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EMOTIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE ON FORMS OF LIFE[1]

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> Knowing, believing, hoping, fearing (among others) are such very diverse concepts that classifying them, or pigeonholing them, is useless to us. But we do want to recognize the differences and similarities among them. (Wittgenstein 1982, par. 122.)

1. Introduction

Emotions disclose forms of life, both in a manifest and deep sense. This paper provides a cross-cultural perspective on how similarities and differences crop up and disappear in the expression and conceptualisation of emotions. In section 2, by way of introduction, I start with a brief indication of similarities and differences of "anger" and similar concepts. In section 3 I consider various proposals for the existence of a fixed number of basic emotions or dimensions on which all emotions (basic or otherwise) can be "measured." Section 4 is about cross-cultural varieties of emotion and emotion talk; section 5 about the variety of theories of emotion. Section 6, on forms of life, aims to show how dichotomies such as cognitive/affective and universal/relative can be left behind if emotions are seen as essential ingredients of interhuman and intercultural communication, without being in any strict sense definable or classifiable.

2. Anger

2.1. variation in English

According to *The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology* the first recorded occurrence of "anger" is in the 12th century; then it meant "distress." The root of "anger" is related to "anguish," meaning "narrow, tight, squeeze, strangle." "Anger" subsequently changed to "trouble, affliction, hot displeasure" and finally to "enraged." Older meanings of "enraged" include "be distracted" and "maddened;" its current meaning is "put in a rage or fury." Since the 13th century "rage" has included "madness, violent anger, furious passion, enthusiasm, excitement, fervour." "Fury" is glossed as "fierce passion or violence." Two phenomena have thus emerged. First, going back in time, the current meaning of "anger" disappears. Second, the concept "anger" is now defined in terms of rage, and vice versa: anger is a weaker form of rage and that is that. Apparently we simply have to know what "angry" (or "rage" or "fury") means before consulting a dictionary.

To understand the sense of anger, we're assumed to think of typical situations in which somebody gets angry and then abstract from such situations a general understanding of what is meant by "anger." As Table 1 illustrates there's no one best way to do this.[2] Still, anger typically is assumed to involve aspects of offence, injustice, scowling, internal tension and agitation, retribution, loss of control, striking out. But many uncertainties remain: Does "anger" of necessity imply moral and/or cognitive judgement? Is "sulking" or "revolt" sufficient, or is aggressive intent required? Most writers on "anger" say the concept of responsibility is presupposed—hence "anger" can only apply to mature humans. But don't we sometimes say of infants they are angry? Although Table 1 suggests there's reasonable agreement on the

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[2] Important publications on the meaning, in English, of "anger" include Averill (1982), Davitz (1969), Lakoff and Kövecses (1984), Stearns and Stearns (1986).

core of anger, this core starts moving when we consider its variation over time (Stearns 1988; Stearns and Stearns 1986) and place (section 2.2).

TABLE 1. Proposed definitions of "anger".

Averill 1982	Anger is a conflictive emotion that, on the biological level, is related to aggressive systems and to the capacities for co-operative social living, symbolisation, and reflective self-awareness; that, on the psychological level, is aimed at the correction of some appraised wrong; and that, on the sociocultural level, functions to uphold accepted standards of conduct.
Bertocci 1988	Anger-pugnacity is the emotion experienced when any situation is perceived as obstructing the gratification of some want or process deemed important by the person. The objective is to remove the obstruction.
de Rivera 1977	An angering event is one in which someone or something challenges what "ought" to happen.
Fischer 1991	Definition contains 18 elements: five types of appraised events, seven types of action tendencies, and six types of responses.
Hochschild 1983	1. Focus on discrepancy between wanting and having; 2. "*You* hit me;" 3. "I feel as or more powerful than you who can hit me; I can or could attack."
Kövecses 1990	1. Offending event; 2. increase in body heat, internal pressure, and physical agitation; 3. attempt at control; 4. loss of control; 5. act of retribution.
Myers 1988	1. Judgement that harm is or has been intended to the subject; 2. such harm is without justification; 3. threat or possibility of retaliation.
Oakley 1992	Anger is equivalent to being pained by the cognition that we (or others we care about) have been injured or wronged, and having a desire to retaliate against the offender.
Ortony et al. 1988	Being angry means disapproving of someone else's blameworthy action and being displeased about the related undesirable event.
Shaver et al. 1987	1. Illegitimate interruption, violation, or harm; 2. vigorous protest, attack, or retaliation; 3. suppression and redefinition.
Webster's dictionary	Anger is a strong feeling of displeasure and usually of antagonism; often but not always implying a justifiable cause for displeasure.
Wierzbicka 1992	X feels angry if X feels something bad because Y did something bad which X doesn't want and because of this X would want to do something bad to Y.

2.2. variation across peoples

In many respects descriptions such as those in Table 1 apply, for example, to the Temiar concept of anger. Nevertheless there are significant differences: "Temiars are known for their lack of physical violence toward one another ... anger is rarely vented in face-to-face interaction, but rather is formalized in a relatively indirect harangue. ... Temiars still consider this a hyperdirect form of interaction capable of shocking the souls of participants or bystanders into taking flight, resulting in the illness of soul loss" (Roseman 1988).[3] On the other hand, Kaluli people find "anger" fascinating and problematic and have a variety of words to refer to it; anger, if not rage, is often openly and dramatically expressed (Fajans 1983, 1985). Both the society of the Yanomamo and that of the Pukhtun have been described as "violent" and having a high "intensity of internal conflict," but where the Yanomamo are famous for their public posture of socially sanctioned rage, among the Pukhtun the "display of anger is prohibited and cold-blooded revenge is favored" (Lindholm 1988). According to Levy (1973, 1984a), Tahitians speak and theorise a lot about "anger," but rarely, if ever, display it. Briggs (1970) reports Utku-Inuit people are almost never angry and don't talk about it either. Ifaluk people use several words that can roughly be glossed as "angry," but one stands out as central: *song* "justified anger" (Lutz 1988). Display of *song* is omnipresent. Rosaldo (1980) notes that among Ilongot people *liget*, which is commonly translated as "anger," is a highly valued force, vital to social and personal life. He also notes that "red in the sky at sunset is a form of *liget* that can make people ill" (p. 49). According to Leff (1973) several African languages have "a single word [that] stands for being angry and being sad."

[3] Similarly, anger (*sengke*) is one of the most feared emotional states among the Toraja (Hollan 1988). The absence of overt expressions of anger and hostility is found among many peoples in Malaysia and Indonesia.

Table 2 provides examples of words which have a meaning both similar to that of "anger" (at least in certain contexts), but also quite different.[4] One reason why "anger" and its congeners differ in time and place concerns the variation in how (what we are tempted to gloss as) "anger" relates to other emotions and the wider setting of moral codes. That's why brief entries, like those in Table 2, are deeply dissatisfying. For example, there are complex emotion-emotion links between Ifaluk anger and fear; Ilongot and Tahitian anger and shame; Pintupi anger and compassion; and Kaluli anger and admiration.

Differences are easily overlooked, because there are, of course, also similarities. Dictionaries (and linguistics generally) tend to exploit the similarities, easily leaving the impression of universality. For example, English-speaking Ugandans may give the same description of words like "anger" as Luganda-speaking Ugandans give for the dictionary translation of "anger." *However*, these descriptions are very different from those of Americans. For example, Ugandans (whether speaking English or Luganda) report crying more than aggression, when asked what is characteristic of anger. In fact there is very little similarity between "typical" American anger and "typical" Ugandan anger (Davitz 1969, pp. 172-190).[5]

TABLE 2. Unfamiliar cases of anger and congeners. For references see also note 4.

Giriama	*utsungu*	anger, resentment, bitterness, grief, poison (Parkin 1985).
Ifaluk	*song*	justifiable anger towards those who have broken rules or taboos with the hidden aim of altering the behaviour of the offending person; less aggressive than anger; includes suicide and forms of grief or sadness; many situations (morally) require the display of *song*.
Ilongot	*liget*	can be aroused by insult and injury, but also by pride of accomplishment or the loss of a loved one; can be manifested in irritability or violence (including head hunting), but also in the sweat of hard, good work (including "fierce" gardening); spurs people to action and as such a driving force of society; narrows vision on a victim or task; combines elements of anger, passion, and envy; unfocused *liget* also associated with chaos, separation, and confusion.
Inuit	*ningaq*	to feel or express hostility; to aggress physically against another;
	qiquq	to feel hostile; silent withdrawal; clogged up; on the point of tears (cf. entry in Table 6);
	urulu	to feel, express, arouse hostility or annoyance; unsmiling; also: to express sympathy at misfortunes of others;
	huaq	to aggress verbally, to scold (behaviour going with *urulu*).
Lohorung	*yik 'bok' kheda*	anger of children and ancestors;
	hibokme	adult anger conceived in terms of relations with others (Hardman 1981).
Pintupi	*rarru*	negative evaluation of one's own social status, most typically in response to a rejection of relatedness (also: *mirrparnpa*).
Samoan	*'o'ona*	anger that is not expressed (Gerber 1985).
Kaluli	*gadiab*	anger that implies a loss of some kind and a legitimate expectation for redress (Schieffelin 1983, 1985).
Yankunytjatjara	*pikaringanyi*	anger not involving judgement or appraisal; only directed at people; always bad;
	mirpanarinyi	anger directed at people or things for good or bad reasons, often leading to fights; also: grudge, grievance, annoyance;
	kuyaringanyi	negative appraisal of someone or something, leading to a disinclination to offer assistance but stopping short of active hostility (Goddard 1991).

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[4] In Tables 2, 6, 7, 8, and throughout this paper, a number of languages occur regularly. See for Ifaluk Lutz (1982, 1985, 1987, 1988); for Ilongot Rosaldo (1980, 1983, 1984); for Inuit Briggs (1970, 1978, 1987); for Pintupi Myers (1986, 1988); for Tahitian Levy (1973, 1978, 1982, 1984a, 1984b, Levy and Wellenkamp 1989). For comparisons of some of the entries in Table 2 see, inter alia, D'Andrade (1987), Middleton (1989), Solomon (1984), Spiro (1984), Wierzbicka (1992a).

[5] The same point was noted when translating psychiatric check lists in Luganda (Leff 1981, p. 43). A similar point is made by Levy (1973, p. 305) concerning bilingual Tahitians who use *triste* ("sad") as a synonym for "fatigued." Apparently, *triste* is assigned the meaning of *haumani* or *pe'ape'a* indicating feeling ill, troubled, fatigued without awareness of any cause and closer to a physical illness than an emotion. Tahitians typically have *pe'ape'a* feelings in situations where we would expect them to be sad. A deep question in such cases is what could be appealed to as "objective" across cultures. Lazarus (1991a) favours the view that Tahitians *do* experience *sadness*, which "they can only verbalize as a metaphorical pain." Levy and Wellenkamp (1989) suggest that individuals "have the option of interpreting a feeling" as either, say, sadness or as a symptom of a spirit-produced illness. A third option might be to say that they react with an emotion, but not sadness. Perhaps there is no such thing as an objective and universal fact of the matter in this kind of situation (see section 6).

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2.3. never in anger

According to Solomon (1984) "there are societies which do not recognize the hostile emotions" and he refers in support to the work of Briggs (1970) on the Utku-Inuit people.[6] He says further: "It is not just that they do not express anger, they do not feel angry, either." These statements have been repeated in various other publications (for example Ratner 1989), but don't seem to reflect the opinion of either Solomon or Briggs. Briggs says: "among adults there are no situations that justify [angry] feelings or behavior, no people, Utku or other, toward whom it is permissible to express them." So, among Utku anger is *never* justified (compare Ifaluk *song* "justified anger"). But this doesn't mean they never express it, although this occurs only very rarely. Such extreme "restraint" on the part of the Utku made it very difficult for Briggs to fathom their feelings, though she lived as an "adopted daughter" in an Utku family for more than two years. (I'll return to the question whether perhaps this concern for other people's inner states is quintessentially Western.)[7]

Let's look at this in more detail. Utku concepts that correspond most closely to "anger" are intrinsically linked to Utku rationality, *ihuma*, a deeply morally loaded concept. *Ihuma* is the criterion of humanness and maturity, governing emotionality.[8] Among Utku (and Inuit generally) ill temper, jealousy, hostility, and such like are strongly disapproved. The ideal person has the right amount of reason, *ihuma*. Such a person is mild and sociable with everyone, and never ever gets angry or resentful. A person who has (or uses) *ihuma* is cheerful but not giddy; is patient in the face of difficulties and accepts unpleasant but uncontrollable events with calmness. Kinds of behaviour attributed to lack of *ihuma* are called *nutaraqpaluktuq* "childish." Among the words that are used to indicate the wrong amount of *ihuma* a few are listed in Table 2. The first three can often be translated as "angry," but seem to be used only in the third person. When applied to the speaker *qiquq* is better glossed as "fear" (hence *qiquq* also occurs in Table 6). However, whatever the best translation might be, these words crucially refer to disapproved states, being a sign of too much, or too little, *ihuma*. Children, dogs, and *kaplunas* (white people)[9] have too little *ihuma*. If a person is too ebullient, smiles too broadly, laughs too easily or gets "clogged up" (*qiquq*), or scolds (*huaq*), s/he is said to be childish (*nutaraqpaluktuq*).

A person who has (or uses) *ihuma* does not sulk (*qiquq*), get annoyed (*urulu*), or attack others physically (*ningaq*). If a person is frequently angry (*ningaq*), but gets over it easily, this is a sign that s/he has very little *ihuma*. If a person is *ningaq* for long periods of time, if s/he nurses *ningaq* thoughts "every day, every day" this is due to having too much *ihuma*. A person who has too much *ihuma* concentrates too much on one idea. "Brooding" about another person can cause that other person to fall ill or die.

Situations that typically lead to anger, irritation, or fear (by Western standards) should be approached with happiness and amusement, with being *tiphi* (see entry in Table 7). Moreover, it is not enough to *display* amusement or happiness (being *tiphi*) in many (potential) stressful situations; it has to be real. Children are explicitly taught to substitute feeling *tiphi* for the feelings of annoyance that are so condemned.

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[6] Utku people are an Inuit tribe living at the lower reaches of the Back River (Northwest of Hudson Bay, Canada). Formerly, the Inuit were also called Eskimo (which has derogatory connotations); their language is Inuktitut. Briggs writes in her Preface: "My greatest debt is of course to the Utkuhikhalingmiut with whom I stayed, especially the members of the family who adopted me and about whom this book is written. I am sorry that they would not understand or like many of the things I have written about them." A number of sentences in the following paragraphs have been quoted near-verbatim from Briggs (1970, pp. 324-363). See also Briggs (1987) and Briggs (1978) on the Qipi Inuit. The Inuktitut words I mention are as given by Briggs; except for *ihuma* they are actually not "words" but word bases which cannot stand alone in the Inuit language.

[7] The quoted passages from Solomon (1984) would seem to be meant as his explanation of the title of Briggs' book "Never in Anger." But he adds that her ethnography does nothing "to support the view that the Utku are emotionally different in any interesting way from ourselves." (One wonders how Solomon can be so sure about this if Briggs found it that difficult to find out what her "parents" felt.)

[8] Closely related is the concept of *naklik*; *naklik* behaviour is derived from the possession of *ihuma*, the criterion of goodness.

[9] Kaplunas tend to consider Inuit "childish" because the latter do not plan for the future with the elaborate caution characteristic of Kaplunas. The Utku, on the other hand, label as "childish" (*nutaraqpaluktuq*) those who are more provident than others. ("They are like children; they are afraid [*kappia*] of a food shortage.")

This brief, all too brief, digression on a few Utku emotion concepts shows that, in this case at least, the life of emotions and emotion words is inseparable from what's considered rational and morally good; inseparable from a form of life in which emotions and emotions words have their natural place.[10]

3. Varieties of "primitiveness"

3.1. pancultural basic emotions?

Russell (1991b, 1993) suggests, correctly I think, that mainstream psychology presupposes that emotions divide naturally into a small number of basic emotions. These are natural kinds in the sense that they are easily recognised by all humans; hence words for basic emotions are easily learned and can be translated one-to-one between languages. As Fodor (1981, p. 312) says:

> Consider such folk-psychological concepts as ANGRY, SAD, HAPPY, etc. I think there's no doubt that these are acquired early, that they must have been part of the universal prehistory of our species, and that they are easily introduced by ostension.

Basic emotions, like basic colours, are assumed to be pancultural universals and several writers have drawn on the analogies between colour and emotion. For example, Plutchik (1984) proposes a multidimensional model of emotions on the analogy with colour. Basic emotions correspond with basic hues; intensity of emotion to brightness of colour; and saturation of colour to blending of emotions.[11] He orders basic emotions in an "emotion circle" with four primaries (joy, fear, sadness, and anger), four binaries (acceptance, surprise, disgust, anticipation), and eight intermediaries (including love and contempt).[12] This ordering allegedly corresponds with variables at the level of biological regulatory processes, behavioural expression, adaptive function, personality traits, mental disorders, ego defence regulatory processes, coping style, and social control institutions (Plutchik 1989).

However, the case for pancultural emotion primitives is as unconvincing as it is for colour.[13] Among universalists, there's no agreement on the number of basic emotions. Competing theories propose four up to fifteen basic emotions (see Table 3).[14] Briggs (1970) divided Utku emotion terms in nine groups (without in any way implying that these groups are *basic*): affection (love, protective concern), kindness/gratefulness, happiness (not merely pleasant, but always morally good), anger/hostility, amusement, fear, anxiety, shyness, and loneliness. Putting aside what the Utku might themselves say, does it really make sense to argue that there must be one best way of ordering Utku and other peoples' emotions, viz. in terms of nine basic emotions, or whatever the true number of basic emotions might be?[15]

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[10] Compare Solomon (1992) on "our" emotions: "emotions *situate* us in the world, and so provide not so much the motive for rationality—much less its opposition—but rather its very framework."

[11] The analogy with colour has been pushed further by others: a basic emotion, "like a basic colour, may be considered as one that cannot be thought of experientially as composed of others" (Clynes 1980, p. 289); human emotions would be governed by opponent processes (Mauro 1988); Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1990) speculate about "a set of antagonistic pairs: happiness-sadness, anger-fear, desire-disgust"; in analogy to Berlin and Kay (1969), there would be cross-cultural universals in the focal points or best examples of particular emotions: *anger* and *liget* might differ greatly, but have the same focal point (Levy 1973, p. 16f; 1984, p. 229; Levy and Wellenkamp 1989, p. 216); and there would be an evolutionary development for basic emotions: starting from the basic dichotomy of pleasant/unpleasant arousal finer distinctions would "evolve" (Leff 1981, p. 45).

[12] Compare Russell's (1989b) circumplex model, in which the axes are interpreted as pleasure/displeasure and low/high arousal (cf. section 3.2).

[13] For arguments against pancultural universals in the case of colour see Saunders (1992), Saunders and van Brakel (1988), van Brakel (1993).

[14] Basic emotion categories are not always considered universal. For example Fischer, Shave and Carnochan (1990) say: "the Chinese use an additional basic-emotion family—shame." Heider (1991, p. 121) says that "in addition to the clusters that are expected on pan-cultural grounds to be 'basic,' in Indonesian and Minangkabau Indecision is a basic emotion and in Indonesian, Nostalgic Longing is basic." Other writers are careful not to be associated with narrow biological views, but nevertheless suggest that some emotions are universal. For example, Solomon (1993) suggests fear, attachment/affection, compassion, and ecstasy are universal in cutting through social-emotional constructions.

[15] Proposals in Table 3 are all Western theories of emotion. Russell (1991e) quotes a Chinese encyclopaedia of the first century B.C. which lists seven "unlearnt" feelings: joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking. The Indian theory of *rasa* (circa 200 B.C. to A.D. 200) "identifies eight primary emotions inherent in all human beings: love, humour, courage, disgust, anger, astonishment, terror, and pity" (Lynch 1990a). Four of these are more basic;

Proposals for a set of basic emotions are usually inspired by a biological (evolutionary-adaptational) perspective: they are basic behavioural categories, which are typically interpreted as defence mechanisms (Kellerman 1980).[16] But why would "survival emotions" like "fear" be more fundamental than emotions like "romantic love" or "hope," which have little or no relevance when seen from a biological perspective (Averill 1980)? Some "adaptive functions" look particularly strained: "Why, for instance, should joy be uniquely linked to reproduction?" (Frijda 1986, p. 86).

sometimes a ninth is added. See Shweder 1992 for a more detailed account and a criticism of Schechner (1988, pp. 267-289) who compared *rasa* expressions with Ekman's basic emotions.

[16] See Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988, p. 27), de Sousa (1987, p. 31), Ortony and Turner (1990), Shweder (forthc.) for the confusion regarding the notion "basic emotion." For detailed exchanges for and against the existence of a fixed set of basic emotions see Oatley and Johnson-Laird's (1990) reply to Ortony and Clore's (1989) comments on Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1989); and also Turner and Ortony's (1992) reply to Ekman's (1992ab), Izard's (1992) and Panksepp's (1992) critiques of Ortony and Turner (1990). The best "deconstruction" of the term "basic" is Shweder (forthc.).

TABLE 3. Proposals for a fixed set of basic emotions, listed relative to the "big five", i.e. **A**nger, **D**isgust, **F**ear, **H**appiness, and **S**adness.

Ben-Ze'ev 1990	**A**, **F**, joy, sorrow	gratitude, hope, love, hate, pride, shame, *Schadenfreude*, pity, happy-for, envy, gratification, remorse, attraction, repulsion
Descartes	joy, **S**	wonder, love, hatred, desire
Ekman 1984	**A**, **D**, **F**, **H**, distress	surprise
Ekman and Friesen 1986	**A**, **D**, **F**, **H**, distress	surprise, contempt
Ekman 1992b	**A**, **D**, **F**, enjoyment, **S**	surprise, contempt?, shame?, guilt?, embarrassment?
Izard 1977	**A**, **D**, **F**, **H**, **S**	interest, surprise, contempt, shame, guilt
James 1884	rage, **F**, grief	love
Johnson-Laird and Oatley 1989	**A**, **D**, **F**, **H**, **S**	-
Johnson-Laird and Oatley 1992	**A**, **D**, **F**, **H**, **S**	desire
Kellerman/Plutchik 1980	**A**, **D**, **F**, joy, **S**	surprise, acceptance/trust, anticipation/ expectation
Kemper 1987	**A**, **F**	depression, satisfaction
Lazarus 1993	**A**, **D**, fright, **H**, **S**	anxiety, guilt, shame, envy, jealousy, pride, relief, hope, love, compassion
Ortony et al. 1988	**F**, joy, distress	hope, love, hate, pride, shame, gloating, pity, admiration, reproach, happy-for, resentment
Panksepp 1982, 1986	rage, **F**	panic, expectancy/desire
Panksepp 1992	rage, **F**, joy?	panic, expectancy, lust?, acceptance?, dominance?
Scheff 1985	**A**, **F**, joy, grief	love attachment, shame
Scherer 1984	**A**, **D**, **F**, joy, **S**	shame
Shaver et al. 1987	**A**, **F**, joy, **S**	love
Tomkins 1980	**A**, **D**, **F**, joy, distress	contempt, interest/excitement, startle/surprise, shame/humiliation

As Table 3 shows there's some sort of consensus among universalists on five basic emotions *at the most*.[17] But even here it's not clear what's meant by calling these *universal* emotions.[18] The problem starts with what seems to be a minor issue: the alleged synonymy of various emotion words. Many writers seem to use joy and happiness interchangeably, though they are far from being synonyms (Davitz 1969, Wierzbicka 1992a).[19] Similarly, Tomkins (1980) considers distress/anguish a basic *affect*; Ekman and others say "sadness" is a basic emotion. Some writers don't consider "distress" an emotion at all, but a "broad emotional dimension" (Izard 1992). Are we to assume that distress, anguish, sadness are the same thing? Similar problems arise with terror/fear, loathing/disgust, amazement/surprise, interest/curiosity, and so on.

These problems becomes even more serious when we go cross-cultural. As Wierzbicka (1992a) points out in a criticism of Johnson-Laird and Oatley's (1989) proposal for five basic emotions:[20]

[17] Ortony, Clore and Collins (1988) have proposed a structure of (cognitive) emotion types in which anger is a compound emotion (see also Ortony and Turner 1990). From a radical cognitive perspective (see section 5.1) emotions are never primitive or basic in any interesting sense. In particular it's an open question whether "our pre-scientific emotion vocabulary embodies all and only those distinctions required for a scientific psychology of emotion" (Griffiths 1990).

[18] Kemper (1987) lists many reasons why surprise and disgust cannot be universal emotions. He presents a table similar to that of Table 3 (including many references that are not included in Table 3) to illustrate his view that there is agreement on *four* basic emotions.

[19] See also de Rivera, Possell, Verette and Weiner (1989) and Bagozzi (1991) on elation, gladness, and joy; as well as Waterman (1993) on *eudaimonia* and hedonic enjoyment. Wierzbicka (1992a, forthc. b) points out that there are many differences between (American-)English "happiness" and its closest equivalents in other European languages.

[20] In a response to Wierzbicka, Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1992) have said they didn't mean that "English 'happiness' is a basic emotion" but that in English the word "happiness" is used to name "[t]he underlying emotion [that] can be communicated between people nonverbally." For an illustration "from the field" of the many problems that arise to get the "right" equivalents in other languages for the alleged basic emotions terms in English see Heider's (1991) very detailed study of emotion words in Indonesian and Minangkabau.

> By using English emotion words as their basic analytical tools scholars are imposing on their subject matter an ethnocentric, Anglocentric perspective. Why should *anger* be any better placed as a tool for identifying "basic human experiences" than either *liget* or *song* (which are different in meaning from both *anger* and from each other)? Had Johnson-Laird and Oatley been born Ilongots, or Ifaluks, rather than Englishmen, *liget* and *song* would have seemed as natural candidates for "basic human emotions" as *anger* seems to them now.

Support for the existence of universal basic emotions comes from various sources, but no doubt the most well known are the widely quoted studies of Ekman and Izard who allegedly showed that recognition of at least some facial expressions of emotions is universal. What is at issue here is whether these studies show that there are similarities to varying degrees (and hence also differences) or whether they show something *universal* to be the case. On closer inspection it would seem that the latter is certainly *not* the case:[21]

1. Studies cited in support of the pancultural thesis do not provide perfect agreement; agreement, significantly, is highest among speakers of English (see Table 4). I've given the monolingual Fore and Bahimeno speakers from New Guinea columns of their own, because they are the only people interviewed who had had little or no contact with the Western world before being interviewed.[22] The Bahimeno had had no contact with the Western world until a few days before the experiments were carried out.[23] What the data gathered in Table 4 may show is that people often make appropriate guesses at other peoples' emotions, even cross-culturally, just as they often make appropriate guesses about people's beliefs, intentions, and so on; but this is a far cry from stating there's universal agreement on what, say, a prototypical sad expression is, let alone agreement on what, in general, is a sad expression. Ekman (1980, p. 122f) acknowledges that earlier studies not only found evidence for universals but also "evidence of cultural differences in judgment of facial expression." In fact there's considerable variation between results in different studies (see Table 4) and it might be speculated that what's primarily being measured in such experiments is not the universal recognition of the same basic emotions but familiarity with Western life, if not protestant middle-class English-American life.

TABLE 4. Variation in judgements of "universal" facial expressions of emotion. Data from Ducci et al. (1982), Boucher and Brandt (1981), Boucher and Carlson (1980), Chan (1985), Ekman et al. (1969, 1987), Ekman and Friesen (1971), Izard (1971), Matsumoto (1992a), Matsumoto and Ekman (1989), Sorenson (1975, 1976). The numbers in the columns give the percentage of pictures that was judged "correctly." A continuous range is indicated for steps of less than 8%. Experimental conditions vary; hence the data should be taken in an impressionistic way (for a much more detailed review and analysis see Russell 1993). Data for DISGUST are sometimes for DISGUST/CONTEMPT. The column for "Western" includes speakers from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, France, Germany, Greece, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. The column for "Non-Western" includes speakers from Africa (not interviewed in their native language), China, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

	English	Western	Japanese	Non-Western	Fore	Bahimeno
ANGER	53, 64, 81-9	67-91	45, 57-70	37, 49-51, 64-73, 96	48	100
DISGUST	57, 69-86	61-93	58, 82, 91	20, 54-70, 84-91	0	0
FEAR	67-88	54, 68-88	31-71	40-51, 62-84	23	0
JOY	79-82, 95-8	87-98	87-98	68, 87-97	60	0
SADNESS	66-74, 89-95	54-90	67-87	32, 52-66, 76, 91	0	0
SURPRISE	56-65, 81-91	54, 80-5, 93	71-94	36, 49-57, 67-80, 91	26	0

[21] Several of these criticisms have been made by others as well. See Ratner (1989), Russell (1991e, 1993), Wierzbicka (1992a).

[22] Data for the Minangkabau people, which are often mentioned explicitly to support the pancultural thesis, I've included in the column for non-European languages, because these data were "gathered by Karl Heider in the Indonesian language from bilingual Minangkabau in Padang, West Sumatra" (Ekman et al. 1987; cf. Heider 1991). As Russell (1993) has stressed, virtually all data gathered for literate people were collected from students, usually college students, if not psychology students. In cases where the degree of education or contact with Western societies was included as a variable, recognition scores dropped sharply with diminishing awareness of Western intellectual culture (Ducci et al. 1982; Sorenson 1975, 1976; Wolfgang and Cohen 1988).

[23] Sorenson (1975) says: "Landing by helicopter in this village which had not yet seen Western man, we found it deserted, but with fires burning in the houses. A full day of shouts into the surrounding forest by our Bahimeno assistant from Wasui Laboon brought a few frightened, wary men to the edge of their village clearing. Gifts of steel axes and bush knives brought shouts which brought more men and boys. Within three days nearly 30 individuals returned to the village." In the end a total of 71 Bahimeno subjects were "interviewed."

TABLE 5. Illustration of the limitations of the "forced-choice" method: alleged pancultural facial expressions of emotions named by Canadian students in a forced choice situation that does not include the name of the pancultural emotion (Russell 1993) and in a free choice situation by speakers of Fore who live in New Guinea (Sorenson 1976).

pancultural emotion	Canadian students label chosen most often	%	Fore speakers label chosen most often	%
ANGER	contempt	76	anger	48
ANGER	frustration	96		
CONTEMPT	boredom	89	anger	27
CONTEMPT	disgust	78		
DISGUST	contempt	90	happiness	23
SADNESS	contempt	46	anger	53

2. Further support for the thesis of biologically based universality is drawn from the so called "facial feedback hypothesis," which goes back to Darwin's (1872) view that different cultures express the same basic emotions with the same pre-programmed control of the same facial muscles.[24] However the review of Izard (1990) shows that there are many uncertainties attached to the claim that experimenter-manipulated facial expressions affect emotion experience. Earlier studies only gave support for the difference between positive and negative feelings. Moreover, the fact that certain expressive behaviour activates emotion experience in itself doesn't show that this experience is automatic or universal; activation may be the result of learning and self-regulation.[25]

3. How much variety of facial expression would be covered by universals? The alleged agreement is only achieved with specially selected photographs of highly stereotyped, uniform, posed expressions.[26] What relevance does this have for the recognition of emotions in practice? The work of Russell and Fehr (1987, 1988) shows clearly that judgement of "emotion expressed by the face is not fixed by the data;" many contextual factors influence the judgement, including recently encountered facial expressions.[27] Even Ekman, O'Sullivan, and Matsumoto (1991) agree that "the use of still photographs—even multiple expressions as we have done—to study the issue of how context influences observers' inferences is too artificial to learn much of value."

4. Experiments of the "forced-choice" type are used in most cases. Such experiments cannot tell us whether a labelled facial expression corresponds with the "concept expressed." People are happy to label the "universal" facial expressions for ANGER, DISGUST, and SADNESS with "contempt" (sadness also with "fear"), and have no problem labelling CONTEMPT with "boredom" or "disgust" (see Table 5).[28] An alternative is to allow free labelling of all photographs, though it causes other problems.[29]

[24] Ekman and Friesen (1982) show that only one of the nineteen smiles they studied (based on a particular set of facial muscles used) is associated with inner joy. The rest, apparently, are largely social in nature. This rediscovery of the "Duchenne smile" is presented as a great advance (Ekman, Davidson and Friesen 1990), but at best it shows that this particular muscle is reflex-controlled. Moreover it throws doubt on the "self-evidence" of the original appeal of Darwin to cross-cultural similarity of facial expressions. Russell (1993) gives a very useful review of earlier work and opinions on the universality of some facial expressions, showing that the idea goes back at least as far as Aristotle.

[25] The distinction between *true* and *voluntarily produced* emotional expressions and the concept of *display rules*, both introduced by Ekman and Friesen (1969) have been criticised by others (Fridlund 1991; Wagner, Lewis, Ramsay and Krediet 1992).

[26] Children take about ten years to achieve adult "accuracy" in judging facial expressions on photographs. It is not until they are five or six years old that they can identify the "big five" with significant accuracy. Hence, what is so natural about facial emotional expressions is not that easy to see, at least in photographs. For various aspects of children's understanding of emotions see, for example, contributions in Saarni and Harris (1989) and also note 71.

[27] See also discussion in Russell (1993), who reviews literature showing that recognition scores for spontaneous expressions are much lower than for posed expressions.

[28] For elaborate discussions about the methodological pitfalls and importance of context relativity in judging facial expressions see the exchanges between Russell (1991a, 1991b, 1991c), Russell and Fehr (1987, 1988), Ekman and

Those who propose universal facial expressions of emotion don't agree on how to obtain reliable results. For example, Izard and Haynes (1988) say of Ekman and Friesen's (1986) paper "A New Pan-Cultural Facial Expression of Emotion" that "the pictures are ambiguous representations of the intended facial appearance changes and that their test confounds static and expressive signals of contempt." They also dispute Ekman and Friesen's claim to priority, claiming that Darwin had already remarked that contempt is a cross-species universal, and that Izard (1971) provided experimental support for the universality of contempt. In reply Ekman and Friesen (1988) say:[30]

> The reader might mistakenly believe Izard had utilized just the word *contempt* to designate one of the response choices given to the observers in his research, for Izard and Haynes used that single word to describe Izard's findings. ... Actually, Izard used many more words to designate this single response choice: "contempt, scorn, disdainful, sneering, derisive and haughty." While the meaning of these words seems related we see no reason to presume *ex cathedra* that they identify identical emotional states that share a single expression or alternative expressions.

Moreover, "the Izard 1971 data reported by Izard and Haynes show disagreement, not agreement, across cultures." These would seem to be valid criticisms. But how do Ekman and Friesen envisage using the "one-word" criterion across languages?

5. What's perhaps most worrying is that there is an astonishing display of ethnocentricity in the literature on "pancultural" facial expressions. Ekman writes (1973, p. 219f): "Regardless of the language, of whether the culture is Western or Eastern, industrialized or preliterate, these facial expressions are labelled with the same emotion terms: happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust, and surprise." Concerning this quotation Wierzbicka (1992a) correctly observes: "Ekman's reasoning seems almost to imply that the whole world speaks English." He certainly seems to assume neat one-to-one translations of emotion terms across languages.[31] Perhaps the claim is that all humans experience and recognise the same basic emotions, independently of whether or not they have words to name these emotions. As Ekman (1975, p. 39) comments: the Dani "don't even have words for the six emotions." But why should 20th century English name these universal emotions correctly? It can only be because Ekman believes that English is at the pinnacle of the evolution of naming the structure of the experiential world.

Let's finally look in more detail at one of the studies that purportedly supports the universal facial expression of basic emotions: the "data" that were obtained from the Fore people in New Guinea. I follow the account of Sorenson (1975, 1976), which is intriguingly different from that of Ekman (1973, 1980).[32] According to Sorenson two methods were used, both based on techniques developed by Izard.

O'Sullivan (1988), and Ekman, O'Sullivan and Matsumoto (1991a, 1991b). Cf. also Wallbott (1988). Russell used three methods differing from Ekman and Friesen's (1986); in all three cases the label "contempt" for a CONTEMPT photograph is used less often than "boredom," "disgust," "sad," and others. The best Ekman, O'Sullivan and Matsumoto (1991b) can come up with in their reply is to suggest: "It may be that in English the lexical distinction between disgust and contempt is less clear than it is in most other languages." According to Ricci-Bitti, Brighitti, Garotti, and Boggi-Cavello (1989) Italian students do not pick out Ekman and Friesen's CONTEMPT expression as prototypical. According to Frijda (1986, p. 73) contempt (as well as shame, guilt, and others) *cannot* be recognised by means of expressive behaviour alone.

[29] See Russell (1993) for a critical review of the validity of the various types of experiments that have been carried out. Threats to internal validity he discusses include nature of instructions to subjects, forced-choice response format, previewing, within-subject design, possibility that subjects were familiar with the hypothesis tested, confounds, feedback between translator and subject, learning to learn, experimenter expectancy, and misapplication of statistical tests. In a reply Izard (forthc.) goes along with the thrust of many of Russell's criticisms, saying that *all* methods that depend on language (including the influential work on facial expressions) are less reliable and that innateness and universalness is better studied by other methods using "objective coding systems."

[30] Ratner (1989) gives a similar criticism of Izard (1977, p. 204) where a photo variously described by subjects as amusement, gratitude, optimism, serenity, and satisfaction is considered to represent the universal JOY.

[31] The quotation to which Wierzbicka draws attention is no exception. Compare: "Our study examined three different facial expressions and found that only one of them was universally a signal for contempt, with that single word (*or its translated equivalent*) chosen by the majority of observers in each of ten cultures" (Ekman and Friesen 1988; emphasis added).

[32] According to Ekman (1973, 1980) what Sorenson calls "Method 2" was carried out first (Ekman, Sorenson, and Friesen 1969) and discarded because of "defects in the judgment task" (Ekman 1980, p. 129); then what Sorenson calls "Method 1" was carried out (Ekman and Friesen 1971). Only the results of "Method 1" have been presented by Ekman as support for the hypothesis that "particular facial behaviors are universally associated with particular emotions" (Ekman and Friesen 1971), although it's acknowledged that there are problems with discriminating fear from surprise (although not, surprisingly, in discriminating surprise form fear). Russell (1993) mentions other discrepancies between the accounts in Ekman, Sorenson, and Friesen (1969) and in Sorenson (1975, 1976).

After being told a story a Fore person was asked "to point to a picture, out of a set of two or three, which showed how the owner of the pig felt" (the story being, say, that somebody had injured the pig). In this case no verbal response is required. In the second type of experiment the Fore respondent was asked "to give the affect term he thought best described the expression in the picture." Despite Sorenson's belief that culture can at best "modify subcortically programmed expressions of emotion" he provides a good impression of many things that are worrying about his experiments.

The first part of the study was carried out in collaboration with Ekman (Ekman, Sorenson and Friesen 1969). Sorenson notes that neither Ekman nor Friesen "knew Melanesian-Pidgen or Fore. My own Melanesian-Pidgen was good; but I was not up to following native discourse or making myself understood beyond the simplest messages." Hence one may express doubts (as Sorenson does) as to whether the experimenters were capable of "devising stories in [this] alien culture that were sure to reflect unambiguously the emotions [the experimenters] had in mind."

This also meant that they had to rely on Fore translator-assistants to relate the stories and explain what was being asked; the experimenters were not "able to monitor this communication." This is the more worrying because presumably the assistants should not tell the respondents the correct answers (putting aside more standard worries about feedback between experimenter and subject). But, in the circumstances this was an almost impossible demand to make (let alone control): "The suggestion that free exchange of information was 'cheating' was quite incomprehensible to the Fore and alien to their view of language as an element of cooperative interaction among close associates." In view of this, it's actually quite surprising that the Fore speakers didn't score higher than 80-90% in the first experiment.

The second experiment was designed in such a way that the Fore assistant remained silent when the picture was shown and could not see the picture. However, now there was another problem: "it required a spoken response among a people who were not familiar with question-and-answer discourse as a means of communication. Among traditional Fore, direct questions were usually considered hostile provocations; answers were not usually expected." As a result some respondents were "completely tongue-tied; others trembled and perspired confusedly ... seemed bewildered, even fearful." The only reason the experiments could be carried out at all was because the Fore were generally eager "to do things in the Western way." The whole undertaking provoked considerable concern and active discussion among the Fore. This further meant that they "were quick to seize on the subtlest cues for an indication of how they *should* respond and react" (emphasis added).

In Tables 4 and 5 I've included Sorenson's data for the category of responses in the Fore language by "group C," the Fore being least in contact with the West. The results speak for themselves. Data for Fore who had had more contact or who were asked to answer in Pidgen show better conformity to the judgements of American college students from the 1950s (relative to which the photographs had been "calibrated"). This further undermines the claim to universality, but perhaps it's better to say that the so called "experiments" with/on the Fore are simply nonsense (or worse).

There is a strong predominance of "anger" among the answers (see Table 5) and Sorenson makes various suggestions to explain this. It might be a consequence of the crudity of the interviewing technique; apparently a typical Fore expression of anger looks more like sadness to us; perhaps the Fore word translated as "anger" is better glossed as "being angry, sad, contemptuous;" and, more subtle, perhaps Fore respondents noticed in most of the pictures "the subtle expressions reflecting our aggressive-competitive social system—possibly facial consequences of the repressed anger, backbiting and gossip that occur in more competitive social systems." If the latter hypothesis were to be true that might be a much more interesting illustration of what's universal among humans (cf. section 6 on empathy).[33]

3.2. componential analysis

Many writers have suggested that what is universal or "real" about emotions is what turns up in multidimensional scaling or semantic differentiation studies.[34] It's assumed that there's a small number of basic dimensions or features, assumed to correspond to basic affective processes, whereas each emotional state is the result of some interaction along these basic dimensions. For example, pride and

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[33] Let me just stress that I don't deny that the facial expressions shown in photographs of people around the world in, for example, Ekman (1980) and Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1970) will *often* mean *roughly* what they seem to mean to Western 20th century eyes. There is no difference without similarity. This point is further discussed in section 6.

[34] I won't introduce a clear distinction between different types of componential analysis like multidimensional scaling versus hierarchical clusters or the difference with somewhat different techniques like network maps. For a useful comparison of the outputs of these different techniques when applied to emotion words see Heider (1991). For a discussion of the differences between the "basic emotions" and "basic dimensions" approach see Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1992).

respect are primarily attitudinal, worry and grief attentional, and gratitude and anger motivational. These three characteristics could be relevant dimensions to "measure" emotions. Or "anger" could be said to be the appraisal of a *negative* event, caused by somebody else (*agency other*), and involving *unfairness*. In which case it would have been explained on these three dimensions (cf. entries in Table 1).

Though it's claimed that neither language nor culture should influence the nature of these dimensions, it seems to me that Inuit or Fore researchers would come up with different dimensions, if only because Western researchers find widely varying (numbers of relevant) dimensions or at least widely varying names of these dimensions.[35] Russell (1979, 1991b) favours only two dimensions: (dis)pleasure and arousal. Lang (1984) favours three dimensions: valence, arousal, and control/dominance. De Rivera (1984) also advances three dimensions. Davitz (1969) proposes four dimensions: hedonic tone, activation, relatedness, and competence. Dalkvist and Rollenhagen (1989) too propose four dimensions but call them (dis)pleasure, excitement, positive relatedness, and potency. Lazarus (1991a, 1991c) favours four appraisal components: goal relevance, goal (in)congruence, goal content, and blame/credit. Moving now to five dimensions, following Hofstede, Matsumoto (1989) uses avoidance, uncertainty, power distance, individualism, and masculinity. Also Scherer (1984) proposes five dimensions (pleasantness, novelty, coping potential, goal/need conduciveness, norm/self compatibility) further subdivided into 10 facets. Roseman (1984) too uses five dimensions, but again different ones (motivational state, agency, probability/certainty, legitimacy, and situational state); later adding a sixth, power (Roseman, Spindel and Jose 1990). Smith and Ellsworth (1985) use eight dimensions; Matsumoto, Kudoh, Scherer and Wallbott (1988) nine. Frijda, Kuipers and ter Schure (1989) consider nine "appraisal factors" drawn from data on 23 variables. They stress that both appraisal *and* action readiness dimensions are relevant in characterising emotions, in which case more dimensions might be distinguished.[36] Mauro, Sato, and Tucker (1992) use 10 dimensions and 28 variables. One is tempted to speculate that if research grants and computers get even bigger, these numbers will rise further and there will be no end to "new appraisal-emotion relationships that revise the theory proposed" (Roseman, Spindel and Jose 1990).

Three dimensions seem to be most popular, according to Russell (1993), although they come under many names: [moral?] evaluation (pain/pleasure, comfort/discomfort, positivity/negativity), activity (arousal), potency (control, dominance). As said, Russell favours the first two, but his review of the literature shows that outside Indo-European languages only the first very general dimension of positive/negative is universally supported (and note that the "same" emotion may have both positive and negative evaluations depending on the circumstances). For example, most studies on Japanese and Chinese find only the first dimension and occasionally the second. Lutz (1982) finds the first and the third in a multidimensional scaling of 31 Ifaluk emotion words, but stresses that anything like the dimension of arousal seems absent.

Mauro, Sato and Tucker (1992) note that any convergence that might seem to appear from these studies

> may reflect regularities in the appraisals that purportedly determine emotional states, but there is a plausible alternative explanation: These data may reflect similarities in socially learned scripts about emotion. Both the researchers and their subjects may share the same social theory of emotion. ... If substantial cross-cultural differences [were to] exist, then the proposed dimensions could not be regarded as fundamental to human emotions.

Cross-cultural research is then suggested to solve this dilemma, but will be subject to similar problems as outlined in the previous section. As Wallbott and Scherer (1988) point out *all* contemporary studies are subject to the criticism that "modern development has reduced important cultural differences that existed earlier." Mauro, Sato and Tucker themselves "provide some empirical support for ... considerable similarity across cultures in the dimensions of appraisal and in the positions of emotions on those dimensions": few differences were observed for the five "more 'primitive' dimensions" of the ten they

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[35] Even for the "same" culture the assumed invariant structure of emotion depends "on the circumstances and even on the stages of the emotion process" (Lazarus 1991a).

[36] I limit my discussions to the more "static" componential analyses of emotion, which concentrate on the cognitive appraisal of emotions. In their review of cultural variations Mesquita and Frijda (1992) distinguish the following components in the elicitation and manifestation of emotions (cf. Frijda 1986): antecedent evens, event coding, cognitive appraisal, physiological reaction patterns, action readiness, emotional behaviour, and regulation. Each of these major dimensions allows for similarities and differences among subdimensions.

investigated.[37] However it's of importance to note that, although their subjects were residents of four countries (China, Hong Kong, Japan, United States), they were all students attending universities.[38]

A related approach is that of Wierzbicka who has stressed that no viable theory of emotion can be found unless "it faces squarely the fundamental question of the role of language in the conceptualization of emotions" (Wierzbicka 1992a). She has argued that emotion words have no exact equivalents in other languages, but, according to her, there is a universal set of semantic primitives—an "alphabet of human thoughts" (Wierzbicka forthc. b), in which the emotion concepts of all peoples can be expressed. These semantic primitives include concepts like *want*, *think*, *feel*, *good*, *bad*.[39] For example, the definition of *fear* is:

X was afraid = X felt as one does

[a] when one thinks that something bad can happen to one;
[b] when one wants to do something to cause it not to happen;
[c] when one thinks that one cannot cause it not to happen.

Presumably, this definition is intended to be read as describing prototypical fear, because it's easy to find exceptions in which one of [a] - [c] does not apply though we would still call it fear.

The basic assumption of Wierzbicka is that not all English words are equally ethnocentric. It's wrong to think that "anger" names a universal, but "simple concepts such as 'say', 'want' and 'bad' are relatively, if not absolutely, culture-free" (Wierzbicka 1991). Here the assumption of one-to-one translation would be warranted; lexical universals would correspond with universal human concepts. Therefore, the variety in cross-cultural emotion talk can be described objectively in a universal semantic metalanguage.

In a critical commentary, Murray and Button (1988) argue that although Wierzbicka's (1986) metalanguage approach presupposes the universality of complex concepts like "feel" or the way various prepositions work, there's lots of evidence from anthropological linguistics to set against it. Her "definitions" only mean what they do to us if a complex underlying structure is presupposed. Furthermore, crucial to her approach is a sharp distinction between pragmatic and semantic equivalence. She acknowledges that semantic primitives can have different pragmatic meanings, and so are not cultural primitives. But she argues that semantic primitives are universals in the sense that "without being definable themselves (without circularity) they enter the definitions of countless other words, expressions, and constructions." In/for each language they "*work* as hypothetical primes" (Wierzbicka 1988).

Apart from the question whether it makes sense to separate the semantic from the pragmatic or cultural domain, there is the more fundamental question whether these primitives also function as primitives in/for other languages. As Murray and Button (1988) formulate it:

> the problem is that the "simpleness" may only be attested by the wide number of commensurate translations, while the adequacy of each translation choice may only be attested by the presupposed simple "basicness" of the concept, which suggests its "universal" nature and hence manifest translatability.

The criticism Wierzbicka has rightly levelled at those in favour of a definite number of universal basic emotions also applies, at a higher level, to her own account.[40] Wierzbicka stresses that the question of semantic primitives is an empirical one.[41] I don't think that is the case: empirical questions can only be raised *given* a conceptual framework. It's one thing to say that "all peoples of the world have 'feelings'"

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[37] According to the review of Mesquita and Frijda (1992), except for the coping characteristics of different emotions, "[a]ll other dimensions, however, appear to contribute in a highly cross-culturally similar way to differences among emotions." Compare my use/assessment of the work of Mauro, Sato and Tucker (1992) in the main text with Mesquita and Frijda's assessment that it "provides impressive evidence, both of generality of appraisal dimensions and of the similarity in meaning of several emotion words."

[38] For a summary of extensive comparisons of people's descriptions of their emotional experience in Europe, Japan, and the United States see Scherer, Wallbott, Matsumoto, and Kudoh (1988).

[39] At present Wierzbicka's metalanguage includes about 35 semantic primitives. See for more details and definitions of numerous emotion words (both in English and many other languages): Wierzbicka (1992b, forthc. a). Crucial to her approach to emotion is that "feel" is a human universal.

[40] Similarly Shweder and Sullivan (1993) correctly comment on the kind of approach that is based on the "decomposition of an emotion into its narrative slots," best exemplified by the approach of Mesquita and Frijda (1992), that it "presupposes the existence of a set of analytic or conceptual universals, which is the particular meta-language for comparison, in terms of narrative slots such as self-appraisal, social appraisal, and somatic phenomenology."

[41] Goddard and Wierzbicka (forthc.) provide detailed studies of about fifteen languages from different language families and different parts of the world to support this claim.

(Shweder forthc.), which is an empirical statement *in English*; it's quite a different thing to say that "to feel" is a semantic universal (see further section 6, in particular note 85).

4. Varieties of emotion

4.1. variations in English

There is no agreement among English speakers which terms label basic emotions, blends, and subtypes and how they are delineated from other psychological states, processes and dispositions like sensations and moods.[42] I give a number of examples of these uncertainties.

Kenny (1989) says: "A philosophical account of the affective life of the mind would need to make careful distinctions between various categories: feelings such as joy, moods such as depression, emotions such as love, attitudes such as admiration, virtues such as courage, and traits of character such as bashfulness." Fehr and Russell (1984) report love as among the most prototypical of emotions, which would support Kenny's choice.[43] However, most lists of basic emotions omit it (see Table 3), perhaps because love is more a disposition and/or a mood. Many authors include "disgust" in their list of basic emotions. If DISGUST is a basic emotion then to say that it is not an emotion would be a contradiction; yet 6% of Fehr and Russell's (1984) sample denied that disgust is an emotion. Panksepp (1982) and Kemper (1987) give reasons why disgust is *not* an emotion.

Happiness is one of the least disputed basic emotions (if we accept that happiness and joy are more or less the same), but what does it mean? Is joy or being happy merely a passing frivolity or does being happy imply having a good life or living well (Waterman 1993), and if so what does *that* mean (McFall 1989)? And why does Kenny (1989) in his plea for careful distinctions call "joy" a feeling instead of an emotion?

Ortony, Clore and Collins (1988, p. 174) have voiced their suspicion that surprise and interest may not be emotions. Green (1992, p. 3) also excludes surprise from his list of emotions. Still many writers list "interest" as a basic emotion term (see Table 3). On the other hand, the word "interest" doesn't occur in Johnson-Laird and Oatley's (1989) list of 590 emotion words. Ekman, Friesen and Simons (1985) discuss at length the status of the startle reaction on which "emotion theorists have disagreed." Other examples of "dubious" emotions include: aesthetic reactions, acceptance, courage, creativeness, depression, desire, disappointment, empathy, faith, frustration, grief, humility, hunger, meditation, ownership, pain, patience, pride, serenity, threat, vigilance.[44]

4.2. variation across cultures

In his "Cook's tour of emotion talk across cultures," Heelas (1986) shows that the number of emotions clearly identified in a language varies greatly,[45] as is how they are classified and what the aetiology and dynamics is supposed to be. Even if "many" emotions *sort of* occur cross-culturally, there are large differences in emphasis and how they are managed and evaluated.[46] Particular emotions may be associated with asocial behaviour or sorcery, or may be seen as vital to oneself and/or the social order.

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[42] The separation of emotions from emotional moods, traits, and disorders is unclear. A recent book entitled *Emotions of Culture: A Malay Perspective* (Karim 1990) in fact deals exclusively with various forms of "madness" from the point of view of socially caused mental disorders. Wierzbicka (forthc. b) shows that even in European languages there are not straightforward equivalents of the English word "emotion."

[43] Not all Fehr and Russell's (1984) subjects agreed that love was an emotion. Among native English-Canadian speakers they found 100% agreement for happiness, anger, sadness, and hate being emotions, but not for love (or fear for that matter). Also in the study of Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson and O'Connor (1987) love came out as the most prototypical emotion followed by anger, hate, depression, fear, jealousy, etc.

[44] See Lazarus (1991a; also 1991c) for a particular useful survey of what are emotions and what not. There have been substantial changes in the history of Western philosophy concerning what counts as an emotion. Rorty (1982) has shown that, as a result of philosophical controversies, the list of emotions has expanded significantly. These changes are mixed up with changes in meanings of the terms "affect," "passion" and "sentiment." See also Baier (1986, 1990).

[45] From Heelas (1986) and Russell (1993) the following intriguing ranking of emotion words can be compiled: English 2000, Dutch 1500, Taiwanese Chinese 750, Malay 230, Ifaluk 58, Chewong 8, Ommura 0.

[46] It's not possible to review all studies on cross-cultural similarities and differences. In section 3 I commented on some of the psychological literature; this section should be representative for most of the anthropological literature. Most of the psychological literature I pass over is covered in Mesquita and Frijda (1992) who review cross-cultural similarities and differences in antecedent events ("causes" of emotions) and relevant event types ("injustice,"

Of course such statements can only be made reliably if "emotions" are universal and there are no serious translation problems. Tables 6-8 illustrate these complexities in increasing order of complexity. At the outset it should be stressed that each entry would warrant a whole article. The tables are meant to invoke an overall picture of the similarities and differences, not to be seen as lists of isolated items.[47]

Table 6 gives a few examples of cases where people make fine distinctions which are not normally made in English. These are similar to the proverbial (though incorrect: Martin 1986) case of Inuit words for snow. There are also many reports of emotions not clearly identified elsewhere, at least not named. English emotions which seem to be missing elsewhere include anxiety and depression.[48] The distinction between shame, guilt, and embarrassment too seems a typical Western concern.[49]

TABLE 6. Distinctions not labelled in English. For references see also note 4.

Ifaluk	disgust	*niyabut* with reference to decaying matter; *song* when associated with moral indignation;
	fear	*metagu* fear of future events; *rus* confrontation with present event;
	surprise	*ker* pleasant surprise; *rus* unpleasant.
Indonesian	pride	*bangga* happy pride; *sombong* arrogant pride (Heider 1991).
Inuit	fear	*iqhi* (also *kappia*) fear of physical injury/calamity; *ilira* fear of being treated unkindly (may also refer to feelings of respect); can only be experienced and caused by creatures who have *ihuma* (cf. section 2.3); *qiquq* fear of "exploding" when being on the verge of tears because of bottled-up hostility (cf. entry in Table 2);
	loneliness	*hujuujaq* unhappy because of absence of other people, but also "other" unhappy feelings e.g. when encountering hostility; *pai* to be or to feel left behind; missing a person who has gone; *tumak* silent and withdrawn, especially because of the absence of others;
	love	*naklik* love for those who need protection (somewhere between Biblical "love" and a more affectionate relationship); also the wish to be with another; *niviuq* love for those who are charming or admired; wish to kiss or touch another affectionately.
Kayardild	shyness	*ngankiyaj* shame/shyness of men in the presence of their mothers-in-law or their sisters (whom they are supposed to avoid); *bulwij* shame/shyness in the presence of potential sexual partners (Wierzbicka 1986).
Tahitian	fear	*ri'ari'a* fear as present experience; *mata'u* anticipatory fear.

Perhaps it needs stressing that "missing" labels for emotions say little about the emotional richness of a language. For example Leff (1977, p. 322) points out that "Chinese" has one word "to stand for worry, tension and anxiety;" still Taiwanese Chinese has at least 750 words for emotions (Boucher 1979). But even a small emotion vocabulary doesn't necessarily mean that people would "have" few emotions. For example, there may be reasons why emotions aren't talked about or are only referred to indirectly. Howell (1981) was surprised to find, notwithstanding effort during extensive field work, she could

"shameful events," and such like); emotional appraisal, action readiness, and regulation (cf. section 3.2); physiology; and emotional behaviour (recognition accuracy, recognition rate and judgement of intensity level of facial expressions; vocal expression, and other non-verbal emotional behaviour).

[47] Reviews that discuss some of the examples in more detail include Heelas (1986) and Russell (1993).

[48] There is a range of studies concerned with the problem of applying the English definitions of mental illnesses across cultures. In particular the term "depression" often resists translation. See for detailed discussions of these complexities Leff (1981), Marsella and White (1981), Russell (1993), and many contributions in the journal *Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry*.

[49] The opposition of shame and guilt and its variation among peoples is well known to anthropologists (Benedict 1946; White and Kirkpatrick 1985; Creighton 1990). One word covering shame and embarrassment can be found in, inter alia, Fulani (Riesman 1977), Ilongot, Kaluli (Schieffelin 1983, 1985), Newar (Levy 1984), Pintupi, Tahitian. Compare also Bali *lek* "fear of failing to sustain one's part in interactions" (C. Geertz 1973; cf. Keeler 1983; Wikan 1989); Bedouin *hasham* "shame due to encounters with more powerful people" (Abu-Lughod 1986); Gidjinhali *gurakadj* "fear, shame" (Hiatt 1978); Japanese *haji, hagi* "similar to both shame and embarrassment" (Lebra 1983; cf. references in Creighton 1990); and Javanese *isin* "shame, guilt, shyness, embarassment" (H. Geertz 1959). Hiatt (1978) notes that the Latin root is the same for *puedo* 'to make or be ashamed' and *pavieo* 'to be struck with fear'. For the philosophical history of shame and guilt in Western history see Greenspan (1994) and Taylor (1985).

identify only 28 Chewong words referring to inner states, of which perhaps five or at the most eight could be identified as emotion words. With the exception of fear (*hentugn*) and shyness (*lidva*), both of which have *positive* connotations, all other emotions are inappropriate and should be suppressed. The Chewong "rarely use gestures of any kind, and their faces register little change as they speak and listen ... they seem never to 'lose control' ... little can be learnt of the nature, or even the existence, of their psychological states by simple observation." Therefore, Howell suggests, there's little need for emotion words among the Chewong people. However Chewong conversation is saturated with the occurrence of words for rules of behaviour,[50] all of which "are directed towards a suppression of emotionality."

Still the kind of differences listed in Tables 6 and the paucity of emotion words elsewhere might be easily explainable taking into account variations in living circumstances and the generally accepted relativity of opinions in moral matters. Cultural relativity in emotion vocabulary may come about because of differences in standards of evaluation of various sorts: people react differently to different things in different places. What is encouraged here may be suppressed there (influencing the frequency and degree of expression of various emotions). What people believe to be the cause of an emotion can vary greatly. Situations vary in frequency and in importance (as judged locally). Ideas vary in what is beneficial, offensive, frustrating, fearful and so on. Differing emotions may be expressed in colloquial and in poetic language with respect to the same cause/object (Abu-Lughod 1985). And so on. Hence one may expect all kinds of variations. The more serious question is whether it's merely the events that surround emotions that are different—causing superficial variations in terminology "fine-tuned" to the local situation—or whether the emotions "themselves" are different.

But how would we make a principled distinction between these two options? From accounts like that of Davitz (1969), Kövecses (1990) and Lutz (1985), it's clear that Americans are full of talk of the "feel" of emotions. The Chewong just mentioned certainly don't talk like that. And Gerber (1985) observed about Samoan people (who employ numerous words that translate as emotion words): "Most Samoans say, for example, that they are aware of no particular bodily feeling that accompanies emotions, yet [contrary to the Chewong they] laugh, cry, flush, shout, and so on, in situations that are interculturally recognizable as affectively stimulating." She also notes that "Samoans frequently say, with the full force of self-evident conventional wisdom, 'we cannot know what is in another person's depths,' or 'we cannot tell what another person is thinking.'" In contrast to Americans, Samoans direct their attention externally.[51] As Needham has stressed in several publications, perhaps there is variation and similarity at all levels: "inner states are not universals and do not in this sense constitute natural resemblances among men."[52]

In Table 7 examples are given of unfamiliar emotions.[53] What these unfamiliar words have in common is that a minimal understanding of how these words are used would require in each case an extensive exposition of the form of life in which they have their place. Apart from describing situations in which the word is used, such an exposition would have to include an account of how the self or person is seen in relation to the body and the social and moral order. If, for example, the distinction between thought and feeling, or body and mind, or between the moral and the personal is not clearly made or made very differently, this will have a profound effect on all the words that allegedly translate as emotion words (cf. Table 8). For example, in Hindi (and Dravidian languages as well), there is no word that translates as "to feel" (Lynch 1990b): anger comes *to* one, one loves or envies *with* another. Reason, judgement, and emotion are all centred in the *manas* which resides in the heart (Lynch 1990a).[54] *Bhava*

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[50] Actually the words are both for wrong behaviour and its effect, which is usually some sort of illness. The apparent fusion of cause and effect is an important feature of the rules.

[51] Similarly, Lutz (1987) reports that Ifaluk do not refer to "internal" feelings when asked to give definitions of Ifaluk emotion terms, nor are internal feelings central in any other kind of Ifaluk discourse. Fajans (1985) reports that the Baining people "are reluctant to speculate about the personal motivations, actions, and feelings either of themselves or others." One reason is, as she formulates it, that there is no distinction between what we call the ethno–psychological and sociocultural structure in the case of the Baining people.

[52] The tendency to do otherwise "is in part a result of the uncritical employment of a traditional method of classification that conduces to this outcome" (Needham 1981). In a detailed study of the Nuer he has shown that "belief" cannot be established as a distinct inner state and that hence it does not constitute a natural resemblance among men (Needham 1972). The same will apply to emotions.

[53] There are also many unfamiliar pathological states; see for example Winzeler (1990) on *amok*; Kenny (1990) on *latah*; and for a general overview Leff (1981).

[54] To say that a language doesn't have a word that translates as "to feel" involves very complicated issues which I have no room to discuss. Wierzbicka (personal communication) disputes Lynch's claim and says that the Hindi word for 'fee' is *mahsus*. Compare Wierzbicka's (forthc. b) criticism of Lutz's (1985, 1987) suggestion that Ifaluk *nunuwan* translates as "thought/emotion." According to Wierzbicka *nunuwan* corresponds to the semantic primitive "think"

refers, roughly, to human moods and sentiments; *rasa* covers "aesthetically distanced" emotions, "more pristine and rarefied than any feeling [sic!] derived from direct sensual perception or experience" (Toomey 1990). *Rasa* is "an autonomous meta-emotion, a *sui generis* form of consciousness" (Shweder 1993). The word *rasa* also means "juice, sap, liquid, to taste, to savour, to sample" and "*rasa* emotion talk" is inseparable from culinary metaphors and metonyms, food symbols and practices: "food literally *is* a form of emotion, particularly love" (Lynch 1990a). Clearly a lot needs to be said and experienced before one can get an inkling of what *rasa* emotions are like and how they relate to "ordinary" emotions (Shweder 1992).

There are many differences in where emotions are located: within the mind, within the body, as coming from without, associated with particular contexts, and so on. Emotions may be located in the

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and *niferash* with "feel" (compare entries for Ifaluk in Table 8). The danger of the approach of Wierzbicka is that it's too easily assumed that the semantic primitives are "think" and "feel" and not, say, *nunuwan* and *niferash* (cf. end of section 3.2).

TABLE 7. Unfamiliar "emotions." See also Table 2 on unfamiliar "anger." For references see also note 4.

Baining	*anaingi*	"hunger" but also an emotion: loneliness is felt as hunger (also *airiski*)
	awumbuk	sadness, tiredness, boredom caused by departures, "social hangover" (Fajans 1983).
Chaubes	*masti*	positive culturally pregnant emotion involving aspects of being intoxicated, drunk, proud, wanton, lustful, happy, overjoyed, careless (Lynch 1990b).
Czech	*litost*	a state of torment caused by a sudden insight into one's own miserable self, involving aspects of grief, sympathy, remorse, longing, and a desire for revenge (Kundera 1980, pp. 121-3).
Hagener	*popokl*	outrage over the failure of others (Strathern 1968).
Hindu	*srngara rasa*	refined mind-body experience of divine erotic love/play not directed at humans (Marglin 1990).
Indonesian	*takut*	mixture of fear and guilt (no separate word for guilt: Heider 1991)
Ifaluk	*fago*	displayed when poverty or illness strikes another, but also in the presence of someone admirable, when receiving a gift or sharing something, or when somebody leaves; involves aspects of compassion, pity, sadness, and love;
	nguch	boredom and lethargy due to extreme heat, weariness or illness; "sick and tired;" response to almost any unpleasant situation of moderate seriousness.
Ilongot	*betang*	shame, timidity, embarrassment, awe, obedience, respect.
Inuit	*siqnaaniq*	combination of protectiveness and almost-hate (cf. Qipi Inuit *ugiangu* "affectionately aggressive behaviour");
	tiphi	happiness, humour, and amusement expressed in response to [i] excessive emotionality on the part of other people; [ii] errors, misfortunes, or minor pains of one self or others; [iii] fear or being startled; [iv] experiences defined as happy or pleasant [i.e. *quvia*].
Japanese	*amae*	a Japanese form of love: a pleasant feeling of "sweet dependence" among adults which is valued positively; implies a considerable blurring between subject and object and unwillingness to be cast into a world of objective "reality" (Doi 1973; Morsbach and Tyler 1986; Kumagai and Kumagai 1986).
Javanese	*iklas*	state of pleasant or at least indifferent frustration;
	sungkan	feeling of respectful politeness before a superior or unfamiliar equal (who may be spiritually higher) (H. Geertz 1959).
Latin	*acedia*	boredom qualified by despair and sadness, sinful negligence or idleness (Harré and Finlay-Jones 1986; Jackson 1985).
Minangkabau	*merantau*	emotion associated with going to distant lands to seek fortune and experience, "the hallmark of Minangkabau culture" (Heider 1991).
Oriya	*lajya*	"to bite your tongue," antidote to destructive female rage; involves aspects of shame, embarrassment, modesty, shyness, gratitude, loyalty, and respect; the glue of social relationships; to be full of *lajya* is to be a person of worth; in some contexts suggestive of seductive coyness (Parish 1991; Menon and Shweder forthc.; Shweder 1993, forthc.).
Pintupi	*kunta*	shame as a "metasentiment," embarrassment, shyness, respect (most applicable to formal or ceremonial occasions);
	watjilpa	melancholy, lonely, pining; effect of separation from objects of security and familiarity; wider than homesickness, akin to, but different from sadness, depression, or worry.
Rauto	*makai*	"full" sadness, associated with the most fundamental dynamics of Rauto cultural and individual expression (Maschio 1992).
Samoan	*alofa*	love, empathy, pity, liking; does not include intimacy, smiling, embracing or sexual love; a bit like Biblical love but more emphasis on social bonding and obligation (cf. Inuit *naklik* in Table 6);
	lotomalie	"sweet", agreeable, flexible dependency, happy passivity (evaluated positively, cf. Japanese *amae*);
	lotomama	emotion associated with averted conflict or anger, lack of resentment (Gerber 1985).
Semai	*snngoh*	fear, caution, proper reserve; being *snngoh* is not reprehensible, but smart (Dentan 1978).
Tahitian	*arofa*	empathetic or pitiful suffering because of the suffering of others;
	fiu	annoyance and/or disappearance of felt motive for a task; opposite of enthusiasm;
	mehameha	uncanny feelings in the head and on the skin, different from fear.

TABLE 8. Problems in translating "emotion" and with distinguishing between the cognitive and the affective. For references see also note 4.

Balinese	*keneh*	the "feeling-mind" ("who can think but with their feelings"); emotion is bound in a conception of social obligation and balance in the cosmos (Wikan 1989).
Chewong	*rus*	"liver", the seat of thoughts and feelings, using expressions like "my liver is good, tiny, forgot" for feeling fine, ashamed and forgetting something; distinct from the *ruway*, the essence of being, situated in the chest (Howell 1981, 1984).
Fiji Hindian	*bhaw*	emotion, gesture, display (with aesthetic overtones); *bhaw* "feelings" are not experiences or viewed as internal states, but located in events (Brenneis 1990).
Giriama	*ini*, *moyo*, *dzitso*:	these three words refer to the physical liver, heart, and eye; both *ini* and *moyo* are the "seat" of innermost sentiments, feelings, desires, etc.; greed and envy also originate from the eye; selfhood is located in the heart; the core of an argument in the liver (Parkin 1985).
Ifaluk	*niferash*	"our insides", subdivided in *nunuwan* and *tip* which distinguish between socially standard and idiosyncratic "processes;" fuse thought and feeling and don't distinguish desire and intention.
Japanese	*jodo*	usually translated as "emotion", but includes considerate, motivated, lucky, calculating (Matsuyama et al. 1978).
Malay	*hati*	"liver", which is the source of the passions (anger, envy, cheerfulness, love, etc.); *sakit hati* "liver sickness" =? mental disorder (Karim 1990, p. 27, 106).
Maori	*ngakau*	the "mind" as an undifferentiated whole of cognition, emotion and volition, located in the intestines; other organs (*manawa* "connected with breathing", *mauri* "life principle", *wairua* "spirit of person that can move about", and others) may also experience emotions (Smith 1981).
Mangap-Mbula	*kete*	"liver;" term used for talking about all kinds of feelings or states linked with feelings (Bugenhagen 1990).
Minangkabau	*raso ati*	usually translated as "emotion" but includes "seriousness," "honesty," "indecision" (Heider 1991).
Newar	*nuga*	"the sacred mind," located in the heart, the seat of cognition, memory, perception, emotional experience and inhabited and animated by "a moral god" (Parish 1991).
Pintupi	...	emotions take place in the stomach where the spirit is located; the organ of thought is the ear.
Samoan	*loto*	in general: "depth;" as seat of emotions physically located in a person's body, but its precise site is ambiguous (Gerber 1985).
Tahitian	*'a'au*	"intestines;" where emotions are located.
Temiar	*hup*	the heart, where feelings, thoughts, awareness, and memory are placed, but not vocalised expressions which are located in the "head soul" (*rewaay* "animating principle") (Roseman 1988).

heart, lungs, liver, stomach, intestines, the eye, or in "pseudo-organs," which may be like souls, detachable from the body.[55]

Other people may talk about emotions as external agencies which invade or possess people. Others again talk as if a person's emotions are occurring in or to others. For example, Maori people consider their experiences as things coming from outside, consuming them, outside their personal control and moral responsibility (Smith 1981); the only exception is "shame." The Dinka and Nuer have "no conception which at all closely corresponds to our popular modern conception of mind" (Lienhardt 1970), despite a very elaborate "psychological" vocabulary (Needham 1972, p. 26). They talk of emotions as powers coming from without (compare the idiom "happening to" in English). Taken this way "controlling one's emotions" makes no sense; they simply happen (somewhat like intrusive memories), not originating "from within," but from elsewhere.

Although many peoples don't have a word that translates even approximately as "emotion," that doesn't exclude the "idea" being known implicitly. For example Levy (1984) argues that though Tahitian has no word equivalent to "emotion," Tahitian emotions have in common that they originate in the intestines, involve the whole person, are directed at something and lead to action. This provides enough

[55] For example, among the Semai, the *ruai* "soul" is located just behind the forehead and is detachable in dreams (Dentan 1978). See also Howell (1984, pp. 127-141) on Chewong *ruway* and Roseman (1988) on Temiar *rewaay*. Jah Hut have seven types of *ruay* (Couillard 1980, p. 33).

similarity to English to call them emotions. Still one might wonder whether Levy's observation does not, so to say, read too much into the Tahitian mind. Perhaps what is too easily taken for granted is that there *must* be emotions, where what emotion *is*, is what white Anglo-Americans think it is (cf. Lutz 1982, 1985).

4.3. cultural translation

Social and cultural anthropologists may be biased to see differences, linguists and cross-cultural psychologists, to see similarities. Until a decade ago or so, seeing similarities no doubt dominated in the are of emotion. For example, Russell (1993), searching the Human Relations Area Files for reports on how societies classify emotions, found that "in every case, the ethnographer assumed that the way in which emotion is described in English suited that society and assumed that native words could be accurately translated into English."

However, translation problems abound. What, for example, is the criterion of "reasonably accurate"? Do we require a word - word translation or are expressions (including metaphorical ones) acceptable? Reasonable accuracy will depend not only on the writer's knowledge of and position in the society studied, but also on the philosophical and other background assumptions that come from the researcher's own society, including his or her standards for doing research. That this point cannot be overestimated is illustrated by the disagreement of two native Polish speakers living and publishing in English-speaking academia: according to Wierzbicka (1986) the Polish *tesknic* has no equivalent in English; according to Kolenda (1987) it simply means "longing."[56] Perhaps Kolenda and Wierzbicka are both right, but use different (explicit or intuitive) criteria of what is still or roughly the same meaning.

As is now generally accepted, when the "same" society is studied in depth by more than one anthropologist, different reports are produced. Freeman criticised Mead for her account of the Samoan people. Freeman himself is criticised by Gerber (1985), who accuses both Mead and Freeman of oversimplifications. For example, according to Freeman (1983, pp. 218-22) *msu* is an "emotionally disturbed state" which is best glossed as "inexpressible anger against authority;" according to Gerber this is wrong and the gloss should be "reluctant." Commenting on C. Geertz's (1973) account of the Balinese emotion *lek* "stage-fright," Wikan (1989) says Geertz "identifies its motivating force as aestheticism supreme: 'to please as beauty, not as virtue pleases'." Instead Wikan suggests "that the opposite is the case; a ceaseless and fearful concern with morality, with good and bad actions and expressions."[57]

As Swartz (1988) points out in a study of Swahili *aibu* "dishonour, disgrace, loss of standing, shame," one reason why disagreements of interpretation will easily arise is because of problems of incomplete cultural sharing of understanding of words, situations, behaviour, and so on. In particular status and gender aspects may distort the picture the anthropologist is offered. Precisely because emotion concepts take into account the whole social and moral world, even at the level of the description of "words-in-use," subtle differences will only transpire after extensive exposition of the form of life in which they find their natural place. For example, it may well be that the best one word rendering of "sad" in Pitjantjatjara is *tjituru-tjituru* (and vice versa). But it requires lengthy comparisons of many possible applications to find out that "sad," but not *tjituru-tjituru*, implies a kind of quiet resignation, can be caused by events which do not affect the speaker personally, and doesn't imply unfulfilled wishes (Wierzbicka 1992a).

5. Varieties of theories

Various approaches to emotions have been proposed in philosophy, biology, psychology, and social science at large. Just as with emotions, classifications of theories of emotions vary. In Table 9 I've listed a number of recent definitions or descriptions of what emotions are, listed alphabetically by author. I haven't tried to group them to show how in accounts *about* emotions, similarities and differences crop up and disappear. The problem with broad classifications like "there are biological, cognitive, and social theories of emotion" is that it's assumed that neat boundaries exist between the biological, the psychological, and the social, and each of these three labels has a universally agreed reference—which is not the case. And the same problem arises for all other labels, such as affective, autonomic,

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[56] A similar example can be found in the colour naming literature where there is continuing disagreement as to whether English "red" can be translated by one word into Hungarian (instead of dividing itself over two "basic" colour terms). Consulting native Hungarian speakers has not settled the issue; English-Hungarian and Hungarian-English dictionaries give conflicting information.

[57] Perhaps there's room for saying that these two assessments don't have to be contraries if we were to reassess Western notions of ethics and aesthetics. See for a different response also Keeler (1983).

behaviouristic, conative, constructionist, contextualist, developmental, ethnopsychological, ethological, evolutionary, feeling, metalinguistic, moral, neural, physiological, psychiatric, psychoanalytic, psychodynamic, psycho-evolutionary, and what is perhaps the most unclear label of all: "naturalistic." For the purpose of my argument it would be sufficient for the reader to go through the entries of Table 9 *slowly*. Nevertheless, in this section, I will give more background to a few theories of emotion that have been proposed by philosophers and social scientists.

TABLE 9. Proposed definitions for emotions in publications since 1980. Plutchik (1980a) listed 28 older definitions. Descriptions given are literal quotations or paraphrases from sources given.

Averill 1980, 1982	Emotions are transitory social roles that include an individual's appraisal of the situation, are interpreted as a passion rather than as an action and are responses that have been institutionalised by society as a means of resolving conflicts.
de Rivera 1984	Emotions are concerned with adjusting the relationship between person and other, ideally maximising the value of the relationship.
de Sousa 1987	Paradigm scenarios, in setting up our emotional repertoire, quite literally provide the meaning of our emotions; their axiological correctness is defined in terms of these scenarios.
Dienstbier 1984	Human emotion is a motivation-laden feeling resulting from shifts in arousal and the meaning attached to those arousal shifts.
Frijda 1986	Emotion is a script-like process. It starts with eliciting conditions which have a range of attributes. It continues with evaluations in relation to the individual's concerns. It causes physiological disturbances, and prepares the individual for action. Finally, it issues in expressions and actions.
Greenspan 1988	Emotions are affective mixtures of comfort/discomfort, inhibition/arousal, etc. towards certain evaluative propositions spelling out their intentional content.
Harré 1986	Emotions are culture-specific patterns of learnt behaviour, mirroring a society's conception of what is appropriate in a particular, socially defined, situation.
Hochschild 1983	Emotion is a biologically given sense (like hearing, touch, smell) which is related not only to an orientation toward action, but also toward cognition.
Johnson and Oatley 1989	There is a small number of basic signals that can set up characteristic emotional modes within the organism. Terms that refer to basic emotions cannot be analysed into anything more basic, such as a prototype or a set of semantic features. Other terms refer to states that combine a basic emotion with a propositional content.
Koch 1987	Emotions share something with sensations, perceptions, beliefs, desires, and moral judgements. They have phenomenal, intentional, and evaluative aspects and have to do with interactive complexes of bodily feelings, attentional sets, evaluations or (moral) judgements, and desires/impulses/inclinations to behave in certain ways.
Lang 1984	An emotion is defined as a broad response disposition that may include measurable language behaviour, organised overt acts, and a physiological support system.
Lazarus et al. 1980	Emotions are complex, organised states consisting of cognitive appraisals, action impulses, and patterned somatic reactions.
Leventhal 1980	Emotion words are related to (but not referring to) certain bodily feelings; they are intentional (about something) and they involve a moral order.
Levy 1984	Emotions are about one's *mode of relationship* as a total individual to the social and nonsocial environment.
Lutz 1984	Emotions are culturally constructed concepts which point to clusters of situations typically calling for some sort of action.
Lyons 1980	X is to be deemed an emotional state if and only if it is a physiologically abnormal state caused by the subject of that state's evaluation of his or her situation.
Marks 1982	Emotions are belief/desire complexes characterised by strong desire.
McCullagh 1990	Emotions involve some sort of reaction to an evaluation, usually at least the onset of feelings about it, sometimes desires and physiological changes as well. These reactions are not rational, but automatic responses, and therefore emotions cannot be wholly rational.
Middleton 1989	Emotions are sociocultural creations that are necessarily communicated routinely through a variety of channels serving to clarify intentions, attitudes, identity and meaning.
Oakley 1992	Emotions are complex phenomena involving dynamically related elements of cognition, desire, and affectivity. All three of these elements have moral significance. Emotions are essential and enduring features of our moral character.
Ratner 1989	Emotions depend on a social consciousness concerning when, where, and what to feel as well as when, where, and how to act.
Shweder forthc.	Emotions are complex narrative structures which give shape and meaning to somatic and affective experiences whose unity is to be found in the type of self-involving stories they make it possible for us to tell about our feelings.
Solomon 1988	An emotion is an evaluative (or normative) judgement, a judgement about my sensation and about myself and/or about all other people.
Tomkins 1980	Affects (like "joy", "fear", "angry") are sets of muscular and glandular responses located in the face and also widely distributed throughout the body.

5.1. cognitive theories

Cognitive theories of emotion are a response to the view, originating with Darwin (1872), that emotions are discrete, innate, adaptive, biosocial, action- and expression-systems.[58] Instead cognitive theories assume that emotion "arises from how a person *construes* the outcome, actual or anticipated, of a transaction or bit of commerce with the environment" (Lazarus, Kanner and Folkman 1980; emphasis added).[59] In philosophy such theories have become popular through the influence of Solomon (1977, 1984, 1988, 1990).[60] Assuming feelings do not require propositional attitudes and do not exhibit directly features of meaning or justifiability, cognitive theories of emotion have in common that emotions require judgements or evaluations; emotions are intentional—*about* events.[61] The point of a cognitive theory of emotion is to deny the opposition between reason and passion:[62] emotions are (rational)[63] evaluative judgements (which may be accompanied by certain physiological phenomena)—hence the view is also labelled "judgementalism." Many cognitivists hold that emotions involve beliefs and have *propositions* as objects, although subjects don't have to believe these propositions; hence leaving room for subjects to misidentify their emotions.[64] However, Solomon (1988, 1993) has stressed that judgement is not the same as belief, does not have to be overly intellectualistic and is always evoked from a perspective defined "by one's place in the world, one's cultural context, status and role(s) in that cultural context, one's personal situation" (Solomon 1993).

Griffiths (1989) gives a useful summary of problems cognitive theories have to deal with. These problems include objectless emotions, reflex emotions, unconscious emotions, neglect of physiological responses and emotions via imagination.[65] Further, the identification of emotion with evaluative judgements both underdetermines and gives far too many emotions. It is not always possible to distinguish between emotions solely on the basis of the cognitions they involve and the cognitivist cannot really explain why some groups of sets of judgements are emotions, whereas innumerable others are not. The notion of "intentionality" too is not sufficiently well understood to set clear criteria as to

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[58] Apart from what has been said about facial expressions in section 3.1, I won't discuss psychophysiological aspects of emotions. There is no doubt that descriptions of the neural, expressive, and conscious-experiential levels of emotion may add to understanding better the mechanisms characteristically underlying emotions. But different emotions "do not differ, however, to such a degree and with such consistency that the response patterns could serve to define or identify the respective emotions" (Frijda 1986, p. 162). Moreover, "the criteria of individuation of the relevant physiological states ... are drawn at least in part from the functional vocabulary of needs, behavior, and judgments of normality" (de Sousa 1987, p. 59). For critical discussions of ANS data see for example Ratner (1989). For an exchange between a cognitivist and a psychophysiologist see Lazarus (1984) and Zajonc (1984).

[59] Cognitive theories do not deny adaptational aspects. See in particular Lazarus (1991c), who speaks of a cognitive-motivational-relational theory. In his view primary appraisal is to do with goals; secondary appraisal with prospects for coping, providing the adaptational aspect.

[60] In anthropology cognitive theories can be seen as a sequel to structuralism in the sense of Lévi-Strauss. Aristotle's account in his *Rhetorica* can easily be interpreted as cognitive, if not social constructionist. In an Editorial in the journal *Cognition and Emotion* Oatley (1987) says "[w]ithin cognitive science emotions are likely to become increasingly important as we begin to understand more about systems with multiple goals that operate in imperfectly known environments."

[61] For discussions of the variety of types of objects of emotions see Baier (1990), de Sousa (1987), Kenny (1963), Rorty (1980), Wilson (1972).

[62] This opposition is perhaps more part of folklore and romanticism than of philosophical tradition proper. For Descartes and Hume emotions have as objects, not propositions, but ideas. The "same" ideas can receive both cool rational assent and affective assent. If we were to be emotion-free much of our action would loose its point. For Descartes reason has the last word, but needs the help of the passions. For Hume, strength of will has the last word, which depends on the passions.

[63] Cognitive theories of emotion are, by their own definition, rational theories of emotion. Unfortunately I have no space to include a discussion of different views of rationality (see Solomon 1992 for 33 definitions of rationality). I take for granted that rationality includes moral considerations. On the subtleties of varying the concept of rationality such that emotions as evaluative judgements should or should not be called rational see, amongst others, de Sousa (1987), McCullagh (1990), Rorty (1980), Solomon (1992). On the relations of the rationality and the morality of emotions see de Sousa (1987), Greenspan (1988), Oakley (1992), Solomon (1977; 1992).

[64] On emotion and error see Greenwood (1987). This is a very complex issue and the main reason why I've left out a discussion of the famous experiments of Schachter and Singer (1962), which have been interpreted very differently by writers from different camps.

[65] See on objectless emotions for example Kenny (1963), Lamb (1987), Morreall (1993), and Wilson (1972). The cognitivist Lazarus (1991) argues that even drug-induced emotions and emotions that are processed entirely through subcortical pathways are mediated by cognition. For the opposite view of "noncognitive information processing" see Izard (1993).

what has to be shown if we say that emotions have an intentional aspect. Other questions for the cognitive approach include: How can we talk about "rational" emotions if having an emotion is, at least sometimes, beyond my control? What's the distinction between emotions justifying actions and emotions giving reasons for actions? How can young children or animals have emotions, when they do not "have" the relevant evaluative judgements?

By restricting the cognitive element of emotions to knowledge and belief, judgemental theories fail to account for the affective aspect, at least that's what those who want to align emotion closer with sensation would say: "it is possible to make the judgement without feeling the corresponding emotion" (Robinson 1983).[66] In an exchange with Kraut (1986), Solomon (1990) agrees that context is an essential feature of emotion, but Kraut's suggestion that emotion is feeling in a certain context goes too far. Insofar as feeling is valuable it's true that we need a rich content of feelings and it will not be possible to distinguish or specify independently feeling and emotion. But such a notion of feelings with rich content already presupposes a cognitive analysis. The response might be that it is conceptually impossible to have various emotions in the absence of certain desires and affects (Oakley 1992, p. 199n61; Green 1992). But it is not obvious that Solomon denies this: "emotions are not constituted just by judgments but essentially involve ... feelings, physiological reactions, strong desires or frustration of desires or 'affective tone' of some sort or other" (Solomon 1988). At a more general level it might be suggested that it all depends on who one asks to do the conceptual analysis. It might well be that the invoked necessary conceptual connections between "emotion" and "affect" or "desire" are merely a contingent product of Western history.

More recently cognitive theories are associated more explicitly with the idea of cognitive prototypes, schemes, scripts, or scenario's. Representatives of this approach can be found in cognitive psychology (Frijda 1986), cognitive linguistics (Kövecses 1990) and philosophy (de Sousa 1987).[67] For example, according to de Sousa emotions are a non-reducible part of our mental life. They are not "raw" feelings, because we need paradigm scenario's which have to be learnt. Furthermore they can be assessed for objective correctness in a similar way as perception. To have an emotion is to impose a certain frame on the situation one is in, to see it in terms of a particular "paradigm scenario" and to be disposed towards particular interpretations of it and reactions to it. Some general features of many of these paradigms are biologically determined. But there is in theory an indefinite variety of emotions, limited only by their capacity to frame experience and actions within these scenarios. Emotions help the agent get what she wants, are centred on paradigm situations, and push her towards desires which make more sense of her life.

5.2. social constructionist theories

Social constructionism, inspired by the writings of Vygotsky, Mead and Wittgenstein opposes Cartesianism and individualism. Instead persons (or selves or positioned subjects) are primarily seen as social constructions, or intersections of social relations, or points of intersection between the subjective and the social, which allows for considerable cross-cultural variation in concepts of self.[68]

Emotions, seen as essential links between and constituents of self and society, might then be characterised as cultural artefacts, the meanings of which are learned.[69] They emerge as a kind of language of the self; a code for statements about intentions, moral judgements, actions, and social relations. On the constructionist view emotions are embedded in a network of norms, values, beliefs, and

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[66] See also Leighton (1988), Kraut (1986), and Clarke (1986). Oakley (1992) argues that although affect is a necessary component of emotions: "an affect is a bodily or psychic condition which we are in, but which we need not feel, in having an emotion" (p. 14).

[67] On emotions and prototypes or scripts see also Fischer (1991), Fischer et al. (1990), Russell (1991d, 1993), Russell and Fehr (1984), Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson and O'Connor (1987), Shweder (forthc), Wierzbicka (forthc. b). Probably Lazarus' (1991) "core relational themes" also fit under this umbrella. Also Ekman (1992b) has recently considered a basic emotions as "a *family* of related states.":

[68] See Marsella, DeVos and Hsu (1985), Shweder and Le Vine (1984), White and Kirkpatrick (1985) and numerous contributions to the journal *Ethos*. There are many societies in which the boundaries between self, other, and cosmos are less distinct and/or the multiplicity and separability of components of the self is recognised. See Wierzbicka (1993) for a useful cross-cultural comparison of "self," "mind," "I," "person," "emotion," "society," and "people."

[69] Thus anthropologists have located emotional meaning within the moral fabric of social relations, institutionalised activities, global ideological structures of the person, or within folk theories used to interpret events such as developmental changes, crisis situations, and interpersonal conflict (Lutz and White 1986). However, it's not the case that all anthropologists are social constructionists. Leach (1981) comments that he can make no sense of C. Geertz's (1973, p. 81) "Not only ideas, but emotions too, are cultural artifacts." See for a review of the variety of theories on emotion in anthropology Lutz and White (1986).

social relationships. Emotions presuppose values, and values presuppose emotions. Involving judgements or appraisals, and hence requiring concepts, they are a moral way of making sense of the world. In the latter sense emotions are *active* engagements with the (social) world, intricately linked with value: moral appraisals, grounded in the "moral order" control both meaning and use of emotion ascriptions. This fits Goffman's attempt to locate emotionality in the interactional and the ritual order.[70]

Many constructionists will acknowledge that mature human emotions are probably continuous with instinctive responses of animals and infants. However, the overlay of cultural and linguistic factors on biology is so great that the physiological aspects of emotional states have only secondary status.[71] Though there is a close relationship between physiological change and at least some emotions, it is denied that any physiological event is constitutive or deterministic in any sense. There are no universal, objective situations that make emotions happen to us; active appraisals are essential. Differences in culturally learnt knowledge are the crucial factor determining which emotions are experienced, in how problems of social relationship (or existential meaning) are seen. This might give social constructionists their own *social* universality, allowing a framework for cross-cultural comparison. Lutz and White (1986) suggest that the following six "basic" human problems cover virtually everything that anthropologists have found out about emotions in different cultures: [i] violation of cultural codes and/or of ego's personal expectations; [ii] ego's own violation of those codes (including social incompetence, personal inadequacy, and awareness of those); [iii] danger to one's physical and psychological self and significant others; [iv] actual or threatened loss of significant relationships; [v] receipt of resources; [vi] focus on rewarding bonds with others. Note however that this classification appeals to many "typical" Western concepts, drawing conceptual boundaries that might be serious barriers in cross-cultural understanding.

If, on the other hand social constructionism is simply taken as cultural determinism, it falls short of making sufficiently clear how intercultural communication in general and interpretation of emotions and emotion terms in particular, is possible given "the overwhelming evidence of cultural diversity and cognitive differentiation in the emotions of mankind" (Harré 1986). If "the bulk of mankind live within systems of thought and feeling that bear little but superficial resemblance to one another" (Harré 1986), it's unclear who is constructing this view. This is the general problem of universalism versus relativism applied to emotions. The problem is further aggravated if it's assumed that emotions play an *essential* role in human communication and hence in *every* aspect of social life, a problem I'll return to in the next section.

The social constructionist view comes in many varieties. Nevertheless there are similarities with the cognitive approaches; Lynch (1990b), among others, considers social constructionism a variation of cognitivism. Both oppose the dichotomy emotions-as-feelings — thought-and-rationality. Both oppose the claim to "true naturalism" of the biological approaches. Both agree that emotions and emotion concepts are complex phenomena and involve situated knowledge. The difference between them is, roughly, that cognitive theories tend to locate rationality in the mind of the person, whereas constructionists locate rationality more in the social sphere and infuse it with more morality: the notion of emotion as judgement is "supplemented by the insight that judgments might better be viewed as socially contested evaluations" (Abu-Lughod and Lutz 1990). The cognitivist is more conceptual, the constructionist more interactional, but both understand emotion as mediating social action. Still these differences might easily be exaggerated with the wrong emphasis. The moral aspect of emotions doesn't necessarily imply anti-individualism. It can be argued that the moral worth of the *individual* person derives (in part) from her emotional life independently from socially embedded actions and behaviour (Oakley 1992). On the other hand, the sort of models or scenario's anthropological constructionists

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[70] Representatives of social constructionism with respect to emotions include Gergen (1990), Harré (1986), Jaggar (1990), Ratner (1989). For criticism of social constructionist views see Kemper (1981). The views of interpretative anthropologists like Lutz and Rosaldo are closely related to social constructionism. More recently the effects of French post-modernism have become apparent in the writings of anthropologists but, in my view, this is not more than veneer overlying the traditional Geertzian type of anthropology (Abu-Lughod and Lutz 1990; Lynch 1990a).

[71] Perhaps this is analogous with Mead's view, as presented by Scheff (1985): [i] the biological component of emotions is based on physiologically programmed response patterns, *but* [ii] inborn response patterns can be modified by experience. After decades of work on the biology of emotions Izard (1990) also tends to this view when he says: "Through maturation and learning the individual modifies the innate connections and establishes new ones. The connections that emerge with development and learning provide other mechanisms whereby expressions can influence feelings." See also Malatesta-Magai, Izard and Camras (1991) for the question whether or not the emotion status of infant facial expressions changes during the course of development. Camras (1992) suggests that elicitation of emotion in infants can be quite different from elicitation in adults.

(interpretive anthropologists) propose are surprisingly similar to the scenarios cognitivists talk about.[72] There's not much difference between "prototypic event sequences" and "scenarios of situated action." The difference is more in a general attitude towards the dichotomy cognition/affect. As Lutz (1987) stresses "the concern with 'true, underlying feeling' is a local cultural preoccupation." She aims at presenting "the Ifaluk 'ethnotheory of emotion'," but the model presented "is *not* meant to be a model of how the Ifaluk 'really feel,' nor is it intended as a model of how the Ifaluk 'think about their feelings'." A cognitivist would claim that the model Lutz proposes *is* a model of the Ifaluk mind.

Perhaps the most important sense in which social constructionism is more on the right track than pure cognitivism is in the way the social embedment of emotions links up to larger issues of politics and power relations. For example, the Latin American emotion (or "syndrome") *nervios* could receive a cognitive analysis in terms of a certain type of anxiety that may take the form of an individual pathology, for example schizophrenia (Jenkins 1988). But such an analysis would remain on the surface of interpreting the symptoms of *nervios*, if a fuller social analysis would show that the symptoms of *nervios* are more correctly seen as the symptoms of hunger (which suggests thinking about food, wealth, and power instead of tranquillisers: Scheper-Hughes 1992).[73]

5.3. emotions as undefinables

As we've seen, not all writers or lay-people agree on how to separate emotions from such things as reflexes, moods, emotional traits, and emotional disorders, nor do they agree on the "amount" or "essentialness" of cognitive, affective, intentional, and moral factors and their relation to changes in physiology and cultural orders. Awareness of this variety is often suppressed or relegated to "mistakes" of opponents. Many writers avoid the problem, consciously or unconsciously, by presenting a theory of emotions on the basis of a few favoured examples. For example, de Sousa (1987) in his 372 pp. book on the rationality of emotions discusses surprisingly few emotions at any length, with one exception, *love*, which occurs on almost every page.[74] He also confesses: "I concede that I am unable to give a definition of emotion" (p. 11, 109). Similar confessions abound in the literature.

But if emotions do not form a natural kind,[75] then it's ludicrous to ask for "compelling arguments" for one kind or another. Perhaps what's wrong is the desire to pigeon-hole everything, including reason and emotion. The philosophical "theory" that fits in best with this anti-definitional (if not anti-theoretical and anti-scientific) approach is that of Wittgenstein.

For Wittgenstein nothing is central to emotion; there are no "essences."[76] Just as with psychological concepts or experiences in general, similarities and differences crop up and disappear, between types of emotions and among token occurrences of the same emotion type, between emotions and sensations as well as between emotions and behavioural dispositions, and so on. For example, fear can, on occasion, be the display of merely innate, instinctive behaviour; on another occasion it can consist solely of imaginings or thoughts. So there is no one thing that fear *is*.[77] It's an ontological illusion to think that there's a specific "it" or "thing" or "process" or "state," to which emotion words refer (whether in the mind, the nervous system, or anywhere else): "'Joy' designates nothing at all. Neither any inward nor any outward thing" (Wittgenstein 1967, par. 487). The words for emotions are as much part of what emotion is as anything else. Wittgenstein stresses neither behaviour, nor inner states, nor anything else as central to emotions. However, this doesn't mean that emotions have nothing to do with sensations or behaviour. Although emotions are not sensations, or grounded in sensations, nonetheless they have *characteristic*

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[72] Cf. Lutz (1988, p. 221): "In each cultural community, there will be one or more 'scenes' identified as prototypic or classic or best examples of particular emotions." See also Rosaldo (1984), Shweder (forthc. b), White (1990), Maschio (1992). The similarity is also apparent from the review articles by Mesquita and Frijda (1992) and Shweder and Sullivan (1993).

[73] The cases of *nervios* Jenkins and Scheper-Hughes refer to are not the same. I use the example to illustrate a point. A detailed account of *nervios* would involve many more complexities.

[74] Similarly, several reviewers of Gordon (1987) point out that only a few emotions are discussed (mainly anger and fear); therefore his theory doesn't apply to all emotions.

[75] "Emotions do not form a natural class" (Rorty 1980; cf. de Sousa 1987, p. 20; Solomon 1993). Whether emotion or separate emotions are natural kinds depends on what the criteria are for being a natural kind. Elsewhere I've shown that all proposed criteria fail to identify what "intuitively" are considered natural kinds (van Brakel 1992).

[76] For Wittgenstein's views on emotion see Black (1990), Kenny (1963, 1989), Schulte (1993), and of course Wittgenstein himself (1967, par. 484-528; 1972, p. 174; and various places in his 1980a, 1980b, 1982).

[77] As Kenny (1989, p. 53) remarks it's not clear what would be "common to fear of famine and fear of cockroaches, fear of a biting tongue and fear of the dentist's drill, fear of overpopulation and fear of being overdressed, fear of being thought a parvenu and fear of catching AIDS."

(not *necessary*) modes of expression, which bring characteristic sensations with them. Emotions not only have a characteristic expression but also a characteristic history.

Emotions must be taught in connection not only with emotional behaviour, but above all in connection with objects of emotion. However, though emotions are usually directed at something, that is not always the case. The object of an emotion can be virtually anything. Hence, what emotion is, in a particular case, depends, typically, on the whole picture: occasion, surroundings, background, moral order, sensations, thoughts, behaviours, combinations of these, memories, memory images, bits of knowledge and innumerable other things. However, the object of an emotion cannot, in general, be its cause, as is obvious from forward-looking emotions, such as hope, dread, and excited anticipation.

Broadly speaking the above summary of the "standard" Wittgensteinian view of emotion is not dissimilar to that of the cognitivist and the constructionist, which is not surprising, as both have been subject, directly or indirectly, to Wittgensteinian influences.[78] Crudely, all agree that no definition can be given and meaning is use in some social context or other. What's missing in these accounts, however, is a clear answer to the question whether there is or is not a core under the differences and similarities. Most cognitivists (and all biological approaches) assume there is a universal cross-cultural core (for "emotion," "anger," "happiness," etc.). Most constructionists would disagree and argue there's no universal core, but still assume an "objective" prototypical description (the core) of each culturally dependent cognitive model can be given. I believe there are no cores whatsoever, other than by contingent terminological/conceptual agreement. It's only thus that the relativistic implications of social constructionism can be avoided. That's the subject of the next section.

6. Similarities of forms of life

In 1932 many "first contacts" occurred between white people and the inhabitants of the Highlands of Papua New Guinea. Fifty years later Connolly and Anderson (1988) interviewed some of those who had been present:

> "Because they wore *lap laps* and trousers," says Kirupano Eza'e of Seigu, "the people said, 'We think they have no wastes in them. How could they when they were wrapped up so neatly and completely?' We wondered how the excreta could be passed. We wondered much about that." ... "One of the people hid," recalls Kirupano, "and watched them going to excrete. He came back and said, 'Those men from heaven went to excrete over there.' Once they had left many men went to take a look. When they saw that it smelt bad, they said, 'Their skin might be different, but their shit smells bad like ours.'"

Who could deny that there are many similarities between human forms of life? Clearly relativism makes no practical sense. Because there are such obvious and trivially true cross-cultural similarities, there's much to start with when trying to make sense of the other's behaviour. In this section I argue that emotions—with their rational, social, and moral aspects as outlined above—play an essential role in these cross-cultural similarities, although no theory tells us exactly what is the same about humans where emotions are concerned.

6.1. form(s) of life

Emotions are manifestations of human form(s) of life; without emotion human life would be unthinkable. Roughly the expression "form of life" refers to the ultimately unsystematisable complex of actual societal life on which any provisionally formulable regularities or rules of behaviour are based (Margolis 1987): "What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—*forms of life* (Wittgenstein 1972, p. 226).[79] As Baker and Hacker (1980:137) say:

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[78] Compare the Wittgensteinian "characteristic history and modes of expression" with "scenario's of situated action" and "prototypical sequences of events." Compare also "narrative slots" (Shweder and Sullivan 1993) and "core themes of person-environment relationships" (Lazarus 1991a).

[79] Wittgenstein uses the expression "form of life" in his (1969, par. 358; 1972, par. 19, 23, 241, pp. 174, 226; 1978, par. VIII-47). Hilmy (1987) gives more quotations from unpublished manuscripts. "Form of life" is related to *Lebenswelt* (Husserl, Habermas) and *Dasein* (Heidegger), but I refrain from entering their differences and similarities. According to Thompkins (1990) the translation of *Lebensform* as "form of life" is incorrect and has led to many red herrings. A better translation would be, he suggests, "patterns of life"; German dictionary entries give [i] patterns of live, [ii] biological form of life. However, I will stick to the entrenched expression "form of life". At other places Wittgenstein uses similar phrases, for example "facts of living" (1980a, par. 630).

> A form of life is a given unjustified and unjustifiable pattern of human activity ... It rests upon, but is not identical with, very general pervasive facts of nature. It consists of shared natural and linguistic responses, of broad agreement in definitions and in judgements, and of corresponding behaviour. ... Training in what counts as justification, acceptance of undoubted truths of the world-picture, is acculturation in the form of life of a community.

Emotions are part of the "shared natural and linguistic responses" and "agreement in definitions and judgements" include judgements of all sorts. Therefore the naturalness stressed by biological theories such as that of Izard is not denied. For example Izard (1992) is right to say that "expressive behaviors served [and serve] critical communicative functions;" that "emotions are *basic* in the fundamental sense of [being] the basis for something—coping strategies and adaptation;" and that there is a "virtually limitless variety of *emotion-related* experiences." But it is wrong to leave out the naturalness of "agreement in definitions and judgements" and to add the alleged naturalness of a fixed set of basic emotions.

That people can understand one another and themselves is because they share a certain form, pattern, or way of life. Growing up is to grow into a form of life. The form of life is the whole of the moral, social, historical, communicative, mythical, and private discernments and orders which *grounds* these orders, without being grounded in anything else. Strictly speaking an *explanation* of what a form of life is makes no sense. Forms of life are constituted by patterns of human activity which cannot simply be given one theoretical explanation or another, because these patterns form the ground on which *any* explanation or justification rests. Emotion forms an intrinsic element of these patterns—patterns which are, in a way, both unjustified and unjustifiable, but which have, as Wittgenstein says, the certainty of life. Starting from certainties we can give reasons, but there's an end to giving reasons: the end is what is *just* given in the form of life—it's where my/your/our/their spade is turned. Questions (scientific or otherwise) can be raised about anything, but these questions cannot but be asked from within the certainties of a form of life (on pain of madness).[80]

As in all views on the nature of social reality, simply using a new term, viz. "form of life," doesn't solve the problem of similarity and difference (of universalism and relativism). In the present case the problem presents itself very much on the surface and has been discussed at length by numerous writers: Is there one form of life or are there many?[81] At least four different suggestions have been proposed (restricting the options to *human* form(s) of life). First it has been argued that there is one biological form of human life: one natural history (Garver 1990; Hunter 1968); second that there is one transcendental form of human life (Haller 1988; Lear 1982; Rudder-Baker 1984; Williams 1981); third that form of life has to be taken as roughly synonymous with either culture or language game—so there are many forms of life (Emmett 1990; Gier 1980). The latter option has led to the common association of the later Wittgenstein with relativism (encouraged by partly misunderstood publications of Winch). A fourth suggestion is that there could be many forms of human life, but as a matter of empirical fact there is only one (Cavell 1979).

I propose the proper interpretation of "form of life" is achieved by applying the approach I used in the earlier sections to "form of life" itself. Just as it is a mistake to look for the universal definition of "anger" or the true definition of "emotion," it's wrong to look for a definition of "form of life." There is both one and many human forms of life in the sense that similarities and differences between a plurality of forms of life crop up and disappear. Wittgenstein's idea of the family resemblance of the things that are referred to by one expression—not to be confused with prototypes (van Brakel 1991)—should also be applied to "form of life." On the one hand it is incorrect to talk about many human forms of life, because all have in common that they are *human* forms of life (where, to be sure, "human" should not be taken in a narrow biological sense). On the other hand it is incorrect to talk about one human form of life, because there are many variations without there being one core (see below). That there is, at the same time, both one form of human life and many forms of human life cannot, perhaps, be said clearly, but certainly it can be shown. Perhaps it can be hinted at by saying things like: humans differ in the ways they share forms of life.

The same applies to other choices: Is form of life the same as language game? Or does it mean something like "human nature"? Or should it be taken as a synonym of "culture"—whatever that may

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[80] See, in addition to references already given, Wittgenstein (1969, par. 559; 1972, par. 206, 217); Fischer (1987); Øfsti (1985), von Savigny (1991).

[81] Apart from the opposition relativism/universalism this dichotomy has variously been described as anthropological/conventional versus biological (Cavell 1979), anthropological versus transcendental (Emmett 1990, Lear 1982), relativist versus transcendental idealist (Vision 1988), language game versus common behaviour of mankind (Fischer 1987; Haller 1988).

mean? Perhaps the answer is that there is no one answer: similarities crop up and disappear. Another way to show what form of life(s) is/are is to say that the dispute between relativists and universalists rests on a form of life. Universalism and relativism are aspects of the human form of life—the human condition. Talk of forms of life is less than universal pragmatics but more than the impossibility of a metadiscourse—it places life before language. It's what makes discussions about functionalism and structuralism or modernism and post-modernism (or whatever) possible in the first place.

6.2. intercultural communication

Linguistic intercultural communication—necessary if we want to give a cross-cultural perspective on emotion—has to be preceded by radical translation; radical translation has to be preceded by non-linguistic intercultural communication. If it weren't the case that forms of life were similar in at least certain respects, radical translation (interpreting a completely strange language) would never get started. Non-linguistic intercultural communication is only possible if different forms of life are partly similar or at least partly imaginable from the other side (accessible by empathetic understanding). One common similarity among forms of life is that humans use language and display emotions. Taking part in a form of life is a necessary condition for displaying emotions and using language and hence a necessary condition for translation and interpretation.[82] On the other hand language and emotion provide the contours of any form of life.[83]

The assessment that in intercultural communication we have at least partly shared forms of life, is, of course, an assessment from within one form of life. Therefore it doesn't follow that because there are similarities there *must* be a universal core. Such similarities crop up and disappear (at least that's what shows itself). Moreover, all human beings (all societies) are busy dealing with *many* different forms of life, just as they are dealing with many different emotions and innumerable other things. Even if a group of people doesn't have (didn't have) obvious "neighbours," it would still recognise a variety of forms of life of (what we might call) castes, clans, sexes, ancestors, spirits, animals, ghosts, etc. Any particular division of (types of) forms of life only has local relevance, but being familiar with many forms of life is inherent to talking with and about others (inherent to being human).[84]

That intercultural communication is possible cannot be disputed, because intercultural communication is a natural extension of "normal" interhuman communication and any argument of whatever sort presupposes interhuman communication. There's no *practical* reason to worry about living in totally incommensurable worlds. But from this extremely well supported empirical fact it doesn't follow that there *has* to be a shared core or essence of human behaviours; or a shared *lingua mentis*, or any other preconceptual, cognitive, affective, or kinaesthetic universal structure that specifies basic emotions, basic colours, basic directions, or whatever (van Brakel 1991):

1. How would we fix the core of "natural" human behaviour (cognition, evaluation, ...) independently of everything else? Perhaps in the right circumstances, any human behaviour can be considered part of the core.

2. What would be the elements of such a core? Perhaps the existence, the number and the kind of elements depends on the conceptual scheme within which the question is being asked.[85]

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[82] As always there are no sharp boundaries. There's a continuity between non-linguistic and linguistic communication as in various types of sign languages (used by deaf or non-deaf people). There's also a continuity in the degree of affect, rationality, and morality that permeates interhuman communication, some of which may almost disappear in the case of severe disabledness or other disorders.

[83] Cf. de Sousa (1987, p. 332): "Our emotional repertoires in some ways resemble our languages. Like language, emotion frames our possibilities of experience." See also Solomon (1992).

[84] Here "many forms of life" merges with "many roles in society" and even with many "inner forms of life" (Brearley 1991). It also merges with a variety of non-human forms of life.

[85] It's a fact that all (normal) humans defecate, speak, have colour vision, display emotions, learn a lot, etcetera. It's also a fact that humans share something like a communicative competence, for example in Habermas' sense (Øfsti 1985), but this "conversational background to [human] lives is strange in that we cannot turn it around into an object of thought, to be explained like all else in our world in terms of either rules, theories, or models. ... For, it is only as we agree in a group to specify and constitute it in one particular way (rather than another), that we can (within the group) justifiably link any of the 'theories' or 'models' we might produce to what they are meant to be theories or models of" (Shotter forthc.). It's probably also a fact that all humans display self-awareness and an "awareness of similarities among persons and of shared involvements and propensities crosscutting the distinctiveness of selves" (White and Kirkpatrick 1985, p. 9), but it's confusing to call this "human universals," as White and Kirkpatrick do, because the conceptual content of the universal is not a universal. Similarly, Wierzbicka (1993) is probably right to stress that "self" and "mind" are typically Western concepts, whereas "person" and "people" are much more easy to translate cross-culturally. But it's wrong to say that the *concept* of person and/or people is "a cornerstone of discourse in every culture," because there's no ground to ascribe universal reality to any concept.

3. What would follow from a set of allegedly universal characteristics of human behaviour which work well in terms of prediction? Perhaps little more than the flexibility of human behaviour to fit itself into numerous theoretical accounts.

To be able to write about how similarities and differences in emotion crop up and disappear it's not necessary for there to be a universal core on which all accounts can rest. Hence Solomon (1984) is wrong when he says:

> insofar as the anthropologist assumes that she is capable of understanding the emotional expressions of her subjects, that is, understanding them as expressions of particular emotions, then she must assume from the outset precisely the hypothesis to be verified, namely, that different people have, and can mutually understand, essentially the same emotions.

This is wrong because [i] complete or exact understanding *never* takes place; [ii] empathy allows for initial understanding of differences; empathy requires assuming some things to be the same, though nothing *specifically* has to be the same;[86] [iii] further understanding reveals new differences to be learnt.

The belief in cores is always ethnocentric. Consider Levy (1984) who says about "fear" and Tahitian *ri'ari'a:*

> the central tendencies named by various emotional terms are probably universal but ... the borders of the categories may differ. There are also, as in colour naming, situations where two or more categories that are separated in one culture (although they seem in some sense closely related, or semantically 'adjacent') are in another not differentiated.

But who is judging in which direction the *central* tendency is going and who is setting the criteria for "in some sense closely related"? Levy (1984; cf. 1973, p. 307) tells us about *ri'ari'a* that [i] it only names "fear as present experience," not "anticipatory fear" (which is *mata'u*), and [ii] *ri'ari'a* also "includes mild aversions to certain foods." Now who is to say that "present experience" or "mild aversion to certain foods" is not part of the "central tendency" of "fear" (and all words from other languages that are usually translated as "fear")?

Neither is it necessary to assume that by submerging oneself completely into another society one could, as it were, jump to the Other side. Trawick (1990) writes:

> But just at those times when I thought that there was some fundamental something that all human beings shared and that I had found that something at last in Tamil Nadu, suddenly some small act would cast a deep shadow between us again, and once again they were strangers, whom I feared and mistrusted. I found myself thinking, time after time, "But *this* isn't love." Now, after years, I can answer myself with detached amusement, "Of course it isn't love, it's *anpu*." Somehow, back then, this relativistic answer never occurred to me.

What is wrong, I think, in Trawick's assessment is the apparent assumption that love is exactly one thing, of which all speakers of English have reliable knowledge and *anpu* exactly one other thing of which speakers of Tamil have their reliable knowledge (or that there is exactly one "fundamental something" all humans share). To *completely* understand *anpu* is as senseless an idea as to *completely* understand "love" (and as senseless as to grasp *completely* what all humans share). The apparent problem arises because of what Putnam has called the Craving for Objectivity: "Human nature (whether in the individual case or in the abstract) is simply not *surveyable*" (Putnam 1990, p. 121). This applies equally to the people "at home" and "far away."

Consider the following accidental encounter (in what is now called New Zealand) on April 7, 1773, quoted from the diaries of Cook and Forster (Beaglehole 1969, p. 116):

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[86] I take "empathy" to mean *not* the projection of one's own state of mind into something else or merely the capacity to feel what the other feels, but the human capacity and sensibility to participate in the content, spirit, feelings, volitions, ideas, movements, etc. of what another human being says, writes, feels, wants, thinks, does, etc. Empathy in this sense is not "to feel with" or "to feel like," but "to live with." Compare Shweder's (1992) interesting suggestion that empathy is a meta-emotion. It's probably correct, as Lynch (1990b) stresses, that anthropologists and others have often fallen in the trap of thinking that if people share nothing else, they at least share their emotional dispositions. Lynch rejects "empathy as a naive and ethnocentric practice, a form of Western imperialism over the emotions of the Other" as well as "the assumption underlying empathy that emotions are sensations and, therefore, universally experienced in the same way." Instead he proposes "the unifying assumption that emotions are fundamentally culturally constructed appraisals telling people what they feel-experience." However, to get at these "culturally constructed appraisals" one cannot do without empathy in my sense, whereas there is the equally dangerous trap of the imperialism of the Western anthropologist's cultural constructions on behalf of "the Other."

> [Cook:] ... we should have pass'd without seeing them [i.e. one man and two Women] had not the man holloa'd to us, he stood with his club in his hand upon the point of a rock. ... the man seemed rather afraid when we approached the Rock with our Boat, he however stood firm. ...
> [Forster:] The captain then taking some sheets of white paper in his hand, landed on the rock unarmed, and held the paper out to the native. The man now trembled visibly, and having exhibited strong marks of fear in his countenance, took the paper: upon which captain Cook coming up to him, took hold of his hand, and embraced him, touching the man's nose with his own, which is their mode of salutation.
> [Cook:] ... presently after we were joined by the two Women, the Gentlemen that were with me and some of the Seamen and we spent about half an hour in chitchat which was little understood on either side in which the youngest of the two Women bore by far the greatest share. We presented them with fish and Wild fowl which we had in our boat, which the young Woman afterwards took up one by one and threw them into the Boat again giving us to understand that such things they wanted not. ...

Although we only have an account from one side, perhaps this is the nearest we can get to what's going on in essence in interhuman communication. What is going on is a lot; everything is involved: innumerable interpretations and judgements are made of the other person(s)—long before any word is

uttered or understood. Though communication works to a greater or lesser extent, it always works to some extent.[87] A whole book and more is encapsulated in the quotation. I limit myself to one comment. Both Cook and Forster interpreted the man as being in fear. Perhaps this was true, perhaps not. Perhaps he was angry at their trespassing; that is why he "holloa'd to us," shouting: "Go away!" That's what they were politely and seriously trying to tell Cook and his officers in "about half an hour in chitchat" and that's what they wanted to say with refusing the "fish and Wild fowl." (Cook and his men could have taken the last gesture as an insult, but they didn't.) But perhaps the man was neither afraid nor angry. Maybe he was trembling from excitement and his "holloa-ing" was an invitation to come ashore. Perhaps he *was* excited or angry, but the trembling had nothing to do with it: because of an illness he trembled when standing.

What would be the real fact of the matter? Does it matter? If the man had been angry, excited, or ill (instead of afraid or in terror), the encounter could have developed in the same way. That is to say, Cook's report of it might have been the same (except for saying that the man showed signs of ecstasy or whatever). But Cook's report would *not* have been the same, except for a small note saying: "These people do not have emotions."

Cook and his men and, I take it, the man and two women they met, both considered the others as similar to themselves (although not the same). Hence they ascribed to them various properties (what we call emotions, beliefs, desires, moral judgements) that made sense. For example, the women and man might have understood that Cook c.s. seemed to be of good intent; they understood that the fish and fowl were given to them, but they had reason to give them back. One only takes things from nature to the extent that one needs them directly and they were not needed. Perhaps they thought it morally wrong of Cook c.s. to catch these animals without obviously needing them, ..., and so on. Every *particular* interpretation depends on innumerable other interpretations, each of which can be wrong. Hence there's no fact of the matter to any particular interpretation.[88] Nevertheless, most interpretations must be right (or at least very many—one can't really count them), because otherwise there would be no communication. This applies both to extreme cases of radical interpretation and to the most informative or phatic chitchat with the person one knows best.

Emotions are part of the natural behaviour of any human, any human form of life, and play a fundamental role in human communication. Similarities and differences in emotion concepts, expressions, and experiences are intertwined with similarities and differences in folk theories of mind, self, interhuman relation, society, nature, morality, and similar. The theories of emotion I've reviewed make it look as if emotion is something very complex which eludes definition, but must somehow be explained in terms of feelings, beliefs, desires, intentions, understanding of social situations, moral judgements, and so on. On the one hand this is true; on the other it isn't. What this complexity indicates is that emotion is more primitive than these other concepts. It's nearer to the form of life that grounds it all. And in one way or another this is more or less recognised by many theorists of emotion, perhaps most explicitly by Solomon (1992) when he speaks of "that ill-defined set of emotional attachments and meanings by which we measure the success and significance of *all* of our more particular activities." It's recognised at the sophisticated level in de Sousa's defence of the rationality of emotion. He presents convincing arguments to the effect that emotions are like beliefs in having epistemic rationality, like reasoning in having instrumental rationality, like desires in having normative rationality, and unlike all of them in requiring that we consider all three rationalities together: "the faculty of emotion is actually required for the more conventional mechanism of rationality to function" (de Sousa 1987, p. 2). It is also recognised from a pragmatically infused evolutionary perspective according to which "language as gesture is primarily the expression of emotion and out of emotional significance has grown intellectual experience."[89] And it's recognised at the common sense level in Wittgensteinian inspired views like that

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[87] Except, perhaps, if it's refused—though this would still seem to be a form of communication. When Cortés conquered what is now called Mexico (starting what's perhaps the largest genocide in the history of humanity), Montezuma, the king of the Aztecs, did not "react" to messages from his spies and from messengers of Cortés about his approach. A contemporary source is quoted as saying (Todorov 1984:71): "Montezuma lowered his head, and without answering a word, placed his hand upon his mouth. In this way he remained for a long time. He appeared to be dead or mute, since he was unable to give any answer."

[88] The diaries of Cook and others contain more information about this encounter and subsequent encounters with the same people, which makes some of my alternative interpretations implausible. Later ethnographic studies of the Maori people—presumably the "man and two Women" were Maori—are also relevant to get at more insightful interpretations (see in particular Salmond 1991). But that's not the issue here.

[89] Quoted from Franks (1985), as representing Mead's view. See for a comparison of the James/Dewey organismic/interactional opposition Hochschild (1983, pp. 201-222). Usually Dewey and Mead are put on one line

of Kenny (1989, p. 50): "expression of emotion is a more primitive level of language than the expression of pure belief untinged with volition, or pure volition unrelated to belief."

7. Conclusion

What we call emotions and the use of emotion words are an essential ingredient of any human society and all interhuman communication. Although types and tokens of emotion and emotion-like concepts, behaviour, feeling, etc. occur in an indefinite variety and there's no way to objectively delineate them, they are intrinsic constituents of any form of life and any moral order, thus having pre-linguistic cross-cultural significance. Although no theory-, culture-, or language-independent mode of expressing this exists, nonetheless, this is part of what makes communication possible in the first place.

This approach to emotion makes it possible to bring together points stressed by a variety of writers on the subject: Emotions are about one's mode of relationship as a total individual to the social and nonsocial environment (Levy 1984). Emotions are part of a solution to problems of organising knowledge and action in a world that is imperfectly known and in which we have limited resources (Oatley 1992). Emotional performances are embedded within relational scenarios (Gergen 1990). Emotion concepts are contained in networks of knowledge about persons, roles, and goals (Lutz 1988). Emotions are about person-environment relations and reactions to what is happening in everyday encounters and in our lives overall (Lazarus 1991b). Emotions play a central role in prudential and moral reasoning (Greenspan 1988; Oakley 1992). They integrate human rationality and give meaning to life (de Sousa 1987). They constitute the framework (or frameworks) of rationality itself (Solomon 1992). In short: emotions disclose forms of life, both in a manifest and a deep sense.

(Baldwin 1985; Scheff 1985), but, presumably under pressure of the empirical data like those of Ekman and Izard, they tend to be presented more towards the biological model than is perhaps warranted.

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