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© 2014 Springer Science+Business Media New York. All rights are reserved. The nature of phenomenal states or qualia-also called the feel of what it is like to be-and of consciousness in general has been an important focus of research in recent discussions in the philosophy of mind. Qualia, then, are (first-order) properties of mental states, and the concept is sometimes used more broadly to indicate conscious experience in general. Explaining these qualia has been called 'the hard problem of consciousness'. We suggest that, though recursion is an important property at the neurobiological level, an explanation of qualia and consciousness might require also emergence and downward causation especially if also the property of intentionality (or aboutness), which also characterises natural languages, is to be accounted for. Furthermore, a unified theory of mind and language requires that, though recursion is a fundamental principle, there is also a non-recursive level which needs to be taken into account.