Title: Nash rationalization of collective choice over lotteries
Authors: Demuynck, Thomas ×
Lauwers, Luc #
Issue Date: 2009
Publisher: North-Holland
Series Title: Mathematical Social Sciences vol:57 issue:1 pages:1-15
Abstract: To test the joint hypothesis that players in a noncooperative game(allowing mixtures over pure strategies) consult an independent preference relation and select a Nash equilibrium, it suffices to study the reaction of the revealed collective choice upon changes in the space of strategies available to the players. The joint hypothesis is supported if the revealed choices satisfy an extended version of Richter's congruence axiom together with a contraction_expansion axiom that models the noncooperative behavior. In addition, we provide sufficient and necessary conditions for a binary relation to have an independent ordering extension, and for individual choices over lotteries to be rationalizable by an independent preference relation.
ISSN: 0165-4896
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Research Center of Econometrics, Leuven
Faculty of Business and Economics, Campus Kulak Kortrijk – miscellaneous
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

Files in This Item:
File Description Status SizeFormat
Nash rationalization of collective choice over lotteries - LL.pdf Published 752KbAdobe PDFView/Open Request a copy

These files are only available to some KU Leuven Association staff members


All items in Lirias are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

© Web of science