Title: How Agents Weaken their Principal’s Incentives to Control: The Case of EU Negotiators and EU Member States in Multilateral Negotiations
Authors: Delreux, Tom ×
Kerremans, Bart #
Issue Date: Jun-2010
Publisher: Routledge
Series Title: Revue d'Intégration Européenne / Journal of European Integration vol:32 issue:4 pages:357-374
ISSN: 0703-6337
VABB publication type: VABB-1
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Leuven International and European Studies (LINES)
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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