Abstract

Illocutionary force and modality are grammatical phenomena that are traditionally considered to operate at a 'high level', scoping over entire clauses and represented in the upper regions of the syntactic tree or of the semantic representation. This is supported by the observation that (most) subordinate clauses do not have their own illocutionary force, but depend on the main clause in this respect. Still, English exhibits a number of constructions where an NP appears to come with its own illocution, independent of the illocutionary force of the clause of which the NP is a part. In other languages as well, NPs are known to occur with illocutionary and modality operators. In this article, several of these constructions will be brought together, and it is then considered how they can be accounted for in two closely related structural-functional syntactic theories, namely Role and Reference Grammar and Functional Discourse Grammar. It is shown that both approaches can accommodate these odd constructions, provided a number of minor adjustments are made to the technical apparatus.

1 Introduction

The category 'mood' comprises a vast array of semantic and pragmatic notions. In this article, I follow

Hengeveld (2004a), who uses mood as a cover term for the two subcategories of illocution and

modality. The former can be seen as the linguistic expression of speech act distinctions, while the

latter is concerned with the evaluation of the content of the speech act on the axes of desirability or

probability. This view on mood is reminiscent of Bybee's (1985) working definition of mood, which

states that it "signals how the speaker chooses to put the proposition into the discourse context"

(Bybee 1985:165), and in line with what she argues, only the axis of probability will be taken into

consideration when dealing with modality in this article, thus ignoring deontic modality (Bybee

1985:166).

Common to both illocution and (subjective) modality is that they belong to what in functional

linguistic theories is generally known as the interpersonal domain. This domain captures everything

that is not concerned with the descriptive function of language - the representation of reality - but

expresses the speaker's view on this representation or the interaction between speakers and

addressees. As such, interpersonal notions resist truth-conditionality and in formal theories they

were traditionally relegated to the domain of pragmatics, although recently there have been several

attempts to integrate interpersonal notions such as illocutionary force in the syntactic structure (see

Rizzi, 1997; Cinque, 1999; Speas & Tenny, 2003).

The question is where mood distinctions are situated in the hierarchical semantic or syntactic

structure. This is not always easy to assess, and many theories remain silent on the topic. In formal

theories this is often due to the fact that syntax is not supposed to deal with pragmatic notions; in

functional theories, on the other hand, the reason is often that they eschew hierarchical structures.

The Emergent Grammar approach (Hopper, 1987, 1998) or, more generally, West-Coast

Functionalism (see McGregor, 1997, Noonan, 1999, Butler, 2003a:49-54 for this term), for instance,

argues that syntactic structure is constantly mediated through language use, and a particular

hierarchical structure is hence always of a temporary, contingent nature. This is not to say that in such a view there are no universal tendencies concerning scope differences between grammatical categories, but a fully detailed blueprint of how different grammatical notions hierarchically relate to one another is hard to come by. This article will take a functional perspective, but in order to be able to make precise claims on the structural position of mood, we will only look at so-called 'structural-functional theories' - the term Butler (2003a, b) uses for functional theories which take grammar to be a system of interlocking rules and structures without assuming the autonomy of syntax with regard to semantics - which do have elaborate semantic-syntactic template structures. Butler (2003a, b) focuses on three structural-functional theories, namely Functional Grammar, Role & Reference Grammar and Systemic Functional Grammar. Of these three theories, Functional Grammar and Role & Reference Grammar make the clearest predictions on the status of illocution and various types of modality. Indeed, the account in terms of layering in both frameworks is highly comparable, despite the conceptual differences (Butler, 1996:8 and see further Section 3). Systemic Functional Grammar is less clear in this respect (Butler, 1996:12-13 and also Butler, 2003b:56-57 with regard to illocution in particular). As a consequence, Systemic Functional Grammar (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004) will be ignored in what follows, and the discussion of 'unusual' mood, the main topic of this article, will be described in Functional Discourse Grammar (Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008), the latest version of Dik's (1997a, b) Functional Grammar, and Role & Reference Grammar (see Van Valin, 2005 for the most recent version).

Let us now look in somewhat more detail at each of the two subclasses of mood.

Illocution can be expressed through so-called illocutionary force indicating devices (IFIDs), morphosyntactic or prosodic markers that mark the illocutionary force, such as word-order, special intonation contours etc. Apart from such IFIDs languages may also possess elements that modify, rather than indicate the illocutionary force. Dutch, for instance, has several particles such as *maar* or *wel* that can be used to either emphasise or downplay the illocutionary force (Vismans, 1994). Another type of modifiers are the so-called illocutionary adverbs, like *honestly*, *in sum*, *frankly*, which

in specific contexts, like for instance (1)-(3), do not modify the proposition itself, but rather the illocution. Under an earlier analysis, these adverbs were seen to modify covert speech act verbs (*I declare honestly ...*) (see Ross's 1970 'performative deletion'), but the postulation of such a verb is not without problems (see Lyons, 1977:782-784; Levinson, 1983:255-263), and an alternative analysis may be proposed in which these adverbs modify the (abstract) illocutionary force (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:81-82).[1]

(1)   ***Honestly,*** *no man is safe at this time of year* (BNC)

(2)   ***In sum****, culture provides no secure foundation for defining a national group* (BNC)

(3)   ***Frankly****, it is not an outstanding record of achievement* (BNC)

A third type of illocutionary modification, related to the illocutionary adverbs in (1)-(3), are subordinate clauses that motivate the speaker's speech act, as in (4)-(5) (see Davison, 1981; Van der Auwera, 1986; Sweetser, 1990). In these examples, the subordinate clause modifies the speech act, rather than the propositional content.

(4)   *Well,* ***since you are so interested****, this is my cousin come from the Neath Valley to help in the business* (BNC)

(5)   ***If you are hungry*** *there's some cheese* (BNC)

Epistemic modality can be expressed through verbal morphology, through auxiliaries, and through adverbs. Of these devices, verbal morphology plays only a marginal role in the expression of modality in present-day English. Auxiliaries and adverbs however, are widely used, see (6)-(7).

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[1] English examples are either drawn from the BNC corpus (see http://corpus.byu.edu/bnc), or from a self-assembled stock of anecdotal internet examples, found with the aid of Google. The former are indicated with (BNC), the latter with (IC). Constructed examples are indicated with (CE).

(6)   *He **might** be dead.* (BNC)

(7)   *He is **probably** a murderer himself* (BNC)

In most linguistic approaches, mood is a category that is accommodated at a high level in the

semantic and/or syntactic structure: illocutionary force is a property of full, independent clauses.

Indeed, the presence of illocutionary force is sometimes taken as a watershed between parataxis and

hypotaxis (see Lehmann, 1988), although there has been some debate about whether illocutionary

distinctions can play a role in finite subordinate clauses as well (see e.g. Bolkestein, 1992). Still, the

idea that expressions without a finite verb, let alone without a verb, can be adorned with

illocutionary modifiers of their own is hardly ever held. The same is true, to some extent, of

epistemic modality.[2] Epistemic modality is a speaker's judgment of the factual status of the whole

proposition, and as such, it has scope over the entire proposition (see Palmer, 2001:8-9 on

"propositional modality"). This motivates why epistemic modality expressed by adverbials is often

realised in the left periphery of the clause and why mood morphology is expressed more peripherally

to the verbal core than tense or aspect inflection (see Bybee, 1985).

Still, in a number of languages, including English, illocution and epistemic modality can

operate on a far lower level in the semantic-syntactic tree than is commonly assumed. In this article,

it is argued that NPs can have their own illocution, independent of the illocution of the clause it is a

part of, and can be modified by epistemic modal markers. This is not to say that NPs are always

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[2] In recent work, the traditional epistemic domain is often subdivided in reportative, evidential and epistemic

modality, or in a subset of these. The exact divisions between these terms is not always very clear and some

scholars have argued that evidentiality is not really on a par with other modal categories, but rather a

functional category sui generis. To complicate matters even more, the distinction between subjective and

objective modality cross-cuts the whole domain (see Hengeveld, 2004a). The delineation within the epistemic

domain will be discussed in Section 3.

marked for illocution and modality or that illocution and modality are not by default linked with the entire clause, but rather that mood operators occasionally can scope over items smaller than the full clause.

Such NP-level mood expressions call for a number of revisions of most of the extant grammatical models. In this paper the focus is on the consequences for the functionally oriented models Role & Reference Grammar (RRG) and Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG).

Despite the differences between these two models (see Section 3), a common solution for the representation of the phenomena discussed in the data section of this paper can be put forward, which consists in allowing mood operators (or frames) for illocution and subjective modality to be inserted at a sub-clausal level. For RRG, this involves adding an extra layer in the structure of the NP. As will be shown, this has additional advantages beyond the accommodation of NP-internal mood features. For FDG, the greater flexibility of the Illocutionary Frame cuts deeper in the model's extant architecture, but it is not an unworkable solution. The remainder of this article consists of three main sections. First, a number of remarkable constructions will be presented in Section 2, in which illocution operates at levels where it should not be found according to the traditional theory of layering. Then, in Section 3, the position of illocution and epistemic modality in the layered structure of the clause will be discussed. The next section (Section 4) is devoted to the question how the models are to be altered in order to be able to account for these problematic constructions.

2 NP-internal mood constructions

In most theories that have elaborate syntactic and/or semantic structures illocution and epistemic modality are situated high up in the layered structure, whereas the NP arguments are deep down near the predicate. One motivation for this idea is that these mood categories have scope over other operators, and in semantically driven frameworks like RRG and FDG scope is a key element in determining the nature of the various layers. A second piece of evidence is that subordinate clauses

as a rule cannot have their own illocution, while they can have their own tense and aspect operators (see e.g. Verstraete, 2005). This is all well established, and can be illustrated by the examples under (8)-(9) (from Verstraete, 2005:614), where the coordinate structure allows for different illocutionary force in the two conjoined main clauses (declarative, interrogative, imperative), see (8a-c), which is not possible in examples (9a-c) with subordination.

(8a)   *John was imprisoned, but he didn't rob the bank.*

(8b)   *John was imprisoned, but did he really rob the bank?*

(8c)   *John was imprisoned, but don't forget that he robbed the bank!*

(9a)   *John was imprisoned after he robbed the bank.*

(9b)   **John was imprisoned after didn't he rob the bank?*

(9c)   **John was imprisoned after do keep in mind that he robbed the bank!*

In this section, a number of constructions will be discussed in which NPs have their own illocution, independent of the illocution of the clause they are part of or their own epistemic modal operators or modifiers. It should be pointed out that we are not concerned here with the kind of constructions mentioned by Sadock & Zwicky (1985:187-188) such as (10). Here the NP is used in isolation and hence can be argued to form a sentence on its own. Nor will constructions where a predicate nominal carries modal morphemes be taken into account, like e.g. (11) (from Kornfilt, 1997:79). Here the reported past suffix *-mIş* is attached to the predicate nominal *öğretmen*, but it cannot be used with an NP functioning as a referential subject or object . In cases like (10) and (11), the mood on the nominal falls together with the clausal mood.

(10)   *a beer, please*

(11)   TURKISH

(ben)   öğretmen   -miş   -im

I   teacher   -REP.PAST   -1SG

'I was/am a teacher (so they say)

This paper, however, is concerned with mood distinctions in NPs that are part of a sentence that has its own mood operators. In other words: the illocutionary force of the NP is independent of the illocutionary force of the sentence it belongs to, and the modality of the NP pertains to the NP only. Three types of such NPs will be discussed: (i) NPs that have their own illocution; (ii) NPs that are accompanied by adverbial illocutionary and modal modifiers; (iii) nouns with mood affixes.

2.1 NP-internal illocution

Illocution is normally associated with full clauses, but occasionally, we find expressions in English where the illocution operates locally. In examples (12)-(16) the NPs printed in bold have their own illocution, independent of the illocution of the clause.

(12)   *His grandmother is still married and is currently living in this cottage in **... France?*** (CE)

(13)   *I had a vague recollection somebody said he had this pet shop at Blagden or som not Blagden er **Blagden?*** (BNC, sic)

(14)   *Right You know you were talking about them deleting all er **references?*** (BNC)

(15)   *Our Senior Director of Interactive Design, Weszt, came up with **what an amazing new design*** (IC)

(16)   *I was impressed with **what a wonderful job that both Brian and the gentleman that worked***

        ***with him completed**.* (IC)

NP-internal illocutionary force can be illustrated with the simple example in (12). There is clearly an interrogative illocution that does not belong to the main clause, as the latter has declarative illocution. The only part that is questioned is the NP that forms the complement of the preposition *in*: the NP *France*. The same is the case in the examples (13)-(14), where the interrogative illocution can be argued to be restricted to the final NP. In (13), e.g., the fact that the person being talked about had a pet shop is not at issue. Rather it is questioned whether the pet shop was located at Blagden. Example (14) is less clear, but at least under one possible reading, the 'deleting' of something is asserted, while the exact nature of what has been deleted is questioned. In (15) and (16), the NP that is the complement of the preposition *with* has mirative illocution.[3] The illocutionary force of the NP is not just pragmatically inferred, but is encoded by the typical rising intonation, which is an IFID for interrogative illocution, and in (15)-(16), the pronoun *what* functions as an IFID for mirative illocution.

        Similar examples of distributed illocution were given in Lakoff (1988 [1974]), on which he pessimistically commented in his 1988 epilogue to the article:

        "These sentences even defied the theory of speech acts, since they had not one overall

        illocutionary force, but many illocutionary forces, some embedded within others. No theory

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[3] I use the term 'mirative illocution', rather than 'exclamative illocution' following Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008:66-67, 73), who argue that exclamative force is an emphatic operator on basic illocutions (see also Moutaouakil 2005): declaratives, interrogatives, imperatives can all be expressed as [+ exclamative] or [– exclamative].

of speech acts, then or now, has been devised to account for the speech act forces of such cases" (Lakoff, 1988:45).

One could object that constructions like (12)-(14) are unnatural or very infrequent. While it is true that they are hard to come by in traditional text corpora, they are, however, not at all ungrammatical, and the reason for their infrequency may simply be that they mainly occur in spoken discourse, and are not likely to be written down. Indeed, the BNC examples all come from the spoken discourse sections. Another reason why they are hard to retrieve from a corpus is that their concrete form varies widely which makes it difficult to query them electronically.[4] Moreover, the rarity of these constructions is not a good argument for not taking them into consideration. Valuable insights can be gained from looking at the fringes of syntax (see Wohlgemuth & Cysouw, 2010a, b and Simon & Wiese, 2011).

Another objection to the idea that (12) features illocutionary force inside the NP could be that in those sentences illocutionary force operates at the clause level throughout, but that the declarative illocution switches to interrogative in the middle of the sentence, at the place where the suspension dots or the hesitation markers are. In other words: the speaker starts out with a declarative illocution, but then changes her mind, so to speak, and turns her proposition into a question. The examples in (12)-(14) would then be cases of anacolutha, in which the regular syntax breaks down due to a sudden change in the speaker's discourse plan. Support for this account is the use of hesitation markers, which may signal the processing difficulties in the discourse reorganisation. One could object that this would miss the semantic point that only the NP *France* is questioned in (12), not the entire proposition. In other words: the speaker does not want to convey that reasons have cropped up mid-sentence to doubt the positive assertion of the already uttered proposition, rather only a specific part, namely the exact location (*France*), is put into question. This

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[4] For NP-internal interrogative illocution, I looked for the hesitation marker 'er', as is obvious from examples (13)-(14).

objection can be countered by analysing a sentence like (12) as an amalgamation of two different sentences, each with their own illocution, to wit *His grandmother is still married and is currently living in this cottage in France* and *Was it really France?*[5] This would be consonant with the observation that it is only *France* which is questioned. So in principle, the examples given in (12)-(16) could be analysed as instances of the Sadock & Zwicky type of NP-illocution exemplified in (10). Still, given that we need to recognise an illocutionary variable inside the NP anyway, as will become clear in the next section, the analysis of (12)-(16) as local illocution does not burden the grammar with an ad hoc category. Such an analysis has the advantage that no deletion of verbal material is needed in the process of amalgamating two sentences.

The same can be argued with regard to example (15). The NP *what an amazing new design* has mirative illocution, again independent of the (declarative) illocution of the main clause. There is thus a fundamental difference between this example and those under (17)-(18), where the mirative illocution pertains to the entire sentence, which takes the characteristic form of a question word without inversion:[6] the focussed NP with the wh-determiner is in fronted position, contrary to what is the case in example (15).[7]

(17)   *What an amazing new design this is!*

(18)   *What an amazing new design our Senior Director of Interactive Design, Weszt, came up with!*

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[5] I want to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this suggestion.

[6] As an alternative to the question word *what*, the determiner *some* can be used as well, as one reviewer points out.

[7] In some approaches, sentences like (17)-(18) are analysed as having NP-internal illocution as well, and are set off against examples where the *what*-operator is used on its own, rather than inside an NP, see e.g. Bennis et al. (1998:104-107), on the Dutch counterpart of this construction.

Example (15) is not an isolated attestation, as is shown by (16), and scores of other examples can readily be found on the internet.[8]

As for the use of the hesitation markers in (12)-(14), this may partly be due to the way in which the corpus was queried (see fn. 4), and even then, the hesitation marker is certainly not always present.

Again, one could maintain that the examples in (15)-(16) are perhaps not cases of NP-internal illocution, but rather blends of two clauses. Example (15) would then be a syntactic blend of (19) and (20).

(19)   *Senior Director of Interactive Design, Weszt, came up with an amazing new design*

(20)   *What an amazing new design!*

This syntactic blend account is particularly useful for cases in which a clause is 'grafted' onto the matrix clause (see Van Riemsdijk, 2001 for a detailed account of this phenomenon). The interrogative and mirative illocution of the NP in (21)-(24) are inherited from the clausal graft, respectively, *Was it London?* and *what an amazing crowd pleasers these will be* and *What a lot of things the Scots have given the world!* and *What terrible news we have to communicate*.

(21)   *saw them play live in...**was it london*** (IC)

(22)   *you can't go wrong with **WHAT an AMAZING crowd pleaser these will be!*** (IC)

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(23)   *I passed the time browsing in the windows of the many tourists shops that stand along it,*

*reflecting on **what a lot of things the Scots have given the world** - kilts, bagpipes, tam-o-*

shanters, tins of oatcakes, bright yellow jumpers with big diamond patterns of the sort

favoured by Ronnie Corbett, sacks of haggis- and how little anyone but a Scot would want

them. (IC, from B. Bryson, *Notes from a small island*, p.327)

(24)   *Honoring our heroes is one way to manage with **what terrible news we have to***

communicate (IC)

At first sight, example (16) is not different from examples (22)-(24), but upon closer inspection there
is a structural difference. In (16), the NP *what a wonderful job* is accompanied by a relative clause,
that both Brian and the gentleman that worked with him completed. Examples (22)-(24) are
structurally ambiguous. In (24), for instance, *we have to communicate* can either be a contact relative
clause, with *what terrible news* as its antecedent, or it can be a remnant of a head clause with
mirative illocution (*what terrible news we have to communicate!*). I would propose to reserve the
graft account only for the latter reading. A true syntactic blend would then be (25), rather than (16).
Here *what a wonderful job both Brian and the gentlemen that worked with him completed* can stand
on its own as a mirative sentence, whereas in (16) the presence of *that* precludes such a reading (at
least in standard English), and has to be parsed as a mirative NP with a relative clause.

(25)   *I was impressed with **what a wonderful job both Brian and the gentleman that worked with***

***him completed**.* (IC)

We will come back to the distinction between (12)-(16) and (21)-(24) in Section 4, where the
representation of all these examples in RRG and FDG is discussed.

Another construction which may be argued to feature NP-internal illocution are NPs introduced by the determiner *such*, although here the presence of a separate illocution is more difficult to maintain on a theory-independent basis. In English, *such* has two different uses: an identifying use and an emphasising or intensifying use (see Bolinger, 1972, Altenberg, 1994 and Wood, 2002 for this difference). This is exemplified in (26)-(27).

(26) *The examination is set and marked in **such** a way that it excludes by its very nature from Science and Social Studies papers any questions based on the local environment.* (BNC)

(27) *Reading is **such** a joy* (BNC)

In (26), *such* cataphorically refers to the relative clause that follows the noun *way*, and is involved, as a regular determiner, in (discourse) identification. In (27), on the other hand, *such* is not a phoric determiner. Rather, it emphasises the NP *a joy*, by boosting the inherent gradability of the concept *joy*. This intensifying use is not restricted to predicate nominals, but occurs with argument NPs as well, see (28).

(28) *Or if you don't care for the porridge, there's some of these new Post Toasties. **Such** a nice young American brought them for us* (BNC)

 The function of *such* in examples (27)-(28) is not exactly the same as the degree modifier *so*. For one thing, whereas *so* and the adjective it modifies can be used as a subject complement, see (29), this is not possible with *such*, see (30). The reason is that *such*, as part of the determiner complex, has the whole NP in its scope, not just the adjective (see Spinillo, 2003:201 and Ghesquière & Van de Velde, 2011:782-784 for a more extensive argumentation).

(29)   *So loud a noise / the noise was so loud*

(30)   *Such a loud noise / *The noise was such loud*

As an operator (or modifier) of the entire NP, the function of *such* is to express the unexpected nature of the referent, by highlighting its deviance from the norm. This function of *such* is in fact comparable to a mirative operator at the clause level, which similarly marks surprise by unexpected information.[9, 10] The difference is basically that the mirative determiner *such* has local scope over the NP only, whereas other mirative operators usually have scope over the entire clause. Interestingly, the English mirative operator *what* at clause level etymologically derives from a question word *what*, which is basically deictic in nature. The mirative determiner *such* draws on the same semantic domain, as it historically derives from a deictic determiner for identification (Bolinger, 1972; Ghesquière & Van de Velde, 2011).

Other instances of NPs which have their own illocution are (i) appositional NPs and (ii) NPs in the left-dislocated 'as for NP' construction, which can both circumvent the sentential illocution, as has been argued by Hannay & Keizer (2005:165-166) and Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008:416), respectively. In example (31), the as-for PP, containing the NP *the nude scene*, is not in the scope of the interrogative illocution of the main clause, and in example (32), the appositional NP *the self proclaimed greatest city in the world*, semantically does not fall under the interrogative illocution either, as it is itself fully asserted.

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[9] See Zeevat (t.a.) for a similar view on particles such as *only* as mirative elements expressing surprise. Note that these particles can also occur NP-internally as focus particles and as such constitute another category of NP-internal mood (see below).

[10] Note that NPs introduced with *such* may convey mirative expressions in the form of Sadock & Zwicky sentences exemplified in (10): *It was without doubt the most beautiful thing she had ever owned, or ever would . **Such delicacy, such refinement!*** (BNC).

(31)   *As for the nude scene, what can one say, except that it is brief and theatrically not very*

   effective? (IC)

(32)   *why does New York - the self proclaimed greatest city in the world - end up with such*

   mediocre architecture? (IC)

The NPs-with-illocution in (31)-(32) are, however, not necessarily on a par with the other cases

discussed above. They are clearly isolated from the main clause by having their own intonation

contour and by not filling any argument positions, and as such form their own mini-clauses, or

Discourse Acts, in the terminology of FDG (see Section 3). In this respect they are more closely

related to the Sadock & Zwicky NPs exemplified in (10). We will come back to the analysis of these

examples in Section 4.

2.2 NPs with adverbial illocutionary modifiers

The second kind of constructions in which illocutionary features are used in connection to the NP are

NPs modified by a so-called illocutionary adverb.

(33)   *I played doumbeck in a band, with **honestly** the most horrible saggy doumbeck I have ever*

   played in my life (IC)

(34)   *Our young people will, therefore, again and again and again, wash up orphans on Harvard's*

   *shores, in search not only of love, but of self-worth, guidance, and acceptance, of, **in short**, a*

   home (IC)

(35)   *it features a bunch of male and female models in **frankly** the most hilarious poses since*

         Zoolander (IC)

(36)   *Next to a pic of the fairy knitted in, **seriously**, the drabbest and most depressing hippie-green*

         colorss [sic] (IC)

The adverbs in bold (*honestly*, *in short*, *frankly*, *seriously*) are illocutionary adverbs. These have been

analysed as modifiers with a covert speech act verb (see Levinson, 1983:255), but as mentioned

earlier, this analysis has been largely abandoned in favour of an analysis in which the adverbs directly

modify the illocutionary force.

(37)   Honestly, …
(38)   [I say] honestly, …

Normally, these adverbs occupy one of the highest positions in the syntactic tree (see Ramat & Ricca,

1998:192; Cinque, 1999, 2004). In examples (33)-(36), however, they are inside the PP. This is an

argument to consider them as modifiers of the NP. This analysis is supported by the semantics: the

adverbs have only the NP in their scope. In (33), the speaker expresses her honesty about the

derogatory description that is provided of the doumbeck, not about her playing in a band, which is a

neutral statement. The same goes for the adverbs in the other examples. In (34) it is only the NP *a*

home of which it can be felicitously said, by using *in short*, that it is a concise expression. In (35),

frankly semantically clearly extends only to the NP it precedes. And in (36), *seriously* belongs to the

description *the drabbest and most depressing hippie-green colorss*. The most straightforward way to

represent these adverbs is as peripheral modifiers to the NP, which is the analysis that Payne &

Huddleston (2002:331-332, 436) themselves subscribe to.[11] They may be preceded and followed by a pause, orthographically marked by commas, as in examples (34) and (36), but this is by no means necessary, see (33) and (35). Indeed, in (33) and (35), the adverbs are intonationally fully integrated in the NP.

(39)   [$_{PP}$ with [$_{NP}$ [$_{Peripheral\ Modifier}$ honestly [$_{Determiner}$ the [… [$_{Head}$ doumbeck] …]]]]]

Invoking a slot for these adverbs in the NP is not a 'deus ex machina', as the slot is needed anyway for the presences of other adverbs that are used in connection with the NP, such as focus particles - at least in descriptions like Payne & Huddleston's (2002), which take surface structure as reflecting the actual syntactic structure.[12] More intricate accounts are available, however, in which the peripheral modifier is not really part of the noun phrase (or DP), see e.g. Kleemann-Krämer (2010) and references therein.

Particles can convey illocutionary-related meanings as well, and such particles can occasionally be found in the NP. Dutch and German have modal particles, as in (40), which Foolen (1993:36-38), following an earlier account of Wunderlich, argues to function as illocutionary modifiers (see also Vismans, 1994). The Dutch particle *toch* (German *doch*) has an adversative meaning, and often translates in English as 'nevertheless', 'after all' or 'even so'. In its use as a modal particle, it seems to convey emphasis of a counter-expectational meaning (see also Daalder 1986:136), which can apply to the propositional content, but also to the illocution. In (40), *toch* modifies the interrogative illocution, by asserting that the speaker has reasons to believe that the

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[11] The exact position of the relative clause is not at issue here. It is here inserted above the adjective but under the determiner, but other representations can be argued for as well.

[12] Note that the slot for peripheral modifiers is not the same slot as where the predeterminers *all* and *both* go, as these quantifiers occur systematically to the right of the peripheral modifiers. This hard ordering constraint warrants setting up a different slot for predeterminers.

answer will be positive. The particle here skews the possible answers to the positive, and, as a consequence, pushes it more in the direction of a declarative.[13] In English, this meaning could be expressed by stressing the verb, by using an emphatic dummy verb *do*, by a question tag, or by a combination of these strategies. In combination with a declarative, as in (41), *toch* motivates the use of the illocutionary force by going against the implicit stance of an imagined speaker.[14]

(40)   DUTCH

   Hij   *heeft*   ***toch***   *een*   *vriendin?* (IC)

   he   has   PTC   a   girlfriend

   'He does have a girlfriend, doesn't he?'

(41)   DUTCH

   Ik   *vond*   *het*   ***toch***   *belangrijk*   *dat*   *mijn*   *man*   *aanwezig*

   I   found   it   PTC   important   that   my   husband   present

   was   *bij*   *de*   *bevalling* (IC)

   was   with   the   delivery

   'I did find it important my husband was there at the delivery.'

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[13] Note that the word order is that of a declarative, rather than an interrogative clause.

[14] Note that *toch* in (41) is not the same *toch* as in *Hij is tóch gekomen* ('He did come, in the end'). In this use, the meaning of (41) would paraphrase as 'First I didn't think it was important, but later I changed my mind'. This is not the default reading of (41), which is more like 'All things considered, and perhaps disagreeing with what others think, I do find it important'. I consider the use of *toch* in (41) as a modal particle, although it can be stressed here, which is normally not possible for modal particles. Another problem is the use of *toch* in examples like *Wat is ze toch mooi!* ('How beautiful she is!'), where the counter-expectation is more difficult to perceive. I follow Daalder (1986:139) in her analysis that *toch* in such examples expresses a revision of a former point of view of the speaker and qualifies as counter-expectational.

The particle *toch* can also be used in combination with an NP, with a meaning that is close to the adversative value it has in combination with a declarative illocution. In (42), the adversative modal particle *toch* stresses the felicity of *een belangrijke Franse appelatie* against the (assumed) opinion of the other discourse participant(s). In (43), *toch* is used in combination with another particle (*wel*). The pragmatic meaning here is 'contrary to (our own) expectation', 'we have to admit'. In (44), *toch* introduces a correction on a previously uttered NP. The contribution of *toch* is to emphasise the felicity of the correction: whatever the status of the first NP, the second NP is *definitely* asserted.

(42)   DUTCH

Ik	*vind*	*persoonlijk*	*dat*	*de*	*laatste*	*tijd*	*nogal*	*minachtend*	*wordt*
I	find	personally	that	the	latest	time	rather	disdainful	is

gedaan	*over*	***toch***	*een*	*belangrijke*	*Franse*	*appelatie.* (IC)
done	about	PTC	an	important	French	appellation.

'Personally I think there have been some rather disdainful comments lately about what is still an important French appellation.'

(43)   DUTCH

De	*citadel*	*bestond*	*uit*	*vele*	*trappen,*	*die*	*we*	*hebben*
The	citadel	consisted	of	many	stairs	which	we	have

betreden	*en*	*bovenaan*	*konden*	*we*	*even*	*genieten*	*van*	***toch***
mounted	and	at-the-top	could	we	a-while	enjoy	of	PTC

wel	*een*	*mooi*	*uitzicht*	*op*	*Namen.* (IC)
PTC	a	nice	view	on	Namur.

'The citadel consisted of many stairs, which we took, and at the top we could enjoy the, after all, very nice view on Namur for a while.

(44)   DUTCH

     iedereen   *heeft*   *een*   *laserprinter*   *tegenwoordig* *(of*   **toch**   *een*

     everyone   has   a   laserprinter   nowadays   or   PTC   a

     high-res   *inkjet)* (IC)

     high-resolution inkjet

     'Everyone has a laserprinter nowadays, or at least a high-resolution inkjet.'

The difficulties in capturing the exact semantics and pragmatics of modal particles in general, makes

it difficult to present a convincing case that the NP-internal use of the modal particle *toch* really has

an illocutionary value. Still, the adversative value of *toch* suggests it is involved in conjuring up

alternative worlds or states, which is crucial to mood: both (interrogative) illocution and epistemic

modality are basically ways to express alternative perspectives on one proposition (see Timberlake,

2007:315). This relation between particles and mood is discussed in detail by Vandeweghe (1986). In

the next section, the link between nominal determination and mood will be further explored, by

looking at NP-internal mood in languages other than English or Dutch.

2.3 Nouns with mood affixes

Morphological expression of NP-internal illocutionary force is hard to find, but what is attested in the

typological literature is morphological expression of NP-internal modality. Just like illocution in the

strict sense, modality is not commonly thought of as a nominal category and it is normally taken to

operate at the clause level, way above the NP level. Moreover, the boundary between illocution and

modality is not always very clear-cut. Timberlake (2007:316-317) sees the imperative, the

interrogative and the declarative, normally considered as illocutionary categories, as extreme forms

of modality. Also, mirativity is related to evidentiality (see references in Delancey, 2001), and

evidentiality belongs to the epistemological-modal domain (see Timberlake, 2007:317).[15] Furthermore, epistemic modality can also be expressed by a first-person present-tense verb such as *suppose*, *believe* and *think*, in a construction that is akin to performative verbs executing speech acts (see Lyons, 1977:738-739).

Nordlinger & Sadler (2004:783-785) give examples of noun operators expressing mood distinctions that are independent of the mood of the clause the NP is part of. In example (45), the noun is combined with a productive morpheme for 'possibility', and in example (46), from Lowe (1999:282), there is an evidential morpheme.

(45)   IATÊ: suffix *-këá* for 'possibility'

se't-këá

'a possible house, something that has the possibility of being a house'

(46)   NAMBIQUARA

wa³lin³-su³-nti²

manioc-CL.BONE.LIKE-OBSERV.REC.PST.GIVEN

'this manioc root that both you and I saw recently'

Other mood affixes can be found in NPs, though they are often reinterpreted as a plain nominal category, dealing with referentiality. Rijkhoff (2008a:73, 2008b:817, referring to the work of Craig, 1977) shows that the Jacaltec exhortative illocution suffix /-OJ/, is used as a non-specificity marker when it occurs with nouns. As Craig (1977) herself notices, the overarching meaning in both cases is 'irrealis', a mood category. Another example is Fongbe, which Rijkhoff (2008a:73, 2008b:817), drawing on Lefebvre (1998), observes to have a morpheme that marks actuality (realis) in the clause

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[15] Timberlake distinguishes between the realm of epistemology and epistemic modality, but concedes that "[e]pistemic modality shades into epistemology" (2007:321).

and definiteness in the NP, see (47)-(48). This may suggest that definiteness is related to mood

categories in this language.[16] The same is true of the cognate Gbe language Gungbe, which has a

marker *ló* alternatively expressing specificity, as in (49), and "known or familiar" events, as in (50)

(examples taken from Aboh, 2009:10).

(47)   FONGBE

    N   ɖú   àsɔ́n   ɔ́

    I   eat   crab   DET

    'I ate the crab (in question/that we know of).'

(48)   FONGBE

    Jan   wá   ɔ́

    John   arrive   DET

    'Actually, John arrived.'

(49)   GUNGBE

    Súrù   xò   àfɔ̀kpà   ló

    Suru   buy   shoe   SPEC

    'Suru bought this/that shoe'

---

[16] Some scholars have argued for a link between definiteness and epistemic modality in English as well:

Cognitive Grammar considers determiners as an epistemic category (Langacker, 1991:89-95). The consequence

of this stretched conception of epistemicity is that *mood*, if seen as encompassing the epistemic domain, is

pervasively present in the NP. Davidse et al. (2008) show that modal adjectives can support the deictic

function.

(50) GUNGBE

ɖé   Súrù   hɔ̀n   lɔ́

as   Suru   fled   SPEC

'As Suru fled (as we all know)'

Another case of NP-internal mood is found in Salish, which has a determiner that is built on the root *kʷ*, which otherwise encodes remote, hypothetical or conjectural meaning, and can also be used as a subordinator with mood import (see Himmelmann, 2001:839-840). Matthewson (1996:57) gives the following example, where the determiner *ku* expresses non-assertion of the 'book', which in English only approximately translates as an indefinite determiner.

(51) ST'ÁT'IMCETS

təxʷp-mín-ɬkan   kəɬ   kʷu   púkʷ   natxʷ

tecwp-mín-lhkan   kelh   ku   pukw   natcw

buy-APPL-1SG.SUBJ   might   DET   book   tomorrow

'I might buy a book tomorrow.'

Kroeber (1999:67) argues that these Salish non-referential determiners "typically occur within the semantic scope of elements that remove the situation talked about from the realm of actual (present or past- reality (...). Such elements include negation, future markers and modals, imperative mood, and world-creating (intensional) predicates such as 'want', 'intend', 'look for', and others.", which underscores their affinity with traditional mood categories.

NP-internal mood morphology is thus not uncommon, and other determiners with an attitudinal overtone, such as the 'empathetic' deictic demonstratives in English (Lyons, 1977:677) or the honorific determiners discussed in Himmelmann (2001) also testify to the possibility of expressing mood or illocution inside NPs, both in English and in a wide range of other languages. We

opt for a more restrictive conception of mood, however. If we were to broaden the notion of mood to all attitudinal elements, then NPs would be rife with mood, as adjectives like *nice* easily acquire speaker-related attitudinal meaning.

3 Layering and the position of mood in RRG and FDG

Before we discuss the representation of NP-internal mood in RRG and FDG in Section 4, we will first present the general lay-out of these frameworks and their treatment of illocution and modality in particular in Section 3.

Both RRG and FDG hold that clauses are not flat structures, but have a hierarchical arrangement, represented as a set of layers around a core. A crucial difference is that the layered structure of the clause in RRG is primarily syntactic in nature, although it is semantically motivated (Van Valin, 1990; Butler, 1996; Butler & Taverniers, 2008:746), whereas FDG has a separate array of layers for morphosyntax, for semantics and for pragmatics (Butler & Taverniers, 2008:747). The FDG conception is an extension of the account in Dik's Functional Grammar, where layering was primarily semantic in nature (Butler 1996:3). This semantic layering had an effect on the surface linearisation, though the latter was not fully determined by it. Similarly in FDG, where the layering at the Morphosyntactic Level (see below for details) is sensitive to, but in principle independent of the layering at the Representational Level and at the Interpersonal Level (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:17, 2010:390). Still, in spite of this difference, there is much that is shared in these models and there are obvious parallels with more formally oriented frameworks (see Siewierska, 1992).

Common to many approaches is the idea that there are different levels or domains for different functional notions, like illocution, modality, negation, tense etc. In formal approaches, a distinction is often made between a CP domain, an IP (or TP) domain and a VP domain, which stand in a hierarchical relation: the lowest level is the VP domain (the thematic layer), which deals with argument structure. Dominating it is the IP or TP domain (the grammatical layer), where tense,

aspect and mood are situated. The most outer layer is the CP domain, where the integration in the discourse of the clause is accommodated. It deals with issues such as information structure (topicalisation) and illocution (see e.g. Haegeman & Guéron, 1999:520-521, 536-538). Each of these domains is further subdivided in additional layers. This arrangement is not unlike the layered structure of the clause that is put forward in RRG (see below for details), where the level of the Sentence more or less compares to the CP domain, the level of the Clause compares to the IP/TP domain, and the Core compares to the VP domain, although there is disagreement between the two approaches about the precise location of tense, modality and other categories and there is a separate 'focus structure projection' in RRG, dealing with information structure. FDG distinguishes between an Interpersonal Level, a Representational Level and a Morphosyntactic Level, each with its own layered structure (more details below). Though we have again a ternary structure, the match with the layered structure of the other approaches is less than perfect. The most important difference is that morphosyntax is treated as a separate level, whereas in formal grammar and in RRG, the three levels are all syntactic in nature. Another difference is that the hierarchical difference between the levels is not discrete. In formal grammar and in RRG, one level begins where the other level ends, but in FDG - in contrast to FG - the Levels are really separate components that run partly in parallel. That is, the processing of the Interpersonal Level starts before the processing of the Representational Level, but the Interpersonal layers are not all fully run through before the Representational layers begin to be processed (Hengeveld, 2004b:367-368). Still, there are significant similarities between FDG and the other approaches. Illocution and evidentiality e.g. are situated in the upper interpersonal levels, whereas tense and aspect are located at the lower representational levels. Argument structure, though potentially driven by interpersonal, representational or morphosyntactic factors, is managed at the Morphosyntactic Level (Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:316-332 for details).

I will now sketch the RRG and the FDG account in more detail, to provide the necessary background for the proposals in Section 4.

In **RRG**, the syntactic tree is divided into four successive layers. The deepest layer is the

Nucleus (NUC), which is the syntactic unit right above the Predicate (PRED), usually a verb. Above it is

the layer of the Core, the layer of the Clause, and the layer of the Sentence. Arguments are attached

under the level of the Core; modifiers of time and place are then added peripherally to the Core. Van

Valin (2005:19-21) argues that other adverbs attach to other layers, so that each layer has its own

periphery. Some languages, like English, have a so-called Precore and/or Postcore Slot (PrCS, PoCS)

for question words and topicalised elements, and a Left-detached and/or Right-detached Position

(LDP, RDP) for isolated constituents (see Van Valin, 2005:5-7). Operators in the form of inflectional

morphemes are represented in a mirror tree, branching downwards. Aspect and lexically derived

negation are operators at the Nuclear level; event quantification, (root) modality, internal (low-

scope) negation are operators of the Core; status, tense, evidentials and illocutionary force attach to

the Clause layer. The RRG conception of the layered structure of the clause (LSC) can be represented

as in Figure 1 (see also Van Valin, 2005:12):[17]

[Insert Figure 1 'The LSC in RRG' about here]

The arguments and the modifiers in Figure 1 are PPs or NPs, which have a layered structure of their

own. Concentrating on NPs, the relevant units are: Nucleus, Core and NP. The structure is thus

reminiscent of the model for the clause - with the exception of the highest layer of the Sentence -

and this is motivated by the striking similarities between the units (see Chomsky, 1970; Jackendoff,

1977; Paardekooper, 1980; Abney, 1987; Rijkhoff, 2002, 2008a, b; Van Valin & LaPolla, 1997;

Bernstein, 2001; Van Valin, 2005). Adjectives are peripherally attached to the Core in the constituent

projection. Determiners, numerals and nominal aspect (the latter dealing with count-mass

distinctions, among other things, see Rijkhoff 1991, 2002) are operators at the level of the NP, the

Core and the Nucleus, respectively. The Noun Phrase Initial Position (NPIP) is reserved for arguments

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[17] The focus structure projection, which deals with information structure, is not represented in Figure 1.

or satellites in nominalisations, like '*America's* attack on Iraq' or '*Yesterday's* attack on Iraq'. The Periphery is used for time and place modifiers in nominalisations. The layered structure of the NP is illustrated in Figure 2 (see Van Valin, 2005:25).

[Insert Figure 2 'The layered structure of the NP in RRG' about here]

As was already clear from the representation in Figure 1, illocution is handled at the level of the Clause. It is the highest ranking operator, and as such is nowhere near the NPs that function as arguments of the Predicate. Consequently, illocution does not play a role in the layered structure of the NP.

Hierarchical layering plays a central role in **FDG** as well. In order to understand how it is conceived, the basic template for the representation of layering has to be introduced, which is as follows:

(52) $(\pi\ v_i: h(v_i): \sigma(v_i))$

In this predicate logic-like representation, the main element is v_i, which stands for any of the various kinds of variables that F(D)G makes use of, like p, e, f etc., for Propositional Contents, State-of-Affairs and Predicates, respectively. The index i is used to distinguish between separate instances of the same variable. The variable v_i is preceded by one or more operators π dealing with grammatically expressed categories, like e.g. tense, aspect or mood inflections on verbs. The colon is used for 'restriction': the variable v_i is narrowed down, by a number of restrictors on its intension. In the representation in (52), the variable v_i is restricted by a head (h) and by one or more modifiers (σ), like e.g. *hard* in *work hard*. Both the head and the modifier are functions taking v_i as their argument. The phrase *work hard* can thus be represented as *v: work(v): hard(v)*. The head (h) can be complex, and this is the way in which the hierarchical layering transpires: the head consists of the same basic

27

template, which is recursively applied to new kinds of variables. In this way, each head constitutes a new layer, with its own operators (π) and modifiers (σ). The basic template in (52) can thus be expanded as in (53), where v_i, v_j and v_k are variables of an increasingly lower order.

(53)   ($_{head of layer n}$ π v_i: ($_{head of layer n-1}$ π v_j: ($_{head of layer n-2}$ π v_k: ($_{head of layer n-3}$ …)(v_k): σ(v_k))(v_j): σ(v_j)) (v_i): σ(v_i))

The principle behind this technical representation can be illustrated with a simple example. A sentence like (54) contains two modifiers on different layers: as in RRG the adverb *hard* is more closely connected to the verbal core than the adverb *tomorrow*. The former is a modifier of the Property (f_j), while the latter modifier belongs to the Episode (ep_i), a variable two layers up. This is also the variable to which the future tense operator (fut^π) is attached.[18] There is a complication, in that f_j is in fact what is called a 'Configurational Property' (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:181-215): it can be broken down in a number of smaller parts, which are not in a hierarchical relationship to each other. These parts are: the verb, represented as a Property (f_i), and the argument *he*, represented by a variable for Individuals, x_i. Variables that are in a non-hierarchical relationship are held together by square brackets.

(54)   *He will work hard tomorrow*

(55)   (fut^π ep_i: ($_{head of ep}$ sim^π e_i: ($_{head of e}$ f_j: [$_{head of fj}$ (f_i:work(f_i)) (x_i)](f_j): $hard^\sigma$ (f_j))(e_i))(ep_i): $tomorrow^\sigma$

(ep_i))

The representation in (55) does not show all of the extant layers in FDG. In total five layers are distinguished: the deepest layer is the one of what is called the 'Lexical Property', a Predicate (f), which combines with Individuals (x), to form a Configurational Property (f). Then comes the layer of

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[18] The sim operator of the e variable expresses simultaneity (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:173-174 for details).

the State-of-Affair (e), enfolded in the layer of the Episode (ep), enfolded itself in the outer layer of the Propositional Content (p).

Apart from the 'layers', FDG makes a distinction between different 'levels'. The grammar, or 'Grammatical Component', as it is technically called in FDG, consists of four separate levels: the Interpersonal Level (IL), the Representational Level (RL), the Morphosyntactic Level (ML), and the Phonological Level (PL).[19] Each level is layered in a similar fashion. The layers and their variables that have just been discussed (p, ep, e, f etc.) are all part of the Representational Level. At the Interpersonal Level, the relevant layered structure is as follows. There are two kinds of Subacts, Referential Subacts (R) and Ascriptive Subacts (T), which typically (though not necessarily) correspond to Individuals (x) and Properties (f) at the Representational Level. These Subacts are executed by the speaker when she summons an Individual or a Property, respectively. Together, these Subacts form the Communicated Content (C), constituting the next IL layer. The Communicated Content combines with a variable for the Speaker (P_1), for the Addressee (P_2), and for the Illocution (F). At the next layer, we have the variable for the Discourse Act (A). The highest layer of the Interpersonal Level is the one that hosts the variable for the Move (M).[20] The Morphosyntactic Level has as its layers Stems (Xs) and Affixes (Aff), combining into Words (Xw), combining into Phrases (Xp), combining into Clauses (Cl), to arrive at the outer layer of the Linguistic Expression (Le). A representation of the hierarchical layering within the three levels is given in (56). Note that this is a simplified representation, without operators and modifiers:[21]

(56)   IL $(M_I: (A_I: [(F_I)(P_1)(P_2)(C_I: [(T_I)(R_I)](C_I))](A_I))(M_I))$

---

[19] As it is not of immediate relevance to the present paper, the Phonological Level will be ignored here.

[20] The common practice in FDG is to use capitals for variables at the Interpersonal Level, lower case letters for variables at the Representational Level, and title case for the Morphosyntactic Level.

[21] It should be stressed that FDG assumes a default correspondence, but not a necessary one-to-one mapping of the variables between the different levels.

RL $(p_i: (ep_i: (e_i: (f_j: [(f_i)(x_i)](f_j))(e_i))(ep_i))(p_i))$

ML $(Le_i: (Cl_i: (Xp_i: (Xw_i [(Xs_i)(Aff_i)](Xw_i))(Xp_i))(Cl_i))(Le_i))$

Noun phrases in FDG have a layered structure of their own (see Hengeveld, 2008), just like in RRG. At the Interpersonal Level, typical referential NPs are represented as Referential Subacts (R).[22] Mackenzie (2002:1-2) notes that the execution of a Referential Subact typically entails the execution of one or more Ascriptive Sub-Subacts (T) in the case of non-pronominal NPs: in order to refer to a particular dog, one has to evoke the property of a dog. The difference between reference and ascription compares to what in Cognitive Grammar is called 'grounding' vs. 'type instantiation/specification' (see Langacker, 1991). At the Representational Level, referential NPs are represented as an Individual (x) if they refer to concrete physical 'first-order' entities (see Lyons, 1977:442-447 and Mackenzie, 2004 for entities of a different order). NPs referring to time, locations and other less prototypical entities are represented by other kinds of variables (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:132-136). As is argued by Hengeveld (1992), Keizer (1992) and Mackenzie (1992), however, the (x) is built on a zero-order property (f). If we ignore the operators and modifiers, we get the following representation:

(57) IL $(R_i: (T_i)(R_i))$

RL $(x_i: (f_i)(x_i))$

ML $(Np_i: (Nw_i: [(Ns_i)(Aff_i)](Nw_i))(Np_i))$

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[22] Non-referential NPs are e.g. predicative complements, incorporated nouns, vocatives etc. (see Hengeveld, 2008).

To each of the Interpersonal and Representational layers operators and modifiers may be attached. Operators of R at the Interpersonal Level (Π^R) deal with identifiability and specificity[23]; operators of x at the Representational Level (π^x) express location and number; and operators of f at the Representational Level (π^f) are associated with shape and measure (nominal aspect, see Rijkhoff, 1991, 2002). Modifiers of R at the Interpersonal Level (Σ^R) express interpersonal notions like subjective attitude (see Van de Velde, 2007 and Butler, 2008 for an overview of the various interpersonal modifiers in the NP); the difference between modifiers of x and modifiers of f can be illustrated by the adjective *poor* (see Hengeveld, 2008): if it is used as an expression of compassion (*poor man!*), it is an interpersonal modifier (Σ^R). If it has the meaning of 'impecunious', it is an x-modifier. If it has the meaning of 'badly skilled' (*a poor doctor*), it is an f-modifier.

Not all kinds of operators and modifiers will be expressed simultaneously in the same NP, of course. An example of an NP packed with various modifiers, and its representation in FDG is given under (58). T_K, T_J and T_I are Ascriptive Sub-Subacts, representing the properties *oversized*, *electric* and *chain saw*, respectively.[24]

(58) *that* *damn* *oversized* *electric* *chain saw*

Π^R Σ^R σ^x σ^f x/f

IL $(id^\Pi R_i: [(T_K) (T_J) (T_I)](R_i): damn^\Sigma(R_i))$

RL $(rem^\pi x_i: ((f_i: chain\ saw\ (f_i)): (electric^\sigma(f_i)))(x_i): (oversized^\sigma(x_i)))$

ML $(Np_i: \text{-that damn oversized electric chain saw-}(Np_i))$

---

[23] Identifiability and specificity are two sides of the same coin: identifiability concerns the Speaker's assessment of the status of the referent for the Addressee, whereas specificity indicates identifiability for him/herself (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:122).

[24] The demonstrative *that* is both represented as an identifiability operator of R_i at the Interpersonal Level and as a remoteness operator of x_i at the Representational Level.

The position of illocutionary force in relation to the NP is comparable to what is the case in RRG: illocution is situated at the F-variable at the Interpersonal Level, way above the R-variable, as is clear in the representation under (56).

The treatment of modality in FDG is more complex than in its precursor FG or than in RRG. Epistemic modality - in its broad sense including reportative and evidential modality (see fn. 2) - is distributed over the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level. This is, in effect, a departure from most other functionalist theories (including FG), which treat epistemic modality invariably as an interpersonal phenomenon. The reason for relegating plain epistemic modality to the Representational Level is that there are scope differences between the reportative markers and the other evidential/epistemic markers (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:151-153). Moreover, the latter can be embedded in a complement clause, where they can express a viewpoint that is not necessarily shared by the speaker, as e.g. in (59). Reportative modality lacks this possibility, see (60).

(59)   Mary said that she would presumably/certainly/possibly/... come to the party.
(60)   *Mary said that she would allegedly/reportedly/... come to the party.

This suggests that a finer-grained distinction can indeed be made within the domain of epistemic modality. The problem is that other criteria suggest that all epistemic adverbs, both those in (59) and those in (60) can be treated together as they behave similarly with regard to other tests for subjective or interpersonal status (De Smet & Verstraete, 2006:376-377): they do not allow pronominal substitution, and cannot easily be brought under the scope of sentence negation or be focussed, see (61)-(63).[25] The interpersonal nature of these adverbs is defended in Ramat & Ricca (1998:190).

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[25] Answering a question with a sentence adverbial is not ungrammatical per se, but it is not appropriate as an answer to the kind of question-word questions in (61).

(61)   Q: *How/When/Why/... did he marry her?*

         A: **Presumably/Certainly/Possibly/Allegedly/Reportedly/...*

(62)   *He didn't presumably/certainly/possibly/allegedly/reportedly/...marry her.*

(63)   **Only presumably/certainly/possibly/allegedly/reportedly/... did he marry her.*

On the semantic side, both types appear not to affect the truth conditions, suggesting they do not belong to the representational semantics. This raises the question whether FDG made the right decision to consign the adverbs in (59) to the Representational Level. A case could be made to analyse them all as modifiers of the Communicated Content at the Interpersonal Level. The reportative adverbs in (60) express that the speaker does not fully commit to the truth of what she is saying as she is relying on other people's views (Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:103). In a sense, this is not only central to the meaning of reportative markers but of the other epistemic adverbs as well. Adverbs like *presumably* or *possibly* also signal that the speaker cannot fully commit to what she is asserting, perhaps not by explicitly referring to other people's views, but at least acknowledging that other views may exist. Moreover, the current approach to the broad epistemic domain in FDG draws a rather confusing boundary between hearsay evidentials, which are interpersonal in nature, and perceptual evidentials, which are representational in nature (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:176-178). Furthermore, the observation that non-reportative evidentials can be used in subordinate clauses, see (64), does not necessarily mean that they should be denied interpersonal status. Other adverbs which belong the Interpersonal Level such as *fortunately* (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:103) can also be found in complement clauses expressing views other than the speaker's:

(64)   *Police said the Toyota rammed three cars on the motorway and another on the A556, but*

         *that **fortunately** no one had been injured.* (BNC)

Summarising, it is clear that in RRG and FDG, illocution is situated in the higher layers, and has most other functional categories in its scope. For modality, things are more complicated. Reportative modality is situated at the Interpersonal Level, and, as this level precedes the Representational Level in the production of a linguistic utterance, reportative modality is also high up in the structure. The non-reportative evidential and epistemic modals belong to the Representational Level in standard FDG, but as they pertain to the Propositional Content, they occupy the higher layers inside this level. In an alternative view, these epistemic modals could be analysed as modifying the Communicated Content at the Interpersonal Level as well.

Glossing over the more fine-grained layering that some of these accounts apply to the modal domain, the following representations show the parallels across the frameworks.[26] The representation in (67) may be altered such that evidential and epistemic modality is treated on the same level as reportative modality.

(65)   Formal Grammar: $[_{CP}$ Illocution $[_{TP}$ Reportative/Evidential/Epistemic Modality $[_{VP}$ ...]]]

(66)   RRG: $[_{Sentence}$ $[_{Clause}$ Illocution [Reportative/Evidential/Epistemic -Modality $[_{Core}$ ...]]]]

(67)   FDG: $[_{Interpersonal\ Level}$ Illocution [Reportative Mood]]

$[_{Representational\ Level}$ [Evidential/Epistemic Modality ...]]

These representations are simplified to highlight the correspondences between the models. A more accurate representation should bring out the idea that basic illocution and illocutionary modification are operators in RRG, whereas in FDG, basic illocution is a frame and has its own variable, which can be modified by illocutionary operators and modifiers.

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[26] The additional indentation for the Representational Level in the FDG representation in (67) is a way of bringing out the idea of the 'delayed processing' of the Representational Level (see above).

4 Implications for the models

Having shown that NPs can have their own illocution, their own mood modifiers, and their own mood operators in Section 2, it is now time to turn to the question how well the models discussed in Section 3 are equipped to account for these constructions, and in what way they need to be adjusted.

The representation of NP-internal mood is more straightforward in the syntactically oriented RRG model than in the more semantically oriented FDG model. As FDG represents semantic (and pragmatic) notions on a different level from the morphosyntactic representations (see Section 3), there is no necessary one-to-one correspondence between form and function. This means that the precise morphosyntactic expression of NP-internal mood cannot be taken as an argument for preferring one representation over the other. Relying strictly on semantic arguments, several options are possible, and it is not easy to decide which one is the best. Concentrating on NP-internal illocutionary adverbial modifiers discussed in Section 2.2 for instance, their syntactic position in the left-periphery of the NP immediately preceding the demonstratives posits constraints on where they can be inserted in the RRG layered structure of the clause. There is a direct relation between their semantic adherence to the NP and their linear contiguity, and it is reasonable to insert them in the NP layering. In FDG, on the other hand, the morphosyntactic expression is not necessarily a reflection of the semantic relations, and a solution whereby the illocutionary modified NP is represented at the interpersonal ('pragmatic') level as a separate Discourse Act is in principle not incompatible with the integration of the NP under one Clause unit at the Morphosyntactic Level. Still, the solution that is proposed in this section to represent the phenomena presented in Section 2 falls out in comparable ways in both models. It boils down to assuming that illocutionary and modality operators, modifiers and frames are not exclusively associated with clause-level entities.

We will now discuss the possible analyses of NP-internal mood constructions step by step.

The representation of the Sadock & Zwicky example in (10) (*a beer, please*) is straightforward. In FDG, this kind of construction may get the following representation at the Interpersonal Level:

(68)   IL $(M_I: [(A_I: [(F_I: IMPER (F_I)) (C_I: (R_I:(T_I)(R_I))(C_I))](A_I)) (A_J: (F_J:please_{Intj}(F_J))(A_J))](M_I))$

The Move (M_I) consists of two Discourse Acts A_I and A_J. The first Discourse Act (A_I) consists of two components: a frame that deals with the (imperative)[27] Illocution (F_I) and a component that deals with the noun phrase *a beer*, viz. the Communicated Content (C_I). The second Discourse Act (A_J) consists of the interjection *please*, which functions as the head of the Illocution F_J (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:76-78). C_I comprises a Referential Subact (R_I), which itself draws upon an Ascriptive Sub-Subact (T_I). As is clear from the representation, there is no need to furnish R_I with an illocution of its own.

This kind of analysis is amenable to representation in RRG as well: in sentences like (10), the illocutionary operator is still in its high position in the layered structure. Only there is an atypical Nucleus, not consisting of a verb, but rather of a full NP.

[Insert Figure 3 'RRG representation of isolated NP' about here]

The other constructions discussed in Section 2, where mood-enriched NPs do not form isolated 'mini-clauses' on their own, are more difficult to account for in standard RRG and FDG, however.

In **RRG**, a possible solution to account for the NPs-with-illocution discussed in Section 2.1 is to say that the NP consists of a Clause unit here. This can be represented as in Figure 4.

[Insert Figure 4 'RRG representation of NP-internal illocution' about here]

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[27] Alternatively, the imperative illocution could be pragmatically inferred here.

The drawback of this representation is that it is not clear why the other clausal layers and the clausal operator projection are not inherited in full. If we have a Clause layer in the NP, why are the arguments encoded as genitives or prepositional phrases, rather than as plain NPs? A more appropriate representation that covers the kinds of constructions discussed in Sections 2.1-2.3 is the simple solution of adding an extra nominal layer. In that way we end up with four layers in the NP, instead of three. The original outermost layer of the NP can then be renamed as NOM, in order to reserve the label NP for the new highest layer.

[Insert Figure 5 'Extended version of the layered structure of the NP in RRG' about here]

In the constituent tree, the new outermost NP layer hosts the kind of illocutionary modifier that was discussed in Section 2.2. Scope relations, as reflected in word order, indicate that it ranks above the NPIP slot: in (69), the adverb precedes the possessor argument of the nominalisation.

(69)   (...) with, **honestly**, the army's most ruthless attack of a village since its atrocities in 1995.
        (CE)

[Insert Figure 6 'RRG representation of example with NP-internal speech act modifier' about here]

The mood suffixes on nouns discussed in Section 2.3 are dealt with in the operator projection. The Iatê example in (45) can be represented as follows:

[Insert Figure 7 'RRG representation of Iatê *se't-këa* ('a possible house')' about here]

Introducing an additional layer in the RRG structure of the NP is not only needed to account for the constructions discussed in Sections 2.1-2.3, but has the additional advantage of making the layered structure of the NP more like the layered structure of the clause. In both structures there is now a CLAUSE/NOM layer in-between the Core and the highest node, the NP and the Sentence, respectively. Both have the same number of layers now, if we abstract away from the PRED node, which is not part of the operator projection and cannot take modifiers. The result is more elegant, given that the similarities between the NP and the clause were one of the main arguments to set up a comparable layered structure for clauses and NPs in RRG in the first place.

[Insert Figure 8 'Comparison of the LSC and the Layered structure of the NP (extended version)' about here]

An additional advantage of the representation with a NOM layer over the representation with an extra CLAUSE layer under the NP node, is that mood operators that are restricted to the nominal domain, like the mirative operator *such*, are treated as genuine nominal categories. The representation is similar to the representation in Figure 7.

In this conception, the determiner *such* can be attached to different layers. In its deictic, identifying use, it is an operator of the NOM level. In its mirative (intensifying) use, it is an operator of the NP level. This double analysis is supported by the diachronic facts. The mirative use has developed from the identifying use (see Bolinger, 1972; Ghesquière & Van de Velde, 2011), which is a clear case of subjectification, the process in which representational elements are recruited for the expression of interpersonal meanings (see Traugott 2003, 2010 for recent accounts). Subjectification is basically a semantic process, but it has syntactic repercussions (see De Smet & Verstraete, 2006). These repercussions can be summarised as 'rising in the layered structure'. The differential representation of *such* in the layered structure, according to its semantics, is then in line with the

subjectification account. Note that in formally oriented theories, mirative *such* is similarly

represented under a higher projection than identifying *such* (see e.g. Wood, 2002).

The solution with the clause node under the NP node in Figure 4 can be used, however, to

represent the obvious cases of syntactic blends or 'grafts' discussed in Section 2.1. The grafted clause

can be inserted under the NP node. This would allow us to bring out the difference between (70) and

(71) (as well as the difference between (16) and (25)).

(70)   *He lived in … was it France?*

(71)   *He lived in … France?*

[Insert Figure 9 'RRG representation of graft' about here]

In **FDG** as well**,** a first attempt to account for the data in Sections 2.1-2.3 could be to supply the NP

with a Discourse Act variable in the representation. A simple example like (72), where the NP

Monday has its own interrogative illocution could then be represented as in (73), where the R_I

variable is wrapped in a second Discourse Act A_J that hosts the separate interrogative illocution

$(F_J:INTER(F_J))$. It is naturally situated next to the Communicated Content C_J which contains as its only

member the Referential Subact R_I.

(72)   *Let's meet on … **Monday?*** (CE)

(73)   IL

(M$_I$:(A$_I$:[(F$_I$:HORT(F$_I$))(C$_I$:[(T$_I$)**(A$_J$:[((F$_J$:INTER(F$_J$))(C$_J$:(R$_I$:Monday(R$_I$))(C$_J$))](A$_J$))**](C$_I$))](A$_I$))(M$_I$))

The use of a Discourse Act variable (A) inside the Communicated Content (C) is not standard in FDG.

The pragmatically motivated layering at the Interpersonal Level entails that inside the Communicated

Contents we only have Subacts, either of a referential nature (R) or of an ascriptive nature (T). If we abide by this restriction, there are basically two solutions: either the Discourse Act *Monday?* is promoted, so that it is directly subsumed under the Move layer, or we treat it as a Subact. Let's consider each of these options in turn.

The first alternative would be to tease apart the two Discourse Acts, and not to embed A_J under a variable inside A_I as was the case in (73). This would yield a representation as in (74), where A_I and A_J do not entertain a hierarchical relationship to one another under the Move layer (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:52-53). This solution is very close to the way appositional and left-dislocated NPs are dealt with in standard FDG. As they stand outside the clause proper, they can be regarded as separate Discourse Acts (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:55-58).

(74)   IL

$(M_I:[(A_I:[(F_I:HORT(F_I))(C_I:[(T_I)](C_I))](A_I))\mathbf{(A_J:[(F_J:INTER(F_J))(C_J:(R_I:Monday(R_I))(C_J))](A_J))}](M_I))$

At first sight, this representation seems to suggest that the two Acts are realised as separate clauses (*Let's meet! On Monday?*), whereas in example (72) the pause after *on* suggests that *Monday* is part of the first Discourse Act. Still, remember that in FDG the Morphosyntactic Level is autonomous, and does not necessarily conform to the structure at the Interpersonal Level. The integration of the two Discourse Acts, which is often not fully realised, as can be deduced from the pauses, the hesitation markers etc., can then be taken care of dynamically at the Morphosyntactic Level.

A variation on the solution in (74) would be to insert a variable for the Subact *Monday* in the first Discourse Act (A_I) and to add a second Discourse Act (A_J) to accommodate the interrogative illocution. The shared Subact (R_I) of both Discourse Acts can then be amalgamated in the expression at the Morphosyntactic Level. This solution, spelled out in (75), is very similar to the graft analysis proposed in Van Riemsdijk (2001). It suffers from the disadvantage that it generates an entity at the Interpersonal Level that is deleted in the expression. Deletion is not a favoured option in FDG.

(75)   IL

(M$_I$:[(A$_I$:[(F$_I$:HORT(F$_I$))(C$_I$:[(T$_I$)**(R$_I$:Monday(R$_I$))**](C$_I$))](A$_I$))(A$_J$:[(F$_J$:INTER(F$_J$))(C$_J$:**(R$_J$:Monday(R$_J$))**)(C$_J$))

](A$_I$))](M$_I$))

The second alternative to (73) would be to treat *Monday?* as a Subact, rather than as a Discourse Act

at the Interpersonal Level. This solution has the advantage that the Morphosyntactic representation

is more closely aligned with the Interpersonal representation, which is preferable as 'Discourse

organisation' is one of the tasks of the Interpersonal Level (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:46-47).

If we represent *Monday?* as a (referential) Subact, there are two options to represent the

interrogative illocution. Either we apply the Illocutionary Frame directly to the Subact, as in (76), or

we treat the interrogative illocution as an operator of the Subact (Π^R), as in (77). The drawback of the

latter representation is that operators of Referential Subacts have to do with identifiability

(Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:122), not with illocutionary force.

(76)   IL   (M$_I$:(A$_I$:[(F$_I$:HORT(F$_I$))(C$_I$:[(T$_I$)**[(F$_J$:INTER(F$_J$))(R$_I$:Monday(R$_I$))]**](C$_I$))](A$_I$))(M$_I$))

(77)   IL   (M$_I$:(A$_I$:[(F$_I$:HORT(F$_I$))(C$_I$:[(T$_I$)**(ΠR$_I$:Monday(R$_I$))**](C$_J$))](A$_I$))(M$_I$))

The same solution is available for mirative *such* (Section 2.1) and the particle *toch* (Section 2.2).

Applying this solution to example (28), we arrive at the representation in (78) for the NP *such a nice*

young American. Here, *such* is the IFID for the mirative illocution, which is represented as an

Illocutionary Frame.[28]

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[28] An alternative solution would be to treat *such* as an emphatic operator on the R Subact, as one reviewer

points out. This, however, does not do full justice to the semantic affinity between intensifying *such* and

mirative illocution. The difference between the emphatic operator and the mirative illocution is what

distinguishes *a real joy* (or: *really a joy*) from *such a joy*. Similarly, mirative illocution at the clausal level (e.g.

(78)   IL $[(F_I:MIRATIVE(F_I))(-id\ R_I:[(T_I)(T_J)(T_K)](R_I))]$

Illocutionary NP modifiers like *in short* in (34) can either be represented as modifiers of the

Referential Subact - the solution along the lines of what was suggested in (77) for operators - or as a

modifier of the illocutionary variable. The former option yields a representation like (80) for the NP

honestly a nice disposition in (79); the latter solution yields a representation like (81).[29] The

representation under (81) acknowledges that *honestly* modifies an illocution, but it seems to entail

that every NP has its own illocutionary force, with Declarative illocution as a default value. This

entailment is not necessary, however. It is also possible to insert the Illocutionary Frame only when

there is either an overt IFID or an illocutionary adverb. This is in line with the common practice in

FDG to only supply those variables in the representation that are actually used in a language or a

construction.

(79)   *I (…) got to carress* [sic] *a nice set of legs and a reasonable butt on a 40 year old provider*

        with, ***honestly, a nice disposition*** (IC)

(80)   IL $(-id\ R_I:[(T_I)(T_J)](R_I):\ honestly(R_I))$
(81)   IL $[(F_I:DECL(F_I):\ honestly(F_I))(-id\ R_I:[(T_I)(T_J)](R_I))]$

What a nice car this is!) should not be confused with the emphatic declarative (e.g. *This IS a nice car!*). See also

fn. 3.

[29] The indefinite article is represented at the Interpersonal Level as an [−identifiability] operator. *Nice* is here

analysed as a modifier at the Representational Level, and is thus not lexically inserted under the T_I variable

representing its Ascriptive Subact.

Moreover, acknowledging the possibility of a Declarative Illocutionary Frame in the NP also helps to account for the presence of the illocutionary particle *toch* in the examples in (42)-(44) (Section 2.2). Here, the particle is perhaps better treated as an operator, rather than a modifier of the illocution. The NP *toch een high-res inkjet*, see (44), can then be represented as (82).

(82) IL $[(\text{emph } F_I:\text{DECL}(F_I))(-\text{id } R_I:[(T_I)(T_J)](R_I))]$

A further advantage of the representation in (81) over the representations in (80) is that the presence of an - optional - illocutionary adverb does not alter the interpersonal status of the Subact: *a nice disposition* is a Referential Subact, whether or not it is modified by *honestly*. What changes is the presence of an extra Illocutionary Frame. This is supported by the fact that non-illocutionary interpersonal adverbs, like for instance the reportative adverb *purportedly*, can modify the Referential Subact as well, which, following Van de Velde (2007:209-210; 2009:1025) can be represented as a Σ^R modifier. There is no need to transform the pragmatic status of the R-variable into a Communicated Content in the presence of such an interpersonal adverb. This is illustrated in (83)-(84), in which R_I represents the NP *purportedly the worst Apple products of the last 10 years*, and T_I, R_J and T_J represent *worst*, *Apple* and *products*, respectively.

(83) *Here's a list of **purportedly** the worst Apple products of the last 10 years* (IC)

(84) IL $(+\text{id } R_I:[(T_I)(R_J)(T_J)](R_I): \textbf{purportedly}(R_I))$

In the same vein, the examples of mood morphology in the NP discussed in Section 2.3 can be represented as Π^R operators. The NP *se't-këá* in example (45) is analysed as (85), where the +possibility operator represents the suffix *-këá*.

(85) IL $(+\text{possibility } R_I:(T_I)(R_I))$

In this way, FDG is able to deal with interpersonal modification of the NP by means of 'sentence adverb' modifiers in a natural way, unlike its predecessor FG, where the Interpersonal Level only started at the higher, clausal layers.

In sum, no extra layering is needed in FDG, as NPs can be modified in a number of different ways at the Interpersonal Level. The only modification of the technical representation that is needed is to allow Illocutionary Frames (F_I: ILL (F_I)) to combine with Subacts. I see no principled, theory-independent reason why Illocutionary Frames should be restricted to the Discourse Act only.

5 Conclusion

While illocutionary force and epistemic modality are normally concerned with full, independent clauses, and are represented in the higher regions of the syntactic or semantic layered structure, they can sometimes relate to smaller chunks in the clause, like NPs. Such 'micro-scope' illocutionary force and illocutionary modification are attested both in English and in other languages. In this article, the focus was on mood marking on NPs, but other constituents can occasionally have mood markings as well. In (86), the AP contains an epistemic modal adverb (see also Tucker, 2001; Van de Velde, 2007), and in (87), the illocutionary modifier *in short* scopes over a PP.

(86)   *an allegedly defamatory article* (IC)

(87)   *while your souls are filled with deceit, and, in short, with every wickedness* (IC)

In this article, the consequences of this small-scope mood operators and modifiers have been investigated for two structural-functional theories of language, viz. Role and Reference Grammar (RRG) and Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG). It turns out that a number of slight modifications to the standard layered structure of the NP in both theories are sufficient to adequately capture the

constructions with NP-internal mood. This being said, layering still proves to be a useful concept, as it brings out the idea that some operators and modifiers have higher scope than others, as is evidenced by their formal characteristics, thus linking semantic differences with syntactic differences. In other words, it would be ill-advised to reject the notion of layering altogether, after having observed that a prototypically clause-level phenomenon like mood occasionally occurs in NPs as well. Instead, the data surveyed in the present paper call for an extension of the notion of layering, at least inside the NP. This is in fact the solution proposed in Section 4.

The adjustment of the RRG representation boils down to adding a supplementary layer in the hierarchical structure of the NP. This has the additional advantage of bringing out the correspondence of the layered structure of the NP and the layered structure of the clause. For FDG, things were even less complicated. The adjustment to the FDG representation comes down to allowing the Illocutionary Frame to combine with a Referential Subact, instead of a Communicated Content. The reason why it is relatively easy to accommodate NP-internal illocution in the FDG representation is that the elaboration of the former FG model into the more recent FDG model involved a significant extension of the interpersonal aspects of the NP (see Van de Velde, 2007). By recognising the possibility of NP-internal illocution, both structural-functional theories converge with recent strands of thought in generative theory in which it has been suggested that the similarities between the NP and the clause comprise illocution as well (see e.g. Bennis et al., 1998:104-114; Aboh et al., 2010:791). This all adds to the idea that there are deep-rooted correspondences between clauses and NPs, not only on the syntactic level, but on the semantic level as well.

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