Title: The stability and effectiveness of climate coalitions: A comparative analysis of multiple integrated assessment models
Authors: Lessmann, Kai ×
Kornek, Ulrike
Bosetti, Valentina
Dellink, Rob
Emmerling, Johannes
Eyckmans, Johan
Nagashima, Miyuki
Weikard, Hans-Peter
Yang, Zili #
Issue Date: 2015
Publisher: Kluwer Academic Publishers
Series Title: Environmental and Resource Economics vol:62 pages:811-836
Abstract: We report results from a comparison of numerically calibrated game theoretic integrated assessment models that explore the stability and performance of international coalitions for climate change mitigation. We identify robust results concerning the incentives of
different nations to commit themselves to a climate agreement and estimate the extent of greenhouse gas mitigation that can be achieved by stable agreements. We also assess the potential of transfers that redistribute the surplus of cooperation to foster the stability of climate coalitions. In contrast to much of the existing analytical game theoretical literature, we find substantial scope for self-enforcing climate coalitions in most models that close much of the abatement and welfare gap between complete absence of cooperation and full cooperation. This more positive message follows from the use of appropriate transfer schemes that are designed to counteract free riding incentives.
ISSN: 0924-6460
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Research Centre for Economics and Corporate Sustainability, Campus Brussels
Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - miscellaneous
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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