Title: Dictatorship in a single export crop economy
Authors: CapĂ©au, Bart ×
Verwimp, Philip #
Issue Date: 2012
Series Title: Journal of Theoretical Politics vol:24 issue:2 pages:210-234
Abstract: We provide an analysis of a power maximising model for
dictatorial behaviour. In the model, the dictator's revenues
depend on the exports of a single crop. With the export earnings
the dictator buys loyalty from the producers of the export crop by
setting the domestic producer price. Revenues resulting from the
difference between the international and the domestic price of the
crop are used to finance a repressive apparatus. We present a
complete comparative statics analysis of the choice between
repression and loyalty to obtain power, in response to changes in
the international price of the single crop in the economy. The
results allow for a novel classification of power maximising
behaviour into benevolent, tyrannical and totalitarian
dictatorship. We argue that the model and the associated
dictatorship typology can be embedded into Wintrobe's more general
specification of a dictator's objective function, which combines
aspirations for power with rent seeking motives. We confront our
analysis with empirical observations
on the Habyarimana regime in Rwanda (1973-1994).
ISSN: 0951-6298
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Research Group Welfare State and Housing
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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