Title: Plotinus and Scepticism
Authors: Opsomer, Jan
Issue Date: 9-May-2017
Conference: International Conference Scepticism from Antiquity to Modern Times location:Universität Hamburg. Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies. Jewish Scepticism date:8-11 May 2017
Abstract: It is a well-known fact that Plotinus integrates skeptic arguments in order to prepare his own account of intellective knowledge. These arguments are paralleled in Sextus Empiricus. As has been argued before, Plotinus uses these arguments, but not for skeptic purposes. I argue that Plotinus shows by using these arguments why sense-perception cannot lead to knowledge, given certain assumptions about the way in which sense-perception works. These assumptions are empiricist and representationalist. It is not my intention to argue that Plotinus addressed these assumptions de dicto, but merely that his position is de re opposed to them. Plotinus construes his account of intellective knowledge as an alternative model of knowledge, which avoids the problems exposed by the skeptical arguments.
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IMa
Appears in Collections:De Wulf-Mansion Centre for Ancient, Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy

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