Title: The choice of environmental regulatory enforcement by lobby groups
Authors: Ovaere, Lotte ×
Proost, Stef
Rousseau, Sandra #
Issue Date: 2013
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Series Title: Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy vol:2 issue:3 pages:328-347
Article number: 0
Abstract: Across countries and regions, we observe wide variations in the level of enforcement
instruments (fines and inspections) that are used to reach compliance with environmental
regulations. In this paper, we study whether the differences in enforcement policies
can be justified from an efficiency perspective, and if not, whether they favour the
interests of certain lobby groups. We develop a theoretical model to derive the preferred
enforcement policy, which is characterised from a global efficiency point of
view and also from the point of view of different interest groups. Also, we explicitly
allow for a non-linear deterrence effect of fines. We find that, despite the regulatory
costs, green interest groups generally favour more stringent enforcement strategies
with high fines and high inspection frequencies, while brown interest groups prefer
laxer enforcement strategies.
ISSN: 2160-6544
VABB publication type: VABB-1
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Research Center of Energy, Transport and Environment, Leuven
Research Centre for Economics and Corporate Sustainability, Campus Brussels
Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - miscellaneous
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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