Title: Phenomenalist dogmatist experientialism and the distinctiveness problem
Authors: Ghijsen, Harmen # ×
Issue Date: May-2014
Publisher: Springer
Series Title: Synthese: an International Journal for Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science vol:191 issue:7 pages:1549-1566
Abstract: Phenomenalist dogmatist experientialism (PDE) holds the following thesis: if S has a perceptual experience that p, then S has immediate prima facie evidential justification for the belief that p in virtue of the experience’s phenomenology. The benefits of PDE are that it (a) provides an undemanding view of perceptual justification that allows most of our ordinary perceptual beliefs to be justified, and (b) accommodates two important internalist intuitions, viz. the New Evil Demon Intuition and the Blindsight Intuition. However, in the face of a specific version of the Sellarsian dilemma, PDE is ad hoc. PDE needs to explain what is so distinct about perceptual experience that enables it to fulfill its evidential role without being itself in need of justification. I argue that neither an experience’s presentational phenomenology, nor its phenomenal forcefulness can be used to answer this question, and that prospects look dim for any other phenomenalist account. The subjective distinctness of perceptual experience might instead just stem from a higher-order belief that the experience is a perceptual one, but this will only serve to strengthen the case for externalism: externalism is better suited to provide an account of how we attain justified higher-order beliefs and can use this account to accommodate the Blindsight Intuition.
ISSN: 0039-7857
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Centre for Logic and Analytical Philosophy
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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