EPSA 2014 Annual General Conference edition:4 location:Edinburgh date:19-21 June 2014
In this paper we present spatial, complete and incomplete information models of the EU antidumping procedure. We identify the key players and study interest groups’, member states’ and institutions’ optimal strategies. We find that in the complete information model the Commission sets the duty it prefers most from among the duties a simple majority of member states prefer to the status quo. In the incomplete information model the industry affected by dumping has private information. It lobbies the Commission at the proposal stage and the pivotal member state at the vote stage. Furthermore, we analyze a scenario in which the European Parliament (EP) becomes involved as a veto player. We find that giving the EP such a role only affects the outcome if the EP is more reluctant to impose antidumping duties than is the pivotal member state. Subsequently, we present an empirical analysis and use Bayesian item response models to compare the positions of the Council and the EP on trade issues between December 2009 and June 2014. We find that the EP is indeed less protectionist than the Council. This suggests that the member states may be reluctant to give the EP more power on antidumping issues, because it would veto duties as high as those the Council currently imposes.