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Q4   Vervaeke 2010. Include in references.

Q5   To what does 'this' refer?

Q6   European Commission 2011c. Include in references.

Q7   ALTHENA. Spell out on first occurrence.

Q8   EUFOR, EULEX, EUBAM, EUMM, EUPOL, EUJUST, LEX, EUPOL, COPPS, EUSEC, EUNAVFOR, ,EUTM, EUCAP, EUAVSEC, EUCAP, Spell out each abbreviation on first occurrence.

Q9   International Security Information Service [ISIS] 2012. Should this be 2011 as in the references?

Q10 Gibert 2009. Include in references.

Q11 DG RELEX. Spell out.

Q12 HR/VP. Correct as edited?

Q13 Please ensure that the following references are either cited in the text or else deleted: Balossi-Rostelli, Ludovica (2011), European Commission (2011a), European Council (2010), Hout, Wil (2010), Olsen, Gorm Rye (2009), Van Vooren, Bart (2011).

Q14 Cotonou Agreement (2010) 'Second revision of the Cotonou Agreement—agreed consolidated text', 11 March, Brussels, 19 March. Why are two dates given? Which is correct?

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The security–development nexus and securitization in the EU's policies towards developing countries

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Stephan Keukeleire and Kolja Raube
University of Leuven

Abstract   *This article assesses how and to what extent the European Union (EU) uses a security perspective to define and shape its relationship with the developing world. In order* 15 *to evaluate the EU's development policy and its relations with developing countries we link the concept of 'security–development nexus' with the concept of 'securitization'. The article examines whether securitization can be observed with regard to four dimensions: discourse, policy instruments, policy actions and institutional framework. The analysis demonstrates a securitization of the EU's development policy and its relations with* 20 *developing countries, particularly in Africa. However, paradoxically, the securitization's extent and nature suggest that the EU can also use it as a way to avoid a more direct involvement in conflict areas.*

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Introduction

This paper analyses how the European Union (EU) relates development and security in its policy towards the developing world. In particular, it examines in which ways and to what extent the EU uses a security perspective to shape its relationships with developing countries. In the context of EU external relations 30 and beyond, the relationship between security and development has been analysed by referring to a 'security–development nexus' (Chandler 2007; Hettne 2010; Saliba-Couture 2012; Stern and Öjendal 2010; Youngs 2008). Theoretically, the concept of a security–development nexus takes into account that development and security fields and challenges can be interconnected, further implying that 35 problems within both fields cannot always be solved independently (Stern and Öjendal 2010, 18). Economic and social development is recognized as one factor strengthening security, whereas, from a development perspective, security may also increase the chances for development. Linking security and development has 40 also become interesting in terms of empirical research, analysing, for example, the convergence between development and conflict management (Hettne 2010, 34).

Research also points to some unintended consequences of the security–development nexus as a new approach of decision-makers. As a point of reference in policy-making the security–development nexus has resulted in the side effect of 45 reconstituting the awareness of policy-makers that there are different objectives at play in security and development policies (Youngs 2008). In the same line, the security–development nexus is found to foster 'inward-looking', 'self-referential' policies among Western actors, rather than seriously taking into account the needs of the developing world (Chandler 2007, 379). In the end, the security–development

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nexus informs actors on the ground, its application depending on the cooperation of different actors to make the relationship between security and development work.

In this article, we link the concept of a security–development nexus with that of 'securitization'. For Buzan and Hansen, 'securitization' refers to 'the process of presenting an issue in security terms' (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 214). Securitization takes place when actors address an issue as a security issue and when this move is accepted (Buzan et al 1998, 23). In this way, securitization can imply that poverty and structural underdevelopment are perceived as existential threats or that development is linked to other issues such as inter- and intra-state conflict, state failure or organized crime (see Buzan and Waever 2003, 359).

In analysing the securitization of development, we make a distinction between the securitization of development policy and the securitization of relations with a developing country or group of developing countries. A securitization of development policy can take place if, for example, crisis management objectives and action become intersected with development objectives and action. A securitization of relations with development countries, however, rather points to a general move of actors, like the EU, to also frame their policies towards developing countries in security terms. We examine whether securitization of development policy and developing countries can be observed with regard to four dimensions: the *discourse* or 'speech acts' of an actor with regard to security and development; the *policy instruments* designed or adapted in order to address security concerns within the context of development policy and relations with developing countries; the *policy action*, meaning the actual use of these policy instruments; and the *institutional framework* created or adapted to address these security concerns. In each of these four dimensions, the link between security and development and a securitization of development policies and development countries can reveal themselves to different degrees.

First, we analyse the EU's policy discourse as represented in its principal official policy documents on development and security: the European Security Strategy (ESS), the Cotonou Agreement, the European Consensus on Development and the Commission's Communication on Policy Coherence.

The next section examines the nature and use of three sets of instruments situated within three different institutional settings and fields of competences: the African Peace Facility (APF), managed by the European Commission's Directorate General for Development Cooperation (DG DEVCO) and funded through the European Development Fund; the Instrument for Stability (IfS), which is programmed through the European External Action Service (EEAS), but managed by the Commission; and the instruments available within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which is managed by the EEAS and the member states. For each of these instruments we analyse what we can learn about the relationship between development and security and about the process of securitization.

The subsequent section analyses the institutional set-up of the EU since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, looking not only at the EEAS and the Commission, but also at the role of the high representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who at the same time is vice president of the Commission (the 'HR/VP'). The last section focuses on the linkage between the

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100   development–security nexus and the 'comprehensive approach', an approach mentioned by many of the senior officials interviewed within the EU.

In addition to official EU documents and secondary sources, the article brings in new data obtained through interviews with 12 senior officials within the following EU institutions: the EEAS (including officials responsible for regional and thematic policies and for the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy); the

105   DG DEVCO; and the Foreign Policy Instrument Service, which bridges the Commission and the EEAS, as it is a Commission service that is located in the EEAS building (and is responsible, inter alia, for the implementation of the IfS).

The EU discourse on security and development

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The ESS of 2003 constitutes the EU's main strategic document. The EES acknowledges the need for more security in order to augment development, and vice versa. 'In many cases,' it is held, 'economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict' (European Council 2003, 2). More precisely, the ESS

115   recognizes that

> security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure, it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty. (European Council 2003, 2)

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The link between the two policy areas is even more explicit in the follow-up 'Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy' of 2008. Including a headline 'Security and development nexus', the report repeats the inseparable connection between the two domains and indicates that development

125   assistance and security instruments have been employed to more closely link policies (European Council 2008, 8). The report arrives at a positive assessment of the EU's actions in security and development:

> the EU already contributes to a more secure world. We have worked to build human security by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity. The EU remains the biggest donor to countries in need. Long-term engagement is required for lasting stabilization. (European Council 2008, 8)

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The EU shows a security awareness wherein an emphasis lies in the mutual

135   dependence and linkage of security and development; this awareness resulted in the incorporation of the 'security and development nexus' as an approach in its official reasoning. A double purpose takes shape within the security–development nexus: security for the EU, and peace and human (individual) security outside the EU. While the EU presents itself as concerned with human

140   security—that is, the security of individuals in third countries—it also acknowledges that the EU first needs to 'ensure *our* security and meet the expectations of *our* citizens' (European Council 2008, 2, emphasis added). As such, the referent objects of security lie both inside and outside the EU, and embrace both states and individuals.

145   The European Consensus on Development (2006) is one of the main strategic texts in the development field. Issued by the European Parliament (EP), the Council, and the member states' governments, the text emphasizes that '[d]evelopment

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policy is at the heart of the EU's relations with all developing countries'. The text, though, also links security and the EU's 'fight' against poverty: 'Combating global poverty is not only a moral obligation,' reads the Consensus; 'it will also help us to build a more stable, peaceful, prosperous and equitable world, reflecting the interdependency of its richer and poorer countries' (2006, 1). Further on in the document, the security–development nexus is implicitly pointed to when i is stated that 'security and development are important and complementary aspects of EU relations with third countries' (2006, 7).

The idea of complementarity is also emphasized in the preceding communication on 'Policy coherence for development' of the Commission:

> The EU will treat security and development as complementary agendas, with the common aim of creating a secure environment and of breaking the vicious circle of poverty, war, environmental degradation and failing economic, social and political structures. (European Commission 2005, 5)

This communication points out further how the EU's assistance to developing countries in attaining the Millennium Development Goals 'should be embedded in a stable and secure environment, as there can be no development without peace and security, and no peace and security without development' (2005, 4). The Commission's recent 'Policy coherence for development work programme 2010–2013' (European Commission 2010a) specifies this approach in greater detail: here, the Commission underlines the dual needs to integrate development policies in the planning and implementation of peace operations and to find a synthesis between development and financial instruments in security-related matters (see especially chapter 6.1, 6.2 and 6.7).

The link between security and development is also explicit in the EU's main agreement with its long-standing partners in the field of development cooperation, the African, Pacific and Caribbean countries (APC). In the Cotonou Agreement (2010), '[t]he parties acknowledge that without development and poverty reduction there will be no sustainable peace and security, and that without peace and security there can be no sustainable development' (article 11). The mutual link is repeated in other parts of the agreement, notably in the section treating crisis situations or 'situations of fragility'. In order to address situations of fragility in a strategic and effective manner, the parties commit themselves to facilitating preventive responses by combining diplomatic, security and development cooperation tools. Although security emerges as an important issue in some articles of this extensive treaty, the Cotonou Agreement remains predominantly concerned with development cooperation and development goals.

This is characteristic of the EU's policy discourse as represented in its main official policy documents. The EU discourse reveals the EU's recognition of the link between security and development and even an explicit acknowledgment of the development–security nexus. It also shows, to some extent, a securitization of relations with the developing world. But the discourse only points to a very limited securitization of development policy, as it emphasizes the need for complementary and coherent but nevertheless separate security and development policies.

How much does this discourse matter in the practical daily work of EU officials in the EEAS and the European Commission? Not surprisingly, the interpretation of this discourse and, particularly, its relevance for daily work

depended on the specific function of the officials interviewed. Whereas for some officials the development–security nexus was a merely theoretical exercise (Interview VI), for others the nexus was very important in their daily work; they indicated that security and development constituted 'the same thing at the same time—you cannot separate it' (Interview I). As another interviewee underlined, security and development belonged together, but the decision to tackle a given issue (in a specific crisis scenario) via the EU's security policy or development policy varied from case to case and from phase to phase (Interview V).

Interestingly, most officials questioned the artificial division of security and development and several interviewees pointed to the growing convergence between 'development and security circles' in the EU (Interview IV). However, they stressed that instruments in the relations with developing countries remained fragmented and that the EU remained instrument rather than strategy driven (Interviews IV and VI). This fragmentation of the instruments also explains why most officials seemed to struggle to make sense of the nexus in practical terms, despite the often positive intentions to better integrate the two policies.

EU policy instruments and actions

As mentioned above, this section analyses the nature and use of three sets of instruments situated within three different institutional settings and fields of competences: the APF, managed by the European Commission's DG DEVCO; the IfS, programmed by the EEAS and managed by the Commission; and the instruments available within the CSDP, managed by the EEAS and the member states. Each of these instruments will be analysed with regard to what we can learn about the relationship between development and security and about the process of securitization.

The APF and the securitization of development policy

The APF demonstrates most clearly the interpenetration of security and development and the securitization of the EU's development policy. Created in 2004, the APF allows for the financing of security-related action within the framework of the European Development Fund (EDF). It is a financial instrument dedicated especially to Africa and therefore strengthens the security dimension within the EU's relations with African countries. The APF provides structural support for the 'African Peace and Security Architecture' that was established by the African Union (AU) to deal with the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa. Through the APF, the EU supports African states in the development of their own security agenda, structures and capacities (Gegout 2009; Bagoyoko and Gibert 2010).

The APF is an exceptional policy framework in the context of the development policy of the EU, as development spending can be used for military means through the EDF (Hoffmeister 2008, 8). This approach was legitimized by referring to the security–development nexus, which was emphasized in the ESS (2003) and the 2007 Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES). In other words, the APF serves as an application of those two texts which emphasize that security is a precondition for development (Vervaeke 2010, 65). Originally foreseen as only temporarily funded

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by the EDF, the APF nowadays expresses a securitization of EU development policy, as it is permanently paid and executed in the framework of the EDF and in the European Commission.

Since its creation, the APF's contracted spending has reached nearly €721.7 million in the ninth and tenth EDF (European Commission 2011b). However, as Youngs notes, the tenth EDF has increased 'conflict-related funding' only to a very limited extent (Youngs 2008, 423–425). During the years 2004–2007 and 2007–2011, the EU spent most of the APF to support the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The EU has so far spent €259 million on contributions to AMISOM, while in the case of AMIS the spending amounted to €303 million (European Commission 2011b). A civil servant in the EU has pointed to the AMISOM mission in particular as a 'cuckoo' that has grown too big and expensive and has left little room for the financial support of other AU missions (Interview III). At the moment, AMISOM comprises 17,000 troops; this number may potentially increase to 20,000, though, given the expense, officials in the EEAS anticipate the necessity of finding a proper exit strategy for the EU from AMISOM (Interview III). EEAS officials point to the complementarity of the CSDP-based EU Training Mission in Uganda (EUTM) (see below), where future Somali security forces are trained (Interview II), as a possible basis for the EU's exit strategy (Interview VI).

EU officials in DG DEVCO evince a need to increase the overall APF spending at the advent of the eleventh EDF despite times of financial belt-tightening. In addition to political dialogue, like that provided for in the JAES, they see the APF instrument as best suited to link development and security issues and to contribute to security in African countries (Interview IV). EEAS officials emphasize that, in the context of APF missions, African ownership and empowerment must be positively evaluated, since this is regarded as a contribution to the overall acceptance and effectiveness of policies (Interviews I and II). Others contrast APF with CSDP missions, which they primarily see as unilateral EU actions in Africa (Interview IV). However, the APF also implies that the EU may prefer to keep some distance and, when possible, avoid deploying EU personnel for involvement on the ground. Instead, the EU uses development money to improve security structures in third countries and to fund security activities through other actors. This reflects the current situation in which, except for a few member states with a recent past in colonial Africa, most EU member states are not interested in or willing to substantially invest in African crisis management or to be directly involved in African crises. Moreover, increasing financial constraints bog down efforts to get CSDP missions started (Interview II). In this context, and quite paradoxically, the creation and use of the APF reflects not only securitization and recognition of the security–development nexus, but also a way for the EU and its member states to *avoid* greater direct involvement in Africa (see also Bagoyoko and Gibert 2009). It remains to be seen though, whether the extent of securitization, defined by the EU's spending on the APF, will remain at the same level as in the past.

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The IfS and the securitization of relations with developing countries

Another instrument undergirding the EU's attempt to tackle security threats in developing countries is the IfS. Unlike the APF, the IfS is not part of the EU's development policy and has a global rather than African scope. And in contrast to the CSDP instruments, to which we turn later, this instrument was established as a traditional Community instrument, and, as such, falls within the realm of the Commission's executive competences. The IfS is devised as a financial instrument to enable the EU to support security-related activities conducted by other actors, such as United Nations (UN) agencies, other international organizations, or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These activities include mediation, monitoring of peace or ceasefire agreements, confidence-building, interim administrations, and strengthening the rule of law. In the advent of emerging crisis or post-crisis situations, the IfS is complementary to, or a temporary substitute for, the EU's geographically oriented instruments, such as the Cotonou Agreement, the EDF and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) (which is focused on developing countries outside the ACP countries). The IfS provides a basis for action when circumstances in a third country or region impede normal development cooperation or development aid. Its aim is then to contribute to the establishment or re-establishment of the conditions necessary to use the regular development instruments (such as the EDF and the DCI) (EP and Council 2006; Gänzle 2009; Interview IX).

The establishment of the IfS in 2006 (EP and Council 2006), which replaced other financial instruments such as the Rapid Reaction Mechanism, pointed to a specific security awareness among the member states and EU institutions. This security awareness was sharp enough to pressure various EU actors to overcome their usual divergences on EU security-related policies. It was also strong enough to sway agreement on the creation of this new instrument, situated outside both the normal development framework and the CSDP setting. In this sense, the IfS was an explicit attempt of the EU to cope with the security–development nexus outside the CFSP setting through the establishment and use of an instrument dealing with security-related issues in developing countries (Gänzle 2009, 7).

Between 2007 and 2011, around 40 countries worldwide benefited from the EU's action in the framework of the IfS, the vast majority of which were developing countries. In 2010, for instance, the Commission made €213 million available for post-crisis management or emerging crisis situations, including the financing of piracy trials in Somalia and of the monitoring of the peace process between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines [Q6] (European Commission 2011c).

The IfS is meant to contribute to security in crisis situations which benefits the overall development of the addressed countries. Hence, it presents itself at the interface of security and development and as an instrument that serves the securitization of the EU's policy towards developing countries.

The CSDP and the securitization of relations with developing countries

Since the creation of the CSDP in the early 2000s—labelled the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) until the Lisbon Treaty entered into force—the EU has become active in civilian and military crisis management (Gross and Juncos 2011;

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Howorth 2007; Webber 2011). The military missions are financed through member state budgets via the so-called ALTHENA mechanism within the CSDP; this covers common costs in addition to member states' expenses for personnel and direct participation. The member states' financing of military CSDP missions (outside any scrutiny on the EU level) points to the exceptional and intergovernmental character of the CSDP missions in the EU context.

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At the time of its creation, it was far from obvious that it would be used to tackle crises in developing countries, as EU member states were mainly focused on the security problems in the Balkans. Nonetheless, half a year later the EU had already launched a military operation, Operation *Artemis*, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). By mid-2012 the had EU executed seven military
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operations, 19 civilian operations and one combined civilian–military operation, and as of mid-2012 16 missions were still operational and one mission was in preparation. Currently, the EU was engaged in four civilian and military crisis
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management operations in Europe (EUFOR *Althea* Bosnia–Herzegovina; EULEX Kosovo; EUBAM Ukraine–Moldova; EUMM Georgia) and 12 operations in
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developing countries. These included one mission in Asia (EUPOL Afghanistan), three in the Middle East (EUJUST LEX IrAQ; EUBAM Rafah; EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories) and eight in Africa. The missions in Africa were: EUSEC DRC; EUPOL DRC; EUNAVFOR *Atalanta* Somalia; EUTM Somalia; EUCAP Nestor in the Horn of Africa; and EUAVSEC South Sudan and EUCAP Sahel Niger
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(decided on in June–July 2012, but still to be executed). The EU had already finished missions in other developing countries, such as Guinea-Bissau, Darfur, Chad/RCA (Central African Republic) and Indonesia (Aceh) (EEAS 2012;
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International Security Information Service [ISIS] 2012).

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Taken together, the operations implemented in the context of the CSDP point to a securitization of the EU's relations with developing countries in Africa, as African countries have been the main targets of CSDP missions outside Europe. Looking at the seven military missions launched since the CSDP's beginning, we see that five of them were centred in Africa (*Artemis* DRC, EUFOR Congo, EUFOR
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Chad, EUTM Somalia and *Atalanta* Somalia). Civilian CSDP missions in Africa are mainly focused on security sector reform (SSR) and capacity-building, such as EUSEC DRC, EUPOL DRC, and EUCAP Nestor in the Horn of Africa and EUCAP Sahel Niger, which were launched in 2012.

Conclusions about the securitization of the EU's relations with African
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countries, though, must be qualified. First, CSDP's long-standing focus on SSR (Ekengren and Simons 2011; Spence and Fluri 2008) and more recent emphasis on capacity-building may also reflect the EU's eagerness to avoid a too far-reaching securitization of these relations. By strengthening third countries' ability to tackle their own security problems, support for SSR and capacity-building is a method
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either to avoid more direct EU involvement or to gradually downsize its existing operations in conflict areas. EU support for capacity-building can thus be part of an exit strategy for the EU from certain regions. Cases in point are the EU training mission in Somalia and the regional maritime capacity-building mission in the Horn of Africa. Their purpose is to increase the potential of countries in the region
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to effectively deal with their security problems, which is seen as essential if the EU is to gradually reduce its own involvement in the region (and bring to a close Operation *Atalanta*) (Interview VIII).

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Second, most missions are quite small with an average of less than 100 staff members involved. The *Atalanta* mission on the Somali coast is the largest EU CSDP military mission outside Europe, and, with 1800 troops involved, its mandate is mainly to protect vessels chartered by the World Food Programme from pirate acts in Somali seawaters, and to keep secure other merchant vessels and waters off the Somali coast (Council Decision of 10 November 2008). In this sense, the main focus is to enhance the security of African citizens (Interview I). Recently, the mandate was adapted to allow the operation to also undertake onshore military strikes against pirates (Council Decision of 23 March 2012; Interview IX). Nevertheless, one might argue that the EU still acts in a 'European context' in the context of the *Atalanta* mission. Europe's own economic interests are at stake, as member states' navies also protect European shipping from Somali pirates on international water highways and guarantee the security of important commercial routes to the Asian markets.

Various case studies emphasize the rather limited financial and human capacities of current (such as EUPOL in Afghanistan and EUPOL DRC) as well as previous missions (such as in Guinea-Bissau) (Gibert 2009; Gross 2011; Justaert and Keukeleire 2010; Knutsen 2010; see also Vines 2010), indicating that the securitization of relations with African countries should not be overestimated. Comparing the number of EU personnel involved in these specific conflict areas with the number of troops on the ground in the framework of other international organizations such as the UN or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) further illustrates the argument. The EU's missions in the Horn of Africa are a case in point. The EU carries out EUNAVFOR *Atalanta* with 1800 troops involved, whereas the SSR training mission EUTM Somalia involves a limited number of people and a modest budget of €4.8 million (August 2011 to October 2012) (EEAS 2011). At the same time, AMISOM, partially financed by the EU through the APF, boasts a staff of nearly 17,000 troops. Moreover, merely 100 European soldiers and police are involved in the CSDP missions to the DRC, for example, while MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC) enlisted nearly 19,000 uniformed personnel (see Justaert and Keukeleire 2010). These examples also explain why individual CSDP missions are often criticized for their limited scope and for their too restrictive or—vice versa—overambitious mandates in view of their limit capacities.

In qualitative terms, a major problem is that CSDP missions are often carried out in a 'compartmentalized' fashion and in an incoherent way vis-à-vis other EU instruments (Interview IV), reinforcing the previous section's findings about the fragmentation of EU's instruments (Interviews IV and VI). Interestingly, this compartmentalization and fragmentation is least present in Somalia and, more generally, in the Horn of Africa, the case where the securitization of both development policy and the relationship with this country or region at large are the most evident (see the section below on the 'comprehensive approach'). CSDP as well as APF-financed missions in the Horn of Africa show that security concerns can prevail over development concerns (Interview I). Conversely, compartmentalization or fragmentation is very visible in the EU's policy towards the DRC. The securitization of the EU's relationship with the DRC and of its development policy towards this country is actually limited, despite the major security problems particularly in the east of the country. One explanation for this

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difference may be that EU member states are less convinced about the existence of common European interests in the DRC than in the crisis in the Horn of Africa.

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Institutions and decision-making

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The new institutional arrangements installed after Lisbon can be seen as strengthening the link between security and development. Prior to Lisbon, 'security' and 'development' were largely viewed as worlds apart, separated by the EU's former pillar structure. The security-related activities launched by the Commission often did not explicitly take into account the security policies of the CSDP. As Youngs (2008) indicated, the EU fell short of a 'development-mediated security', as decisions in the intergovernmental CSDP were also made within the Council without or before consultation with the actors responsible for development policy (such as the relevant directorates general in the Commission). Diverse interests and a lack of coordination among the various institutional actors in the EU undermined rather than fostered a link between security and development (see also Gross and Juncos 2011). Instead of the bringing together of policy communities to reflect upon the security–development nexus, walls were constituted around each of the communities.

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The Lisbon Treaty formally disabled the pillar structure and, in theory, enables the formulation of a coherent and integrated foreign policy across former pillars and policy domains, including security and development. Two institutional innovations reflect this goal, aiming to overcome the old pillar structure and bridge the divide between the different policy domains. The first innovation is the new function of the high representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who at the same time is vice president of the Commission with general responsibility for the Commission's external relations and for coordinating the various aspects of the EU's external action (Catherine Ashton being the first person to take up this dual function of 'HR/VP'). However, even in the new post-Lisbon system, the HR/VP is not, in fact, responsible for all dimensions of the EU's external relations. Within the European Commission, she must also manage separate commissioners responsible for Development (Andris Piebalgs) and for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy (Stefan Füle); the latter must also account for relations with developing countries in Northern Africa and the Middle East. In other words, the security–development nexus has not materialized within the EU's political leadership, different interpretations in the security and the development sectors complicating consensus-building on the overall strategy towards developing countries (Interview III).

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The second major innovation of the Lisbon Treaty is the creation of the EEAS, which functions under the authority of the HR/VP. The EEAS is a partial fusion of the European Commission's former DG RELEX and Directorate General for Development (DG DEV) and of the Council Secretariat, and also includes personnel from member states' diplomatic services. Together, the HR/VP and the EEAS have a major responsibility to pursue consistency and coherence in EU policies—a significant problem, particularly with regard to development and security (see Carbone 2008; 2009; Duke 2011). The EEAS is not entirely responsible, however, for all dimensions of the EU's external action, or for all stages in the EU's policymaking and implementation process, as the European Commission's

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Directorate General for Development and Cooperation—EuropeAid (DG DVCO) still plays a major role (see also Duke and Blockmans 2010).

Despite attempts to institutionally embed the security–development nexus by integrating part of DG DEV in the EEAS, the lingering duality between the EEAS and the new DG DEVCO negatively impacts on efforts to bridge the security–development divide and to overcome the fragmentation of instruments (Interview IV). Staff from the geographical desks of the Commission's previous DG DEV, as well as staff from the units previously responsible for aid programming, have been integrated in the EEAS since its establishment in early 2011. Colleagues responsible for the thematic desks, on the other hand, stayed in the Commission and now work for the new DG DEVCO. The EEAS is responsible for strategic planning and overall external action toward developing countries; DG DEVCO is responsible for the implementation and management of development policies and, most importantly, of the various financial instruments, including the APF. What's more, a duality also exists within DG DEVCO: interviews show that some senior officials are positively inclined to integrate security concerns in the EU's development policy whereas others strongly emphasize the need to prevent security-related objectives influencing the aid agenda and to avoid using development funds for security-related activities (Interviews IV and VII).

This duality and division of labour further exists with regard to the relationship between the EEAS and the Foreign Policy Instruments Service (FPI), responsible for the management of the IfS. Whereas the EEAS is responsible for political decisions on the use of the IfS, the FPI is responsible for the management and implementation of the IfS. The FPI is a 'Commission service within the EEAS': it is a full part of the Commission and is staffed by Commission officials, but is housed in the building of the EEAS in order to assure a close cooperation between civil servants and diplomats in the EEAS and FPI (see also Wouters et al 2013, 56).

While there are daily inter-institutional exchanges amongst colleagues in the EEAS, DG DEVCO and FPI, tensions and divergences persist, fuelled by preoccupations over which institutional actor in fact bears most influence on the substance of EU policy (Interviews IV and IX). It remains to be seen in practice how the precise working relationship between the EEAS, DG DEVCO and FPI will evolve and to what extent it will help to foster a closer link between the EU's development and security policies.

The EU's crisis management structures, responsible for the CSDP operations, present more glaring obstacles to linking security and development. These civilian and military crisis management structures (including the EU Military Staff, the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability) are part of the EEAS. However, they fall under the direct responsibility of the HR/VP and have a separate position within the EEAS organogram, which de facto reflects the pre-Lisbon position as a distinct bureaucracy within the EU (Portela and Raube 2012; Vanhoonacker et al 2010). The relationship between the CSDP actors and the EEAS units responsible for relations with the various developing countries is not at all clarified, which impedes the integration of CSDP activities and EEAS policies in general towards developing countries (Interviews VII and IX).

In short, the post-Lisbon EU institutional setup reflects an attempt to translate the security–development nexus to the EU's new institutional system via the integration of DG DEV in the EEAS and through the specific position of the FPI

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(see also Merket 2013). However, this has been barely the case for the EEAS units responsible for the CSDP. The potential of the recent CSDP operations in the Horn of Africa, though, presents a chance to help clarify these relations and to narrow down the distance between the various relevant actors within the EEAS. This is also the topic of the following section.

Beyond the security–development nexus and securitization: the 'comprehensive approach'

One of the most interesting findings emerging from interviews in the EEAS and the Commission is that most interviewees acknowledged the link between development and security, as well as the need to further integrate the two. At the same time, interviewees were generally reluctant to use the label 'security–development nexus' and were careful not to speak about the 'securitization of development'. The reason for this reluctance may be that the use of this label is seen as counterproductive to trying to bring the two policy domains closer to each other. Referring to the 'security–development nexus' or to the 'securitization of development' is thought to reinforce the segregation between 'security' and 'development'. Each policy domain is indeed represented by one or more policy communities or institutional actors within the EU. When using these labels each actor feels a greater need to seek shelter in the trenches of their policy domain in order to defend their individual competences, instruments, budgets and habits from intrusion by other policy actors. The difficult and only partially successful institutional reforms prescribed by the Lisbon Treaty demonstrate how difficult it is to bridge policy communities, development and security actors, and instruments.

A term that, in contrast, appeared in most of the interviews is 'comprehensive approach'. This term has been used before to characterize the EU's approach to crisis management (see Johannsen 2011). It is interpreted in many different ways. A current policy paper that has been developed in the EEAS tries to set out the meaning of a 'comprehensive approach' in the EU (Wouters et al 2013, 28). The use of this term acknowledges the need to bring development and security closer together, but without making this too explicit and without endangering the process of doing so by forcing various actors into their trenches. The recurrent reference to this approach in official documents like the 'Sahel Strategy' and by the interviewees from both the EEAS and the Commission points to a clear attempt to overcome existing fragmentation. This is to be done not by explicitly integrating the various relevant policy actors and instruments (as this would prove to be problematic), but rather by making sure that all relevant actors within the EU are actively involved, that all available policy instruments are deployed to tackle a specific crisis and that specific competences and expertise of each actor or institution are tapped. Synergies are to be found between the various policy actors and instruments on a case-by-case basis and through a bottom-up approach, rather than through an explicit top-down intervention or decision (Interviews I, III, V and IX). The idea of a 'comprehensive approach' is clearly promoted within the EU, especially within the EEAS (Wouters et al 2013, 28). However, this approach is no grand strategy, nor is it defined or formalized in a major policy document of the EU. It is rather to be developed on a case-by-case basis and its

590 concrete implementation in specific crises or conflicts depends on the active participation of the various EU policy actors capable of playing a relevant role in tackling these specific crises or conflicts.

To that end, the EEAS is currently focusing on developing more specific country-based and strategic long-term analyses as opposed to one-size-fits-all approaches that are mainly instrument-driven and that do not take into account 595 the specificity of each country, crisis or conflict (Interview VIII). This also explains the intention (though this still must materialize) to give a larger role to the country desks in the EEAS and to the EU delegations in third countries, so that they may provide ad hoc inside information and long-term assessments that can help shape the EU's policy (Interviews V and VI).

600 A new system of 'Crisis Platforms', introduced in 2011, is by and large the institutional translation of the 'comprehensive approach'. Crisis Platforms are established on an ad hoc basis in response to specific crises and bring together all actors that are relevant for a specific crisis (including the various CSDP actors, the geographical EEAS desks, the relevant directorates general in the Commission 605 and the Council Secretariat). As Blockmans (2012) indicates, the 'EEAS is thus effectively trying to turn a comprehensive approach into comprehensive action: by joining up all EU instruments it covers conflict prevention, development and conflict resolution'. Depending on the crisis, this inter-service structure can meet very frequently—if needed, on a daily basis. They have already been convened for 610 the crises in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Côte d'Ivoir and the Horn of Africa. However, for the time being, their main task is to foster information exchange and mutual understanding between these actors, not to provide a platform where an integrated policy towards such crises is devised (Interview VI; Blockmans 2012, 29–31). In this sense, it is too early to tell whether the Crisis Platforms will allow 615 the EU to systematically transition the comprehensive approach into comprehensive action and, most importantly, to translate the security–development nexus into concrete policy action. EU officials point to a specific crisis where the new comprehensive approach is believed to be in place already: the EU's Horn of Africa Strategy, where the EU is trying to look into the needs on the ground and 620 then linking several of its policy instruments including development policy (including the APF), the IfS and CSDP (Interviews II and VI).

Conclusions

625 The purpose of this article was to investigate the security–development nexus within the policy of the EU and to better understand whether and how the EU has securitized its relations with the developing world. Our analysis shows a recognition of the link between security and development in the main discourse of 630 the EU, including an explicit recognition of the 'security–development nexus'. Evaluation of the EU's main policy instruments and actions illuminates a limited securitization of the EU's development policy (in the context of the APF) and of EU relations with developing countries (in the context of the IfS and CSDP). This may lead to a more direct security involvement of the EU in developing countries. 635 However, we argue that, paradoxically, this limited securitization can also be seen as a way to avoid a more direct involvement of the EU and its member states in conflicts. The APF and IfS are indeed supporting security-related activities

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conducted by other actors, while CSDP is increasingly focused on the capacity-building of third actors in conflict-prone regions. In total, then, the securitization of development policies and development countries does not immediately lead to a more direct security-involvement of the EU as such, but rather the enabling of third actors to respond to security threats by, for example, means of capacity-building in military structures.

By integrating parts of the Commission's DG DEV into the EEAS, attempts were made to institutionally embed the security–development nexus in the new Lisbon Treaty context. However, ambiguity remains as a result of the limited competences of the HR/VP and as a result of the specific position of CSDP actors within the EEAS, of the new DG DEVCO outside the EEAS and of the FPI as a Commission instrument within the EEAS. It therefore remains to be seen whether the new institutional setting will be conducive to a stronger link between development and security.

Interviews with officials in the various institutional settings illuminate the recurrent reference to the EU's 'comprehensive approach'. By actively promoting the comprehensive approach, the EU is currently trying to strengthen the link between security and development without explicitly referring to the 'security–development nexus'. This label of 'comprehensive approach', in contrast to the labels 'security–development nexus' and 'securitization', is seen as a more constructive and potentially more effective way to bridge development and security policies.

Notes on contributors

Stephan Keukeleire is Jean Monnet Professor in European Foreign Policy at the University of Leuven (Institute for International and European Policy) and Co-director of its 'Master of European Studies: Transnational and Global Perspectives'. He is also Chairholder of the 'Total Chair of EU Foreign Policy' at the College of Europe in Bruges (Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies). He coordinates the specialized online resource guide 'Exploring EU foreign policy' (<http://www.exploring-europe.eu/foreignpolicy >) and has published on various dimensions of the EU's external policies, including the textbook *The foreign policy of the European Union* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, 2nd edition). Email: stephan.keukeleire@soc.kuleuven.be

Kolja Raube is a senior researcher at the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies and Programme Coordinator of the 'Master of European Studies: Transnational and Global Perspectives' at the University of Leuven. He has worked and published on the EU's CFSP with a special focus on its institutional dimension, including the making of the EEAS, the role of the EP in EU foreign policy and the EU's quest for coherent external action after Lisbon. Recent publications include: *Difference and democracy—exploring potentials in Europe and beyond* (Campus, 2011, co-editor). Email: kolja.raube@ghum.kuleuven.be

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785 **Appendix: Interviews**

Interview I, senior official, EEAS, 7 May 2012
Interview II, senior official, EEAS, 8 May 2012
Interview III, senior official, EEAS, 15 May 2012
790 Interview IV, three senior officials, European Commission, DG DEVCO, 8 May
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Interview V, senior official, EEAS, 21 May 2012
Interview VI, senior official, EEAS, 21 May 2012
Interview VII, two senior officials, European Commission, DG DEVCO and
Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, 25 May 2012
795 Interview VIII, senior official, EEAS, 12 June 2012
Interview IX, senior official, European Commission, 13 June 2012

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