Title: Grounding Perceptual Dogmatism: What are Perceptual Seemings?
Authors: Ghijsen, Harmen # ×
Issue Date: Jun-2015
Publisher: Dept. of Philosophy, Memphis State University
Series Title: The Southern Journal of Philosophy vol:53 issue:2 pages:196-215
Abstract: Perceptual Dogmatism (PD) holds that if it perceptually seems to S that p, then S has immediate prima facie justification for the belief that p. Various philosophers have made the notion of a perceptual seeming more precise by distinguishing perceptual seemings from both sensations and beliefs to accommodate a) the epistemic difference between perceptual judgments of novices and experts, and, b) the problem of the speckled hen. Using somewhat different terminology, perceptual seemings are supposed to be high-level percepts instead of low-level sensations. I argue that although it is right that perceptual seemings should not be identified with sensations, they should also not be identified with percepts. There is no strong reason to assume that sensations and percepts exist as separate conscious states, and it appears therefore best to identify perceptual seemings simply with perceptual experiences interpreted as high-level representational entities. However, even with this plausible identification in hand, the speckled hen will remain problematic for PD.
ISSN: 0038-4283
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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