Title: Design of public procurement auctions: Evidence from cleaning contracts
Other Titles: MSI Working Paper
Authors: Hyytinen, Ari
Lundberg, Sofia
Toivanen, Otto
Issue Date: Feb-2015
Publisher: KU Leuven - Faculty of Economics and Business
Series Title: FEB Research Report MSI_1503 vol:MSI_1503
Abstract: We compare beauty contests with first-price sealed-bid and scoring auctions, using data on public procurement of cleaning services in Swedish municipalities. The lowest submitted and winning bids are similar in all auction designs despite a higher price sensitivity of procurement bureaucrats in scoring (and first-price) auctions. There is more entry in beauty contests, by firms favored in them. Reduced entry into the scoring and price only auctions largely explains why the procurement costs are not lowered compared to beauty contests.
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IR
Appears in Collections:Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation (MSI), Leuven

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