Title: Optimal agenda-setter timing
Other Titles: How an agenda-setter optimally schedules a vote
Authors: Polborn, Mattias
Willmann, Gerald # ×
Issue Date: Nov-2009
Series Title: The Canadian Journal of Economics vol:42 issue:4 pages:1527-1546
Abstract: We analyze the optimal timing problem of an agenda setter who can propose a project that is then voted on by a committee. The payoff consists of a common stochastic component and an idiosyncratic component that differs among committee members. The agenda setter may be biased for or against the project, relative to the median committee member, and chooses when to call the vote. We analyze how the timing decision depends on the political environment and the bias of the agenda setter. We show that both positively and negatively biased agenda setters can implement decisions that differ from those preferred by the median committee member.
ISSN: 0008-4085
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Research Center of International Economics, Leuven
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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