Title: A Problem for Contrastivist Accounts of Knowledge
Authors: Kelp, Christoph # ×
Issue Date: Jan-2011
Publisher: Kluwer Academic Publishers
Series Title: Philosophical Studies vol:152 issue:2 pages:287-292
Abstract: This paper raises a problem for contrastivist accounts of knowledge. It is
argued that contrastivism fails to succeed in providing a modest solution to the sceptical paradox—i.e. one according to which we have knowledge of a wide range of ordinary empirical propositions whilst failing to know the various anti-sceptical hypotheses entailed by them—whilst, at the same time, retaining a contrastivist version of the closure principle for knowledge.
ISSN: 0031-8116
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Centre for Logic and Analytical Philosophy
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

Files in This Item:
File Description Status SizeFormat
Contrastivism_Final.pdfOA article (author's postprint) Published 319KbAdobe PDFView/Open


All items in Lirias are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

© Web of science