Title: The weak axiom of revealed preference for collective households
Authors: Smeulders, Bart
Cherhcye, L.
De Rock, B.
Spieksma, Frits
Talla Nobibon, Fabrice
Issue Date: 2014
Host Document: Workshop Notes
Conference: International Workshop on Computational Social Choice edition:5 location:Pittsburgh (US) date:23-25 June 2014
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to derive extensions of the weak axiom of revealed preference (warp) to collective households. We consider three different settings: the
general setting, where no information on the characteristics of goods is available; the private setting, where all goods are consumed privately without externalities, and finally, the dictator setting, where each observation is fully assigned to a single member of the household. For each of the above settings, we propose an extension of warp and we establish the complexity of testing that extension.
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IMa
Appears in Collections:Research Center for Operations Research and Business Statistics (ORSTAT), Leuven

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