Title: Pritchard on Virtue Epistemology
Authors: Kelp, Christoph # ×
Issue Date: 2009
Publisher: Routledge
Series Title: International Journal of Philosophical Studies vol:17 issue:4 pages:583-587
Abstract: Duncan Pritchard has recently argued against robust virtue epistemology on the grounds that it gets caught up in a fatal double bind: There is a type of case suggesting that the central robust virtue theoretic condition on knowledge is too strong to be necessary for knowledge as well as a type of case suggesting that it is too weak to be sufficient for knowledge. He does concede to the robust virtue epistemologist that his argument will be fully convincing only if it really is a double bind the view gets caught up in, i.e. if robust virtue epistemology faces both types of case. This paper shows that Pritchard’s argument fails to fulfil its promise. I consider the two major ways of interpreting the virtue theoretic condition and argue that while it is plausible that for each interpretation of this condition one problematic type of case arises, for neither interpretation both problematic types of case arise. In consequence, by his own lights, Pritchard’s argument turns out unconvincing.
ISSN: 0967-2559
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Centre for Logic and Analytical Philosophy
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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