This paper is the first to study the effect of European anti-dumping policy on market structure, i.e. the incentives for firms to engage in a domestic or international cartel in a multi-stage setting. The analysis concentrates on how European anti-dumping policy influences the incentives for firms to collude domestically or internationally. We tackle the question of whether anti-dumping regulation helps to establish, maintain or rather endanger full cartels as well as cartels restricted to domestic firms only. Our findings suggest that anti-dumping legislation can both have a pro-competitive or an anti-competitive effect. Which case prevails depends crucially on the welfare objective function used by the European government and also on the cost asymmetry and the degree of product heterogenity between domestic and foreign firms. In addition to market structure we also discuss welfare effects. We find that anti-dumping measures are capable of both increasing or decreasing total community welfare depending on the type of measures installed.