Title: Growth-friendly dictatorship
Authors: De Luca, Giacomo ×
Litina, Anastasia
Sekeris, Petros #
Issue Date: 2015
Series Title: Journal of Comparative Economics vol:43 issue:1 pages:98-111
Abstract: This research argues that in highly unequal societies, a rent-seeking and self-maximizing dictator may be supported by a fraction of the population, despite the absence of special benefits to these societal groups. Importantly, it is the stakes of the dictator in the economy, in the form of capital ownership, that drive the support of individuals. In highly unequal societies ruled by a capital-rich dictator endowed with the power to tax and
appropriate at will, the elites will support dictatorial policies given that they can generate higher growth rates than the ones obtained under democracy. This support arises unconditionally to special benefits to the elites and despite the total absence of checks and balances on the dictator.
ISSN: 0147-5967
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Research Center of Development Economics, Leuven
LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, Leuven
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

Files in This Item:
File Description Status SizeFormat
Growth-friendly Dictatorship.pdf Accepted 593KbAdobe PDFView/Open Request a copy

These files are only available to some KU Leuven Association staff members


All items in Lirias are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

© Web of science