ITEM METADATA RECORD
Title: Entry and strategic information display in credit markets
Authors: Bouckaert, Jan ×
Degryse, Hans #
Contributors: 8838
Issue Date: Jul-2006
Publisher: Blackwell publishing
Series Title: Economic journal vol:116 issue:513 pages:702-720
Abstract: In many countries, lenders voluntarily provide information about their borrowers to private credit registries. A recent World Bank survey reveals that the display of a lender's own borrower information is often not reciprocated. That is, access to these registries does not require the prior provision of proprietary data. We argue that incumbent lenders release information about a portion of their profitable borrowers for strategic reasons. The reasoning is that the pool of unreleased borrowers becomes characterised by a severe adverse selection problem. This prevents the entrants from bidding for all the incumbent's profitable borrowers and reduces their scale of entry.
URI: 
ISSN: 0013-0133
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Research Center of Monetary and Information Economics, Leuven
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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