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BOOK REVIEWS

Joel and Obadiah: A Commentary (Old Testament Library). By John Barton. Pp. xxi,168, Louisville KY, Westminster John Knox Press, 2001, $39.95.

This volume completes the series in the admirable Old Testament Library on 'The Book of the Twelve' (a term found in Sirach in the second century BCE, and known also to those Greek Fathers whose commentaries are extant), or in Augustine's term 'Minor Prophets'. Augustine was not being disparaging: he adds, 'Minor, because they are short' – and with Obadiah we have the shortest of all, a mere twenty-one verses, while Joel reaches only to three chapters (or four in the Hebrew numbering). In the Greek Bible, in fact, The Twelve stand ahead of the 'major' prophets. Of The Twelve, Barton explains, Joel and Obadiah tend to receive treatment last also because of uncertainty in dating them, critics' 'proposals ranging from the early monarchic to the late postexilic age' (p. ix). So there is a certain logic about including both in the one volume, as another in the OTL series (by David L. Petersen) logically includes Zechariah 9–14 and Malachi, whereas a further volume of Petersen's includes Zechariah 1–8 and Haggai. The excellent series, now complete, thus comprises The Twelve in eight volumes. No worthwhile theological library serving English-speakers could afford to do without them for rigorous, if non-specialist, scholarship from cutting-edge scholars, treating of biblical works in comprehensive introductions and close commentary on individual verses based largely on the text of the Hebrew Bible.

Barton, whose previous work on prophecy and prophets includes a monograph on Amos, evinces a wide-ranging acquaintance with work on Joel and Obadiah, as the lengthy bibliographies reveal. His choice of standard works falls, in the case of Joel, on James Crenshaw's 1995 Anchor Bible and H. W. Wolff's 1969 (now in English in the Hermeneia series) commentaries, and for Obadiah P. R. Raabe's 1996 Anchor Bible commentary. His text betrays his close familiarity also with other scholars' writings; yet he is no mere disciple, establishing his distinctive position on many a moot point of interpretation.

Perhaps Barton's most distinctive position is his judgement that we may have in these works not two but four (or so) biblical authors, not just Joel and Obadiah but as well Deutero-Joel and Deutero-Obadiah; Crenshaw himself acknowledges this independent judgement in the publisher's blurb. In other words, in works that at a certain point take a decisive turn in thinking, and in Joel's case also in genre (after 2:17), we may have different composers at work; Obadiah, too, gives up berating the Edomites after v.14 to include an eschatological oracle against the nations in general, and then a further oracle about the restoration of Israel. Yet Barton is not for striking a trendy pose: he insists from the outset that he is not prepared to follow the approach currently in vogue of 'simply reading "what is there" in a synchronic and holistic way'. He unashamedly adopts what used to be styled the historical-critical tradition that wants to seek the original location of the book; nor does he see an alternative to verse-by-verse commentary.

The respective length of treatment of the two prophets, 109 pages to 44, accords with the length of their works. Barton addresses the prominent features and problems of each prophet and his prophecy. In the case of Joel, the reality of the locust plague so strikingly depicted in chapters 1 and 2 has ever teased commentators: is it a real plague? does it rather suggest an enemy invasion? can it point also to divine judgement? What of the term occurring five times in Joel, 'Day of the Lord': is it

merely the stuff of apocalyptic, or does it refer to some day within the experience of the prophet's listeners? Again, in what sense is Joel, who unlike many prophets is comfortable with cult, a 'cultic prophet'? Here Barton finds Wolff displaying 'an element of Protestant reserve toward all things cultic or theocratic' (p. 65) in not allowing a liturgical perspective to the work.

Obadiah deserves less attention, though Jerome once claimed that 'its difficulty is in inverse proportion to its length'. While conceding that this prophet touches on a surprising number of important theological themes, Barton admits ruefully that 'Obadiah is hard to love' (p. 126), his spleen in regard to the Edomites hardly winning him friends. But on the credit side his classic commentator Raabe explains the short book as a kind of response to Lamentations (a book that has received more recent OTL commentary), which expressed the fear that the Lord had abandoned his people. Not so, says (the Deutero-) Obadiah.

Both prophets, then, pose exegetical and hermeneutical questions for a commentator and reader, and on these Barton's introductions, textual notes and commentary are illuminating. Reading our (relatively late) Masoretic text, he occasionally checks with Septuagint and even Vulgate, though he is under the impression that the former is a univocal term ('*the* Septuagint', pp. 4, 117), thus excluding the possibility that one or other of the three forms of the LXX known to Jerome (and available to us in the Gttingen volumes) may not support a reading he cites. Related to this partial review of textual history is his decision to leave the 'intensely interesting question' (p. x) of the history of interpretation to others, like A. Merx in his 1879 opus. This is an understandable option, though regrettable. He and his readers are thus deprived of access to two complete Greek commentaries on Joel, Obadiah and all the rest of The Twelve by the Antiochene Fathers Theodore of Mopsuestia and Theodoret of Cyrus. They are reading their local form of the LXX, and thus find The Twelve not in the order Barton presumes all forms of the LXX list them (p. 4) but in that of the Hebrew Bible. This location influences their thinking on the dating of Joel, e.g., who appears there immediately after Hosea and is therefore presumed by these Fathers to be likewise an eighth-century prophet. He thus also neglects the distinctive readings of Joel 1:5 and Obad 1:16 found in the Antioch text or the LXX generally. Of particular significance is the Antioch form of Joel 2:28–29 on the outpouring of the Spirit cited by Peter on Pentecost day in Acts 2, 'I shall pour out my spirit on *my* male and female servants', and Theodore's lengthy rebuttal of the possibility of the Spirit being known to Old Testament readers. I also looked to find mention of Syriac (the Peshitta of the prophets being available and authoritative by the second century) in the topical index, but such a helpful tool is not provided.

Still, with indexes of biblical passages and modern authors, not to mention the introductions and generous layout, this is a user-friendly volume, and like other members of the OTL series may soon appear in paperback. It represents a fitting culmination of an enterprise that provides an excellent service to students of the Book of the Twelve and the Old Testament generally.

University of Sydney, Australia Robert C. Hill

A Marginal Jew, Volume III: Companions and Competitors. By John P. Meier. Pp. xiv, 699, New York, Doubleday, 2001, $45.00.

This book, the third of a projected four-volume work, focuses on Jesus' relationships with his followers on the one hand and his opponents, or competitors, on the other hand. Meier's stated intention, admirably fulfilled, is to correct an imbalance in historical Jesus research in recent years that has tended to ignore the full range of Jesus' relationships with Jewish groups and individuals as well as the essentially

Jewish nature of these relationships. The book addresses questions such as the identity of Jesus' travelling companions, the nature of their participation in his activities and travels, and the ways and situations in which he interacted with other groups such as the Sadducees, Pharisees, and Essenes.

Meier addresses these issues by means of the major approaches of New Testament historical criticism. For example, his chapter on the disciples begins with a detailed word study of the Greek and Hebrew words meaning 'disciple', noting the absence as well as the presence of the term in particular texts and contexts in the New Testament and cognate literature. From this study he concludes that Jesus gathered around himself a group of committed disciples. In order to examine the requirements of discipleship, he looks at the 'history of religions' background of the Gospels, and in particular at the relationship between teachers and disciples in the Greek and Hellenistic philosophical schools as well as in the rabbinical academies. He concludes that the closest parallel to the relationship between Jesus and his disciples is to be found in the biblical stories of Elijah and Elisha, in so far as Elijah calls Elisha to discipleship, just as Jesus called his followers, and then groomed him for succession, as Jesus has done with Peter and others. Meier gleans insight into the requirements for discipleship by means of an analysis of the Gospel texts, with close attention to source and redaction, including the role of Q. He concludes that Jesus took the initiative in calling his disciples, who were required to leave home and travel with Jesus, thereby risking danger and hostility. At the core of this group were the Twelve, whom Jesus moulded into a coherent and close-knit community. Analysis of the Gospel materials suggests to Meier that women functioned as disciples though this label is not explicitly attached to any women in the Gospel materials.

Jesus' relationships with his competitors for the adherence of Israel are analysed with similar care. Along with Ed Sanders, Meier argues that most Jews of the time did not belong to the four philosophical schools described by Josephus. Rather, most adhered to a 'common Judaism' characterized by the practice of circumcision, Sabbath, food laws and pilgrimage. The 'fourth philosophy', that is, armed anti-Roman revolutionaries, and the Essenes are invisible in the Gospels, despite some intriguing similaries between the teachings in the Qumran documents. Jesus shared little in common with the Sadducees beyond mainstream or common Judaism. Jesus' chief competitors were the Pharisees, with whom he disagreed radically on eschatological issues, which in turn led to differing attitudes on such this-worldy matters as marriage and divorce. In Meier's view, Jesus and Pharisees represented the two major religious movements active among the ordinary Jews of Palestine.

Like the other volumes, this book is carefully argued and at the same time clearly accessible to specialists and non-specialists alike. It is particularly valuable in its emphasis on the Jewish context of Jesus' 'companions and competitors' alike and hence of Jesus' own activity in Palestine. The detailed notes provide an excellent guide to current scholarship on Jesus and first century Judaism. Also useful is the concluding chapter, which sets the findings of this volume into the framework set by the first two volumes (the first on Jesus' chronology and early years, and the second on his key sayings and deeds), and sketches the direction that the final volume will take. This is a fine contribution to historical Jesus research and one looks forward to the completion of the series.

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Jesus and the Village Scribes: Galilean Conflicts and the Setting of Q. By William E. Arnal. Pp. xiv, 290, Minneapolis MN, Fortress Press, 2001, $26.00.

Despite its title this book is not a study of the interactions of Jesus of Nazareth with the scribal cadre in rural Galilee. The sub-title provides a rather more accurate

indication as to the contents, but the main thrust, at least in the first half, is arguably an attack on the so-called itinerancy hypothesis which has been influential in many aspects of early Christian studies for several decades. His thesis of the origins of Q among village scribes of Herodian and Roman Galilee may not depend entirely on his dismantling of the notion of wandering preacher, whether charismatic, prophetic, cynic, or a combination of these. Nevertheless this book will be noted both for its treatment of the itinerancy hypothesis and for the setting in which it locates Q. This book is a revised version of Arnal's doctoral dissertation, supervised by John S. Kloppenborg. His reconstruction of Q is heavily dependent on that of his supervisor. Given how influential Kloppenborg's work has been, Arnal is perhaps unnecessarily defensive in subscribing to this hypothesis and in his rejection of any alternative in his Introduction.

The first chapter deals with the itinerancy hypothesis, in relation not so much to Q as to the *Didache*. This is useful in that the author traces the origins of the hypothesis to the rediscovery of the *Didache* and Harnack's commentary on that text shortly thereafter. Thus far Arnal's reconstruction of the origins of the itinerancy hypothesis is substantially accurate and unobjectionable. However, he proceeds to raise the crucial issue of the setting of the scholar and its influence on his or her perception and interpretation of the material under scrutiny. Arnal is not the first to suggest that many of the ideas which have been influential in early Christian scholarship of the twentieth century have their roots in German idealism of the late nineteenth. However, awareness of the cultural milieu out of which an earlier scholar wrote does not warrant postulation of direct cause and effect between later reconstructions of that milieu and the conclusions of the scholarship which emerged from that context. There is no obvious connection between *Wanderradikalismus*, real or imaginary, with its attendant homelessness and poverty, and German idealization of the countryside and rural pursuits which did not involve abandonment of social and economic position and activities in the towns and cities. This is not to deny that Harnack and others were influenced by their cultural context, as are scholars today, but this does not in itself falsify their insights.

Chapter two deals with the itinerancy hypothesis in more recent scholarship, particularly as it has been applied to Q by Theissen and others. Arnal treats also Patterson's work on the Coptic *Gospel of Thomas* and other texts, and gives particular attention to scholarship which has posited analogies between the movement from which Q arose and Cynicism. Chapter three continues Arnal's critique of the itinerancy hypothesis, this time with particular attention to the *Didache* and the development of the traditions it preserves. His criticisms are trenchant if not original, and scholars who seek to revive or develop the itinerancy hypothesis in the future will need to take these into account. No doubt they will do so.

In chapter four Arnal turns his attention to social and economic conditions in Galilee during the Roman period. In what is perhaps the most cogent part of his work, he reconstructs the economy of rural Galilee, and the impact of the development of Sepphoris and Tiberias on the region. His treatment of trade and travelling is of particular relevance to his previous arguments regarding the itinerancy hypothesis, and the argument he is to develop in the final chapter. He suggests that, with the imposition of the urban-based imperial economy on Galilee, villages lost their previous autonomy, and scribes were forced to become retainers of the imperial system. This hypothesis could fruitfully have been developed further, with closer attention to the role of the scribal cadre earlier in the history of Galilee and other regions, which surely included a major role in the transmission of communal traditions as well as the production of necessary documents. The administrative role imposed on scribes by the imperial order would certainly have involved the collection of revenue, and alienated this cadre from the community. Arnal only hints in a note that this may have implications for the presence of so-called tax gatherers among the disciples of Jesus.

In the final chapter Arnal argues that Q developed among the scribes of the villages around the Western rim of the sea of Galilee during the period of Herodian and Roman rule. The thesis is more than plausible in itself, but there are aspects of the argument with which scholars will undoubtedly wish to engage. He suggests that what previous scholars have labelled itinerancy was nothing more than village scribes walking to the next village in the hope of persuading their counterparts there to subscribe to the Q ideology. He suggests that the Q material was gradually collected and committed to writing in the course of this process. Arnal does not explain why such scribes in Galilean villages would have collected, committed to writing at successive stages, and transmitted their ideological baggage in Greek rather than Aramaic, which is presumably his unstated assumption on the subject. This issue requires discussion if the hypothesis is to be at all convincing. Arnal suggests further that Jesus may have had no more to do with Q than having been a popular folk hero of recent memory co-opted by the scribes in a bid to give their movement coherence and credibility. Very few scholars are likely to find this plausible, and the connection between Q, as its evolution is reconstructed by Arnal, and the historical Jesus is an issue which requires further attention.

This book is in many ways engaging and provocative. Arnal's reconstruction of the origins and development of Q is also in many ways attractive, but it is not fully developed. Too many questions remain unanswered for the thesis to be persuasive as it stands. But nonetheless this is an hypothesis with a great deal of potential and which cannot be ignored. It is to be hoped that critical engagement with several aspects of this book will contribute significantly to the development of further insights into the development and spread of early Christian traditions, in particular but not only Q. But perhaps the most significant question tantalizingly raised but not addressed concerns precisely Jesus and the village scribes.

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Hearing the Whole Story: The Politics of Plot in Mark's Gospel. By Richard A. Horsley. Pp. xv, 296, Louisville KY, Westminster John Knox Press, 2001, $29.95.

Horsley seeks in this book to correct interpretations of the Gospel of Mark founded on modern Western cultural presuppositions. Principal among these is the individualism which assumes that silent and often piecemeal private reading, and modes of interpretation based on such an approach to the text, are normative. Similarly, the categorization of religion as a distinctive sphere of life, divorced from socio–economic and political reality, has led to pietistic readings of the text alien to its original context. He views the traditional ascription of Roman provenance to Mark as symptomatic of this tendency.

Horsley observes that the majority of the population of the ancient Near East were illiterate, and he is undoubtedly correct both that this would have included the majority of those who heard Jesus speak, and most of those to whom Mark was first read. Whether Jesus himself was illiterate is rather more debatable, but the point stands that the first recipients of the written Gospel heard it read to them. This has implications for ways in which allusions to the heritage of Israel are discerned in the text. This would have been known to Jesus' audience, and the first hearers of Mark, through oral traditions rather than through texts read in public worship. These oral traditions would presumably have been more popular in orientation than the elitist perspectives reflected in surviving writings of the period, and have stood in continuity with the (Elohist) traditions of Northern Israel rather than the later, Jerusalem-centred, redaction of the written Torah. The encounters between Jesus and the Pharisees in Mark are viewed in terms of Hasmonaean and subsequent attempts to

impose Judaean traditions on Galilee, and popular resistance thereto. It is in this context that Jesus' rejection of the Temple is to be understood.

Horsley identifies as the dominant theme of Mark Jesus' programme for the renewal of Israel, with which gentile Christian communities have also come to identify. The motif of discipleship, popular in Western scholarship, is at most a subordinate theme. Rather than inaugurating a new covenant, Jesus is understood to reaffirm that associated with Israel, and to stand in continuity with Moses and the prophets. The renewal of Israel is understood in terms of the restoration of family and community life which had been disrupted by Roman, Herodian, and Temple-priestly oppression, taxation, and extortion, with consequent debt slavery and loss of patrimony. In several pericopae women feature prominently as exemplary of the renewed covenant community, while the male disciples of Jesus are portrayed as deficient. This could reflect a perception that they have failed to remain true to Jesus' message in their leadership of the early Church.

Horsley has made a significant contribution to the study of Mark. Many of his insights are applicable to the other Gospels also, and will challenge scholars in several areas of early Christian studies. While some of the detail of his argument will undoubtedly give rise to further debate, his critique of dominant modes of Western reading of early Christian literature, while not entirely original, is incontrovertible. The need to discern and respect the original context of ancient writings is one which literary and theological approaches to the New Testament documents must heed.

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Aramaic Sources of Mark's Gospel. By Maurice Casey. Pp. 278, Cambridge University Press, 1998, £37.50.

For over a quarter of a century Maurice Casey has written extensively on the Aramaic background to the New Testament, and more specifically on the Son of Man problem. In the present work he pays special attention to what might be considered possible Aramaic sources of Mark's Gospel, or more specifically certain texts of this Gospel. He approaches his task systematically, with an opening chapter on the state of play, the state of research at the time of writing, followed by a chapter on methodology in this field of research. We are then given four chapters on individual texts of the second Gospel: Jesus' scriptural understanding of John the Baptist's death (Mark 9:11–13); two Sabbath controversies (Mark 2:23–3:6); the question of Jacob (James) and John (Mark 10:35–45), and Jesus' final Passover with his disciples (Mark 14:12–26). The final chapter is on conclusions.

The excellent history of research takes consideration of the questions involved from the early Fathers (Eusebius and others) right through to our own day. He examines the individual contributions and adds his own wise observations. First there was the stress on Syriac as the important Aramaic language on the subject. Then came the study of Jewish Aramaic: Dalman's grammar in 1894, the dictionaries of J. Levy (1867–1888; 1876–1889) and M. Jastrow (1886–1903). The view that Jesus spoke and taught in Aramaic was the prevailing view in 1896, the first watershed in the study of our subject with the publication of A. Meyer's *Jesu Muttersprache*. For Casey the major work on this topic is that of Meyer and Matthew Black's *An Aramaic Approach to the Gospels and Acts* (1946, with later editions 1954, 1967). We are taken though the various stages of the study of the form of Aramaic to be used in the quest: the later Targumic and Rabbinic Aramaic, the discovery of (Palestinian) Dead Sea Scrolls with Aramaic before, and contemporary with, Christ. Casey notes J. A. Fitzmyer's important contributions in the field of Aramaic language and the Aramaic substratum of the Gospels and his reaffirmation of the earlier principle that whole sayings should be considered. He is uneasy about Fitzmyer's attempt to exclude Late Aramaic (from

roughly 200 CE to 700 CE) from work on the substratum of the teaching of Jesus. He notes that while we must take positive advantage from Fitzmyer's excellent work on the Aramaic background of the Gospels, we must not adopt a literal interpretation of some of his principles, but rather seek a more nuanced understanding of how to move forward. This point is well made. While linguistically 'Late Aramaic' may be post-New Testament times, texts in it may have vocabulary, idioms and phraseology current in a form of the Aramaic of Jesus' day and surroundings.

His second chapter proposes a methodology for reconstructing Aramaic sources which lie behind the synoptic Gospels. At the outset he gives a survey of the languages which were in general use in Israel during Jesus' lifetime: Latin, Greek, Hebrew and Aramaic. We must suppose that Jesus spoke Galilean Aramaic. However, he continues, virtually no Galilean Aramaic of the right period survives. Later sources (Targums for instance) are centuries later, and much of what goes under the heading of Galilean Aramaic does not really come from Galilee. Moreover, there is no guarantee that Mark's Aramaic sources were actually transmitted in Galilean Aramaic, rather than by one or more disciples who spoke Judaean Aramaic. Fortunately we have the Dead Sea scrolls which are for him our major resource. In his final chapter with his conclusions Casey goes over the individual texts examined by him. Their importance is not merely linguistic, but for him have a bearing on the 'Jesus of history' in his Jewish setting. From his study of the texts he believes we have found substantial and decisive evidence that parts of Mark's Gospel are literal translations of written Aramaic texts. This follows from an argument of cumulative weight, which is dependent on evidence of several different kinds. Who could have written these sources?, he asks. His answer is: only Jews from Israel, writing for people who were sufficiently Jewish to understand certain assumptions in the texts. One of the Twelve must have been the source for Mark 10:35–45 (the question put by James and John), while 14:12–26 (the Passover) was written by an eyewitness who was not a member of the Twelve. He does not see how a date for the source(s) can be later than 40 CE when the gentile mission was such a success that it would have to be taken note of. A date earlier than this is surely very probable. With regard to the date of Mark's Gospel itself, while he notes the usual date of c. 65 CE (and even the post-70 one) he regards the basis for this very flimsy. In his view, a date c. 40 CE must be regarded as highly probable.

While it is good to have the Aramaic question opened up so thoroughly again, so many texts analysed and given in their presumed Aramaic original, and with so much evidence put before us, many scholars will fail to be convinced by a number of the statements made and positions taken in this most learned book. Certain elements of the author's methodology will also be queried. The choice of the Greek original at Mark 14:25 merits comment. The critical editions, on the weight of manuscript evidence, have: 'I shall not drink again (of the fruit of the vine)…', *ouketi ou mê piô*. A weakly attested variant, in three manuscripts DQ and MS 565, adds a form of the Greek verb *prostithenai*, 'to add', a Semitic construction indicating repetition: 'I (Q 'we') will not add (to drink)'. Casey follows this reading (and specifically that of the sole manuscript Q with the first person plural). In Bruce Metzger's view none of the three readings is sufficiently supported to be accepted as original. The variant could have arisen during the transmission history. Casey's view that Jesus, while generally teaching in Aramaic, answered some halakhic queries in Aramaic, others in Hebrew, depending on the halakhic item, can also be called into question. On more than one occasion it appears that our author has taken the Gospel texts as evidence without due respect for redactional history. Some of his understandings of the texts can also be queried, such as the view that in 14:12–26 Mark's Aramaic source did not mention the Eucharist, but openly and clearly described the preparations for a Passover meal, and proceeded on the assumption that that is what the meal was. In sum, while this learned and very informative work has much to offer on the Aramaic of Jesus and the Gospel

tradition, it also makes us aware of the sheer complexity of the entire question, where attention must be paid to a variety of factors, such as redaction criticism and many others. The work should provide an occasion for further reflection on methodology.

Milltown Institute, Dublin, Ireland Martin McNamara

Hidden Gospels: How the Search for Jesus Lost its Way. By Philip Jenkins. Pp. vii, 260, Oxford University Press, 2001, £19.99/£10.99.

This book is an expression of exasperation by an academic historian not only at recent developments in historical Jesus research, but perhaps even more at ways in which these have been brought to bear upon public perceptions of Christianity and of academic scholarship. Conservative scholars have not surprisingly given this work an enthusiastic welcome, and the sympathies of the author clearly lie with orthodox Christianity. However, the book cannot be ignored or discounted as reactionary polemic. Jenkins makes important observations on the influence of culture on scholarship which, if acknowledged, could contribute to a more constructive intellectual environment in which historical research about Christian origins could be conducted.

The principal target of Jenkins' pen is the Jesus Seminar. Unlike other critics he does not deal at any length with its voting system. Rather, he addresses what he sees as its undue dependence on the Coptic Gospel of Thomas and such later texts as the Gospels of Peter, Mary, and Philip, and the unwarranted disregard for the canonical Gospels. Jenkins does not dispute the significance of the Nag Hammadi find, but he does argue that undue weight has been placed on some of the texts as records of early Christianity, in order to shape a modern post-Christian ethos among North American intellectuals and their popular following. This he sees as having been influenced by an idealization of Gnosticism in modern Western, and particularly North American, academia. The radical individualism and elitism, the absence of ecclesiastical structures, and the apparent prominence of women reflected in these texts, together with an absence of unfashionable apocalyptic and eschatological notions, have led some scholars effectively to canonize recently rediscovered tomes in place of the orthodox Christian Canon.

Jenkins does not object so much to the popularizing activities of the Jesus Seminar and some of its members, as to what he sees as a distorted perception of the current state of scholarship which it portrays. The frustration may well be legitimate that the fundamentalism of the religious right and the avowedly post-Christian radicalism of some scholars enjoy enormous media exposure, together with the sensationalism of the lunatic fringe of journalistic scholarship and conspiracy theories in which the Vatican features prominently, while the mainstream of scholarship and of orthodox Christianity are ignored. However, it is contrary to the nature of scholarship and of journalism alike for protagonists of particular positions to promote their views and at the same time to indicate that they are anything less than representative of consensus. If other positions are not receiving exposure in popular discourse, that presents the proponents of such views with a challenge.

Jenkins, perhaps unfairly, points to the fundamentalist pasts of several of the most prominent self-publicists, suggesting that they may be reacting to memories of the revivalist activities which preceded their conversions to post-Christian radicalism. However accurate or otherwise Jenkins' observation may be, the social psychology of North American religiosity, and its influence on scholarship and on the ways in which scholarly ideas are promoted in popular discourse, is surely worthy of serious academic investigation.

Jenkins argues that the impact of the Nag Hammadi discoveries on subsequent scholarship and popular intellectualism has in many ways reflected that of the Oxyrhynchus papyri and other finds in previous generations. This has included the romanticization of Gnosticism in the theosophical and other movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, elaborate conspiracy theories about the concealment of the true nature of Christian origins, and the varieties of popular literature including fiction which archaeological discoveries in the Middle East have inspired. In this the perspective of an academic historian is undoubtedly valuable, even if Jenkins' assumption that orthodoxy will ultimately prevail in both scholarship and popular religion, and will meet the challenges of further discoveries and their exaggerated but transient impact, is unduly complacent.

This book can by no means be the final word in the current phase of historical Jesus scholarship. It has to be acknowledged that orthodox Christianity is a product of a variety of historical influences and circumstances, and not simply the continuation of the original form of Christianity. New archaeological discoveries can and do raise questions about the assumptions on which any prevailing consensus has been based. The Coptic Gospel of Thomas will undoubtedly remain an important factor in historical Jesus and Gospel studies, even if some interpretations and reconstructions based on the single complete, late, manuscript, in translation from a still lost original, have exceeded the weight of the evidence. Christianity will undoubtedly continue to evolve, and moderate reformers and post-Christian radicals alike will continue to claim to be true to the heritage of Jesus. All parties will appeal selectively to scholarship to support their positions, and those most sensational in their utterances will always be those who enjoy the most media attention. This will continue to frustrate many academics and church leaders. But, if anything is learned from this book, scholarship may become more conscious of its own cultural context, and scholars of the dynamics of their engagement in popular discourse and the ethics thereof. The challenges posed by Jenkins cannot be ignored, and it is to be hoped that this book will be engaged with all due seriousness.

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Christology and the New Testament: Jesus and His Earliest Followers. By Christopher M. Tuckett. Pp. ix, 246, Louisville KY, Westminster John Knox Press, 2001, $ 24.95.
The Cambridge Companion to Jesus. Edited by Markus Bockmuehl. Pp. xviii, 311, Cambridge University Press, 2001, £40.00/£14.95.

Christopher Tuckett has written an introduction to the Christologies of the writers of the New Testament and of Jesus himself, which is designed for undergraduates and other serious readers. Whether he gets many 'other serious readers' remains to be seen as the book may be that bit too academic and schematic to attract those who are not following taught courses with exams. Nevertheless, what he has done, he has done very well and this is probably now the most recommendable introduction to New Testament Christology for the serious student.

Tuckett points out that older Christologies that organized themselves round the titles of Jesus failed to cover much of what the authors of the New Testament had to say about who Jesus was – and who Christians think he *is*. That approach stressed the importance of the titles that the *community* gave Jesus and came out of a form-critical background, while Tuckett works through the books and authors of the New Testament which, consciously or not, reflect a redaction-critical approach. He does this more or less chronologically: Paul (the usual seven authentic letters) followed by the Deutero-Pauline letters, Hebrews, Synoptic Gospels and Johannine writings.

The treatment is up to date and fairly comprehensive. Within these sections Tuckett still devotes quite a lot of space to titles and how different authors used them. This approach stresses discontinuity and difference – what different authors had to say at different moments of the first century. What unity there is in the use of these titles comes from their rootedness in Jewish scripture. The influence of Jewish wisdom literature is emphasized repeatedly. The author does not make much of any possible connectedness in the Christological thinking of the various NT writers but to do this you probably need to believe in the Incarnation – which is where it is all leading in John and after – and want to show how Christian thinking was developing in that direction even when the idea of Incarnation is not explicit in those earliest traditions.

After moving from Paul to John by way of the Synoptic gospels, Tuckett backtracks and goes behind the first published documents to look at Q's Christology and then to see what Jesus might have thought about himself. He is aware of the hermeneutical problems involved in not possessing anything that Jesus himself wrote but, because of the endless disagreements about the historical authenticity of the sayings attributed to Jesus, he might have done better to follow Sander's tactic of examining the actions of Jesus, particularly to see the sense of how he might have acted out the role of messiah.

In all his judgments Tuckett is well considered and moderate, careful not to read too much into the evidence of NT texts. It is not an original book but it can be safely given to students, which is its purpose. As the aim of Jesus in his actions and in his teaching – in his life – was to reveal something of who God is, Tuckett rightly says that it is dangerous for Christology to be detached from 'theo-logy'. But in saying in his last sentence that 'Christology must at the end of the day [ugh, a rare cliché] be subservient to theology' he fails to appreciate that in Christian orthodoxy thinking Christologically is a way of doing theology. Christology is not subservient; it must be integrated into a broader Christian way of thinking about God.

Christopher Tuckett has also contributed a short chapter to *The Cambridge Companion to Jesus* in which he surveys the sources and criteria for determining how much we can know about the historical Jesus. This *Companion*, edited and introduced by Markus Bockmuehl, is helpfully divided into two sections: the Jesus of history and the History of Jesus, the latter looking at how Jesus is understood in Christian tradition. The collection by and large not only has a house style but a house theology. A lot of it seems to be a self-conscious antidote to the practices and conclusions of Funk, Crossan and the Jesus Seminar generally. Here is an (almost) consistent attempt to take the historicality of Jesus seriously and to integrate it with orthodox Christian tradition. That means accepting that the resurrection was an event in time and history, that Jesus's life cannot be understood without it (Bockmuehl), believing the Incarnation and its Chalcedonian definition and recognizing the genius of Athanasius (Alan Torrance, whose modern heroes are Barth and Bonhoeffer). We end with a bold restatement of the importance of eschatology (Richard Bauckham).

Bruce Chilton proves to be a bit of a maverick. He takes the history of Jesus seriously but plays fast and loose with the texts to suggest that Jesus was crucified, not at Passover 30 AD, but at Sukkoth 32. His reconstruction of Jesus's career under the title 'Friends and Enemies' is striking and challenging: John the Baptist was killed in 21, Jesus had been his disciple baptizing in Judea while John had baptized in Samaria, Jesus continued this ministry in rural Galilee, left Capernaum, handed on his mission to twelve emissaries, collected five thousand men for an insurrection, but abandoned ambitions to power and disappointed many of his disciples. There are some reminders in this original recreation of Brandon's Zealot Jesus.

This wide-ranging collection includes chapters that emphasize the Jewishness of Jesus – he was not a Cynic philosopher (Craig Evans, Peter Tomson), that integrate the message and the miracles of Jesus (Graham Stanton), or the faith of Jesus and later faith in Jesus, particularly as expressed in the Letter to the Hebrews (Marianne

Thompson). Joel Green shows how Jesus subverted the authority of the Temple and proclaimed the end of exile and a new covenant through his suffering and death. James Paget surveys quests for the historical Jesus in order to call for a theological analysis of the presuppositions of the Questers. Francis Watson claims that New Testament texts must be read theologically as they incorporate the reception of the one they are about. While integration of history and faith or theology is one of the recurrent emphases of this *Companion*, plurality is also emphasized by Stephen Barton, who looks at the fourfoldness of the canonical Gospels (non-canonical Gospels are recognized but not valued highly), and by Stanton who shows how Jesus does not conform to any *one* role he might have adopted in Jewish religion.

Walter Moberly looks at the complex interplay of Old Testament prophecies and Jesus in the way the New Testament interprets him as Christ/messiah. The Nigerian theologian, Teresa Okure assesses the subversive global significance of Jesus in an economically globalized world and David Burrell has interesting religious and political insights in his piece on Jerusalem, the holy city for three faiths – very readable but surely out of place in this volume.

Rowan Williams' brilliant, nuanced survey of the history of devotion to Jesus is also very accessible. He is aware of a certain sentimentality surrounding many Western devotions that are focused on Jesus. These shallow enthusiasms are often less than Incarnational and do not realize that, while Jesus is at the centre of Christian devotion, he is not its terminus. We pray to him, with him and through him to the Father. Williams sees possible corrections in patristic theology and modern third world practice to these Western imbalances. This chapter is erudite but certainly more accessible than other chapters and this raises my one criticism, which concerns who the book is for. What is it to be a 'Cambridge Companion'? The blurb before the title page says it is for 'new readers and non-specialists'. But this Companion is not a gentle introduction. It is for the best of undergraduates or those already knowledgeable and competent in theology.

Trinity and All Saints College, University of Leeds, UK Geoffrey Turner

First Converts: Rich Pagan Women and the Rhetoric of Mission in Early Judaism and Christianity (Contraversions: Jews and Other Differences). By Shelly Matthews. Pp. xiv, 164, Stanford CA, Stanford University Press, 2001, £30.00/$45.00.

This book is a reworked Harvard dissertation which examines the role of women in the propagation of Judaism and Christianity in the Greco-Roman world, and the depiction thereof in the literature of the period.

Matthews supports and substantiates the notion that some Diaspora Jews were actively engaged in promoting as well as defending Judaism in the Greco-Roman world, as well as attracting and welcoming gentile adherents. She argues persuasively that religious activities were an aspect of life in which the supposedly rigid boundary between public and private spheres was blurred, and that women were therefore able to be active in cultic activities, notwithstanding the sexual overtones imputed in some contemporary writings. While Judaism and early Christianity would undoubtedly have been viewed as among the oriental cults establishing themselves and attracting adherents in Greco-Roman society, the depiction of women in the polemics and satires of Greek and Latin writers needs to be understood in context. Religious propaganda was not all the work of lower order women operating by devious and seductive means, and there is clear evidence that women of all orders were religiously active outside the households of their husbands, and that women of means exercised patronage as well as participating in various cults, including Judaism and Christianity. Not all contemporary authors viewed this in negative terms, even if

sexual innuendoes colour some of the more satirical accounts. On the contrary, women's piety and patronage were frequently viewed in positive terms, without suggestions of promiscuity or subversive political intrigue.

Josephus appropriates the positive image of women as religious benefactors, enquirers, sympathizers, and brokers to enhance his projection of Judaism as a respectable and well established movement in Greco-Roman society. Similarly, Luke shapes his accounts of prominent women in the early Church to portray Christianity as a reputable cult, in which the conduct of leading women in no way approximates that attributed to female adherents of other cults.

This book adds to the increasing volume of studies of the role of gender in early Christianity. Stereotypes and assumptions which have prevailed in scholarship are challenged, and alternative interpretations of the data are offered. Its brevity means that several aspects of Matthews' argument are not as detailed as they might be, and perhaps for that reason less persuasive than a fuller treatment might have been. While readers will not necessarily assent to every detail of her reconstruction, this work should prove a useful impetus for further research, with implications for understanding early Christian mission in the context of religious apologetics and propaganda in the ancient world. Constructions of gender in the Greco-Roman world will also need to be reconsidered. For the questions it raises, as well as the interpretations it offers, this book should be welcomed by scholars of antiquity as well as of Judaism and Christianity in the Greco-Roman world.

University of Pretoria, South Africa N. H. Taylor

The Cult of Saint Thecla: A Tradition of Women's Piety in Late Antiquity (Oxford Early Christian Studies). By Stephen J. Davis. Pp. xiv, 288, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, £50.00.

Stephen Davis' *The Cult of Saint Thecla*, a revised version of his doctoral dissertation (Yale, 1998), fills a gap in the scholarship on early Christian martyr cults. Saint Thecla has been in need of an up-to-date, synthetic treatment that charts the rapid expansion of her well-attested cult in the Eastern Mediterranean during late antiquity. Davis provides this as well as a detailed analysis of the translation of Thecla's cult from Asia Minor to Egypt. While others have studied the development of Thecla-devotion in a given place, such as Gilbert Dagron's edition of Thecla's fifth-century *Life and Miracles* at Seleucia-on-the-Calycadnos (Brussels, 1978), Davis demonstrates the importance of the movement of her cult for the physical and intellectual growth of the Eastern churches in the fourth and fifth centuries.

He begins his introductory chapter with a synopsis of Thecla's life and martyrdom as told in the late second-century *Acts of Paul and Thecla*. He then summarizes the early Christian reactions to her legend, including, most significantly, Tertullian's (pre-Montanist) condemnation of Thecla's self-baptism, which provides a *terminus ante quem* for the composition of the work. Davis goes on to discuss the audience of the *Acts of Paul and Thecla*, a text which consistently denigrates its male characters and which may have been written, he argues, with female readers/listeners in mind. Davis is somewhat sceptical, however, about identifying the specific audience and concentrates instead on the qualifications of female piety as they are represented in this text, an analysis which provides the groundwork for his later comparisons with women's asceticism in Egypt (chapter 3). These qualifications include the practice of domestic continence, itinerancy (an integral part of which is transvestitism) and charismatic authority. Davis suggests that these defining characteristics of female piety reflect the social and religious concerns of the community behind the *Acts of*

Paul and Thecla, a text which inspired an enormous response in late antique and medieval Christian devotion.

Having thus introduced the representation of women's piety in the seminal *Acts*, Davis proceeds to examine in his second chapter the physical and textual development of the cult at Seleucia, the most successful centre of Thecla's cult in the East. Here Davis relies heavily on Dagron for the archaeology, but, in his own analysis of the *Life and Miracles*, Davis rightly notes that it has not been exploited as it could be and goes on to provide through this text a contribution to the study of the rhetoric of female sanctity in late antiquity. Davis' main argument in this chapter is that local cultic competition in Asia Minor, between Thecla cults as well as between pagans and Christians, offers the author of the fifth-century *Life and Miracles* the opportunity to reemphasize the community values on display in the second-century *Acts*: by doing this the author is arguing for the priority of Seleucia as well as his own personal connection to Thecla. Davis shows how part of the importance of establishing the primacy of Seleucia was the fast-growing industry of female pilgrimage: Egeria, in her famous trip to the Holy Land in the late fourth century, stopped at Seleucia and read in one sitting the entire *Acts of Paul and Thecla* in the grotto where Thecla was said to have disappeared. Egeria's pilgrimage is for Davis a prime example of how an influential, authoritative text can determine the success of a cult site empire-wide.

Chapters three through five comprise the second, more innovative half of the book. In this half Davis argues for the existence of a thriving late antique pilgrimage center of Thecla in the Mareotis, South-West of Alexandria. Davis admits that due to controversial or conjectured evidence, such as (Pseudo-?) Athanasius' *De virginitate* and a notional convent devoted to Thecla, his results are 'more tenuous' than the previous half (p. 84). Nonetheless, he argues a compelling case for Thecla-devotion among women ascetics in the Egyptian wilderness by combining, as he does concerning Thecla in Seleucia, new close readings of seminal texts with archaeological evidence (p. 114).

In chapter three Davis examines the *De virginitate* from the point of view of cultic development: in the face of persecution from enemy Christian groups, the 'Arians' and the 'Meletians', the author of this text uses the example of Thecla to encourage his female readers/listeners to imitate her struggles against hostile male authorities. The combination of *paraenesis* with *mimesis* is common in ascetical writings, and Davis rightly highlights the interrelated character of late antique ascetic vocabulary, including *xenos/e* and *xeneteia*, fundamental terms that also appear in the earlier *Acts of Paul and Thecla*. A close reading of the Alexandrian *Life of Syncletica*, which betrays elements imitative of the Thecla legend, rounds off the chapter.

Chapter four is concerned with how the stories generated by these late antique martyr cults tended toward an 'isomorphism' based on earlier models of text and practice (p. 136). Thecla, in the case of the Coptic *Miracles of Saint Menas*, serves as a literary model for the story of Sophia, who suffers an attempted rape while on an ascetic walkabout in the Egyptian wilderness. The clear influence of Thecla's legend, here coupled with the convention of pairing-up male and female martyrs in a given place, is for Davis strong evidence that Thecla was Menas' Egyptian companion. The material remains include a very large number of *ampullae* (pilgrim flasks) from late antique Egypt that have standard depictions of Menas on one side and Thecla on the other. In his Appendix A, Davis provides a convenient list of these *ampullae* that have been published and uses that data to argue that the ubiquitous pairing of these two points further to the existence of a cult centre devoted to Thecla in the Mareotis, near Abu Mina, the cult shrine of Menas.

In chapter five Davis shows how the reach of Thecla's cult extended deep into Southern Egypt. He describes in detail the depictions of Thecla in the funerary chapels of El Bagamat in the Kharga Oasis. That this remote site in South-Western Egypt possesses wall paintings of Thecla is an astounding testimony to the spread of her cult,

a movement which appears to be connected, according to Davis, with a group of virgins, possibly followers of Athanasius, exiled from Alexandria in the mid to late fourth century (p. 165). Davis goes on to argue that the Coptic *Martyrdom of Saints Paese and Thecla* (fifth to sixth century) was written to capitalize on a growing popularity of Thecla in the Nile valley, and onomastic evidence further emphasizes the devotion to the patronage of Thecla in this region (Appendix B). Thus, by the fifth century the legend of Thecla had made its way to all corners of Egypt, reinventing itself in art and text as it went.

This well-argued book is to my mind open only to minor criticisms. In discussing the archaeology of Seleucia Davis perhaps relies too heavily on the idiosyncratic interpretation of Dagron and does not cite the most recent re-analysis of the archaeological reports, Stephen Hill's *The Early Byzantine Churches of Cilicia and Isauria* (Aldershot, 1996). One problem, however, that Dagron, Hill, and Davis all have is that they take the anti-pagan rhetoric of the *Life and Miracles* virtually at face value: it is entirely possible that one reason archaeologists have not recovered much in the way of late pagan remains from Seleucia is that the corresponding picture we get from the *Life and Miracles* is an anachronistic rhetorical device designed to substantiate the author's personal claims. Regarding the Egyptian evidence, Davis could have acknowledged more explicitly that Athanasian authorship of the *De virginitate* is not conclusive (p. 86 n. 18): even if pseudonymous, it still supports Davis' argument, but the spread of the cult into Southern Egypt is not necessarily bound to Athanasius' tumultuous bishopric.

Despite these minor points, Davis' overall analysis of the translation of the cult of Thecla from Asia Minor to Egypt is thorough, creative, insightful, and rewards close attention. He handles Greek and Coptic texts, as well as the plentiful material remains, with methodological sensitivity and provides many suggestions of avenues for further research.

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A Christian's Guide to Greek Culture. The Pseudo-Nonnus Commentaries on Sermons 4, 5, 39 and 43 by Gregory of Nazianzus: Introduction, Translation and Notes (Translated Texts for Historians, 37). By J. Nimmo Smith. Pp. xlviii, 156, Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2001, £12.95

Of the three Cappadocian Fathers, Gregory of Nazianzen was undoubtedly the most eloquent witness to the Christian appropriation of 'pagan' or 'Hellenic' culture. Indeed, his *Sermons* frequently contain references to mythological tales. Moreover, Gregory often introduced quotations from authors such as Homer and Plato as well as references to Herodotus, Xenophon, Aristophanes and Hesiod. (See Kristoffel Demoen, *Pagan and Biblical Exempla in Gregory Nazianzen: A Study in Rhetoric and Hermeneutics* [Turnhout, 1996]).

In subsequent centuries these references to Hellenic culture became the subject of commentaries and scholia which explained them to a (largely) Christian audience that was no longer really familiar with them. The large number of references to this pagan heritage in his work combined with his renown as 'the Theologian' resulted in *Commentaries* on Gregory of Nazianzen's work being one of the earliest examples. Going back to the early sixth century, there are the *Commentaries*, in fact a series of scholia, on Gregory's *Invectives against Julian*, *On Epiphany* and *On Basil the Great* (Sermons nos. 4, 5, 39 and 43). They were composed by an anonymous Christian author who is now commonly referred to as the Pseudo-Nonnus, to distinguish him from Nonnus of Panopolis, the author of the *Dionysiaca*. In 1992 these *Commentaries* were edited by Jennifer Nimmo Smith as no. 27 of the Series Graeca of the Corpus

Christianorum. Now she has published, with an introduction, an annotated English translation in the Translated Texts for Historians series, adding again an interesting but not particularly well-known text to this collection.

Nimmo Smith offers not only the translation of the commentaries but she precedes each commentary with the passage of Gregory's sermon being commented upon. These are not in the manuscript but are very helpful in trying to read the entries. After Gregory's text a brief introductory formula mentions the place of the passage by assigning it a number in the sequence of commented passages and also mentions its subject. Finally the commentary itself follows. A brief example may make this much clearer:

> *Dionysius' his drunkenness* (*Sermo 4.122*). [ref. to Gregory's work]. Ninety-third is the story about the drunkenness of Dionysius. It is this. It is said that Dionysius is the patron of the vine and of wine and of drunkenness itself, and that they also depict him as drunken, as Hera had brought drunkenness upon him to drive him mad. For Hera was angry with him because he was a son of Zeus. For she used to envy those who were begotten of Zeus. (p. 66)

Of this kind there are ninety-six scholia on *Sermon 4*, thirty-five on *Sermon 5*, twenty-four on *Sermon 39* and eighteen on *Sermon 43*. Many of them are longer than the one quoted above but all are written in a simple repetitious style that has been successfully retained in the otherwise fluent translation. It will be clear that this book is more a goldmine of information than an entertaining read for a winter-evening. Yet, everyone interested in the Early Byzantine period will be grateful for Nimmo Smith's efforts to make this information readily available. For historians of theology these *Commentaries* will be a reminder that the Byzantine world was surely a Christian world, but a Christian world of which mythological tales about Heracles, Zeus, Diogenes or Dionysius were still part and parcel.

K. U. Leuven, Belgium Johan Leemans

Early Moslem Polemic Against Christianity: Abu Isa al-Warraq's 'Against the Incarnation'. Edited and translated by David Thomas. Pp. x, 314, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, £45.00.

This book is a companion to Thomas' 1992 translation of Abu Isa's 'Against the Trinity'. Here Thomas translates and edits Abu Isa's 'Against the Incarnation', the second and last part of his *Refutation of the Three Christian Sects*. The English translation is given opposite the Arabic text, together with explanatory notes.

Thomas prefaces the work with an eighty-three-page introduction that brings brilliantly to life the intellectual and cultural situation in ninth-century Iraq. Baghdad was founded in 762, but there had already been Christian churches and monasteries in the area for centuries. Christians were the older, and in a sense more prestigious, segment of the population, though numerically fewer and politically weaker. They translated Greek science and philosophy into Arabic, often attained high position in the Caliph's court, and seem to have regarded themselves as culturally superior to the lower-class, vulgar types who had recently conquered them. Like Greek slaves among the Romans, or like the 'old nobility' in France after the revolution, they viewed with indulgent contempt the crude opposition between the human and divine upon which Muslim theology was based, although they took advantage of the distinctions Muslims were willing to make to explain their distinctive Christian doctrines to this

new, hostile audience. To the Muslims the Christians appeared disingenuous, over-subtle, and sophistic.

Muslim theology had to re-fight the battle that had been going on within Christianity between a traditional, static, 'Parmenidean' view of the divinity as transcendent and unchanging, and the 'dynamic' aspects implicitly attributed to it by such religious doctrines as creation, miracles, prophecy, and the Christian 'hyper-claim' that Jesus was divine or the 'Son of God'. The only 'dogma' in Islam is the utter transcendence of God – stressed even more strongly than in Judaism – so that the problem of reconciling these apparently opposed depictions of the deity is exacerbated within this tradition. (John Damascene attributed the new religion to the meeting of the young Mohammed with an Arian heretic, from whom Mohammed borrowed his teachings and presented them to his contemporaries as a new revelation). Islam solves this by postulating a single perfect revelation that has always been given to mankind – that was given, specifically, to Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Mohammed; unfortunately with the earlier recipients the recording of this revelation was garbled or corrupted, and the resulting traditions slipped back toward various forms of anthropomorphism, polytheism, and idolatry. Only Mohammed transcribed the revelation perfectly, and that is why, as the 'seal of the prophets', his edition supersedes and replaces all earlier and inferior versions. While Christians decided to include the Jewish scriptures as part of their own Bible, this is unthinkable for a Muslim; all that he needs to know about Judaism and Christianity he can learn from the Qur'an.

Abu Isa (*fl.* 835-861) belongs to the period when Greek logic and critical dialectic were making their way into Islam, giving them new tools with which to confound their enemies but also by which to assess their own tradition. Already the Mu'tazili sect, of which Abu Isa had been a member, had adopted a certain independence toward official Islam, claiming that the Qur'an was not eternal but created. They subscribed to an atomistic physics, but like Spinoza later, claimed that God was the only substance; everything that happens, happens by divine decree. This further strained the tension between divine omnipotence and human freedom or responsibility, to both of which they were committed.

Abu Isa did not delve into theology, but used his dialectical acumen to point out contradictions, raise conundrums, and reduce to embarrassing confusion the distinctive theories of the Melkite, Jacobite, and Nestorian Christians on the Incarnation, of whose doctrines he had an extraordinary and unparalleled knowledge. Apparently he also turned his critical tools on his own tradition as well, pointing out contradictions and confusions within the Qur'an. Even Mohammed's transcription of the single truth was evidently not up to Abu Isa's standards. Thomas concludes that 'his beliefs were more likely a form of rational monotheism than immediately recognizable Islam' (p. 74) – perhaps closer to Plotinus or Spinoza. According to one source, Abu Isa died in prison.

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Celtic Theology: Humanity, World and God in Early Irish Writings. By Thomas O'Loughlin. Pp. xv, 235, London and New York, Continuum, 2000, £17.99/$29.95.

This book is the result of mature reflection by a careful scholar, well versed in the historical subtleties and ambiguities that mark this period. However, while there are manifold references to primary literature, the emphasis is on the theological beliefs of the time emerging in a particular historical context. As such, it is book that will be of use to theologians interested in this period as well as historians. It is also a book that sparkles with lived experience as a tutor of students coming to terms with their own

preconceptions about Celtic thought, one being that the very distinctiveness of Celtic Christianity and theology is itself open to question. The author argues that the most that might be claimed is that it represents a local theology, one that emerged in a particular culture and period, but not as radically dissimilar from Latin tradition as some would like to believe. However, the author remains sensitive to the pastoral need to find inspiration from particular experiences of faith in this period, while insisting that the interpretation of theology and history needs to take into account historical issues in a much more nuanced way than has generally been the case.

The book itself is particularly relevant for courses in Celtic Christianity, even if the latter's identity can be challenged. While the author implicitly rejects the title of his own book, that is any sense of separation of Celtic theology from other theologies, the enormous popularity of all things Celtic suggests a search for a common identity through historical reflection. Those who start this search with an open mind may find their treasured myths, such as the supposed affirmation of women in the Celtic tradition, quashed by careful reflection on particular sources, such as *The Collectio*, the Irish Collection of Canons. Sexuality seemed to be treated with almost greater severity compared with Augustinian writings. Marriage is seen as an antidote to desire, with those married saved from wanton passion through childbirth. The elevation of celibacy and the categorization of marriage with sin confront any romantic view about Celtic treatment of women. The author is also more suspicious of Bede's historical account of a rift with Rome through the date of Easter controversy, believing that he had his own agenda for portraying history in this light. The author suggests that Bede's account coheres well with post-Reformation rejection of Rome, hence is readily accepted by those searching for a historical precedent to their views. O'Loughlin is right to caution against arriving at too hasty an analysis. However, it is a pity that the significance or otherwise of the Synod of Whitby that supposedly marked the end of 'Celtic' Christianity is not discussed at all.

The author modestly likens his work to the early shallow trenches that are first laid out by an archaeologist when beginning the investigative task on a site. The attention to detail in each chapter is suggestive of rather more thoroughness than this image implies. However, it is soon apparent that the diversity of topics covered in the book are indicative of more that could be said in each area, ranging from the theology of Patrick, through to theologies of Adomnan, who compiled a major biography of St. Columba and Miurchu, who compiled major biography of St Patrick. O'Loughlin helpfully draws out particular themes, for example he speaks of Patrick as convert, teacher, missionary, pilgrim, saint. Such subdivisions are particularly useful in a teaching context, as are the illustrations such as a map showing how Patrick perceived the world, with its edge corresponding to Ireland. Much of what we learn of Patrick's theology may be uncomfortable to hear; for example he thought of God as a stern judge, reaping punishment on those who transgressed, all 'natural' acts being acts of God within a strong sense of divine providence. In the contemporary world of science such a rigid view of the workings of God are more difficult to accept, and for the author at least, requiring careful discernment. Yet there are other strands that may be worth trying to envisage, even if it is more difficult in our present culture. One is the corporate sense of community and its inclusion of the worshipping life of the church as historically and corporeally situated.

Such expression of corporeal life comes through clearly in what forms a major section of the book dealing with liturgical life. As was the case for theology, the author is anxious to stress that such texts are not anachronistic relative to mainstream Christianity, yet they are also responsive to local needs and developments. The chapters on particular missals and prayers are instructive for those who really want to engage with the heart of the Christianity of this period. In these chapters the author brings in examples from present culture not so much to apply historical understanding to the present, but in order to enable us as modern readers to understand what it was

like then. He is more doubtful about whether some images such as that of heavenly Jerusalem could become relevant symbols for the present context. While this is an important corrective to exaggerated claims for relevance, it seems to me that in some places his emphasis on the particular and the local is overdrawn, thus seeming to downplay the need for mutual exchange between different traditions. Liberation theology is not just relevant for the so-called 'developing' world, as he implies in the beginning of this book, but for all cultures, which experience oppressive power relationships. Yet while I might be more positive about what present-day theologians can learn from a study of this period, we must be grateful to the author for his insight, humour and honesty in drawing out important strands for reflection and deliberation. Such a scholarly and well-written book that combines historical acumen with theological interest is a treasure indeed.

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The Church and Learning in Later Medieval Society: Essays in Honour of R. B. Dobson (Harlaxton Medieval Studies XI). Edited by Caroline M. Barron and Jenny Stratford. Pp. xii, 398 and 45 plates, Donington, Shaun Tyas, 2002, £49.50.

Barrie Dobson, the distinguished medievalist and encourager of other scholars, has been accorded Festschriften by three circles of friends following his recent retirement as Professor of Medieval History at Cambridge University: those in Cambridge; those in York, where he was Professor beforehand; and the contributors to the present volume, who meet regularly in the summer at Harlaxton Manor in Lincolnshire and who focus here (this volume comprises the proceedings of the 1999 Harlaxton Symposium) on two central and often linked aspects of his scholarship, the Church and learning in late medieval England. Twenty-seven writers divide their attention between religious orders, cathedrals, universities and parishes. Learned and frequently innovative, with copious bibliographies in the footnotes, the contributions provide a survey of recent scholarship as well as indications of likely developments in the future.

On religious orders, Benjamin Thompson looks at the zealous and prickly John Peckham, Franciscan friar and archbishop of Canterbury, who supported crusades, the expulsion of Jews, the English conquest and civilizing of Wales, disliked Aquinas, told king Edward I that secular law must be subordinated to canon law, and excommunicated Bishop Walter Cantelupe of Hereford, who was later canonized a saint. Learned and an administrator, with a typically medieval mix of qualities, he contributed nevertheless, according to Thompson, to the Christianization of late medieval England and Europe. James Clark finds that monastic education in late medieval England was rich and diverse, religious and thoughtful, confident of monastic traditions and not overawed by university learning. The reader asks again why the Reformation, including the dissolution of monasteries, occurred in England: late medieval signs are of vitality rather than decadence. Maybe the Reformation should be seen as a development from late medieval religion as much as – the traditional view – a reaction against it. David Crook examines churches and chapels on a monastic map of the Lincolnshire fenland, A. J. Piper the old age of Durham monks. Martin Heale asks how monks occupied their time in the dependent cells of large monasteries and found they gave more attention to reading and intellectual pursuits than might be expected. Lynda Dennison and Nicholas Rogers study the role of monasteries as publishers through the lens of the medieval best-seller, Ralph Higden's *Polychronicon*. Andrew Wines looks at the career of Philip Underwood, Carthusian monk and entrepreneurial procurator of the London Charterhouse, who

netted for his monastery the remarkable sum of £2011 for the year 1499–1500. Pamela Tudor-Craig attends to the iconography of Wisdom, including the role of round churches, and the frontispiece of one manuscript in particular, *Bible Historiale*, British Library, Additional MS 18856.

For cathedrals, Nicholas Vincent revisits the career of Elias of Dereham, steering a judicious middle course between his possible roles of manager and architect of cathedrals. Compton Reeves examines learning among the English cathedral clergy of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. While he found a decent and conservative academic attainment among them, he laments their lack of creativity, hoping for more of the latter than perhaps can reasonably be expected. Joan Greatrex is more optimistic than Reeves regarding curiosity and originality in her study of horoscopes and healing at Norwich cathedral priory. David Lepine, too, appears relatively optimistic in his study of the learning of Hereford cathedral canons in the fifteenth century. It is encouraging that the canons seem to have valued reading and learning for their own sake, without too much preoccupation with their usefulness. Pamela King, in trying to identify the owner of the so-called 'Treasurer's Cadaver Tomb' in York Minster, found bibliophiles and considerable intellectual curiosity among the canons there.

Regarding universities, Patrick Zutshi records the gradual acceptance of friars into Oxford and Cambridge after 1300: tensions too, including the friars' dislike of paying for doctoral feasts. John Barron's particularly interesting essay traces the university of Oxford back to the twelfth century through St George's College, the community of Augustinian canons residing in the Castle. Virginia Davis looks at the contribution of university-educated secular clerics to the pastoral life of the English church and finds them too ready to abandon pastoralia for what appeared more interesting and lucrative activities.

Several of the essays on parishes explore new avenues. Jeffrey Denton, in his subtle assessment of the competence of parish clergy in thirteenth-century England, analyses the meaning of *illiteratus* and wonders whether the papal bull *Cum ex eo* was meant to encourage scholars to study at university or rather to promote the clerical careers of nobles. Clive Burgess surveys educated parishioners in London and Bristol on the eve of the Reformation, principally through their benefactions, and takes education beyond books to art and music: a healthy approach that views medieval education in a suitably holistic fashion. Fiona Kisby takes the story down to 1603 by examining the books that might be found in the parish churches of London in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Joel Rosenthal studies the books bequeathed by clergy in their wills, noting that the collections represent only the tip of the iceberg of the private libraries that probably existed. Claire Cross looks at the libraries of the clergy of York city. She notes some intellectual interest among them but puts the matter into financial perspective by pointing out that the books of much the greatest known collector, Dr William Melton, chancellor of York Minster and formerly Master of Peterhouse, Cambridge, were valued at his death in 1528 at a mere £5.14.10p, a seventh of the value of his plate and less than half that of his furred habits, gowns, amices and surplices. Alexandra Johnston argues that the York cycle of mystery plays, and its ongoing revision, should be seen not so much as an expression of artisan independence, nor of the city council's desire for control, which have hitherto been the traditional explanations, but rather as resulting principally from the initiative of the Augustinian friary in the city. Finally, Carole Rawcliffe elaborates on the educational functions of hospitals through their dependent schools and through the singing and liturgical functions of the schoolboys: an interesting theme that parallels for hospitals the arguments of Burgess regarding parishes. Two hospitals receive particular attention: St Giles Hospital in Norwich, the subject of her earlier book, and St Leonard's Hospital in London, which maintained a choir of thirty boys – larger than the choirs of Exeter and Salisbury cathedrals combined.

As is to be expected in a Festschrift, we are given individual contributions. The link is the common area(s) – the Church and learning – rather than a common theme. Nevertheless, in addition to the detailed scholarship provided on a wide range of particular topics within this field, the volume furthers, in a balanced and critical way, the revisionist approach to the late medieval English church. Gone, long ago, is the rejection of this church as irredeemably corrupt and ignorant. It is now being examined in its own right, without the Reformation constantly looming in the background. Plenty of life and diversity are to be found. It is interesting that many of the contributors to the present volume are Anglicans, pleasantly revealing their Church's respect for its medieval traditions. The number of essays about York is fitting testimony to Barrie's long years as teacher, professor and colleague at its university.

Gregorian University, Rome, Italy Norman Tanner

The Early Reformation on the Continent (The Oxford History of the Christian Church). By Owen Chadwick. Pp. 446, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, £60.00.
The Making of the English Bible. By Benson Bobrick. Pp. 376, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2001, £20.00.

Professor Owen Chadwick, as one would expect, presents a magisterial and highly readable synthesis of the European Reformation prior to c. 1550, excluding Britain and Ireland. Moreover he takes a novel approach, by considering the Reformation by a series of themes – important themes that are often forgotten or laid aside in other histories of the Reformation, i.e., the book, the Bible, death, the city, conversion, monks and nuns, education, divorce, rural reformation, toleration, unbelief and numerous others. Therefore while this work will be invaluable to scholars and students, the latter might find it helpful also to have a text such as Euan Cameron's *The European Reformation* at hand, which takes a generally more chronological approach. Professor Chadwick's discussion of the fifteenth and sixteenth-century reform movements is filled with remarkable detail and insights, having made use of his own and other authorities' recent scholarship in the field. Furthermore, his discussions are generally nuanced and balanced, such as his discussion of the important place of the Bible both prior to and during the Reformation (pp. 19, 25), his insightful considerations of the character and works of Erasmus and Luther (pp. 42–54,124–129), Luther's legacy and the divisions among Lutherans (pp. 342–7) and the witch-craze (pp. 404–408).

With some reservations, I would describe this book as a *tour de force*. I believe that Professor Chadwick may underestimate the level of Latin lay-literacy in the late medieval and early modern periods (p. 9); he also falls into the trap of misunderstanding the phrase, the 'new learning'. As Richard Rex has definitively demonstrated in his 1993 article in *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 'new learning' was a term that denoted heresy, not reformist texts, which for Luther and the other reformers would have been 'old learning' 'rediscovered'; 'new' was novel and therefore a bad thing, while 'old' was what was perceived to hold a pedigree from the primitive church, and therefore good. The Professor's discussion on the Eucharist, while extremely helpful, could be more clearly delineated (pp. 234–240), and the discussion on predestination is all too brief (p. 244). It is imprudent to quote at length from the apparently confessionally-biased writing of Steven Ozment (p. 180), and Professor Chadwick seems to take for granted medieval anti–clericalism as a large movement among the peasantry, while Peter Marshall's 1994 *The Catholic Priesthood and the English Reformation* offers a more nuanced view of the laity's interaction with the clergy; and it is hard to believe that England was so unique in lay-clerical relations.

Finally Professor Chadwick disappointingly leaves unanswered 'the unsolved historical question': what caused the Reformation in Germany (p. 39)? Once again, Cameron's *The European Reformation* is useful in that it proposes a solid thesis to answer this ur-question. These, however, are minor quibbles in a work not only of superb erudition, but which is also a pleasure to read and re-read.

Benson Brodrick's *The Making of the English Bible*, however, is quite another thing. I should have been more on my guard when I read in the Prologue that 'the Catholic Church comes in for its usual Reformation drubbing', swiftly followed by '[t]he reader is asked only to set all assumptions aside and come to the story with an ecumenical mind' (p. 6). It is a popular history of the Bible in English full of popular misconceptions. It is 'Whig' historiography writ large, complete with numerous quotations with the now-discredited *Tudor England* by S. T. Bindoff (1950). In fact, despite the wealth of Reformation research – English and European – that has appeared in print within the past twenty years, very few of these works can be found in the notes or bibliography; even the version of *The English Reformation* of A. G. Dickens that is cited is the 1964 edition, and not the 1989 version that he considerably revised. The system of notation is also highly peculiar; while there are citations according to page in the back of the book, there are no numbers alluding to them in the text. Dr Bobrick and others interested in late medieval and early modern translations of the Bible should look to Professor Chadwick's chapter on the subject and his select bibliography in *The Early Reformation on the Continent*.

Fordham University, New York William Wizeman

The Beginnings of English Protestantism. Edited by Peter Marshall and Alec Ryrie. Pp. xi, 242, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, £40.00/£14.95.

The Reformation and the Towns in England. Politics and Political Culture, c. 1540–1640. By Robert Tittler. Pp. xi, 395, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998, £48.00.

Beliefs and the Dead in Reformation England. By Peter Marshall. Pp. xi, 344, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, £50.00.

For almost thirty years the study of the Reformation in England has been all but dominated by the questions of the extent and the moment of its reception. Revisionist historians have tended to emphasize resistance to the new teachings until they were finally accepted, albeit with reluctance, in the second half of the reign of Queen Elizabeth. This historiographical trend has, in the words of the editors of *The Beginnings of English Protestantism*, 'been matched by a neglect of early Protestant reformers and reform movements in the first half of the sixteenth century. This book contributes to redressing the balance.

The nine essays in *The Beginnings of Protestantism* concentrate on different aspects of sixteenth-century England, and the value of many of the pieces is a stimulating reminder of the number of discoveries still to be made. English Protestantism, particularly in its early 'evangelical' phase and in keeping with the movement elsewhere in Europe, emerges as a thoroughly variegated phenomenon, a collection of different positions, such as that of Clement Armstrong with his mystical faith in a strangely radical form of royal supremacy, studied by Ethan Shagan, or that of the Freewillers, analysed by Thomas Freeman. They might have certain features in common with the traditionally dissenting movement of the Lollards, or with contemporary positions on the European continent, but they retain an individuality reflecting the novelty of Protestantism in an English setting. The Lollards, as Patrick Collinson observes in his splendid article 'Night schools, conventicles and churches: continuities and discontinuities in early Protestant ecclesiology', undoubtedly contributed to a tradition of separatism, but they never advocated the doctrine of

justification by faith alone which remained peculiar to Lutheranism. Andrew Pettegree's article, 'Printing and the Reformation: the English exception', also points to the 'exceptional' nature in England of a trade largely dependent on continental models.

In his paper 'Counting sheep, counting shepherds', Alec Ryrie, one of the editors of *The Beginnings of English Protestantism*, shows how hard it is to quantify the acceptance of the Reformation in England. What cannot be denied, however, are the effects of Henry VIII's measures on many aspects of the country's traditions, society, and economy. In *The Reformation and the Towns in England: Politics and Political Culture, c. 1540–1640*, Robert Tittler assesses the impact of these measures on provincial urban organization. The dissolution of the monasteries in the 1530s and 1540s was one of Henry's more revolutionary achievements, and Tittler shows how the monastic possessions were often acquired not only by individuals but were taken over by towns, with inevitable consequences as to their wealth and administration. Institutions such as schools and hospitals, which had previously been in the hands of the clergy, fell increasingly under lay control. One of the main results of the rise of a relatively modest class of laymen was the gradual change from a primarily aristocratic system to an oligarchic one. This was attended by a number of features which emphasized the power of the new class and the glory of civic administration. The town hall became the seat of authority, understood 'not merely as a convenient place of business, but as an edifice irreplaceably symbolic of civic authority, power and legitimacy'. Official regalia and dress grew in importance and were used and imposed with the utmost rigour, while local history and local mythology were cultivated with unprecedented energy. Many previous historians have considered the model of London to have been a vital factor in the development of provincial urban culture, but Tittler proposes an alternative, 'indigenously urban, grounded in political necessity', and resulting from the Henrician reforms.

One of the principal theological changes to affect English society, Robert Tittler argues at the beginning of his book, was the abolition of Purgatory, leading to the collapse of an entire devotional and economic system which consisted, on the one hand, of prayers for the dead, processions and commemoratory celebrations, and on the other of foundations and bequests. This is the starting point of Peter Marshall's enthralling *Beliefs and the Dead in Reformation England*. The suppression of Purgatory, Marshall shows, raised a whole range of problems and questions. Was it permissible for Protestants to do so much as to pray for the dead? How should a funeral service be conducted if prayers for the dead were not allowed? Should it be accompanied by celebration of the Eucharist and the distribution of alms or bread to the poor? And what was to become of all those many foundations connected with speeding the dead on their way to heaven? Here, too, the dissolution of the monasteries played an important part. 'It represented', as Marshall says, 'an extraordinary repudiation of the hold of the past, and of past dead generations, on the present and the living. It was a signal of what else it might be possible to achieve'.

Marshall examines all the many aspects of the cult of the dead inherited from the medieval church – religious services and liturgy, the tolling of church bells at funerals, sermons preached to commemorate the deceased, the decoration of tombs and inscriptions, descriptions of heaven and hell and the degree to which Paradise was accessible, the problem as to whether Roman Catholics, the parents of the first reformers and living before the Reformation, could be saved, and the existence of ghosts. On the whole English Protestantism reached compromises in the face of more extreme positions. Ghosts were indeed largely relegated to the stage, but the funeral sermon increased in importance with an emphasis on the edifying aspects of the life of the deceased. These could serve as models for the living and thanks for them could be given to God. There was also a growing interest in the Greek Church where prayers for the dead were not attended by a belief in Purgatory. Although Holy Communion

at funeral services seems to have been abandoned in the early 1560s, the Book of Common Prayer, authorized in 1560, had an appendix with texts for commemorating benefactors as well as for the celebration of the Eucharist at funerals. Severe measures were taken to prevent tombs from being defaced, and it needs but a superficial glance at Tudor and Stuart funeral monuments to see that the embellishment of tombs was far from abandoned. This all remained part of what Marshall calls 'a rich and complex Protestant culture of commemoration'. However reluctantly and however late Protestantism may actually have been accepted in England, the material effects of the Reformation, despite the return of Catholicism under Queen Mary, were swift and remarkably enduring.

Leiden University, The Netherlands Alastair Hamilton

Aspects of English Protestantism, c.1530–1700. By Nicholas Tyacke. Pp. xiv, 354, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2001, £13.49.

Nicholas Tyacke has made a name for himself as one of the staunchest defenders of the theological earnestness of the English Reformation. While revisionists have characterized most religious controversy and ecclesiastical politics, particularly in the reigns of Elizabeth and James, as opportunist, governed more by expediency and immediate pressures than by commitment to theological tradition, Tyacke has resolutely maintained the strength of the connections between the English academy and the continental reformation, especially the conflicts between Calvinists and their adversaries: Arminians, Remonstrants, Socinians and Lutherans. This book is a collection of essays on these themes, mainly written in the late 1980s and early 1990s, actively engaged in a lively debate with the likes of Peter White, George Bernard and Julian Davies.

The basic thesis that Tyacke wishes to defend is that Calvinism really was the dominant theology of grace in the Church of England until the mid-1620s, that the upsurge of Arminianism in the reign of Charles I was radical and subversive (thus playing an important role in the line-up of forces in the Civil War), that Calvinism was re-asserted during the interregnum but gave way to Arminianism during the Restoration, with Latitudinarianism emerging distinctly only after the Toleration Act of 1689. Thus baldly stated, the interpretation of seventeenth-century churchmanship may seem either elegantly simple or crassly reductive, but Tyacke himself is careful to define his terms and specify, very accurately, what the evidence is for the positions he upholds. This makes these essays such a valuable contribution to ecclesiastical history. Only the most modest claims are made about English culture generally, or about ideological currents that go beyond the ambit of the evidence proffered. Tyacke is concerned with the theological and ecclesiological alignments of the leading figures in the two universities and the episcopacy, most particularly Canterbury and London. The shifts of power within these circles can be charted with precision, and Tyacke performs this operation lucidly and vigorously.

Tyacke's interpretation revolves around the publication, in 1624, of *A New Gagg* by Richard Montagu. According to his analysis, this protest against Calvinist monopoly (which Montagu called Puritan) of Church of England theology was without precedent and ushered in a true Arminian revolution. There had been an anti-Calvinist movement in Cambridge in the 1590s, which had failed. But by 1626 Calvinism was being suppressed (in the sense that it could no longer be taught with authority), with royal approval, and in the 1630s Arminians held most of the positions of power in the church. This so destabilized the religious scene that eventually there was a Puritan reaction, one of the major factors leading up to the Civil War.

An important emphasis in this book is the distinction between theology and ecclesiology. The term Calvinist is theological; Puritan is ecclesiological. Equating Calvinism and Puritanism was an anti-Calvinist ploy which has tended to cloud the issue even for modern historians. That the rise of Arminianism provoked a Puritan reaction requires, therefore, a complex explanation. Puritan animus against the church hierarchy and practice was held in check by a theology held in common with the Calvinist bishops. Once the episcopacy was chiefly Arminian, the Puritans became more aggressive. Another period when the Puritan-Calvinist distinction is significant is the archiepiscopate of Richard Bancroft, who was equally anti-Puritan and anti-Catholic. As a result of his preoccupation with the papist threat, the rather lukewarm nature of his Calvinism did not materially affect the Calvinist consensus of the earlier seventeenth century. In understanding the Restoration period, theology and ecclesiology also need to be kept apart, because both Arminians and Calvinists could be High Church, in the sense of exclusivist, and both could lay claim to a rational theology, a term more commonly associated, now, with Latitudinarianism.

The term 'Arminian' is a controversial one. Tyacke frequently explains that he means by this, 'Anti-Calvinist', rather than 'demonstrably influenced by the writings of Jacob Arminius', but a glance at the chapter headings will show that he uses Arminian much more aggressively and confidently here than in his 1987 book, *Anti-Calvinists: The Rise of English Arminianism c. 1590–1640*. This may be explained partly by the emphasis given to the Synod of Dort in 1619 when the Arminian theology of the Dutch Remonstrants was ultimately denounced. Tyacke pays a lot of attention to the significance of the Synod in English affairs. At the time King James was anxious for a Spanish alliance for his son Charles, and for a while this dampened Calvinist ardour: anti-Catholic polemic was deemed undiplomatic. But James also decided to support Prince Maurice and the Calvinists in the political struggle with Oldenbarneveldt, Advocate of Holland, and the Remonstrants. Consequently the English delegation to the Synod of Dort consisted only of (relatively mild) Calvinists, despite the overtures of the Dutch ambassador to London. This meant that the operations of the anti-Calvinist faction of this period, climaxing with the emergence of Montagu, Neile, Buckeridge and Laud, could be much more closely associated with the Remonstrants than would otherwise have been the case. Many historians will cavil, nonetheless, at the loose application of the word 'Arminian'.

There is also room for disagreement on two other aspects of Tyacke's argument, bearing on the significance of his findings. First, his analysis of groupings and power relations in the Church of England depends on the centrality of the theology of grace. He castigates Peter White for identifying a *via media* in the 1590s, claiming that this is based on an artificial restriction of theology to 'the resolution of the great antinomies, of nature and grace, of freedom and necessity, of faith and works' (p. 180, quoting White's *Predestination, Policy and Polemic*), but his own privileging of predestination is also problematic. Second, the strict confinement of comment to the documentary evidence means that it is difficult to gauge the wider impact of these theological and ecclesiological shifts. Where Tyacke does venture onto the ground of social history, in discussing Puritan names and wills, the evidence is parochial and suggests that a lot more research remains to be done. It needs to be remarked, all the same, that this book is exemplary in the use of evidence, and the thoroughness of the research; for instance, our understanding of the Restoration Church is immeasurably enhanced by the detailed study of the manuscript collections of the writings of Joseph Beamont, Regius professor of divinity at Cambridge from 1674 to 1699, and Thomas Barlow, Lady Margaret professor of divinity at Oxford from 1660 to 1676.

Apart from the central concerns of Calvinism and Arminianism, and especially the rise of Arminianism in the 1620s and 1630s, the book offers two immensely helpful surveys: the history of the legalizing of dissent, 1579–1719, and the history of religious controversy at Oxford from the 1590s through to the Restoration. These are

magisterial, and treat the nuances of both subjects with delicacy, but they also point to the topics that lie tantalizingly at the margins of this book: Catholicism, and its role in shaping the course of English Protestantism; Socinianism, and its uneasy alliances with other forms of anti-Calvinism; the Cambridge Platonists, and their heterodoxy; and the rationalism of John Locke.

This is an extraordinarily erudite book, one that treats the writings of the churchmen of the English Reformation with respect and sympathy. Like all good intellectual history, it opens up the field and invites us all to read more. There is reason behind the method and the focus. Tyacke argues that the way forward in Reformation studies is not to concentrate either on popular religion (was the English Reformation 'of the people'?) or on government policy (was the Reformation 'imposed from above'?) but on the middle ground of university debate and print controversy. The effect is to steer us away from ideological grand narratives without reducing the history of the Reformation to the mere play of contingency. Perhaps academics are prone to over-emphasize the power of books; on the other hand, it is good to be reminded that books made history just as much as history made books.

University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa Victor Houliston

Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England, 1558–1689. By John Coffey. Pp. xii, 244, Harlow, Longman, 2000, £17.99.

The Church of England 1688–1832: Unity and Accord. By William Gibson. Pp. vi, 269, London, Routledge, 2001, £16.99.

John Coffey, the author of *Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England*, describes his approach as post-revisionist. He agrees substantially with the 'Whig' position expressed in W. K. Jordan's *Development of Religious Toleration in England, 1558–1660* (1932–40), although he does indeed modify it in the light of more recent research, much of which has been undertaken by the revisionists. He shows how, thanks largely to the Act of Toleration of 1689, toleration replaced persecution and pluralism replaced religious uniformity. This was a process which gathered momentum in the course of the seventeenth century. Considerable credit goes to moderate Anglicans such as Gilbert Burnet, who had the courage to abandon Augustine's justifications of persecution and to appeal to an earlier Christian tradition of tolerance. But credit also goes to the growing number of dissenters who, albeit not necessarily tolerant themselves, contributed greatly to religious pluralism.

As an introduction to the subject Coffey's book is undoubtedly serviceable. He gives an intelligent definition of toleration, 'the policy of patient forbearance towards that which is not approved', and emphasizes the element of disapproval. He also provides a good picture of the different types of tolerance. On the one hand there is civil tolerance, ranging from relief from persecution and freedom of worship for dissenters who were nevertheless regarded as second-class citizens (and excluded accordingly from certain privileges), to a complete separation between Church and state and the recognition of dissenters as citizens with full rights. On the other hand there is ecclesiastical tolerance, the readiness to accommodate different theological positions within one Church.

Coffey is at his best when discussing the English in England. His book is less satisfactory when he looks at events on the European continent. The Swiss scholar Jean Leclerc is described as a Dutch Arminian. Balthasar Hubmaier and Michael Sattler are said to have 'repudiated all religious violence, including the disastrous takeover of the city of Münster by a group of theocratic Anabaptists in 1535', although Sattler died in 1527 and Hubmaier in 1528. The degree of Menno Simons' disapproval of the Münster experiment, moreover, remains highly debatable. In his

eagerness to include the work of recent scholars, Coffey sometimes draws on provocative and unreliable sources, such as the books of Nabil Matar who vastly overrates the appeal of Islam in England.

The extent to which ecclesiastical tolerance was practised by the Church of England after the Act of Toleration is one of the themes of William Gibson's survey, *The Church of England 1688–1832*. Gibson argues that the English Church succeeded in remaining more united throughout the eighteenth century than has been appreciated in the past and that this was partly due to the latitude of doctrine which it sustained. Certainly, there were disputes. Episodes such as the meetings of Convocation in 1701 and 1710 showed that there was some pressure to act with greater rigour. Even if, by about 1740, the Church had succeeded in quelling the dangers of Deism, and both dissent and latitudinarianism were in decline, in the second half of the century Trinitarianism was found sufficiently worrying to prompt a reaffirmation of the Thirty-Nine Articles and a defence of the Test. Yet this only concerned a small minority of the clergy. Far from being 'fractured by controversy', the Church of England was, Gibson demonstrates, deeply and successfully committed to peace and tranquillity.

A common mistake among earlier historians has been to imagine a polarization of different positions. Yet, Gibson writes, 'High Church and Low Church were not exclusive categories of thought and churchmanship. They were blurred and broad streams within Anglicanism that often merged, overlapped and coincided'. Many dissenters were christened in Anglican churches, read Anglican theological literature and, despite the existence of dissenting academies, sent their children to Anglican schools. The various currents which the English Church managed to accommodate were treated with an eirenicism reflected in the various efforts of Anglican churchmen to unite with other Christian Churches, not only with the Moravians and the German Lutherans who shared the faith of George I, but with the French Gallicans and the Greek Orthodox.

While a measure of civil tolerance was imposed by the government with the Catholic Relief Act of 1778 and the Dissenters Relief Act of the following year, the Church strengthened its hold on the entire country. The English Church, Gibson maintains, forged a national identity, permeating every aspect of English culture and providing a shared experience for the nation at large. This clear, informative, and well-considered study, with an excellent bibliography, is a useful antidote to much previous literature.

Leiden University, The Netherlands Alastair Hamilton

Joachim of Fiore and the Myth of the Eternal Evangel in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. By Warwick Gould and Marjorie Reeves. Pp. xi, 435, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2001, £55.00.

Little is as indicative of the distortions and legends of which Joachim of Fiore was the object as the book of the Eternal Evangel. The Eternal Evangel – the reference is to Revelation 14:6 – was supposed to succeed the Old and New Testaments and to be a third and everlasting status corresponding to Joachim's Age of the Holy Ghost. Yet Joachim himself never used the term any more than he wrote so many of the works subsequently attributed to him. He died in 1202, and the idea of the Eternal Evangel was first announced over fifty years later by the Franciscan Gerard of Borgo San Donnino. Gerard also issued a book with the same title, consisting of excerpts from Joachim's writings. In 1255 Gerard was condemned for heresy, sentenced to perpetual reclusion, and the book was ordered to be burnt. No complete copy appears to

survive. The myth, on the other hand, survived astonishingly well. The Eternal Evangel came to represent the attainment of some sort of perfection, changing, through the centuries, from religious to scientific or social, but always retaining a spiritual flavour.

The authors of *Joachim of Fiore and the Myth of the Eternal Evangel* are rigorous in the definition of the influence they document, and rightly discard – even if they survey – the various uses of the Eternal Evangel in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries unaccompanied by the name of Joachim, just as they do the ever popular tripartite division of history and the idea of the providential role of 'spiritual men' if these are not specifically linked to the Calabrian abbot. The first proper account of Joachim of Fiore in a later period appears in the work of the German church historian Johann Lorenz Mosheim in the mid-eighteenth century. Mosheim dwelt on Joachim's significance both as a prophet and as a heretic, and it was this combination which would fascinate subsequent generations.

Taken up in England in the early nineteenth century by such obscure writers as Godfrey Higgins and Algernon Herbert, the figure of Joachim and the myth of the Eternal Evangel were truly revived by another German historian, August Neander, in 1841. Neander also brought out a relatively neglected aspect of Joachim which would grow in popularity in the coming years – his use of the three apostles Peter, Paul and John, to symbolize the three ages. Neander influenced Schelling, and Joachim thus found his way into the German cultural repertory. In the meantime, in France, Joachim was rediscovered by Michelet and Edgar Quinet. He was given an ever more heroic role, seen as an inveterate opponent of scholasticism, a bold critic of the Church, and a champion of liberty, whose Eternal Evangel suggested an age of progress and intellectual freedom. The idea was adopted by Pierre Leroux, for whom the Eternal Evangel meant the revolutionary ideals of *liberté, égalité* and *fraternité*, and was exploited to the full, under his influence, by George Sand in her novels *Spiridion* and *Consuelo*. By the mid-nineteenth century Joachim and the Eternal Evangel were fairly common currency. George Eliot may well have had them in mind when she wrote *Romola*, and they appear in the works of many writers concerned, in one way or another, with launching a new teaching – Ernest Renan, Matthew Arnold, and the great proponent of Aestheticism, Walter Pater. They fascinated numerous intellectuals in Eastern Europe, such as the Czech poet Jaroslav Vrchlicky, Sygmunt Krasinski in Poland, and Merezhkovsky in Russia. And in early twentieth-century England Joachim's ideas are clearly reflected in the work of W. B. Yeats and D. H. Lawrence.

This is a revised and enlarged edition of a book that originally appeared in 1987. The new edition, some seventy pages longer than the first, brings the story closer to the millennium which prompted the authors to revise it. New bibliographical references have been provided, even if the section on the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is left largely untouched and one might regret the seeming reliance on somewhat outdated works, such as Frances Yates's *Rosicrucian Enlightenment*, and the neglect of the better and more recent work on the Rosicrucians by Carlos Gilly. The Conclusion has been greatly lengthened, and now contains a discussion and critique of *Messianic Revolution: Radical Religious Politics to the End of the Second Millennium* by David Katz and Richard Popkin (1999). Warwick Gould and Marjorie Reeves tell a fascinating story which brings out the strongly apocalyptic views of a remarkable number of writers of the nineteenth century. Their book, with its vast amount of information on a neglected aspect of Western culture, was rightly acclaimed when it first appeared, and deserves to remain a classic.

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God: Thoughts in an Age of Uncertainty (New Century Theology). By James M. Byrne. Pp. xiv, 170, London and New York, Continuum, 2001, $22.95.

A. N. Whitehead once famously asserted that the history of Western philosophy has been a series of footnotes on Plato. Whatever the insightfulness of that comment, numerous Western thinkers have been learning, relearning, and unlearning, to various degrees, the wisdom of Plato's teacher's observation on the philosophical task: the wise are those who are aware of their ignorance. Socrates' learned ignorance has not, at least if James Byrne's book has merit, always been appreciated in theology. *Theologia*, one might assume, has been more the occasion of mapping the *theo*-'logic' in some kind of comprehensive fashion, or at least in a way that enables us to possess the wisdom of being un-Socratically 'secure' in our knowledge. It seems that 'the long history of anthropmorphism has enabled us to think that we know who God is; God has become a familiar figure, so much so that God is perceived by a major strand of Western culture in terms of a limited set of images which the tradition used to describe God' (p. 65).

What Byrne's delightfully readable and accessible study (although for ease of reading sacrificed has been in-depth analysis, substantive argument and justification, and detailed referencing) does not do (and the negative tone of these opening observations is appropriate, given the nature of the book) is (1) provide a systematic theology of what God may be like; (2) map the wide-range of theological conceptions; (3) or attempt to defend any positively voiced theo-logical particularity. In fact, this lack of theo-logical specificity, while a child of Enlightenment moves against arbitrary theological parochialism, is not necessarily a strength, as will be maintained later. This book operates within a distinctly philosophical milieu of asking about what kind of theo-talk is appropriate. Of course, one herein glimpses Byrne's 'God' (the irony of naming this 'God' is obvious), since the question is always uppermost what kind of talk is appropriate to the kind of God that God is not.

Many of the themes of the book turn on Byrne's rejection of what could be called the god of 'classical modern theism', the god of natural theology, whose ways and works are evident to the inquiring mind. Byrne's is a learning of one's *theo-ignorantia* through learning the folly of the fate of God-talk in modern times, and an unlearning of the grammar usually entailed by modern Western talk of the cosmically explanatory *thing* referred to as 'God'. He argues, 'proofs and disproofs do not work, and the truth will always elude our feeble attempts at certainty.... We cannot step outside our world and view it *sub specie aeternitatis*; that, after all, is the prerogative of God, and we have no such luxury' (p. 5).

'I have no idea whether there exists a Being that we can call God' (p. ix). The problem with 'Being' language, as much of the Christian tradition has known all too well, is that it can lend itself to making God an aspect (even if it be the pre-eminent aspect, or the highest) of the 'things', 'items', or 'furniture' of this ambiguous world (the world does not wear any 'meaning' directly on its sleeve) that can be named and made an object of our knowing. There must be critical restraints upon fantasy and self-deception. And it is in this that Byrne displays sensitivity to the destructive propensities toward idolatry.

So Byrne continues, 'we can never know for certain if there is a God. To put this philosophically, when it comes to God, all of us must be philosophical agnostics' (p. x). But here Byrne has overstepped the mark by confusing questions of cognition, and the limits of human conceiving, with the existential status before 'God'. Even Kant, whose limiting of the human imagination to the phenomenal, accorded highly significant ethically regulative status to the noumenal (Byrne does come close to this as a statement about how 'God' can function for *others*: '"God" is the utterly ineffable symbol through which we attempt to express a reality greater than the fragments of the mundane, a totality greater than the self, and a horizon beyond the

tangible', [p. xiii]). After all, certain reasoned fideists (not to be confused with uncritical realists/fideists), or theologically critical realists, would not agree that cognitive uncertainty necessitates agnosticism as such. Concepts such as 'faith' and 'hope' work in the space inhabited by a certain cognitive 'blindness'.

Something else is going on in Byrne's account to entail that questions about his perspectivism venture into questions about whether he has provided an adequate theo-logical mapping. In his introduction a clue is provided by his 'wandering approach' conversationally locatable within a 'pluralism of discourses' (p. xi). Byrne seems to celebrate this with little sense of Nietzsche's unease, of it being at once liberating and a burden and creating a task (however that task may be conceived). Instead of a *docta ignoranta* that remains a part of our journeying, Byrne's silence too easily gives the impression that the job has been finished, and we can become stationary in our ignorance, a lazy silence in other words taking place in empty spaces – 'we best understand God when we remain silent' (p. xii. It is true, however, that the final chapter attempts to render significance to the metaphors of movement and journeying [see chapter 8]). His treatment of the Christian apophatic thinkers is made less useful here by his failure to map types of silences, and therefore to distinguish an apophasis which is learned through being enveloped by the mystery identified as 'God', and the silences of one's emptiness.

Byrne is concerned 'not to defend any particular theology, least of all official Christian dogma' (p. xi). Leaving aside the question of what may be identified as 'official Christian dogma' (itself by no means a simple question) Byrne could be seen as returning theological discourse to generalizing banalities, that take place nowhere and by no-one, and displays no savant for the irreducibility of the particular and concrete.

Admitting this is not to dispute the accuracy of his comments to the effect that all religions are perspectival. But is not Byrne himself verging on accessing a powerful meta-story, albeit one infused with postmodern agnostic sensibilities? It is reasonable to argue that 'no idea or concept of God is completely innocent' (p. 68). However, it is also possible to ask whether the tone of the book suggests, unwittingly, that Byrne has attempted to find an innocence in a non-realistic negation of theism and atheism (a non-realism is suggested by 'Our religious experience then becomes a relation not to some other Being but to the depths of our own being…an orientation towards the whole of human existence which regards that existence as constituted by relationality', p. 20)? While one may agree that 'our anthropomorphic ideas of God are always limited and inadequate' (p. 68), it needs to be asked whether our silences are any less limited and inadequate. Should it not be asked, with much of the apophatic tendencies within traditions of Christianity, whether the silence is one learned in the particular schools of theo–linguistic pedagogy, in other words a *studied* imprecision disciplining our naming of that which we *worship*, and that discourse of divine transcendence and absence are themselves parasitic upon acquaintance with the divine reality?

Some of the book's concerns and its weaknesses in approach are demonstrated in chapter 5 and part of chapter 6 when Byrne considers the notion of, in anthropomorphic terms, 'God' acting. Thinking through Spong, the target that Byrne has in mind is a conception of God as *super*-natural and therefore *interventionist*, summoned or directed to act through a style of praying determined by what Byrne describes as a magical concept of the world, resulting in a certain arbitrariness and capriciousness of resultant divine 'action'. 'God thus understood becomes an ethical affront to our sense of justice and fairness' (p. 81). Without much detailed justification Byrne asserts from Spong that this manner of praying to be demeaning to human beings and damaging to the idea of God. What he seems to mean by those is that this type of divine action leaves little room for contingency, human responsibility, and their manifestations in the politics of ecclesial agency (Byrne here cites the example of the politics of the Arian controversy), that which is often surmised as being subjection

to an overly paternalistic deity. Byrne's understanding of prayer, then, is markedly different: 'All that can be left is that the power of prayer for those who are ill, for the success of the harvest, or for success in battle, comes not from the influence which it has on a deity who will occasionally deign to intervene and adjust the course of nature, but comes rather from the human realization that we are not alone in our pain, that we are cared for by those to whom we are close, that our continued well-being and very existence is of untold value to all those who love us. That is all' (p. 82).

The problem that Byrne does indicate his awareness of, in this simple self-assuredness, is the complexity of conceptions of divine agency and the nature of prayer. What he is targeting is certainly a popular impression but by no means the universal one among, for example, Christian theologians. Envisaging models of divine agency beyond the simple dualism of the interventionist image is a common feature of theological reflections on human and divine agencies as non-competitive. Something else is going on through Byrne's critique, somewhat problematically suggesting a threat to his postmodern god: 'For many modern people, like Bishop Spong…, to believe in the benevolent, providential, interventionist God of theism is to be forced to accept too much on trust, to go against what the evidence of one's senses and one's experience says about a world in which miraculous divine intervention does not occur' (p. 80).

Socrates, at his trial in 399 BC, maintained that the reason he philosophized was because 'the unexamined life was not worth living'. In a temper not prophetically irrelevant to our modern Western consumer society, he had through his life complained of the engagement of his contemporaries in pursuing goals such as fame, riches, pleasure, and so on, without ever asking whether these are important (or even useful, useful for what?). Unless they raised such a question, and seriously sought the answer, they could never know whether or not their entire lives might be wasted in pursuing useless or even dangerous goals. Byrne's study could provide a useful tool for introducing students to the difficulties of their theo-logical journeying, particularly in taking them beyond the simplisms of various popular atheisms and theisms, indicating for them reasons for the changing fortunes of the Western beliefs in 'God' in the modern period, and rejecting the modern autonomous ego. This 'God' must be unthought through and beyond the 'death of God'. However, the book's limitations lie precisely in its tendency to be less than sensitive to the complexities of some of the debates. This is perhaps why, when there are profitable discussions of the likes of Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Marion, the book is less well equipped to enable readers to navigate the particularisms of religions, and no mention is made of certain prominent theologians of the twentieth century – von Balthasar and Rahner, for example – and both Barth and Bonhoeffer are mentioned only in passing.

Nevertheless, one must ask, what is it that enables one to hope? Byrne's silence before God is less that of being in awe of the inexpressible, and more the Being-as-projection of our ignorances, an empty space. And, as we have hinted at earlier, empty spaces are not only full of meaning but lacking in the hope that enables one to act *Christianly*. Conceiving of a doctrine of the Trinity may not make God-talk *conceptually* any easier (if Williams is right, and I think he is, then that is not its point), but it does open up in the space between our words and that to which they witness a space (or, rather, a 'trace') pregnant with possibility, with hope for the performance of a socializing of this world. For Christians at least, this performance is irreducible – whether to ideas or a surpassable myth – to the proper sense of who one is (…to become).

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The Question of God: An Introduction and Sourcebook. By Michael Palmer. Pp. xvii, 357, London, Routledge, 2001, £17.99.

With more than ninety per cent of British AS and A-Level Religious Studies (RS) students currently studying Philosophy of Religion and Ethics, this book is a timely contribution to an area of growing interest. Michael Palmer needs little by way of introduction to Sixth Form teachers as his earlier book, *Moral Problems: A Coursebook for Schools and Colleges,* has long been a popular and much appreciated part of the staple Sixth Form RS diet. With *The Question of God,* he has taken a broadly similar approach to his earlier *Moral Problems,* although I'm glad to see that the old A4 size of *Moral Problems* has been replaced by a much more convenient size for this book.

Overall, the book does exactly what its title suggests. It focuses on the key issues arising from considerations of whether God exists, examining the Ontological Argument, the Cosmological Argument, the Argument from Design, the Argument from Miracles, the Moral Argument and the Pragmatic Argument. In each case the chapter opens with a solid, readable introduction to the argument, providing a generally fair exploration of both sides of the question, before concluding in each case to why the argument fails to 'prove' God's existence. This discussion is followed by a series of short, relatively straightforward extracts from the original sources, each averaging about four pages in length.

The material is introductory but manages to be so without being superficial or too basic. Even the most able of Sixth Form students will find it repays attention. Particularly welcome is the fact that the book generally manages to add a welcome 'fresh' approach to discussions and analyses of arguments which have been picked over by many an 'introductory' book. The discussion section in the chapter on the Design Argument, for example, contains a particularly thoughtful analysis of Darwin which goes beyond anything comparable in any of the other introductory books that are currently available. Yet it manages to do so without drowning the reader in unnecessary detail and makes its points in a readable non-technical way.

Whilst its strengths clearly outweigh any weaknesses, there are nevertheless a few surprising features to this book. Why, for example, is there no text extract from Alvin Plantinga who is arguably one of the most important contemporary defenders of the ontological argument? Why is there no extract in the chapter on the design argument from Swinburne whose contemporary defence of that argument has rapidly attained the status of a classic 'must read' treatment? Equally surprising, is the fact that the issue of 'inductive proofs' is only really introduced in chapter three during the discussion of the Design Argument. Yet few, if any, of the contemporary proponents of the cosmological arguments discussed in chapter two would propose that argument today as a 'deductive proof'. One of the key reasons why cosmological arguments are generally thought to fail is that, however they are formulated, they often tend to result in offering a choice: either one takes the existence of the universe as a brute fact, or else one posits the existence of God to explain the universe. With no clear argument explaining why we must go beyond the universe to appeal to God, the argument is therefore often thought to be ineffective. Yet its modern proponents often appeal to induction at precisely this stage in the argument. Why should we go beyond the existence of the universe as a brute fact? Well, proponents of the Cosmological argument suggest, contemporary scientists and cosmologists simply do not treat the universe as a brute inexplicable fact. They spend considerable amounts of time and money exploring questions about its age, size and composition. So drawing upon the current practice amongst scientists, it is possible to present an inductive justification for dismissing the idea that 'the universe is just there and that's all there is to it' as Bertrand Russell famously put it. Of course, whether this approach will ultimately be any more successful than the traditional deductive versions of the argument is a

different matter. But the crucial fact is that the inclusion of inductive considerations makes it possible to formulate a much more sophisticated version of the Cosmological Argument, one that does actually offer a reason for the demand that we should go beyond the brute existence of the universe. It is disappointing that Palmer's presentation and ordering of material does not really acknowledge that. By delaying the introduction of induction to chapter three the book has therefore constructed a bit of a straw man of the Cosmological Argument. Nevertheless – the point needs to be reiterated – the book's strengths far outweigh any weaknesses. It deserves to find a place in every AS and A-Level classroom and will undoubtedly be of benefit to first year undergraduate readers too.

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The Power of God: ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ in Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian Theology. By Michel René Barnes. Pp. xvi, 333, Washington DC, Catholic University of America Press, 2001, £52.50.

As an occasional reader of Dr Barnes' essays, I was very gratified to discover his new monograph. It is written with the lucidity and lightness of touch that is characteristic of his work. In the case at hand, this means that Barnes traces the antecedents of Gregory of Nyssa's understanding of *dynamis* ('power' – though, as Barnes shows, the term is more supple than that) back to the Presocratics, and does so in a way that is informative and even pleasant to read. Although Barnes' primary contention is that *dynamis* is a central concept for Gregory's doctrine of the Holy Trinity, he dedicates most of the study to a painstaking account of *dynamis* in Greek philosophy. By approaching the question in this way, Barnes is able to incorporate scholarly findings from late antique philosophy into his study. This is very helpful in that it considerably augments the theological discussion. Perhaps the most gratifying example is Barnes' treatment of the Hippocratics and the impact of 'medical philosophy' (p. 9) on Plato and indeed everybody else. From its medical use, *dynamis* becomes current in psychological and other rather abstract discussions as well – so we have not long to wait for it to become a theological term. Barnes therefore dedicates a chapter to surveying the theological use of *dynamis* in early Christian and contemporary pagan use. His discussions of the *Chaldean Oracles* and Numenius were particularly helpful.

These theological considerations feed into Barnes' account of how Nicene and especially pro-Nicene figures (e.g., Athanasius, Ambrose, Hilary, Marius Victorinus) construed their respective 'power theologies'. He shows that the pro-Nicene use of 'one power' language is based on the technical sense of the term, the subject of his monograph to this point. It is in contrast to this technical use that Barnes presents Eunomius' teaching of the Trinity. He takes exception to conventional accounts of the Eunomian controversy that seek to schematize the debate in terms of 'whether, to what degree, and how, God is knowable by the human mind' (p. 220). In place of this, Barnes argues that the salient point at issue between the Cappadocians, not least Gregory of Nyssa, and Eunomius is best understood in terms of how the different parties reconciled divine transcendence with divine productivity. Briefly, he shows that Eunomius' teaching is unlike the pro-Nicene teaching because, for Eunomius, God cannot generate a product the existence of which is identical to God's existence; whereas Gregory, by appealing to the technical sense of *dynamis* Barnes has described at some length, insists that *dynamis* is characteristic of the divine nature and that this *dynamis* issues forth in a effect indistinguishable from its cause. In this way, Barnes persuasively shows that *dynamis* is a central concept in the Eunomian debates – and indeed in Gregory of Nyssa's theology more generally.

The study is extremely impressive. Barnes writes with verve and yet manages to express complex ideas without recourse to cumbersome jargon. It is therefore not only possible, but even enjoyable, to follow him through the thicket of a controversy about the Trinity by way of ancient debates about whether and when 'like produces like'. It must be said that Barnes periodically assumes more knowledge on the part of his reader than is perhaps fair (particularly since he takes some satisfaction in pointing out how novel it is to incorporate the debates of ancient philosophers and physicians into a study in patristics). For instance, Barnes twice refers (p. 7 fn. 22 and p. 23 at fn. 10) to a supposedly Pythagorean account of *dynamis* that is now attributed to Philolaus. However, he does not provide references to the primary source or indeed to any discussion of why it is now thought to be spurious; he only points out which scholars have based their analyses of Pythagorean *dynamis* on Philolaus. One would think that some further information was in order. But this is a small problem and a resourceful scholar can overcome it readily enough. It scarcely detracts from the value of this important monograph.

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Disputed Questions on Virtue. By Thomas Aquinas, translated by Ralph McInerny. Pp. xx, 140, South Bend IN, St. Augustine's Press, 2001, £16.00.

Interest in Aquinas and medieval philosophical theology is currently growing, but for most readers a knowledge of Aquinas' texts will probably extend only as far as his *Summa Theologiae* or perhaps his *Summa Contra Gentiles*. Rarely do students get as far as the *Disputed Questions* and, even when they do, it is to dip into the larger collections, the *de Veritate* or the *de Malo*. Few students will have ever consulted Aquinas' *Disputed Questions on Virtue*. Perhaps this was in part due to the fact that until this translation by Ralph McInerny, they were only generally accessible in Latin, unless one was fortunate enough to stumble across the only other English translation, published some fifty years ago.

McInerny is well known in the field of medieval thought and has contributed significantly to making Aquinas' work more accessible and comprehensible. Nevertheless, in this particular translation it is not entirely clear what he was trying to achieve. Whilst he has provided a good solid English translation of the Latin, it is a bare translation with no facing Latin text, few critical notes and little by way of introduction other than a generalized account of Aquinas' views on ethics. Most peculiarly of all, rather than putting Aquinas' own references into a format that would be accessible to modern readers, this book simply translates them and leaves them in their medieval format.

One of the big questions which really needed to be addressed was why bother translating this set of disputed questions at all? It is a shame that McInerny does not include in his introduction, an exploration of how this work fits into the overall Thomist corpus. This is an important question which has a bearing on how useful students will find this translation. To get to grips with this key question we need to start by looking at what a disputed question actually is. In a society in which written texts could cost the equivalent of several years wages, medieval universities placed a premium on oral communications, especially oral disputations (*disputationes*) at which university masters would present and defend views whilst being challenged by colleagues. The disputation was a formal occasion and would usually follow a common pattern. It would begin with the short statement of a thesis or point and then all the objections against that point would be raised. The master's graduate students (bachelors) would then make some counter replies in favour of the point before the

master would conclude the disputation by giving the determination (*determinatio*), formally resolving the point at issue and answering all of the objections.

The proceedings of the disputation would be written up by the master and published as a set of 'Disputed Questions' (*Quaestiones Disputatae*). As they typically explored issues of contemporary interest and reflected the real disagreements and disputes going on between medieval masters, they generally represent thorough treatments of significant medieval problems. What contemporary scholars are still rather unclear about, however, is how precisely the published documents as they have come down to us relate to the actual medieval discussions themselves. A published set of Disputed Questions explores a large range of key issues and questions, with each separate topic constituting an individual 'question'. Each question was further subdivided into 'articles', with each article providing a distinct discussion, analysis and determination of a particular point or issue. One of the big problems facing scholars of Aquinas is whether each question constitutes the content of a formal disputation, or whether the proceedings of each disputation is reflected within the content of each article.

Looking at the format of each article and seeing the way it often contains a full set of objections, counter objections and determination, Mandonnet, for example, has argued that each article must represent a separate disputation. But debating a disputed question was a formal occasion in university life and it was customary for other masters at the university to stop their teaching so that they and their students could attend the disputation. If each of the many articles in Aquinas' disputed questions represented a separate disputation then it has been estimated that during Thomas' time as a master in Paris, university life would have had to stop twice a week in order for him to have had time to hold all of the many disputations this would have amounted to. Clearly that would not have been possible, especially when we bear in mind all of the other masters who would also have had to have held disputations. Taking a different approach, another Thomist scholar, Dondaine, has argued that when Thomas held a disputation, the subject matter for the disputation must have been the question – not the individual article. Whilst this approach would fit better with a university calendar, it raises a new problem. How could Thomas possibly have got through the enormous amount of diverse material contained within each question and its sub-articles in a single disputation?

As neither Mandonnet's or Dondaine's approach seems entirely adequate a third approach to the problem has been suggested by Bazan. Agreeing with Mandonnet that each separate article must constitute a distinct disputation, he nevertheless also accepted that there would not have been enough time in the university calendar for Thomas to debate them all publicly. So, his suggestion was that we should look at some of the disputed questions as private disputations which Thomas would have held in his own classroom for the benefit of his own students. Having taught a topic in the morning via lectures he would have been returning to it in the afternoon with a disputation in order to reinforce his earlier teaching and help his students gain a better grasp of the issues which it raised. If Bazan is right, and the model certainly seems attractive, then this has serious implications for the significance of the *Disputed Questions on Virtue*. Rather than representing Thomas' most mature thought, we must now look at them as possibly just a set of teaching exercises designed to help young students get to grips with key issues. Comparing the *Disputed Questions on Virtue* with Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae* confirms this impression. The issues appear in both works in almost exactly the same order, but with intervening discussions and much more refined, nuanced analysis in the *Summa Theologiae*. We can see this by looking at the very first question in the disputed questions: 'Are virtues habits?' Thomas' answer (determination) runs to a long, sometimes almost rambling seventy-two lines as he gives examples, explanations and all the support that one would imagine young thirteenth century students needed. In responding to the same

question in the *Summa Theologiae* Thomas needs just ten lines to get to the heart of the matter in a much more sharply focused way.

Once we begin to understand the origin and background of these *Disputed Questions on Virtue* as probably arising from what were essentially school room exercises, the original question returns. What is the purpose in translating them? As this translation lacks the Latin text it is clearly not intended for serious scholars and academics. As all the issues covered in the *Disputed Questions on Virtue* are also explored, and to a better degree, in the *Summa Theologiae*, then students wanting to get to grips with Thomas' views on the virtues would be better advised to turn to the *Summa Theologiae* discussion. Perhaps the translation is intended as a simpler approach to help 'contemporary' beginners get to grips with Aquinas' virtue theory? If so it will probably disappoint. Key discussions such as that concerning prudence, do not appear and would still have to be accessed via the *Summa Theologiae*, and the prolixity which medieval students may well have found helpful is just as likely to confuse contemporary readers, especially as this translation does not contain the helpful notes and appendixes which would make elements of the discussion more comprehensible. So, ultimately, I was left wondering what was the purpose of the book? My ruminations were not aided by the tendency for pages to fall out as I tried to read it.

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Wilderness Wanderings: Probing Twentieth-Century Theology and Philosophy. By Stanley M. Hauerwas. Pp. xiv, 242, London, SCM Press, 2001, £14.95.

Waiting for Godot in Sarajevo: Theological Reflections on Nihilism, Tragedy, and Apocalypse. By David Toole. Pp. xix, 332, London, SCM Press, 2001, £17.95.

We have here two entries in the challenging new SCM imprint *Radical Traditions*, a series co-edited by Hauerwas himself, along with Peter Ochs, whose recently edited volume on *Textual Reasoning* is another (strong) entry in the series. Both titles appeared originally about five years ago from Westview Press in the States. Since Toole was a student under Hauerwas, both books come from a certain perspective familiar to readers of Hauerwas, and since the latter is also editing the series, *Radical Traditions* carries something of the same flavour. How then to characterize that flavour? It is theology profoundly influenced by the tradition-constituted ethical enquiry of Alasdair MacIntyre (particularly in *After Virtue*) and yet it is worried that perhaps in John Milbank's 'postmodern critical Augustinianism' MacIntyre's project has met its theological match. Either way, the emphasis is on recovering tradition: the virtue tradition of Aquinas, and contemporary manifestations of it in either post-liberal or Anabaptist-inspired circles (though also with a strong Jewish flavour, thanks to Ochs). Perhaps it is an injustice to attempt to situate such creative and provocative work quite so precisely. It is bracing stuff throughout, and displays wide-ranging agreements and disagreements within the overall orientation.

In *Wilderness Wanderings* we find Hauerwas playing his strong suit: essay mode, whereby he typically engages at length with specific works of others in order to clarify his own position. The wilderness in question is contemporary America. Christian theologians are not (or should not be) at 'home' there, and surely enough Hauerwas wanders his way in and out of various theological entanglements with Christendom. The first eight essays are exercises in disagreement, and deal with a lot of the usual suspects (Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Ramsey, etc). Jeffrey Stout's *Ethics After Babel* gets a very good critical treatment, and here at least the back-cover claim that Hauerwas is 'respectful' is fair, though whether all the thinkers treated here would think so is perhaps debatable.

The second section of the book, consisting of just one essay, uses Paul Holmer, in typically Wittgensteinian fashion, to claim that we do not need a theory to know how to proceed. This is Hauerwas' approach in a nutshell, offering once again his view that ethics is simply the way we do theology, and not a separable subject.

In part three, we arrive at five thinkers Hauerwas finds more congenial. Since this section lends itself to more constructive theological proposals it is the most interesting part of the book. James McClendon is lauded for his emphasis on practice. Milbank is given his due, with the interesting departure (for Hauerwas) of using his argument about non-violent creation as a way of raising the profile of the potential ethical significance of creation (a topic now treated at greater length in Hauerwas' recently published Gifford lectures, *With the Grain of the Universe* (SCM, 2002)). And in a densely co-written chapter on Oliver O'Donovan's *Desire of the Nations*, we find the intriguing spectacle of Hauerwas navigating a path through O'Donovan's defence of Christendom which manages to be both immensely respectful and predictably fundamentally unconvinced. Here in particular the epic footnotes do threaten to sink under the weight of caveat and counter-caveat.

The essay genre allows Hauerwas freedom to explore contemporary theological space with great insight, and thanks to his driving vision of the ethical life as the practice of the Christian community, it still hints at a clear overarching story. It is the ambitious goal of Toole's *Waiting for Godot in Sarajevo* to sustain its similarly oriented vision through one long connected argument which is every bit as wide ranging as Hauerwas' essays.

Toole takes as his starting point the remarkable staging of *Waiting for Godot* in war-torn Sarajevo in August 1993, and uses it to explore the various options we have for living in a world which appears to make no sense, or at least where violence is the final word. The three ways forward are indicated in the subtitle.

Nietzsche's critique of nihilism focuses the first option, exploring the 'condition whereby the world and our lives within it appear to us as meaningless' (p. 19). Nietzsche's own response: the way of tragedy. In our ability to embrace the tragic, for example to stage *Waiting for Godot* in Sarajevo in 1993, we might find meaning and evade nihilism. An alternative way is to find meaning through some other, non-tragic, means, and here Toole turns, for reasons that remain a little unclear, to John Milbank. He takes Milbank to be arguing for a world which is saved from nihilism by the revelation of God in Christ, a form of 'apocalypticism' (in the sense of apocalyptic as 'unveiling') which Toole argues is insufficiently attentive to the cross as the key to the reality of Christ. Nevertheless, Milbank's pursuit of an alternative way of understanding the world apart from an 'ontology of violence' is seen as a step beyond the conceptual analysis of the situation provided by MacIntyre (and broadly accepted in outline here).

But it is tricky to know why there is this extended and ultimately dissatisfied discussion of Milbank so early in the book, when Toole next turns to Foucault as a resource for constructing a 'tragic politics' which sees the figure of the poet as a way of articulating meaning in our world. The oddity of this argumentative structure is only increased by the turn in the final two chapters to the New Testament and to the work of John Howard Yoder. Here Toole finds a much more coherent Christian response to nihilism in the guise of apocalyptic thinking (or apocalyptic style, as he prefers to say). By the end of the book it has become clear that Milbank is faulted for offering a confused map from violence to victory, whereas in Yoder, and particularly in his *Politics of Jesus*, the map takes us to victory always through the cross and the turning away from the path of political power. (Power language is read in turn through the prism of Walter Wink's unusual perspective on 'the powers'.) All this is a fair and indeed strong argument, even if alternative interpretations of the key NT passages are also well known, but it is unclear why it requires such a lengthy discussion of Foucault at all. In a surprising footnote, we read that 'I spent two chapters trying to construct

the figure of the poet who, in the end, serves as the model for Foucault's politics, whereas to display Yoder's politics, I need only turn to Jesus' (p. 302). Indeed.

Toole's basic argument I take to be both on the right lines and important. Despite his lengthy defence of the circuitous route by which he pursues it, I finished the book sure that it could have profited from being shorter. Further, there is a wealth of constructive and relevant scholarship on the book of Revelation which finds no mention here. Its socio-political and thoroughly Christological critique of human power structures has been amply discussed by Richard Bauckham, Christopher Rowland, and a host of other writers. It is a little disappointing to find the NT voice here effectively subsumed into that of Yoder, indeed into *The Politics of Jesus*, which work Yoder himself more or less acknowledged to be incapable of being up-dated since the world had moved on. And since much of this recent scholarship proceeds without reference to Yoder's ecclesiological convictions, it would have been helpful to see Toole explore how it can be that an authentically apocalyptic voice can still be situated in the seat of power. The suspicion lingers that Toole has been captured by an older view of apocalyptic as the collapse of prophecy (especially since Paul Hanson's work in this area is specifically acknowledged), whereas it seems much more likely that apocalyptic remains a form of engaged prophetic eschatology. Disappointingly, in the end, *Waiting for Godot* proves unable to match its readings of Milbank, Nietzsche and Foucault with equally subtle readings of the NT and NT scholarship.

A final thought: surely there are few subjects of more practical relevance than learning to navigate our way through the contemporary violent wilderness with Christian integrity. Toole follows Milbank into an area which desperately needs a clear Christian voice. But one could wish, with both these writers, that the practical relevance remained slightly more clearly in view. It is not a failing to signpost the implications more clearly. Toole does, in true Hauerwas style, occasionally veer sharply from the conceptual high-road and start to discuss novels and poems which exemplify what he is talking about. The light these forays shine into our fragmented and despairing world is penetrating indeed. My concern is that too few people will follow the long and winding road to Toole's destination, and that, disagreement over details aside, would be a great pity.

All Nations Christian College, Ware, UK Richard Briggs

Catholic Education: Distinctive and Inclusive. By John Sullivan. Pp. xv, 231, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, £59.00.

Any ideology – political, religious, or other – tends to divide its adherents in two opposite camps: a 'right' conservative *versus* a 'left' progressive wing. Psychic, internal conditions (e.g., conformist mind) together with social, external circumstances (e.g., secularization) partly explain such an internal split. The continuity of any ideology requires, however, the transmission of its unambiguous content to the next generation through education and 'indoctrination'. This generates the problem of how an internally divided ideology can possibly safeguard its future and preserve itself.

Contemporary Catholicism and Catholic education are no exception to this general predicament. In this timely book Sullivan offers a remedy to resolve the detrimental opposition between conservatives and progressives within the Catholic Church since the Second Vatican Council (1962–65) by means of a penetrating re-articulation of the nature of Catholicism and Catholic education. Central to his undertaking is the idea – the interpretative key – that the very essence of Catholicism consists of a creative tension or dialectic between distinctiveness and inclusiveness. To keep its integrity, Catholicism cannot opt for either of these polarities but must give respect to, and do justice to, both of them. Correspondingly, Catholic education essentially is *both*

distinctive *and* inclusive. So, according to Sullivan, both conservatives and progressives go astray in their unbalanced and one-dimensional emphasis on respectively the distinctiveness or even exclusiveness of Catholic ideology on the one hand and the inclusiveness or openness of the Catholic message to secular culture on the other. True Catholicism and authentic Catholic education require a well-balanced and dual emphasis on *both* 'fidelity', 'continuity', 'obedience', 'tradition' *and* 'creativity', 'innovation', 'liberal', 'progressive'.

Is such a 'creative fidelity' to Catholicism possible? The problem arises from two apparently conflicting imperatives within Catholicism itself. And the problem aggravates due to the managerial imperative for effectiveness in contemporary society. On the one hand, the Roman Magisterial imperative for distinctiveness urges the necessity of a theological and philosophical articulation of a distinctively Catholic identity. This delineation of 'who we are' and 'what we stand for' as Catholics is founded upon a distinctive worldview (e.g., Creation, Incarnation, Redemption, Trinity) and understanding of the human person as made in the image of God and called to follow the example of Jesus Christ. Such a distinctively Catholic identity is then foundational for the distinctiveness of a Catholic educational philosophy and policy, in which the integral development of the human person, the autonomy of the disciplines, the synthesis of faith and culture, and the interconnectedness of all aspects of education – the holistic approach – are promoted. On the other hand, the Gospel imperative for inclusiveness exhorts Catholics, helped by the grace of God and the workings of the Holy Spirit, to be open to the needs of others – 'saints' and 'sinners' alike – and, by implication, to multiculturalism and ecumenism. Accordingly, although the *raison d'être* for separate Catholic schools resides in the distinctiveness of a Catholic educational philosophy, pupil admission policies should give heed to God's all-inclusive love. Of course, there are limits to the inclusive imperative: while some liberal 'market' principles of secular culture are acceptable (e.g., human rights), others are clearly intolerable (e.g., individualism, materialism, utilitarianism, consumerism).

To justify his claim that the distinctive and inclusive imperatives within Catholicism are not only compatible but also intrinsically related – that 'creative fidelity' is possible – Sullivan draws upon the work of two neglected but important Catholic thinkers: Friedrich von Hügel (1852–1925) and Maurice Blondel (1861–1949). In particular Blondel's notion of 'living tradition' shows how fidelity to the past and openness to the future can be combined, and how the pitfalls of ossification and assimilation can be evaded. Blondel's accompanying critique of Roman 'clerical' imperialism and triumphalism inspires Sullivan's hermeneutic conclusion: 'No authority can legislate for relationships or prescribe in advance the way they must inevitably develop. This will depend upon the day-to-day interpretations and actions, the flexibility of the partners and their mutual sensitivity and responsiveness. So too the ongoing (and constantly provisional) working out of the relationship between distinctiveness and inclusiveness within Catholic education will depend, in large part, on the day-to-day interactions and interpretations of teachers and pupils, rather than on edicts from the hierarchy of the church, or from any other source' (p. 202).

Given the non-negotiable Catholic body of unchanging truths and objective values, this conclusion is perhaps too optimistic. Moreover, Catholic teachers need perhaps something more stable than such an ongoing hermeneutic dialectic to confront the daily problems of Catholic school life. Sullivan has written an enormously rich, sensitive and stimulating book about the most important theological, philosophical and practical issues in contemporary Catholic education and schooling. It is an absolute must-read for all Catholic educators as well as other-religious and non-religious educators who take their task seriously.

Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium Stefaan E. Cuypers

The Idea of a Catholic University. By George Dennis O'Brien. Pp. 239, Chicago IL and London, University of Chicago Press, 2002, $28.00.

Since John Paul II's *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* (1990), scholarship on Catholic identity in Catholic higher education keeps growing. Essays, articles, historical studies, symposia, and case studies abound. Oddly, theological monographs on the topic of the Catholic university *as such* are rare. In *The Idea of a Catholic University*, O'Brien fills a substantial gap in the literature since Michael J. Buckley's *The Catholic University as Promise and Project* (1998). Written for a general audience, he frames a broad context – Catholic faith and the modern university. The problem, for O'Brien, is whether a 'Catholic University' is a 'contradiction' (p. 165). O'Brien rejects this position, arguing that although aspects of a Catholic and secular university 'clash', one can conceive a modern institution that legitimately conjoins 'Catholic' and 'university'. The book is primarily a theoretical examination of the underlying assumptions that would characterize a Catholic university as 'contrarian'. Some central claims of Christian faith, the principal assumptions operative in the secular university, and the key role of theology within it are treated.

The first half examines the compatibility of the biblical tradition with the modern university by distinguishing various conceptions of 'truth'. O'Brien explores three types: scientific, artistic, and religious. Scientific truth concerns the universally neutral, rational inquiry whose conclusions always remain open to further verification and review. It dominates the university paradigm. The truth of art is defined as 'signatured truth' because works of art 'are essentially historical insofar as they are connected to and express particular visions with historical placement' (p. 35). Evaluation and assessment develop within a tradition of exemplars. Religious truth transcends the signatured truth of art and the 'clarifying abstraction of science' (p. 57). This 'truth of presence' signifies personal participation in what O'Brien calls 'the real', that is, 'experiences of totalizing presence' (p. 57). It admittedly resembles Rudolph Otto's characterization of 'the holy'. It is an existential truth that engages human beings in their lived reality of pain, love, sorrow, passion, hope etc. This arena of truth is that which Catholic faith claims to know authoritatively, interpret, and promote. The difference between the senses of truth builds to a theological interpretation of Jesus' statement 'I am the Truth' and the truth status of doctrinal statements.

The second half judges the inadequacy of secular university's assumptions concerning the significance of 'the real', especially as it pertains to the marginalization of theology within the curriculum. The absence of theology as the study of 'existential truth', and of 'the real' impoverishes the university. In parallel, O'Brien also advances a notion of church more integrated and rich for a Catholic university than the juridical model described in *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*. A juridical model claims 'to offer specific, stateable dogmas – which certainly look like ordinary statements claiming to be verifiable' (p. 167). He indicates problems that attend a juridical understanding of church authority within the Catholic university and the university's commitment to academic freedom. Drawing upon Avery Dulles's different models of church, he criticizes all (institutional, mystical, prophetic, and servant) save for the sacramental (pp. 152–153). He proposes a 'sacramental model' of church for a Catholic university and its truth claims in relation to the 'world of the university' (p. 167). He considers, for example, the nature of 'academic dogmas', the existential life of the university, and the nature and relation of iconic presentations, that is, the way in which religious truth discloses to participants caught up into the mystery of 'the real'. The sacramental, for O'Brien, does not destroy the integrity of science or art, but brings them to a deeper meaning and completion in terms of existential commitment and the implicit values of the university. The Catholic university distinguishes itself, he concludes, from the secular insofar as it opens its life and study to the realm of 'the real, the participatory

immersion within which love, commitment, and decision have lodging' (p. 213). For all the benefits that secular universities offer, they neglect what underlies the mission of Catholic universities, namely, the vocation of persons towards something higher, richer than provisional knowledge or the particularity of art. Catholic universities frame a broader, soteriological horizon for lives of thinking and acting.

O'Brien aims for provocation and clarity. He succeeds in writing a provocative book but not a sufficiently clear one. Administrators, educators, deans, and interdisciplinary faculty seminars will find this book a rich and suggestive resource for conversations about Catholic universities. It eschews heavy theological jargon and employs intelligent and creative examples from Duchampian art to the idea of a 'Holocaust' university. Regrettably, however, there is no engagement with the two most significant contemporary figures on the topic of theology in the university: Buckley and Edward Farley. Their omission is puzzling. Moreover, his distinction between fundamental and dogmatic theology needs more nuance and explanation as to how they are 'meta-disciplines' and how they relate to 'totalizing experiences' that frame 'the real'. The description of fundamental theology as that which concerns things such as love, commitment, and decision is simply too broad. More problematic, however, is theology resting 'on some ''intuition''' in an academic context where intellectual rigour and argument are fundamental (p. 198). Dogmatic theology is vaguely defined as 'traditional Catholic orthodoxy' encompassing 'liturgy, theology, dogmatic pronouncements, meditations, catechisms, moral instructions, spiritual guidance, and so on that constitutes the language of Catholicism' (pp. 203–204). Theology's academic character – specialty field, discipline, pedagogical area – is unclear. However, O'Brien rightly holds that theology offers something beyond truth as 'scientific' or 'artistic'.

Still, if theology is not a 'science', what is it? O'Brien's discussion of theology's centrality in the Catholic university as contrarian would benefit by thinking about theological reflection as a teachable 'hermeneutic' vision cultivated through habits of mind. This would enhance what Catholic universities ultimately provide: a vocation toward seeing 'the real' in the world and its claim upon our actions. Still, these criticisms do not detract from the valuable service O'Brien provides, especially as a former university president. It is an original and reflective contribution to the burgeoning conversation about the Catholic university.

Boston College, USA Brian W. Hughes

A History of Western Thought. By Gunnar Skirbekk and Nils Gilje. Pp. xix, 487, Routledge, London and New York, 2001, £14.99.

This extremely ambitious work is a translation of *Filosofihistorie*, first published in 1972 by Scandinavian University Press, and now in its seventh edition. Its historical breadth is from the pre–Socratics to Rawls and Habermas, and whilst it is true to its English title as a history of *Western* thought, there are occasional useful references to Indian, Chinese and Arabic philosophy. The authors begin with a brief discussion of why we should study philosophy, suggesting that it is part of the 'intellectual baggage we carry with us', whether we are aware of it or not. It therefore follows that we should be acquainted with it. Not being entirely convinced by this reasoning, they follow with some ethical dilemmas, and this is a stress that is continued throughout. Skirbekk and Gilje are concerned with showing how thought and societies impact on each other. In a sense then, this is a social history of ideas.

It is a broad historical period studied here, yet even so, it is impressive in the range of thinkers and movements covered within that range. Coverage is not just confined to the strictly philosophical but Copernicus and Newton, Malthus and von Savigny,

Freud, Durkheim, de Tocqueville and Tnnies all receive treatment. Some thinkers receive chapters of their own – from Plato, Kant and Hegel, to Darwin, Nietzsche and Freud. Perhaps showing a slight Scandinavian bias, Kierkegaard also receives a chapter of his own, having as much space in the book as a chapter entitled 'Utilitarianism and liberalism'. There are some very useful discussions of periods that are often neglected in these overview studies – the chapter on 'The late classical period' and the one on 'The Middle Ages' particularly stand out. Naturally there are thinkers and movements neglected – twentieth-century Marxism beyond Lenin one striking example – and others passed over very quickly, but this is extremely wide-ranging.

The last few chapters are also especially good, moving between Anglo-American approaches and those from continental Europe. As they importantly note: 'All great philosophy lives in contemporary philosophy. Platonism, Aristotelianism, Thomism, Spinozism, Kantianism, etc. all form a part of contemporary philosophy; therefore, we can understand today's debates only by becoming familiar with the history of philosophy'. This seems a valuable corrective to both the unhistorical or the overly-dismissive approaches to the tradition, as well as useful in showing the two broad schools of modern thought how much they have in common.

Some relevant diagrams, some slightly strange suggestions for secondary reading, and a few questions for further discussion at the end of each chapter, add to the usefulness of the text for pedagogical purposes. There are some minor gripes about the translation – liberalist is used rather than liberal, some titles of well-known books appear in the original rather than translation, and some English books are referenced to translations. But given the huge job the translation must have been, these are marginal issues. Routledge are to be commended for making this work available, but it is not quite certain who the target audience is. It is difficult to imagine many courses could cover this range of material, and those that only covered a part of it might look elsewhere for a text. But for those people seeking a general overview, or for some useful links between different periods, this book is highly recommended.

University of Durham, UK Stuart Elden

Essays on Plato's Psychology. Edited by Ellen Wagner. Pp. xi, 385, Lanham MD, Lexington Books, 2001, £53.00/£22.95.

Plato's psychology – theory of the soul – throws up a number of puzzles, all of which are addressed in this book. Fourteen of the fifteen essays have been printed before, but it is good to have them all collected and accessible in a single volume. The book is divided into sections each of which addresses one of the major issues: 'The Nature of the Soul' (three essays), 'The Tripartite Soul' (six essays), 'Arguments for Immortality of the Soul' (six essays). The essays are preceded by Wagner's introduction, which is a useful survey of the issues, their importance, the background, and the solutions argued for by each of the subsequent essays. A bibliography and the usual indexes follow.

The first section of the book focuses entirely on *Phaedo*, the second almost entirely on *Republic*, and the third on *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*. *Timaeus* and *Laws* are the other two dialogues most frequently referred to. Since the volume is as difficult to review as are all collections of essays – because it combines a wide range of approaches and highly detailed argumentation – I shall mention the kinds of questions the essays raise, rather than their answers.

The essays of the first section try to make sense of Plato's complex arguments against the (Pythagorean?) conception of the soul as an attunement or *harmonia*, and his constructive remarks about the soul's kinship to Forms. One of the major problems that arises concerns the soul's relation to the body: at different times Plato implies that the soul is or should rule the body, and also that it is trapped within the body like a helpless prisoner. On the *harmonia* theory, the soul is an attunement of the bodily parts: does that make the soul material? Socrates certainly assumes not, but he argues that it makes the soul mortal. Is the soul itself some kind of Form, perhaps? One of the papers in this section is a discussion of the clever argument for immortality at the end of *Phaedo*: Plato argues that just as threeness and oddness always go together, so that threeness cannot admit the opposite of oddness, so soul and life always go together, so that soul cannot admit the opposite of life. Since the opposite of life is death, it follows that the soul cannot die. What is wrong with this argument, and why? This paper might have belonged in the third section of the book, except that it also casts light on the nature of the soul, not just its immortality.

The essays in the second section of the book are concerned not just with exploring Plato's theory of the tripartite soul and what it tells us about human motivation, but also with reconciling the tension between Plato's saying that the soul is simple, and that it is tripartite (or bipartite, because he sometimes speaks as if it consisted of just rational and irrational parts). In *Phaedo*, Plato argued that only something that is simple, non-composite, can be eternal. How then can he simultaneously maintain both that the soul is tripartite, and that it is immortal? And anyway, in what sense does Plato mean that the soul has 'parts'? In *Phaedo*, Plato argued that the 'lower', irrational elements of the soul were due to contamination by the body and its desires, while the soul itself was rational, pure and simple. Can this point of view be reconciled with the tripartite soul of *Republic*, or has Plato matured and changed his mind? It is certainly true that Plato's psychology has provided developmentalists with a rich vein of evidence. Papers in this section also consider the implications of Plato's analogy between the tripartite soul and the tripartite political constitution of his ideal city, and of the idea that justice is the state of the soul where the rational part rules the passionate and appetitive parts.

The essays in the third section of the book tackle puzzles about immortality. At different times Plato appears to have thought that all the soul is immortal, or that only the 'highest', rational part is. Sometimes (see the previous paragraph) he speaks as if the soul was only rationality, sometimes as if there were more to it. Moreover, there are no fewer than seven arguments for immortality in the dialogues. How good are they? Are they compatible with one another? The argument for immortality in *Phaedrus* is especially dense and interesting, and Wagner is right to have included two papers on this short argument alone.

In her introduction, Wagner points out that Plato's psychological arguments are of interest not just to historians; the issues he tackled coincide with some of those that exercise modern philosophers of mind, and to the religious the question of the immortality of the soul is still live. Nevertheless, this volume will chiefly interest ancient philosophers: it gathers together the work of excellent scholars whose task is to understand Plato's arguments, and not to range much wider than that. There have been other good essays on Plato's psychology in recent years, but it would be nitpicking to find any fault with Wagner's selection. There have been monographs on the subject before, but this is the era of the scholarly essay, and there has never been an anthology like this. It is extremely welcome.

Battersea, London Robin Waterfield

Aquinas on Being. By Anthony Kenny. Pp. x, 212, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2002, £30.00/$45.00.

Anthony Kenny's *Aquinas on Being* is his attempt to develop further a critique of Aquinas' metaphysics which he had made a few decades earlier in *The Five Ways* (1969) and *Aquinas* (1980). In the latter book Kenny had notoriously concluded that Aquinas' teachings about the essence/existence distinction and about God as self-subsistent being were nothing but 'sophistry and illusion' (p. 60). He has not changed his mind in *Aquinas on Being*. A little background might help those unfamiliar with the issues under discussion understand where Kenny is coming from.

The student of medieval philosophy is faced with several schools of interpretation when it comes to St Thomas' metaphysics. The Suárezian, existential, and transcendental approaches long ago established themselves as among the main alternatives in modern Thomistic exegesis. The latter half of the twentieth century, however, saw the emergence of a smaller but recently more visible school of 'analytical' Thomism. A 1997 issue of *The Monist* was dedicated to articles by several of its representatives. If we are going to put a label on him, Kenny is best understood as belonging to this school, despite important disagreements he has with other of its proponents. There are two perfectly good reasons for including Kenny in this group: first, he shares its interest in an analysis of the language of Aquinas' metaphysics and, second, he shares the suspicion held by many of its members of conceptions of existence which do not square with those advanced by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. Frege and Russell, like Kant, argued against understanding existence as a predicate. Thus, for many contemporary analytic philosophers who take their bearings on this point from them, the only way to make sense of sentences like 'Sophia Loren exists' is either to interpret them as intending a statement about some other property of Sophia Loren, e.g., that she is a woman, thus 'SL exists' = 'SL is a woman', or as intending a statement about number, e.g., 'Exactly one person plays Cary Grant's housekeeper in ''Houseboat''". Existence is not a property that can be attributed to Sophia Loren in the same way that, e.g., being a woman or being Italian can be attributed to her. Indeed, in the mind of these analysts, 'Sophia Loren is/exists' is in danger of being considered a sentence fragment since it seems to have a subject but no predicate. Whether or not we agree with this line of reasoning, we can in any case see how it makes trouble for traditional theistic discourse. How are we to understand such statements as, e.g., 'God is/exists'? And what on earth could Aquinas have meant when he said that 'God is his own existence' (*Deus est suum esse*)? These problems which frame much contemporary analytic reflection on metaphysics, have a special role in determining how Kenny evaluates Aquinas' conception of being in this book. In confronting Aquinas with a modern analytic understanding of existence, Kenny takes his readers on an impressive tour through twelve texts he considers key to Aquinas' metaphysics. Not only does he comment on more familiar texts such as *De ente et essentia* and the *Summa theologiae*, he also examines several lesser known works like the commentary on Boethius' *De hebdomadibus* and the late treatise *De substantiis separatis*. Kenny tries to put the best possible spin on problematic passages and even entertains more sympathetic interpretations by Norman Kretzmann and Peter Geach but in the end determines that Aquinas' account of existence simply cannot be made respectable for analytic philosophy. 'But surely this is nonsense', he says of Aquinas' view that God's *esse*, unlike that of creatures, does not admit of addition (p. 110). 'God is', as a statement about God's nature, is for Kenny not a profundity but merely 'an ill-formed formula' (p. 111). Many of his analyses are punctuated with similar expressions of philosophical discontent. Obviously, Kenny's views on Aquinas have not changed much since his first articulations of them in 1969 and 1980. Only now Kenny takes himself to have backed them up with more substantial textual evidence. Besides repeating and reinforcing his previous criticisms

of Aquinas' understanding of existence, Kenny argues in favour of a second thesis, namely, that Aquinas is 'thoroughly confused' about what *esse* is because he never brings together the several different meanings it has for him into 'a coherent and systematic whole' (pp. i, viii). In the final chapter Kenny identifies no less than twelve different meanings of *esse* which he was able to distinguish in the preceding chapters of the study. Kenny's pursuit of this second thesis, however, carries with it certain problems.

The first is that Kenny leaves unclear to the reader whether he would have been more satisfied with Aquinas had he stuck to a single meaning of *esse* throughout his career or whether he should have written a treatise in which each of the twelve meanings of *esse* discovered by Kenny is discussed and their relationship analysed. A second problem is that Kenny does not go into enough detail about what he means by systematicity and why Aquinas' metaphysics should have had it. In a certain sense, one is tempted to regard this as more of a truism than an accusation. Aquinas, like Aristotle and Heidegger, recognized that 'being is said in many ways' and that a perfect, closed system of metaphysics is both impossible and undesirable. Indeed, many of the great twentieth-century commentators on Aquinas took the openness of his metaphysics to be a virtue rather than a vice. Finally, the fact that *esse* has several senses for Aquinas and that he often uses it in more than one sense even in a single passage does not mean that he is confused on this point. It is quite normal for us to use the same word in different senses during the course of a single conversation and nevertheless be quite clear with ourselves what we intend in each instance. Although the title of Kenny's book would lead one to believe he intends to present a very general examination of Aquinas' understanding of being, the overwhelming focus seems to be on divine being. It will come as no surprise that Kenny finds Aquinas' conception of the identity of essence and existence in God to be nonsensical. But there are a couple of other matters in his treatment of Aquinas' philosophical theology which demand special comment. The first is his insistence that in talking about existence as predicated of God, Aquinas has to have either specific or individual existence in mind (p. 43). Unfortunately, Aquinas' thinking about God cannot fit neatly into these categories. Aquinas insists that God is not a species or genus and that if he is thought as an individual, he is so in an utterly different way from humans since the principle of individuation in the sublunar world is matter and the divine nature completely excludes matter. Aquinas' theological discourse simply does not fit and cannot be rightly understood in the categories Kenny proposes here. But Kenny shows signs of being aware of this (cf. pp. 46–47, 121–122), which makes his manner of proceeding rather perplexing.

The other obvious problem in Kenny's assessment of Aquinas' conception of God becomes explicit at the end of the book. In the last chapter Kenny asserts that there is an ambiguity in Aquinas as to whether God's *esse* is that of absolute being or common being (*ens commune*, p. 193). Since Aquinas understands *ens commune* to be created being, Kenny's claim amounts to saying that Aquinas was never clear about whether God's being is divine or created! Kenny takes a passage on participation from *De substantiis separatis* as evidence for this remarkable claim (p. 188). But it is very difficult to see in this bit of text what Kenny supposes to find there. Indeed, passages which lead up to it in Aquinas' treatise plainly reaffirm the difference between divine and created being and it does not appear to say anything which would contradict them. A curious omission in Aquinas on Being is St Thomas' commentary on Boethius' *De trinitate*. Kenny makes no mention of it despite the fact that it is widely regarded as a seminal text for understanding Aquinas' metaphysics. But I doubt that its inclusion would have decisively changed Kenny's views. Certainly *Aquinas on Being* poses a significant challenge to those analysts who believe that Aquinas' understanding of existence can be reconciled with Frege and Russell. However, one wishes that Kenny would have done more to engage non-Fregean, non-Russellian

analysts, like Barry Miller, who have criticized his reading of Aquinas in the past. Kenny does not open this dialogue. Existential Thomists will likely regard Kenny's negative judgments on Aquinas as foregone conclusions given his criteria. For them, the deeper problem will have gone unaddressed, namely, whether Frege and Russell are right about existence. *Aquinas on Being* is probably not the most evenhanded treatment of Aquinas' metaphysics but, for those who have a serious interest in the topic, it is worth becoming acquainted with.

Fordham University, New York, US Joseph G. Trabbic

Deals and Ideals: Two Concepts of Enlightenment. By James Daly. Pp. 156, London, Greenwich Exchange, 2001, no price given.

The central claim of this book is that it is possible to view Western philosophy, from the Athenian *polis* to the present day, in terms of two conflicting claimants to the title 'Enlightenment'. One of these is the Anglo-French Enlightenment, in which particularism, relativism, individualism and pleasure feature prominently. This is the Enlightenment of 'Deals', so labelled due to its emphasis on social-contract political models. The competing tradition is that of the dialectical, spiritual Enlightenment – where the emphasis is placed on the universal, the communal and the good. Thinkers such as the Sophists, Hobbes, Hume and Bentham are identified as being within the Enlightenment of 'Deals'; while Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Aquinas and Marx are among those who are allocated to the competing Enlightenment of 'Ideals'. These two Enlightenments stand in opposition to one another, each being underpinned at a basic level by their own ontologies and epistemologies. Similarly, concepts such as nature, reason, happiness, and justice hold contrary meanings within each of the Enlightenments.

Daly writes with an awareness that some thinkers display their position within one of the two Enlightenments more fully and clearly than others. Even within each of the traditions Daly is laudably careful in his presentation of the thought of those concerned. For example there is no attempt to pretend that the Utilitarianism of Bentham is identical to that of Mill. German Idealism is interestingly recognized as occupying a somewhat ambiguous position with regard to the two Enlightenments.

It is also notable how Daly constantly makes connections between historically widely separated thinkers. For example, in the first chapter – where the thesis of the book is initially identified in the debates between the Sophists and the Platonic Socrates – Daly highlights the relativism and social contractarian thinking of certain of the Sophists, and the similarities discernible in the writings of Hobbes. Daly then proceeds to ably maintain his central argument down to, and including, the circumstances of the present day. Contemporary issues, as apparently diverse as the 'globalization' of capital and the question as to whether unpaid carers are being exploited by governments and society, are addressed with competence. The importance of freedom is stressed; the book has an entire chapter devoted to the very different interpretations of freedom held by each of the two traditions. The Enlightenment of 'Deals' is associated with what Isaiah Berlin referred to as 'negative freedom', that is to say the absence of constraints to the pursuit of any objectives one might happen to have. Berlin's 'positive freedom' is attributed to the Ideals Enlightenment, involving as it does self-government by reason.

The final two chapters of the book focus on Marx – perhaps in recognition that his placing within Daly's Enlightenment of Ideals may be contentious. The text goes a long way toward supporting Daly's decision. He recognizes, following Scott Meikle, the teleological essentialism in Marx's thought. Additionally, there is an awareness of the Feuerbachian humanism which is present throughout Marx's writings – and not

merely, as Althusser famously argued, in early 'ideological' texts. Closure is brought to the 'Marx and Justice' debate; revisiting and developing many of the themes from Daly's previous book, *Marx: Justice & Dialectic*n. A convincing argument is presented both for Marx holding capitalism to be both unrequited labour, an economic injustice in the broad sense, and also – and more importantly – alienation, an ontological injustice. In a chapter on Marx and progress, Daly challenges positivist and determinist readings of Marx with a Benjaminian redemptive approach.

This book is an original and remarkable synthesis of ideas and thinkers who might otherwise be considered disparate and incompatible. It is a book about 'the big picture', and serves as a reminder of what philosophy is (or should be) all about.

Newry, Co. Down, N. Ireland Jonathan Aiken

Kant: A Biography. By Manfred Kuehn. Pp. xxii, 544, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, £24.95.

Although his importance as a thinker is well established, the received wisdom about Kant's life is that he did little but work, that his routine was one of such regularity that people in his home town set their clocks to his walks, and as a person he was rather boring. Manfred Kuehn's impressive biography is hardly an exposé, but it does much to debunk the standard story. One of the most effective strategies in this regard is to suggest that much of what is well known about Kant's life is actually a description of his final years, and that this is unrepresentative of the story as a whole. The tales of his 'mechanical regularity' and the peculiarities he was supposed to display are about a man in decline, rather than the person who wrote his most important works. Accordingly Kuehn builds a story around Kant's *intellectual* life, such as is revealed by his letters, his teaching and his intellectual relations. In his prime, Kant was quite a society man, with several close friendships with both men and women. Kuehn tells of quite a number of disputes over ideas, and stresses that though a lot of Kant's life was quite routine, this was not at all untypical for German professors of the time. Indeed, he suggests that Kant was a 'very gregarious and social being', for whom dialogue played an important role. On the evidence deployed here, it is difficult to dispute such judgements.

Kuehn's extensive research is presented in nine chapters, from 'Childhood and Early Youth' to 'The Old Man'. Though each of the chapters treats periods of his life of variable length, they are roughly equally weighted: the section on the 'Silent Years (1770–1780)' is about as long as 'Founder of a Metaphysics of Morals (1784–1787)'. What this means is that fairly obscure parts of Kant's life are treated in detail, and that a wealth of unknown material is presented. A range of interlocutors are introduced; a series of contexts deployed to make sense of his intellectual engagements; and some useful background is given on his key texts. The detail on his teaching is particularly good, giving a real sense of the kind of lecturer he was. There is also the story about how Kant's books were interleaved with blank pages, upon which he wrote his comments, which often spilled over into the margins of the printed pages. Some of the stories told of the final years are sad and, contrasted with the earlier years, reveal a dramatic change of life style.

What emerges is that Kant's ordered life was not so much chosen as the product of various circumstances. For example, his generally unhealthy state and his innate worrying led him to a more careful life, which also made possible the range of his achievements. His work as a public lecturer required him to give lectures at 7 a.m., and this led him to hire a servant to wake and prepare things for him. Equally the long friendship with Joseph Green, a British merchant who lived in Königsberg, and around which Kant had structured much of his social life, came to an end in 1786 with

Green's death. Green had been a man of great routine, and some of his characteristics have been passed onto Kant – in early biographies as much as in reality. With Green's death Kant entertained more at home, taking on some of Green's responsibilities, but this added to the idea of a reclusive life. In his later life he also began to worry that he would not complete his works, and so streamlined his existence in order to provide as much time as possible. It is worth noting – though it is already well known – that the *Critique of Pure Reason* appeared when he was in his mid fifties: Hume by contrast had published *A Treatise of Human Nature* before he was thirty.

Kuehn is surprisingly good when summarizing the import of Kant's works. This is not always the best part of intellectual biographies, but here the presentation of the ideas is impressive, clear and useful. This makes this a good introduction to Kant's work as well as an exemplary life. Less well known works are discussed along side the canonical texts. Kuehn's book is supplemented with a useful 'Cast of Characters' and a 'Chronology'; it is extensively referenced and has a comprehensive bibliography of works cited and a helpful index. It is both thoughtful and thought-provoking, and for such an unpromising story it is surprisingly interesting. There really is nothing comparable in this field. It should be on the shelves of anyone interested in Kant.

University of Durham Stuart Elden

Remembering the End: Dostoevsky as Prophet to Modernity. By P. Travis Kroeker and Bruce K. Ward. Pp. Xii, 280, Oxford, Westview Press, 2001, £21.99.

The premise of this book, that Dostoevsky's work is prophetic, is an interesting one and the authors argue their case through a thorough examination of Dostoevsky's novels and personal writing. Although well regarded in many fields, Kroeker and Ward feel that Dostoevsky's work has been ignored by theologians and seek to put this right by demonstrating Dostoevsky's value as a prophet. A reprint of 'The Grand Inquisitor' from *The Brothers Karamazov* is included in the text as the authors believe this to be 'the culminating point of both his art and his religious thought, the text in which his prophecy and his poetics come together in the most compact intensity' (p. 35). This is useful for those unfamiliar with Dostoevsky's work and as a focus for the discussion.

Dostoevsky was writing at a time when he felt Russia would develop in one of two ways – it could follow Europe into modernity or embrace the Russian Orthodox Church and the values of Christianity: through his characters Dostoevsky discusses the various merits and pitfalls of these paths. However Kroeker and Ward argue that some of the subtlety of his discussion has been lost by an overly simplistic interpretation of the characters. The brothers Ivan and Alyosha Karamazov represent the two positions, and the authors note that although Dostoevsky was advocating the religious route, *The Brothers Karamazov* seems to have become best known for the powerful rejection of God made by Ivan in his 'handing back the ticket' speech.

It is Dostoevsky's 'ability to discern an underlying sense to history' which fascinates Kroeker and Ward (p. 57), and which they believe adds a prophetic dimension to his work. The authors compare Dostoevsky's vision of the 'telos' with that in the Book of Revelation (pp. 103–105) and show that there is much use made of biblical imagery in his work. Through these and other literary methods, Dostoevsky tries to show a bigger picture of life than just the present suffering. For Dostoevsky, 'The pattern of God's rule, of God's nature…[is] the free offering of self in the service of a wider reconciliation in which love fulfils all' (p. 115). The authors argue that Dostoevsky presents this picture through what is said and what is unsaid. Kroeker and Ward suggest that Dostoevsky was the Father of the 'school of suspicion' (p. 135) and ask, 'Was it not Dostoevsky, before Nietzsche and before Freud, who began to teach

readers to observe what a character reveals only in order then to ask: "What is it supposed to hide?"?' (p. 137) But of course Dostoevsky's aim is very different to that of either Nietzsche or Freud. He is 'devoted to the *restoration* of meaning', whereas 'the hermeneutic of the other masters is one of reduction' (p.138). The atheism of Ivan is an important voice in Dostoevsky's work. As Kroeker and Ward write, 'Dostoevsky's exploration of atheism was not only an act of confrontation but also an attempt to learn the meaning of atheism for faith' (p. 152).

The theme of justice was important for Dostoevsky, and Kroeker and Ward show how again he constructs a debate between his own position and the prevalent one of the time. Dostoevsky argues against retributive justice in favour of restorative justice – again he looks to the *telos* to find the purpose of life. The final chapter is concerned with Dostoevsky's understanding of Christ. According to Nietzsche, Dostoevsky had been the only one apart from himself who had properly 'figured out' Christ (p. 247). Dostoevsky describes Christ as an 'eternal ideal toward which man strives' (p. 252) and he believes that by following the example of Christ, there would be an end to individualism. Kroeker and Ward write, 'It was Dostoevsky's hope that the problem of the "*I* and the *all*" would be resolved in the historical future after the model of Christ … the full realization of his hope would signify the end of history itself' (p. 255).

I felt that the book would have benefited from a concluding section to pull out the main points in support of the authors' belief that Dostoevsky should be considered a prophet to modernity. However throughout the book, Kroeker and Ward make many literary and theological observations about Dostoevsky's work and lead the reader to a much greater appreciation of the 'poet-prophet'.

Bristol, UK Lindsey Hall

Inheritance and Originality: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard. By Stephen Mulhall. Pp. xi, 448, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2001, £40.00.

This is a book about reading. The three writers under consideration are subjected to detailed, careful and at times exemplary readings of some of their key works – Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*; Heidegger's *Being and Time* and *What is Called Thinking?*; and Kierkegaard's *Philosophical Fragments*, *Fear and Trembling*, and *Repetition*. Indeed, Mulhall goes further than this, providing a number of close readings of other works throughout the study – notably the extended introduction which considers Stanley Cavell's *The Claim of Reason* as a way into the problematic of the text. It is in this particular reading that Mulhall provides his overall strategy: 'a reading of a text might as properly go on from the point at which it begins by going backwards as by going forwards. Mine will do both'. In other words, Mulhall wants to read texts through their heritage as well as their promise – Cavell's work is a response to, a reading of, the *Philosophical Investigations*; Heidegger's *Being and Time* is shaped by the opening quotation from Plato's *Sophist*, and emerged from lectures given on a range of historical texts.

Whilst the treatments of the works are worthy of close investigation, the emphasis on textual rigour has a number of drawbacks. First, and most apparent, is the difficulty in discerning the book's glue, what binds these readings together. Indeed, it is easier to gain a sense of the book's purpose from the jacket than from the inside. Careful reading can determine its rationale, but it is tempting to see the book as merely the sum of its parts. Though this would be misleading, Mulhall does not really provide the architecture of his argument in any clearly discernable form, and readers are left to uncover it for themselves. There are some useful orientations in the closing pages of the introduction, but whilst there are elements of a drawing together on

display in the final 'Concluding Dogmatic Postscript', this too is more often a reading of a range of texts and an opening towards new ideas than a conclusion in any usual sense.

Second, there is very little engagement with existing literature on these thinkers. When literature about these thinkers is brought into the argument, it is often in order to read these texts effectively as primary texts themselves. The problem is that unless a reader knows not just the texts of Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Kierkegaard being discussed, but also the literature on them, it is difficult to see exactly where Mulhall makes his contribution. For a book concerned with links back into the tradition, and the problematic notion of originality, this seems a particularly interesting issue. Third, and perhaps most understandable, is the question of language. The level of close reading that Mulhall uses seems to require very close attention to the words and constructions used by the author. None of the principal writers under consideration originally wrote in English, and though Mulhall is attentive to some translation issues, his working with English versions puts him at the mercy of their translators. This is highlighted by the wonderfully slow and patient reading of Cavell in the introduction. Cavell, of course, wrote in English, and Mulhall's analysis is down to the very letter of his writing. At the same time it illustrates the relative limitations of the other readings.

I do not mean to be overly critical. There is much to commend here, including some great examples. I particularly liked the analysis of Manchester United as practising patterns of play which provide the conditions for their own disruption, which illustrates some of the discussion of the relation between rules and games in Wittgenstein. Mulhall returns to previously trodden ground – he is the author of books on Heidegger and Cavell for example – but shows a refreshing ability to reconsider previous positions. It transcends the Anglo-American/Continental 'divide' by ignoring it, and considering writers who would ordinarily be put on different sides. It is naturally a book which repays careful reading, and there are some important insights to be found in the analysis of the individual authors. The closing pages bring in a range of issues which will be of particular interest to readers of this journal, ending with the question 'but can philosophy acknowledge religion and still have faith in itself?' A big question certainly, but all the more so since, for this reader at least, it seems to come almost from nowhere. It is in keeping with this book's muted intention that such a question will send us back to the opening pages in search of the beginning of an answer.

University of Durham, UK Stuart Elden

Natural Law Modernized. By David Braybrooke. Pp. xiii, 351, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2001, £70.00/£45.00.

This book has two major theses. The first, argued for in earlier publications and here functioning primarily as an assumption, is that the various modern attempts to develop a comprehensive legal philosophy apart from natural law have failed. That is, like the modern project of 'foundationalism' in philosophy as a whole, these attempts to generate an adequate legal theory based on social contract, binding rational duties, the hedonistic calculus, basic (but non-empirical) rights, or the autonomy of the individual have all proven themselves bankrupt. This thesis is clear, impressive, and non-controversial. The second thesis, to which the present text is devoted, is more perplexing. It is that the best way to demonstrate the first thesis to stubborn defenders of any of these modern rebellions against natural law is to pretend that the rebellion never really happened, that is, that the major thinkers of the modern canon – Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, and Hume – carried forward essentially intact the core of the same

natural law theory to be found in Thomas Aquinas! This second claim, although intriguing as an intellectual thesis, is disturbing as a rhetorical strategy for bringing about consensus and contemporary support for natural law because there seems to lurk at its core a self-referential contradiction: why try to overcome something you claim never took place? If the enemy you are trying to refute or persuade exists, where exactly did he come from? And if he doesn't exist, why are you still talking to him?

Braybrooke believes that reviving traditional natural law theory in a selective way 'offers the best hope of making plain the attachment of ethics to human needs' (p. 221). Proper moral education offers the best strategy for overcoming the prevailing (and erroneous) official ideology of rational egoism in favour of a more natural mutual consideration (Hume's and Adam Smith's 'sympathy') that begins by taking account of human needs but naturally expands to other concerns. Fortunately medieval natural law philosophy did not die out; on the contrary, it is alive and well at the heart of those who were thought to be its enemies and destroyers. Not only did it survive, one could argue that through their influence it is today even dominant! And if these masters of modernity are defending it, then their contemporary epigones cannot continue to ignore or despise it: 'If natural law theory survived robustly with them, it cannot be written off as a concern of minor authors' (p. 11). Like M. Jourdain in Moliere's *The Would-Be Gentleman*, Braybrooke would show such would-be rebels that they have been speaking 'natural law' all their lives, and didn't even know it.

The rhetorical questionableness of Braybrooke's strategy comes out in his treatment of David Copp, who in his work *Morality, Normativity, and Society* (Oxford, 1995) tries to combine a 'standard-based' theory of moral propositions with a 'society-centred' theory of moral standards. This is close to Braybrooke's own project and to his notion of the core of natural law theory. Yet Braybrooke notes that Copp does not once cite Thomas Aquinas and mentions natural law only in passing, and then not as a variety of ethical theory but as a position opposed to legal positivism. Similarly in jurisprudence Braybrooke recognizes the difficulty in invoking natural law terminology in a society thoroughly imbued with the positive understanding of law. Braybrooke writes: 'It must still come as something of a surprise to find the core of medieval natural law theory flourishing at the present day unperceived as such by an author who champions it. May its surprising presence in Copp's theory not signify that natural law theory is with us still, as much in the received ethics that Copp seeks to theorize as in any theory of the sort that he attempts? It is so familiar that, outside Catholic circles, we look past it, and overlook it; but it is lying in wait all the while, waiting for theoretical attention' (p. 178). It may be that we are working our way back painfully in practice to a position that is indiscernibly different from traditional natural law as the only basis sufficient for developing an adequate legal philosophy; but if the *same* natural law theory is operative with us as was operative with Thomas Aquinas, *why* is it so difficult to see, and *why* is it so difficult to refer to? Would not a better rhetorical strategy consist in recognizing that some change *did* take place, and that this change must now be overcome?

Braybrooke means to rescue these masters of the modern canon from their disciples and from the excesses of the fanatics and agenda-driven popularizers who have invoked their authority to support their various revolutionary and conservative causes. The obvious opposition in these programs, however, gives one pause about the cogency of Braybrooke's readings. Braybrooke takes on Leo Strauss, George Sabine, and J. B. Schneewind (and the majority opinion) in his denial that a major watershed separates 'traditional' and 'modern' political science. Though his scholarship is impressive, to this reviewer it appears that he is on occasion reading 'against the spirit' of the texts. It appears that the same thing happened in legal theory as happened in the evolution of modern science out of 'natural philosophy': many of the same words were used, but their meaning had begun to shift. The four authors

mentioned seem in fact to have on occasion deliberately cultivated certain ambiguities in their terminology to allow for such stretching and shifting to take place.

To include all four of the authors mentioned in the natural law tradition along with Thomas Aquinas, Braybrooke admits he has to be 'selective'; it appears they each contribute only one or the other element of what would be considered a 'full' natural law position: 'I shall be making corrections, as needed, to the contributions of these canonical authors to the core theory in the course of arguing for the recognition of their contributions as reinforcements rather than departures' (p. 11). To this reviewer he has stretched all of them too much on a Procrustean bed; in particular he is committing the fundamental fallacy of maintaining that if some emergent or holistic reality is constituted as a tension of opposites, as in Heraclitus' strung bow or Aristotle's form/matter composition, then each of the opposed principles deserves to be ranked as real in the same sense as the reality they together constitute, even though each of the principles can not exist without its opposite, that is, it could never be a free-standing or independent reality in its own right. Each of the four authors emphasizes one or the other of the opposed principles. Braybrooke is over generous in viewing this as sufficient to qualify them as 'natural law' philosophers in the same sense as Thomas Aquinas. So violent is the opposition between these 'principles' that, when they are put together they do not generate a stable equilibrium; rather, as in the modern physics of matter and anti-matter, they cancel each other out and disappear.

Arrupe College, Harare, Zimbabwe Patrick Madigan

Rethinking Evil. Edited by María Pía Lara. Pp. vii, 307, Berkeley CA, University of California Press, 2001, £15.95/$22.50.

Although it is primarily a philosophical text, this volume includes various social science and humanities approaches to the issue of evil. In Part One, the discussion is located in a religious context, the traditional home of the 'problem of evil'. As Lara writes: 'in the past, theologians and experts on religion were the only people really interested in the subject. Even philosophy was dependent on the capacity of religion to create a space for different kinds of answers to the problem of evil' (p. 239). Now this is no longer the case, Peter Dews suggests that 'insofar as most contemporary philosophers would regard themselves as inhabiting a "posttheological" – and even a "postmetaphysical" – intellectual universe, one must ask why evil should be regarded as a problem at all' (pp. 46–47). This 'relocation' of evil into a wider subject area is one of the reasons that the author's propose 'rethinking evil'. Another reason is the scale on which moral evil took place in the twentieth century. Bernstein comments that with Auschwitz 'an outbreak of evil occurred that poses a challenge to all previous conceptions of evil' (p. 56).

Both Kant and Arendt feature heavily in this book, particularly in Part Two 'Evil and Moral Philosophy'. Kant's use of the term 'radical evil' and Arendt's concept of the 'banality of evil' are central to many of the articles. Richard J. Bernstein concludes that 'Radical evil seems to be little more than a way of designating the tendency of human beings to disobey the moral law, not to do what they ought to do' (p. 84). A particularly interesting motif in this book, arising from Kant's and Arendt's remarks, is the question of whether evil is pursued in order to bring about a recognizably evil outcome. Jeffrey Alexander in his contribution, 'Toward a Sociology of Evil' argues that 'The act of murdering millions of Jewish and non-Jewish people during the Holocaust must be seen as something valued, as something desired. It was an evil event motivated not by the absence of values… but by the presence of heinous values' (p. 161). Similarly, Ferrara in 'The Evil That Men Do' observes that 'what was done at Auschwitz was done in the name of the good – a certain conception of the good for

a certain community. It was not done as a deliberate denial of the moral law, but as an intended affirmation of it' (p. 175). Indeed Ferrara argues that radical evil 'is never pursued directly by human beings' (p. 174). It is pursued rather as a 'misconceived view of the good' (p. 174). In conclusion, Ferrara makes the point that 'when something is recognized as evil, it means we are already distancing ourselves from it'. In contrast, Sergio Pérez in the following chapter asserts that 'for some major offenders… being evil is a life choice'. Indeed he claims there are those who 'like evil for evil itself, those who act wrongly because they like to be wicked' and such people are 'inner dispositions seeking evil in the same way that others seek good' (p. 190). For Pérez, the 'worst of evils is knowing what good is and then rejecting it to sink into darkness' (p. 191).

The question of responsibility is tackled at the end of Part Three. Manuel Cruz observes that 'what is wrong with our society is not that there is a proliferation of persons willing to apportion blame, but rather the absence in equal proportions of those prepared to accept the slightest share of this blame' (p. 201). Cruz also notes that there is 'a new *to whom* our present actions must be accountable' namely the future inhabitants of the earth. Carlos Pereda concludes that responsibility cannot be simply defined but that we must widen our understanding of what we are responsible for. He writes: 'responsibility for our deeds involves responsibility for our virtues and vices, both epistemic and practical' (p. 222) and in turn these responsibilities lead to other responsibilities including 'responsibility for our institutions, which lead us to other responsibilities, one after the next' (p. 222).

The final chapters are concerned with literature and the idea of happy endings. In the editor's contribution 'Narrating Evil' she advocates the need for reflective judgement and argues that narratives allow space for this to happen. She concludes that 'in stressing the importance of narratives, we do not seek scientific explanations or factual accuracy; what we acquire, rather, is the possibility of building a bridge, a philosophical horizon, where reflective judgement can situate us within the domain of moral learning' (pp. 249–250). This is a comprehensive collection, in which the approaches of different academic disciplines contribute to a discussion which is brought sharply into focus by the reality of human evil in the last century.

Bristol, UK Lindsey Hall

Freud and Psychoanalysis. By W. W. Meissner. Pp. xv, 279, Notre Dame IN, University of Notre Dame Press, 2000, $40.00/$16.00.

The objective of this book by the highly-regarded psychiatrist, psychoanalyst and Jesuit priest, William Meissner, is to provide an account of psychoanalytic theory for students of psychiatry. In practice, the principal subject of the book is Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) although attention is also paid to a range of other thinkers more or less in the Freudian 'tradition' (we shall return to the significance of the phrase 'more or less' shortly). As a point of information, it should be noted that this is not in any sense a book about religion or the psychology of religion: although it is a volume in the Gethsemani Studies in Psychological and Religious Anthropology, only in the preface by the editor, E. D. Carrere, is there any reference to religion.

Throughout the book, Meissner presents his complex material in clear, judiciously chosen language that, whilst often laden with jargon, is almost always accessible and intelligible. At his best, Meissner's exposition of Freud is genuinely illuminating and stimulating. His study of Freud's very early (unpublished) work, *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, for example, outlines Freud's initial enthusiasm for a quasi-hydraulic account of human psychology. In so doing, Meissner usefully illuminates some of the late nineteenth-century scientific context in which Freud was working,

and suggests how Freud's early attraction to strict positivism, though ultimately abandoned, continued to exert an influence on the development of the conceptual and linguistic identity of psychoanalysis 'proper'. Equally outstanding is Meissner's rich account of the *Interpretation of Dreams* (chapter three) as well as many other sometimes economic, but always masterful, accounts of difficult and sophisticated concepts which are nevertheless communicated with both authority and lucidity. So, the best parts of this book are excellent and deserve to be re-read and returned to many times. This is a serious work that deserves serious study.

Unfortunately, however, it was not only the best parts of the book that attracted this reviewer's attention, for it also has many weaknesses. First, it seems to have been very hurriedly constructed. Some chapters have eccentric inclusions which more attentive editing might have reorganized. Chapter nine, for example, is entitled 'Structural Theory and Ego Psychology' and indeed most of the chapter belongs under this heading (and some of it is excellent, especially its exploration of ego defence mechanisms). But the chapter ends with an apparently free-floating section on metapsychological assumptions that seems to bear little direct relevance to the rest of its contents. And almost all of the chapters have badly edited sentences in which repetition and other infelicities mar the style and distract the reader's attention (e.g., 'Invariably, the list of basic ego functions suggested by various authors differs in varying degrees', p. 170).

Perhaps more serious is the problem of the definition of Meissner's subject. Nowhere does the author present a set of criteria for what might legitimately constitute psychoanalytic theory – and what should be deemed to lie beyond its scope. In consequence, there are no explicit criteria to determine which thinkers should be included and which excluded; which treated at length, and which dismissed with – sometimes – bewildering rapidity. This lack of explicit criteria for the book's subject gives rise to a further problem: the apparent selectivity with which Meissner offers critical comment on those whose thought he describes. To take the worst example, the work of Melanie Klein attracts an entire litany of criticisms in chapter ten ('Ongoing Developments') whilst most of the rest of the analytic thinkers who share this chapter with her, e.g., D. W. Winnicott and Michael Balint, escape with virtually no evaluative comment at all. There is no explanation for this: no explicit indication, for example, that, somehow, Klein is more deviant from 'classical theory' than Winnicott or Balint.

Equally, it is hard to reconstruct on what basis Meissner offers criticisms of Freud himself and, indeed, these criticisms too look somewhat selective. Meissner is certainly willing to deliver robust challenge: for example, he has little time for aspects of Freud's instinct theory (pp. 140–41). But he is, in this reviewer's opinion at least, excessively merciful towards Freud for the undoubted poverty of his thinking around the psychological development of girls. More problematic still, however, is Meissner's austere and Olympian style that envelops the entire book. This is a book without humour, with no lightness of touch, no human warmth. Its language is devoid of affect, and there is virtually no clinical material or clinical discussion to remind the reader that psychoanalysis is fundamentally about being human, about personal growth and healing, insight, and the richness of what it might mean to be mentally healthy. When, at the end of the book, Meissner advises that the analyst should always be a 'real person' (p. 243), the student psychiatrist reader could be forgiven for already having concluded that the world of psychoanalysis was one of cold reason, emotional distance and dry detachment. If those of us who believe with passion in the psychoanalytic enterprise are to share our passion effectively with every psychiatrist, let alone the general public, we have to find a way of doing better than this.

London, UK Chris O'Gorman

Truth, Trust and Medicine. By Jennifer Jackson. Pp. xi, 172, London and New York, Routledge, 2001, £12.99.

The recent evolution from paternalism to respect for patient autonomy has called into question the traditional approach to truth-telling in medicine. In this approach it was not wrong to deceive a patient, even by lying, if this was considered to be in the patient's best interests. Fatal diagnoses, especially incurable cancer, were routinely withheld from patients on the grounds that knowledge of their imminent death would adversely affect the quality of their remaining life. Other forms of deception included the administration of placebos to hypochrondriacs and telling children about to receive vaccination that 'this won't hurt'.

In this book the author, a philosophical ethicist, sets out to determine whether lying and other forms of deception can ever be justified in the practice of medicine. She does not underestimate the difficulties involved in truth-telling, both in determining the truth and in communicating it. Accurate medical diagnosis is notoriously difficult to achieve. Telling the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth may be appropriate in a court but it can have detrimental effects on relationships between patients and doctors as well as those between friends and colleagues. The author's position is that lying is almost never justifiable, although other forms of deception can be. Even lying to save a life is wrong because it can undermine trust and establish a precedent for other exceptions to the rule. The only acceptable justification for lying is in 'situations where the liar is bereft of the usual background conditions of reciprocity and protection which account for the bindingness of general moral obligations…only where there is a direct threat to life and limb that you are cut off from effective protection of the state' (p. 71). Other forms of deception besides lying are permissible and sometimes even required in order to achieve important ends such as sustaining friendships. The author distinguishes truthfulness from candour; the former is an aspect of justice while the latter is an aspect of prudence (p. 36). There is a duty to be truthful but no duty to be candid with others.

In applying the prohibition of lying to medicine the author examines several extreme situations where lying has been held to be justifiable, e.g., to prevent a confused patient from committing suicide. She concludes that the general rule against lying must be upheld to safeguard trustworthiness, but in medicine as elsewhere the exceptional situation mentioned above can occur, e.g., where there is a serious risk to the life of the patient or another person. Here the author seems to be employing the principle of double effect without naming it as such.

Extreme candour is no less problematic in medicine than in other human relationships: 'Doctors who make more extravagant promises, never to intentionally deceive or conceal…do undermine trust, because the promise is so unrealistic…' (p. 104). This is not to justify deception willy-nilly but rather the appropriateness of deception has to be determined on a case-by-case basis. In this determination deception should not be the default position: 'though deception is not as such wrong, there seems good reason to counsel generally against casual deception, if only because people are wont to conflate lying and deceiving and hence to suppose trust is equally abused in either case' (p. 131). The author reviews common practices in patient care where deception frequently occurs and concludes that there are usually better alternatives to deception. Medical and psychological research raise special concerns about lying and deception since research methodology often requires deception and researchers may cross the boundary between deception and lying. Codes of research conduct need to make this distinction explicit and rule out lying to research subjects. In the process of enrolling research subjects both the benefits and the burdens of participating in the study should be fully disclosed so that potential subjects will not have false or unrealistic expectations.

This book is clearly written and carefully argued. It serves to clarify the issues around truth-telling in general and especially in medicine and offers practical advice for achieving the goals of truthfulness and compassion in relationships with patients. Further work on this topic should take account of the literature on the principle of double effect and on the problem of 'dirty hands'.

University of Ottawa, Canada John R. Williams

Methods in Medical Ethics. Edited by Jeremy Sugarman and Daniel P. Sulmasy. Pp. xiv, 314, Washington DC, Georgetown University Press, 2001, £29.50/$39.95.

This book is an important contribution to the understanding of modern bioethics (a term that the editors and most of the authors studiously avoid, preferring instead 'medical ethics'). It provides a systematic review of the major disciplinary approaches to the common subject matter of medical ethics, with separate chapters on philosophy, religion and theology, professional codes, legal methods, casuistry, history, qualitative methods, ethnographic methods, quantitative surveys, experimental methods, and economics and decision science. Two introductory chapters provide an overview of these methods and a review of empirical research in medical ethics in the 1980s, and the book concludes with chapters on research on physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia, research on genetic diagnosis, and how to read the medical ethics literature.

Unlike many collected works, this one displays an admirable consistency among the various contributions. The chapters on the different disciplinary methods each provide an easily understood description of the discipline and/or method(s) in question, an explanation of how they differ from other approaches, and a summary of their strengths and weaknesses. These chapters serve both to overcome the barriers that separate devotees of different approaches, especially the empirical and the non-empirical, and to explain to newcomers to the field how to undertake the different types of research. A further strength of the volume is that each of the authors heeds the editors' warning not to confuse descriptive and normative approaches.

A good book is often easier to criticize than a bad one because the weaknesses stand out, and this volume is no exception. It is unfortunate that the editors did not defend their choice of the term 'medical ethics' in place of the standard term 'bioethics' or at least explain how the two differ, if at all. A more significant omission is to be found in their overview of methods, where they identify three basic types of ethical inquiry: normative ethics, meta-ethics and descriptive ethics (p. 3). Clinical ethicists, members of ethics committees and developers of public policies on ethical issues will wonder why their practical approaches to ethics have been excluded (except in the chapter on casuistry). Given the contributors' preoccupation with research, the book would have been more accurately entitled 'Methods of Research in Medical Ethics'.

Many of the chapters on disciplinary methods are weakened by their exclusive focus on American scholarship. The one on philosophy makes no mention of the extensive work of European and Asian scholars in the field of medical ethics. Likewise, the chapter on religion and theology deals primarily with American Christian authors. The treatment of legal methods is also focused on the United States and it displays a curious lack of attention to legal scholarship (jurisprudence), dealing only with legislation and case law.

Awareness of methods is becoming recognized as an essential aspect of any scholarly endeavour, be it teaching, research, policy development or counselling. This book goes some considerable way towards illuminating the variety and roles of methods in medical ethics research. Its omissions may spur others to complete the task

of mapping methods in medical ethics in general, drawing upon sources from around the world.

World Medical Association, Ferney-Voltaire, France John R. Williams

Allocating Scarce Medical Resources: Roman Catholic Perspectives. Edited by H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. and Mark J. Cherry. Pp. x, 331, Washington DC, Georgetown University Press, 2002, $39.95/£29.75.

In 1997 the well-known American bioethicist, H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., convened a series of meetings of theologians, philosophers and physicians to elicit and discuss Roman Catholic moral theological insights into the proper allocation of medical resources, using critical/intensive care as a heuristic example. This volume contains papers that were presented at these meetings and subsequently rewritten, a consensus statement developed by the meeting participants, and introductions by the editors.

As the principal editor of and frequent contributor to the journal *Christian Bioethics*, Engelhardt has made no secret of his preference for an Orthodox religious approach to bioethics. In his introduction to this book, however, he displays an appreciation for the depth, if not the breadth, of the Roman Catholic tradition of moral theology in general and medical ethics in particular. Nevertheless, in his view the Roman Catholic reliance on natural law for determining moral imperatives provides no distinctive or unique perspective on issues of resource allocation: 'the more one asks to hear about what is specific in Roman Catholic moral theology regarding allocation morality, the more one gets an emphatic answer that would otherwise be quite puzzling: There is nothing specific, there is nothing particular! It is all universal!… Roman Catholic morality, at least that relevant to allocational issues, is universally available through discursive reason' (p. 14).

The Roman Catholic contributors to this volume agree with Engelhardt's characterization of their tradition that the insights of faith on issues related to resource allocation are not contrary to those available through human reason. However, they assert against Engelhardt that Roman Catholicism can enrich our understanding of these issues by applying certain Christian values and virtues to resource allocation decision making and behaviour. For Paulina Taboda, these are the moral duty to pursue health in proportion to the risks inherent in certain medical interventions, and the moral duty to accept death. For Joseph Boyle and Josef Seifert, it is the moral duty not to demand or provide 'futile' interventions. For Paul Schotsmans and Ludger Honnefelder, it is the dignity and equality of all human persons that requires equal access to critical care. For George Khushf, it is the sacralizing of health care in Catholic health care institutions.

The non-Roman Catholic contributors to the volume disagree among themselves about the value of the Roman Catholic approaches and whether, and to what extent, these approaches are similar to their own. Michael A. Rie claims that his Reform Judaism and Roman Catholicism agree on the infinite value of human life, which requires close attention to societal allocation of resources to critical care. Another Jewish participant, Teodoro Forcht Dagi, offers a detailed account of Jewish approaches to resource allocation but does not compare them to those of Roman Catholicism. Edward Hughes does not want to compare and contrast his Orthodox tradition with Roman Catholicism but 'to point out sources of understanding and of action found within our common heritage, and calling for their restoration as the basis of moral action' (p. 239). For example, the teachings of the Church Fathers on life and death, if properly understood and applied, would result in Christians seeking intensive medical care only in cases of real need. However, he feels that the majority of Roman Catholics have abandoned the common heritage. Dietrich Rössler describes

Protestant views on resource allocation but, like Dagi, does not comment on the Roman Catholic essays. On the other hand, Corinna Delkeskamp-Hayes challenges strongly the Roman Catholic consensus on the capacity of human reason to deal with moral dilemmas: 'The authors' commitment to a Roman Catholic understanding of natural reason and moral obedience that is thought accessible and attainable without the assistance of the Holy Spirit has rendered them unable to take seriously the gulf that separates secular policy from the spiritual implications of Christian morality' (p. 277). She finds the Roman Catholic proposals for allocation policies at best weak and at worst contradictory. James W. Heisig, a Roman Catholic, criticizes the book's preoccupation with critical care as an example of contemporary Western society's misplaced faith in science and technology, and of the gross imbalance in health care resources among nations.

Given these differences among the participants in the project, it is not surprising that their consensus statement is minimalistic in content. It identifies the main issues considered by the group, posits a few non-controversial dogmatic principles and ethical norms, describes the main features of critical care, sets forth seven agreed-upon guidelines and concludes with two areas for further work and one area where no agreement has been reached.

As a contribution to moral theology, this book provides a useful overview of the variety of Christian approaches to a specific ethical issue and illustrates the difficulty, if not impossibility, of achieving ecumenical or inter-religious consensus on such issues. As a contribution to bioethics, the book's main shortcoming is the absence of the other principal players in health care resource allocation: hospital administrators, nurses, health department officials, politicians, health economists and political scientists. Their experience and insights would have greatly enriched the somewhat abstract discussion reflected in the participants' essays.

World Medical Association, Ferney-Voltaire, France John R. Williams

The Ethics and Economics of Assisted Reproduction: The Cost of Longing. By Maura A. Ryan. Pp. viii, 183, Washington DC, Georgetown University Press, 2001, £33.25/ $44.95.

The literature on assisted human reproduction is vast. This book has two distinguishing characteristics: its author speaks from personal experience of infertility treatment as well as from an academic perspective; and its focus is the interplay of theological, ethical and economic contributions to the issue of fair access to infertility treatment.

Determination of what constitutes fair access is a highly contested matter, particularly in the United States of America where health care in general is treated 'as, at the same time, a commodity, an entitlement, and a dispensation of charity' (p. 122). The confused relationship among these three concepts is manifested in many ways, for example: the refusal of public and many private insurers to cover infertility treatment, which restricts access for all but the relatively wealthy; the widespread acceptance of 'procreative liberty', which militates against any limits on reproductive technologies; and the highly ambiguous attitude towards infertility of one of the main dispenser of charity health care, the Catholic Church. The author explores each of these constraints on fair access in turn.

In justifying their refusal to fund infertility treatment, insurers cite the very high cost of some of the procedures as well as the low priority that both their insurees and the public assign to this condition. Ryan counters with the following arguments: infertility treatment is not necessarily more costly than many other insured services; privatizing infertility treatment exempts it from routine consideration of appropri-

ateness, cost, effectiveness and safety and, more importantly, risks commodifying the 'product' of treatment, i.e., the child; and infertility can be as great a threat to personal well-being as medical conditions for which treatments are fully insured.

Ryan takes serious issue with the proponents of procreative liberty, most notably John Robertson, on their understanding of reproduction as a wholly private matter. Drawing upon Catholic social teaching, she criticizes this approach for elevating the interests of infertile individuals or couples far above those of the children who are born as a result of assisted reproduction and for ignoring the social impact of individual reproductive decisions. Despite its rich tradition of ethical and pastoral teachings, the Catholic Church has failed to develop a spirituality of infertility that would include recognition of the suffering experienced by infertile couples and provision of services to alleviate infertility or, when this is not possible, to reconcile couples to living without their own offspring. In addition to Catholic social teaching, Ryan draws upon ethicists such as Lisa Sowle Cahill, Eric Cassell and Daniel Callahan as she sketches her outline of fair access to infertility treatment. Cahill provides her with 'a nuanced appreciation for the integrity of sexuality, marriage, and parenthood in the Catholic natural law tradition…[that strikes] a delicate balance…between, on the one hand, giving the biological or genetic dimensions of human reproduction an absolute moral status and, on the other, treating biological and genetic connections as wholly dispensable' (pp. 51, 53). Cassell's discussion of suffering situates infertility as a condition worthy of medical treatment while at the same time cautions against seeing it as simply a medical problem rather than as a more general crisis of the self. Callahan's writings on the goals of medicine entail 'at least a prima facie case for including treatment for infertility in an account of basic care' (p. 83). Ryan characterizes as 'modest or cautious' her approach to determining fair access to assisted reproduction (p. 133). It requires, first of all, a definition of infertility as 'an impairment giving rise to a normative claim insofar as it is the frustration of a physical capacity that results in the inability to act in the world in an important way, that is, through procreation' (p. 136). As such, it should in principle be eligible for appropriately funded and regulated medical treatment. However, given the need to ration medical services, limits to infertility treatment are not only acceptable but required. Ryan prefers a policy that makes limits treatment specific, for example, four attempts at in-vitro fertilization.

In the end, Ryan seems pessimistic that her approach will prevail: 'The strong weight of American traditions of procreative liberty and the current independence of fertility clinics will make it extremely difficult to attempt to place external constraints on the practices of assisted reproduction' (p. 173). What seems to be required is a major educational and political program to convince both the citizenry and politicians that infertility is a socio-medical condition in need of adequate public support. Perhaps a subsequent book by the author will deal with such unfinished business.

World Medical Association, Ferney-Voltaire, France John R. Williams

Dictionary of Christian Biography. Edited by Michael Walsh. Pp. xiv, 1250, New York and London, Continuum, 2001, £60.00.

Oftentimes in research or simple reading, scholars and others have come across names of people with whom they are not familiar and there has been no handy tool to get basic information about who they were and what they did. Now with this *Dictionary of Christian Biography* those unfamiliar names as well as those who are more well known are easily accessed. For example, Liutwin of Trier is side by side with David Livingstone. Chao Tzu Ch'en and John Shang-chieh Sung figure among the list from

China as do Matteo Ricci and Jean Joseph Marie Amiot. The editor, Michael Walsh, formerly Librarian at Heythrop College in London, has accomplished an excellent job in the face of a mammoth task.

He and his collaborators provide us with more than six thousand entries in paragraph form. While each entry is limited to a single paragraph in size, one finds the basic information concerning each person (as a rule, between one and two hundred words). Furthermore, the two pages of basic bibliography which the writers used, provide a person with a starting point to more information. How does one choose which people are to have their biographies included here? The editor wanted to include a variety of people whose Christian faith played an important role in their public lives which began after the New Testament period. (Another criteria is that these people are deceased.) One would expect, then, a simple selection from among the saints, theologians, or leading Church people. To select among the saints is a difficult task. Yet, this Dictionary attempts to do so by choosing those who are considered important today because of cultural influences and interests. When it comes to theologians and leading Church figures, the Dictionary is clearly inter-denominational covering the various Protestant churches as well as Orthodox Churches. The editor does admit that, though there are entries about the major figures in the Eastern Churches, there could be more. This is an imbalance which, as he says, could be redressed in another edition were there to be one. One might think that this list covers the scope sufficiently. However, that person would be wrong. The entries also include musicians, painters, politicians, lawyers, architects and people in education. All of these entries come from people who lived in all parts of the world, though it is evident there will be more emphasis upon those from the Middle East and the West. (One might hope that someday, scholars will come together to compile a similar Dictionary which will deal with Christian figures who come from Asia or Africa or South America exclusively.) A very interesting feature of the Dictionary is to be found in the Indices. The first Index is one of the dates of the deaths of the individuals covered. The second Index concerns the Places of the deaths of the individuals found herein.

This *Dictionary of Christian Biography* is a wonderful reference work suited to many people. Today more and more people who are not professional theologians are reading theological studies. They will find this tool very helpful as they come across figures who are unknown to them. The same can be said of theological students who find new worlds of thought opening up to them through people in the past who reflected seriously upon Christian Faith. This work is a must for journalists who write for newspapers and magazines which are religious or not. The Editor deserves our thanks and praise for providing the world with this immensely useful reference work in our time.

Church Divinity School of the Pacific at Berkeley CA, USA Richard P. Hardy

HeyJ XLV (2004), pp. 128–133

SHORT NOTICES

Images of God in the Old Testament. By Mary E. Mills. Pp. 159, London, Cassel, 1998, £14.99.

Even a casual reading of the Bible makes one aware of the different manners in which God is presented: the 'transcendental' God of Genesis 1; the different ('anthropomorphic') presentation in Genesis 2 and 3; the God who seems revengeful but also loving, and so on. What are the implications of this for one's concept of the God of the Bible? Mary Mills gives us a rather detailed study of this question. After an introduction on the Old Testament in general, there is a chapter on introducing God, Genesis 1–11 (God the creator, God the judge, God the redeemer). This is followed by three sections on images of God in the Torah (God and gods in Genesis; God of law and covenant in Exodus; God of love and jealousy in Deuteronomy), in prophecy (God as First and Last in Isaiah; God as father and husband in prophecy; God and the Temple in Ezekiel), and in the Writings (God and Divine Wisdom (personified wisdom), God of power and justice in Psalms; the god of time in Daniel). In the second last chapter she returns to the three basic images of God in Genesis 1–11, God the creator, the judge and redeemer. These three roles of God she considers to provide an ideological perspective for the rest of the Old Testament. The final chapter, conclusion, is on God, the Old Testament and godtalk We are taken into the question of culture–linked readings, ideologies; we are also lead into the debate as to the locus, the arena, of biblical study, citing P. R. Davies' position: the church (devotional; liturgy), the 'academy, which is humanistic and non-confessional', Scripture in the 'academy' but at the service of the church. Related to this is the view of the Bible merely as text, as literature. Applied to the subject of the book there can be no generalization from one text to an overall view. Citing Davies again: the texts 'cannot deliver a system of beliefs, a ''religion'' nor a ''theology'' beyond the confines of the stories themselves, since stories create their own worlds'. We are given, too, F. Watson's reply to Davies and S. Fowl's position that texts do not have ideologies. In this book we thus have on the one hand what appears to be Mills' own position that God is the key character of each of the books of the Bible, but that God's role and character nevertheless vary between the books, and between genres of writing and on the other an indication of problems arising from particular stances, ideologies (for instance the 'academic') from which the biblical evidence is viewed by the modern reader or scholar. There is a good bibliography, but surely 'P. Saatchi' in p. 154 must be an error for 'P. Sacchi'.

M. McN.

God in the Fray: A Tribute to Walter Brueggemann. Edited by Tod Linafelt and Timothy K. Beal. Pp. 350, Minneapolis MN, Fortress Press, 1998, £19.99.

In his *Theology of the Old Testament* (1997) Professor Walter Brueggemann wrote: 'Among the general matters to be noted at the outset of our work in the face of ''the collapse of history'' is this: *The Old Testament in its theological articulation is characteristically dialectical and dialogical, and not transcendental*…By this I mean that the God of Israel is characteristically ''in the fray'' and at risk in the ongoing life of Israel'. To celebrate the professor's sixty-fifth birthday his friends have drawn on this text for the title of the volume of essays in his honour. All twenty essays have to do with the theme. They are arranged in four parts: I. Engaging Brueggemann's

theology (essays 1–3); II. God in the Torah (essays 4–8); III. God in the Prophets (essays 9–14); IV. God in the Writings (essays 15–20). There is a lengthy introduction by the editors. Part V provides clear evidence that Brueggemann himself has not withdrawn from the fray. He has a chapter (21) on his own classic: '*Theology of the Old Testament:* A Prompt Retrospect'. The work ends with a selected bibliography of Walter Brueggemann's writings from 1961 to 1998. An entire galaxy of Old Testament scholars have contributed to this festschrift: N. G. Gottwald, T. E. Fretheim, D. R. Blumenthal, J. Barr, N. C. Lee, J. L. Crenshaw, Dale Patrick, R. W. L. Moberly, D. M. Gunn, R. E. Clements, S. Terrien, K. M. O'Connor, R. Rendtorff, P. Trible, P. D. Miller, C. Westermann, D. J. A. Clines, S. E. Balentine, and the editors T. Linafelt and T. K. Beal. The bibliography has been compiled by C. H. Hulet. There is an index of scriptural references, which includes at the end some apocryphal/deuterocanonical and rabbinic writings. It would be invidious to single out any particular contribution in this fine collection for mention. All together form a fine contribution in an area in which there is currently no small interest.

M. McN.

God, Anger and Ideology: The Anger of God in Joshua and Judges in Relation to Deuteronomy amd the Priestly Writings (Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplement Series 279). By Kari Latvus. Pp. 108, Sheffield, Sheffield Academic Press, 1998, £37.50/$60.00.

The anger of God and its dire consequences as presented in some of the books of the Bible (notably in the Old Testament) is clearly a serious theological problem. It is a question addressed in this slim volume, which is a much-abbreviated version of a doctoral thesis published in Finnish and accepted in 1993 at the University of Helsinki. The title and subtitle indicate the approach followed: the theme of the anger of God in the books of Joshua and Judges is an ideology, a manner of presenting a message, in line with what we find in Deuteronomy and the Priestly Writings. Two major subjects are treated in the introduction: The history of the investigation of the formation of the Deuteronomistic History (Joshua to Kings) and studies of the Anger of God (in the Old Testament). The Deuteronomistic History is seen as having a basic original layer which has later additions, representing later, post-exilic, redactional activity of Deuteronomistic and Priestly circles, activity which responded to situations within the respective Jewish groups. The texts of the two books analysed (with their themes) are: Joshua 23 (Other Nations), Joshua 2 (Other Gods), Judges 3:7–11; 10:6–16 (Other Gods 2); Joshua 7 (Fire and Stones: Achan); Joshua 22 (God between the Parties) and Joshua 9 (Divine Order). His conclusion is that in the basic text of the Deuteronomistic history the question of God's anger does not appear even once, although most of the basic elements of the Deuteronomistic theology of anger are present. The theme of anger was added by later Deuteronomistic editors for a variety of reasons. A main reason for God's anger is idolatry which symbolizes for a later Deuteronomic theology a totally negative attitude to everything that God had done or given to the Israelites. Among other reasons for the additions was the demand to obey the law. Latvus identifies other post-Deuteronomistic texts which connect God's anger with a still stricter attitude to the law, e.g., the Achan case where Yahweh turns from his anger only after the stoning of Achan who had committed a theft. The priestly texts for their part give a wholly different view of the theology of anger. Among other things the anger of God has become an instrument in the power struggle between Jewish parties or the ultimate legitimization of the position of the priestly leaders. In these cases writers have assimilated their own interpretations with God's will and created a system which cannot even be criticized by others without causing

the risk of divine anger. There is 'An Uncritical Epilogue' on a search of the theological intention beyond the Anger of God, with reflection on the relevance of the basic message of Deuteronomy for present-day pastoral concerns. There is a good bibliography and the usual indexes of references and authors. At p. 69, line 5 'the book of Joshua' seems a patent error for 'J. B. Pritchard'! While a study of this sort does not remove the theological problem of God's anger, an analysis such as this would seem to be a prior requirement for an examination of the matter.

M. McN.

The Stories of Jesus' Birth: A Critical Introduction (The Biblical Seminar 72). By Edwin D. Freed. Pp. 184, Sheffield, Sheffield Academic Press, 2001, no price given.

Despite its subtitle, the aim and thrust of this book is popularizing rather than scholarly. As a tool for familiarizing lay readers with the historical and critical issues surrounding the infancy narratives in Matthew and Luke, it will undoubtedly prove useful. However, scholars would have some reservations about much of the presentation. Freed's interactions with other scholars are substantially limited to four works, of which Brown's *The Birth of the Messiah* is quite justifiably one. Fitzmyer's commentary on Luke is undoubtedly important, Goulder's work on Luke interesting and intriguing, and Horsley's *Liberation of Christmas* challenging. But is there really no scholarship on Matthew important enough to merit some interaction? Freed's references to Jewish traditions is far too heavily dependent on Ginzberg's *Legends of the Jews*, even where he acknowledges tions of John, according to an overall plan: introduction, shape of the section (discourse, prayer, narrative), reading the text, conclusion. His title for the work is inspired by words of a sermon of the eighth–century abbot St Theodore the Studite on the adoration of the cross: 'Indeed an unheard of exchange! We are given life instead of death, incorruptibility instead of corruption, glory instead of dishonour'. This book by is quite distinct from the same author's commentary on John, published approximately at the same time. His approach to John's Gospel is the same in both – through narrative criticism, but with stress on the original author and readers, as well as an eye the work's message today. Moloney has written extensively on narrative criticism and related questions in *Belief in the Word* (1993) and again in the introduction to his *Sacra Pagina* commentary. With regard to Scripture interpretation we are in an age when the very admissibility of any faith dimension in academic exegesis is queried by some. Biblical studies in 'the academy' are expected to be humanistic and non-confessional. In the preface to this work, Moloney finds it necessary to refer to this current situation. Some recent scholarship, he notes, has withdrawn approval for the approach he had adopted for his reading of the Fourth Gospel in the first two volumes of this work (1993, 1996) (re refers in a note to works on poststructuralism and the 'Postmodern Bible'). In this new view, a postmodern reading of the Bible can no longer privilege the biblical text. The Bible, like all other imposed 'canons', is a collection of moments in the endless play of intertext that has been frozen and then imposed as a 'rule' within a culture. In a parallel fashion, the reader is also an unstable text, the result of the interweaving of many texts, none of which should be taken as the norm. Despite this, Moloney tells us, he has pursued his project to its conclusion. One of the many important contributions of postmodern scholarship, he remarks, is its focus on context. His context is critical scholarship of the Christian tradition *from within the Christian tradition*. One of his expressed difficulties with scholars who demand that the Bible be removed from its canonical position is their apparent neglect of their own context: academics who are who they are and do what they do because of the Christian tradition. His adherence to

his stated principle shines through in this very fine reading of John 13–21. The work has an excellent bibliography and an index of authors.

M. McN.

Old Testament Yahweh Texts in Paul's Christology (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament. 2 Reihe, 47). By David B. Capes. Pp. 220, Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1992, no price given.

Capes' work is a slight revision of his doctoral dissertation, 'Paul's Use of the Old Testament Yahweh Texts and its Importance for his Christology', which had Professor E. Earles Ellis as supervisor. After an introduction, in three chapters it takes us through—as a Christological title in recent discussion (the theory of an origin outside Palestine of Bousset and Hahn; the theory of a Palestinian origin of J. G. Machen, A. E. J. Rawlinson, O. Cullmann);—in the Septuagint and Paul's Letters; Yahweh texts in Paul's letters, first with God as referent and then with Christ as referent. There is treatment of the implications of his findings for Paul's Christology, with sections, among others, on 'Jesus is Yahweh', and Paul's 'high' Christology. A conclusion gives a summary of his evidence and findings, noting that he has suggested that the application of Yahweh texts to Christ occurred within the churches of Palestine at an early date and that it was not an innovation of the later Greek churches. Given his high regard for Scripture, this exegetical picture means that Paul considered Jesus as a manifestation of Yahweh. It means that he identified Jesus with Yahweh in a substantive way, despite the opinion of some to the contrary. For Paul Christ was more than God's agent to effect the redemption of the world, He remained distinct, yet fully identified with Yahweh. His closing words are: 'Could there indeed be a "higher" Christology?' There is a very good bibliography and an index of passages cited.

M. McN.

Platonism Pagan and Christian: Studies in Plotinus and Augustine. By Gerard O'Daly. Pp. x, 278, Aldershot, Ashgate-Variorum, 2001, £52.50.

The volume under review features fourteen of Professor O'Daly's publications on key philosophical topics in Plotinus and Augustine, with a fifteenth article dedicated to Boethius. As one has come to expect with Variorum's Collected Studies Series, the book is well produced and is enormously convenient since some of the articles herein were initially published in *Festschriften* or acta that are not readily available. The articles tend to cluster around a few central themes: for Plotinus, the theme is the relationship of the self to the One; for Augustine, O'Daly is particularly concerned about memory and cognate topics on the one hand, and the origin of souls on the other. This gives the collection a reasonable coherence. What emerges from these comparisons is a strong conviction that thoughtful late ancient men like Plotinus and Augustine shared an enormous stock of values, beliefs and thinking-habits, irrespective of their religious differences.

By far the lion's share of the essays is devoted to Augustine. Of these, all but three are ancillary to longer works that O'Daly has published (*Augustine's Philosophy of Mind* and *Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide*). Readers desiring a nuanced,

contextualised and systematic approach to Augustine's thought will find these publications very satisfying. It should be noted that, even though only two of the articles are specifically dedicated to him, Plotinus is also very much in evidence throughout the collection: O'Daly often compares and contrasts Augustine's position on a given issue to Plotinus'. Futhermore, the book contains O'Daly's doctoral thesis in toto (*Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self*), so readers with a special interest in Plotinus' thought will find a great deal to ponder quite apart from Augustine. The price is steep, but certainly this is a book that belongs in every library that supports research into late ancient philosophy and religion.

The works reprinted in this volume are as follows:

Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self (Shannon, 1973); 'The presence of the One in Plotinus', in *Plotino e il Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente* (Rome, 1974); 'Memory in Plotinus and two early texts of St. Augustine', in *Texte und Untersuchungen* 117 (= *Studia Patristica* 14); 'Did St. Augustine ever believe in the soul's pre-existence?', in *Augustinian Studies* 5 (1974); 'Time as *distentio* and St. Augustine's exegesis of *Philippians* 3, 12–14', in *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 23 (1977); 'Augustine on the measurement of time: some comparisons with Aristotelian and Stoic texts', in *Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought*, edited by H. J. Blumenthal and R. A. Markus (London, 1981); '*Anima, error*, and *falsum* in some early writings of St Augustine', originally published in Spanish in *Augustinus* 26 (1981); '*Sensus interior* in St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* 2.3.25-6.51', in *Texte und Untersuchungen* 129 (= *Studia Patristica* 16); 'Augustine on the origin of souls', in *Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum, Ergänzungsband* 10 (1983); 'Predestination and freedom in Augustine's ethics', in *Philosophy in Christianity*, edited by M. Vesey (Cambridge, 1989); 'Hierarchies in Augustine's thought', in *From Augustine to Eriugena*, edited by F. X. Martin and J. A. Richmond (Washington, DC, 1991); 'Remembering and forgetting in Augustine', in *Poetik und Hermeneutik* 15 (1993); 'Augustine's critique of Varro on Roman religion', in *Religion and Superstition in Latin Literature*, edited by A. H. Sommerstein (Bari, 1994); 'Thinking through history: Augustine's method in the *City of God* and its Ciceronian dimension', in *Augustinian Studies* 30 (1999); and 'Sense-perception and imagination in Boethius, *Philosophiae Consolatio* 5 m. 4', in *Philanthropia kai Eusebia*, edited by G. W. Most, H. Petersmann and A. M. Ritter (Göttingen, 1993).

A.M.C.C.

Forgiveness and Truth: Explorations in Contemporary Theology. Edited by Alistair McFadyen and Marcel Sarot. Pp. ix, 227, Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark, 2001, £19.99.

The annual Easter conference of the Society for the Study of Theology has begun to produce edited collections of papers and responses in a series published by T. and T. Clark and bearing the title carried by this book's subtitle: *Explorations in Contemporary Theology*. The first volume was on *The Future as God's Gift* from the 1999 conference on eschatology. Here we have papers from the 2000 Oxford conference on forgiveness. Forgiveness is perhaps a leading candidate for an area of contemporary life crying out for sensitive theological analysis, and while this volume does not disappoint, it does perhaps most clearly underline the vast complexity of the topic. Of particular note are the first and last chapters. Alistair McFadyen offers an introduction to the book which locates and even dialogues with the subsequent chapters. His own work on sin (*Bound to Sin* [Cambridge University Press, 2000]) is a

profound analysis of related areas, and gives him a constructive voice here. One key issue is whether forgiveness comes first, unmerited and undeserved regardless of repentance, or whether it needs to be part of a process including remorse or repentance on the part of the wrongdoer. This latter view has risen more to prominence through focusing on the voice of the victim (whether by way of feminist analysis or therapeutic/pastoral concerns, both tackled here). Fundamentally: is the scriptural ideal of generous forgiveness an impossible, unrealistic or simply irresponsible model? Does it, in fact, achieve forgiveness only at the expense of truth? Is it possible, as one contributor puts it, to move from the facile 'forgive and forget' to the profound 'remember and forgive'? The chapters of this book work hard to navigate this path. Main conference papers included are Haddon Wilmer, 'Jesus Christ the Forgiven: Christology, Atonement and Forgiveness'; Christopher Jones, 'Loosing and Binding: The Liturgical Mediation of Forgiveness'; Fraser Watts, 'Shame, Sin and Guilt'; Deborah van Deusen Hunsinger, 'Forgiving Abusive Parents: Psychological and Theological Considerations'; and Peter Selby, 'The Merciful Economy'. Another paper, from George Hunsinger, was published in IJST in 2000. In addition there are two conference responses, five short papers and one invited essay. The final chapter is a comprehensive literature survey from Nigel Biggar, covering one hundred years of literature on forgiveness in thirty-seven pages, loosely organized by topic according to theological, philosophical, political or empirical orientation. Not only would I have greatly valued this when researching the topic myself, but it would serve as an ideal *entrée* to those wanting to untangle the many different strands of thought on forgiveness. Biggar himself articulates a helpful multi-faceted perspective at the end, holding together willingness to forgive, repentance, actual forgiveness, and varieties of appropriate restoration. Familiar topics such as 'third-party forgiveness' (where A forgives B for a sin against C) and unforgivability here, as elsewhere, receive helpful comment. This book will be a valuable resource for all who are wanting to look at the topic of forgiveness in all its theological and practical complexity.

R.B.