Tijdschrift voor Filosofie vol:70 issue:2 pages:247-268
In contemporary analytic philosophy, more and more attention is shifted towards the relation between subject and body. The phenomenon of bodily awareness — the subject feels the warmth of a cup of tea, knows the position of his body without looking, etc. — shows, it is said, that the subject is essentially a bodily subject. Hence, the Cartesian position is deemed untenable, and an identification of the subject with the body is put forward to make sense of bodily awareness. Remarkably, the work of Edmund Husserl is entirely absent in this discussion in analytic philosophy, though he has investigated the relation between subject and body in a particularly meticulous and penetrating way. On the one hand, Husserl pays special attention to the way our body shows itself to us, i.e. as a living body: the subject is an essentially embodied subject. But on the other hand Husserl does not want to go as far as to simply identify subject an body: one may not loose sight of what separates subject and body, what stands in the way of a plain and simple identification. We follow Husserl's analyses of the relation between subject and body while constantly referring to the analytic discussion of the same topic, thus showing a middle course between Cartesianism and the currently en vogue identification theory.