Title: Regulating on-street parking
Regulating on street parking
Authors: Calthrop, E ×
Proost, Stef #
Issue Date: Jan-2006
Publisher: Elsevier science bv
Series Title: Regional science and urban economics vol:36 issue:1 pages:29-48
Abstract: Consider a shopper or tourist driving downtown and trying to park. Two strategies are usually available: either park at a private off-street facility or search for a cheaper on-street spot. We formalise Such a setting and use the model to Study Optimal government regulation of the on-street parking market. It is shown that the optimal on-street fee equals the marginal cost of off-street supply at the optimal quantity. If the off-street market is supplied under constant returns to scale, this provides a particularly simple operational rule: the price on street should match that off street. We also extend the model to consider maximum length of stay restrictions and non-competitive private supply. A numerical model, calibrated to central London, investigates the magnitude of an optimal fee. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
ISSN: 0166-0462
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Research Center of Energy, Transport and Environment, Leuven
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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