Title: A concrete security analysis for 3GPP-MAC
Authors: Hong, D
Kang, JS
Preneel, Bart
Ryu, H
Issue Date: 2003
Publisher: Springer
Host Document: Lecture Notes in Computer Science vol:2887 pages:154-169
Conference: FSE 2003 date:February 24-26, 2003
Abstract: The standardized integrity algorithm f9 of the 3GPP algorithm computes a MAC (Message Authentication Code) to establish the integrity and the data origin of the signalling data over a radio access link of W-CDMA IMT-2000. The function f9 is based on the block cipher KASUMI and it can be considered as a variant of CBC-MAC. In this paper we examine the provable security of f9. We prove that f9 is a secure pseudorandom function by giving a concrete bound on an adversary's inability to forge a MAC value in terms of her inability to distinguish the underlying block cipher from a random permutation.
ISSN: 0302-9743
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IC
Appears in Collections:ESAT - STADIUS, Stadius Centre for Dynamical Systems, Signal Processing and Data Analytics

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