

- 10 – Anthony S. Cua, “Emergence of the History of Chinese Philosophy,” in *Comparative Approaches to Chinese Philosophy*, ed. Bo Mou (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), p. 5.
- 11 – See, for example, J. F. Lyotard, *The Differend* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), esp. pp. 128–138.
- 12 – Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), p. 47.
- 13 – Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* (London: Verso), pp. 2, 5.
- 14 – Diogenes Laertius, *Diogenous Laertiou bioi kai gnōmai tōn en filosofiai egdokimēsantōn*, I.3.

## Is “Chinese Philosophy” a Proper Name? A Response to Rein Raud

**Carine Defoort**

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

In the preface to his *Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy*, Hu Shi wrote: “Today, the two main branches of philosophy meet and influence each other. Whether or not in fifty years or one hundred a sort of world philosophy will finally arise cannot yet be ascertained.”<sup>1</sup> Although uncertain, Hu was still hopeful, since he believed that the two major traditions of modern world philosophy, founded in Europe and China, had finally met. That was in 1919. Now, almost a century later, we can respond to Hu’s speculation with relative certainty: a world philosophy has not arisen and is not on the rise. In fact, the situation is much worse: Chinese ancient thought is not even considered “philosophy” by most Western specialists in the field.

For Feng Youlan, Hu’s contemporary, this lack of recognition had become a major frustration by the end of his life. Feng earnestly felt that “parts of classical Chinese philosophy have a contribution to make to the elevating of man’s spiritual sphere and in solving universal problems in human life.”<sup>2</sup> But on the last page of the last volume of his *New Edition of the History of Chinese Philosophy*, completed a few weeks before his death in November 1990, Feng concluded that Western philosophers had not even begun to consider ancient Chinese thought to be worthy of their attention: “Chinese traditional philosophy has always been regarded as a part of sinological studies and is considered as having no relation to philosophy.”<sup>3</sup> Feng’s sentiment is still widely shared today; for instance, in the *Yearbook of Chinese Philosophy* for 2001, Zheng Jiadong remarks that “in the West, especially in Europe, the legitimacy of ‘Chinese philosophy’ has always been questioned; ‘Chinese philoso-

phy' has to a large extent been considered a strange thing of questionable antecedents."<sup>4</sup> Others confirm that "Chinese thinking has been all but excluded from the discipline of philosophy in Western seats of learning."<sup>5</sup>

Indeed, various eminent European philosophers, such as Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and, more recently, Jacques Derrida on his visit to Shanghai in 2001,<sup>6</sup> have proclaimed that ancient Chinese thought is not really philosophy. Kant, for example, stated that "Philosophy is not to be found in the whole Orient. . . . Their teacher Confucius teaches in his writings nothing outside a moral doctrine designed for the princes."<sup>7</sup> Even sinology scholars sometimes wonder whether ancient Chinese thought ought to be labeled "philosophy."<sup>8</sup> But more powerful than such explicit rejections of the legitimacy of "Chinese philosophy," which are nowadays relatively rare, is the dominant and implicit Western (especially European) view, embedded in the organization of academic conferences, journals, university curricula (as Feng Youlan remarked), and bookstores, that ancient China did not have philosophy. The average European bookstore, for instance, does not display the *Laozi* or *Yijing* on the "philosophy" shelf, but rather among various types of wisdom or practical knowledge, between Celtic myths, herbal medicine, and the art of astrology. However unobtrusive, this organizational given reveals more clearly and influentially than any contemporary scholar explicitly states, that the name "Chinese philosophy" for the Chinese masters and some Classics is not proper—or, to put it in ancient Chinese terms: this *ming* 名 is not *zheng* 正.<sup>9</sup>

The twenty-first century, however, has seen strong indications of change, not in the sense that "Chinese philosophy" is now being generally accepted as one of the two main branches of world philosophy, as Hu Shi had hoped, but in the sense that the debate has been reopened, both in China and in the West. In China, the appropriateness of the label "Chinese philosophy" for ancient Chinese thought was questioned by some leading scholars in the first part of the twentieth century. But in the last decade the matter has been experienced as a crisis and challenge, and has been discussed much more broadly and vividly by Chinese academia: conferences are being dedicated to the question of the "legitimacy of 'Chinese philosophy'" (*Zhongguo zhexue hefaxing* 中国哲学的合法性), newspapers report on it, and some journals devote whole forums to it.<sup>10</sup> About one hundred articles or chapters related to the topic confirm its proclaimed status as "one of the ten major questions in the field in the year 2003."<sup>11</sup> One scholar considers it a "historical challenge between Chinese and Western philosophy, a major historical reflection of Chinese philosophy really turning toward the world."<sup>12</sup> In the West, there are also signs of renewed interest, one indication being the thoughtful discussion by Rein Raud, in this issue of *Philosophy East and West*, of my earlier article in a previous issue of this journal, "Is There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy? Arguments of an Implicit Debate."<sup>13</sup>

The aim of my new contribution here is threefold: to include views of contemporary Chinese colleagues in the debate, to reflect on suggestions brought up by Rein Raud, and to elaborate on one aspect of the debate, namely the sensitivity of the very question. "Sensitivity," according to the *Oxford Dictionary*, means "subject to restriction of discussion because of embarrassment," thus combining the absence

of discussion on the one hand with the presence of certain feelings on the other. My focus will be on this combination in a broad sense: the relative absence of argumentation and the presence of emotional commitment. There are various reasons to focus on this topic. First, I am confident that other scholars, mainly from China, are in a better position to come up with more arguments in favor of or against the existence of “Chinese philosophy,” as they have amply shown in their recent publication boom. Second, I believe that the last part of my previous article, concerning the “conflict of sensitivities,” has caused the most disagreement.<sup>14</sup> My divergence with Raud, for instance, is not on the status of “Chinese philosophy,” since we both agree that there are many good reasons for attributing this label to a large corpus of ancient Chinese texts. But we differ in our attitude toward the debate: while he believes that the question can be settled once and for all as soon as Western philosophers get rid of their institutional and ethnocentric biases, I think that, aside from these biases, which Raud has convincingly analyzed, there is an aspect to the debate that will leave it forever unsettled. The sensitivity toward the topic of “Chinese philosophy” in China as well as in the West is not merely an indication of rational weakness, power struggle, or chauvinistic sentiment, but also an invitation to reflect on the nature of our deepest attachments.

### *1. The Periphery of What Is not Being Said*

Sensitivities often remain unspoken. Discussions of the legitimacy of “Chinese philosophy,” therefore, tend to focus on various related matters surrounding this sensitivity. The more a topic is being carefully—and often unconsciously—avoided, the more the surrounding debates proliferate. Therefore, before leaving the beaten track to focus on the topic of my particular interest, I will distinguish ten academic debates (seven very briefly in part 2 and three somewhat more broadly in part 3) that are closely related to the topic—so closely that they easily risk being confused with one another and monopolizing the topic. Without denying the importance of these debates, I will refrain from further elaboration, leaving them for others to discuss.

*First, the existence of “philosophy in China” and “contemporary Chinese philosophy.”* Probably nobody would deny that scholars in China who are studying Kant, Husserl, or Derrida, are doing philosophy in China. Some, however, would question whether the contemporary philosophical reflection on the Chinese tradition by such thinkers as Hu Shi, Feng Youlan, Mou Zongsan, or Zhang Dainian is to be considered “(contemporary) Chinese philosophy.”<sup>15</sup> This essay, however, does not join this debate but focuses on the legitimacy of the expression “Chinese philosophy” for pre-modern masters (*zi*) and some Classic books (*jing*) that have been commonly treated as such since the beginning of the twentieth century.<sup>16</sup> Before then, scholar-officials entertained a tradition of teaching and writing that retrospectively came to be labeled “Chinese philosophy.” In addition to their reflection on issues that have since come to be considered philosophical, “they also wrote poetry, painted, studied history, practiced rituals, engaged in self-cultivation, and in the course of things, gov-

erned the nation, as well as much else."<sup>17</sup> With the introduction of philosophy as an academic discipline in China, this very tradition lost its age-old institutional support and thus, paradoxically, died of its own birth.<sup>18</sup>

*Second, the relation between the adjective "Chinese" and the noun "philosophy."* If philosophy were considered universal in its claims, as positive science is, the adjective would certainly create a *contradictio in terminis*: there would be no "Chinese philosophy" as there is no "Greek science."<sup>19</sup> But even if one agrees that philosophy is concerned with a *Weltanschauung*, a lifestyle, a cultural *habitus*, or personal issues, one still has to specify in what sense a certain type of philosophy (or philosophies), whether ancient or contemporary, can be considered Chinese. Is the restriction imposed by the adjective on the noun relative or essential? And is "Chinese" to be understood in a geographical, ethnic, historical, national, or cultural fashion?<sup>20</sup>

*Third, the question of the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy.* Many scholars agree that one major reason why the legitimacy of the label "Chinese philosophy" remains an unsolved matter is the lack of constancy, agreement, and transparency of what is to be called "philosophy," even in the West. As long as there is no general agreement on the definition of philosophy, we cannot check the philosophical legitimacy of concrete authors and texts.<sup>21</sup> The whole question can, therefore, be considered a false one, as Ge Zhaoguang has pointed out.<sup>22</sup> Thus, rather than taking part in the discussion, my aim is to describe and analyze the positions.

*Fourth, the value of the ancient Chinese corpus related to the label of "philosophy."* For many scholars in both China and the West, philosophy is a respectable asset, something that any major culture should have. It sounds demeaning to deny philosophy to others.<sup>23</sup> Confirming the existence of "Chinese philosophy" is thus to some extent recognizing the value of China's ancient masters and Classics. But the term is not necessarily or always used in this positive sense. Hegel, for instance, did not deny that ancient China had produced philosophy, but he found it primitive and unimpressive. For Hegel, "the teaching of Confucius . . . is a moral philosophy," "a certain amount of practical and worldly wisdom"; he considered Confucius' "original works" so disappointing that "for their reputation it would have been better that they had never been translated."<sup>24</sup> The value of the Chinese corpus is thus not necessarily guaranteed by the label of "philosophy." Nor is it denied by the rejection of this label, as Derrida pointed out when he visited China in 2001; without the arrogance and disrespect that one reads in Hegel's evaluation of Chinese thought, Derrida insisted that ancient China did not have any philosophy: "Philosophy is related to some sort of particular history, some languages, and some ancient Greek invention. . . . It is something of European form." For him, to state that ancient China did not have philosophy is the same as having a Chinese claim that ancient Europe had no *Taijiquan* (shadowboxing), hence nothing particularly informative or worrisome.<sup>25</sup>

*Fifth, being philosophically interesting versus being considered philosophy.* Denying texts such as the *Lunyu* and *Laozi* the label of philosophy does not necessarily preclude their value for philosophers. Even though Heidegger claimed that

“philosophy speaks Greek,”<sup>26</sup> he nevertheless considered the *Laozi* a philosophically interesting text. For some philosophers, the most interesting fruits are to be reaped beyond the orchard of academic philosophy.<sup>27</sup> Hence, not considering a particular ancient text philosophy does not necessarily amount to denying its inspirational value for philosophers; on the contrary, the rejection of “Chinese philosophy” is often motivated by a concern to protect the rich Chinese tradition from the professional straitjacket of modern Western academia. A major reason for questioning the existence of “Chinese philosophy” is that ancient Chinese ideas end up being disfigured by a selection on the basis of their resemblance to traditional Western philosophy or by an interpretation through that jargon, as “feet being forced into small shoes” (削足适履).<sup>28</sup> For this reason, Joël Thoraval even argues in favor of a Confucian, Buddhist, or Taoist anti-philosophy, in order to preserve symbolic practices from the dominant academic philosophical discourse.<sup>29</sup> This concern to save the Chinese masters from philosophy is as old as their large-scale conversion at the beginning of the twentieth century, but its success has increased in the last decades. While it used to be a topic related to the Western dominance in China, it has now also become a matter of self-reflection.<sup>30</sup>

*Sixth, a philosophical interpretation of the masters.* This growing suspicion of the philosophical approach that was promoted by scholars such as Hu Shi and Feng Youlan, later narrowed down to the materialism-versus-idealism debate and finally opened up again in the eighties, has instigated a lively debate over the interpretation of ancient Chinese texts through (modern, Western) philosophical categories.<sup>31</sup> Rejecting the name “philosophy” for the ancient Chinese masters does not mean denying the similarities between ancient Greek and Chinese thought, nor does it necessarily reject the possibility of a philosophical interpretation.<sup>32</sup> That can vary widely: while some may use the neologisms that were introduced into the Chinese language a century ago (among which were a herd of terms ending in “ism” and “logy”), others now try to go beyond them, inspired by hermeneutical, pragmatic, Marxist, existentialist, or postmodern philosophical approaches.<sup>33</sup> It is a fact that many neologisms have to some extent become part of Chinese everyday language and philosophical discourse.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, since any form of interpretation is some sort of translation through another language or new jargon—including the modern Chinese reading of ancient Masters—it makes no sense to demand a purely authentic reading of the ancient Chinese corpus, whatever that may mean.<sup>35</sup>

*Seventh, the emotions and attitudes involved in the rejection of Chinese philosophy and the response to it.* The debate over the legitimacy of “Chinese philosophy” is at times emotional or inspired by feelings, by nonrational elements, in both China and the West. Attitudes that are often associated with the Western (European) rejection of “Chinese philosophy” are cultural chauvinism, imperial arrogance, institutional resistance, and Western ethnocentrism. This criticism against the Western position is often expressed by Chinese scholars, sometimes by China scholars (among them sinologists), and occasionally by Western philosophers such as Raud, who are critical of Western pretentiousness.<sup>36</sup> Emotions associated with the Chinese side are concern with national strength, ethnic pride, frustration, and upsurging national-

ism.<sup>37</sup> All these attitudes are presented mainly in a negative light, as the unphilosophical motives behind the positions, the emotions deluding rationality, thus defacing the validity of the arguments. Without denying the power of these attitudes, I want to focus on a sensitivity that cannot be *totally* reduced to such political, psychological, institutional, or ideological disturbances.

## II. The History of Names

Three more points are often mentioned in relation to the questioned legitimacy of “Chinese philosophy.” They all concern the history of terminology related to the matter: the original meaning of the Greek term “philosophy” (topic eight), the missionaries’ presentation of ancient Chinese texts under the category of philosophy in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (topic nine), and finally the invention of the Chinese expression *Zhongguo zhexue* 中国哲学 at the end of the nineteenth century (topic ten). The reflections on these three subjects are presented in somewhat greater detail here because they form the immediate periphery of my topic: the sensitivity of the debate in its relation to nouns and names.

*Eighth, the ancient Greek meaning of the term “philosophy.”* According to the *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*,<sup>38</sup> the first sparse occurrences of the Greek words related to philosophy are uncertain and their meanings varying. The verb (to philosophize) and adjective (philosophical) were used in the fifth century B.C. in a broad sense referring to the “love of *sophia* (wisdom, knowledge, proficiency, familiarity and insight),” prevalent among Athens’ free citizens joining the political sphere and public debates. The term was used as a noun (φιλοσοφία) from 380 B.C. onward and defined differently by Socrates’ students in relation to the Sophists’ education in public speech, but also in other arts such as geometry, music, and astronomy. While Isocrates promoted philosophy as sound common sense to be practiced in politics, Plato—with Socrates as his spokesman—stressed the difference between wisdom (*sophia*) and the love of it (*philo-sophia*). Socrates’ basic attitude was one of not knowing, but wanting to know, following the path to wisdom, and never arriving there: “Whoever is wise or has knowledge, does not philosophize anymore,” he says in an early dialogue.<sup>39</sup> While in the later Platonic dialogues philosophy is mentioned more often and associated with the soul (as opposed to the body), Being, and Ideas (as opposed to common sense), the *striving* for knowledge remains more important in Plato’s work than its *possession*.<sup>40</sup>

This overview of the birth of “philosophy” is relevant for several reasons, but not for the reason why it is sometimes used, namely to check the nature of the ancient Chinese texts against the so-called original meaning of philosophy in order confidently to determine (positively or negatively) the legitimacy of “Chinese philosophy.”<sup>41</sup> First of all, because the most ancient occurrences of the Greek terms related to philosophy (including “philosopher,” “philosophize,” and “philosophical”) are sparsely documented, their reconstruction remains tentative and debated. Second, the overview shows that, already at its very beginning, the term had a variety of meanings, changing even within the oeuvre of one author, such as Plato. And finally,

we learn that the term increasingly occurred in arguments among Socrates' students, claiming what "true philosophy" is—a debate that lives on up to today.<sup>42</sup> When referring to the original meaning of philosophy, we need to take into account the fact that from the very beginning it was a matter of speculation and debate. The fact that Chinese colleagues have joined this debate may be the best indication of its (contemporary) philosophical nature, despite continuous disagreements with and disinterest on the part of the Western side.<sup>43</sup>

*Ninth, the attribution of the term philosophy by sixteenth- and seventeenth-century missionaries to Confucius' thought and to the Yijing.* Here again, reference to this label is usually brief and sometimes used as a support for the legitimacy of "Chinese philosophy": since Western missionaries were the first to call Confucius a philosopher, why would that name not hold anymore? But in fact these accounts of European missionaries describing Chinese philosophy shed light on the premodern Western concept of "philosophy" itself rather than on the nature of ancient Chinese texts. "Philosophy" was based on the categories of Aristotelian writings so that it included logic, physics, metaphysics, ethics, and mathematics, which was further divided into arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy.<sup>44</sup> According to Nicolas Standaert,

For the Jesuits in the seventeenth century, there seems to have been no doubt that Confucius was a philosopher and that [the] *Yijing* was a philosophical book. A major reason for this different evaluation of Chinese thought was that they used a much broader definition of philosophy than a mere system of thought guided by logic, though they considered dialectics to belong to the core of their own system. By the time of the Enlightenment, the definition narrowed down, and for someone like Kant there was no philosophy to be found in the East.<sup>45</sup>

A major change occurred in the eighteenth century, when Kant clearly determined for the first time what philosophy was, as distinguished from science, and when he established an inherent relation between the various domains of what he considered philosophy, namely metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and the social and political sciences.<sup>46</sup>

The fact that premodern Europeans did not hesitate to consider Chinese thought philosophy may not be a strong argument in the contemporary debate, but it is interesting nevertheless. It confirms, first of all, that the concept of philosophy is far from transparent or stable even in the West. The question as to whether or not Chinese thought should be considered philosophy is relatively recent and emerging from the narrowing and the specification of the concept in our own history. It is often forgotten that this view of philosophy, with its strict demand for system and division into domains, is itself the result of a particular historical context. Second, the missionary's acceptance of "Chinese philosophy" also confirms the open-endedness of the debate as to what philosophy is: it shows that since the seventeenth century it is the Western expectations concerning philosophy that have changed rather than the ancient Chinese texts that are now being considered not philosophical. A third interesting consequence of this tolerant view is that one could choose to revitalize a non-

academic and more practical way of doing philosophy, less burdened by the “scholarly teaching of philosophy and especially of the history of philosophy, which has always had a tendency to insist on the theoretical, abstract, and conceptual aspect of philosophy.”<sup>47</sup> Although Pierre Hadot’s defense of a philosophy that originates in and leads back to a lifestyle is inspired by ancient *Western* thought, he senses that this view may breach the modern gap between East and West: “It seems to me now . . . that there really are troubling analogies between the philosophical attitudes of Antiquity and those of the East” and that “the Ancients were perhaps closer to the East than we are.”<sup>48</sup>

*Tenth, the history of the expressions for Chinese philosophy since the late nineteenth century.*<sup>49</sup> The contemporary Chinese term for “philosophy” (*zhexue* 哲学) did not exist in ancient China; it was coined in Japan on the basis of the words for “wisdom” and “learning.” *Tetsugaku* 哲学 was one of the Japanese terms used for “philosophy.” Nishi Amane (or Kono) introduced it in his translation of Western philosophy (in 1873) in order to distinguish the latter from Eastern thought, which was dominated by Confucianism. But the term went its own way, so that Tokyo University initiated a Chair in “Chinese Literature and Chinese Philosophy” in 1881, and Peking University had its “Chinese Philosophy Section” (*Zhongguo Zhexue Men*) in 1914. Early on, Chinese scholars used the expression *zhexue* in relation to Chinese thought; among them were Liang Qichao (1902), Wang Guowei (1905), Liu Shipai (1906), and Xie Wuliang (1916), followed by Hu Shi (1917), Liang Shuming (1921), Feng Youlan (1930), Fan Shoukang (1937), Zhao Jibin (1939), Zhang Dainian (1937), and many others. The various episodes of this evolution, which some have called “a historical mistake,”<sup>50</sup> have been fairly well documented on the basis of translations of Western books, titles of university departments and courses, and early articles and books using the expression, first in Japan and then in China.<sup>51</sup>

The implications involved in the creation of philosophy departments and the retrospective application of philosophy to the corpus of ancient Chinese texts can hardly be overstated. There was a strong political and psychological urge to take part in this radical change: the majority of Chinese intellectuals believed that the re-interpretation of their ancient masters was necessary for communicating and competing with the West.<sup>52</sup> But questions were asked as to whether Chinese thought was philosophy; if so, which part of it was and what type of philosophy it was; and what its value was compared to Western philosophy, its relevance to the world, its interpretation in Western versus Chinese categories, and its influence on the concept of philosophy itself.

### *III. The Silence Surrounding Sensitivity*

Discussions about the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy tend to focus on one or more of the ten topics outlined above, not always clearly distinguished. In relegating these debates to the periphery I do not mean to minimize their importance. On the contrary, I am convinced that the histories of the terminology involved are important, as are reflections about the value of ancient Chinese thought, its philosophical

relevance, the meaning of the term philosophy, and the implications of philosophical jargon and institutions. I have relegated all these debates to the periphery only in order to distinguish them from the topic that they tend to suffocate with an overdose of arguments and data.

One may wonder what else remains to be said when this whole periphery has been fully examined. Perhaps not very much, but enough to hold our attention for a while. Of course, I would not have put aside all the surrounding debates if I were not convinced that something important is consistently being left out; in other words, that all the other debates are really in a sense the periphery of something more crucial. I believe that the weakness of the arguments in favor of Chinese philosophy on the one hand and the deafness on the part of mainly Western philosophers on the other cannot be exclusively attributed to nationalist, chauvinistic, or ethnocentric reactions. They are also the result of our relation to the concept of (Chinese) philosophy, a topic that is sensitive on both sides of the globe.

The problem with sensitive topics is that people avoid them. The present search will hence first be an exercise in noticing what is not there, what is not being explicitly said. Searching for what is absent is a difficult quest, which can of course never be exhaustive.<sup>53</sup> A reading of the prefaces and introductory chapters of standard works on Chinese philosophy shows that its legitimacy is largely assumed. Only a minority of all the scholars working on Chinese philosophy explicitly tackle this question. The most lively periods of debate were, first, at the introduction of the concept of Chinese philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century and, second, during the period of self-reflection beginning at the end of the twentieth century. Despite the real concern of these scholars with the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy in these two periods—or perhaps because of it—they have not provided any conclusive argumentation as to whether it actually exists.

#### *The Introduction of Something New but Very Old at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century*

For the first period, I will focus on those two thinkers whose work was substantial in the retrospective discovery or creation of Chinese philosophy: Hu Shi (1891–1962) and Feng Youlan (1895–1990).<sup>54</sup> Both presentations of Chinese philosophy in its historical evolution describe something relatively new and unknown, but at the same time age-old and very valuable. Although, in this new combination of East and West, “philosophy” is the foreign part while the “Chinese” texts are relatively familiar, it is the former that is passed over rather lightly. Many Chinese contemporaries of Hu and Feng have applauded the two prominent initiators of Chinese philosophy and have “unconsciously started using the term ‘philosophy’.”<sup>55</sup> Some have criticized them for various reasons, but only a very few, to my knowledge, have consistently questioned their easy acceptance of the legitimacy of “Chinese philosophy.”<sup>56</sup>

Hu Shi, for instance, does not directly treat the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy, although it constitutes the cornerstone of his work. The introduction of his *Zhongguo zhhexueshi dagang* (Outline of Chinese philosophy) begins with the state-

ment, "The definition of philosophy has never been fixed. I will for the moment temporarily make a definition: 'In general, a discipline that studies the most important questions of human life, a fundamental reflection that wants to find a fundamental solution to these questions: this is called philosophy'."<sup>57</sup> He then shows, but without much argumentation, that China possessed one of the world's two major philosophies. Not only does Hu Shi treat his definition as relatively unimportant and generally accepted, he also considers the Chinese appropriation of the term quite unproblematic.<sup>58</sup>

Something similar happens in Feng Youlan's work. The introduction to the first volume of his *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, translated and rewritten by Derk Bodde and Feng Youlan, focuses on three points: the nature of Chinese philosophy, the claim that it lacks system, and the claim that it lacks progressive growth. It does not begin by arguing that the subject matter of his book exists. Perhaps the oversight can be explained by the fact that we are looking at a partial translation from which, as Bodde explains, "portions, which it was felt would be of less interest to westerners, have been omitted."<sup>59</sup> Conscious omissions, made by Bodde in consultation with Feng Youlan, may be an interesting starting point to read what was once there but is now being left out. Indeed, the Chinese edition begins with a reflection on the content of philosophy: "Philosophy is a Western term. An important task now, if one wishes to discuss the history of Chinese philosophy, is to select and narrate what in all types of learning throughout Chinese history can be named according to what the West calls philosophy." It also indicates that "The term philosophy has known a long history in the West, and each philosopher's definition of philosophy is different. For the sake of convenience, I will now describe what is generally considered the content of philosophy. Once we know its content, we can then know what sort of thing it is and we don't need to mention any other formal definition of the term."<sup>60</sup>

Having thus remarked that there is no fixed definition of philosophy, Feng makes a temporary, demonstrative definition in order to proceed with what really matters to him: to show that some ancient Chinese thinkers did exactly that. He determines, both in the Chinese and the English versions, what has always belonged to philosophy, from Plato onwards—physics, ethics, and logic.<sup>61</sup> Then he searches the Chinese corpus of texts for similarities or he explains their absence. The next passage literally occurs in the English edition, arranging philosophy along with "learning of the mystery" (*xuanxue*) in the Wei and Jin dynasties, "learning of the truth" (*daoxue*) in the Song and Ming, and "learning of the principles" (*yili zhi xue* 義理之學) in the Qing, and concludes that "we find that these problems resemble to a considerable degree those of western philosophy."<sup>62</sup> And finally, Feng indicates, again for Chinese readers alone, that one could just as well write a history of the *yili zhi xue* of China and even of the West, but that philosophy is in fact a better alternative since it is a modern concept from the West that fits better with all other current modern types of learning introduced into China. "This is why recently there have only been works on the history of Chinese philosophy and none on the history of Western *yili zhi xue*. Therefore, below I will always use the terms 'Chinese philosophy' and 'Chinese philosopher'."<sup>63</sup>

What does all this say about things left unsaid? As Wu Xiao-ming remarks, in Feng Youlan's work "the original Western word 'philosophy' is taken for granted from the very beginning as a suitable name for Chinese thought and culture. There is no question concerning the concept or the name 'philosophy' itself."<sup>64</sup> Indeed, in all Feng Youlan's subtle reflections on philosophy and on the ancient Chinese masters, their basic correspondence is largely taken for granted. Feng's various definitions of the concept of philosophy throughout his career confirm this assumption of familiarity.<sup>65</sup> It is obvious for him that philosophy has something to do with a rational, systematic, original, subdivided inquiry into fundamental matters of human life and the world. The core of his work, the presentation of ancient Chinese thought as philosophy, is shrouded in vagueness and constitutes a vicious circle: on the basis of a particular, modern Western, neorealist view of philosophy, Feng makes a selection from the Chinese corpus, and on the basis of these texts, he is willing to adapt his search for philosophy.<sup>66</sup> For instance, when the ancient masters do not appear to be systematic at all, Feng explains that they lack a "formal" system, but that the historian's task is to search for the "real" system in their thought.

This lack of argumentation is not something to hold against Feng. Every system of thought is constructed on the basis of some axioms, some unfounded principles; moreover, considering the absence of agreement on the definition of "philosophy" even among Western philosophers, the vicious circle in Feng's work cannot be avoided.<sup>67</sup> Along with this argumentative absence comes the second aspect of sensitivity, namely the presence of emotions. Feng's claim—addressed only to Chinese readers—that a Chinese indigenous term could just as well characterize both Chinese and Western thought were it not for some practical, organizational inconveniences, is a first indication of his personal involvement as a member of Chinese culture. This is further confirmed by a close comparison of the remaining passage in the Chinese and English editions:

[Chinese] Although the philosophy of Chinese philosophers lacks formal system, if one were to say that the philosophy of Chinese philosophers lacks any real system, then it would be equivalent to saying that the philosophy of Chinese philosophers amounts to nothing, that China has no philosophy. . . .

According to what has just been said, if the philosophy of a philosopher can be labeled philosophy, then it must have a real system. What is called the system of a philosophical system refers to the real system of a philosophy. Although the formal system of the philosophy of the Chinese philosophers is not as good as that of Western philosophers, in fact the real system is there.<sup>68</sup>

[English] It may be admitted that Chinese philosophy lacks formal system; but if one were to say that it therefore lacks any real system, meaning that there is no organic unity of ideas to be found in Chinese philosophy, it would be equivalent to say that Chinese philosophy is not philosophy and that China has no philosophy. . . .

According to what has just been said, philosophy in order to be philosophy must have *real* system, and although Chinese philosophy, formally speaking, is less systematic than that of the West, in its actual content it has just as much system as does western philosophy."<sup>69</sup>

To avoid the risk of over interpretation, I will refrain from lingering over the small differences between these two versions. Like Hu Shi, Feng Youlan hardly argues for the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy. Denying this is clearly unthinkable and only arouses indignation, especially in the Chinese edition: "it would be equivalent to saying that the philosophy of Chinese philosophers *amounts to nothing*, that China has no philosophy"—in other words, that China and its ancient intellectual tradition is culturally inferior.<sup>70</sup>

It is far from my intention to argue that Hu and Feng merely evidenced strong feelings combined with weak arguments. On the contrary, the absence of a solid argument for the existence of Chinese philosophy shows that however new their interpretation was, Chinese philosophy belonged to the background of their reflections rather than the foreground, that it was largely assumed rather than in need of sound proof, and that it was too obvious and crucial to be called into question. Their concern was with "Chinese" rather than with "philosophy." They occasionally joined the Western discussion of what "true philosophy" was, but mainly in order to use the concept as it seemed obvious to them, in order revitalize their own tradition and empower their endangered nation. Feng Youlan's intention, especially in the Chinese edition, was as much to teach his Chinese audience about the nature and advantages of philosophical interpretation as it was to convince Western philosophers that China also had a philosophy.<sup>71</sup>

#### *Reactions to Something Intimately Strange at the End of the Twentieth Century*

Now that Chinese philosophy has become a common concept in contemporary China, after almost a century of academic activity in the field, it has again turned into a subject of reflection, an unsolved problem. According to Chen Jian, it is a fish-bone that remains stuck in the throats of Chinese philosophers.<sup>72</sup> Doubts are growing about the digestion of this foreign ingredient in the Chinese body of thought. The sensitivity of the matter has not decreased with this strangeness lodged within the daily practices of many professionals. The silence of most contemporary scholars on the topic and the emotional commitment of others confirm that the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy is still, as Ge Zhaoguang puts it, "a very serious and even sacred matter."<sup>73</sup>

The silence of the majority lies in the fact that most scholars in the field simply do not discuss the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy.<sup>74</sup> They either assume that it exists or, if pressed to answer, come up with a simple definition in the style of Hu Shi and Feng Youlan.<sup>75</sup> It is usually presented or briefly discussed in the preface or a footnote, as a stepping stone toward more interesting matters.<sup>76</sup> There is no harm in this, since we all think and work against a background of shared terms, current discussions, common concerns, old habits, and new vogues.<sup>77</sup> Nobody is expected to provide a rational foundation for each and all of them before discussing specific matters. Nor would this be possible, since every foundation can again be further questioned and hence demand more foundation. But, of course, one *can* reflect on one's background and question specific habits or assumptions. Philosophers have a tendency to do exactly that. While Chinese philosophy is one of those entities that

are embedded in institutional structures, journals, and conferences, the question of its legitimacy is one that can be fruitfully reflected upon.

This is indeed what has happened since the end of the twentieth century, when the “legitimacy of Chinese philosophy” gained the status of hot topic in the field. As a result, a drastic increase in subtlety and variation has occurred both in the argumentation and the emotions involved, too abundant to describe here in a few sentences. As to the former, one recurring line of argumentation correctly points out that the problem cannot be simply solved because of the absence of a transparent definition of philosophy as an absolute norm against which the ancient Chinese texts could be checked; there is no *fā* (standard) to determine the *hefaxing* (legitimacy, appropriateness).<sup>78</sup> This impossibility of providing a conclusive proof for the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy does not necessarily indicate an argumentative weakness, but perhaps indicates, on the contrary, a growing involvement in philosophical discourse. Among the wide variety of emotions involved, there are mild or strong instances of the following: a concern with the Chinese cultural legacy, an awareness of crisis, feelings of challenge, indignation about Western arrogance and cultural imperialism or Chinese criticism,<sup>79</sup> excitement about China’s revival,<sup>80</sup> dissatisfaction with the quality of Chinese philosophy,<sup>81</sup> enthusiasm for new intellectual currents, and a growing sense of autonomy and confidence.<sup>82</sup> All in all there is a dominance of positive feelings, a willingness to improve the quality of contemporary Chinese philosophy,<sup>83</sup> and a hope for respect, recognition, and true dialogue with the West.<sup>84</sup>

As there is nothing wrong with the absence of a conclusive argument in favor of Chinese philosophy, the presence of some sort of emotional commitment is not objectionable either. It demands some courage to admit this commitment in publications for a Western audience. Not surprisingly, some scholars mention their *previous* disappointment or embarrassment in contact with Western philosophers only after they declare the problem solved. Toward the end of his *Short History of Chinese Philosophy* Feng Youlan indicates that he has “been somewhat embarrassed” when asked about the contribution of Chinese philosophy to the philosophy of the world. But “now that the reader has gained some acquaintance with the traditions of Chinese philosophy,” Feng feels more confident about answering these questions.<sup>85</sup> Lao Sze-kwang also concludes by stating that he “had been puzzled and disappointed” by “the lack of communication between philosophical societies with different traditions” before he realized that “the obstacle was in the concept of philosophy” and that, by this insight, was presumably removed.<sup>86</sup> More important than this emotional commitment is how one relates to it. And this, together with the vagueness of the term philosophy, is the point on which I would like to dwell for a while.

#### IV. “(Chinese) Philosophy” as a Proper Name

The sensitivity surrounding the status of Chinese philosophy is often seen as a drawback, something immature to be overcome by a more scientific or rational approach. This view is related to one’s understanding of the nature of the concept of “philoso-

phy." Chen Jian speculates that the term "philosophy" is unproblematic for Westerners, since they first invented it and were thus free to use it like a personal or proper name (*mingzi* 名字) for any type of thought that they wished to label as such. But when the Chinese took over this foreign label a century ago, it had become a generic noun, so that they are now confronted with the question of whether this noun (*ming* 名) is appropriate (*zheng* 正) for the type of thought that has retrospectively been labeled by it.<sup>87</sup> The argumentation surrounding its identification with the ancient Chinese masters confirms that since its introduction in China, "philosophy" has indeed been considered a generic noun. But even in the West, "philosophy" has never merely functioned as a proper name, an arbitrary label of some author's thought. If that had been the case, there would have been little sense in discussing its characteristics and criteria. We know that from its very conception on Greek soil, "philosophy" was a debated term among Socrates' disciples and was never used as a merely personal label. The expectation of rational argumentation and the possibility of debate is thus related to the view of "philosophy" not as a personal name but as a generic term.<sup>88</sup>

But fixation on this argumentation has a pernicious consequence, namely that attention is being constantly diverted from something else: the emotions surrounding the question and the ineffectiveness of arguments to solve it. My focus on this aspect of the problem is not meant to dismiss all the rational arguments that have been brought up by others, but rather to supplement them with a positive appreciation of their limitations. I have argued elsewhere that Wittgenstein's idea of family resemblances could be used, and not only negatively, in order to discourage the search for a common essence dwelling behind all the manifestations of philosophy,<sup>89</sup> but also to highlight something positive.<sup>90</sup> The members of a family may not all share a common essence, but there is something else that binds them: a family name. In contrast to a generic noun, whose meaning may be the object of debate, the average family name is something arbitrary and largely devoid of meaning. It has no abstract essence and cannot be defined. The sensitivity of discussions concerning philosophy also lies, I believe, in the fact that this term, to some (even though minor) extent, functions like a family name.<sup>91</sup>

The history of philosophy in the West can then be read as the chronicle of a large family or clan. Descendants are usually born through the study of philosophy, then lecturing and publishing in it. Now and then a bastard is spawned, from literature, linguistics, history, or anthropology, whose right to the family name is unclear or disputed. As in many families, adoption can incite protest, particularly when many foreign masters come to claim the name. Some family members simply do not want an outsider to adopt their name, even though they do not quite know why they are themselves deserving of that name. Their protest cannot be adequately founded because there are no defensible criteria or intrinsic reasons to deny this name to others. But the absence of a crystal-clear criterion of what exactly philosophy is only makes the question that much more sensitive.

Therefore, however intimate a proper name is, it also remains ex-timate.<sup>92</sup> Its "unhomeliness," according to Rudi Visker, is due to a lack of control: one does not

choose it, nor can one determine what it means, what privileges or duties are attached to it. The emptiness of the family name thus maintains uncertainty concerning not only the question of who has rights to it but also the responsibilities it imposes. "The name, as it were, always leaves its job half done, it suggests that there is something proper to its bearer, but there is never 'enough' of the name to know what that something consists in, and yet always 'too much' to simply ignore what it thus singles out." One must hold the name high, but what are its demands? We are attached to something that remains inaccessible to us; we are rooted in our "uprootedness." This passive relation to one's name forces the subject out of its own center. The subject is thus "attached to something to which it does not find access and from which it cannot rid itself, because it is that to which it owes its singularity."<sup>93</sup>

Our Chinese colleagues find themselves in a somewhat different predicament: while their academic activity also derives meaning from the framework within which they operate, they are aware that one of their forefathers was an adopted child.<sup>94</sup> They know that even after a century, Western philosophers often do not consider them family members of equal standing. Some of them reject the adoption and prefer to function without the name and demands of "philosophy." Fu Sinian once remarked in a private letter to Gu Jiegang: "I do not approve of Mr. Hu Shi's designation of the records of Laozi, Confucius, Mozi, et al. as the history of philosophy. China did not originally have a so-called philosophy; thank god for giving our tribe such a healthy practice."<sup>95</sup> He also once declared German philosophy the result of "the bad habits of the German language."<sup>96</sup> But the majority of our Chinese colleagues, following Feng Youlan or Hu Shi, propose that the masters do belong to the great philosophical family. Only some among that majority demand or predict that the family will adapt itself to its adopted children.<sup>97</sup>

Another difference is that "philosophy" in China probably has fewer proper-name qualities than in the West. Indeed, it tends more toward a generic noun. Since it became part of the expression "Chinese philosophy," the name "Philosophy" in itself has lost some of its sensitivity to the name "Chinese": while the former may retain something foreign, the latter indicates home. "Chinese" contains characteristics of a proper name more clearly than the term "philosophy" does: nationality as the name of one's group.<sup>98</sup> Again, there is an attachment to being American or European, French or Chinese, although we do not know what exactly these names mean. In his analysis of attitudes toward national feelings in terms of attachments to proper names, Visker identifies two opposite attempts to re-center the de-centered subject. The former is the sort of nationalism (or other types of particularism) that tries to fill in completely the emptiness that comes with a name. It admits that people are attached to something and believes that they can get total access to it. Confident statements about the essence of being Chinese are instances of this strategy. The opposite attempt can be associated with universalism, which sees the particular name as something irrelevant, since it is arbitrary and impossible to describe uniquely. In their opposition to the essentialist claims of particularism, universalists stress the fact that Chineseness simply does not exist, thus rejecting expressions of particularistic attachment as nationalistic delusions. Both are attempts—very common but mis-

guided, according to Visker—to regain control, to undo the uncomfortable position of *finding oneself* attached to something that one does not totally know, something one has not actively attached oneself to. One reason why we can never know with certainty whether “Chinese philosophy” is a proper (*zheng*) name (*ming*) is precisely because it has some features of a proper name.

#### V. Attachments to (Chinese) Philosophy

The description of “Philosophy” as a proper name is not proposed here as a theory on names, but rather as an analysis of attachment. A proper name—one’s family name or nationality—can be seen as paradigmatic for something that is both sensitive and yet relatively meaningless, such as one’s gender, race, or species. We are attached to it without knowing exactly what it is. To the admittedly minor extent that “(Western) Philosophy” and “Chinese (Philosophy)” function like proper names, we belong to them as to our family or tribe.<sup>99</sup> This type of belonging, combining familiarity with the ultimately unfamiliar, can shed light on the sensitivity of the question.

A first characteristic of a family or tribe is that its common norms and daily habits are largely implicit. The parochial context predates and shapes the subject; few things are more irritating for an outsider than these meaningless habits. Implicit views of philosophy, as one largely acquires them during one’s academic training in a particular setting, are like habits. Most philosophers in the West do not reflect at length about the definition of philosophy before excluding the Chinese masters. This rejection belongs to the background of philosophical activity, while its acceptance has largely lived an equally implicit life in China. Many Chinese scholars, sinologists, and some Western philosophers are vexed by this implicit exclusion of Chinese philosophy on the basis of what they consider exclusively Western and even modern criteria.<sup>100</sup> Robert Solomon warns against getting “trapped and suffocated by our own history” now that our philosophy “has become a constricted, oppressive, and ethnocentric one,” so that not only other cultures but also the Western premodern past risks being excluded.<sup>101</sup>

But when contemporary Western scholars seriously reflect on the meaning of philosophy, as philosophers occasionally do, they tend to disagree with these implicit norms and with each other. In their reflections, a second characteristic of family bonding is often revealed, namely emotional commitment, predominantly one of pride. For instance, one can say of Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida, Deleuze, and Guattari that each in his own way seems to be thinking of philosophy as a tribal activity, something particular to his own culture.<sup>102</sup> Even though they consider philosophy universal in its ambitions, claims, interest, relevance, or historical evolution, they are fascinated by the early Greeks as by their own ancestors.<sup>103</sup> They are proud of philosophy in a way that a Chinese may be proud of shadowboxing. And they reject the idea of an ancient “Chinese philosophy” just as Chinese people would deny that the West has always had its *Táijiquan*. Scholars of Chinese thought tend to be more

proud of the Chinese intellectual heritage—whether or not labeled as philosophy—than about philosophy.

This combination of implicit ethnocentrism and explicit cultural pride may sound like a comfortable position. But the analogy with the proper name further suggests a third characteristic, namely a dimension of strangeness in one's own home. Belonging to a certain family or tribe is beyond one's personal control: not only it is a given and not-chosen fact; its meaning is also largely determined by others. From very early on in life, one is identified by others as belonging to that family. The fact that we have not consciously and carefully chosen a certain family does not make the bond any weaker. On the contrary, consciously chosen bonds—for example, marriage or adoption—often turn out to be the weakest in a family.<sup>104</sup> The emotional commitment that ensues from these bonds is complex. Pride is only one possible part of it and a rather intriguing one. But there are often other emotions involved in one's belonging to a tribe, such as love and concern, but also embarrassment, shame, or even guilt. Without having chosen to be American or Chinese, one nevertheless feels attached to one's nationality: proudly or shamefully, gratefully or reluctantly, or a mixture of all these and other emotions.

Fourth, the strongest type of attachment is probably not to the family into which one is born, but to one's own children. Although parents nowadays can choose to have children, they cannot (yet) determine how a child will be. However it turns out, parents tend to love it dearly. They know that this feeling does not depend on a judgment concerning the child's character or features, but on the mere fact that this child happens to be theirs. Since parents know that their attachment is deeper than all the good reasons they can give in support of it, they can accept a neighbor's relative indifference toward their child. Although they may occasionally expound on the many reasons for their pride, they also consider it a matter of good taste not to overdo this. One can be impressed by one's own tradition and give descriptions of its merits, but recognition and admiration by others cannot be forced. There should always be some acceptance of the failure of argumentation in this matter. Overly self-confident statements on the nature of Chinese philosophy and insistence on its absolute superiority in the world are not only a breach of good manners, but they also indicate one's incapacity to stand the predicament of being, in Visker's terms, de-centered.<sup>105</sup> Milder and tentative reflections suggest, paradoxically, a more confident acceptance of this predicament.<sup>106</sup>

Fifth, besides a lack of control over one's emotional entanglement and the limits of argumentation, family relations are also characterized by a failure to understand fully. Deleuze and Guattari explicitly distinguish their reflection on the nature of philosophy from hurried thoughts on the topic, such as when "one kept asking the question, but too indirectly or obliquely, too artificially, too abstractly, and one exposed on it, dominated it, in passing rather than being grabbed by it. . . . One was too eager to do philosophy, so that one failed to ask oneself what it was." The reflection they undertake is not young or overly confident, but comes with old age, occurs at midnight, when one wonders: "But what is it that I have been doing all my

life?"<sup>107</sup> Perhaps because "philosophie" in French is a female noun, the authors' approach reminds one of a loving and lucid husband who, after several decades of married life, still wonders about the peculiarities of his wife's character, the mysteries of his most intimate companion. Philosophy loses her air of transparency as one really tries to see through her mysteries. According to Derrida, philosophy is never a given: despite the fact that philosophy is from our soil, it has always retained something foreign: "Under her Greek name and in her European memory, she has always been a bastard, hybrid, grafted, multilinear, polyglot."<sup>108</sup> Concise definitions and general statements in footnotes or prefaces concerning the definition of philosophy are usually no indications of a close acquaintance with her.

And finally, we tend to forget that philosophy is a "love" affair that one has with "wisdom." Love affairs are not always as innocent as the lifelong fascination with one's partner: they make philosophers jealous, uncertain, and unfair toward others. Although the *philo* for *sophia*—the *ai* 爱, which does *not* occur in Chinese neologisms for "philosophy"<sup>109</sup>—is usually understood as a continuous search for wisdom or some form of blissful contemplation, it may also be seen as a source of painful contention and unfair exclusion.<sup>110</sup> It is easy to recognize the threat posed by the enormous Chinese corpus of texts to the average Western professor, who will never master its difficult scripts. Like a jealous husband, he rejects the Chinese rival without knowing him. This mechanism of exclusion on a more philosophical level is analyzed by Wu Xiao-ming as the "relation of philosophy with the irreducible other that it nevertheless endeavors to reduce."<sup>111</sup> The aim of Western philosophy is to determine its own identity by excluding the other: China. Chinese thought is presented as nonphilosophy, the limit of philosophy, its proper other. Being "the only discourse that has ever intended to receive its name from itself,"<sup>112</sup> philosophy thus reappropriates the other as exactly that what is excluded.

The six family features that I have identified with attachments to "Chinese" and "philosophy"—implicit norms, parochial pride, lack of control, limits of argumentation, lack of knowledge, and jealousy—are only part of a larger picture. On the one hand, much more could be said about the role of pride, identification, and recognition in this matter. But on the other hand, the question of the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy should not be reduced to that. Of course, rational arguments and historical data, as presented by Raud and a large group of contemporary Chinese scholars, retain their relevance, as long as one respects their limits. The silence surrounding the disagreement, the relative inefficiency of arguments, and the emotional commitment to the topic suggest that something crucial is being left out: the uncomfortable predicament of being attached to something that one has no access to. Although increasing cultural contacts may allow Western and Chinese scholars to become more familiar with each other, and thus perhaps—not necessarily—to understand and appreciate each other better, there will always be some attachment to tribal habits, as there is to one's own children. The lack of a perfect mutual understanding may be counterbalanced by some understanding of why we do not totally understand each other.

## Notes

This article is based on a presentation given at the Fairbank seminar “Philosophy as a Way of Life: Moral Psychology in Classical Chinese Philosophy,” at Harvard University, May 24–25, 2003, organized by Yang Xiao.

- 1 – Hu Shi, *Zhongguo zhhexueshi dagang*, pp. 5–6.
- 2 – Feng Youlan, *The Hall of Three Pines*, p. 373.
- 3 – Feng Youlan, *Zhongguo Zhhexueshi xinbian*, p. 209.
- 4 – Zheng Jiadong, “‘Zhongguo zhhexue’ de ‘hefaxing’ wenti,” p. 1.
- 5 – Lin, Rosemont, and Ames, “Chinese Philosophy,” p. 747. See also Solomon, “‘What is Philosophy?’” p. 103, and Thoraval, “Expérience confucéenne et discours philosophique,” p. 65.
- 6 – See also Deleuze and Guattari, *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* pp. 88–91, which will be discussed further in section 5 below. For a discussion of the views of Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger, see Wu Xiao-ming, “Philosophy, *Philosophia*, and *Zhe-xue*,” pp. 411–432.
- 7 – Translated in Ching and Oxtoby, *Moral Enlightenment*, p. 223.
- 8 – See the quotes below and the discussion in Creel, *Chinese Civilization in Liberal Education*, pp. 132–169.
- 9 – See Chen Jian, “Zhongguo zhhexue heyi neng chengli,” p. 7.
- 10 – Yang Haiwen, “Zhongguo zhhexue de ‘hefaxing weiji’ yu chongxie Zhongguo zhhexueshi,” p. 10. See, for instance, *Zhongguo zhhexue*, 2002.11; *Renmin daxue xuebao*, 2003.2; and *Jiangnan luntan*, 2003.7.
- 11 – Wei Changbao, “Zhongguo zhhexue de ‘hefaxing’ xushi ji qi chaoyue,” p. 7, where he cites the Shanghai journal 学术月刊 (Academics monthly) and 文汇报 (Reading weekly).
- 12 – Chen Zhiliang, “Lun dangdai Zhongguo zhhexue yanjiu zhong de qianyan wenti,” p. 75. Together with Ge Zhaoguang, I am preparing several issues of the translation journal *Contemporary Chinese Thought* on this recent debate on contemporary China.
- 13 – Defoort, “Is There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy?” pp. 393–413, offers a typology of four positions. For other typologies of views in this debate, see Chen Duoxu, “Zhongguo zhhexueshi xiezuo xiangguan wenti de taolun shuping,” pp. 29–30; Chen Wenjuan, “Qiantan ‘Zhongguo zhhexue’ de ‘hefaxing’ wenti,” p. 44; and Jing Haifeng, “Zhhexueshi leixing yu Zhongguo sixiang de xushu fangshi,” p. 13 n. 2.
- 14 – In his discussion preceding this one in the present issue of *Philosophy East and West*, Raud seems to consider my article an attempt to “settle” the matter,

and my family model a way to solve the problem. In fact, I try rather to analyze one cause of the unsolvable and unsettled state of the debate. See sections 4 and 5 below.

- 15 – Unlike many others, Zheng Jiadong clearly distinguishes between ancient “Chinese philosophy” and its contemporary continuation (Zheng Jiadong, “‘Zhongguo zhhexueshi’ xiezuozuo yu Zhongguo sixiang chuantong de xiandai kunjing,” p. 3). Li Ming considers only the latter to be “Chinese philosophy” (Li Ming, “‘Zhongguo zhhexue,’” p. 9). Michael Friedrich and Joël Thoraval even question the legitimacy of contemporary Chinese philosophy (Friedrich, *De Inventione Sinarum Philosophiae*, p. 4, and Thoraval, “Expérience confucéenne et discours philosophique,” pp. 70–72).
- 16 – With Feng Youlan, I consider premodern the period that precedes the large-scale introduction of Western thought and institutions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For Hu Shi, modern thought begins with Song-Ming philosophy.
- 17 – Lin, Rosemont, and Ames, “Chinese Philosophy,” pp. 746–747.
- 18 – See Thoraval, “De la philosophie en Chine à la ‘Chine’ dans la philosophie,” pp. 9–10, and section 2, topic 10 below.
- 19 – See also Gan Chunsong, “Zhongguo zhhexue he zhhexue zai Zhongguo,” p. 191.
- 20 – See, for instance, Mou Zongsan, *Zhongguo zhhexue shijiu jiang*, pp. 1–3; Ren Jie, “‘Zhongguo youwu zhhexue’ zhi wo jian,” p. 5; and Zheng Jiadong, “‘Hefaxing’ gainian ji qita,” pp. 4–6.
- 21 – See, for instance, Lin, Rosemont, and Ames, “Chinese Philosophy,” pp. 744–745; Peng Guoxiang, “Hefaxing shiyu yu zhutixing,” p. 38; Zhang Zhiwei, “Zhongguo zhhexue haishi Zhongguo sixiang,” p. 18; Hu Jun, “‘Zhongguo zhhexue’ ‘hefaxing’ taolun de hefaxing wenti,” p. 76; Yang Haiwen, “Zhongguo zhhexue de ‘hefaxing weiji’ yu chongxie Zhongguo zhhexueshi,” pp. 10–11; and Chen Renren, “Zhongguo zhhexue de hefaxing yu Zhongguo zhhexue de zijue,” pp. 17–18. Thoraval and Lao Sze-kwang suggest to avoid essentialist discussions and instead work with a strategic definition, stating clearly what one calls philosophy before making further assessments on the nature of the Chinese texts. For Thoraval, see his “Expérience confucéenne et discours philosophique,” pp. 67–68; for Lao Sze-kwang, see his “On Understanding Chinese Philosophy,” p. 267. I believe that this suggestion overestimates one’s control over the term “philosophy” and underestimates its current emotive force; see sections 4 and 5 below.
- 22 – See Ge Zhaoguang, “Chuan yijian chizun buhe de yishan,” pp. 49–50, 54. Ge considers it “a false question” but “full with true history and true feelings” (Ge Zhaoguang, “Wei shenme shi sixiangshi,” p. 24). See also Zhang Liwen, “Zhongguo zhhexue de ‘ziji jiang’ ‘jiang ziji,’” p. 2.

- 23 – See, for instance, Zhang Dainian, *Zhongguo zhexue dagang*, p. 2; Li Zhonghua, “Zhongguo zhexue de licheng,” p. 55; and Feng Youlan, cited in section 3 below (under “The Introduction of Something New . . .”).
- 24 – Hegel thought that Confucius was “only a man who has a certain amount of practical and worldly wisdom—one with whom there is no speculative philosophy. We may conclude from his original works that for their reputation it would have been better had they never been translated (Hegel, *Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, pp. 120–121). He also discusses the *Yijing* and the *Laozi*, but concludes that “if Philosophy has got no further than to such expressions, it still stands on its most elementary stage. What is there to be found in all this learning?” (p. 125).
- 25 – See Du and Zhang, *Delida zai zhongguo jiangyanlu*, p. 139. In an interview, the Chinese scholar Wang Yuanhua tells about his conversation with Derrida at the diner table in Shanghai. As their most important topic of conversation he cites Derrida’s claim that “China has no philosophy, *only* thought” (my italics). I conjecture that this “only” is no literal citation of Derrida’s words, but was added by Wang Yuanhua. He reports that “the people at the table were stunned,” and, like most Chinese scholars citing this event, he naturally interprets this statement as rather dismissive of the Chinese intellectual tradition. See, for instance, Jing Haifeng, “Zhongguo zhexue mianlin de tiaozhan he shenfen chongjian,” p. 93; Zhang Liwen, “Zhongguo zhexue de ‘ziji jiang’ ‘jiang ziji,’” p. 4; Yang Haiwen, “Zhongguo zhexue de ‘hefaxing weiji’ yu chongxie Zhongguo zhexueshi,” pp. 11, 14; and Chen Zhiliang, “Lun dangdai Zhongguo zhexue yanjiu zhong de qianyan wenti,” p. 75. Some scholars do not understand Derrida’s remark as being particularly dismissive. See Zhang Zhiwei, “Zhongguo zhexue haishi Zhongguo sixiang,” pp. 17–18, and Chen Renren, “Zhongguo zhexue de hefaxing yu Zhongguo zhexue de zijue,” p. 15.
- 26 – Heidegger, *Was ist das—Die Philosophie?* p. 13.
- 27 – See, for instance, Chen Shaoming, “Chongti ‘Zhong zhexue’ de zhengdangxing,” p. 35, and Thoraval, “Expérience confucèenne et discours philosophique,” pp. 75–79.
- 28 – Many scholars make this point using the “forced feet” saying. See Ge Zhaoguang, *Zhongguo sixiang shi*, pp. 763–764; Peng Yongjie, “Lun Zhongguo zhexue xueke cunzai de hefaxing weiji,” p. 27; Chen Duoxu, “Zhongguo zhexueshi xiezuoxiangguan wenti de taolun shuping,” p. 30; Qiao Qingju, “Xifang huayu,” p. 68; Zheng Jiadong, “‘Hefaxing’ gainian ji qita,” pp. 5–6; and Jing Haifeng, “Zhexueshi leixing yu Zhongguo sixiang de xushu fangshi,” p. 15. Some scholars tend to forget that this problem is not only intercultural but also inter-temporal. The expressions *yili zhi xue* (study of right and principle) or even *daojia* (Daoist school) and *rujia* (Confucian school) are also anachronistic and thus somewhat forced upon pre-Han masters. For the in-

- evitability of such “distortions” in any act of interpretation, see Defoort, “Is There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy?” pp. 400–401.
- 29 – Thoraval, “Expérience confucéenne et discours philosophique,” p. 78. Zhang Xianglong shares this concern (Zhang Xianglong, “‘Zhongguo zhexue’, ‘daoshu’, haishi ke daoshuhua de guangyi zhexue?” p. 12), but he allows for a broader view of “philosophy” that includes these practices.
- 30 – See, for instance, Jing Haifeng, “Cong ‘zhexue’ dao ‘Zhongguo zhexue,’” pp. 31, 33, and Li Jinglin, “Xifang huayu baquan xia Zhongguo zhexue xueke hefaxing zhi fansi,” p. 22.
- 31 – Zheng Jiadong remarks that the differences in the study of Chinese philosophy throughout the twentieth century are only relative since they all rely on traditional Western norms and jargon (Zheng Jiadong, “‘Zhongguo zhexue’ de ‘hefaxing’ wenti,” p. 5). Ge Zhaoguang indicates another reason to avoid philosophy and its jargon, namely its heavy political associations with Marxism and materialism in contemporary China (Ge Zhaoguang, *Zhongguo sixiang shi*, p. 764).
- 32 – Ge Zhaoguang clearly distinguishes between using philosophy to interpret ancient Chinese texts and declaring them philosophy (Ge Zhaoguang, “Chuan yijian chizun buhe de yishan,” p. 53).
- 33 – See, for instance, Li Ming, “‘Zhongguo zhexue,’” pp. 7–8; Zhang Xianglong, “Zhongguo zhexue yanjiu fangfa de duoyuanhua,” pp. 14–15; and Jing Haifeng, “Zhexueshi leixing yu Zhongguo sixiang de xushu fangshi,” p. 14.
- 34 – A total avoidance of such neologisms is impossible and would render contemporary Chinese scholars speechless. See Ge Zhaoguang, “Chuan yijian chizun buhe de yishan,” p. 54; Ren Jie, “‘Zhongguo youwu zhexue’ zhi wo jian,” p. 5; Tang Wenming, “Gudian jiaohua sixiang de xiandai mingyun,” p. 59; Qiao Qingju, “Xifang huayu,” p. 70; and Hu Jun, “‘Zhongguo zhexue’ ‘hefaxing’ taolun de hefaxing wenti,” p. 77.
- 35 – See Defoort, “Chinese Scholars on Chinese Philosophy,” pp. 5–6; Defoort, “Is There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy?” pp. 400–401; Ge Zhaoguang, “Chuan yijian chizun buhe de yishan,” p. 54; Zhang Xianglong, “Zhongguo zhexue yanjiu fangfa de duoyuanhua,” p. 14; and Zheng Jiadong, “‘Hefaxing’ gainian ji qita,” pp. 4–5.
- 36 – See the preceding discussion by Raud in this issue of *Philosophy East and West*; Li Minghui, “Zhongguo meiyou zhexue ma” pp. 144–149; Chen Lai, “Guanyu ‘Zhongguo zhexue’ de ruogan wenti qianyi,” p. 23; Jing Haifeng, “Cong ‘zhexue’ dao ‘Zhongguo zhexue,’” p. 33; and Chen Zhiliang, “Lun dangdai Zhongguo zhexue yanjiu zhong de qianyan wenti,” p. 75.
- 37 – Thoraval, “Expérience confucéenne et discours philosophique,” p. 67. Peng Yongjie paraphrases the Chinese nationalist reaction of the early twentieth century as follows: “As for what others have, we have always had that, too,

or we now also need to have it, or we will certainly have it in the future" (Peng Yongjie, "Lun Zhongguo zhexue xueke cunzai de hefaxing weiji," p. 26).

- 38 – Ritter and Gründer, *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, pp. 572–590.
- 39 – Ibid., p. 577, referring to *Lysis* 218a.
- 40 – Possession of knowledge becomes important in Aristotle's concept of "philosophy. The *Historisches Wörterbuch* extracts various meanings of philosophy from Aristotle's work, among which are "the possession and use of wisdom," "the knowledge of first causes and principles," knowledge for its own sake, and the godlike act of man (Ritter and Gründer, *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, pp. 589, 586).
- 41 – Some Chinese scholars indicate that "love for wisdom" (*filo-sophia*) characterizes both early Greek and early Chinese thought. See, for instance, Chen Weiping, "Xingshang zhihui he shenghuo," p. 13; Ren Jie, "'Zhongguo youwu zhexue' zhi wo jian," p. 6; Li Zhonghua, "Zhongguo zhexue de licheng," p. 54; and Chen Renren "Zhongguo zhexue de hefaxing yu Zhongguo zhexue de zijue," p. 18. For the rejection of this adaequation, see the discussion of Deleuze and Guattari, *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* in part 5 below.
- 42 – See Ritter and Gründer, *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, pp. 577, 580.
- 43 – As Li Jinglin points out, the question of what philosophy is and whether ancient Chinese thought is philosophy is not a scientific question but is being asked from within a philosophical position (Li Jinglin, "Xifang huayu baquan xia Zhongguo zhexue xueke hefaxing zhi fansi," pp. 22–23). See also Ren Jie, "'Zhongguo youwu zhexue' zhi wo jian," p. 6.
- 44 – This is the description of philosophy (*like* 理科 or *feilusuo feiya* 非录所费亚) in the Jesuit educational system by Aleni in his *Xixue fan* (A summary of Western learning) of 1623 (Standaert, "The Classification of Sciences and the Jesuit Mission in Late Ming China," p. 294).
- 45 – Standaert, "The Classification of Sciences and the Jesuit Mission in Late Ming China," p. 315.
- 46 – See Ritter and Gründer, *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, pp. 731–732, and also Chen Lai, "Guanyu 'Zhongguo zhexue' de ruogan wenti qianyi," p. 21.
- 47 – The premodern European view of philosophy was at times also very academic but did not exclude the broader philosophical concern with a good life. Pierre Hadot attributes this more general philosophical concern to many modern and contemporary philosophers, including Kant (Hadot, *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie antique?* p. 412). Various Chinese scholars argue in favor of a non-institutionalized form of Chinese philosophy. See Hu Jun, "'Zhongguo

zhexue' 'hefaxing' taolun de hefaxing wenti," p. 77, and Li Jinglin, "Chongjian zhexue yu shenghuo de lianxi," pp. 13–16.

- 48 – Hadot, *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie antique?* pp. 419, 421. In the last quote, he cites J.-L. Solère, who writes about Indian thought. Many Chinese scholars stress the difference between the focus on theoretical knowledge in (modern) Western philosophy and the importance of wisdom, experience, education, and life orientation in Chinese philosophy. See, for instance, Lao Sze-kwang, "On Understanding Chinese Philosophy," p. 277; Chen Weiping, "Xingshang zhihui he shenghuo," p. 13; Zhang Xianglong, "Zhongguo zhexue yanjiu fangfa de duoyuanhua," pp. 10–11, and Li Jinglin, "Xifang huayu baquan xia Zhongguo zhexue xueke hefaxing zhi fansi," p. 26. Peng Guoxiang makes explicit reference to the views of Pierre Hadot (Peng Guoxiang, "Hefaxing shiyu yu zhutixing," p. 38).
- 49 – Mainly *Zhongguo zhexue* 中國哲學, but also *Zhina zhexue* 支那哲學. For the history of terms see Chen Jidong, "Wailai gainian de Zhexue shifou Zhongguo guyou?" pp. 49–53.
- 50 – Peng Yongjie, "Lun Zhongguo zhexue xueke cunzai de hefaxing weiji," p. 26.
- 51 – Many articles on the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy describe this crucial period. See, for instance, Zhong Shaohua, "Qingmo Zhongguoren duiyu 'zhexue' de zhuiqiu," pp. 159–189; Thoraval, "De la philosophie en Chine à la 'Chine' dans la philosophie," pp. 9–10; Ge Zhaoguang, "Chuan yijian chizun buhe de yishan," pp. 51–52; Zheng Jiadong, "'Zhongguo zhexue' de 'hefaxing' wenti," pp. 3–6; Friedrich, *De Inventione Sinarum Philosophiae*, pp. 4–17; Chen Wenjuan, "Qiantan 'Zhongguo zhexue' de 'hefaxing' wenti," p. 44; and Chen Renren, "Zhongguo zhexue de hefaxing yu Zhongguo zhexue de zijue," pp. 16–17.
- 52 – See Ge Zhaoguang, *Zhongguo sixiang shi*, p. 763, and Li Jinglin, "Xifang huayu baquan xia Zhongguo zhexue xueke hefaxing zhi fansi," p. 20.
- 53 – My view is based on (1) secondary work discussing the topic and quoting the relevant authors, and (2) prefaces, introductory chapters, and passages explicitly discussing the concept of "philosophy" or "Chinese philosophy" in writings by Hu Shi, Cai Yuanpei, Feng Youlan, Zhang Dainian, Liang Shuming, Mou Zongsan, Ren Jiyu, and others. My reading of their work, however, is far from complete.
- 54 – For a discussion of Hu Shi's and Feng Youlan's work, see Cua, "Philosophy in China: Historiography," pp. 501–505.
- 55 – Ge Zhaoguang, "Chuan yijian chizun buhe de yishan," p. 50. About the general acceptance of the concept of "Chinese philosophy" in China, see also Jing Haifeng, "Zhongguo zhexue mianlin de tiaozhan he shenfen chongjian," pp. 93–94.

- 56 – One of them is Jin Yuelin, who—perhaps not coincidentally—studied Western philosophy and lived abroad for nine years. See “Shencha baogao, 2,” published as an appendix to Feng Youlan, *Zhongguo zhexue shi*. Another critic is Fu Sinian, quoted in part 4 below. Others were Zhang Zhidong, Wang Guo-wei, Liang Shuming, and even Hu Shi himself, at some point in their careers. For Hu Shi, see Ge Zhaoguang, “Chuan yijian chizun buhe de yishan,” p. 52, and Gan Chunsong, “Zhongguo zhexue he zhexue zai Zhongguo,” p. 192.
- 57 – Hu Shi, *Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang*, p. 1.
- 58 – Chen Jian also remarks that “Hu Shi does not directly treat the question as to whether China originally had philosophy” (Chen Jian, “Zhongguo zhexue heyi neng chengli,” p. 4).
- 59 – Fung Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, pp. 1–6.
- 60 – Feng Youlan, *Zhongguo zhexue shi*, p. 1.
- 61 – Feng Youlan adds that these three fields are now named: “theory of the world, theory of life, and theory of knowledge” (Feng Youlan, *Zhongguo zhexue shi*, p. 2). He mentions the following division: “metaphysics, ethics, epistemology, logic, etc.” (Fung Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, p. 1). As for its method, he insists—to Chinese readers alone—that “philosophy is a product of rationality. If philosophers want to set up a theory/truth (*daoli*), they must do it on the basis of argumentation and evidence” (Feng Youlan, *Zhongguo zhexue shi*, p. 6).
- 62 – Fung Youlan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, p. 1.
- 63 – Fung Yu-lan, *Zhongguo zhexue shi*, pp. 7–8.
- 64 – Wu Xiao-ming, “Philosophy, *Philosophia*, and *Zhe-xue*,” p. 433.
- 65 – See Standaert and Geivers, “Feng Youlan (Fung Yu-lan): Works on the history of Chinese Philosophy,” p. 264. In Fung Yu-lan, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*—which, according to Derk Bodde, is “written with the Western reader specifically in mind, which means that its treatment and subject matter are not always the same as they would be in a book intended solely for a Chinese public” (p. xiii)—Feng defines philosophy as “systematic, reflective thinking on life” (p. 2). A whole section in Feng Youlan, *Zhongguo zhexueshi xinbian* (pp. 9–16) is on the definition of philosophy, largely based on Lenin’s thought.
- 66 – Concerning the vagueness and vicious circle of Feng’s concept of philosophy, see also Gan Chunsong, “Zhongguo zhexue he zhexue zai Zhongguo,” p. 191.
- 67 – Heidegger also describes the attempt to understand philosophy as a circle, since it is done from within philosophy itself (Heidegger, *Was ist das—Die Philosophie?* p. 19). See also Deleuze and Guattari in part 5 below.

- 68 – Feng Youlan, *Zhongguo zhaxue shi*, pp. 13–14.
- 69 – Fung Yulan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, p. 4; his italics.
- 70 – Also discussed by Zheng Jiadong, “‘Zhongguo zhaxue’ de ‘hefaxing’ wenti,” p. 7.
- 71 – Hu Shi’s intention is to “make Chinese feel at ease in this new world.” “I have the strongest desire to make my own people see that these methods of the West are not totally alien to the Chinese mind, and that . . . they are instruments by means of which and in the light of which much of the lost treasures of Chinese philosophy can be recovered” (Hu Shi, *The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China*, pp. 6, 9).
- 72 – Chen Jian, “Zhongguo zhaxue heyi neng chengli,” p. 4.
- 73 – Ge Zhaoguang, “Chuan yijian chizun buhe de yishan,” p. 54.
- 74 – Some Chinese scholars mainly express irritation at the debate. Li Zonggui is convinced that “normally, this should be obvious without need of any proof. But recently, because some people with half-baked knowledge have made a big fuss, and because of the increase in cultural exchange between China and abroad, and the dissemination of Western philosophy, [some] nonprofessionals and university students have been influenced by prejudices and believe that China has no philosophy . . . so that the claim that ‘China has no philosophy’ has become a problem that needs to be clarified” (Li Zonggui, “Bo ‘Zhongguo wu zhaxue’ lun,” p. 47). Zhang Zhaomin believes that doubts concerning the legitimacy of “Chinese philosophy” are mistaken views that are caused by Western cultural arrogance and by ignorance on the side of Western scholars and Chinese youngsters, and that they can easily be resolved by some reflection (Zhang Zhaomin, “Zhongguo mei you ‘zhaxue’ ma?” p. 11).
- 75 – Some contemporary scholars provide a definition or criteria for the concept of “philosophy.” See, for example, Zhang Liwen, “Zhongguo zhaxue de ‘ziji jiang’ ‘jiang ziji,’” p. 39, and Zhao Jinglai, “Zhongguo zhaxue de hefaxing wenti yanjiu shuyao,” p. 39. He Zhonghua begs the question by stating that although the term “philosophy” (*zhaxue*) did not exist in ancient times, the matter nevertheless existed since philosophy is something that is universal (He Zhonghua, “Zhongguo you mei you ‘zhaxue?’” p. 3).
- 76 – Some scholars explicitly mention the uncomfortableness for scholars in the field to have their whole field (and their identity as philosophers) being questioned. See, for example, He Zhonghua, “Zhongguo you mei you ‘zhaxue?’” p. 2, and Peng Yongjie, “Lun Zhongguo zhaxue xueke cunzai de hefaxing weiji,” p. 25. Understandably, Chinese scholars of predominantly Western philosophy identify less with “Chinese philosophy” and are more relaxed about the possible rejection of the term “philosophy” for the ancient Chinese corpus of texts, especially in its narrow (traditional Western) sense. See Zhang

Zhiwei, "Zhongguo zhexue haishi Zhongguo sixiang," pp. 18–19, and, to some extent, Zhang Xianglong, "'Zhongguo zhexue', 'daoshu', haishi ke daoshuhua de guangyi zhexue?" pp. 11–12.

- 77 – About the absence of interest in this question, see Hu Jun, "'Zhongguo zhexue' 'hefaxing' taolun de hefaxing wenti," p. 75.
- 78 – See, for instance, Li Minghui, "Zhongguo meiyou zhexue ma" pp. 144–146; Zhang Liwen, "Zhongguo zhexue de 'ziji jiang' 'jiang ziji'," p. 4; Chen Shaoming, "Chongti 'Zhong zhexue' de zhengdangxing," p. 34; and Chen Renren, "Zhongguo zhexue de hefaxing yu Zhongguo zhexue de zijue," pp. 17–18.
- 79 – See, for instance, Li Zonggui, "Bo 'Zhongguo wu zhexue' lun," p. 47; He Zhonghua, "Zhongguo you mei you 'zhexue'?" p. 4; and Peng Yongjie, "Lun Zhongguo zhexue xueke cunzai de hefaxing weiji," p. 28.
- 80 – See, for instance, Wei Changbao, "Zhongguo zhexue de 'hefaxing' xushi ji qi chaoyue," pp. 8–9.
- 81 – See, for instance, Peng Yongjie, "Lun Zhongguo zhexue xueke cunzai de hefaxing weiji," p. 31; Chen Shaoming, "Chongti 'Zhong zhexue' de zhengdangxing," p. 34; Jing Haifeng, "Zhexueshi leixing yu Zhongguo sixiang de xushu fangshi," pp. 16–17; and Yu Wujin, "Yige xujia er you yiyi de wenti," pp. 31–33.
- 82 – In this respect, see Zhang Liwen, "Zhongguo zhexue de 'ziji jiang' 'jiang ziji'," pp. 4–7, on "speaking ourselves" (自己讲) and "speaking about ourselves" (讲自己). See also Zheng Jiadong, "'Zhongguo zhexue' de 'hefaxing' wenti," p. 11; Jing Haifeng, "Cong 'zhexue' dao 'Zhongguo zhexue'," p. 31; Peng Yongjie, "Lun Zhongguo zhexue xueke cunzai de hefaxing weiji," p. 30; and Chen Renren, "Zhongguo zhexue de hefaxing yu Zhongguo zhexue de zijue," p. 19. But this self-confidence usually concerns "Chinese philosophy" in its *contemporary* sense and future possibilities, not always in reference to the proper way of labeling *ancient* Chinese thought.
- 83 – For suggestions about future research, see, for instance, Chen Duoxu, "Zhongguo zhexueshi xiezuoxiangguan wenti de taolun shuping," pp. 31–33, and Yang Haiwen, "Zhongguo zhexue de 'hefaxing weiji' yu chongxie Zhongguo zhexueshi," pp. 13–14.
- 84 – See, for instance, Gan Chunsong, "Zhongguo zhexue he zhexue zai Zhongguo," p. 193; Jing Haifeng, "Zhongguo zhexue mianlin de tiaozhan he shenfen chongjian," p. 94; Tang Wenming, "Gudian jiaohua sixiang de xiandai mingyun," p. 58; and Chen Wenjuan, "Qiantan 'Zhongguo zhexue' de 'hefaxing' wenti," p. 47.
- 85 – Fung Yu-lan, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, p. 332. Feng was writing more specifically about the contribution of contemporary Chinese philoso-

phy. The remark, written at the end of his life (quoted at the beginning of this essay), shows that the recognition by Western philosophers of Chinese philosophy remained problematic throughout his life.

86 – Lao Sze-kwang, “On Understanding Chinese Philosophy,” p. 290.

87 – See Chen Jian, “Zhongguo zhexue heyi neng chengli,” pp. 3–4.

88 – I therefore disagree with Yu Wujin, who believes that the acceptance of “philosophy” as a generic term allows for variation and hence stops the debate on the legitimacy of “Chinese philosophy” (Yu Wujin, “Yige xujia er you yiyi de wenti,” pp. 28–29). The possible variation is precisely what makes a rational debate possible. Some authors explicitly characterize “philosophy” as a generic term. See, for instance, Zhang Dainian, *Zhongguo zhexue dagang*, p. 2, and Lao Sze-kwang, “On Understanding Chinese Philosophy,” pp. 266–267, 291.

89 – For this use of Wittgenstein’s idea of “family resemblances” (*jiazu leisi* 家族类似) in the debate over “philosophy,” see, for instance, Chen Lai, “Guanyu ‘Zhongguo zhexue’ de ruogan wenti qianyi,” p. 23; Chen Shaoming, “Chongti ‘Zhong zhexue’ de zhengdangxing,” p. 34; Zhao Jinglai, “Zhongguo zhexue de hefaxing wenti yanjiu shuyao,” p. 39; and Yang Haiwen, “Zhongguo zhexue de ‘hefaxing weiji’ yu chongxie Zhongguo zhexueshi,” p. 10. Lao Sze-kwang explicitly rejects this view in favor of a definition of philosophy as a reflexive type of thinking that is relevant to life (Lao Sze-kwang, “On Understanding Chinese Philosophy,” pp. 269, 291 n. 4).

90 – Defoort, “Is There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy?” pp. 407–409.

91 – Raud’s main objection to the family model “is precisely that in it the head of the family, who makes the decisions of who can be adopted and who cannot, is always Western, and the acceptance criteria are not transparent or equal to all.” Raud seems to understand my analogy as a suggestion for solving the problem, an alternative to the other views in the debate. However, the family analogy is not meant prescriptively, but rather descriptively, namely to analyze one cause of the unsolvable debate. The success of “philosophical bastards” like Foucault or Derrida shows that the family has been far less organized and obedient to the head of the family than what Raud has in mind. But, indeed, paternalistic and arbitrary exclusion is a major problem in the field of academic philosophy for both non-white and non-male thinkers, a fact that can be well understood through this family model.

92 – Visker, *Truth and Singularity*, p. 19, using Jacques Lacan.

93 – *Ibid.*, pp. 1, 11–13.

94 – The imagery of homelessness to describe the legitimacy crisis has been independently explored by Li Jinglin, “Chongjian zhexue yu shenghuo de lianxi,” pp. 14–18, and Qiao Qingju, “Xifang huayu,” pp. 68, 70.

- 95 – Fu Sinian, “Yu Gu Jiegang lun gushishu,” p. 374.
- 96 – This remark is reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s well-known characterization of philosophy as the bewitchment of language. See Fu Sinian (in 1926) as quoted by Zheng Jiadong, “‘Zhongguo zhexueshi’ xiezuo yu Zhongguo sixiang chuantong de xiandai kunjing,” p. 4 n. 1.
- 97 – They argue for a broad and pluralist sense of “philosophy,” in line with contemporary trends in Western philosophy. See Zheng Jiadong, “‘Zhongguo zhexue’ de ‘hefaxing’ wenti,” pp. 1–13, and Zhang Xianglong, “‘Zhongguo zhexue’, ‘daoshu’, haishi ke daoshuhua de guangyi zhexue?” pp. 12–13.
- 98 – See Lyotard, “Le nom et l’exception,” p. 51.
- 99 – Solomon means to criticize Western philosophy by comparing it to a peculiar tribal preoccupation rather than a universal discipline (Solomon, “‘What is Philosophy?’” p. 102). See also Fu Sinian quoted above.
- 100 – See, for instance, Lin, Rosemont, and Ames, “Chinese Philosophy,” p. 748; Li Zonggui, “Bo ‘Zhongguo wu zhexue’ lun,” p. 48; Chen Jian, “Zhongguo zhexue heyi neng chengli,” p. 8; and Zheng Jiadong, “‘Zhongguo zhexue’ de ‘hefaxing’ wenti,” p. 11.
- 101 – Solomon, “‘What is Philosophy?’” p. 101. Zheng Jiadong predicts that “all that used to be considered eternal, universal, global, obvious models, principles, judgments, premises etc. . . . will have to be reconsidered as soon as Chinese philosophy is being taken more seriously in the West” (Zheng Jiadong, “‘Zhongguo zhexue’ de ‘hefaxing’ wenti,” p. 11).
- 102 – Derrida was quoted above. For Husserl and Heidegger, see Wu Xiao-ming, “Philosophy, *Philosophia*, and *Zhe-xue*,” pp. 419–426 and 427–432. See also Deleuze and Guattari, *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* pp. 82–108. Raud, however, uses precisely their definition of philosophy to sustain his support for the existence of “Chinese philosophy.”
- 103 – Husserl characterizes philosophy as the disinterested pursuit of “theoria” for its own sake and, therefore, denies its existence in any other ancient culture, including the Chinese (Husserl, “The Vienna Lecture,” pp. 279–80). See also Heidegger, *Was ist das—Die Philosophie?* p. 13, and Deleuze and Guattari, *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* p. 92.
- 104 – These bonds are often strengthened by rituals, which are also meaningless and powerful, more like non-chosen bonds than conscious choices.
- 105 – Chinese arguments for the superiority of Chinese philosophy over Western philosophy are too many to quote. I have found them in some writings of, among others, Feng Youlan, Mou Zongsan, Liang Shuming, and Zhang Dainian. See, for instance, Ryden and Defoort, “The Importance of Daoism,” pp. 3–6.

- 106 – Examples are Fung Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, pp. 1–6; Hu Shi, *The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China*, pp. 6–10; and Lao Sze-kwang, “On Understanding Chinese Philosophy,” pp. 265–271.
- 107 – Deleuze and Guattari, *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* p. 7.
- 108 – Derrida, *Le droit à la philosophie du point de vue cosmopolitique*, pp. 1, 33.
- 109 – Zhong Shaohua, “Qingmo Zhongguoren duiyu ‘zhexue’ de zhuiqiu,” p. 188. For Deleuze and Guattari, this absence of “love” is an important difference between Western philosophy and Eastern wisdom (Deleuze and Guattari, *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* p. 92).
- 110 – This reading of “love” (not necessarily erotic) is suggested by some remarks made by Deleuze and Guattari in *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* pp. 14–15.
- 111 – Wu Xiao-ming, “Philosophy, *Philosophia*, and *Zhe-xue*,” p. 409.
- 112 – *Ibid.*, p. 431.

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