ITEM METADATA RECORD
Title: Bertrand competition with an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint
Authors: Bouckaert, J. ×
Degryse, Hans
van Dijk, T. #
Issue Date: 2013
Series Title: The Journal of Industrial Economics vol:61 issue:1 pages:62-83
Abstract: Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power, or dominant firms, from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers’ interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power from
practicing both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is
small.
ISSN: 0022-1821
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Research Center Finance, Leuven
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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