Researching Peace Building Architecture

Luc Reychler and Arnim Langer

The Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies (Centrum voor Vredesonderzoek en Strategische Studies) was established in the Department of Political Science of the University of Leuven in 1983.

The last five years research has been focused on: conflict prevention, democratic peace building, field diplomacy, conflict impact assessment and peace architecture. CPRS output appears in journals, books and in the Cahiers of the Centre for Peace Research. Linked to the Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies is the Master Program in Conflict and Sustainable Peace (www.kuleuven.be/macsp/).

Contents

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Introduction

Violent conflict is a common feature of today's developing world. The vast majority of the world's poorest countries has experienced a violent conflict during the past decade[1]. It has become clear that sustainable development is impossible without sustainable peace building, and vice versa. Although there appears to be a decline in the global magnitude of armed conflict, at the end of 2002, Marshall and Gurr still registrar 12 ongoing major societal wars (e.g. Algeria, Colombia, Burundi, Liberia, Chechnya); 11 societal wars with sporadic outbursts of violence (e.g. Philippines, Nigeria, Somalia, Uganda); and 7 major societal wars which appeared to have been suspended or repressed during the period 2001-2002 (e.g. Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Chad, Angola)[2]. These (armed) conflicts have become increasingly concentrated in Africa and south-central Asia.

Building sustainable peace is a complicated, time-consuming and often very expensive process. One factor that strongly complicates this process is the fact that these countries are frequently confronted with ***multiple transition processes***: from war to peace, from authoritarian to more democratic government, and from a state-directed to a market-directed economy[3]. Transforming conflict-torn, political unstable, and socially and economically disintegrated countries into more politically and economically stable, equal and prosperous ones requires not only a clear and legitimate vision of the 'peace' or future one wants to achieve, but also a clear understanding of how to get there. One-dimensional approaches proposing magical solutions, ensuring the peaceful co-existence of the different peoples in one country, obviously, do not exist.

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[1] World Bank, (1997), *A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, Washington D.C., April 1997.

[2] Marshall, Monty G., Gurr, Ted Robert, (2003), *Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy*, CIDCM, University of Maryland, February 2003, p. 12-16.

[3] Haughton, J., (1998), The Reconstruction of War-Torn Economies, CAER II Discussion Paper, June 1998, no. 23, p.4.

Some peace processes like those in Northern Ireland, South Africa and El Salvador seem well underway towards building self-sustainable peaceful societies. Other peace processes like those in Bosnia, Cyprus, Rwanda, Korea or Angola seem at best to have stopped the fighting. In this respect, Walter and Hartzell have found that in, respectively, 53 percent and 30 percent of the cases they investigated, the conflict parties returned to war within five years after signing a peace agreement[4]. Moreover, certain conflict countries appear to be stuck in a situation characterised by a more or less 'stable unresolvedness'. This means that to a large extent the hostilities have stopped or are limited to certain regions; however, the root or structural causes of the conflict are not addressed, the reintegration and reconciliation of different parties and/or communities has not taken place and the establishment of more democratic structures and institutions has no priority. The presence and/or leverage of outside actors over the conflicting parties is often crucial for maintaining stability in such an environment (e.g. SFOR in Bosnia, UN peace keeping force in Cyprus).

Our handling and understanding of these extremely complicated transformation processes is still largely insufficient. Although a considerable amount of research has been done on identifying and explaining the impact of a wide variety of factors, actors or circumstances on the stability of peace processes (e.g. presence of international peace keeping forces, provisions of peace agreements, commitment problems, conflict ripeness, security dilemmas, demobilisation issues, etc.), there are still many aspects and factors that need further analysis and explanation. Moreover, the question why certain peace processes are more successful in establishing or transforming societies into more politically stable and peaceful ones is as important and urgent as ever.

This leads us to the concept of '**peace architecture**'. This concept can be defined as the overall design of the peace building process. There is obviously a great deal of overlap in the meaning of the terms strategy, design, planning and architecture. However, we prefer to use the metaphor peace architecture because (a) it draws attention to the architectural principles/considerations that have to be addressed in sustainable peace building processes; (b) it emphasizes the need to identify the necessary pre-conditions or building blocks for different types of conflicts; (c) it could shorten the learning curve by providing a methodology for comparative analysis and evaluation of conflict transformation; and (d) it could

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[4] See respectively: Hartzell, Caroline, (February 1999), "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.43, No.1, p.3-6; Walter, Barbara F., (Summer 1999), "Designing Transitions from Civil War, Demobilization, Democratization, Commitments to Peace", *International Security*, Vol.24, No.1, p.127-130.

contribute to greater attention paid to the vital role of peace architects[5]. Further, the image of peace architecture suggests that peace building is not only a science but also an art, where imagination and creativity are an essential part of the building process.

Building peace requires not only courage and will, but also a great deal of knowledge and skill. There is good and bad peace architecture and, subsequently, good and bad architects. An example of bad peace architecture was the Treaty of Versailles at the end of the First World War. It was a revenge type peace arrangement that planted the seeds of more violence. John Keynes explained in 1919 his disappointments in a book 'The economic consequences of Peace'. He was especially critical of the one-sided attribution of guilt and the high level of reparations demanded from the Germans. He called it a Carthaginian peace on drastically severe terms. His message was that no political structure for keeping peace would stand up if its economic foundations are rotten. The Second World War proved his point. An example of good peace architecture is the creation of the European Union. This peace architecture turned Europe, which scored all the Guinness Records of violence before 1945 into one of the most free, secure and effluent regions of the world.

The hypothesis of this book is that sustainable peace is more likely to be achieved through 'good' peace architecture. The characteristics of good and bad peace architecture will be researched through comparing successful and less successful peace processes. The objective of this paper is to present a comprehensive framework for analysing peace processes. The framework provides both a methodological and operational route map for differentiating good from bad peace architecture. This paper is structured as follows. The first section discusses the nature of contemporary conflicts and how this influences the current peace building practice. The second part reviews some of the current explanations for success or failure of peace processes. The third section identifies the (conceptual) impediments in the research on sustainable peace building. The fourth section defines sustainable peace building and its constituent building blocks. The fifth section suggests how peace building processes can be analyzed and compared. This involves five research steps, starting with: (a) an analysis of the conflict, (b) an assessment of the inherent difficulty of the conflict, (c) an assessment of the achieved success, (d) an analysis of conflict transformation at the level of the building blocks, and (e) an inquiry of the overall peace building process. The sixth section gives an overview of the case studies and discusses the case selection method. Finally some specific research questions are being put forward (still to be done).

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[5] Reychler, Luc, (May 2002), "Peace Architecture", *Peace and Conflict Studies*, Vol. 9, No.1, p.26.

1. Contemporary conflicts and peace building environments

Most contemporary conflicts are said to be internal or civil wars[6]. Yet, as Kaldor has pointed out, even though these current wars are localised, they involve a myriad of transnational connections so that the distinction between internal and external becomes difficult to sustain[7]. She further asserts that during 1980's and 1990's a new type of organised violence has developed. These so-called 'new wars' [8] are characterised by a globalisation, privatisation and democratisation of the violence.

First, the globalisation of conflicts points at the increasing interconnectedness - on political, economic, military and cultural issues - of the conflict parties and conflict regions with the rest of the world. The impact of globalisation on contemporary conflicts is clearly visible. Just think of the wide variety of international actors that are usually present in a conflict country or region. Among others: international reporters, mercenary troops and military advisers, diaspora volunteers, international agencies ranging from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) like Oxfam, Save the Children, 'Médecins sans Frontières', Human Rights Watch, and international organisations and institutions like the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the European Union (EU), the United Nations Children's Fund (Unicef), the United Nations (UN).

Second, the privatisation of violence refers to the fact that in most contemporary conflict countries, the 'state' has lost its monopoly of (legitimate) violence. The main entities responsible for today's violence are no longer regular state armies, but rather (loosely) organised rebel groups, paramilitary entities or terrorists. In this respect Kaldor states "… violence is increasingly privatised both as a result of growing organised crime and the emergence of paramilitary groups, …"[9]. There are many cases that substantiate this observation. For instance: the violence committed in Northern Ireland by the Ulster Defence Force (UDF) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA); the atrocities committed by the paramilitary groups active during the Bosnian war (most notoriously the Arkan's Tigers, Red Berets and Seselj's Chetniks); the various rebel groups in the eastern

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[6] Wallensteen and Sollenberg have found that of the 107 armed conflicts that took place in the period 1989-1998, 101-armed conflicts had an intrastate character (Wallensteen, Peter and Margareta Sollenberg, Armed Conflict, 1989-98, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 5, pp. 593-606).

[7] Kaldor, Mary, (2001), *New and Old War: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA.

[8] Kaldor, Mary, (2001), ibid., p.1.

[9] Kaldor, Mary, (2001), ibid., p.5.

part of the Democratic Republic of Congo or Liberia that are fighting each other over state control or the lucrative natural resources.

Third, the democratisation of the violence signifies that in contemporary conflicts the civilian population is the main victim. On average 90 percent of the casualties are civilians and only 10 percent are active combatants. This contrasts sharply with the situation at the beginning of the 20th century when these figures were completely reversed. Thus, 90 percent of the casualties were military combatants and only 10 percent civilians. There are several reasons for this dramatic change of the military-civilian-casualties ratio. For instance, in order to achieve their (strategic) objectives (e.g. facilitating an envisioned secession, creating an ethnic homogenised territory or controlling a region through fear and violence) it has become rule rather than exception for the warring parties to directly and violently target and attack the civilian population. Whatever the terminology used to describe these actions - war crimes, human rights abuses, ethnic cleansing, genocide - it was a phenomenon widely observed throughout the world during 1990's (e.g. Bosnia, Rwanda, East Timor, Liberia, Sierra Leone).

It becomes increasingly difficult to make generalisations about the causes of intrastate conflict. Every conflict is the result of a myriad of interrelated factors within a context-specific environment[10]. However, Gardner observes that there are four explanatory factors to be repeatedly referred to in the academic literature: insecurity, inequality, private incentives and perceptions[11]. Most scholars agree that certain combinations of these factors cause or exacerbate conflict[12]. In this respect Stewart puts forward an interesting hypothesis to explain the incidence of violent conflicts. She asserts that if severe political, economic and social inter-group inequalities - so-called horizontal inequalities - are coinciding with some sort of cultural identity group (e.g. religious, ethnic, regional, etc.), culture could become an important mobilising agent[13].

This hypothesis could be used to incorporate the four explanatory variables. Moreover, socio-economic inequalities could not only lead to grievance-based conflict mobilisation, but certain elite groups could also use these (perceived) differences and disparities between different identity groups as a means of gaining political and economic power and influence. Further the

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[10] Gardner, Anne-Marie, "Diagnosing Conflict: What Do we Know?", in: Hampson, Fen Osler, Malone, David M., (eds.), (2002), *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, p.17.

[11] Gardner, Anne-Marie, (2002), ibid., p.17.

[12] Gardner, Anne-Marie, (2002), ibid., p.18.

[13] Stewart, Frances, (February 2002), "Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development", *QEH Working Papers*, No.81, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, p.10-13.

stimulation or even manipulation of the perceptions of exclusion, inequalities and discrimination will result in an increased insecurity feeling or fear for the other ethnic groups within a country. In this situation ethnic conflict mobilisation and violent conflict becomes more likely.

Certain environments are more conducive to violent conflict than others. Environments that make countries more prone to or more susceptible for violent conflict are usually characterised by features such as the absence of democratic institutions and rule of law, the erosion of state institutions and legitimacy, economic failure and severe impoverishment of the population, the inversion of economic growth patterns, etc. In Exhibit 1 below we have grouped together some characteristics of peace-enhancing and conflict-enhancing environments.

Peace-enhancing environment	Conflict-enhancing environment
- No history of violence; - Minor and/or declining horizontal and vertical inequalities; - High level of income or development - Sustained progress and improving economic situation; - Set of strong formal institutions including rule of law, property rights, democracy, independent judiciary, etc.; - Relatively equal power distribution across the society; - All members of the society contribute to the economy; - Set of informal rules encouraging cooperation, solidarity, reciprocity, non-violence and mutual trust; - Relatively moderate (positive) expectations about the socio-economic progress; - Stable and democratic region; - Economic burden of adjustment and war evenly distributed; - Steady economic progress or development; - Fair and transparent distribution of export revenues; - No (ethnic) elite domination or monopolisation in politics and/or economics; - Highly legitimate and effective state structures and institutions; - Low level of human rights abuses;	- History of violent conflict and political instability; - Severe and increasing horizontal and vertical inequalities; - Low level of income or development; - Economic failure or stagnation: negative economic growth, rising inflation, rising unemployment, etc.; - Weak formal institutions (e.g. corruption, bureaucratic and not transparent procedures, fraud, no guaranteed property rights, weak democratic structures, half-hearted implementation and enforcement of laws and sentences, etc.); - Power in the hands of few illegitimate and unaccountable 'free agents' or political entrepreneurs; - Economic burden of adjustment or war unevenly distributed; - Widespread human rights abuses; - Unstable and undemocratic region; - Informal institutions encouraging exclusiveness, self-help, personal benefit, etc.; - Unattainable expectations about the future socio-economic progress; (Ethnic) elite domination in the economic realm and/or monopolisation of political decision-making process; - Simultaneous political and economic transitions and reform processes;

• Management of inequalities through effective socio-economic redistribution • Good governance based on a legitimate, effective, competent, transparent and participative government; • No ethnic favouritism and/or discriminatory policies; • International supportive (trade) environment (e.g. lowering of trade tariffs and quotas, terms of trade support, etc.); • International support/aid (e.g. technical assistance, debt relief, financial support, etc.).	• State structures and institutions lack legitimacy and effectiveness; • Ethnic favouritism and discrimination with regard to public employment (e.g. government, army, state businesses, etc.), government spending priorities, distribution of export revenues, tax burden, etc.; • Too little support from the international community; • No protection or international support against global economic forces and trends.

Exhibit 1: Peace-enhancing versus conflict-enhancing environments[14]

Once a conflict has crossed the threshold of violence it becomes more difficult and costly to manage. In addition to the social, political, ecological, cultural, psychological, humanitarian, time related and spiritual costs, violent conflicts often result in considerable development and economic costs and consequences. Typical macroeconomic effects of war are[15]: declining, stagnating or negative economic growth; falling income, food production exports and imports; declining tax revenues and rising budget deficits; biased price structures and exchange rates; hyperinflation; the collapse of economic regulation and the rules of exchange. It is clear that war substantially reduces developing countries' capacity of socio-economic development. Moreover, the destruction of capital and the reduction of new investment will severely inhibit countries' future economic growth and socio-economic progress[16]. Stewart and Fitzgerald distinguish six categories of capital - productive capital, economic infrastructure, social infrastructure, human capital, organisational capital and social capital - and subsequently show how war negatively affects each of them. Thus, for instance, the existing stock of a country's productive capital such as plants, equipment and buildings is usually significantly

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[14] Langer, Arnim; Reychler, Luc, (2003), "The Political Economy of Peace Building", *CPRS Working Paper*, University of Leuven; see also: Le Billon, Philippe, (July 2000), "The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies Need to Know", *Network Paper*, No.33, Humanitarian Practice Network, p.7.

[15] Le Billon, Philippe, (July 2000), ibid., p.11

[16] Stewart, Frances, FitzGerald, Valpy, "Introduction: Assessing the Economic Costs of War", in: Stewart, Frances, FitzGerald, Valpy and Associates, (2001), *War and Underdevelopment, Volume 1: The economic and Social Consequences of Conflict*, Oxford University Press, p.15.

degraded as result of bombings, landmines or lack of maintenance. New private productive investments will obviously fall as a consequence of the insecurity and uncertainty of the return of investment.

Certain violent conflicts will have more drastic and persistent effects on an economy than others. Likewise, certain kind of economies and/or sectors will be more vulnerable to the disrupting consequences of violence and thereby suffer more. Because internal wars are so politically divisive they generally have more drastic consequences than international wars[17]. Economies that are characterised by such features as a low average income, a low tax base that is dependent on a few key sectors, dependence on the import of essential commodities, inflexible economic production structures, high dependence on markets and thus on transport and financial systems, are worst affected by war[18].

Let us illustrate the significant economic and social costs of armed conflict by looking at the conflict in El Salvador[19]. El Salvador's civil war lasted from 1979 till 1991. The lowest GDP-estimate by the World Bank's Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit indicates that in absence of the armed conflict, El Salvador's GDP per capita in 2000 would have been at least 75 percent higher than its actual value. The poverty headcount would have been 15 percent points lower, child malnutrition could have been halved to about 6 percent, and infant mortality could have been 25 percent lower than today's levels. Further, in the absence of conflict the country's education indicators would also be significantly better. Moreover, estimates indicate that the secondary and tertiary school enrolments could have been 6 and 10 percentage points higher, respectively.

Civil war not only has extremely high development costs and consequences, but there are also significant costs for outside actors. Brown and Rosecrance have estimated the costs of conflicts to regional and international powers[20]. They distinguish five main sets of costs: *refugee costs* (e.g. economic burdens, political and social problems, military complications), *military costs* (e.g. territorial infringements, military skirmishes, higher defence budgets), *direct economic costs and economic*

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[17] Le Billon, Philippe, (July 2000), ibid., p.11.

[18] Le Billon, Philippe, (July 2000), ibid., p.11-12.

[19] Figures and data with regard to El Salvador have been borrowed from: World Bank, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, (January 2003), *The Economic and Social Costs of Armed Conflict in El Salvador*, Social Development Department, Dissemination Notes, No.8.

[20] Brown, Michael E., Rosecrance, Richard N., (1999), The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Area, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflicts Series, Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa (N.J.), 275 pp.

opportunity costs (e.g. lost investments, lost imports, lost export markets, disruptions to labour supplies, regional burdens), *instability costs* (e.g. ethnic radicalisation, drug trafficking, nationalistic and diversionary campaigns, opportunistic interventions and invasions), and *costs of international peace operations* (e.g. humanitarian relief efforts, multifunctional conflict resolution operations). This framework of analysis was subsequently used to compare the costs of actual conflicts (Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti, and the Persian Gulf) to the estimated costs of conflict prevention efforts that could have been taken to prevent these conflicts[21].

Talentino applies this framework for the analysis of the costs of conflicts to the Bosnian case [22]. She concludes that "the costs of the war are undoubtedly higher, particularly when taking into account the effort it will take to rehabilitate Bosnia's economy, provide services such as roads and electricity, and return displaced persons to their home"[23]. Moreover, the total measurable cost to the international community of the Bosnian conflict has been estimated to amount to $53.7 billion for the period 1992-1997. The costs can be decomposed as follows: Military 19.06, Humanitarian 11.98, Economic (direct) 6.36, Economic (opportunity) 10.00, Individual nations 6.28. Further, the counterfactual analysis of the costs of conflict prevention assumes that the escalation of the conflict could have been prevented if the international community would have been prepared to send a preventive force to Bosnia for four years. Depending on the size of such a preventive force, the international community would have saved between $20.4 billion and $43.3 billion.

International and domestic peace builders or architects should be fully aware of these (changed) features or characteristics of contemporary peace building environments. Without a thorough analysis of the nature and problems of a particular peace building environment, most peace building interventions are unlikely to contribute to the sustainability of a peace process and can even seriously endanger it. Variables such as the democratisation and privatisation of violence or the extremely high development costs influence the design of a peace building process. They can significantly reduce the policy options. For instance: the democratisation of violence means not only that there are more victims and refugees, but also that the reintegration and reconciliation process with

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[21] Brown, Michael E., Rosecrance, Richard N., (1999), ibid., p.21.
[22] Talentino, Andrea Kathryn, "Bosnia", in: Brown, Michael E., Rosecrance, Richard N., (1999), *The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Area*, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflicts Series, Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa (N.J.), p.25-52.
[23] Talentino, Andrea Kathryn, ibid., p.51.

regard to the affected families will cost more time and resources that cannot be spent on other issues; further, the privatisation of violence frequently results in a more complicated demobilisation process because the command structures of most paramilitary/criminal organisations is less transparent and stable. However, in order to prevent the criminalisation of a post-conflict society it is crucial that these organisations and persons are being fully demobilised and decommissioned.

2. Current research on peace building

During the 1990's, the incidence and pervasiveness of intrastate conflicts has forced both policymakers and scholars to devote more attention to these conflicts [24]. Concerned with both the humanitarian suffering and the potential economic and regional security consequences, governmental and non-governmental organisations are now paying more attention to conflict prevention and peace building and are looking for expertise. Equally important, during the last ten years considerably more research has been done on the issues of conflict prevention and peace building.

However, as Stedman observes in this respect "the first studies of peace implementation in the 1990's tended to have an undifferentiated view of civil wars: El Salvador was Angola was Northern Ireland was Rwanda"[25]. Moreover, the challenges of peace making were seen as generic, common and/or non-specific. This undifferentiated treatment of the problem resulted in "open-ended solutions"; simply stressing the need for more resources, more attention, and stronger (security) guarantees[26]. Yet, a great deal of progress has been made regarding the understanding of conflict transformation and peace building processes.

Moreover, during this period research on peace building issues has attracted attention from different disciplines (e.g. political, economic, sociological, psychological, philosophical, etc.). In addition to the research that has specifically focused on issues of peace building and conflict resolution within conflict countries, there is a vast (academic) literature on issues and problems that are inextricably linked with building self-sustainable peaceful societies. In this respect one can think of the research on democratic transition processes, economic reform and development,

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[24] Hartzell, Caroline, (February 1999), "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.43, No.1, p.3.

[25] Stedman, John, (2002), "Introduction", in: Stedman, Stephen John; Rothchild, Donald; Cousens, Elizabeth M., *Ending Civil Wars, The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, p.3.

[26] Stedman, John, (2002), ibid., p.5.

institution building, structural adjustment, development cooperation and aid, environmental sustainability, etc.

Let us briefly review some studies that have contributed to enhancing our understanding and explanation of the (in-) stability and/or (un-) successfulness of peace processes:

Caroline Hartzell explores the role of institutions in mitigating the security threats that antagonists face as they move from a violent conflict situation - characterised by self-help - towards a situation of centralised state power. She finds that the settlements that are more extensively institutionalised prove to be more stable[27].

Barbara Walter rejects the conventional view that the main obstacle for solving intrastate conflicts is the unwillingness or inability of rival leaders to compromise or find mutually acceptable ground. She asserts that even if war adversaries do solve their underlying grievances, they still confront a "unique set of commitment problems" that stem from the need to integrate two or more separate organisations into a single state[28]. A successful implementation of a settlement requires that each group is able to convince its opponent that it will faithfully disengage its military forces and then honestly share power[29]. This requires a complex set of internal and external guarantees. In this respect Walter stresses "the crucial role that outside intervention can play in resolving these conflicts"[30]. Charles William Maynes is another scholar who emphasises the importance of outside actors such as international - especially the United Nations - and regional organisations[31].

Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo examine the importance of economic conditions to the settlement stability in the case of El Salvador[32]. Moreover, they assert that El Salvador faces the following dilemma: "Should it sacrifice economic stabilisation to proceed with implementing the peace accords, or should it strictly carry out its stabilisation and

[27] Hartzell, Caroline, (February 1999), ibid., p.3-22.
[28] Walter, Barbara F., (Summer 1999), "Designing Transitions from Civil War, Demobilization, Democratization, Commitments to Peace", *International Security*, Vol.24, No.1, p.127-155.
[29] Walter, Barbara F., (Summer 1999), ibid., p.154.
[30] Walter, Barbara F., (Summer 1997), International Organization, Vol.51, No.3, p.336.
[31] Maynes, Charles William, (Spring 1993), "Containing Ethnic Conflict", *Foreign Policy*, Issue 90, p.3-21.
[32] De Soto, Alvaro; Del Castillo, Graciana, (Spring 1994), "Obstacles to Peacebuilding", *Foreign Policy*, Issue 94, p.69-83. Other studies in this respect are among others: Haggard, Stephan; Kaufman, Robert R., *The Political Economy of Democratization*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (N.J.); Boyce, James, (ed.), (1996), *Economic Policy for Building Peace: The Lessons of El Salvador*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO.

structural adjustment program, perhaps endangering the peace?"[33]. In this context he foresees a potential collision between, on the one hand, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and, on the other hand, the United Nations. Neither process is independently sustainable; therefore there is a need for an integrated approach.

Fen Osler Hampson studies why some peace agreements fail and others succeed at ending civil war[34]. In order to explain the outcome of peace processes, he analyses four different factors: the extent of the international involvement in the peace process; the ripeness of the conflict; the systemic and regional power balances; and the quality of the peace agreement itself. Based on his analysis of the peace processes in Namibia, Cyprus, Angola, El Salvador, and Cambodia, he concludes that the outcome of peace process is dependent on "the quality and level of support given by third parties to the peace process" and "the support of a country's neighbours and outside great powers that are involved directly or indirectly in the conflict"[35].

Stephen John Stedman focuses on the spoiler problem[36]. He identifies spoilers as leaders or parties that see their interests threatened by the peace process and who will use force to undermine the peace process. He puts forward a spoiler typology based on their position in the peace process, number of spoilers, their intent, and whether the locus of spoiling behaviour lies with the leader or followers of the party[37]. In the presence of spoilers, the peace building strategy should be adapted accordingly because, in his view, confidence building will not be enough to stop these wreckers of peace agreements. He suggests that international implementers should start by diagnosing the spoiler type "and then choose an effective strategy for managing the spoiler"[38].

Roland Paris points out that the effectiveness of the current international peace building paradigm of "liberal internationalism" has been limited[39]. This paradigm assumes that "the best way to consolidate peace in war-shattered states is to transform these states into stable market democracies"[40]. He argues that the main reason of this limited success

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[33] De Soto, Alvaro; Del Castillo, Graciana, (Spring 1994), ibid., p.4.

[34] Hampson, Fen Osler, (1996), *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail*, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C.

[35] Hampson, Fen Osler, (1996), ibid., p.210.

[36] Stedman, Stephen John, (Fall 1997), "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes", *International Security*, Vol.22, No.2, p.5-53.

[37] Stedman, John, (2002), ibid., p.12.

[38] Stedman, John, (2002), ibid., p.12.

[39] Paris, Roland, (Fall 1997), "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism", *International Security*, Vol.22, No.2, p.54-89.

[40] Paris, Roland, (Fall 1997), ibid., p.89.

stems from the "destabilising effects that the process of political and economic liberalisation itself generates"[41]. Peace building agencies have not adequately anticipated or addressed these problems.

John Darby and Roger MacGinty have edited a volume, based on the 'Coming out of Violence' project, that aims to identify those factors that expedited or frustrated five peace processes in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, the Basque Country, South Africa and Sri Lanka. The study investigates the influence of the following six variables on the success or failure of peace processes: violence and security issues, the economy, external actors, public opinion, symbols, and progress towards political settlement. They find that violence and the progress towards a political settlement are the most important variables in determining the outcome of a peace process. With regard to the latter variable, it is crucial to have a sufficient inclusion of ex-militants in order to prevent or limit potential spoiler behaviour.

Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens have edited a volume that focuses on the role of outside implementers in peace processes. Therefore peace agreements that were "largely self-implementing", such as South Africa in 1994, or Zimbabwe in 1987, were not included in the case studies[42]. They claim that the current research on peace implementation suffers from several weaknesses, such as a lack of conflict differentiation with regard to the complexity of the peace building environment, the prescription of open-ended, underspecified strategies for implementing peace agreements or a lack of prioritisation in the implementation agenda[43]. An important finding of the project was the observation that "cases of peace implementation differ in two important respects: difficulty of the implementation environment and the willingness of states to provide resources and risk troops"[44].

These studies have contributed significantly to improving our understanding of the failures and successes of peace processes. Yet, this research overview is by no means complete or exhaustive; we could have discussed many other interesting studies and publications. However, the crucial point is that there still is a serious lack of understanding regarding the *architecture* of these transformation processes. Comparative research is necessary to fill this void. In general terms, this research should be aimed at exploring the question how the overall design of a peace process affects its stability or successfulness. Further research questions in this respect are for example: how do the different building blocks of sustainable peace (e.g.

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[41] Paris, Roland, (Fall 1997), ibid., p.89.
[42] Stedman, John, (2002), ibid., p.22.
[43] Stedman, John, (2002), ibid., p.2.
[44] Stedman, John, (2002), ibid., p.2.

democratising, reconciliation, etc.) interact and affect each other? Which building block should get priority? Is there an implementation sequence or timing that increases the chances of success? The study of Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo is very interesting in this respect because it is one of the few studies that actually looks at the interaction between two different peace building blocks (economic versus political). In any case, a study that aims to research these issues should take notice and learn from the above described studies.

3. Impediments to research on sustainable peace building

As mentioned above, a great deal of progress has been in the understanding of conflict transformation and peace building processes. Important, for example, is the identification of the necessary building blocks for sustainable peace. However, despite all the progress, conflict prevention and peace building is still characterised by a slow learning curve. This can be attributed to a series of weaknesses in (a) the recognition and definition of latent and manifest violence, (b) the explanatory analysis, and (c) the design of conflict prevention and peace building efforts.

3.1. Recognition and definition of latent and manifest violence

Superficial and narrow definition of violence. Most attention tends to be paid to the direct and mediagenic means of violence, such as wars and terrorism. And this despite the fact that less visible, indirect violence causes more casualties. Most of the violence results from discriminatory structures and bad governance[45]. The price of using the narrow definition of violence can be a surprise. Physical violence is never far away from the other types of violence. Before the genocide erupted with volcanic force, Rwanda was considered a relatively secure place. A broader analysis of the violence would have warned us better about the growing tensions in the country[46].

Poor differentiation between different types of violent conflicts. Most of the research projects tend to lump a variety of types of violence into broad categories, such as civil wars, ethnic or identity conflicts. Others use rather simple ways to differentiate conflicts. They dichotomise conflicts along one or more dimensions: internal versus international, low intensity versus high intensity, protracted versus short-term conflicts, symmetric versus asymmetric. The lack of appropriate differentiation does not enhance a good understanding and management of conflicts. Different conflicts have

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[45] Reychler, Luc; Jacobs, Michèle, (2003), "Het Geweldsvierkant", *CPRS Working Paper,* University of Leuven.
[46] Uvin, Peter, (1998), *Aiding violence*, Kumarian Press, Connecticut, USA.

dissimilar causes and need different approaches to transform them constructively.

Inadequate analysis of the costs and benefits of violence. It remains very difficult to find comprehensive, precise and reliable data on the costs and the benefits of violent conflicts. The number of people killed during the Spanish civil war and the Algerian war of independence is estimated between half a million and a million. The contrast between the precision with which the American casualties in the Iraqi war are accounted for and the Iraqi casualties is disturbing. With respect to violent conflicts, there seem to be three classes of dead people. First-class casualties get close up media attention. The suffering and frustration is well depicted. Second-class dead receive less and more detached attention. Third-class casualties, such as the two million Congolese who died during the recent civil war, tend to be neglected and are covered in large numbers. Another problem is the absence of comprehensive assessments of the costs of violent conflicts. A comprehensive assessment covers not only humanitarian and economic costs, but also political, social, ecological, cultural, psychological, spiritual and time related costs. Time is an irreversible resource. A third problem relates to the poor information about the benefits of violence and those who receive them. The lack of a comprehensive, precise and reliable accounting system remains a serious problem. As long as decision-makers are not convinced that conflict prevention is more cost-effective than reactive conflict management, it will be difficult to create an effective conflict prevention regime. In addition, violent conflicts will be difficult to eradicate, when conflict profiteers are not made accountable. Conflicts tend to escalate and continue, as long as powerful stakeholders expect benefits[47].

3.2. Explanatory analysis of potential and manifest violence

A premature framing of the violence as good or bad. Some analysts start their research with the implicit assumption that the violent conflict behaviour they study is bad. When violent conflict is framed as immoral, insane and criminal, it is difficult to imagine that other parties involved in the conflict are perceiving the same violence as morally acceptable, rational and justified. Such premature moralising, psychologising or legalising of conflicts tends to hamper a thorough understanding of a conflict. If everybody would perceive violent conflict as bad, violence would disappear from the earth. Conflict prevention and peace building requires an open-minded analysis.

Predominant one-disciplinary analyses. Most of the studies of conflict and peace building tend to be characterised by their one-disciplinary analysis.

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[47] Lucienne Beuls

The disciplines studying conflict and peace tend to consider themselves as the most important. Economists believe that development will bring peace; political scientists believe in democracy; lawyers in justice; the military consider security as the most important contribution. Some recent studies focus at the interaction between variables from two disciplines (political-psychology and political-economy). The growing awareness of the negative side-effects of well intentioned peace efforts stimulated these kinds of studies[48]. Others, the so-called multi-disciplinary studies, ask different experts to shed light on the conflict. Despite these recent efforts, we are still far away from comprehensive and trans-disciplinary analyses. There are no studies which research systematically the cross impact of all the necessary peace building efforts

High on static, low on dynamic conflict analyses. Although progress has been made in identifying different escalation and de-escalation phases in conflict behaviour, most empirical research is static. It continues the Correlates Of War (and peace) work started by David Singer. There are practically no projects comparing the dynamics of successful and less successful cases of conflict transformation and peace building. A better insight into the cross-impact of the many transitions (political, economic, security, psychological, etc.) involved in the peace building process, would contribute considerably to the design of peace building processes.

Taboos or the evasion of sensitive issues. Research on war and peace has always been hampered by taboos, resulting in the evasion of studying sensitive issues, such as the role of the victims in genocidal conflicts, the root causes of political terrorism or the low level of international democracy.

No systematic study of peace building leadership. In the study of business, politics and strategy a great deal of research has been done on the nature of successful leadership. Despite the fact that conflict and peace researchers consider leadership as a crucial factor in the peace building process, there is practically no systematic research about the nature of successful peace building leadership. Great leaders like Gandhi, Mandela or Marshall have become icons. Peace building leadership has similarities with other effective leadership, but also has a set of unique characteristics that need to be validated [49].

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[48] See for example: Anderson, Mary, (1999), Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace or War, Lynne Rienner, London, Colorado.
[49] Reychler, Luc; Stellamans, Anton, (2002), "Peace Building Leadership", *CPRS Working Paper*, University of Leuven.

3.3. Design of conflict transformation and peace building architecture

No clear and compelling definition of peace. Without a clear and compelling vision of the peace one intends to build, it is difficult to design an appropriate peace building process and to motivate the stakeholders to support it. Most peace building efforts, such as the road map for the Middle East, have no clear and compelling definition of peace. This causes distrust and tends to inhibit progress. A clear and common vision of the future is a major hope-raising and confidence-building measure.

No comprehensive needs assessment. Every policy is based on some kind of needs assessment. The problem is that most needs assessments for peace building are incomprehensive. A comprehensive needs assessment for sustainable peace building pays attention to the state of the following building blocks: (a) an effective system of communication, consultation and negotiation, (b) peace enhancing political, economic and security structures, (c) an integrative climate, (d) multilateral cooperation, and (e) a critical mass of peace building leadership.

Belief in the added value of separate peace building efforts. A great deal of peace building consists of a compilation of peace building measures and efforts designed and implemented by different departments. They could include mediation efforts, election monitoring, development cooperation, peace keeping, and the facilitation of reconciliation. The underlying assumption is that all these efforts will end up or contribute to sustainable peace building; the more peace efforts the better. Instead, in many cases the outcome was at best a huge pile of peace building stones. This can be attributed to (a) the lack of coherence between the efforts made in different sectors and at different levels, and (b) bad timing. The experience has shown that well-intentioned efforts can have negative impacts on the conflict transformation and peace building process. The aim of sustainable peace building architecture is to strengthen the synergy between the different peace building efforts.

Intuitive assessment and anticipation of the difficulty to transform a conflict and of the costs and benefits of alternative approaches. The decision to tackle a conflict will be determined by the expected difficulty of the conflict transformation and of the anticipated costs and benefits of different options. Only recently efforts are being made to differentiate difficult from less difficult conflicts[50]. The difficulty of a conflict is

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[50] See for example: Stedman, John, (2002), "Introduction", in: Stedman, Stephen John; Rothchild, Donald; Cousens, Elizabeth M., *Ending Civil Wars, The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, p.1-40; and Reychler, Luc; Langer, Arnim, (2001), "De Moeilijkheidsgraad van conflicten" ["The level of difficulty of Conflicts"], *CPRS Internal Paper*, University of Leuven.

determined by several factors: the history of the conflict, the nature of the issues, the symmetry or asymmetry of the power relations, the strategic thinking and bargaining of the primary parties, and the positive or negative role of the outside players. A more accurate proactive assessment of the costs and benefits of different conflict transformation options would permit the stakeholders to make more rational choices.

No objective common criteria for determining the success or failure of peace building efforts. Evaluating the results is the final and often overlooked stage in the peace building process. The purpose is to determine the extent to which the efforts have led to sustainable peace. Too often, peace is declared prematurely. The Treaty of Versailles and the Oslo peace process are sad reminders. An accurate appraisal of the success of peace building efforts is of crucial importance in the study of peace architecture. The appraisal implies the involvement of the major stakeholders. It considers not only the outcome, but also the cost-effectiveness of the efforts, the satisfaction with the peace building process, and the inherent difficulty of the conflict.

4. Sustainable peace building

Sustainable peace is not a mirage, but a political reality that can be created [51]. It is present in many countries and even in a few regions in the world. The European Union is a good example. In contrast to the first part of the 20th Century, Western Europe has become a security community or an environment that has acquired all the attributes of a sustainable peace[52]. A series of pre-conditions has proved to enhance the creation of security communities: compatibility of political and economic values, "we-ness" feeling, democratic regimes of the member states, communication and mobility, political efficacy and successful arms control[53]. The concept of security community mainly refers to the interaction between states; however, the framework that we propose has its principal focus on building peace between different conflict parties, groups or communities *within* countries. The objective of this conceptual framework is to provide a practical way of looking at the peace building process. If one aims to study these processes, one needs an operational definition of **sustainable peace**.

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[51] Reychler, Luc, (1999), *Democratic Peace-Building and Conflict Prevention: The Devil is in the Transition*, Leuven University Press, Leuven, p.24.

[52] The term "security community" was introduced by Karl Deutsch and refers to a group of countries that feel mutually secure. See Deutsch, Karl W., (1978), *The Analysis of International Relations*, Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs (N.J.), 312 pp.

[53] For a further discussion of security communities and its preconditions see; Reychler, Luc, *A Pan-European Security Community: Utopia or realistic perspective*, in: United Nations, (1991), *Disarmament*, United Nations Publications.

The absence or presence of sustainable peace can be assessed by looking at the output or the installation of the pre-conditions of sustainable peace.

Output: sustainable peace is characterised by:

- Absence of physical violence;

- Elimination of unacceptable forms of political, economic and cultural discrimination;

- Self-sustainability;

- High level of internal and external legitimacy or approval, and;

- Propensity to enhance constructive management and transformation of conflicts.

Pre-conditions:

The essential requirements or pre-conditions - cited in the peace research literature - for creating such a sustainable peace can be clustered into five peace building blocks: an effective system of communication, consultation and negotiation, peace-enhancing structures and institutions, an integrative political-psychological climate, a critical mass of peace building leadership and a supportive international environment. The underlying assumption is that these five peace building blocks are mutually reinforcing and therefore need to be present or installed simultaneously. The lagging of one of these building blocks can seriously undermine the stability or effectiveness of the entire peace building process.

The first building block focuses on the establishment of an effective communication, consultation and negotiation system at different levels between the conflicting parties or members. In contrast to the negotiation styles used in most international organisations, the negotiation style, for example, within the European Union is predominantly integrative. Ample time and creativity is invested in generating mutually benefiting agreements. Without win-win agreements the Union would disintegrate.

The second building block emphasises the importance and nature of certain peace-enhancing structures. In order to achieve a sustainable peace, (conflict) countries have to install certain political, economic and security structures and institutions. The political-legal reform process should aim to establish a legitimate political structure. Legitimate political structures are supported by the people when they are perceived or expected to deliver physical security, economic security, education, health facilities, etc. Full fledged and consolidated democracies tend to achieve the highest level of support. Partial democracies, who do not satisfy the earlier mentioned basic needs, lead to disillusion and violence. A widely noted United Nations survey of 19.000 Latin Americans in 18 countries in April 2004 produced a

startling result: A majority would choose a dictator over an elected leader if that would provide economic benefits [54]. It is crucial to note that the transition from one state (e.g. non-democratic structures) to another (e.g. consolidated democratic environment) is not without difficulties: the devil is in the transition [55].

The economic reform process envisions the establishment of an economic environment which stimulates sustainable development and economic growth and reduces vertical and horizontal inequalities. The security structures should be able to safeguard and/or increase the population's objective and subjective security. The most effective is the cooperative security structure. It provides at the same time human security, collective security, collective defence, and efforts to create stability in its external environment [56].

The creation of an *integrative climate* is the third necessary building block for establishing a sustainable peace process [57]. This building block stresses the importance of a favourable political-psychological and social-psychological environment. Although the climate is less tangible and observable than the other building blocks, it can be assessed by looking at the consequences. An integrative or disintegrative climate can express itself in the form of attitudes, behaviour and institutions. Characteristic of an integrative climate are, for example, the expectation of an attractive future as a consequence of cooperation, the development of a we-ness feeling or multiple - loyalties and reconciliation.

The fourth building block is a supportive regional and international environment. The stability of a peace process is often crucially dependent on the behaviour and interests of neighbouring countries or regional powers. These actors can have a positive influence on the peace process by providing political legitimacy or support, by assisting with the demobilisation and demilitarisation process or by facilitating and stimulating regional trade and economic integration. However, these same actors can also inhibit the progress towards stability, for example, by supporting certain groups that do not subscribe to the peace process. Likewise, the larger international community plays a crucial role in most post-conflict countries. The international community by means of the UN agencies or other international (non-)governmental organisations often provide crucial resources and funding or even take direct responsibility for

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[54] International Herald Tribune, Electing force in Latin America, June 25, 2004, p.2.
[55] Reychler, Luc, (1999), ibid., p.58.
[56] Richard cohen and Michael Mihalka, Cooperative security: New Horizons for International security, The Marshall Center, European center for security studies.
[57] Reychler, Luc; Langer, Arnim, (2003), The Software of Peace building, Canadian Journal of Peace Studies

a wide variety of tasks such as the (physical) rebuilding process, humanitarian aid, development cooperation, third-party security guarantor, etc.

The fifth building block is the presence of a critical mass of peace building leadership. There are leaders in different domains: politics, diplomacy, defence, economics, education, media, religion, health, etc. Leadership can be situated at different levels: the elite, middle and grassroots level[58]. The top level comprises the key political and military leaders in the conflict. The middle-range leaders are not necessarily connected to or controlled by the authority or structures of the major opposition movements. They could be highly respected individuals or persons who occupy formal positions of leadership in sectors such as education, business, religion, agriculture, health, or humanitarian organizations. The grassroots leaders include people who are involved in local communities, members of indigenous nongovernmental organizations carrying out relief projects for local populations, health officials, and refugee camp leaders. Finally, there are external and internal leaders[59].

In addition to the above mentioned peace building blocks, we need also appropriate support systems and humanitarian aid. The installation of the building blocks needs to be backed up by the development of appropriate educational (media), legal, health and technological support systems. The humanitarian aid is indispensable during the conflict and in part of the post conflict phase. The aim is to provide help to people, who have been victims of man-made disasters (wars, conflicts, outbreaks of fighting) or structural crises (severe political, economic or social breakdowns). According to the EU, "the focus is mainly on providing goods and services (e.g. food supplies, medicine, vaccinations, water conveyance, psychological support, minesweeping, clothes, shelter, rehabilitation). The aid is also preventive (planting of trees to counter floods, etc.). Its sole aim is to prevent or relieve human suffering. This assistance is directed mainly towards vulnerable people and, as a priority, to those in developing countries. A key point is that it is accorded to victims without discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, sex, age, nationality or political affiliation. Humanitarian aid decisions are to be taken impartially and solely according to the victims' needs and interests. There are therefore no criteria or conditions for the aid, which is non-refundable"[60].

The way in which these different building blocks are established or are dealt with, will surely affect the outcome of a peace process (see exhibit 2).

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[58] Lederach, John Paul, (1997), *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C.
[59] Reychler, Luc; Stellamans, Anton, (2002), ibid., p.2.
[60] Humanitarian aid: introduction, http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r10000.htm.

Important issues in this respect are for instance; the timing, the internal dynamics and progress, the sequence and prioritisation, and the mutually interdependence and interaction of the various building blocks. The design or *architecture* of these reforms or transformation processes is often the result of an ad hoc and to some extent technocratic decision-making process. Therefore, the collision of objectives and the negative or inhibiting influences of one building block on another are rarely anticipated and prevented. In order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of peace building, we need to pay more (research) attention to the architecture of these peace processes.

Exhibit 2: Sustainable peace building pentagon.

4.1. Effective system of communication, consultation and negotiation

The first condition for establishing sustainable peace is the presence of an effective communication, consultation and negotiation system at different levels and between the major stakeholders. To assess the probability of progress one should look at (a) the negotiation process, (b) the content, and (c) the implementation. For each of these three phases of peace negotiations a series of characteristics are listed which tend to enhance or inhibit progress. These characteristics can be used as checklists to assess the negotiation process, the peace agreement, and the implementation.

A. NEGOTIATION PROCESS		
1. Symmetric	How (a) symmetric are - issues / what is at stake - power - population - strategies	Asymmetric
2. Inclusive	Are all relevant stakeholders involved? - moderates/radicals - elite, middle, local level. - internal/external.	Exclusive
3. Cost-effective	How high are the transaction costs? - time - human resources - material resources	Cost-ineffective
4. Constructive relations between negotiating parties	How are the relations between the parties? Are the mediators able to distinguish the problems from the people?	Inimical relations between negotiating parties
5. Reflexive framing - respective responsibility - how can we revolve - analytic empathy - self-awareness-ownership	How do the parties approach the conflict?	Antagonistic framing - blaming - polarizing: us-them - attributing negative character - projecting
6. Impartial mediation	Is there a mediator who is acceptable for both and perceived as impartial?	Partial mediation
7. Endogenous process	Is the negotiation process predominantly influenced by the (f) actors within the conflict system or by external (f)actors?	Exogenous process
8. Elicitive	Was the approach of the mediators elicitive or prescriptive? Did he/she prescribe the process and/or the outcome or elicit them from the parties?	Prescriptive
9. External mediator	Is the mediator an internal or external person / team/ organization?	Internal mediator
10. Mediation is requested by both parties.	How strongly did both parties want mediation?	Only one party asked for assistance

Exhibit 2a: Checklist for assessing the peace negotiation process.

B. THE AGREEMENT		
1. Free acceptance	Is the agreement accepted by the negotiators or is it the product of coercion and pressure?	Pressure / coercion
2. Internal support high	Is the international legitimacy (social-psychological support) high or low? Do the constituencies of the parties support the agreement?	Internal support low
3. External support high	Does the relevant international community support the agreement?	External support low
4. Comprehensive	Does the agreement cope with all the important issues?	Partial
5. Reasonable satisfaction of interests	Are the major interests of the parties involved dealt with in a satisfactory way?	Dissatisfaction of interest
6. Adequate treatment of all conditions for sustainable peace	Does the agreement address all the necessary peace building deficiencies? -CCN -political, economic and security structures -integrative climate -international cooperation -leadership	Inadequate treatment of conditions for sustainable peace
7. Precise agreements with concrete measures	Does the agreement consist of general principles or are they translated into concrete behavioral commitments? Does the agreement allow for interpretive freedom or are the terms precise?	Principled agreement with large interpretative freedom
8. Third party guarantees for demobilization period	Is there a third party willing to guarantee security in the demobilization phase?	No third party security guarantees
9. Power-sharing guarantees	Does the agreement provide appropriate power-sharing guarantees?	No power-sharing guarantees

Exhibit 2b. Checklist for assessing the peace agreement.

C. IMPLEMENTATION		
1. Politically binding	How politically binding is the agreement?	Not politically binding
2. Legally binding	Is the agreement legally binding?	Not legally binding
3. Effective verification measures	Are effective verification measures agreed upon (effective and accurate monitoring system and timely information)?	Ineffective verification measures
4. Appropriate sanctions	Are sanctions foreseen when one of the parties does not keep its promises?	No sanctions available
5. Adequate internal capacity for implementation	Do the parties have adequate means to implement the agreement (will-support, financial, organizational, and technical)?	Inadequate internal capacity
6. Adequate external support for implementation	Is there enough external support to implement the agreement?	Inadequate external support
7. Anticipation of future issues and for monitoring them before they erupt	Have the parties created a system for anticipating potential sources of new conflict?	No anticipation or conflict prevention monitoring.
8. Appropriate procedures for handling disputes during the implementation process (for example peace commissions)	Are appropriate procedures agreed upon to handle disputes that may arise during the implementation process?	No procedures for handling disputes peacefully during the implementation process.
9. Have adequate efforts been undertaken to inform and educate people about the agreement?	Have adequate efforts been made to encourage the constituencies to change their conflict culture and choose and support the peace agreement?	Not enough efforts have been undertaken to inform and educate people about the agreement.

Exhibit 3: Checklist for assessing peace negotiations

4.2. Peace-enhancing structures

The second set of peace building blocks are the peace-enhancing structures. These structures and institutions can be considered as a set of mostly formal rules, regulations and agreements that regulate the interaction between both civilians and state institutions. These rules are 'codified' and observable in a country's set of (state) organisations, power balances and centres, and decision-making procedures. It is widely acknowledged that certain political, economic and security structures contribute positively to the stability of a society. In what follows, we discuss three sets of structures that are considered to have this capacity: a) democracy and the rule of law,

b) social free market system, and c) effective and accountable security system.

A. Peace-enhancing political-legal structures: democracy and the rule of law

The political structure that is strongest correlated with sustainable peace building is a consolidated democracy. A democracy is considered consolidated when it has survived several elections, when its institutions function well, when there are no groups trying to overthrow the system, and when the attitudes of the people are favourable. To assess democratic progress we study the state of a number of democratic building blocks (see exhibit 4). Instead of reducing democracy to one dimension, we prefer to look at the whole profile and asses not only the progress made, but also the future expectations.

GENUINE DEMOCRACY		
Free and fair elections		Un-free and rigged elections
Separation of powers		No separation of powers
Open and accountable government		Problems with political, legal and financial accountability
Appropriate decentralization		Inappropriate centralization or decentralization
Appropriate power sharing arrangements		Inadequate power sharing
Respect for human rights		No respect for human rights
Well functioning civil society		Frail civil society
Good governance administration		Administration is corrupt and inefficient
Rule of law		No rule of law, might is right
Inclusive citizenship and participation		Part of the population cannot fully participate

CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACY		
Behavioral support is high		There are efforts to weaken or destroy the political system
Attitudinal support is high		The legitimacy status or popular support is low
Institutional support is high		The democratic institutions do not function

Exhibit 4: Checklist for assessing the democracy profile of a country.

B. Peace-enhancing socio-economic structures

The interaction between grievance, greed and political-economic governance is crucial for explaining the incidence of violent conflict. Grievance can be the result of the prevailing poverty, vertical and horizontal inequalities, and negative expectations about the future.

	Expectations about the future		
	worse	more of the same	better
Poor	negative	negative	
Rich	negative		

Exhibit 5: Socio-economic sources of grievance.

Greed refers to the presence of greed motivated actors or so called political entrepreneurs who try to abuse the prevailing political-economic grievances and economic insecure environment for their own personal benefits. The term political-economic governance refers to all activities, institutions and structures that regulate the political- and socio- economic functioning of a society. This concerns, for example, the choice of the decision makers between a free market or regulated market system, the degree of autonomy of the economic entrepreneurs from the political class (economic society), the absence or presence of a social security system, the privatisation policy, the property laws. In addition to internal governance, attention should also be given to the impact of the international political economic environment and of external actors.

LEVEL OF GRIEVANCE		
Economic growth		Stagnation/ regression
Expectation of growth in the foreseeable future		Negative expectations of growth
Low level of poverty		High level of poverty
Low vertical inequality		High vertical inequality
Low horizontal inequality		High horizontal inequality
Expectation that poverty will diminish		Expectation that poverty will increase
Expectation that the position of the rich will remain (not deteriorate)		The rich class fears a serious reduction of their income
GREED		
Low level of greed		High level of greed
Low level of political and economic corruption		High level of political and economic corruption
DOMESTIC SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLICY		
Free-market economy		Planned-centralized economy
Privatization with positive impact		Privatization has negative impact
Adequate infrastructure		Inadequate structures
Health care		No health care
Social mobility		Social immobility
High level of education		Low level of education
Viable economic society		The economic society is weak (middle class)
Reasonable social security		Absence of equitable social security
The economic environment (law) is		The economic

stimulating entrepreneurship		environment inhibits entrepreneurship
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT		
The country is attractive for foreign investment		An investment unfriendly environment
The international environment is passively supportive (trade)		The international environment inhibits development
The international environment is actively supportive (aid, investments)		The international environment does not actively support development
The country is a member of an effective inter-national economic organization		The country is not a member of such organizations

Exhibit 6. Checklist for assessing the political economic conditions

C. Peace-enhancing security structures: an effective and accountable security system

An essential condition for sustainable peace building is the creation of an environment characterized by a high level of objective and subjective security. People must experience and feel a high level of security.

HUMAN SECURITY		
Human security high, people feel secure (physical, political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, health)		High level of human insecurity
DOMESTIC SECURITY		
High level of internal security		Low level of internal security
The security services, police forces, and judicial system work effectively to prevent crime		The security services, police forces and judicial system does not function

They are democratically controlled		There is no democratic control
The demobilization and demilitarization succeeds		The demobilization and demilitarization efforts have failed
A unified army has been created		There is no unified army
EXTERNAL SECURITY		
There are no external threats		The country is exposed to external threats
The country is protected against external threats		The country is vulnerable to external threats
The country is a member of regional cooperative security organizations		The country does not belong to regional cooperative security organizations

Exhibit 7: Checklist for assessing security condition.

4.3. An integrative political-psychological climate

The third building block deals with the establishment of a favourable political-psychological climate. The term climate refers to the quality of a relatively enduring environment that is perceived by the occupants and influences their behaviour[61]. Reychler and Langer use the term climate to accentuate the subjective dimension of the peace building dynamics [62].

The term climate refers to the total experience of the social-psychological environment in which the conflict transformation and the peace building process takes place. The existing climate can enhance or inhibit the peace building process. When the climate enhances or reinforces the peace building process it is called integrative; when it inhibits peace building or regresses the process it is called disintegrative. The climate is composed of six mutually influencing components [63].

Expectation of an attractive common future. When people or their leaders do not believe in an attractive common future, sustainable peace building

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[61] Reychler, Luc, (1979), *Patterns of Diplomatic Thinking: A Cross-National Study of Structural and Social-Psychological Determinants*, Praeger New York (N.Y.).
[62] Reychler, Luc and Anton Stellamans, Researching peace building leadership, 2004, paper presented at the IPRA conference, Sopron, Hungary.
[63] Reychler, Luc and Anton Stellamans, op cit.

will not be easy. Cynicism, despair and/or defeatism inhibit a mobilization of the hearts and minds for building a new future.

Reconciliation. Reconciliation is a joint process of releasing the past with its pain, restructuring the present with reciprocal respect and acceptance, and reopening the future to new risks and spontaneity (Augsburger, 1992). Reconciliation is of vital importance for the success of sustainable peace building. Reconciliation releases the necessary energy to build a new future. It requires the cooperation of the conflicting parties and involves a series of distinct but interdependent elements. Although there is no standard operational formula for reconciliation, it normally involves actions that reconcile the competing needs and values for: security, justice, truth, amnesty, economic development, freedom and forgiveness[64]. The most important ingredients of a negation process are: (a) justice (tribunal, compensation and lustration), (b) truth, (c) commitment to cooperate in the future, (d) reassurance, and (e) recognitition, asking for forgiveness and being forgive.

Human security. Another characteristic of an integrative climate is the absence of fear and insecurity. In this context, the concept of human security is widely used[65]. Naidu defines human security, analogically with 'national security', as "a situation in which the life, body and the well-being of the human person have been protected through the use of physical violence."[66]. In the context of building an integrative climate, the concept of human security has to be broadened. More particularly, it refers not only to the objective threats to life, body and well-being, but also to individual *feelings* of (in-) security in different domains, such as physical, health, political, economic, social, and cultural, that could be the result of perceived, imagined or unreal threats.

Social capital. This component of the integrative climate refers to trust and reciprocity between people that enable them to collaborate (Herriot, 1998). Gouldner (1960) identifies as the most fundamental manifestations of trust:

The confidence that another will fulfil their obligations to you. These may have been explicitly undertaken and promised or they may have been implicitly assumed;

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[64] The competing character of four values (truth, peace, mercy and justice) has been discussed by John Paul Lederach in: John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997).

[65] See among others: M.V. Naidu, (ed.), (2001), *Perspectives on Human Security*, Canadian Peace Research and Education Association, Brandon, Canada; and Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, "Transition in Central Asia and Human Security", *United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Conference paper*, April 22-24, 2002.

[66] Naidu, M.V., (ed.), (2001), ibid., p.1.

The confidence that the other will not try to deceive you;

The expectation that people can do things which their position, qualifications, experience and achievements suggest they can do, and;

The expectation that people will not harm us and maybe even care for our welfare.

Multiple loyalties. A country in which the conflicting groups have developed exclusive loyalties is not fit to develop a successful sustainable peace process. A minimum requirement is the development of an overall we-ness feeling and/or multiple loyalties. The intensity and the nature of the commitment or attachment (instrumental or sentimental) may differ at different levels.

Absence of other senti-mental walls. Senti-mental walls are attitudes and feelings, perceptions and expectations, causal analyses and attributions of responsibility, strategic analyses, values, preferences, taboos, and social psychological pressures (such as conformity pressures, group-think and political correctness) which stand in the way of sustainable peace building. The existence of senti-mental walls increases the chances of misperceiving the situation; mis-evaluating the interests at stake; lowering the motivation to act on an opportunity and developing the necessary skills and know-how. The hyphenation of sentiment and mental to 'senti-mental' is intended to make people aware of the fact that mental walls tend to be reinforced by emotions, and that efforts to dismantle them tend to be confronted with different kinds of emotional resistance (Reychler, 1999).

There are three important observations to be made about an integrative climate. Firstly, an important characteristic of the climate refers to the interdependence and mutual reinforcement of the different constituent components. For instance, sincere reconciliation will only begin if people feel sufficiently secure; the rebuilding of trust demands that people have at least partially reconciled themselves with the past and former adversaries, and somehow share expectations of an interdependent and attractive future.

Secondly, a climate is manageable and changeable. This means that a constructive 'management' of the social-psychological environment can make it more favourable for sustainable peace building. However, in turn, a climate could also be manipulated and changed for the worse; as so often happens in the case of ethnic political strife. The changes in the climate could be used for assessing the likelihood of a violent conflict or the sustainability of a peace process

Thirdly, there are several degrees of integrativeness. A country, as a whole, may have a high-level integrative climate, but could be confronted with extremely violent local riots (*e.g.* Bradford, Burnley and Oldham, three

communities with large Asian populations in the United Kingdom). Alternatively, a country could have communities with high integrative climates, but lack an overall integrative climate (*e.g.* the Protestant and Catholic community in Northern Ireland).

People believe in a mutually benefiting future		People cannot imagine a cooperative and attractive common future
In addition to other identities(y), there is an overarching common identity		Loyalties are exclusively defined
The conflicting parties have reconciled themselves		There has not been a sincere and durable reconciliation process
On the whole people feel secure		The level of human insecurity is very high
There is a high level of trust. People feel that they can rely on each other		The rebuilding of trust and voluntary cooperation has been negligible
Most senti-mental walls have been dismantled (negative stereotypes, cynicism, lose-mindedness, intolerance)		Senti-mental walls are widespread and cultivated by extreme ethnic, religious, nationalist parties

Exhibit 8: Checklist for assessing integrative climate

4.4. International supportive environment and actors

The fourth building block is the existence of a supportive regional (neighbouring states) or international environment. The development of multilateral security, economic and political-diplomatic cooperation is of great importance.

There is no significant negative external interference		There is a great deal of negative external interference
The peace process is effectively supported by external actors		There is no effective external support of the peace process
The country is actively involved in regional		The country is not actively involved

political/diplomatic cooperation		in regional diplomatic/political cooperation
The country is actively involved in regional economic cooperation		There is no multilateral economic cooperation
The country is actively involved in regional security cooperation		There is no multilateral security cooperation

Exhibit 9: Checklist for assessing international support.

4.5. Peace building leadership

Without the activities of a critical mass of peace building leadership, the chances of transforming conflicts into a sustainable peace building process are very low. Peace building leadership can be found in people with legitimate authority, but also in people without authority. To limit leadership to people with authority would exclude people who defied authority, such as Vaclav Havel, Lech Walesa, Aung San Suu Kyi, Martin Luther King, and Mohandas Gandhi[67]. Leadership can also be found within and outside a country, in different sectors, and at different levels. The critical mass of peace building leadership could be assessed by means of a force field analysis, in which the strength of the peace building leadership is compared with the peace inhibiting leadership. The leadership can be strong or weak. Indicators of strong leadership are: it is self confident and secure in its position, willing to risk popularity in order to achieve its ends, owning a clear view of the goals it wants to accomplish, it has good resource and popular support[68].

To convey the differences between peace building leadership and peace inhibiting leadership it is helpful to make use of ideal types. These ideal types can be used as poles of a continuum between which leaders can be situated. In the CPRS study, peace building leadership is being researched through an examination of the performance of tangible, visceral examples of people who have been recognized as contributors to peace. Their peace building behavior contrasts clearly with the activities of leaders who have inhibited or prevented the building of sustainable peace[69]. Leaders can express peace building leadership in one conflict and not in another. The same is true for the leadership approach in different phases of the conflict transformation. Peace building leadership and non-peace building leadership differ with respect to their values, analytic style, change

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[67] Ronald Heyfetz, Leadership without easy answers, p.21.
[68] Ashley Tellis, Anticipating ethnic conflict.

behavior, and motivation and personality. For each of these aspects a number of hypotheses have been formulated which are being validated in the ongoing research.

Peace building leadership	Peace inhibiting leadership
DEFINITION OF PEACE	
1. They attach a great deal of importance to the future. They envision a shared, clear and mutually attractive peaceful future for all who want to cooperate. The future is depicted as non-violent, inclusive and as a win-win situation. They know that extinguishing hope creates desperation.	They also attach a great deal to the future. Their future however is exclusive, privileges some at the expense of others. It is a win-loose situation.
2. Peace defined as more than the absence of physical violence; They use a broad definition of violence (physical, psychological, environmental and cultural).	They tend to define peace as the absence of the threat of violence. Violence is defined as the absence of war.
3. Peace is perceived as the result of reconciling competing values. Compromise is not considered cowardice.	Peace is perceived as the result of imposing certain values (such as security and development) at the expense of other values.
ANALYTIC STYLE	
4. They do everything to identify and get a full understanding of the challenge with which they are confronted. This implies a willingness to ask for and confront the brutal facts.	They tend to define the challenge which they are confronted with in a selective way.
5. They do not only focus on the weaknesses and problems, but also at the actual and potential strengths.	They are mesmerized by the past and the problems. They try to exploit the weaknesses in order to strengthen their power base.
6. Reflective	Adversarial
They frame the conflict in a reflective way. Instead of: - only blaming the other, they assume responsibility for changing the situation, - polarizing the conflict in terms of "we versus them ", they think how can " we " solve it, - attributing the negative behavior to the disposition of the other, they develop	They frame the conflict in an antagonistic way. - They tend to blame the other for the problem. - Polarize the conflict in terms of "we versus them".

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[70] Donald Phillips,p.34.

analytic empathy and contextual understanding. - projecting their own shadows/faults on the other, they develop more self-awareness. "It was this penetrating comprehension of human nature that helped Lincoln possess the compassion necessary to issue many pardons."[70]	- Attribute the negative behavior of the other party to their character or disposition. They stereotype the other. - Project all their own faults on the other. They express a low level of analytic empathy.

CHANGE BEHAVIOR	
7. Adaptive	**Non-adaptive**
a. They identify the adaptive challenges	They do not make a comprehensive analysis of the adaptive challenge.
b. They regulate stress	They manipulate fear and stress. They elicit negative emotions, particularly a mix of fear and anger, the threat to us from them, and the threat that they will take from us.
c. They maintain disciplined attention	They make use of distractions that prevent people from dealing with the challenges, such as: scapegoating, denial, focusing only on today's technical problems, or attacking individuals rather than the perspectives they represent.
d. They give the work back to the people and empower them to take on their responsibilities.	They promise the people that they will solve the problem, that they are the saviors and tell them what to do.
e. They protect voices of dissidents and from below.	They repress dissident voices. They organize conformity pressures.
8. Integrative	**Non-integrative**
a. They look at the big picture, including the problems caused by the impact of the international system.	They tend to have a narrow or close minded perception of the problems with which they are confronted.
b. They favor effective communication, consultation and integrative negotiation methods. They try to find peace agreements which satisfy the needs and concerns of the major stakeholders.	They try to control the information, do not consult and opt for hard bargaining. They are not concerned with the own needs and interests.
c. They believe that democracy is the best political system. " No man is good enough to govern another man without that other's consent. Understanding the spirit of our institutions is to aim at the elevation of	They believe in strong leadership and authoritarian political systems.

men. I am opposed to whatever tends to degrade them. Dictatorship in any form degrades human beings".[71]	
d. They favor an economic system that stimulates development and reduces discrimination and gross inequalities.	They favor a centralized or a pure free market economy that inhibits development or the reduction of discriminations and gross inequalities.
e. They tend to opt for a cooperative security system.	National – non cooperative security.
f. They try to establish an integrative climate, characterized by: -hope or the expectation of a better future -multiple loyalties -reconciliation -trust -human security -the absence of senti-mental walls. They believe that the past should not be forgotten and be dealt with in a way that heals and restores the vitality of the society. This implies balancing or reconciling competing values, such as truth, justice, security, compensation, development, mercy.	They create a disintegrative climate characterized by: - hope for some/ despair for others - exclusive loyalties - retributive justice and revenge - distrust - human insecurity - senti-mental walls
g. They prefer multilateral cooperation in different fields (security, economic, political, environmental.)	They don't engage into multilateral cooperation.
9. Flexible	**Inflexible**
a. Depending on the situation they skillfully switch between various leadership styles: visionary, coaching, affiliative, democratic, pace setting and commanding. The latter two however are applied with caution[72].	a. They tend to have a preference for the pace setting and commanding styles of leadership.
b. They are able to cope with conceptually complex problems, psychological ambiguity and difficult ethical questions. Their tolerance of uncertainty is high. They know that the fog of peace and frictions in the peace building process are caused by an inability to forecast external events brought about by intelligent and resourceful opposition. They are not ideologists. Theories are considered an aid	b. They tend to be uncomfortable with complexities and ambiguities.

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[71] Donald Phillips,p.40

[72] Daniel Goleman, The new leaders,p.53-69.

to judgment, and judgment must be free to determine whether or not they are suitable.	
c. They create space for creativity in order to generate alternative options for resolving the conflict or the problem.	c. They tend to be less flexible and defend their positions.

10. Selecting the right people

They spend a great deal of their time selecting the right people involved.	They also spend a great deal of their time selecting loyal people, to implement the policies of the great leader.

11. Skills

-Relational skills which sustain interconnections among people -Mediation skills which turn conflicts into opportunities. -Wisdom skills which increase understanding, such as imagination, judgment, innovation, paradoxical problem-solving. -Elicitive skills which motivate people to act, such as involving others, building coalition, facilitating, coaching, nurturing talent, and empowering leadership.	

12. Time

Time is everything (Lincoln). They can be patient but know that time can make the difference between life and death. Frequently they slow down in order to speed up.[73]	They believe that time will solve the problem; they prefer the short-long approach of conflict management.

13. Violence

They are well acquainted with non-violent methods. They find robust and workable alternatives to violence as a means of resolving disputes. This does not exclude the use of violence. They do not condemn those who fight the just fight[74].	They tend to look at the world in terms of power and power balances. They believe that, military power can solve many problems.

14. Ethics

They use a mix of intentional and consequential ethics. They insist on using objective and fair criteria for evaluating options.	The decisions tend to be influenced by intentional ethics and the "might is right" principle. They believe in pressure.

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[73] Daniel Goleman,p.219.
[74] Helena Cobban, The moral architecture of worldpeace,p.44.

PERSONALITY AND MOTIVATION	
15. Motivation	
Several sources of motivation could drive their activities (anger, frustration, religious inspiration...) but they use these sources of emotional energy constructively. But most important is a sense of purpose or the capacity to find the values that make the efforts and risk taking meaningful. They never loose faith.	The prime driver of their behavior are negative motivations, which are turned into destructive policies.
16. Personality	
a. Courage. They are courageous men and women; encouraging other people. They risk their lives and careers. b. Humility. They demonstrate a compelling humility, shun public adulation and are never boastful. When successful, they tend to apportion credit to other people. c. Hardiness factor. They draw positive energy from painful experiences in their life. d. Sense of humor. Humor can be used to relieve the strain. "I always believed that a good laugh was good for both the mental and physical digestion."[75] e. Personal integrity. Being congruent and true to one's values.	a. Some spoilers have courage, some spoil the process because of a lack of courage. b. Tend to build a personality culture and claim all the credits for themselves and attribute the failures to others. c. No hardiness factors. Painful experiences lead to negative energy. d. Are stuck into their seriousness and feel threatened by laughter. e. Lack of integrity.

Exhibit 10: Checklist for assessing peace building leadership.

The behavior described in the second column is incomplete. This is caused by the fact that there are different types of peace inhibiting leadership / spoilers:

Spoilers of peace negotiations (Stephen Stedman)

Destructive killers: leaders who use violence to realize grand dreams (Hitler, Stalin, Mao, Saddam) at the expense of their own people.

Leaders who believe that they can solve most problems with their stick, rather than with carrots.(Sharon, Bush ??)

Profiteers/ vultures: people who profit from the conflicts (exploitation of minerals, arms sales.(MIC).

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[75] Donald Phillips, Lincoln on Leadership,p.158.

Passive spoilers who allow conflicts to escalate because of neglect or ineffective prevention of violence (EU).

Demoralizers: Dissonant leaders who drain peace, hope and happiness out of the air around them (Daniel Goleman: The new leaders).

5. Researching sustainable peace building architecture

The main research question is: "What are the characteristics of successful peace building architecture?". To answer this question we will compare successful and less successful peace building efforts. Controlled comparisons will be made between failed peace processes (Burundi and the Middle East), partial successes (Bosnia), and successes (El Salvador, Northern Ireland, and South Africa). Controlled comparison or controlled differentiation as Horowitz puts it "does not imply perfect identity or even very close similarity, but rather a restricted range of difference"76

For each of the selected cases, we make the following analyses:

- Step one: analysis of the conflict;
- Step two: assessment of the difficulty of the conflict;
- Step three: assessment of success;
- Step four: analysis of the conflict transformation or peace building process;
- Step five: analysis of leadership.

5.1. Step one: Analysis of the conflict

We start by making an analysis of the conflict. As mentioned above, most studies that explore or analyse conflict management or peace building processes suffer from a lack of conflict differentiation, especially with regard to the level of difficulty of the different peace building environments. The conventional view can best be captured in Stedman's words: "El Salvador was Angola was Northern Ireland was Rwanda"77. However, the nature and characteristics of peace building environments differ substantially. Furthermore, valid comparative research requires a research methodology that takes these differences into consideration. As our main focus is on the relationship between the successfulness of peace processes and their design or architecture, it is crucial to differentiate between different kinds of peace building environments. Good peace architecture starts by exploring and analysing the prevailing peace building environment and its specific problems and characteristics. In other words,

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76 Horowitz, Donald L., (1985), Ethnic Groups in Conflict, University of California Press, Berkeley, p. 17.
77 Stedman, John, (2002), ibid., p.4.

good peace architects start with conducting a comprehensive needs assessment of the peace building environment and its actors. This assessment should enable them to design a more effective, constructive and cost-effective way of dealing with the (root) causes of the violent conflict and its potential solutions for creating a more sustainable peaceful society.

The issues: concerns, interests, needs. The identification of the real concerns, interests and needs are essential in the analysis. In addition to listing the concerns, interests or needs, it is important to find out what types of issues we have (definition of the situation, means-ends, interests, values, identity issues, …), how important they are for the parties (some are vital others are of marginal importance), and if there are also common interests.

The conflict environment. Since the interaction between the parties is influenced by the conflict environment (political, diplomatic, legal, economic, educational, moral, communication-information, environmental, and security (police-military)), it is useful to identify the factors which positively or negatively influence the conflict.

Strategic thinking of the parties. This is the subjective reality of the conflict. Here we try to understand: (a) how the parties perceive the present situation and how they think the future will look like, (b) how they frame the causes and responsibilities, (c) why they opted for the current approach of the conflict, and what other solutions they are willing to consider.

Current interaction. Are the parties sitting around the table? Are they using coercion? Etc.

Other relevant facts. Other relevant facts are: the history of the dispute (when did it begin and how did it evolve), the costs-losses and benefits-profits; attempts at resolution, and the characteristics of the parties. For all these facts there are methods that help to present them in a clear and concise way (conflict mapping, time lines...)

	Parties involved		
	1	2	3
Issues, concerns, interests (competing and common interests)			
Conflict environment			
Strategic thinking of the parties: - expectations about the future - perception of causes and attribution of responsibilities - perceived costs and benefits of alternative approaches - alternative solutions			

Current interaction			
Other relevant facts: history, peace building efforts, conflict environment, costs and benefits			

Exhibit 11: Conflict analysis matrix

5.2. Step two: assessment of difficulty

In the second step we assess the degree of difficulty of the conflict. Georges Downs and Stephen John Stedman are among the first researchers who differentiated conflicts in a more systematic and theoretically sound way[78]. In their work, they link the outcome of the implementation of peace agreements to the difficulty of the conflict environment and the international willingness to commit and risk resources and people. The underlying idea is simple: some peace implementation environments are more difficult and challenging than others; and some cases get more resources and attention from the international community. These two implementation conditions are important variables to explain why some peace agreements succeed and others fail[79]. Based on a review of the literature on peacemaking and civil war, they have developed a way of ranking the difficulty of conflict environments and the international willingness to intervene[80]. Moreover, they have created a *difficulty score* based on the following eight variables: the number of warring parties, the lack of either a peace agreement before intervention or a coerced peace agreement; the likelihood of spoilers; a collapsed state; the number of soldiers; the presence of disposable natural resources; the presence of hostile neighbouring states or networks; and demands for secession. Further, the willingness of the international community to get involved in the implementation process is translated into a *willingness score* based on the following three variables: major or regional power interest, commitment of resources, and acceptance of risk of casualties to soldiers[81]. The interpretation of respectively the difficulty and willingness score is straightforward: "the higher the difficulty score, the more difficult the implementation environment; the higher the willingness score, the greater the willingness of international actors to commit to the effort"[82]. Downs and Stedman's approach has the appealing quality that it is extremely easy to

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[78] Downs, George; Stedman, Stephen John, (2002), "Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation", in: Stedman, Stephen John; Rothchild, Donald; Cousens, Elizabeth M., *Ending CivilWars, The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, p.43-69.
[79] Downs, George; Stedman, Stephen John, (2002), ibid., p.55.
[80] Downs, George; Stedman, Stephen John, (2002), ibid., p.55.
[81] Downs, George; Stedman, Stephen John, (2002), ibid., p.57.
[82] Downs, George; Stedman, Stephen John, (2002), ibid., p.58.

determine the level of difficulty of conflict. But the oversimplification can easily result in an incomplete and inaccurate classification of conflicts. The comparison of the implementation processes in sixteen conflict countries has produced some interesting results[83]. Among other things, Downs and Stedman found that implementing peace agreements in countries with a low difficulty score and high willingness score - such as Guatemala, El Salvador, Namibia, and Nicaragua - is likely to succeed. On the other hand, the chances of implementation success in countries with highly difficult implementation environments - such as Sri Lanka, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Cambodia and Lebanon - are very slim. Undoubtedly, Downs and Stedman's work is an important contribution to the improvement of the analysis, understanding and handling of peace building processes. Moreover, it is a valuable starting point for further comparative research regarding conflict prevention and conflict management issues. However, four aspects have to be criticised.

First, certain variables that are very likely to contribute under certain circumstances to increasing the level of difficulty of a peace implementation environment seem to be missing. In this respect, one can think of such variables as the duration of a conflict, the extensiveness of the violence, the number of refugees, the number of previous failed peace initiatives, the level of asymmetry between the warring parties, the nature of the conflict issues (other than secession) and a country's pre-conflict development level and potential. The Bosnian implementation environment is not only extremely difficult because the conflict environment is characterised by, among other things, the presence of spoilers, a large number of soldiers, numerous warring parties and a weak agreement[84]. But also because the war has raged for over 3 years, resulted in more than 250.000 civilian deaths, caused millions of refugees and displaced persons, created three ethnic-homogenised territories, and almost completely destroyed the social fabric of the pre-war society.

Second, the (implied) precision, the static approach and the rather simple compilation of both the difficulty score and the willingness score has to be questioned. For instance, according to Downs and Stedman's approach, the Guatemalan implementation environment (1996-1997) is not considered difficult (difficulty score: 0)[85]. The comparison of Guatemala to cases with extremely difficult conflict environments such as Bosnia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (difficulty scores: 6), implies that the Guatemalan peace implementation process had to be successful because the conflict

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[83] Downs, George; Stedman, Stephen John, (2002), ibid., p.59.
[84] See appendix 2.1 "Coding of cases by difficulty and willingness variables" in: Downs, George; Stedman, Stephen John, (2002), ibid., p.67.
[85] Downs, George; Stedman, Stephen John, (2002), ibid., p.59.

environment was so 'easy'. Yet, the civil conflict in Guatemala has lasted for over three decades, has had an estimated death toll of 200.000, has resulted in over a million refugees or displaced persons, and the state has so far been unwilling to admit its debt to the victims of the human rights violations. Further, simple adding up variables into a difficulty or willingness score disregards the important fact that certain combinations of characteristics are particularly difficult to handle. Moreover, it is quite possible that countries with a relatively low difficulty score are actually confronted with more difficult and challenging peace building environments than countries with very high difficulty scores. It is not only a question whether or not each of the variables is equally important, but also whether or not there are certain combinations of variables that make a conflict environment especially challenging. For example, Rwanda gets a relatively low difficulty score (3). But it seems not unreasonable to say that conflict environment in Rwanda is especially difficult, because of the *simultaneous* presence of multiple spoilers and hostile neighbours[86].

Third, as a consequence of their focus on outside implementers, Downs and Stedman largely neglect the internal dimension of the peace building process. Without any doubt, the commitment and involvement of the international community is often crucial for maintaining stability and providing the necessary resources for rebuilding a war-torn society. Although outside actors are crucial, in the end sustainable peace has to be built from within a society. The internal capacity and willingness for building peace should not be ignored; not even in the short-term implementation phase. For instance: one of the most important stabilising developments during the short-term post-conflict period is a rapid economic recovery and improvement. The provision of financial support by the international community is indispensable in this respect, but arguably features such as the (pre-conflict) outlook, potential and strength of a conflict country's economy, people's motivation to improve their socio-economic situation and the overall readiness or attitude towards the peace process, seem to be at least as important. Further, conflict ripeness and internal willingness in form of responsible leadership are other key variables for making a peace process work.

Fourth, the level of difficulty of the peace building environment and the extent of the international commitment and involvement in the peace process are but two important factors that affect the outcome of a peace process. However, the design or architecture of the peace building process is another crucial factor, which should not be overlooked. We question the explanation that the success of the peace process in for instance El

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[86] See appendix 2.1 "Coding of cases by difficulty and willingness variables" in: Downs, George; Stedman, Stephen John, (2002), ibid., p.67.

Salvador is strictly due to a relatively easy conflict environment (difficulty score: 1) and the involvement of a reasonably committed international community. Contrastingly, we assert that the successfulness of peace processes is (often) closely related to the design of a peace building process. A particular feature of the peace architecture in El Salvador was the fact that the rebuilding and restructuring of the economy has started while violent conflict was still ongoing. This had the beneficial effect that in the direct aftermath of the violent conflict, El Salvador was in a better shape to tackle different kinds of political and economic problems[87].

To elucidate our conceptual framework for analysing peace building processes, we could draw an analogy with a mountaineering expedition. The success of such an expedition, as measured by the fact whether or not a mountaineer reaches the top, depends on several factors: 1) the nature and characteristics of the mountain (e.g. a higher and more steep mountain is probably more difficult to climb); 2) the skill, resources, experience, motivation and physical fitness of the mountaineer(s (e.g. a well-trained, highly experienced and physical fit mountaineer stands a better chance of reaching the top); and 3) the chosen path or route towards the top (e.g. northern or southern side, etc.).


Exhibit 12: A framework for analysing and understanding peace building success or failure

We therefore propose a framework of analysis that is build around the following four variables: the difficulty of the conflict environment, the internal and external peace building willingness and capacity, the design or architecture of the peace process and the level of success of a peace process. The mountaineering analogy explains the general interrelationship between these factors. Moreover, the outcome of the latter variable depends on the interaction of the first three variables (see exhibit 11). The difficulty

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[87] Boyce, James,

of the conflict environment and the peace building willingness, potential and capacity together constitute the peace building environment.

In order to establish a self-sustainable peaceful society, good peace architecture aims to tackle the root causes of violent conflict and political instability in constructive and effective way. A proper needs assessment of the peace building environment is essential. Most needs assessments are partial and incomplete. However, a peace process is unlikely to be successful or effective, if it is not based on a comprehensive assessment of the concrete circumstances or *needs* of a specific conflict country or region. Good peace architects and analysts likewise must start by thoroughly analysing the nature and difficulty of a peace building environment. In this respect two elements need to be considered. On the one hand, it is crucial to examine the specific circumstances, problems and challenges that are likely to contribute to the instability and/or ineffectiveness of a peace process. On the other hand, it is important to explore a country's (potential) peace building assets and opportunities that could support or enhance a peace process. These assets and opportunities can either be 'material' or 'mental'. For instance, the conflict parties' willingness to compromise and build sustainable peace is a crucial 'mental' asset that makes a peace building environment more amenable and thereby less difficult. If done in a methodologically sound way, this analysis could provide both peace architects and analysts with a good indication of the nature and difficulty of a specific peace building environment.

The characteristics of a peace building environment can only be correctly assessed and evaluated if they are interpreted within the specific context of a conflict country. Simple looking at the presence or absence of certain variables is insufficient and could easily result in a mischaracterization or misinterpretation of the nature and/or difficulty of a peace building environment. Further, peace building environments are by no means stable or unchangeable over time. It is consequently not only essential to take the specific conflict context into account, but also to look at the (preceding) evolutions or origins of certain characteristics. For example, the fact that a peace agreement lacks legitimacy or popular support is an important observation. However, the reasons or origins for this lack of legitimacy (e.g. the agreement was coerced by international community or not all parties were represented at the negotiation table) usually tell us much more about the nature and difficulty of a peace building environment. It is important to develop a comprehensive and in-depth framework for analysing and understanding the particularities and dynamics of different peace building environments. In this respect we intend to follow a descriptive-analytical approach rather than a (purely) quantitative-statistical approach.

Peace building environments differ in nature and difficulty. Some peace processes are confronted with a more difficult combination of conflict characteristics than others. There appears to be a clear empirical and theoretical link between the difficulty of a peace building environment and the extent of conflict escalation. Moreover, there is widespread agreement that the more a conflict escalates in time, space and with regard to the level of violence, the more difficult and costly it will become to manage or resolve it. The preference of proactive conflict prevention over reactive conflict management is based on this basic observation. However, there is no single peace building environment that can be considered *the* most difficult. There are different combinations of conflict characteristics that can create extremely difficult peace building environments. It seems not only impossible to validly and accurately differentiate between such cases, but also to a certain extent meaningless or unnecessary. Arguably, it makes more sense to limit the differentiation of peace building environments to a small number of more broadly defined difficulty categories (e.g. relatively 'easy', moderately difficult and extremely difficult).

Our framework for analysing the nature and the difficulty of the peace building environment is based on four clusters of analysis: actors and issues; conflict and peace building history; internal capability and willingness; and external willingness and commitment.

1. Actors and issues

The first cluster of variables that needs to be closely examined deals with the conflict issues and conflict parties or actors. These variables are often closely related and interdependent. A thorough understanding and insight into the conflict issues and actors is evidently fundamental for assessing the nature and difficulty of a peace building environment. In this respect several factors or components need to be looked at: the nature of conflict parties; the number of conflict parties; conflict parties' objectives; conflict parties' strategy; regional and international stakeholders; and conflict issues. A peace architect or analyst should ascertain how a country's specific combination of factors might affect the peace building environment.

With regard to the analysis of the nature and difficulty of peace building environment it is further important to keep two things in mind. First, the explanatory power of the individual factors is fairly limited. These factors have to be interpreted and analysed in a specific peace building context, in combination with other factors and even with other clusters of variables such as the internal and external willingness or the presence of certain peace enhancing structures. Second, the evolution or changes with regard to these factors have to be taken into account as well. For instance, the reasons for the continuation of violent conflicts frequently differ from the conflict

issues that led to the outbreak of violence in the first place; conflict parties' objectives and motivations can and do change. Another factor that can be subject to change is a conflict party's strategy. It is clearly important to understand why conflict parties change their strategies (e.g. from violent to none-violent or vice versa).

Analysis of the actors and issues

Nature of conflict parties	The nature of the conflict parties refers to its organisation and origins. It is important to get a clear understanding of how conflict parties are structured and financed (e.g. through taxation, control of natural resources, looting, illegal business activities, etc.), the underlying power relations within a conflict party, the extent of power asymmetry between the conflict parties, the relationship between a conflict party's leadership and its constituency, the decision-making process and enforcement, etc.
Number of conflict parties	It appears that the peace implementation process becomes more difficult and the outcome more uncertain, when there are more than two warring parties involved[88]. This does not mean that two single conflict parties cannot be locked in an (seemingly) insurmountable conflict process. However, it is important to analyse whether the number of conflict parties has contributed to increasing the difficulty of a specific peace building environment. In addition, it is important to examine whether 'new' conflict parties, groups or factions have shown up during the peace building process (e.g. spoilers)
Conflict parties' objectives and issues	The conflict parties' objectives and issues are two sides of the same coin. Although conflicts are often presented as being

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[88] Downs and Stedman

about one specific issue (e.g. autonomy or secession struggle, territorial dispute, fight for political control, etc.), in most violent conflicts a wide variety of interdependent issues are in contention. The same goes for the conflict parties' objectives. Moreover, the publicly stated objectives of a conflict party often contrast sharply with the incentives and personal objectives of the conflict party's leadership (e.g. private economic gain or political power). The more these public and private objectives differ from each other, the more difficult it will be to resolve the fundamental conflict issues. The objectives and issues in contention need to be clearly analysed in a specific conflict context.

Conflict parties' strategy	The conflict parties' strategies for achieving their objectives or dealing with the contentious issues involved, is another important variable influencing the difficulty of a peace building environment. Do conflict parties perceive the use of violence as an action of last resort or as an effective means for achieving their goals?
	Further, the (military) strategy used during the violent phase of a conflict will undoubtedly influence the conflict parties' behaviour, perceptions and attitudes in the post-violent phase. The more the conflict parties and their constituencies regard their ideas and objectives as just, non-negotiable, sacred, final, and vital for their group's subsistence and survival, the more likely they are to justify more violent means and strategies (e.g. scorched earth policy) to achieve their goals.
Regional and international stakeholders	The role and importance of regional and international stakeholders is another crucial factor that needs to be examined in order to determine the nature and

difficulty of the peace building environment. Regional and international stakeholders such as arm traders, international organisations, regional powers, etc. can facilitate or undermine a peace building process. These stakeholders have their own set of economic, military, political and/or humanitarian incentives and motivations for openly or secretly intervening in an internal conflict. These stakeholders can influence the peace process through several ways or actions (e.g. giving political legitimacy to conflict parties, providing military or economic support, providing shelter for combatants, etc.). Peace architects and analysts need to carefully examine the relationships, objectives and influence of regional and international stakeholders on a specific peace building process.

2. Conflict and peace building legacies

The second cluster of variables deals with the conflict and peace building history and legacies. To ensure long-term stability and prosperity, it is necessary to tackle the root causes of violent conflicts. However, in the short-term post-conflict phase, most resources, time and energy have to be allocated to the (in-)direct legacies and consequences of the violent conflict. Some of the common challenges and tasks that absorb significant amounts of resources are for instance: the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons, the demobilisation of combatants, and the rebuilding of physical infrastructure. When more resources have to be allocated to these (in-)direct legacies of a violent conflict, we argue that a peace building environment becomes more difficult and challenging. The underlying logic is straightforward: the allocation of scarce resources to these specific post-conflict challenges does significantly limit the possibilities for dealing with the root causes or other social, political or economic problems and issues. Another element that influences the nature and difficulty of the peace building environment deals with the interaction history of the conflict parties. The way in which the conflict parties have interacted and behaved, both during the violent confrontation and non-violent attempts to solve their conflicts and disputes, will have an important

impact on a conflict party's behaviour, attitudes, perceptions and expectations towards the other conflict parties during a peace building process.

Not all conflict countries are confronted with the same detrimental costs or aggravating previous history. In order to differentiate between these cases, peace architects and analysts should make a thorough analysis of the following variables: duration and level of violence and destruction; number of failed peace initiatives; number of refugees and displaced persons; number of casualties; and number of combatants. In the description hereunder, we do not give any absolute numbers or figures with regard to these variables (e.g. the presence of more than 50.000 soldiers makes a peace building environment more difficult). These numbers and figures are always arbitrary and furthermore the impact of a specific variable depends on a country's specific circumstances. For instance: the impact of 10.000 casualties on a country's economy is likely to be smaller in an economy with a work force of 10 million people rather than 1 million people. In addition, the impact does not only depend on a country's context or the number of casualties, but also on the specific characteristics of the group of casualties such as the gender ratio, the level of education and training, and the age structure.

Analysis of the conflict and peace building history

| Duration and level of violence and destruction | This composite variable captures several elements that have the same effect on the peace building environment. First, the duration of a violent conflict. The longer a violent conflict is raging or destabilising a country, the more disruptive and detrimental it will be for a country's economic, social and political climate, structures and/or functioning. The more social, political and economic disintegration and distortions, the more costly and difficult it will be to restore a stable and prosperous society. Second, the level of violence and destruction has a similar impact on societies. Higher levels of violence and destruction result in more costly and more difficult peace building environments (e.g. reconciliation efforts will be more time-consuming, more |

people will be traumatised, rebuilding of physical infrastructure will take more time and resources, environmental degradation will be more severe, etc.).

Number of failed peace initiatives	The second variable deals with an important aspect of the conflict parties' interaction history. Moreover, we argue that it is important to examine the history of the (failed) peace initiatives and interventions. The relationship between the difficulty of peace building environment and
	the number of peace initiatives is to some extent mutually reinforcing. The more difficult the peace building environment, the greater the chance of failure of a peace initiative. However, it appears that there is frequently a relationship in the other direction as well. Thus, the more peace initiatives have failed, the more difficult a peace building environment becomes. This relationship mainly stems from the fact that a failed peace intervention usually increases the level of distrust between the conflict parties. An increase in the level of distrust makes a peace building environment more difficult and less amenable. Peace architects and analysts have to carefully analyse the impact of previously failed peace initiatives and interventions on the peace building environment.
Number of refugees and displaced persons	The third variable examines the influence of the number of refugees and displaced persons on the nature and difficulty of a peace building environment. The higher the number of refugees and displaced persons, the more problematic and the higher the costs will be for returning them home and reintegrating them into the society. The repatriation and reintegration

of refugees and displaced persons is crucial because these groups can have serious destabilising effects on both the conflict country or another host country (e.g. situation in Eastern part of D.R. Congo). The humanitarian costs of maintaining these refugees are enormous and normally without the support of the international community conflict countries are unable to bear these costs. The impact of the refugee situation on the peace building environment needs to be thoroughly analysed.

Number of casualties	The fourth variable refers to the impact of the number of casualties on the nature and difficulty of peace building environment. Again numbers as such do not say much and can only be interpreted within a specific country context. However, in general we assert that the higher the number of casualties, the more difficult a peace building environment will become. Two important arguments support this assertion. First, the more people have been killed, maimed or wounded, the more likely it is that a country's economic, political and social structures, relations and functioning will be severely damaged. For instance, the lost of a substantial part of the young, male workforce through violent conflict usually has serious consequences for a country's economic potential of growth and development. Second, if more people have lost a relative or friend, or were themselves wounded or maimed, it is likely that more people suffer from serious psychological and mental problems, impediments and traumas. The reintegration of a society under such circumstances will evidently be more difficult.

Number of combatants	The fifth variable stresses the influence of the number of soldiers on the nature and difficulty of a peace building environment. There are several ways through which the number of combatants and soldiers can influence the peace building environment. First, higher numbers of soldiers make verification and monitoring more difficult and expensive (e.g. more personnel) [89]. Second, the demilitarisation, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants is not only extremely expensive, but also a politically sensitive issue.

3. Internal capability and willingness

The third set of variables refers to the conflict country's capability and willingness for initiating and establishing a sustainable peace process. These *internal* characteristics are important variables for determining the nature and difficulty of the peace building environment. The presence of certain features or characteristics such as the availability of responsible and legitimate leadership or the opportunities for expedited socio-economic progress can make a peace building environment more amenable and less difficult. The internal *capability* or preconditions refer to, for example, the incidence and state of the political structures and institutions, the socio-economic endowments and comparative advantages, the availability of qualified human resources. The internal *willingness* captures aspects such as the political-psychological climate, the conflict ripeness, the preparedness to compromise and sacrifice during the peace building process.

No two-conflict countries have the same set of internal preconditions, strengths, opportunities and/or political-psychological circumstances. Peace architects and analysts have to thoroughly analyse how a country's specific set of preconditions or characteristics contributes to the difficulty of a peace building environment. The main characteristics or features of the internal capability and willingness can be captured by looking at the following variables: State of the peace-enhancing structures; nature of the political-psychological climate; availability of legitimate leadership; conflict transformation process; and socio-economic development potential.

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[89] Downs, George; Stedman, Stephen John, (2002), ibid., p.56.

Analysis of the internal capability and willingness

The first variable points at the presence and functioning of the peace-enhancing structures. Above we have identified certain political-legal, socio-economic and security structures and institutions that contribute to the creation of more stable and prosperous societies. There are often considerable differences between the state structures of countries coming out of a violent conflict. In some cases the state structures and institutions have completely collapsed as a consequence of the protracted violent conflict (e.g. Somalia). Building peace in such an environment is going to be extremely difficult. The absence of legitimate, democratic and well-functioning state structures and institutions or in other words the absence of a sufficient high degree of institutional development is often not only one the causes for the outbreak of the violence, but also means that these countries have no institutional memory that could help rebuilding new structures and institutions[90]. The extent to which certain sate structures and institutions still enjoy legitimacy and function effectively, will have a decreasing effect on the difficulty of a peace building environment.

Nature of the political-psychological climate

The second variable that surely affects the difficulty of a peace building environment deals with the nature of the political-psychological climate. The political-psycho-gical climate refers to people's perceptions, stereotypes, attitudes, opinions and views regarding issues such as reconciliation, conflict termination, multiple loyalties, nationalism or multi-ethnic co-operation and perceptions such as distrust, hate, unwillingness to compromise, fear, intolerance and attribution of blame and guilt. However, the extent and pervasiveness of these negative stereotypes, attitudes and perceptions may differ substantially between conflict countries. These differences result from a wide variety of factors, such as the extent and duration of the violence, conflict parties (military) strategy, process of (ethnic) group mobilisation, and previous conflict legacies. Furthermore, the political-psychological climate is not a static feature, but a dynamic and to some extent even Conflict countries are usually confronted with peace-obstructing attitudes manageable one. The willingness to compromise and/or to end the violence are two crucial aspects indicating a more amenable political-psychological climate and consequently a less difficult peace building environment.

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[90] See for the importance of "institutional memory" and "degree of institutional development": Aron, Janine, Building institutions in post-conflict Africa, P.3

Presence of legitimate leadership

The third variable emphasises the importance of the presence of legitimate and responsible leadership. Responsible peace building leadership is not only crucial during the difficult process of conflict termination (e.g. during peace negotiations), but, at least as important during the later stages of the peace building process. Peace builders or architects should not only mobilise support within their constituencies for the difficult policy choices, measures and sacrifices that have to be taken during a peace building process, but they also have to temper expectations and hope of unrealistic socio-economic progress and improvements. Without a critical mass of legitimate peace building leadership both at the top and middle as well as the grassroots level, peace building environments are doomed to fail. The South African case is an excellent illustration how the presence of responsible leadership, personified by Nelson Mandela and F.W. De Klerk, was not only crucial for securing a peaceful transition, but also for legitimising and mobilising support for establishing a sustainable peace building process.

Conflict transformation process

The fourth variable deals with the course and outcome of the conflict transformation process. It seems clear that the way in which the conflict parties have ended their violent conflict will have an important impact on the nature and difficulty of the peace building environment[91]. In order for peace architects and analysts to get a clear picture of the difficulty of a peace building environment, it is crucial to thoroughly analyse issues and questions such as: whether or not the violent conflict was 'ended' through peace negotiations, military defeat or suppression of one side or just died out slowly by itself; whether or not the peace negotiations were initiated by the conflict parties themselves or under pressure of the international community; whether or not all the major warring conflict parties were present and have participated constructively; whether or not the conflict parties' constituencies supported the peace negotiations; whether or not the content of the peace agreement is feasible, realistic and satisfactory to the conflict parties; whether or not the outcome was endorsed by all conflict parties; and whether or not there is a history of failed peace initiatives and non-implementation of peace agreements.

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[91] See for a similar variable ("The absence of a peace agreement signed by all major warring parties before intervention and with a minimum of coercion") Downs and Stedman, (2002), ibid., p.56.

Socio-economic development potential

The fifth variable emphasises the influence of a conflict country's socio-economic situation and development potential on the nature and difficulty of the peace building environment. For the stability of a peace process, it is often crucial to quickly improve a conflict country's socio-economic situation. Improving people's socio-economic situation requires not only policies and measures that assure a sustained economic recovery and progress, but also policies that aim to reduce poverty levels and distribute the socio-economic wealth more equally. However, the economic recovery and development is often severely hampered or obstructed by various financial, economic, political, cultural, and political-psychological constraints and preconditions. Further, although the majority of the conflict countries are relatively poor and has to deal with similar constraints, conflict countries' socio-economic potential and opportunities differ considerably (e.g. when coming out of conflict, El Salvador, Angola and Sierra Leone had respectively a GNI per capita of approximately $1500, $500 and $130)92. In order to get an accurate picture of the nature and difficulty of the peace building environment, peace architects and analysts need to take a conflict country's socio-economic situation and potential into account.

4. International involvement

The fourth set of variables looks at the involvement of the international community in the peace building process. The international community is composed of such diverse actors as international NGOs, international and regional organisations, single states or groups of states, or even individuals (e.g. mediation efforts by the former U.S. president Jimmy Carter). The international community can support or sustain a peace building process in a wide variety of ways (e.g. sending peace keeping forces, providing reconstruction aid, providing humanitarian relief aid, training and giving technical assistance to (new) government agencies or institutions, etc). Although not all conflict countries require the same extent of international involvement in order to establish a stable peace process (e.g. South Africa versus Bosnia), most conflict countries cannot do without some sort of international support. Moreover, certain tasks such as separating the warring parties or monitoring a ceasefire can only be effectively done by more neutral outside actors or organisations.

In general, the influence of the international community on the nature and

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92 World Bank statistics. Available at:
http://www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/countryclass.html.

difficulty of peace building environment appears to be straightforward. The more willing the international community is to commit and risk resources and invest time and money in order to rebuild a war-torn country, the less difficult a peace building environment becomes93. International support and involvement can make the difference between success and failure. Unsurprisingly, orphaned conflict countries or regions are less likely to establish sustainable peace processes. To what extent the international community is willing to get involved and commit resources depends on several factors. Among other things: specific countries' national security interests and/or political-economic interests, humanitarian concerns, international media attention and coverage, and historical linkages.

With regard to the hypothesised influence of the international involvement on a peace building environment, we have to remark two important things. First, mainly depending on other characteristics and features of the peace building environment (e.g. conflict issues, duration, extent of the violence, etc.), certain conflict countries require less international support and involvement to establish a successful peace process. Second, it is not only the extent of the international support and involvement that counts, but also the quality and appropriateness of international interventions. It is not uncommon for international interventions to have unintentional externalities that can seriously hamper the conflict resolution process94. Therefore, analysts should not only look at the extent of the international commitment, but, more importantly, they should also consider what the actual impact of the international involvement has been on the peace building environment. In this respect we assert that the following variables or features need to be closely examined: regional and international integration prospects; peace making process; peace implementation responsibility and commitment; post-conflict rebuilding and development commitment; and institutional, technical, policy and administrative assistance and training.

Analysis of the international involvement

Regional/international integration prospects	The first variable considers how international integration or co-operation prospects and promises can influence the nature and difficulty of a peace building environment. Countries can decide to integrate and coordinate their national

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93 For a discussion of Downs and Stedman's international 'willingness score' see:
Downs and Stedman, (2002), ibid., p.57-58.
94 The first author to systematically analyse the unintentional impact of humanitarian aid Mary B. Anderson, Do no harm

policies or start co-operating on a wide variety of issues (e.g. political, economic, financial, military, environmental, social, etc.). The extent, depth and (potential) benefits of different international organisations or co-operation agreements can be an important incentive for conflict countries to adapt their organisations or co-operation agreements differ considerably (e.g. European Union versus ASEAN). Yet, the political, economic and/or security benefits and advantages of joining certain international or regional behaviour and look for peaceful and more compromising solutions and measures. Further, the presence of a (strong) regional or international organisation can have the positive effect of providing a forum for the peaceful conflict resolution. Lastly, regional and international co-operation can expedite and facilitate the post-conflict economic recovery and future socio-economic development; thereby diminishing the risk of a relapse into violence. Analysts should closely examine to what extent regional or international integration prospects and promises have contributed to facilitating a peace building environment.

| Peace making process | The second variable examines the role of the international community in the peace making process. Peace building can only start once the (widespread) fighting and hostilities have ceased. Outside actors often play a crucial role in initiating, facilitating and keeping the conflict parties on the path of peaceful conflict resolution. In this respect the international community can assume several roles or tasks such as acting as a mediator or facilitator during the negotiations, exerting international pressure to induce or coerce conflict |

parties to seek a peaceful resolution to their conflict and/or acting as a potential guarantor of a peace agreement. Conflict parties usually have a number of motives for accepting outside involvement for instance in the form of mediation (e.g. an international mediator may help de-escalating the conflict or help influencing the other conflict party, conflict parties may accept mediation as a way of showing their commitment to peaceful conflict management and in case negotiations fail the mediator can take the blame) 95 . International involvement can expedite the peace making process. We assert that the sooner a conflict turns non-violent, the less damaging and destructive it will be and, subsequently, the less difficult a peace building environment becomes. Therefore, analysts need to xamine how the course of the peace making process has influenced the nature and difficulty of the peace building environment.

Peace implementation responsibility and commitment

The third variable considers the commitment of the international community during the peace implementation process. The extent and impact of the international commitment is an important variable influencing the difficulty of a peace building environment. It obviously makes a difference whether the international community strictly limits its support to mitigating the humanitarian situation or is willing to commit and risk resources, and take responsibility for certain aspects of the peace building process such as monitoring a ceasefire, separating the conflict parties and

[95] See for a detailed overview of the international mediation theory: Bercovitch, Jacob, (1997), "Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, A review of Practice", in: Zartman, William I.; Rasmussen, J.L., (eds.), *Peacemaking in International Conflict*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C.

disarming the warring parties. Implementing, guaranteeing and securing the military aspects of a (peace) agreement are more dangerous and riskier undertakings than supporting the implementation of the civilian aspects. As mentioned above, not all conflict countries require the same extent of international support and commitment. Therefore, analysts need to examine how the international commitment with regard to the implementation of a (peace) agreement has affected a specific peace building environment.

Post-conflict rebuilding and development commitment	The fourth variable considers the continuity of the international commitment with regard to the rebuilding process and the socio-economic development of a war-torn country. Rebuilding and transforming conflict countries into peaceful and more prosperous ones requires a sustained and long-term effort. The degree of socio-economic destruction and disintegration as a consequence of a violent conflict depends on a country's political-economic characteristics as well as the specific conflict dynamics. However, it seems clear that a country that has experienced a wide-scale violent conflict for several years or even decades, cannot be rebuild within a couple years. In addition, most conflict countries are usually quite poor or underdeveloped. The peace building environment will clearly become more amenable and less difficult if the international community is willing to commit resources over an extended period of time (e.g. Bosnia). In this case the chances of establishing or maintaining a stable peace process will increase. In order to get a clear picture whether or not the international community is willing to

commit itself over an extended period of time, peace architects must analysed the nature, objectives and time-horizon of the international interventions

| Institutional, technical, policy and administrative assistance and training | The fifth variable examines another aspect of the nature of the international commitment. It is therefore closely linked and partly overlaps with some of the above-mentioned variables. We argue here that analysts should consider to what extent the international community has assisted or taken responsibility for the policy making process (e.g. United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) versus United Nations Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) in Angola), has provided technical and administrative support, and has trained or educated (future) policy and decision makers (e.g. government officials, judges, members of parliament, election monitors, etc.). Thus, is the international community limiting its involvement to standardised policies prescriptions or is the international community willing to support and assist the policy making process and help building institutional capacities in a more extensive and long-term way? Conflict countries can hugely benefit from the expertise and (institutional) know-how of the international community. With regard to the economic and financial policy making, the international community - mainly by means of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund - usually provides considerable policy and technical assistance and support. We argue that a peace building environment can become less difficult if the international community is willing to provide sufficient institutional, technical, policy and |

administrative assistance and training during the peace building process.

5. Cross-country comparison

In order to compare and explain the outcome of different peace processes, one first has to analyse the nature and difficulty of a peace building environment. In this respect, our framework of analysis considers four clusters of variables: 1) actors and issues, 2) conflict and peace building history, 3) conflict country's internal capability and willingness, and 4) involvement of the international community. From a methodological point of view, compounding these individual variables into a valid overall country assessment or index is obviously a tricky business. As discussed above, it appears to be especially futile to develop very precise scores or ratings for ranking and comparing countries according to the difficulty of their peace building environment. During the determination of these scores or ratings the specific country context is often insufficiently taken into account. Therefore, it is important to stress once more that the assessment of the difficulty of a peace building environment always remains largely indicative.

We propose a different methodology for assessing and comparing peace building environments. This approach aims to go beyond simple checking whether or not certain features or variables are present (e.g. are there more than 50.000 combatants?). An accurate assessment of the nature and difficulty of a peace building environment should be based on a thorough analysis of the actual impact of various (potentially) difficulty-enhancing or reducing variables. Furthermore, analysts should not only consider how many or to what extent individual variables have increased the difficulty of a peace building environment. But they should also pay attention to the existing mutual influence, interdependence and reinforcement between various variables. The simultaneous presence of certain combinations of difficulty-enhancing variables can disproportionately increase the difficulty of a peace building environment.

Analysts can use the following exhibit to indicate the individual impact of variables on the difficulty of a peace building environment. In order to get an overall country assessment, analysts need to consider the combined impact of certain combinations of variables. For example, the combination of spoilers, hostile regional stakeholders and weak state structures can easily result in an extremely difficulty peace building environment. However, it is also quite possibly that there are other variables that neutralise or reduce the difficulty and dangers of this specific combination (e.g. a strong potential of socio-economic development or an effective peace implementation intervention by the international community).

Therefore, an overall assessment must be based on a thorough analysis of interaction and mutual influence of the different variables.

For example: ● Burundi, ○ Northern Ireland, ▲ South Africa, ■ El Salvador, and □ Bosnia

Exhibit 13: Cross-country comparison of peace building environments

5.3. Step three: assessing success

Progress in the peace building process can be assessed by looking at (a) the output, or (b) the installation of the building blocks. First, we can find out if the conflict environment has been transformed into a zone characterized by the absence of physical violence, the elimination of unacceptable forms of political, economic and cultural discrimination, a self sustainable peace building process, a high level of internal and external legitimacy or approval, and a constructive management and transformation of conflicts. Second, we can do a peace building deficiency assessment. This implies

that we study the state of the building blocks: what has been realized and what still needs to be done?

5.4. *Step four: assessing the conflict transformation and peace building process*

1. Mapping transition-transformation.
   a. Phases
   b. Within the building blocks: changes
   c. Overview of all the changes
2. Analysis of the changes.
   a. Within the building blocks: progress.
   b. Between the building blocks.
      i. Correlations
      ii. Negative side effects/ synergies
      iii. priorities (time and resources)
3. Analysis of challenges and responses.
   a. Within
      i. Challenges?
      ii. Responses (who, what and how).
   b. Between:
      i. Challenges?
      ii. Responses (who, what and how).
      iii. Priorities (time and resources)
4. Evaluation of overall peace building architecture
   a. Clear and compelling definition of peace
   b. Comprehensive peace building deficiency assessment
   c. Coherent planning
   d. Efficient and effective implementation
   e. Satisfactory involvement of owners and stakeholders
   f. Identification and dismantlement of senti-mental walls.

5.4.1. Mapping the transformation-transition

➢ Phases of conflict.

In this part we check if the history of the conflict can be divided in different phases. The criteria for distinguishing phases can be (a) changes in violence, (b) progress in the overall climate, etc.

➢ Changes within each of the building blocks.

Here we describe the changes in each of the building blocks. For each of the building blocks the changes are tracked on a time scale by means of different indicators, for example:

- CCN: communication, peace negotiations, etc
- Structures:

    i. Democratic transition: Freedom House indices

    ii. Economic transition: indicators of growth, PPP, HDI and vertical and horizontal inequality.

    iii. Security transition: indicators of political and criminal violence

- Political-psychological climate: hope, loyalties, reconciliation.
- International cooperation and support.

	Fase 1	Fase 2	Fase 3
CCN	Changes Challenges Responses		
Political transition			
Economic transition			
Security transition			
Climate			
International support			

Exhibit 14: Changes in building blocks

➢ Overview of all the changes

5.4.2. Analysis of changes

➢ Within the building blocks: progress?

➢ Between the building blocks:

    i. Correlations. How do the transformations in the different building blocks evolve? Parallel?

    ii. Negative side effects / synergies? Were there developments in one or more building block, which had clearly a synergetic or negative impact on other building blocks?

    iii. Priorities? Were the efforts undertaken simultaneously or were there clear priorities in the different phases of the transition process? Do some activities get priority in terms of time (come first) and resources (get more attention and human and material resources) ?

5.4.3. Analysis of challenges and responses

➢ Within the building blocks: challenges and responses

In this part we are invited to identify for each of the transformations (a) the shocks, incidents or challenges, with which the decision-makers were confronted, and (b) describe what was done and *how* to cope with these challenges, and (c) who took the leadership. The "how" can differ in several ways[96]:

- the extent of the change desired (transformation or realignment)
- the pace of the change (incremental or big-bang)
- top-down or bottom-up
- change style or how the process of change is managed (education- and communication, collaboration, participation/intervention, direction and coercion).
- change target (values, behaviour and attitudes)
- change levers (paradigm, stories, symbols, routines and rituals, control system, power structures...)
- responsibility for leading change.

➢ Between building blocks: challenges and responses

5.4.4. Evaluation of the overall peace building architecture

To evaluate peace building we make use of the following six criteria.

Criterion 1: a clear and compelling definition-vision of peace and a valid conceptual framework indicating the necessary conditions for realizing the aim.

One reason why conflict prevention fails is the existence of an incoherent peace policy. In many cases the incoherence results from the pursuit of different aims or of different kinds of peace. It is impossible to develop an effective conflict prevention policy when there is no consensus or clarity about what is meant by conflict prevention or the kind of peace one wants to pursue. Do the policy makers perceive peace as an endpoint or as a process?; are they satisfied with negative peace (the absence of military violence) or do they want positive peace?; are they aiming for a suspension of violence (a peace break) or a sustainable peace?

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[96] Julia Balogun and Veronica Hope Hailey, Exploring strategic change, 1999, Prentice Hall, Harlow, Essex, England.

Clear operational definition	←——————→	Vague
Consensus	←——————→	Lack of consensus
Attractive for all parties	←——————→	Not attractive for all parties

Criterion 2: a comprehensive needs assessment

The design of an effective conflict prevention policy requires not only a clear operational definition of the peace one wants to create, but also a comprehensive assessment of the concrete needs in the conflict ridden region. Most needs assessments are partial and incomplete. A comprehensive needs assessment means that we have to find out if the necessary conditions for a sustainable peace are present or not. This will help us to distinguish strong areas which have been adequately covered, weak areas which need much more attention, and finally some blind spots which have been overlooked by the decision-makers.

Criterion 3: a coherent peace plan

Once the needs of a particular situation have been spotted, the required tasks and suitable conflict prevention tools become evident. The next task is to design a coherent action plan for building a sustainable peace. This not only requires being acquainted with the impact of a wide battery of peace building instruments and tools, but also an understanding of the complex interdependence of different domains (political, economic, legal, military), different levels-actors, time-frames and layers or depths.[97][98]

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[97] REYCHLER Luc, *Field Diplomacy: A new Conflict Paradigm ?*, in Peace and Conflict Studies, July 1997, pp.34-47.

[98] REYCHLER Luc, Democratic peacebuilding and conflict prevention, paper for Conflict Prevention Network (CPN, European Commission) seminar on Democracy building and conflict-resolution, June 19, 1997.

	Levels / actors	
	– International: global, regional, sub-regional – National: elite, middle, local	
Domains / Measures diplomatic, political, economic, humanitarian, education/information, military		**Time-factors** – timing of entry/ exit – lead time: long, middle, short – synchronic or sequential – duration
	Layers – Public layers: public behavior/opinion – Deeper layers: private opinion, perceptions, wishes, expectations, feelings, emotions, memory	

Exhibit 15: Cross-impacts of peace building efforts.

Criterion 4: an effective and efficient implementation

Implementing a peace plan effectively and efficiently is also a major political problem. It requires the will to make the means and the time, skilled people, coordination, and leadership available. Delivering the necessary means is to a great extent related to the perceived interests of the donor countries. When vital interests are at stake, it seem easier than when it concerns a 'far from our bed' type of conflict. How does one convince the opinion leaders that one should be involved at an early stage and that proactive conflict prevention is more cost-effective than reactive conflict prevention? A second set of questions relates to: Who will be the prime mover(s)? How will the peace efforts be coordinated? Should it be one person or a team who will mediate in the conflict? Should the team consist of impartial outsiders or also include partial insiders? When do coordination efforts result in creative synergic processes and when do they become stifling? Finally, more attention should be paid to the role of 'leadership ' in conflict transformation. What kind of leadership is appropriate for conflict transformation? The implementation question calls for (a) the timely provision of sufficient means and time to assist in the transition process, (b) an effective coordination of the efforts of the actors involved; and (c) a great deal of leadership. The first two issues receive ample attention in evaluation studies. However, this is not the case with the leadership factor. Despite the fact that most conflicts in the Post Cold War period are typically leader-led, the role of leadership tends to be overlooked. Many factors underlie conflict and potentially violent conflict.

But there must be a spark, which is normally struck by the leader with power, and a susceptible group of people who can be incited to violence.[99] Successful cases tend to be blessed, in their moments of transition, with extraordinary able leadership in the persons of Nelson Mandela, Cyril Ramaphosa, Vaclav Havel and Vaclav Klaus. Effective leadership is crucial to the success of democratization, and civil society, in addition to other valuable functions, generally provides a setting for the development of leadership.[100]

Criterion 5: Recognition of owners and stakeholders and their legitimate control of the conflict transformation process

A very important element in the democratization transition is the 'process. The term process refers to the way decisions get made and how people feel about it. The process of decision-making as a key cause of conflict is often overlooked, but it is here that resentment, feelings of being treated unfairly, and a sense of powerfulness are rooted. People who feel excluded or sense they cannot influence decisions affecting their lives will rarely cooperate with and support those decisions. They may not overtly reject the decision, but their behavior will disrupt the relationship in subtle and covert ways. The goal of those involved is to empower people to function as equals, structure a process of decision making that involves those affected by the decisions and that feels fair to them.[101] It has become part of the litany of peace workers that conflicting parties should be the owners of their conflict; that one should not steal conflicts; that one needs a mandate to provide peace services; that one ought to work with local partners, etc. The problem of ownership is also alive in academic discussions about the pros and cons of inclusive- versus exclusive-, elicitive versus prescriptive-, and exogenous versus endogenous approaches of conflict transformation. It is also related to the entry and exit of a conflict (when to intervene and when to get out). The underlying assumption of this concern is that a peace process can only be sustained when the internal and external stakeholders support it. But who are these stakeholders? Should efforts be concentrated on the elite's or also involve the people? What does it mean to empower the people? Should the extremists be invited to the negotiation table? How and to what extent should external parties whose security and interests are linked with the conflict have a say in the conflict transformation process

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[99] Conflict prevention: strategies to sustain peace in the post-cold war world, report of the Aspen Institute conference, July 30-August 3,1996, Aspen, Colorado.
[100] MURAVCHIK Joshua, *Promoting peace through democracy*, in CROCKER Chester et al (Eds.), Managing global chaos: sources of and responses to international conflict, 1996, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, p. 582.
[101] LEDERACH John Paul, *Understanding conflict: The experience, structure and dynamics*, in Mediating for conflict resolution, 1995, Education for conflict resolution, Indiana.

and the peace agreement. What are the guidelines for governmental and non-governmental third parties whose expertise and others kinds of support are needed for peace making, peace building and arms control? Four layers of stakeholders can be distinguished: (a) the owners of the conflict or those who are directly involved in the conflict (at elite, middle and local level); (b) the neighboring actors whose national or private interests are influenced by the conflict; (c) other foreign actors whose interest are at stake; and (4) third parties whose peace building initiatives or lack of them could significantly influence the conflict dynamic. To recognize and include the owners and the major stakeholders in the conflict transformation process makes the difference between successful and unsuccessful intervention.

Criterion 6: Awareness and dismantling of mental and "senti-mental" walls

To analyze and transform conflicts, more attention needs to be paid to political-psychological variables. In particular, efforts should be made to identify and dismantle "senti-mental" walls. The term "senti-mental" wall refers to concepts, theories, dogmas, attitudes, and habits, emotions and inclinations which inhibit democratic transition and constructive transformation of conflicts. The existence of senti-mental walls increases the chances of misperceiving the situation; mis-evaluating the interests at stake; lowering the motivation to act on an opportunity; and developing the necessary skills and know-how. The hyphenation of sentiment and mental to 'senti-mental' is intended to make people aware of the fact that mental walls tend to be reinforced by emotions, and that efforts to dismantle them tend to be confronted with different kinds of emotional resistance. They can have a long history, but are basically man made obstacles. They can be created, restored, reinforced and dismantled.

5.4.5. Analysis of peace building architecture

6. Case-studies

Controlled comparisons will be made between failed peace processes (Burundi and the Middle East), partial successes (Bosnia), and successes (El Salvador, Northern Ireland, and South Africa). Controlled comparison or controlled differentiation, as Horowitz puts it, "does not imply perfect identity or even very close similarity, but rather a restricted range of difference".[102]

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[102] Horowitz, Donald L., (1985), Ethnic Groups in Conflict, University of California Press, Berkeley, p. 17.

7. Specific research questions

<u>Some underlying assumptions</u>

This research project aims to contribute to a better understanding of sustainable peace building architecture. If the world wants sustainable development, it will have to invest more seriously in sustainable peace building. The underlying assumptions of this study are:

- That it is important to look at the big picture of peace building. Cleverness in peace building is a sharp focus camera. Wisdom a wide-angle lens103.
- Peace building is the result of many (peace building blocks).
- A great deal of today's peace building efforts is hampered by two beliefs. First, the belief that peace is the sum of all the efforts. In many cases, the peace building efforts resulted in huge piles of peace building stones, and not in the expected peace building. Peace building is a complex dynamic system, in which the efforts in different sectors or at different levels impact each other. Second, there is also the law of the hammer. Analysts and actors in different sectors (diplomats, military, economists, politicians, educators, ...) are convinced that they are the most important and should come first.
- Peace building requires progress in all the building blocks and support systems.
- Peace building involves simultaneous efforts and priority (time and resources) setting.
- Peace building requires a critical mass of internal and external peace building leadership.
- A clear and compelling definition of peace is very important to mobilize peace efforts.
- The design of a good peace planning requires a comprehensive peace building deficiency and opportunity assessment.
- Coherent planning is essential.
- Peace building requires an effective and efficient implementation.
- Sustainable peace building requires the inclusion of the major stakeholders.
- Peace building requires a great deal of learning and unlearning. This implies the identification and dismantlement of senti-mental walls.
- Peace building requires a better co-operation between the operari (practitioners) and the speculari (research community).
- Architecture should be developed from the bottom-up.

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103 E. De bobo, New thinking for the new millennium, 1999, Penguin Books, London.

- Analysis id essential, but peace building will not be solved by more analysis.

Empirical research priorities

This research project will focus on step 3. Special attention will be paid to "priority setting" in peace building decision-making. In the literature on peace building there are several unresolved debates about, for example: the timing of elections, the prioritisation of security, development and democratic transition, the timing of cease-fire and peace negotiations. The term "priority setting" refers to decision-making about the prioritisation of time and resources for particular activities in the transition process. The role of the variable time is one of the least researched variables in peace building architecture.

Conceptual development

The second priority in the research is the development of practical analytical framework for developing sustainable peace architecture.


Exhibit 16. Thinking about peace building architecture.

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