Title: Topological social choice
Authors: Lauwers, Luc
Issue Date: 1999
Publisher: K.U.Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Applied Economics : Department of Economics
Series Title: CES - Discussion Paper Series (DPS) 99.12 pages:1-39
Abstract: The topological approach to social choice was developed by Graciela Chichilnisky in the beginning of the eighties. The main result in this area (known as the resolution of the topological social choice paradox) shows that a space of preferences admits of a continuous, anonymous, and unanimous aggregation rule for every number of individuals if and only if this space is contractible. Furthermore, connections between the Pareto principle, dictatorship, and manipulation were established. Recently, Baryshnikov used the topological approach to demonstrate that Arrow's impossibility theorem can be reformulated in terms of the non-contractibility of spheres. This paper discusses these results in a self-contained way, emphasizes the social choice interpretation of some topological concepts, and surveys the area of topological aggregation.
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IR
Appears in Collections:Research Center of Econometrics, Leuven

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