Title: Sequential reciprocity in two-player, two-stage games: an experimental analysis
Authors: Dhaene, Geert ×
Bouckaert, Jan #
Issue Date: Nov-2010
Publisher: Academic Press
Series Title: Games and Economic Behavior vol:70 issue:2 pages:289-303
Abstract: We experimentally test Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger’s (2004) theory of sequential reciprocity in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma and a mini-ultimatum game. Data on behavior and first- and second-order beliefs allow us to classify each subject’s behavior as a material best response, a reciprocity best response, both, or none. We found that in both games the behavior of about 80% of the first movers was a material best response, a reciprocity best response, or both. The remaining 20% of first movers almost always made choices that were “too kind” according to Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger’s theory. Second-mover behavior, in both games, was in line with the predictions of the theory. We found first and second-order beliefs to be unbiased in the sequential prisoner’s dilemma, but biased in the mini-ultimatum game.
ISSN: 0899-8256
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Research Center of Econometrics, Leuven
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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