahajan, Muller and Bass 1990; Simon 1989). These reviews reveal that existing models are well suited to one-country, one-product situations. Most products are launched or sold, however, in multiple countries or geographic regions, and undergo global diffusion processes. Recently, a number of comparative studies have started to consider differences in diffusion patterns across countries. Our study contributes to this stream of work in a number of ways.

First, previous research on international diffusion has mainly dealt with comparisons of diffusion rates across a limited set of industrialized countries (see Table 1). As a consequence, over 90 percent of the world's nations are ignored, and key countries like Brazil, Indonesia, China, India and Russia which together represent over 40 percent of the world's population are

mostly excluded.¹ This tendency to focus on only a few countries is mirrored in a broader survey of the international marketing literature. Table 2 shows that of 111 international marketing studies published since 1975 in 25 major marketing and management journals, only one reported a sample exceeding 50 countries. In this paper, we investigate global adoption and diffusion by considering 184 countries located in Africa (55 countries), Asia (37 countries), Europe (32 countries), the Americas (45 countries) and other regions (15, mostly island, countries).²

Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here

Second, beyond considering the entire community of nations, we identify and model two distinct components of the global diffusion process. Consider, for example, Figure 1 which shows the aggregate adoption of cellular telephone service (subscriptions) on a worldwide basis. While one might be tempted to directly explain the dynamics of this aggregate diffusion pattern, the global adoption curve inherently masks two underlying and fundamentally different processes:

- adoption timing across countries; i.e. when will each individual country first show, or allow, the sales of the innovation, and
- within-country diffusion process; i.e. given the adoption time, what are the likely diffusion rates within a given country?

We label these processes *breadth* and *depth* of adoption, respectively. From the manager's point of view, a comprehensive understanding of these two distinct dimensions is required. Knowing when a country will first adopt a product does not indicate, by itself, that it warrants certain marketing activities (e.g. the market potential may be too small). Likewise, knowing that a country will have a large market potential and fast penetration rate may be

¹ Some of these countries were considered by Heeler and Hustad (1980) in their study on the diffusion of black and white TV and refrigerators. Still, the number of countries they considered was less than twenty.

²Countries are defined broadly, in that we also include territories, protectorates or colonies of United Nations members which are, however, often represented as being sovereign states in international agencies (e.g. the World Health Organization or the International Olympic Committee). These smaller states are generally autonomous, have disputed sovereignty, or are distant from the parent country (e.g. the Falkland Islands, Puerto Rico).

inconsequential to planning if the country will only begin adoption well beyond the planning horizon. From an academic perspective, breadth and depth processes result in two distinct modelling approaches. The data investigated are disaggregate in the former case (i.e. each country is an individual adopter), but are aggregated in the latter (i.e. the penetration rates within each country). By modelling both breadth and depth, we can determine if factors hypothesized to affect global diffusion have similar or differing influences on the different components of the process. Moreover, by considering both dimensions, we are able to investigate possible *linkages* between the two, e.g. does the adoption timing affect the subsequent rate of diffusion within a country? With respect to prior diffusion research, Table 1 shows that only the second aspect (depth) has received attention in the literature, while the former (breadth) has been completely overlooked. Likewise, no study has thoroughly considered the linkages between the two.

Insert Figure 1 about here

Third, diffusion theory suggests that differences in the diffusion pattern of a technology across countries may be due to both exogenous and endogenous factors, but empirical studies have mainly considered the impact of the former. Gatignon et al. (1989), for example, assessed the impact of a country's degree of cosmopolitanism, mobility and sex roles (all factors exogenous to the diffusion process) on its propensity to innovate and imitate, but did not model the impact of endogenous factors (e.g. number of countries which have already adopted). Some (indirect) evidence of endogenous influence is found in Takada and Jain (1991), who found the diffusion process to be a function of the country's adoption timing; the number and nature (similarity) of previously adopting countries was not considered, however. Our approach estimates cross-country heterogeneity in both breadth and depth processes while simultaneously incorporating exogenous and diffusion-driven (endogenous) covariates. As such, a more complete picture of the relative importance of exogenous versus endogenous forces is obtained.

Fourth, from a methodological point of view, the proposed modelling approaches have a number of advantages over existing techniques. With respect to the adoption timing across countries (breadth), a flexible hazard specification is proposed which explicitly takes the grouped nature of the data into account, allows for a non-parametric specification of the time dependence, includes both fixed and time-varying covariates, accounts for unobserved heterogeneity and does not require all countries to ultimately adopt. While each of these individual features has been applied before in the marketing literature (see e.g. Helsen and Schmittlein 1993; Jain and Vilcassim 1991; Sharma 1993; Sinha and Chandrashekaran 1992), our study is the first to incorporate all of them simultaneously, which, in our context, is needed to ensure consistency of the parameter estimates. In terms of the within-country diffusion (depth), the international nature of the process elucidated a number of problems with earlier specifications. To this end we improve upon existing aggregate diffusion models in three respects: (1) we are the first to apply "sample matching" which is required in cross-cultural research but overlooked in the diffusion literature, (2) we make explicit the need for a comparable "time of origin" and thereby overcome problems caused by left-hand adoptioncurve truncation, and (3) we propose a staged estimation procedure which results in more plausible parameter estimates than extant techniques.³ Combined, these three extensions considerably attenuate Simon's (1994, p. 14) criticism that aggregate diffusion models are "risky and potentially misleading", and show that this conclusion may be more a function of the estimation procedures used than of the intrinsic quality of the diffusion models themselves.

Finally, the paper tests a variety of international theories suggested in the diffusion literature (e.g. Gatignon and Robertson 1985; Rogers 1983). Our study provides substantive insights, for example, into the effects of various country traits on the diffusion process, including ethnic homogeneity, economic development, political disposition, levels of competition and cross-country influence. We must qualify our contribution, however, since we use only one industry to illustrate the modelling approach. We do not, therefore, claim that the results are generalizable to every other product category; still, they represent a first attempt at testing prevailing theories.

We illustrate our approach using diffusion data from the cellular telephone industry.

³Each of these properties is discussed in Section 4, where we also compare our approach with existing specifications.

In Section 2, we provide some background information on the nature of this diffusion process, and mention a number of pragmatic concerns associated with empirical studies of global marketing phenomena. Next, we report and apply the modelling approaches for the breadth (Section 3) and depth (Section 4) dimensions of the diffusion process. In Section 5 we conclude with a discussion on some of the implementation issues involved, and present areas for future research.

2. DATA ISSUES

2.1. The Nature of the Considered Diffusion Process

While we use the cellular-telephone industry as an illustration, we want to emphasize up front that the modelling concepts presented in Sections 3 and 4 are applicable to any situation where managers or researchers have some indication of the domestic or foreignmarket demand for the new product, and are interested in likely demand dynamics across countries. Assuming that an innovation is launched in the "home" market (e.g. Japan as was the case for cellular-telephone services in 1979), cross-country diffusion takes place when adoption begins in other countries. This may be the result of what Rogers (1983) calls a centralized process whereby the firm (i.e. the change agent) systematically determines where the innovation should be sold next. In other instances, diffusion may be of a decentralized nature. For durable products, for example, international diffusion may begin as unsolicited exports, with independent channel members selling in foreign markets without the manufacturer's knowledge or explicit action. In this paper, we mostly consider decentralized processes where the manufacturers themselves do not determine when sales will begin in a specific country, but where foreign governments determine (even though the firms may try to influence that decision) from what point in time the product or service is allowed to be sold in their country. Such processes are likely to exist for a wide variety of product categories such as most medical products, telecommunication services, energy-supply systems, electronic products which must meet local type approval, cosmetics, or any other packaged consumer goods which require government approval or face non-tariff barriers. When firms themselves

plan the introduction sequence (i.e. when dealing with centralized processes), one can still use the proposed modelling techniques as research tools, though the nature of the explanatory variables may be somewhat different.

2.2. Pragmatic Considerations

Our approach allows researchers to rigorously test a number of hypotheses/theories, whether generated by the academic community, managers, or economic planners. There are, however, a number of pragmatic issues associated with generating and testing international theories of diffusion which should be kept in mind. First, specific theories or hypotheses ultimately depend on the category under consideration, even though general diffusion theory can be the overall framework. For example, in their study of cross-European diffusion patterns for household appliances, Gatignon et al. (1989) propose that diffusion patterns for time-saving innovations are a function of the country's sex roles, or the percentage of women in the labor force. While this might appear plausible for dishwashers and deep freezers, it is not clear that this proposition is (or should be) a useful hypothesis for all product categories (e.g. nuclear submarines). As such, we do not claim that the covariates included in our study should be equally relevant for all other product categories. Our empirical results should be interpreted as an illustration of how a variety of hypotheses can be tested rigorously, rather than as empirical generalizations. Second, a practical problem in testing "global theories" is the need to use globally representative proxies. As applied international researchers are well aware, the requirement to use covariates which measure international differences across 184 countries leaves us with a limited set of variables (e.g. basic socioeconomic characteristics). As a consequence, some of the factors which could potentially have an impact on, say, the adoption timing were not included in the model because their values were only available for a small fraction of the countries, and also the development of multi-item scales was infeasible.⁴

Given these concerns (that theories/hypotheses are likely to be category specific, and

⁴ As indicated below, this makes a correction for unobserved heterogeneity an important property of our hazard specification.

that proxies are required, but limited in number), the hypotheses tested here represent the intersection of three considerations: (1) support in the diffusion literature, (2) managerial relevance, and (3) data availability. Specifically, we assess the impact of exogenous forces including political disposition (communist or not), socioeconomic characteristics (GNP per capita, crude death rate, population growth), competition (number of competitors), social-system homogeneity (number of ethnic groups) and population concentration (number of major population centers). We also consider the role of endogenous factors including the importance of the demonstration effect exerted by earlier adoptions in "similar" countries.

3. STUDY #1: THE BREADTH DIMENSION OF GLOBAL DIFFUSION

3.1. Introduction

Table 3 classifies countries having introduced cellular services using the "innovator-laggard" spectrum proposed by Rogers (1983),⁵ whereby late-majority and laggard countries are those which had yet to offer the service in 1993. The great variability in adoption times is also reflected in Figure 2 which shows both the actual number of countries introducing the service in a given year and the number of adopters predicted by the aggregate diffusion model of Easingwood, Mahajan and Muller (1983). Even though the latter approach gives a parsimonious description of how fast the innovation will be accepted across the world, it does not help management to understand why certain countries adopt sooner than others. Indeed, aggregate diffusion models treat each country as a homogenous unit, and cannot explain why some countries have a higher probability of adopting in a given year than others.

Insert Table 3 and Figure 2 about here

Micro-level models relax this homogeneity assumption, and allow the probability of adoption to be heterogenous across potential adopters (Chatterjee and Eliashberg 1990; Sinha and

⁵A similar classification can be made using the methodology proposed by Mahajan, Muller, and Srivastava (1990).

Chandrashekaran 1992). Moreover, since the unit of analysis is at the individual level, various causal factors which may affect the individual adoption decision can be included into the model and formally tested. Hannan and McDowell (1984), Sharma (1993), Sharma and Sinha (1991a) and Sinha and Chandrashekaran (1992), for example, all investigated the impact of firm and market characteristics on the adoption timing of automated teller machines. In our first study, we extend these approaches to international diffusion processes where our units of observation are countries rather than firms.

3.2. Model Development

To explain the variance in international adoption timing, a flexible hazard model is used which: (1) adjusts for the grouped nature of the data, (2) assumes no distributional assumptions with respect to the form of the baseline hazard, (3) incorporates both time-invariant and time-varying covariates, (4) corrects for unobserved heterogeneity, and (5) explicitly tests the managerial assumption that eventually all countries will adopt the innovation.

Let T denote the random duration until a country adopts the innovation with probability density function f(t), cumulative distribution function F(t) and hazard function $\lambda(t)$. Yearly grouping intervals $[t_{k-1}, t_k)$, $k=1, 2, ..., m+1, t_0=0$ and $t_{m+1}=\infty$ are defined and adoption in duration interval $[t_{k-1}, t_k)$ is recorded as t_k . It should be emphasized that t_k does not refer to actual calendar time, but to the number of years elapsed since the system first became available. Cellular technology, for example, was first tried (but not adopted) on a limited scale by the government of Qatar in June 1979, which becomes the starting point of our time axis. Japan introduced the technology by the end of 1979, and is therefore given a duration of one (i.e. they adopted within the first year the technology was available), while France adopted in 1985, the seventh year.⁶ For those countries which had not yet adopted a cellular system by

⁶For 87% of the adopting countries, we know both the year and month of adoption so that we can easily calculate the associated grouping interval (e.g. France adopted in November 1985, i.e. after 78 months, and is assigned to the seventh grouping interval). For 13% of the adopting countries, only the year of adoption is known, and for those countries we assume that adoption occurred in the middle of the year (June). None of our substantive results was affected, however, when we assumed that adoption occurred at the beginning or end of the year.

September 1990 (the right-censored observations), a duration of 12 years is recorded.⁷

Parameter estimates are obtained through maximum-likelihood estimation, and the contribution to the likelihood function differs depending on whether or not a country has adopted cellular technology by the end of the observation period. The contribution to the likelihood function of country k which adopted the technology in year t_k is given by $S(t_k-1)$ - $S(t_k)$, where the survivor function $S(t_k) = 1$ - $F(t_k)$ denotes the probability that the country has not yet adopted the new technology after t_k years. By working with the difference of survivor functions rather than with the density function, we recognize the discrete nature of the yearly duration intervals. This adjustment is needed since not accounting for the discrete nature of the data has been shown to result in inconsistent parameter estimates, with increasing asymptotic bias as the grouping becomes more coarse (Kiefer 1988; Sharma and Sinha 1991a,b).§ For country t_k which has not yet adopted cellular systems by September 1990, the contribution to the likelihood function is given by t_k i.e. we assume that censoring takes place at the beginning of the duration interval. Clearly, some such assumption is required given the grouping in the data. The contribution to the likelihood function of any country t_k can therefore be written as

$$L_i(t_i) = [S(t_i-1)-S(t_i)]^{1-d_i} [S(t_i-1)]^{d_i},$$
 (1)

where d_i is an indicator variable which takes the value of one if the country has not yet adopted by the end of September 1990, and zero otherwise; as such, all 184 countries, whether they have adopted or not, are contributing to the likelihood function.

To incorporate covariates into the model, we first propose an expression for the hazard function, and subsequently use a general relationship between a distribution's hazard and survivor function. We write the hazard function $\lambda_i(t)$, which gives the conditional probability

⁷In study #1, the end of the observation period is September 1990. This enables us to clearly distinguish communist from non-communist countries, a distinction which became blurred after the Fall of the Berlin Wall. Going beyond September 1990 would also have affected the sample size in that the national boundaries of a number of countries have changed.

⁸As such, not adjusting for the discrete nature of the data may be fairly inconsequential when working with daily or weekly data (e.g. Jain and Vilcassim 1991), but may seriously affect the parameter estimates when working with annual grouping intervals (e.g. Sinha and Chandrashekaran 1992).

that country i will adopt in duration interval t given that it has not done so by the end of interval t-1, as:

$$\lambda_i(t) = \lambda_0 e^{\beta X_i(t)} e^{c D_i(t)}. \tag{2}$$

This expression consists of three building blocks. First, λ_0 gives the adoption probability of countries in the base group in the first year after the technology's introduction. The base group is defined as those countries for which all covariates, given by the vector $X_i(t)$, are zero. Second, when some of the covariates are different from zero, the country's hazard is multiplied by $\exp[\beta X_i(t)]$. A positive β coefficient implies that an increase in the value of the associated covariate augments the (conditional) adoption probability, or conversely, reduces the expected time until adoption. Finally, a set of time-varying dummy variables $D_i(t)$ is added to capture a wide variety of time dependencies. Consider, for example, the situation where a separate dummy is included for every possible adoption year. The time-varying dummy associated with year three is always zero, except during year three when it takes the value of one, i.e. its different values are (0 0 1 0 ...). To avoid identification problems when simultaneously estimating c_1 and λ_0 , no dummy variable is included for the first year. As such, λ_0 reflects the adoption rate of the base group in the first period, and positive (negative) c-coefficients for the other intervals indicate a higher (lower) adoption rate compared to that first year. approach makes no distributional assumption with respect to the nature of the time dependence, and is therefore called non-parametric (Vanhuele et al. 1994). The only assumption made is that within a grouping interval (e.g. a year) the hazard remains constant. Intuitively, this is equivalent to a piece-wise approximation of an underlying, possibly very complex, continuous time-dependence pattern. Its main advantage is that it results in consistent parameter estimates even when the true form of the baseline is unknown. In contrast, an incorrect parametric specification results in inconsistent parameter estimates (Meyer 1986, 1990). Because of the variability in the observed durations (ranging from one to twelve years), the small number of adopting countries (63), and the need to have a sufficient number of adoptions in any given

⁹ Specifically, when the *j*-th covariate changes by one unit, the hazard changes by $[\exp(\beta_i)-1)]*100$ percent.

period to reliably estimate the associated c-parameter, we limit in our empirical application the number of discrete jumps in the baseline hazard. Rather than allowing for a different c-parameter in every year, we allow for a discrete shift after every three years.¹⁰

To estimate the parameters of interest, an expression for the survivor function $S_i(t)$ associated with the hazard in (2) is needed. It can be shown (see e.g. Lancaster 1990) that

$$S_{i}(t) = e^{-\int_{0}^{t} \lambda_{i}(u)du} . \tag{3}$$

When the time-varying covariates are assumed to remain constant within a given year, but are allowed to vary from year to year, (3) can be written as (Gupta 1991, Vanhuele et al. 1994):

$$S_i(t) = e^{-\lambda_0 B_i(t)}, \text{ where } B_i(t) = \sum_{j=1}^t e^{\beta X_i(j) + c D_i(j)}.$$
 (4)

After appropriate substitutions, the log-likelihood function for N countries becomes:

$$LL = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \{ (1 - d_i) \log[e^{-\lambda_0 B_i(t_i - 1)} - e^{-\lambda_0 B_i(t_i)}] - d_i \lambda_0 B_i(t_i - 1) \} .$$
 (5)

In Equation (5), we basically assume that every country in the base group has the same initial adoption probability λ_0 . However, some of the factors that can have an impact on a country's adoption timing may be hard to quantify (e.g. the attitude of its political leaders towards innovations), or may not have been available in our data set (e.g. the number of political parties forming the government at any given point in time). Not accounting for these omitted factors (often referred to as unobserved heterogeneity) has been shown to cause a spurious negative duration dependence (as reflected in a downward bias on the *c*-coefficients), and to result in inconsistent parameter estimates for the included covariates (see e.g. Lancaster 1990). To correct for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, we let λ_0 be distributed

¹⁰Our substantive findings were not affected by this choice, and similar results were obtained when working with shifts after two or four years.

according to a gamma mixing distribution.¹¹ This mixing distribution is quite flexible, and has been shown to result in the following closed-form solution for the likelihood function (see Vanhuele et al. 1994 for a formal proof):

$$LL = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \ln\{(1+d_i) \left[\frac{a}{B_i(t_i-1)+a} \right]^r - \left[\frac{a}{B_i(t_i-1)+(1-d_i) e^{\beta X_i(t_i)+cD_i(t_i)}+a} \right]^r \}.$$
 (6)

The average first-year adoption probability for countries in the base group is then given by the mean of the mixing distribution, r/a, and all other coefficients can be interpreted relative to this ratio in the same way as they were interpreted vis a vis λ_0 in earlier models.

Finally, to explicitly allow for the fact that some countries may never adopt cellular technology, we extend the model in Equation (6) using the homogenous split-hazard approach of Sinha and Chandrashekaran (1992). Mathematical derivations are presented in Appendix A, but intuitively, this approach allows for a discrete spike at $\lambda_0 = 0$. The magnitude of this spike allows us to test the managerial intuition that in the long run all countries will adopt the innovation. The model in Equation (A.2) extends Sinha and Chandrashekaran's work in three different ways, since they (1) specified the baseline hazard parametrically (as opposed to our non-parametric specification), (2) made no adjustment for the discrete nature of the data (even though they also worked with yearly data intervals), and (3) did not make a correction for unobserved heterogeneity. As indicated before, each of these issues may have affected the consistency of their parameter estimates. A more complete comparison of the proposed model specification with earlier marketing applications of hazard-rate models is given in Table 4. This table illustrates that our model is the first to integrate all aforementioned properties.

¹¹The gamma mixing distribution is also used in Dekimpe and Morrison (1991), Gupta (1991), Han and Hausman (1990), Meyer (1990) and Sharma and Sinha (1991a,b), among others. Other authors (e.g. Jain and Vilcassim 1991, Vilcassim and Jain 1991) have modeled the baseline hazard parametrically and the unobserved heterogeneity non-parametrically. This was motivated by the findings of Flinn and Heckman (1982) and Heckman and Singer (1984) that for a given parametric form of the baseline, the results tend to be very sensitive to the form of the mixing distribution. Recent research has shown, however, that the specification of the heterogeneity component is not as crucial as a flexible specification of the time dependence (Han and Hausman 1990; Manton, Vaupel and Stallard 1986; Ridder 1986).

Insert Table 4 about here

3.3. Empirical Findings

The models described in Section 3.2. are used to test the impact of a number of exogenous and endogenous factors on the timing of a country's decision to adopt cellular telephones. Data on the cellular telephone industry were collected from the relevant government agencies, trade associations, and the International Telecommunications Union, a United Nations Agency. The exogenous covariates reflect political (communist or not), demographic (average annual population growth, number of major population centers), economic (GNP per Capita, crude death rate) and social-system (number of ethnic groups) characteristics. These data were collected from Euromonitor Ltd. and the *World Factbook* (Central Intelligence Agency, 1993). Relevant summary statistics are presented in Table 5.¹³ The highest correlation between the respective variables does not exceed 0.4, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem.

Insert Table 5 about here

In addition to these exogenous forces, we also consider the endogenous effect suggested by Gatignon and Robertson (1985, p. 858) that "social similari[ties] between the countries are negatively related to the diffusion sequence across countries." To capture the impact of previous adoptions by "similar" countries, a time-varying covariate is added which measures how many nations in a country's "World-Bank group" have adopted cellular technology by the

¹²The innovation is defined as "mobile cellular-like telecommunications subscriptions" (as opposed to a particular type of terminal equipment).

¹³ As data on 184 countries are difficult to collect on a year-to-year basis, we treat the exogenous covariates as time-invariant, i.e. we assume that they did not vary in a systematic fashion over the considered time span.

end of the previous grouping interval.¹⁴ The World Bank defines nine categories of countries which are similar in terms of a number of socioeconomic and political variables; 156 countries fit into one of these categories. Rather than combining the remaining 28 countries in an "others" category (which would imply considering Cuba and Monaco as similar countries), we will test the impact of this endogenous factor on the more restricted data set of 156 countries. Countries also have political and economic ties with countries outside their World-Bank group. The demonstration effect from adoptions in those countries will be reflected in the baseline hazard, which is therefore expected to increase over time (Helsen and Schmittlein 1993; Sharma and Sinha 1991a).

Parameter estimates for a number of different model specifications are given in Table 6. In Table 6, we still impose the managerial assumption that all countries will eventually adopt; we will test that assumption later on.

Insert Table 6 about here

The first column of Table 6 presents the estimates for a model which explicitly accounts for unobserved heterogeneity (Eq. 6), but which does not yet include the time-varying proportion of earlier adoptions in a country's World-Bank group. It is found that non-communist countries, with a high GNP per Capita, a low crude death rate, few ethnic groups and many major population centers tend to be early adopters of cellular technology. Most estimates have the signs that could be expected on the basis of diffusion theory and/or managerial intuition for this product category. The diffusion literature has argued that a society's adoption timing is related to its standard of living and stage of economic development (Antonelli 1993; Gatignon and Robertson 1989), for which gross national product (wealth) and crude death rate (poverty) are main indicators (Helsen et al. 1993). Similarly, several case studies have shown that the planned economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe tend to lag in the adoption of new technologies (see e.g. Amann and Cooper 1982; Berliner 1976; Leary and Thornton

¹⁴Since June 1979 is the start of our time axis, we computed the percentage of adopters in each World-Bank category in May 1980, May 1981, etc. Percentages are used to correct for the fact that not all groups have the same number of countries.

1989). With respect to the negative impact of the number of ethnic groups, Gatignon and Robertson (1985) argue that homogenous social systems (for which we use the number of ethnic groups as a proxy) tend to be characterized by faster (and in our case, earlier) diffusion rates. Several managers in the industry argue that the relative advantage of cellular phone systems over existing technologies is directly related to the number of urban areas or major population centers, which explains the positive parameter estimate for this covariate. Population growth (a surrogate for the need to expand the telecommunications infrastructure), on the other hand, had no significant impact on the countries' adoption timing.

The increasing baseline hazard in this model captures the "demonstration" (Mansfield 1968, Sharma and Sinha 1991a) or "snowball" (Helsen and Schmittlein 1993) effect resulting from previous adoptions within *and* outside a country's World-Bank group: as more countries have adopted the technology, the uncertainty surrounding its value diminishes since potential adopters can benefit from the experience of the earlier adopters.

In Model 2, no adjustment for unobserved heterogeneity is made. Even though the signs of the respective coefficients are not affected, we see that the magnitude of the parameter estimates is somewhat larger when this correction is made. Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity therefore seems to eliminate (some of) the attenuating effects of the omitted variables. Note in this respect that the number of ethnic groups in the country only has a significant impact when correcting for unobserved heterogeneity. Also the demonstration effect is much more pronounced in Model 1, since the downward bias caused by the spurious aggregation effect has been reduced by adding the gamma mixing distribution. This phenomenon is illustrated further in Figure 3 where we use the parameter estimates from Model 1 and 2 to derive the conditional adoption probability for an "average" non-communist country.

Insert Figure 3 about here

To obtain further insights into the relative importance of the demonstration effect, we explicitly account for the proportion of previous, similar adopters in Model 4. As indicated before, the World-bank classification which is used as a measure of similarity is only available for 156

countries. To enhance the comparability with the previous models, we re-estimated Model 1 on this restricted sample (see Model 3 in Table 6), and found the results to be very similar across the two samples. The main difference appears in the initial base hazard (r/a) which becomes larger when estimated on 156 countries. Some face validity for this result is obtained when noting that only 7 of the omitted countries had adopted the technology, and that those seven all did so shortly before the end of the observation period. Put differently, they appear to have been "lagging" in their adoption decision, and their omission from the sample caused an increase in the average hazard for the remaining countries. Consistent with the hypothesis that there is a strong demonstration effect among "similar" countries, a significant positive parameter estimate is obtained. In terms of the economic significance of the estimate, a country's conditional probability of adoption in any given year is 43.1 (104.7) percent higher when one fourth (half) of the countries in its World-Bank group have adopted the technology than if none had done so. Also, the baseline hazard in Model 4 only reflects the demonstration effect by non-member countries, and is not as steep as in Model 3.

Finally, we estimated a split-hazard model (both with and without gamma mixing distribution) to test whether, as managers in the industry expect, all 156 countries will eventually adopt. The parameter estimate for the proportion of ultimate adopters (the parameter δ in Appendix A) converged to one in both cases, and for the split-hazard model with unobserved-heterogeneity correction, the same parameter estimates as in Model 4 were obtained. As such, in the long run, all countries will likely adopt cellular-telephone networks.

3.4. Summary

In this first study, we relaxed the homogeneity assumption common to aggregate diffusion models, and assessed which covariates affect a country's adoption timing. In addition to demonstrating the approach's flexibility to incorporate theoretical paradigms, our particular application indicates that planned economies lag in allowing innovations, and that homogenous countries with a high level of economic development and population concentration are, on average, earlier adopters. Support was also found for the demonstration effect of earlier adoptions: the baseline hazard increases over time, and adoptions by countries significantly

increase the likelihood of "similar" countries adopting (World Bank group members). Moreover, we provided empirical support for the managerial intuition that eventually all countries will adopt cellular technology.

4. STUDY #2: THE DEPTH DIMENSION OF GLOBAL DIFFUSION

4.1. Introduction

Having explained the *cross-country* variance in adoption times in Section 3, we subsequently assess the influence of exogenous and endogenous forces on two basic components of the *within-country* adoption patterns: (1) the first-year penetration level (the intercept of the penetration curve), and (2) the speed of adoption between initial penetration and long-run ceiling. Another point of interest is the possible *linkage* between the timing of adoption and the subsequent adoption depth.

Simon recently concluded that aggregate diffusion models "are risky and potentially misleading" (1994, p. 34). This observation appears especially true within international contexts. Schmittlein and Mahajan (1982) suggest that diffusion models typically require 10 or more observations to be estimable (or the data must cover periods beyond the penetration curve's inflection point), which may be difficult to attain in international studies (Heeler and Hustad 1980). Even though their data series had 15 degrees of freedom each, Gatignon et al. (1989) report that almost 30 percent of their models yielded implausible estimates. In our application to the cellular telephone industry, only 57 countries had sufficient degrees of freedom (i.e. at least 3 data points) to estimate traditional diffusion models. Table 7 reports the parameter estimates resulting from a "blind application" of the original Bass (1969) model using nonlinear least squares estimation (see Srinivasan and Mason 1986). In almost 95 percent of the cases, ¹⁵ implausible results (wrong signs or insignificant results) were obtained, which obviously would prevent subsequent analyses to explain variances across countries.

¹⁵ Exceptions are Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway and the United States.

Insert Table 7 about here

Despite this apparent evidence in support of Simon's statement, we will demonstrate that his conclusion may be more a function of the context and estimation procedures used than of the intrinsic quality of the models. We present a "staged estimation procedure" which (1) results in plausible estimates, (2) provides sufficient flexibility to model cross-country heterogeneity via exogenous/endogenous covariates, and (3) provides a reasonable basis upon which hypotheses can be tested when only the earliest adoption figures are available (e.g. after only one year of diffusion or several years prior to the inflection point).

4.2. Model Development

To make a valid comparison of diffusion patterns across countries, one has to correct for the fact that their introduction timing may vary widely. In the cellular industry, for example, Japan adopted in 1979 while the United States postponed their adoption decision until 1983 (see also Table 3). If one ignores that country-level diffusion patterns have different origins in time, time-specific cross-sectional measures will reflect a different temporal stage of each country's penetration curve (see Figure 4 for a graphical illustration).

Insert Figure 4 about here

In addition to precluding an assessment of the impact of the introduction timing (delay) on subsequent penetration growth, a failure to recognize differences in introduction date can also lead to left-hand truncation bias. By assuming a fixed temporal window (e.g. 1966-1980 for all countries when one country started adoption in 1959 and another in 1965), diffusion curves are truncated to the left with only some countries having their initial year included. This truncation or shift in the time origin inflates the intercept value of the penetration curve, and therefore, the estimate of external influence. As shown in Table 1, several international

¹⁶Obviously, this problem is largely driven by data availability, or lags between product introduction and data reporting.

diffusion studies have been affected by left-hand truncation bias.

To overcome these problems, we use the first year of within-country penetration (i.e. after 12 months) as a time origin which is comparable across countries.¹⁷ Time t therefore measures the number of years elapsed since the country has adopted the innovation ($t\ge 1$). For a given country, i, we define the following time-series adoption function based on the three-parameter Bass model:¹⁸

$$n_{i,t} = [a_i + b_i (\frac{N_{i,t-1}}{c_i S_i})] [c_i S_i - N_{i,t-1}], t = \{1, 2, ...\},$$
 (7)

where a_i , b_i and c_i are constants, $n_{i,t}$ is the number of adoptions in time period t, and $N_{i,t-1}$ is the number of cumulative adoptions up to t-1. By definition, t is equal to 1 at the origin, and $N_{i,0}$ equals zero. S_i measures the social-system size (e.g. the population or the number of households) and c_i is the long-run adoption ceiling ($0 \le c_i \le 1$). The term $c_i S_i$, therefore measures the long-run adoption potential, and is analogous to the "market potential" in the original Bass model. In the diffusion literature, a_i is typically interpreted as the external influence (or innovation) coefficient. In our model, this parameter can also be interpreted, in an agnostic manner, as the penetration curve intercept. Since the origin is put at t=1 (as opposed to t=0), and since $n_{i,1}$ measures the number of first-year adopters, a_i is given by $[n_{i,1} / c_i S_i]$. The first year penetration level is therefore an exact estimate of this parameter (provided that the potential is defined). Finally, b_i reflects the growth rate between the intercept and the potential, and is often called the coefficient of internal or imitative influences (Mahajan, Muller and Bass 1990).

To explain cross-country variances in the diffusion patterns, we incorporate country-specific covariates in the diffusion parameters. To ensure that a_i and b_i lie between zero and one, the following logistic transformations are used:

¹⁷This origin could be the first month or week if the data were collected at these time intervals.

¹⁸See Kamakura and Balasubramanian (1988), Parker (1992) or Schmittlein and Mahajan (1982) for similar formulations.

¹⁹ If c_i or S_i are dynamic in time, the value of the first-year penetration is computed with respect to the social-system size in the first year (t=1).

$$a_i = [1 + e^{-d_1 X_i}]^{-1} (8)$$

$$b_i = [1 + e^{-d_2X_i}]^{-1} , (9)$$

where X is a set of exogenous (e.g. GNP/Capita) and/or endogenous (e.g. proportion of previous adopters) covariates, and where d_1 and d_2 are sets of parameters.²⁰

Pooling (i.e. stacking) the base-line model across countries, the following "global" or "generalized" depth diffusion model is obtained:

$$n_{t} = [A + B * (\frac{N_{t-1}}{C * S})] [C * S - N_{t-1}]$$
 (10)

where A, B and C are cross-sectional vector variables; n_i and N_i are vectors obtained by stacking $n_{i,i}$ and $N_{i,i}$ respectively, and vary over time across countries; S is the social systemsize vector. In Equation (10), "+", "*" and "-" refer to element-wise operations. Hence, for example, the j-th element of C^*S is given by c_jS_j , and the j-th element of $[B * (N_{i-1} / C^*S)]$ is given by $[b_jN_{j,i-1}/(c_jS_j)]$. This model is similar in spirit to that proposed in Gatignon et al. (1989), with the exception of the inclusion of the ceiling (C) and social-system-size (S) vectors, the recognition of a comparable time origin of innovation age (t=1), and the incorporation of covariates via the logistic transformation. 21

²⁰The linear form $d_i X_i$ (l=1, 2) is used for simplicity. However, one can easily generalize (8) and (9) to more complex relationships $f_i(X_i)$.

²¹The reader will note that we do not include independent cross-country influences beyond the intercept, a_i , and growth parameter, b_i . Including independent effects (e.g. the isolated effect of Panama on Singapore) proves problematic for three reasons: (1) it generates severe multicollinearity, (2) it does not allow for the separation of cross-country effects on the initial penetration level, a_i , or the long-run growth rate, b_i , and (3) it is unimplementable when the diffusion rates are separately included for all countries of the world.

4.3 Staged Estimation

We propose a staged estimation procedure for this general model which is logically consistent with diffusion paradigms. The approach consists of three stages which, we argue, should occur in the following sequence: (1) external estimation of the social-system sizes and long-run adoption ceilings, c_iS_i across countries, (2) calculation or external estimation of the intercept term, a_i , and (3) internal estimation of the growth parameter, b_i , for each country. The temporal order of the three stages reflects the evolutionary nature of a diffusion process which proceeds based on a strict hierarchy of necessary conditions: initial adoption depends on the prior existence of a social system, and growth processes are always preceded by an initial introduction or acceptance level. As described below, each stage relies on a unique procedure which supplies manifestly superior estimates to traditional approaches. The staged methodology also takes advantage of certain characteristics of Equations (7) and (10) and fully uses each observation, regardless of the temporal length or cross-sectional nature of the data available. As such, it is especially useful to managers or researchers interested in understanding cross-country variances at the early stages of the international life cycle.

4.3.1. Stage #1: The Social System and Sample Matching

A number of authors recommend estimating long-run adoption potentials externally to diffusion models (e.g. Heeler and Hustad 1980; Srinivasan and Mason 1986; Tigert and Farivar 1981). Two considerations support this approach: (1) as mentioned before, there may be insufficient degrees of freedom to internally estimate the potential, and (2) both c_i and S_i may be fundamentally driven by processes which are product independent (e.g. population growth rates). The first, more practical, concern often arises in international diffusion studies, especially during the early years of the international product life cycle. The second, more theoretical, reason requires that international diffusion studies match social-system parameters on clearly-defined, yet externally-established criteria, a procedure called "sample matching" in cross-cultural research (Dawar and Parker 1994). Sample matching essentially forces the researcher to make comparisons within comparable social networks to make valid statements

on cross-cultural effects. This is consistent with diffusion theory which suggests that diffusion processes are limited to social networks which will ultimately perceive the innovation, among other criteria, as being compatible with social norms or to be a relative advantage to existing substitutes (Rogers 1983). Specifically, to compare the diffusion of medical equipment across countries, one may externally limit the discussion to hospitals. Similarly, farmers may be a more relevant social network to study the diffusion of farm equipment than the entire population.

Using the cellular-telephone industry as an example, Figure 5 illustrates the importance of sample matching in cross-cultural diffusion research. The top graph displays temporal penetration patterns across a sample of countries. In order to plot the data in terms of penetration (as opposed to subscriptions), we are required to externally impose a definition of the relevant market. A popular measure in the industry is to define the market as the total population in the country (c_i =1 for all countries, and S_i is the population), and to express penetration as "penetration per pop". From the top figure, we might conclude that Scandinavian countries have a greater proneness to innovate, or exhibit high levels of word-ofmouth influence (say, due to their citizens being highly mobile and cosmopolitan). The bottom graph in Figure 5 illustrates penetration levels when the ceiling parameter is matched across countries on the following criteria: "the percentage of the population who is literate, lives in urban areas and has a sufficient income to afford basic telephone service". 22 This definition of potential can be judged theoretically superior to the total population (the industry norm) because it better reflects the actual network within which the diffusion process occurs. If we accept this second definition of potential, the bottom graph in Figure 5 is obtained. When contrasting the top and bottom graphs, we clearly see that "innovative" behavior under one definition of potential appears less so under another, and high-growth markets are transformed into slow-growth markets when the definition of market potential is matched across cultures. Innovative countries are no longer Scandinavian, but South-East Asian.

²²Data on these percentages are obtained from the sources given in Section 3.3.

Insert Figure 5 about here

Unless market potentials (social systems) are matched on theoretical or managerial grounds, comparisons of diffusion-growth parameters may be arbitrary or, worse, misleading. In sum, we strongly argue that **the market potential definition must precede any discussion of theories affecting growth** (e.g. innovative or interpersonal influences).²³ This argument rejects blind "curve fitting" (as in Table 7) in favor of explaining innovation adoption growth within theoretically identified social networks.²⁴

4.3.2 Stage #2: The Penetration Curve Intercept

The second stage involves estimating the first-year intercept, a_i (the external-influence parameter), which by definition precedes in time any growth process or internal influence. Two cases can be distinguished: (1) when countries have some experience, and (2) when countries have no experience. In the first case, we propose that the modeler takes advantage of the "intercept property" of a_i in Equation (7), and fix a_i as the first-year penetration level: $a_i = n_{i,l}/(cS_i)$. This property exists as long as the data are consistently analyzed with an identical origin and over the same discrete time interval for all countries (e.g. daily, weekly, monthly, annually). Clearly, a_i depends on cS_i being pre-defined. Put differently, to speak of "penetration" in the first year, one needs to clarify (externally impose) "of what". This agnostic interpretation of a_i generates the most efficient use of the theoretical (as opposed to statistical) degree of freedom offered by the first data point in the series. The reader will note that the second, or any subsequent, data point in the series provides no information on this parameter's

²³This conclusion is "fit-statistic" independent as we can develop models which fit curves from both figures equally well.

²⁴We want to point out that external growth mechanisms may make it necessary to use dynamic ceiling and/or system-size estimates (e.g. population growth for S_i , or economic development for c_i). Data for these estimates may come from a variety of public agencies or private vendors (the World Bank, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, Euromonitor). In cases of extreme doubt (diffuse priors), c_i can be set equal to 1.0 for all countries, in which case the matching would only occur in terms of S_i .

estimate as the intercept is already known and fixed by time period 2. Hence, a_i should not be internally estimated using time series data. Internal estimation of a_i needlessly increases the instability of this parameter.

For each country where one does not have the first data point, one can derive an estimate (forecast) of a_i using the logistic function in (8). This estimation is based on data from the adopting countries, and is conducted externally to the pooled model using nonlinear least squares. The explanatory performance of this model clearly increases as more countries experience their first-year adoption level, since both the statistical degrees of freedom and the variance in the covariates will increase. Once an external estimate is made for a_i , it is fixed at this value for the next stage. When the actual intercept value becomes available for a given country, this data point updates (replaces) the estimate of a_i , and we no longer make use of the cross-sectional model to estimate this parameter for that particular country.

4.3.3 Stage #3: Penetration Growth

The third stage in the sequence requires an estimate of the growth rate. As before, two cases are relevant: (1) when data are unavailable for a given country (i.e. when there is no more than one observation of experience), and (2) when data are available past the first observation. In the first case we generate estimates of b_i by imposing A, C, and S on the pooled model and incorporating covariates nested in the logistic transformation given in Equation (9). In the second case, as within-country degrees of freedom increase, an individual country's b_i can, as suggested by Gatignon et al. (1989), be estimated exclusively using that country's data.²⁵ The parameters c_i , S_i and a_i remain, of course, fixed in order to estimate b_i , even though the series may have several observations.

²⁵Within the cellular industry, our analyses indicated that with one or more degrees of freedom beyond the intercept observation (which is always used to calculate a_i), 63 percent of the estimates of b_i were both plausible and significant; after 4 observations, over 80 percent, and after 7 or more observations beyond the intercept, over 95 percent of the estimates were both plausible and significant.

4.4. Empirical Application to the Cellular Industry

4.4.1 Stage #1: The Long-Run Potential (cS_i)

Definitions

A number of social system definitions and ceilings were considered which could be matched across cultures. For this application, the social system, S_p , is defined as each country's population. Based on industry interviews, the ceiling parameter, c_p is defined as described earlier: "the percentage of the literate population living in urban areas having a sufficient income to afford basic telephone service". This definition of the long-run ceiling, c_p reflects the "AT&T vision" of mobile communications. Cellular services, as externally judged by several managers in the industry, will remain an urban (village, town or city) oriented service which could potentially (in the long run) replace or be a direct complement to fixed or conventional service; rural areas are expected to be serviced by digital wireless technologies (Basic Exchange Radio Telephone Services - BETRs) or conventional services in the long run.

This ceiling foresees over the next decade "flat phones" (i.e. with credit card or smaller size/weight) which will have battery lives and prices comparable to electric watches. A going assumption is that the barrier to adoption will not be the handset price. This assumption foresees that these and other terminal models will ultimately (in the long run) be one-to-one complements to all urban wire-based telephones and in many countries, especially former communist and developing countries, direct substitutes to wire-based systems which are too costly to implement. This external estimate of the ceiling has the advantage of further limiting the social system to a *relevant* population; the target market being limited to literate persons with a minimum purchasing power is a de-facto limitation on age (i.e. excludes infants).²⁷

Appendix B reports c_i and S_i for the 184 countries studied. For the sake of illustration,

²⁶We would like thank Claes Tadne of Ericsson Radio Systems for this insight.

²⁷Alternative definitions of social system (e.g. based on the number of automobiles, all moving vehicles, households, etc.), were considered but not reported here as they either generated similar results, were less theoretically appealing, or were rejected due to a lack of data availability.

and since the time period studied is limited in duration, we assume c_i and S_i to be time-invariant. The social-system size ranges from 2,000 persons in the Falkland Islands, to over 1.1 billion in China; the average country size is approximately 29 million, or the size of Morocco. The ceiling parameter, c_i ranges from less than 1 percent, in Rwanda, to 99 percent, in Monaco; an average country is Portugal at 17 percent. The long-run potential (c_iS_i) ranges from 100 subscriptions in Tuvalu, to over 180 million, in the United States; a country of average potential is Turkey with 3 million subscribers. Should we wish to apply the models within a long-run, or multiple-decade. forecasting exercise (as opposed to testing prevailing theories over the historical range of the data), we would forecast changes in c_i and S_i using external models which would foresee changes in urbanization, literacy and income levels. This would be especially important for countries like China whose c_i parameter is estimated to be less than 1 percent (though the total subscriber potential still exceeds 5 million).

Validation

An external imposition of the adoption ceiling does not guarantee that it will, in some way, reflect theories of diffusion. Yet, in unreported tests, the adopted ceiling parameter was found to be significantly correlated with theoretically motivated covariates. For example, it varies significantly with the income per capita in each country, which supports Gatignon and Robertson's (1985, p. 858) suggestion that long-run penetration is a function of the innovation's compatibility and normative fit within the social system. In contrast, the industry norm in defining the potential (penetration per "pop") generally fails to correlate with these theoretically appealing covariates. We will now test the face validity of our estimates of c_i and S_i using naive pooled models.

Table 8 summarizes *naive* applications of the pooled model in order to compare internal versus external estimation of the social system and ceiling parameters. Model 1 can be considered the base-case model in that it internally estimates all parameters which are assumed constant across countries: the average or typical diffusion curve. The model, in addition to having a statistically insignificant intercept, indicates an average potential of 18.7 million

subscribers. The high reported fit statistic (R^2 _a=0.93) is deceptive in suggesting that this fixedparameter model provides meaningful or highly explanatory results. In fact, if we accept that the level of subscriptions will not exceed, in the long-run, every man, woman and child on the planet, then the "average" potential (18,679 thousand subscriptions) is implausible for over 134 countries of the world whose population does not exceed 18 million persons. This result strongly supports the argument for external controls for country heterogeneity. partially fulfills this role by imposing a social-system size, S, but it internally estimates the "average" ceiling, intercept, and growth parameter. We see that the model is worse on average, and that it yields implausible coefficients: a significantly negative intercept and a negligible growth rate. The ceiling estimate of 6 percent appears plausible at first, yet it is completely inappropriate for 101 countries which have less than 6 percent of their populations living in urban areas, or having the financial means to own basic telephone service (see Appendix B). This result shows that it is insufficient to control for social-system sizes alone and let the model indicate a ceiling level. Imposing a "diffuse-prior" estimate of c=1.0 for all countries (see Footnote 24), Model 3 yields plausible and significant results for both intercept and growth parameters. As shown in Model 4, the imposition of the aforementioned managerial priors (reflected in the vector variable C), provides some improvement: significant and plausible parameter estimates are obtained, and the fit statistics are superior. A comparison of these four models lends some face validity to our argument that a staged estimation procedure should be followed where social-system sizes and ceiling parameters are estimated externally prior to estimating other diffusion parameters. Even so, Model 4 provides a single intercept estimate of 0.17 percent which is an inappropriate estimate for most countries studied. We are therefore left to explain heterogeneity in initial adoption levels (A) and growth rates (B) across countries.

Insert Table 8 about here

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4.4.2. Stages 2 and 3: Intercept and Growth Parameters (a_i, b_i)

Given matched definitions of the potential across social systems, we can *calculate* the first year penetration percent which is used as an *exact* estimate of the intercept parameter, a_p for those countries which have at least one year's experience; these estimates are available for 74 countries and are reported in Appendix B with an "*" sign. 28 Values range from a high of 3.3 percent (in Brunei) to a low of .0007 percent in Spain. As we are interested in explaining variations across countries and to provide estimates of first-year adoption in countries having no experience, we apply the logistic model in Equation (8) and incorporate the explanatory covariates given in Table 5. Likewise, having now obtained vector variables of intercept values, A, ceiling levels, C, and system sizes, S, we can in Stage #3 estimate the pooled model (10).

Table 9 summarizes estimations of Equations (8) and (10). Besides the exogenous covariates we include endogenous covariates (number of other countries having adopted, and the proportion of World Bank countries having adopted) to investigate the linkage between a country's adoption timing (Study #1) and its penetration curve. Table 9 reports the full model with all covariates included as well as a retained model which proved the most parsimonious with all covariates remaining significant (multicollinearity effects across covariates are negligible). Likelihood-ratio tests reveal statistical equivalence between the retained and full models (chi-square test *p-value>*.20). This comparison indicates stability in the covariate's parameter estimates. The models support the notion that poverty (crude death rates), which acts a cross-country surrogate for real relative prices (i.e. the price of cellular will always appear higher to impoverished populations), and ethnic heterogeneity decrease initial adoption levels. Our result for the ethnic-heterogeneity variable support Gatignon and Robertson's (1985, p. 858) contention that "the more homogenous the social system, the faster the diffusion rate". Initial penetration seems to also decrease with the number of major population centers.

²⁸The reader will note that we have more adopting countries than in Study #1 which limited the sample to the de-facto date of German reunification (to avoid ambiguities in defining countries); here this constraint need not be imposed.

Intuitively, the more centers to be covered by the network, the more difficult to provide ubiquitous coverage in the first year. Influences which are positively related to initial penetration levels include population growth rates (a surrogate for the need to expand telecommunications infrastructure) and the number of competing systems; this second relationship is again supported in the diffusion literature as Gatignon and Robertson (p. 861) suggest that "the greater the level of competitive activity, the faster the rate of diffusion". All other influences are marginal or are statistically insignificant (e.g. GNP per capita, and communism). With respect to the linkage between innovation timing (Study #1) and initial penetration levels, no endogenous covariate proved explanatory for the first year penetration level. These or alternative endogenous covariates (year of adoption, or total number of worldwide subscribers) whether incorporated simultaneously or one-at-a-time were consistently found to be unrelated to first year penetration levels.

Insert Table 9 about here

In terms of the diffusion growth rates (b_i), crude death rates and the number of ethnic groups all have negative influence on diffusion rates, whereas only the number of major population centers has a positive effect (i.e. the higher the number of centers, the lower the initial penetration level, yet the faster the growth to the ceiling). Population growth, state-control over the economy, and GNP per capita have no influence on growth rates. Mahajan, Muller and Bass (1990, p. 21) ask: "How does the number of [competitors] available in the market affect the growth of a product?" In the case of cellular services, no relationship is found between the number of competitors and the diffusion growth rate. As was the case for initial penetration, adoption timing or any other endogenous covariate has no influence on b_i .

Using the retained models given in Table 9, Appendix B reports the calculated estimates for a_i and b_i for all countries, including those which have yet to adopt cellular technology. In addition to generating high fit statistics, the reader will note that all values are plausible and, hence, manifestly superior to those obtained using traditional estimation procedures (see Table 7). We see that the variances in global diffusion patterns are explained by variances in social system characteristics which affect long run ceilings (which vary between .001 and .99) and

social system sizes (which vary between 2,000 and 1.1 billion), variances in the initial penetration level (which varies between .00001 and .033, based on Equation 8), and variances in the growth rate coefficient (from .001 to .705, based on Equation 9). Such low estimates for both diffusion parameters are infrequently seen in the extant literature which primarily uses data from industrialized countries.

4.5. Summary

In Study #2, we discussed a general model of within-country diffusion. By making certain modifications to existing models, we proposed a staged estimation procedure which provides insights which were not forthcoming using traditional approaches. By applying the staged estimation procedure, we could explain cross-national variances in diffusion via tests of various research hypotheses and obtain plausible parameter estimates for countries which have yet to undergo diffusion. Our application to the cellular industry (and Figure 5 in particular) reveals that the critical factor in explaining diffusion patterns across countries is the matched definition of social system size, S_p and the adoption ceiling, c_i (i.e. the market potential), which must be estimated externally to the model (especially during the early phases of the international life cycle). This finding would suggest that greater research efforts be made to develop models which can assist managers in understanding and anticipating variances in the long-run ceiling across countries.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper presents general models of global diffusion processes. We identify two processes: the timing of initial adoption at the country level (breadth - Study #1), and the within-country diffusion process (depth - Study #2). The models proposed for the two processes have the primary advantage of allowing researchers to rigorously test various hypotheses, whether generated by academicians or managers. This can reflect either exogenous or endogenous factors and can involve tests of potential linkages between innovation introduction timing and subsequent growth rates. We illustrate the application of our models

to the cellular telephone industry across 184 countries.

Table 10 sheds light on the various components of global diffusion across Study #1 and Study #2. Though not our primary contribution, three substantive findings are noteworthy. First, we note that the impact of many factors (e.g. the effect of communism) is not uniform across the various components of global diffusion (e.g. strong effects for adoption timing, yet weak for growth rates). Other influences hypothesized in the diffusion literature have only marginal influence (e.g. number of competitors). Second, for other factors, the impact seems to be uniform in direction across all components. In particular, ethnic heterogeneity appears to have a negative influence on most aspects of international diffusion; income per capita has a generally positive influence; crude death rates have a negative influence. Finally, we find that endogenous cross-country influences are strong for innovation introduction timing, yet inconsequential for within-country diffusion patterns. Further empirical research should be undertaken to examine the extent to which these findings are generalizable to other industries. We strongly suspect that specific factors affecting innovation diffusion will be largely category specific (contrast, for example, the diffusion of nuclear submarines and the diffusion of tropical crop pesticide use), yet commonly governed by theories of diffusion as discussed in Section 2 of the paper.

Insert Table 10 about here

Finally, we want to point out that our discussion has ignored the potential use of the proposed modelling procedures in forecasting exercises (as our contribution is focussed on modelling, estimation and, to a lesser extent, substantive theory testing). This focus is in line with the conclusion of Mahajan, Muller and Bass (1990, p. 9) that "parameter estimation for diffusion models is primarily of historical interest; by the time sufficient observations have been developed for reliable estimation, it is too late to use the estimates for forecasting purposes". Still, it is interesting to know that earlier versions of the models have been used over the past 6 years by cellular-telephone manufacturers to forecast within-country diffusion patterns. Model-based projections are used as benchmarks which are compared against or combined with forecasts generated from local (country or regional) offices.

APPENDIX A

In a split-hazard specification, one explicitly allows for the fact that some countries may never adopt the technology. Following Sinha and Chandrashekaran (1992), we define an indicator variable A_i , where A_i is equal to one if the country belongs to the group of eventual adopters, and zero otherwise. If the probability of A_i =1 (denoted as δ_i) is assumed to be homogeneous across all countries (i.e. δ_i = δ), it can be interpreted as the fraction of countries that will adopt in the long run. A likelihood-ratio test can subsequently be used to test the managerial intuition that δ is equal to one in the cellular-telephone industry.

Using a similar logic as in Sinha and Chandrashekaran, but making an adjustment for the discrete nature of the data, it is easy to show that the likelihood function for N countries is given by:

$$LL = \prod_{i=1}^{N} \left\{ \delta \left[S_{i}(t_{i}-1) - S_{i}(t_{i}) \right] \right\}^{1-d_{i}} * \left\{ (1-\delta) + \delta S_{i}(t_{i}-1) \right\}^{d_{i}}. \tag{A.1}$$

If all countries which will eventually adopt have the same λ_0 , one can substitute equation (4) into (A.1) to derive a split hazard model which does not yet correct for unobserved heterogeneity among the eventual adopters. In order to account for this heterogeneity, one can let λ_0 be distributed according to a gamma mixing distribution. After lengthy derivations, the following expression for the log-likelihood function is obtained (see Van de Gucht 1994):

$$LL = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \ln \left\{ \frac{\left(\delta^{1-d_{i}} - \delta\right) \left(1 + d_{i}\right) a^{r}}{\left[\left(1 - d_{i}\right) B_{i}(t_{i} - 1) + a\right]^{r}} - \frac{\left(\delta^{1-d_{i}} - \delta\right) a^{r}}{\left[\left(1 - d_{i}\right) B_{i}(t_{i}) + a\right]^{r}} + \frac{\delta \left(1 + d_{i}\right) a^{r}}{\left[B_{i}(t_{i} - 1) + a\right]^{r}} - \frac{\delta a^{r}}{\left[B_{i}(t_{i} - 1) + \left(1 - d_{i}\right) e^{\beta X_{i}(t_{i}) + cD_{i}(t_{i})} + a\right]^{r}} \right\},$$
(A.2)

where all variables are defined as before.

An alternative way to allow for the possibility that adoption will never take place for some countries is to work with a degenerate parametric density function, such as the Inverse Gaussian, to describe the baseline hazard. In those instances, $\lim_{t\to\infty} S(t)>0$ (see Lancaster 1990). This offers less flexibility in modeling various forms of time dependence, however, does not ensure the consistency of the parameter estimates (as the a priori parametric form may be incorrect), and does not allow to characterize which countries are most likely to never adopt. When working with the split-hazard specification, on the other hand, one may replace δ by δ_i in (A.2), where

$$\delta_i = \frac{1}{[1 + \exp(\alpha X_i)]} \tag{A.3}$$

to determine what covariates affect the probability of belonging to the group of potential adopters when δ <1 (see Sinha and Chandrashekaran 1992 for a marketing application).

APPENDIX B.
Summary of Staged Estimation Procedure, Across Countries (* signifies actual values)

		Stage 1		Stage 2	Stage 3	
		S_i		$c_i S_i$		• ———
	Country	(000's)	C_{i}	(000's)	a_i	b_i
. 1	Afghanistan =	16,450	0.002	33	0.0001	0.004
	Albania	3,335	0.002	6	0.0048	0.402
3	Algeria	26,022	0.032	833	0.0004 *	0.464
	American Samoa	43	0.180	8	0.0079	0.458
	Andorra	53	0.474	25	0.0045	0.458
6	Angola	8,668	0.005	44	0.0001	0.003
7	Antigua & Barbuda	64	0.089	6	0.0050	0.266
8	Argentina	32,664	0.105	3,430	0.0004 *	0.164
9	Australia	17,288	0.538	9,301	0.00002 *	0.464
10	Austria	7,666	0.459	3,519	0.0005 *	0.144
11	Bahamas	252	0.368	93	0.0022 *	0.417
12	Bahrain	537	0.257	138	0.0123 *	0.427
13	Bangladesh	116,601	0.002	175	0.0007	0.079
14	Barbados	255	0.299	76	0.0028	0.117
15	Belgium	9.922	0.417	4,137	0.0012 *	0.184
16	Belize	228	0.041	9	0.0054	0.275
17	Benin	4,832	0.005	24	0.0010	0.010
18	Bermuda	58	0.836	48	0.0144 *	0.155
19	Bhutan	1.598	0.012	19	0.0007	0.011
20	Bolivia	7,157	0.024	172	0.0116 *	0.111
21	Botswana	1,258	0.018	23	0.0005	0.217
22	Brazil	155,356	0.076	11,807	0.0010 *	0.462
23	Brunei	398	0.114	45	0.0331 *	0.274
24	Bulgaria	8,911	0.200	1,782	0.0007 *	0.083
25	Burkina Faso	9,360	0.002	18	0.0002	0.017
26	Burma	42,112	0.001	59	0.0006	0.046
27	Burundi	5,831	0.001	8	0.0018	0.015
28	Cambodia	7,146	0.001	7	0.0006	0.018
29	Cameroon	11,390	0.005	58	0.0001	0.034
30	1	26,835	0.668	17,926	0.0013 *	0.491
31	Cape Verde	387	0.006	2	0.0055	0.074
	Cayman Islands	27	0.406	11	0.0091 *	0.376
	Central African Rep	2,952	0.002	6	0.0002	0.006
	Chad	5,122	0.001	7	0.00003	0.002
1	Chile	13.287	0.054	718	0.0079 *	0.389
	China, People's Rep	1,151,487	0.005	5,757	0.0001 *	0.230
	Colombia	33,778	0.073	2,466	0.0019	0.444
1	Comoros	477	0.009	4	0.0052	0.030
	Congo	2,309	0.011	25	0.0005	0.035
1	Costa Rica	3,111	0.123	383	0.0008 *	0.458
1	Cote D'Ivoire	12,978	0.011	143	0.0011	0.064
1	Cuba	10,732	0.011	537	0.0011	0.353
	Cyprus	709	0.050	179	0.0013	0.104
1	Czechoslovakia	15,725	0.233	3,475	0.0072	0.159
1	Denmark	5,133	0.702	3,603	0.0010 *	0.139
	Djibouti	3,133	0.702	3,003	0.0014	0.009
	Dominica	86	0.022	3	0.0014	0.299
						1
L 48	Dominican Republic	7,385	0.029	214	0.0009 *	0.303

Appendix D. (continued)	Stage 1			Stage 2	Stage 3	
	S_{i}		$c_i S_i$			
Country	(000's)	C_{i}	(000's)	a_i	b_i	
49 East Germany	16,705	0.206	3,441	0.0004	0.168	
50 Ecuador	10,752	0.038	409	0.0028	0.279	
51 Egypt	54,452	0.012	653	0.0008 *	0.157	
52 El Salvador	5,419	0.025	135	0.0052 *	0.187	
53 Equatorial Guinea	379	0.007	3	0.0006	0.013	
54 Ethiopia	53,191	0.003	144	0.0001	0.023	
55 Falkland Islands	2	0.211	0	0.0160	0.121	
56 Fiji	744	0.075	56	0.0045	0.235	
57 Finland	4,991	0.571	2,850	0.0008 *	0.183	
58 France	56,596	0.537	30,392	0.0001 *	0.353	
59 French Guiana	102	0.274	28	0.0032	0.275	
60 French Polynesia	195	0.198	39	0.0040	0.266	
61 Gabon	1.080	0.012	13	0.0011	0.021	
62 The Gambia	875	0.005	5	0.0003	0.013	
63 Germany (west)	79,548	0.572	45,501	0.0002	0.221	
64 Ghana	15,617	0.006	95	0.0063 *	0.064	
65 Greece	10,043	0.336	3,374	0.0012	0.142	
66 Greenland	57	0.327	19	0.0009	0.466	
67 Grenada	84	0.062	5	0.0038	0.206	
68 Guadeloupe	345	0.174	60	0.0017	0.419	
69 Guam	145	0.257	37	0.0074	0.374	
70 Guatemala	9.266	0.013	120	0.0125 *	0.189	
71 Guinea	7.456	0.002	13	0.0004	0.002	
72 Guinea-Bissau	1.024	0.003	3	0.0004	0.008	
73 Guyana	750	0.035	26	0.0036	0.147	
74 Haiti	6.287	0.007	45	0.0022	0.015	
75 Honduras	4,949	0.009	43	0.0141 *	0.353	
76 Hungary	10,558	0.129	1,362	0.0073 *	0.068	
77 Iceland	260	0.527	137	0.0088 *	0.315	
78 India	866,352	0.004	3,812	0.0005	0.239	
79 Indonesia	193,560	0.004	832	0.0008 *	0.450	
80 Iran, I.R. of	59.051	0.051	312	0.0001	0.258	
81 Iraq	19,525	0.043	840	0.0007	0.364	
82 Ireland. Republic of	3,489	0.235	820	0.0001 *	0.180	
83 Israel	4,477	0.380	1,701	0.0006 *	0.403	
84 Italy	57,772	0.405	23,398	0.0001 *	0.295	
85 Jamaica	2,489	0.059	147	0.0042	0.266	
86 Japan	124,017	0.513	63,621	0.0001 *	0.462	
87 Jordan	3,413	0.009	31	0.0034	0.530	
88 Kenya	25,242	0.012	303	0.0026 *	0.257	
89 Kiribati	71	0.015	1	0.0077	0.020	
90 Kuwait	2.204	0.165	364	0.0275 *	0.553	
91 Laos	4,113	0.002	9	0.0008	0.017	
92 Lebanon	3,385	0.057	193	0.0021 *	0.133	
93 Lesotho	1,801	0.004	8	0.0083	0.063	
94 Liberia	2.730	0.004	11	0.0013	0.028	
95 Libya	4.351	0.046	200	0.0039	0.404	
96 Liechtenstein	28	0.810	23	0.0027	0.235	
97 Luxembourg	388	0.544	211	0.0005 *	0.086	
98 Macau	446	0.079	35	0.0199 *	0.212	
99 Madagascar	12,185	0.004	52	0.0004	0.018	
Iviaua Bascai	12,105		24	0.0001	0.010	

101 Mataysia 17,982 0.066 1,187 0.0034 * 0.46 102 Maldives 226 0.005 1 0.0138 0.06 103 Mali 8.339 0.001 9 0.0001 0.00 104 Matta 356 0.300 107 0.0084 * 0.13 105 Martinique 345 0.211 73 0.0029 0.26 106 Mauritania 1.996 0.003 5 0.0004 0.00 107 Mauritius 1.081 0.048 52 0.0051 0.19 108 Mexico 90,007 0.086 7.741 0.0011 * 0.70 109 Monaco 30 0.990 30 0.0106 0.11 110 Mongolia 2.247 0.025 56 0.0018 0.18 111 Morocco 26.182 0.013 340 0.0006 * 0.23 112 Mozambique 15.113 0.004 67 0.0006 0.01 113 Namibia 1.521 0.049 75 0.018 0.06 114 Nauru 9 0.213 2 0.0055 0.37 115 Nepal 19.612 0.001 22 0.0007 0.02 116 Netherlands Antilles 184 0.168 31 0.0086 0.23 118 New Caledonia 172 0.221 38 0.0018 0.46 119 New Zealand 3.309 0.623 2.062 0.0009 * 0.39 120 Nicaragua 3.752 0.013 49 0.0018 0.25 121 Niger 8.154 0.002 15 0.0005 0.01 122 Nigeria 88.515 0.008 726 0.0007 * 0.10 123 Norway 4.273 0.579 2.474 0.0005 * 0.15 125 Pakistan 117.490 0.05 611 0.001 * 0.05 126 Panama 2.476 0.105 260 0.0027 * 0.33 127 Papua New Guinea 3.913 0.016 63 0.0027 0.07 128 Paraguay 4.799 0.024 115 0.0069 * 0.43 129 Peru 22.362 0.030 671 0.011 * 0.31 130 Philippines 65.759 0.015 3.969 0.0016 * 0.23 131 Pottugal 10.388 0.169 1.756 0.0029 0.41 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41	Appendix 21 (continued)	Stage 1			Stage 2	Stage 3
Country		S_i		$c_i S_i$		
101 Malaysia 17.982 0.066 1.187 0.0034 * 0.46 102 Maldives 226 0.005 1 0.0138 0.06 103 Mali 8.339 0.001 9 0.0001 0.00 104 Malta 356 0.300 107 0.0084 * 0.13 105 Martinique 345 0.211 73 0.0029 0.26 106 Mauritania 1.996 0.003 5 0.0004 0.00 107 Mauritius 1.081 0.048 52 0.0051 0.19 108 Mexico 90.007 0.086 7.741 0.0011 * 0.70 109 Monaco 30 0.990 30 0.0106 0.11 110 Mongolia 2.247 0.025 56 0.0018 0.18 111 Morocco 26.182 0.013 340 0.0006 * 0.23 112 Mozambique 15.113 0.004 67 0.0006 0.01 113 Namibia 1.521 0.049 75 0.018 0.06 114 Nauru 9 0.213 2 0.0055 0.37 115 Nepal 19.612 0.001 22 0.0007 0.02 116 Netherlands Antilles 184 0.168 31 0.0086 0.23 118 New Caledonia 172 0.221 38 0.0018 0.46 119 New Zealand 3.309 0.623 2.062 0.0009 * 0.39 120 Nicaragua 3.752 0.013 49 0.0018 0.25 121 Nigeria 8.515 0.008 726 0.0007 * 0.10 122 Nigeria 8.515 0.008 726 0.0007 * 0.10 123 Norway 4.273 0.579 2.474 0.0005 * 0.15 125 Pakistan 117.490 0.005 611 0.001 * 0.005 126 Panama 2.476 0.105 260 0.0027 * 0.33 127 Papua New Guinea 3.913 0.016 63 0.0027 0.07 128 Paraguay 4.799 0.024 115 0.0005 * 0.31 129 Peru 22.362 0.030 671 0.011 * 0.31 130 Philippines 65.759 0.015 3.969 0.0016 * 0.23 131 Puerto Rico 3.295 0.196 646 0.0008 0.44 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41 130 Philippines 65.759 0.16 646 0.0008 0.44 134 Quatar 518 0.342 177 0.0156 0.39 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41 130 Philippines 60.759 0.160 0.160 0.0029 0.41 130 Philippines 60.759 0.160 0.160 0.0029 0.41 130 Philippines 60.7	Country		<i>C</i> _i		a_i	b_i
102 Maldives	100 Malawi	9,438	0.006	55	0.0006	0.006
103 Mali	101 Malaysia	17,982	0.066	1,187	0.0034 *	0.460
104 Malta	102 Maldives	226	0.005	1	0.0138	0.062
105 Martinique 345 0.211 73 0.0029 0.26 106 Mauritania 1.996 0.003 5 0.0004 0.00 107 Mauritius 1.081 0.048 52 0.0051 0.19 108 Mexico 90.007 0.086 7.741 0.0011 * 0.70 109 Monaco 30 0.990 30 0.0106 0.11 110 Mongolia 2.247 0.025 56 0.0018 0.18 111 Morocco 26.182 0.013 340 0.0006 * 0.23 112 Mozambique 15.113 0.004 67 0.0006 0.01 13 Namibia 1.521 0.049 75 0.0018 0.06 14 Nauru 9 0.213 2 0.0055 0.37 115 Nepal 19.612 0.001 22 0.0007 0.02 116 Netherlands 15.022 0.576 8.653 0.0007 * 0.30 117 Netherlands Antilles 184 0.168 31 0.0086 0.23 118 New Caledonia 172 0.221 38 0.0018 0.46 119 New Zealand 3.309 0.623 2.062 0.0009 * 0.39 120 Nicaragua 3.752 0.013 49 0.0018 0.25 121 Niger 8.154 0.002 15 0.0005 * 0.01 122 Nigeria 88.515 0.008 726 0.0007 * 0.10 123 Norway 4.273 0.579 2.474 0.0005 * 0.08 124 Oman 1.534 0.055 84 0.0089 * 0.15 125 Pakistan 117.490 0.005 611 0.0011 * 0.05 126 Panama 2.476 0.105 260 0.0027 * 0.33 127 Papua New Guinea 3.913 0.016 63 0.0027 0.07 128 Paraguay 4.799 0.024 115 0.0005 * 0.32 130 Philippines 65.759 0.015 9.86 0.0007 * 0.33 131 Pottugal 10.388 0.169 1.756 0.0020 * 0.31 133 Puerto Ricco 3.295 0.196 646 0.0008 0.46 134 Qatar 518 0.342 177 0.0156 0.39 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41	103 Mali	8,339	0.001	9	0.0001	0.003
106 Mauritania 1,996 0.003 5 0.0004 0.00 107 Mauritius 1,081 0.048 52 0.0051 0.19 108 Mexico 90,007 0.086 7,741 0.0011 * 0.70 109 Monaco 30 0.990 30 0.0106 0.11 110 Mongolia 2,247 0.025 56 0.0018 0.18 111 Morocco 26,182 0.013 340 0.0006 * 0.23 112 Mozambique 15,113 0.004 67 0.0006 0.01 113 Namibia 1,521 0.049 75 0.0018 0.06 114 Nauru 9 0.213 2 0.0055 0.37 115 Nepal 19,612 0.001 22 0.0007 0.02 116 Netherlands 15,022 0.576 8.653 0.0007 * 0.30 117 Netherlands Antilles 184 0.168 31 0.0086 0.23 118 New Caledonia 172 0.221 38 0.0018 0.46 119 New Zealand 3,309 0.623 2.062 0.0009 * 0.39 120 Nicaragua 3,752 0.013 49 0.0018 0.25 121 Niger 8,154 0.002 15 0.0005 0.01 122 Nigeria 88,515 0.008 726 0.0007 * 0.10 123 Norway 4,273 0.579 2,474 0.0005 * 0.10 124 Oman 1,534 0.055 84 0.0089 * 0.15 125 Pakistan 117,490 0.005 611 0.0011 * 0.05 126 Panama 2,476 0.105 260 0.0027 * 0.33 127 Papua New Guinea 3,913 0.016 63 0.0027 0.07 128 Paraguay 4,799 0.024 115 0.0005 * 0.33 131 Poland 37,800 0.105 3,969 0.0016 * 0.23 132 Portugal 10,388 0.169 1,756 0.0020 * 0.13 133 Puerto Ricco 3,295 0.196 646 0.0020 * 0.14 134 Qatar 518 0.342 177 0.0156 0.39 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41		356	0.300	107	0.0084 *	0.135
107 Mauritius 1.081 0.048 52 0.0051 0.19 108 Mexico 90.007 0.086 7.741 0.0011 * 0.70 109 Monaco 30 0.990 30 0.0106 0.11 110 Mongolia 2.247 0.025 56 0.0006 * 0.23 111 Morocco 26.182 0.013 340 0.0006 * 0.23 112 Mozambique 15.113 0.004 67 0.0006 0.01 113 Namibia 1.521 0.049 75 0.0018 0.06 114 Nauru 9 0.213 2 0.0055 0.37 115 Nepal 19.612 0.001 22 0.0007 0.02 116 Netherlands 15.022 0.576 8.653 0.0007 * 0.30 117 Netherlands Antilles 184 0.168 31 0.0086 0.23 118 New Caledonia 172 0.221 38 0.0018 0.46 119 New Zealand 3.309 0.623 2.062 0.0009 * 0.39 120 Nicaragua 3.752 0.013 49 0.0018 0.25 121 Niger 8.154 0.002 15 0.0005 0.01 122 Nigeria 88.515 0.008 726 0.0007 * 0.08 124 Oman 1.534 0.055 84 0.0008 * 0.15 125 Pakistan 117.490 0.005 611 0.0011 * 0.05 126 Panama 2.476 0.105 260 0.0027 * 0.33 127 Papua New Guinca 3.7800 0.105 3.969 0.0016 * 0.23 131 Poland 37.800 0.105 3.969 0.0016 * 0.23 132 Portugal 10.388 0.169 1.756 0.002 * 0.13 133 Puerto Ricco 3.295 0.196 646 0.0008 0.44 134 Qatar 518 0.342 177 0.0156 0.39 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41	105 Martinique	345	0.211	73	0.0029	0.268
108 Mexico 90,007 0.086 7.741 0.0011 * 0.70 109 Monaco 30 0.990 30 0.0106 0.11 110 Mongolia 2.247 0.025 56 0.0018 0.18 111 Morocco 26,182 0.013 340 0.0006 * 0.23 112 Mozambique 15,113 0.004 67 0.0006 0.01 113 Namibia 1.521 0.049 75 0.0018 0.06 114 Nauru 9 0.213 2 0.0055 0.37 115 Nepal 19,612 0.001 22 0.0007 0.02 116 Netherlands 15,022 0.576 8.653 0.0007 * 0.30 117 Netherlands 172 0.221 38 0.0018 0.46 119 New Zealand 3.309 0.623 2.062 0.0009 * 0.39 120 Nicaragua 3.752 0.013 49 0.0018 0.25 121 Niger 8,154 0.002 15 0.0005 0.01 122 Nigeria 88,515 0.008 726 0.0007 * 0.10 123 Norway 4,273 0.579 2,474 0.0005 * 0.08 124 Oman 1.534 0.055 84 0.0089 * 0.15 125 Pakistan 117,490 0.005 611 0.0011 * 0.05 126 Panama 2,476 0.105 260 0.0027 * 0.33 131 Potand 37,800 0.105 3,969 0.0016 * 0.23 133 Puerto Rico 3.295 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41 135 Reunion 0.008 0.46 0.0008 0.4	106 Mauritania	1.996	0.003	5	0.0004	0.007
109 Monaco 30 0.990 30 0.0106 0.11		1.081	0.048	52	0.0051	0.194
110 Mongolia 2.247 0.025 56 0.0018 0.18 111 Morocco 26.182 0.013 340 0.0006 * 0.23 112 Mozambique 15.113 0.004 67 0.0006 0.01 113 Namibia 1.521 0.049 75 0.0018 0.06 114 Nauru 9 0.213 2 0.0055 0.37 115 Nepal 19.612 0.001 22 0.0007 0.02 116 Netherlands 15.022 0.576 8.653 0.0007 * 0.30 117 Netherlands Antilles 184 0.168 31 0.0086 0.23 118 New Caledonia 172 0.221 38 0.0018 0.46 119 New Zealand 3.309 0.623 2.062 0.0009 * 0.39 120 Nicaragua 3.752 0.013 49 0.0018 0.25 121 Niger 8.154 0.002 15 0.0005 0.01 122 Nigeria 88.515 0.008 726 0.0007 * 0.10 123 Norway 4.273 0.579 2.474 0.0005 * 0.08 124 Oman 1.534 0.055 84 0.0089 * 0.15 125 Pakistan 117.490 0.005 611 0.0011 * 0.05 126 Panama 2.476 0.105 260 0.0027 * 0.33 127 Papua New Guinca 3.913 0.016 63 0.0027 0.07 128 Paraguay 4.799 0.024 115 0.0069 * 0.43 129 Peru 22.362 0.030 671 0.0119 * 0.31 130 Philippines 65.759 0.015 3.969 0.0016 * 0.32 131 Poland 37.800 0.105 3.969 0.0016 * 0.32 131 Poland 37.800 0.105 3.969 0.0016 * 0.23 133 Puerto Rico 3.295 0.196 646 0.0002 * 0.13 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41 135 0.0029 0.41		90,007	0.086	7,741	0.0011 *	0.705
111 Morocco 26,182 0.013 340 0.0006 * 0.23 112 Mozambique 15,113 0.004 67 0.0006 0.01 113 Namibia 1.521 0.049 75 0.0018 0.06 114 Nauru 9 0.213 2 0.0055 0.37 115 Nepal 19,612 0.001 22 0.0007 0.02 116 Netherlands 15,022 0.576 8.653 0.0007 * 0.30 117 Netherlands Antilles 184 0.168 31 0.0086 0.23 118 New Caledonia 172 0.221 38 0.0018 0.46 119 New Zealand 3.309 0.623 2.062 0.0009 * 0.39 120 Nicaragua 3.752 0.013 49 0.0018 0.25 121 Niger 8.154 0.002 15 0.0005 0.01 122 Nigeria 88,515 0.008 726 0.0007 * 0.10 123 Norway 4.273 0.579 2.474 0.0005 * 0.08 124 Oman 1.534 0.055 84 0.0089 * 0.15 125 Pakistan 117,490 0.005 611 0.0011 * 0.05 126 Panama 2.476 0.105 260 0.0027 * 0.33 127 Papua New Guinea 3.913 0.016 63 0.0027 0.07 128 Paraguay 4.799 0.024 115 0.0069 * 0.43 129 Peru 22,362 0.030 671 0.0119 * 0.31 130 Philippines 65,759 0.015 986 0.0005 * 0.32 131 Poland 37,800 0.105 3,969 0.0016 * 0.23 132 Portugal 10,388 0.169 1,756 0.0002 * 0.13 133 Puerto Rico 3.295 0.196 646 0.0008 0.46 0.0008 0.46 134 Qatar 518 0.342 177 0.0156 0.39 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41 135 0.0029 0.41 135 0.0029 0.41 135 Reunion 0.0140 85 0.0029 0.41 135 0.0029 0.41 135 Reunion 0.005 0.0029 0.41 135 0.	109 Monaco	30	0.990	30	0.0106	0.115
112 Mozambique 15.113 0.004 67 0.0006 0.01 113 Namibia 1.521 0.049 75 0.0018 0.06 114 Nauru 9 0.213 2 0.0055 0.37 115 Nepal 19.612 0.001 22 0.0007 0.02 116 Netherlands 15.022 0.576 8.653 0.0007 * 0.30 117 Netherlands Antilles 184 0.168 31 0.0086 0.23 118 New Caledonia 172 0.221 38 0.0018 0.46 119 New Zealand 3.309 0.623 2.062 0.0009 * 0.39 120 Nicaragua 3.752 0.013 49 0.0018 0.25 121 Niger 8.154 0.002 15 0.0005 0.01 122 Nigeria 88.515 0.008 726 0.0007 * 0.10 123 Norway 4.273 0.579 2.474 0.0005 * 0.08 124 Oman 1.534 0.055 84 0.0089 * 0.15 125 Pakistan 117.490 0.005 611 0.0011 * 0.05 126 Panama 2.476 0.105 260 0.0027 * 0.37 127 Papua New Guinca 3.913 0.016 63 0.0027 0.07 128 Paraguay 4.799 0.024 115 0.0069 * 0.43 129 Peru 22.362 0.030 671 0.0119 * 0.31 130 Philippines 65.759 0.015 986 0.0005 * 0.32 131 Poland 37,800 0.105 3,969 0.0016 * 0.23 132 Portugal 10,388 0.169 1,756 0.0020 * 0.13 133 Puerto Rico 3.295 0.196 646 0.0008 0.46 134 Qatar 518 0.342 177 0.0156 0.39 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41	110 Mongolia	2.247	0.025	56	0.0018	0.180
113 Namibia 1.521 0.049 75 0.0018 0.06 114 Nauru 9 0.213 2 0.0055 0.37 115 Nepal 19.612 0.001 22 0.0007 0.02 116 Netherlands 15.022 0.576 8.653 0.0007* 0.30 117 Netherlands Antilles 184 0.168 31 0.0086 0.23 118 New Caledonia 172 0.221 38 0.0018 0.46 119 New Zealand 3.309 0.623 2.062 0.0009* 0.39 120 Nicaragua 3.752 0.013 49 0.0018 0.25 121 Nigeria 88,515 0.008 726 0.0007* 0.10 122 Nigeria 88,515 0.008 726 0.0007* 0.10 123 Norway 4.273 0.579 2.474 0.0005* 0.08 124 Oman <t< td=""><td>111 Morocco</td><td>26,182</td><td>0.013</td><td>340</td><td>0.0006 *</td><td>0.236</td></t<>	111 Morocco	26,182	0.013	340	0.0006 *	0.236
114 Nauru 9 0.213 2 0.0055 0.37 115 Nepal 19.612 0.001 22 0.0007 0.02 116 Netherlands 15.022 0.576 8.653 0.0007 * 0.30 117 Netherlands Antilles 184 0.168 31 0.0086 0.23 118 New Caledonia 172 0.221 38 0.0018 0.46 119 New Zealand 3.309 0.623 2.062 0.0009 * 0.39 120 Nicaragua 3.752 0.013 49 0.018 0.25 121 Niger 8.154 0.002 15 0.0005 0.01 122 Nigeria 88,515 0.008 726 0.0007 * 0.10 123 Norway 4.273 0.579 2.474 0.0005 * 0.08 124 Oman 1.534 0.055 84 0.0089 * 0.15 125 Pakistan 117.490 0.005 611 0.0011 * 0.05 126 Panama 2.476 0.105	112 Mozambique	15,113	0.004	67	0.0006	0.011
115 Nepal 19.612 0.001 22 0.0007 0.02 116 Netherlands 15.022 0.576 8.653 0.0007 * 0.30 117 Netherlands Antilles 184 0.168 31 0.0086 0.23 118 New Caledonia 172 0.221 38 0.0018 0.46 119 New Zealand 3.309 0.623 2.062 0.0009 * 0.39 120 Nicaragua 3.752 0.013 49 0.0018 0.25 121 Niger 8.154 0.002 15 0.0005 0.01 122 Nigeria 88,515 0.008 726 0.0007 * 0.10 123 Norway 4.273 0.579 2.474 0.0005 * 0.08 124 Oman 1.534 0.055 84 0.0089 * 0.15 125 Pakistan 117.490 0.005 611 0.0011 * 0.05 126 Panama 2.476 0.105 260 0.0027 * 0.33 127 Papua New Guinea 3.913 0.016 63 0.0027 0.07 128 Paraguay 4.799 0.024 115 0.0069 * 0.43 129 Peru 22.362 0.030 671 0.0119 * 0.31 130 Philippines 65.759 0.015 986 0.0005 * 0.32 131 Poland 37,800 0.105 3,969 0.0016 * 0.23 132 Portugal 10,388 0.169 1,756 0.0020 * 0.13 133 Puerto Rico 3.295 0.196 646 0.0008 0.46 134 Qatar 518 0.342 177 0.0156 0.39 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41	113 Namibia	1.521	0.049	75	0.0018	0.062
116 Netherlands 15.022 0.576 8.653 0.0007 * 0.30 117 Netherlands Antilles 184 0.168 31 0.0086 0.23 118 New Caledonia 172 0.221 38 0.0018 0.46 119 New Zealand 3.309 0.623 2.062 0.0009 * 0.39 120 Nicaragua 3.752 0.013 49 0.0018 0.25 121 Niger 8.154 0.002 15 0.0005 0.01 122 Nigeria 88.515 0.008 726 0.0007 * 0.10 123 Norway 4.273 0.579 2.474 0.0005 * 0.08 124 Oman 1.534 0.055 84 0.0089 * 0.15 125 Pakistan 117.490 0.005 611 0.0011 * 0.05 126 Panama 2.476 0.105 260 0.0027 * 0.33 127 Papua New Guinea 3.913 0.016 63 0.0027 0.07 128 Paraguay 4.799 0.024 115 0.0069 * 0.43 129 Peru 22.362 0.030 671 0.0119 * 0.31 130 Philippines 65.759 0.015 986 0.0005 * 0.32 131 Poland 37,800 0.105 3,969 0.0016 * 0.23 132 Portugal 10,388 0.169 1,756 0.0029 0.13 133 Puerto Rico 3.295 0.196 646 0.0008 0.46 134 Qatar 518 0.342 177 0.0156 0.39 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41 136 137 130 0.0000 0.00000 0.00000000000000	114 Nauru	9	0.213	2	0.0055	0.376
117 Netherlands Antilles 184 0.168 31 0.0086 0.23 118 New Caledonia 172 0.221 38 0.0018 0.46 119 New Zealand 3.309 0.623 2.062 0.0009 * 0.39 120 Nicaragua 3.752 0.013 49 0.0018 0.25 121 Niger 8.154 0.002 15 0.0005 0.01 122 Nigeria 88,515 0.008 726 0.0007 * 0.10 123 Norway 4.273 0.579 2.474 0.0005 * 0.08 124 Oman 1.534 0.055 84 0.0089 * 0.15 125 Pakistan 117.490 0.005 611 0.0011 * 0.05 126 Panama 2.476 0.105 260 0.0027 * 0.07 128 Paraguay 4.799 0.024 115 0.0069 * 0.43 129 Peru	115 Nepal	19.612	0.001	22	0.0007	0.020
118 New Caledonia 172 0.221 38 0.0018 0.46 119 New Zealand 3.309 0.623 2.062 0.0009 * 0.39 120 Nicaragua 3.752 0.013 49 0.0018 0.25 121 Niger 8.154 0.002 15 0.0005 0.01 122 Nigeria 88.515 0.008 726 0.0007 * 0.10 123 Norway 4.273 0.579 2.474 0.0005 * 0.08 124 Oman 1.534 0.055 84 0.0089 * 0.15 125 Pakistan 117.490 0.005 611 0.0011 * 0.05 126 Panama 2.476 0.105 260 0.0027 * 0.33 127 Papua New Guinca 3.913 0.016 63 0.0027 * 0.07 128 Paraguay 4.799 0.024 115 0.0069 * 0.43 129 Peru	116 Netherlands	15,022	0.576	8,653	0.0007 *	0.304
119 New Zealand 3,309 0,623 2,062 0,0009 * 0,39 120 Nicaragua 3,752 0,013 49 0,0018 0,25 121 Niger 8,154 0,002 15 0,0005 0,01 122 Nigeria 88,515 0,008 726 0,0007 * 0,10 123 Norway 4,273 0,579 2,474 0,0005 * 0,08 124 Oman 1,534 0,055 84 0,0089 * 0,15 125 Pakistan 117,490 0,005 611 0,0011 * 0,05 126 Panama 2,476 0,105 260 0,0027 * 0,33 127 Papua New Guinca 3,913 0,016 63 0,0027 * 0,07 128 Paraguay 4,799 0,024 115 0,0069 * 0,43 129 Peru 22,362 0,030 671 0,0119 * 0,31 130 Philippines <td>117 Netherlands Antilles</td> <td>184</td> <td>0.168</td> <td>31</td> <td>0.0086</td> <td>0.232</td>	117 Netherlands Antilles	184	0.168	31	0.0086	0.232
120 Nicaragua 3.752 0.013 49 0.0018 0.25 121 Niger 8.154 0.002 15 0.0005 0.01 122 Nigeria 88.515 0.008 726 0.0007 * 0.10 123 Norway 4.273 0.579 2.474 0.0005 * 0.08 124 Oman 1.534 0.055 84 0.0089 * 0.15 125 Panama 2.476 0.105 260 0.0027 * 0.33 127 Papua New Guinea 3.913 0.016 63 0.0027 0.07 128 Paraguay 4.799 0.024 115 0.0069 * 0.43 129 Peru 22.362 0.030 671 0.0119 * 0.31 130 Philippines 65.759 0.015 986 0.0005 * 0.32 131 Poland 37,800 0.105 3,969 0.0016 * 0.23 132 Portugal 10,388 0.169 1,756 0.0020 * 0.13 133 Puerto Rico 3.295 0.196 646 0.0008 0.46 134 Qatar 518 0.342 177 0.0156 0.39 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41	118 New Caledonia	172	0.221	38	0.0018	0.460
121 Niger 8,154 0.002 15 0.0005 0.01 122 Nigeria 88,515 0.008 726 0.0007 * 0.10 123 Norway 4.273 0.579 2.474 0.0005 * 0.08 124 Oman 1.534 0.055 84 0.0089 * 0.15 125 Pakistan 117,490 0.005 611 0.0011 * 0.05 126 Panama 2.476 0.105 260 0.0027 * 0.33 127 Papua New Guinea 3.913 0.016 63 0.0027 0.07 128 Paraguay 4.799 0.024 115 0.0069 * 0.43 129 Peru 22,362 0.030 671 0.0119 * 0.31 130 Philippines 65,759 0.015 986 0.0005 * 0.32 131 Poland 37,800 0.105 3,969 0.0016 * 0.23 132 Portugal 10,388 0.169 1,756 0.0020 * 0.13 133 Puerto Rico 3.295 0.196 646 0.0008 0.46 134 Qatar 518 0.342 177 0.0156 0.39 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41	119 New Zealand	3.309	0.623	2,062	0.0009 *	0.395
122 Nigeria 88,515 0.008 726 0.0007 * 0.10 123 Norway 4.273 0.579 2.474 0.0005 * 0.08 124 Oman 1.534 0.055 84 0.0089 * 0.15 125 Pakistan 117.490 0.005 611 0.0011 * 0.05 126 Panama 2.476 0.105 260 0.0027 * 0.33 127 Papua New Guinea 3.913 0.016 63 0.0027 * 0.07 128 Paraguay 4.799 0.024 115 0.0069 * 0.43 129 Peru 22.362 0.030 671 0.0119 * 0.31 130 Philippines 65.759 0.015 986 0.0005 * 0.32 131 Poland 37,800 0.105 3,969 0.0016 * 0.23 132 Portugal 10,388 0.169 1,756 0.0020 * 0.13 133 Puer	120 Nicaragua	3,752	0.013	49	0.0018	0.256
123 Norway 4.273 0.579 2.474 0.0005 * 0.08 124 Oman 1.534 0.055 84 0.0089 * 0.15 125 Pakistan 117.490 0.005 611 0.0011 * 0.05 126 Panama 2.476 0.105 260 0.0027 * 0.33 127 Papua New Guinea 3.913 0.016 63 0.0027 * 0.07 128 Paraguay 4.799 0.024 115 0.0069 * 0.43 129 Peru 22.362 0.030 671 0.0119 * 0.31 130 Philippines 65.759 0.015 986 0.0005 * 0.32 131 Poland 37,800 0.105 3,969 0.0016 * 0.23 132 Portugal 10,388 0.169 1,756 0.0020 * 0.13 133 Puerto Rico 3,295 0.196 646 0.0008 0.46 134 Qatar 518 0.342 177 0.0156 0.39 135	121 Niger	8,154	0.002	15	0.0005	0.015
124 Oman 1.534 0.055 84 0.0089 * 0.15 125 Pakistan 117.490 0.005 611 0.0011 * 0.05 126 Panama 2.476 0.105 260 0.0027 * 0.33 127 Papua New Guinea 3.913 0.016 63 0.0027 0.07 128 Paraguay 4.799 0.024 115 0.0069 * 0.43 129 Peru 22.362 0.030 671 0.0119 * 0.31 130 Philippines 65.759 0.015 986 0.0005 * 0.32 131 Poland 37,800 0.105 3,969 0.0016 * 0.23 132 Portugal 10,388 0.169 1,756 0.0020 * 0.13 133 Puerto Rico 3,295 0.196 646 0.0008 0.46 134 Qatar 518 0.342 177 0.0156 0.39 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41	122 Nigeria	88,515	0.008	726	0.0007 *	0.106
125 Pakistan 117.490 0.005 611 0.0011 * 0.05 126 Panama 2.476 0.105 260 0.0027 * 0.33 127 Papua New Guinea 3.913 0.016 63 0.0027 0.07 128 Paraguay 4.799 0.024 115 0.0069 * 0.43 129 Peru 22.362 0.030 671 0.0119 * 0.31 130 Philippines 65.759 0.015 986 0.0005 * 0.32 131 Poland 37,800 0.105 3,969 0.0016 * 0.23 132 Portugal 10,388 0.169 1,756 0.0020 * 0.13 133 Puerto Rico 3.295 0.196 646 0.0008 0.46 134 Qatar 518 0.342 177 0.0156 0.39 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41	123 Norway	4.273	0.579	2.474	0.0005 *	0.082
126 Panama 2.476 0.105 260 0.0027 * 0.33 127 Papua New Guinea 3.913 0.016 63 0.0027 0.07 128 Paraguay 4.799 0.024 115 0.0069 * 0.43 129 Peru 22.362 0.030 671 0.0119 * 0.31 130 Philippines 65.759 0.015 986 0.0005 * 0.32 131 Poland 37,800 0.105 3,969 0.0016 * 0.23 132 Portugal 10,388 0.169 1,756 0.0020 * 0.13 133 Puerto Rico 3.295 0.196 646 0.0008 0.46 134 Qatar 518 0.342 177 0.0156 0.39 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41	124 Oman	1.534	0.055	84	0.0089 *	0.153
127 Papua New Guinea 3.913 0.016 63 0.0027 0.07 128 Paraguay 4.799 0.024 115 0.0069 * 0.43 129 Peru 22.362 0.030 671 0.0119 * 0.31 130 Philippines 65.759 0.015 986 0.0005 * 0.32 131 Poland 37,800 0.105 3,969 0.0016 * 0.23 132 Portugal 10,388 0.169 1,756 0.0020 * 0.13 133 Puerto Rico 3.295 0.196 646 0.0008 0.46 134 Qatar 518 0.342 177 0.0156 0.39 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41	125 Pakistan	117,490	0.005	611	0.0011 *	0.054
128 Paraguay 4.799 0.024 115 0.0069 * 0.43 129 Peru 22.362 0.030 671 0.0119 * 0.31 130 Philippines 65.759 0.015 986 0.0005 * 0.32 131 Poland 37,800 0.105 3,969 0.0016 * 0.23 132 Portugal 10,388 0.169 1,756 0.0020 * 0.13 133 Puerto Rico 3.295 0.196 646 0.0008 0.46 134 Qatar 518 0.342 177 0.0156 0.39 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41	126 Panama	2,476	0.105	260	0.0027 *	0.337
129 Peru 22,362 0.030 671 0.0119 * 0.31 130 Philippines 65,759 0.015 986 0.0005 * 0.32 131 Poland 37,800 0.105 3,969 0.0016 * 0.23 132 Portugal 10,388 0.169 1,756 0.0020 * 0.13 133 Puerto Rico 3,295 0.196 646 0.0008 0.46 134 Qatar 518 0.342 177 0.0156 0.39 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41	127 Papua New Guinea	3.913	0.016	63	0.0027	0.074
130 Philippines 65.759 0.015 986 0.0005 * 0.32 131 Poland 37,800 0.105 3.969 0.0016 * 0.23 132 Portugal 10,388 0.169 1,756 0.0020 * 0.13 133 Puerto Rico 3.295 0.196 646 0.0008 0.46 134 Qatar 518 0.342 177 0.0156 0.39 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41	128 Paraguay	4.799	0.024	115	0.0069 *	0.433
131 Poland 37,800 0.105 3,969 0.0016 * 0.23 132 Portugal 10,388 0.169 1,756 0.0020 * 0.13 133 Puerto Rico 3.295 0.196 646 0.0008 0.46 134 Qatar 518 0.342 177 0.0156 0.39 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41	129 Peru	22,362	0.030	671	0.0119 *	0.316
132 Portugal 10,388 0.169 1,756 0.0020 * 0.13 133 Puerto Rico 3,295 0.196 646 0.0008 0.46 134 Qatar 518 0.342 177 0.0156 0.39 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41	130 Philippines	65,759	0.015	986	0.0005 *	0.327
133 Puerto Rico 3.295 0.196 646 0.0008 0.46 134 Qatar 518 0.342 177 0.0156 0.39 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41		37,800	0.105	3,969	0.0016 *	0.238
134 Qatar 518 0.342 177 0.0156 0.39 135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41	132 Portugal	10,388	0.169	1,756	0.0020 *	0.130
135 Reunion 607 0.140 85 0.0029 0.41	133 Puerto Rico	3,295	0.196	646	0.0008	0.466
	134 Qatar	518	0.342	177	0.0156	0.398
	135 Reunion	607	0.140	85	0.0029	0.417
136 Romania 23.397 0.093 2,176 0.0011 0.15	136 Romania	23.397	0.093	2,176	0.0011	0.150
137 Rwanda 7.903 0.001 5 0.0021 0.01	137 Rwanda	7.903	0.001	5	0.0021	0.017
138 Sahara, Western 197 0.006 1 0.0011 0.00	138 Sahara, Western	197	0.006	1	0.0011	0.001
	l l	23	0.367	8	0.0105	0.134
140 Sao Tome E Principe 128 0.022 3 0.0092 0.08	140 Sao Tome E Principe	128	0.022	3	0.0092	0.085
	I :	17,870		2,716	0.0008 *	0.445
	142 Senegal	7,953	0.007	58	0.0006	0.030
	1 1 -					0.140
	1 '	1		1		0.003
	1					0.264
1 1 9.	1 1	1				0.337
1						0.026
	1					0.316
	I I	1				0.391
		1				0.579

Appendix B. (continued)

	Stage 1			Stage 2	Stage 3
	S_i		$c_i S_i$		
Country	(000's)	C_{i}	(000's)	a_i	b_i
151 Sri Lanka	17,424	0.007	120	0.0042 *	0.338
152 St. Kitts and Nevis	40	0.055	2	0.0031	0.074
153 St. Lucia	153	0.067	10	0.0094	0.299
154 St. Vincent & the Gr	114	0.056	6	0.0055	0.234
155 Sudan	27,220	0.003	93	0.0002	0.037
156 Suriname	402	0.074	30	0.0026	0.194
157 Swaziland	859	0.023	20	0.0019	0.054
158 Sweden	8.564	0.830	7,108	0.0004 *	0.221
159 Switzerland	6,784	0.600	4.070	0.0012 *	0.238
160 Syrian Arab Republic	12.966	0.053	687	0.0033	0.443
161 Taiwan	20,659	0.209	4.318	0.0051 *	0.444
162 Tanzania	26,869	0.005	137	0.0006	0.022
163 Thailand	56,814	0.013	739	0.0020 *	0.378
164 Togo	3.811	0.004	17	0.0006	0.064
165 Tonga	102	0.037	4	0.0140	0.134
166 Trinidad & Tobago	1,285	0.095	122	0.0066	0.204
167 Tunisia	8,276	0.034	281	0.0002 *	0.473
168 Turkey	58,581	0.055	3.222	0.0006 *	0.349
169 Tuvalu	9	0.013	0	0.0089	0.038
170 Uganda	18.690	0.004	69	0.0002	0.024
171 United Arab Emirates	2.390	0.255	609	0.0230 *	0.306
172 United Kingdom	57.515	0.523	380	0.0021 *	0.100
173 United States	252,502	0.740	186.852	0.0005 *	0.437
174 Uruguay	3,121	0.116	362	0.0033 *	0.111
175 USSR (Former)	293.048	0.107	31,356	0.00002	0.236
176 Vanuatu	170	0.019	3	0.0172	0.299
177 Venezuela	20,189	0.088	1,777	0.0006 *	0.652
178 Vietnam	67,568	0.002	122	0.0004	0.234
179 Virgin Islands, US	99	0.390	39	0.0122	0.264
180 Western Samoa	190	0.037	7	0.0102	0.234
181 Yugoslavia	17.123	0.123	2,106	0.00001	0.437
182 Zaire	37.832	0.001	42	0.0096 *	0.071
183 Zambia	8.446	0.012	101	0.0004	0.071
184 Zimbabwe	10,720	0.032	343	0.0013	0.316
Minimum	2	0.001	0	0.00001	0.001
Maximum	1,151,487	0.990	186,852	0.03306	0.705
Mean	29,273	0.150	3,128	0.00380	0.216
Standard Deviation	111,958	0.208	15,450	0.00519	0.165

Note: The reported values in Stages 2 and 3 are based on the retained models in Table 9.

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Table 1. Summary of Recent International Diffusion Studies

Depth of Adoption

Study	Number of Countries	Breadth of Adoption	Sample Matching	Left-Hand Truncation Bias	Exogenous Covariates	Endogenous Covariates (Linkage)
Gatignon et al. (1989)	14	No	No	Yes	3	None
Heeler and Hustad (1980)	16	No	No	Yes	0	None
Helsen et al. (1993)	12	No	No	No	6	None
Lindberg (1982)	7	No	No	No	0	None
Mahajan and Muller (1994)	16	No	No	Yes	0	Yes (No)
Takada and Jain (1991)	4	No	No	Partial	1	Yes (No)
Present study	184	Yes	Yes	No	8	Yes (Yes)

Table 2. Countries Compared within International Marketing Studies

Number of Countries	Number of Studies	%
50 <	1	0.9
30 - 50	1	0.9
20 - 30	4	3.6
10 - 20	12	10.8
6 - 9	17	15.3
3 - 5	39	35.1
2	37	33.3
Total	111	100%

Note:

Journals surveyed (1975-1993):

Journal of International Business Studies

European Journal of Marketing

The Columbia Journal of World Business

Journal of Business Research

Journal of Marketing

International Marketing Review

Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science

International Journal of Research in Marketing

Journal of Advertising Research

Journal of Consumer Research

Journal of Global Marketing

Journal of Advertising

International Journal of Advertising

Journal of Marketing Research

Journal of the Market Research Society

Marketing and Research Today

Industrial Marketing Management

Journal of Consumer Affaires

Journal of Economic Psychology

Journal of Macromarketing

Journal of Product Innovation Management

Marketing Science

Journal of Public Policy and Marketing

Management Science

Marketing Letters

Table 3. Diffusion of Cellular Services Across Countries

Early Majority (33%)	1	
Algeria]	
American Samoa		
Argentina		
Bahamas		
Bangladesh		
Belgium		
Bermuda		
Bolivia		
Botswana		
Brazil		
Brunei		
Bulgaria		
_	Lata Majarity and Las	
Cayman Islands	Late Majority and Lag	
Chile	Afghanistan	Malawi
China, People's Rep	Albania	Maldives
Colombia	Andorra	Mali
Costa Rica	Angola	Martinique
Cyprus	Antigua & Barbuda	Mauritania
Czechoslovakia	Barbados	Monaco
Dominican Republic	Belize	Mongolia
Ecuador	Benin	Mozambique
Egypt	Bhutan	Namibia
El Salvador	Burkina Faso	Nauru
Fiji	Burma	Nepal
Gabon	Burundi	Netherlands Antilles
Ghana	Cambodia	New Caledonia
Greece Guatemala	Cameroon	Nicaragua
Honduras	Cape Verde Central African Rep	Niger Papua New Guinea
Hungary	Chad	Puerto Rico
India	Comoros	Qatar
Kenya	Congo	Reunion
Laos	Cote D'Ivoire	Rwanda
Lebanon	Cuba	Sahara, Western
Macau	Djibouti	San Marino
Malta	Dominica	Sao Tome E Principe
Mauritius	East Germany	Senegal
Mexico	Equatorial Guinea	Seychelles
Morocco	Ethiopia	Sierra Leone
New Zealand	Falkland Islands	Solomon Islands
Nigeria	French Guiana	Somalia St. Lucia
Pakistan Panama	French Polynesia Greenland	St. Lucia St. Vincent & the Gr
Panama Paraguay	Greenland Grenada	St. Vincent & the Gr Sudan
n araguay	Cuadalana	Cultural

	Early Adopter (12%)	Mexico	Equatorial Guinea	Seychelles
	Australia	Morocco	Ethiopia	Sierra Leone
	Austria	New Zealand	Falkland Islands	Solomon Islands
	Bahrain	Nigeria	French Guiana	Somalia
	Canada	Pakistan	French Polynesia	St. Lucia
	France	Panama	Greenland	St. Vincent & the Gr
	Germany (west)	Paraguay	Grenada	Sudan
	Iceland	Peru	Guadeloupe	Suriname
	Ireland, Republic of	Philippines	Guam	Swaziland
	Israel	Poland	Guinea	Syrian Arab Republic
	Italy	Portugal	Guinea-Bissau	Tanzania
	Kuwait	Romania	Guyana	The Gambia
	Luxembourg	Singapore	Haiti	Togo
	Malaysia	Sri Lanka	Iran, I.R. of	Tuvalu
Innovator (4%)	Netherlands	St. Kitts and Nevis	Iraq	Uganda
Denmark	Oman	Switzerland	Jamaica	United Arab Emirates
Finland	South Africa	Taiwan	Jordan	USSR (Former)
indonesia	South Korea	Tonga	Kiribati	Vanuatu
Japan	Thailand	Trinidad & Tobago	Lesotho	Virgin Islands, US
Norway	Tunisia	Uruguay	Liberia	Western Samoa
Saudi Arabia	Turkey	Venezuela	Libya	Yugoslavia
Spain	United Kingdom	Vietnam	Liechtenstein	Zambia
Sweden	United States	Zaire	Madagascar	Zimbabwe

Table 4: Summary of Hazard-rate Models in Marketing

Study	Covariates Correction Nonparametric for Grouped Baseline Nature Hazard		Unobserved Heterogeneity	Split Hazard	
		Tractic	Tuzuu		
Dekimpe and Morrison (1991)	No	Yes	No	Gamma	No
Gönül and Srinivasan (1993)	Yes	No	Yes	Fixed effects/ Gamma	No
Gupta (1991)	Yes	No	No	Gamma	No
Hannan and McDowell (1984)	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Jain and Vilcassim (1991)	Yes	No	No	Normal/ Nonparametric	No
Sharma (1993)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Gamma	No
Sharma and Sinha (1991 a, b)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Gamma	No
Sinha and Chandrashekaran (1992)	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Helsen and Schmittlein (1993)	Yes	No	No	No	No
Helsen and Schmittlein (1994)	Yes	No	No	No	No
Vilcassim and Jain (1991)	Yes	No	No	Nonparametric	No
Present Study	Yes	Yes	Yes	Gamma	Yes

Table 5. Summary Descriptive Statistics of Exogenous Covariates (N = 184 countries)

Covariate	Means	STDV	Min.	Max.
Demographic Factors				
Avg. Annual Pop. Growth Rate	2.0	1.3	-0.6	6.3
No. of Major Population Centers	8.0	4.0	1.0	19
Economic Factors				
GNP per Capita (\$000)	5,065.0	7,488.0	71.0	50,000.0
Crude Death Rate	9.4	4.4	2.0	23.0
Communism	0.1	0.3	0.0	1.0
No. of Competing Systems	1.0	0.5	1.0	4.0
Social System Factors				
No. of Ethnic Groups	5.0	2.6	1.0	15.0

Table 6. Parameter Estimates for the Cross-country Timing Model

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
$\lambda_{_{\mathbf{U}}}$	_	0.005	_	_
	0.002		0.007	0.012
r/a	0.002	-	0.007	0.012
Time Dependence				
c ₂ (4-6 yrs)	1.071*	0.709	0.732	0.457
c_3 (7-9 yrs)	2.909***	2.044***	2.429***	1.912***
c_4 (10-12 yrs)	4.224***	2.814***	3.561***	2.980***
Exogenous Factors				
Demographic Factors				
Avg. Annual Pop. Growth Rate	-0.082	-0.112	-0.235	-0.242
No. of Major Population Centers	().266***	0.208***	0.199***	0.180***
Economic Factors				
GNP per Capita (\$10,000,000)	1.160***	0.580***	1.073***	0.872***
Crude Death Rate	-().169**	-0.147**	-0.172**	-0.174**
Communism	-2.781*	-2.423***	-2.520***	-2.237**
Social System Factors				
No. of Ethnic Groups	-().2()9*	-0.095	-0.196*	-0.181*
Endogenous Factors				
Proportion of World Bank Countries	-	-	-	1.433*
N	184	184	156	156
Log likelihood	-206.73	-210.74	-166.53	-164.70
AIC [(-2LL) + 2(# parms)]	435.46	441.48	355.06	353.40

Note: * < 0.1, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001; significance levels are determined using likelihood-ratio tests

Model 1: 184 countries - only exogenous covariates - with gamma mixing

Model 2: 184 countries - only exogenous covariates - without gamma mixing

Model 3: 156 countries - only exogenous covariates - with gamma mixing

Model 4: 156 countries - exogenous and endogenous covariates - with gamma mixing

Table 7. Estimated Bass-Model Coefficients Across Countries using Nonlinear Estimation

		External Influ	ence	Internal In		Potential		Adjusted
Countries	DF	a P-	Value	b	P-Value	M	P-Value	R-sq
Algeria	3	0.0115	1.00	1.91	1.00	47		0.98
Argentina	4	0.0008	1.00	0.84	0.63	5,611	1.00	0.73
Australia	7	0.0310	0.12	0.91	1.00	531	0.00	0.90
Austria	9	0.0056	0.60	0.55	0.02	305	0.14	0.83
Bahamas	5	9.3078	1.00	-0.09	1.00	30,981	1.00	-0.09
Bahrain	6	0.0000	1.00	-0.26	0.37	69,253	1.00	-0.16
Belgium	6	0.0012	1.00	0.05	0.97	7,325	1.00	-0.45
Bermuda	4	0.0003	1.00	-0.49	0.31	1,884	1.00	0.65
Brunei	4	0.0000	1.00	-0.23	0.89	58,587	1.00	-0.98
Canada	8	0.0000	1.00	0.30	0.30	-575,682	1.00	0.79
Cayman Islands	6	0.0000	1.00	0.00	1.00	4.472	1.00	-0.21
Chile	4	0.0000	1.00	0.45	0.63	108,164	1.00	0.79
China, People's Rep.	6	0.0181	0.98	0.29	0.92	362	0.98	-0.45
Costa Rica	4	0.0007	1.00	0.44	0.56	540	1.00	0.86
Cyprus	4	0.0004	1.00	0.09	0.96	3,505	1.00	-0.61
Denmark*	11	0.0189	0.01	0.24	0.00	416		0.86
Dominican Republic	6	-1.2857	1.00	0.36	0.67	-168,234		0.44
Egypt	6	1.1538	1.00	0.32	0.50	410,673		0.72
Finland	11	0.0062	0.53	0.62	0.00	434		0.96
France	8	0.0000	1.00	0.33	0.39	-381,546	1.00	0.71
Iceland	7	0.0053	1.00	-0.01	1.00	394	1.00	-0.49
Indonesia	10	-8.2635	1.00	0.36	0.11	-82,022	1.00	0.84
Ircland, Republic of	8	0.0000	1.00	0.44	0.50	-69,748	1.00	0.60
Israel	7	0.0105	0.31	1.10	0.00	31	0.00	0.98
Italy	8	0.0107	0.69	1.91	0.00	731	0.00	0.90
Japan	13	-0.0052	0.49	0.94	0.00	2,652	0.00	0.95
Kuwait	5	0.0000	1.00	-1.08	0.43	164,216	1.00	0.08
Luxembourg	8	5.4044	1.00	0.41	0.17	56,820	1.00	0.83
Macau	5	2.4262	1.00	0.38	0.80	313,990	1.00	-0.07
Malaysia	8	0.0000	1.00	0.37	0.38	-391,401	1.00	0.69
Malta	3	0.0008	0.00	0.12	1.00	1,408	1.00	0.46
Mexico	4	0.0870	0.42	0.86	0.25	307	0.17	0.78
Morocco	6	7.9281	1.00	0.34	1.00	217.279	0.00	-0.10
Netherlands*	8	0.0078	0.06	0.49	0.00	509	0.10	0.98
New Zealand	6	0.0296	0.86	0.33	0.69	292	0.87	0.09
Norway*	12	0.0241	0.10	0.36	0.01	327	0.00	0.49
Oman	7	5.4432	1.00	0.85	0.48	519,471	1.00	0.27
Pakistan	3	0.0020	1.00	0.07	1.00	1,264	1.00	0.34
Philippines	6	0.0000	1.00	0.36	0.92	-62,896	1.00	-0.30
Portugal	4	0.0000	1.00	0.28	0.70	316,027	1.00	0.73
Saudi Arabia	11	-0.0006	1.00	-0.04	0.84	-3,346	1.00	0.01
Singapore	5	0.0180	0.94	0.36	0.71	632	0.94	0.33
South Africa	7	0.0055	0.99	0.20	0.91	199	0.99	-0.38
South Korea	9	-1.9712	1.00	0.68	0.20	-3,071,661	1.00	0.79
Spain	11	-1.8815	1.00	0.77	0.00	-1,319,390	1.00	0.96
Sri Lanka	4	0.0000	1.00	0.00	1.00	10,001	1.00	0.00
Sweden	12	0.0002	0.97	0.67	0.00	751	0.00	0.92
Switzerland	6	0.0143	0.95	0.22	0.76	1,688	0.95	0.12
Taiwan	4	-0.0009	1.00	0.28	0.93	-54,539	1.00	-0.71
Thailand	7	0.0086	88.0	1.26	0.04	200	0.00	0.57
Tunisia	7	-9.0763	1.00	0.40	0.68	-15,459	1.00	0.27
Turkey	7	0.0000	1.00	0.49	0.21	196,179	1.00	0.83
United Arab Emirate	4	0.0009	1.00	-0.16	0.88	13,393	1.00	-0.54
United Kingdom	8	0.0560	0.26	0.27	0.55	1,893	0.25	-0.05
United States*	9	0.0094	0.08	0.67	0.00	14,134	0.00	0.98
Venezuela	4	0.0000	1.00	4.37	0.60	156,690	1.00	0.64
Zaire	5	0.0006	1.00	-0.19	0.78	589	1.00	-0.19
Average		0.1678	0.83	0.45	0.54	-61,417	0.74	0.37
Standard Deviation		2.5832	0.32	0.72	0.37	471,265	0.42	0.54

Note: DF= degrees of freedom; figures are rounded

^{* :} countries with plausible and significant coefficients

Table 8. Applications of the Naive Pooled Model (nonlinear least square estimation)

Model	a _i	bi	ci	Si	c _i S _i	SSE	MSE	R_a^2
Model 1:	0.0005 (N.S.)	0.56			18,679	1.3	57.4	0.93
Model 2	-0.0019	1.11e ⁻¹¹	0.06	S	0.06 S	2.1	72.5	0.88
Model 3	0.0007	0.40	1.0 fixed	S	S	1.8	66.0	0.90
Model 4	0.0017	0.34	С	S	CS	1.1	52.9	0.94

Note:

S signifies the vector variable of population sizes, across countries;
C signifies the vector variable of ceilings, across countries.
(N.S.) signifies "Not significant" (p-value = .73); all other estimates p-value < .001.

Table 9. Logistic Models of External and Internal Influences

Covariate	External In a_i		Internal Influences b_i		
	Full	Retained	Full	Retained	
Exogeneous Factors			•		
Demographic Factors					
Avg. Annual Pop. Growth Rate	0.174**	0.165**	0.118	_	
No. of Major Population Centers	-0.850***	-1.027***	0.559**	0.509***	
Economic Factors					
GNP per Capita (\$000)	0.142	-	0.180	-	
Crude Death Rate	-0.769**	-0.797**	-1.330***	-1.274***	
Communism	0.174	*	0.018	-	
No. of Competing Systems	0.202*	0.195*	-0.059	-	
Social System Factors					
No. of Ethnic Groups	-0.565* -0.737**		-1.045***	-0.637***	
Endogenous factors					
No. of other Countries Adopted	0.313	~	-0.099	-	
Proportion World Bank Countries	-0.024	•	0.223	-	
	0.0000	0.00005	1205076	1222751	
Fit SSE	0.0009	0.00095	1205976	1222751	
Root MSE	0.0037	0.0037	55.12	55.08	
R_a^2	0.67	0.68	0.9325	0.9326	

Note:

* < 0.1

** < 0.01

*** <0.001

Table 10. Degree of Covariate Influence on Global Diffusion Patterns:

Strength and Direction

Covariate	Introduction Timing		Initial Penetration		Penetration Growth		Penetration Ceiling	
Exogeneous Factors								
Demographic Factors							· .	
Avg. Annual Pop. Growth Rate	ns		**	(+)	ns		**	(-)
No. of Major Population Centers	***	(+)	***	(-)	**	(+)	***	(+)
Economic Factors								
GNP per Capita	***	(+)	ns		ns		***	(+)
Crude Death Rate	**	(-)	**	(-)	***	(-)	ns	
Communism	***	(-)	ns		ns		ns	
No. of Competing Systems	n/a		*	(+)	ns		*	(+)
Social System Factors								
No. of Ethnic Groups	*	(-)	**	(-)	***	(-)	ns	
Endogenous Factors								
Proportion World Bank Countries	*	(+)	ns		ns		n/a	
No. of Other Countries Adopted	n/a		ns		ns		n/a	

Notes: *: < 0.1; ** < 0.01; ***: < 0.001; ns: not significant; n/a: signifies not applicable; Relations shown under penetration ceiling are based on bi-variate Pearson correlations

Figure 1. Worldwide Adoptions of Cellular Subscriptions







Figure 2. Country Adoption of Cellular Telephone Systems






Cumulative Adoption



Note: Predicted values are based on the application of the aggregate diffusion model proposed by Easingwood, Mahajan and Muller (1983).

Figure 3. Evolution of the Conditional Adoption Probability




Note: The "average" non-communist country considered has a GNP per Capita of 5,065, a crude death rate of 9.4, 5 ethnic groups and 8 major population centers

Model 1: with correction for unobserved heterogeneity
Model 2: without correction for unobserved heterogeneity

Figure 4. Left-hand Truncation Bias





Diffusion curves adjusted to comparable origin





Figure 5. Penetration of Cellular Services, Across Countries



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