In this article I compare the way in which Merleau-Ponty gives shape to the differentiality which characterizes being, with Deleuze's elaborated differential ontology. Both authors refuse to think the ontological ground as an abstract or concrete identity but consider it to be a singular unity based on the global disposition of heterogeneous elements. It does not coincide with itself but is kept open by ail ever changing blank spot, which is the condition of possibility of the individualisation of this ontological ground. Moreover, both authors recognize the genetic or individualizing power of difference. Despite these resemblances however, Merleau-Ponty's differential ontology seems to be premature in comparison with the one of Deleuze. Not only has Deleuze, in contrast to Merleau-Ponty, developed an extended theory of difference, according to Deleuze's standards Merleau-Ponty's conception of difference seems to be secondary and derived. As is also remarked by Claude Lefort, the ontological differences Merleau-Ponty points out are always differences of a more fundamental unity. And ultimately, the motor of Merleau-Pontian individualisation is resemblance instead of difference. Since Merleau-Ponty's early death prevented him from developing his differential aspirations any further, these remarks cannot be considered as a critique but should be taken as an indication about how the differential Ontology that is sketched out in Le visible et l'invisible could be elaborated.