Title: Capital-Intensive projects induce more effort than labor-intensive projects
Authors: Glazer, Amihai
Proost, Stef
Issue Date: Dec-2008
Publisher: K.U.Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Applied Economics : Department of Economics
Series Title: CES - Discussion paper series (DPS) 08.31 pages:1-12
Abstract: Central governments often subsidize capital spending by local governments, instead of subsidizing operating expenses or labor-intensive projects. This paper offers one explanation, focusing on the incentive effects for local officials. a local official can more easily shift the cost of optimizing a project to his successor on a labor-intensive project than on a capital-intensive project.
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IR
Appears in Collections:Research Center of Energy, Transport and Environment, Leuven

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