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Title: Subjective probabilities need not be sharp (forthcoming)
Authors: Chandler, Jacob # ×
Issue Date: 2013
Publisher: D. Reidel
Series Title: Erkenntnis: an International Journal of Analytic Philosophy
Abstract: It is well known that classical, aka ‘sharp’, Bayesian decision theory, which models belief states as single probability functions, faces a number of serious difficulties with respect to its handling of agnosticism.
These difficulties have led to the increasing popularity of
so-called ‘imprecise’ models of decision-making, which represent belief states as sets of probability functions. In a recent paper, however, Adam Elga has argued in favour of a putative normative principle of sequential choice that he claims to be borne out by the sharp model but not by any promising incarnation of its imprecise counterpart. After first pointing out that Elga has fallen short of establishing that his principle is indeed uniquely borne out by the sharp model, I cast aspersions on its plausibility. I show that a slight weakening of the principle is satisfied by at least one, but interestingly not all, varieties of the imprecise model and point out that Elga has failed to motivate his stronger commitment.
ISSN: 0165-0106
Publication status: accepted
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Centre for Logic and Analytical Philosophy
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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