Title: CEO Compensation in Private Family Firms: Pay-for-Performance and the Moderating Role of Ownership and Management
Authors: Michiels, Anneleen ×
Voordeckers, Wim
Lybaert, Nadine
Steijvers, Tensie #
Issue Date: Jun-2013
Publisher: Jossey-Bass, Inc.
Series Title: Family Business Review vol:26 issue:2 pages:140-160
Abstract: Although classical agency theorists claim that pay-for-performance is not relevant in the context of private family firms, the authors provide empirical evidence of the opposite, using a sample of 529 privately held U.S. family firms. The results suggest that objective performance-based measures play a significant role in CEO compensation. Additionally, the authors find that in private family firms CEO compensation is more responsive to firm performance in firms with low ownership dispersion and in the controlling-owner stage. Furthermore, the positive pay-for-performance relation is slightly stronger for nonfamily CEOs than for family CEOs.
ISSN: 0894-4865
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Non-KU Leuven Association publications
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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